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
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OF THE

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FOR THE

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
VOLUME IX.

REPORT OF THE LIEUTENANT-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY
AND DEPARTMENT COMMANDERS.

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*J. C. Cocks,
Cambridge.*



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ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, September 23, 1902.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith the annual reports of the following officers:

Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, commanding Department of the East.
Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, commanding Department of the Lakes.
Maj. Gen. Robert P. Hughes, commanding Department of California.
Maj. Gen. John C. Bates, commanding Department of the Missouri.
Brig. Gen. George M. Randall, commanding Department of the Columbia.
Brig. Gen. William A. Kobbé, commanding Department of Dakota.
Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, commanding Department of Colorado.
Col. William C. Forbush, Twelfth Cavalry, commanding Department of Texas.
And also the report of the Chief of Artillery.

The reports of the division commander of the Philippines, the Adjutant-General of the Army, the Inspector-General of the Army, and the commandants of the schools of instruction have not yet been received.

During the past year there have been no serious engagements, except that of the troops under Gen. Frank D. Baldwin, in Mindanao, P. I., with the Moros. For the number of men engaged this was a very spirited and desperate engagement. Our forces were commanded by one of the most experienced and efficient officers of the Army, whose record has always been of the highest order, and his achievement, together with that of the troops, in this engagement, made another chapter of fortitude, tenacity, and heroic sacrifice in the history of American arms.

In the first paragraph of his report, Major-General Brooke alludes to a subject that has been referred to in several communications, and one which, in my opinion, requires attention and readjustment, namely, the geographical limits of the departments. It will be observed that the Department of the East embraces not only the troops on the entire Atlantic coast and part of the Gulf coast, but also a large number stationed in the interior, as well as those located in Cuba and Porto Rico,

while two other departments include principally only the troops located in single States. It must be apparent that this is out of proper proportion and not adapted to the best administration of military affairs.

I concur in the recommendations contained in the reports of Major-Generals Brooke and MacArthur, and invite especial attention to the report of Major-General Hughes, wherein he refers to the condition of Fort Rosecrans, Cal., in the following language:

An entire post for two companies of coast artillery, and the usual buildings for the noncommissioned staff, administration, etc., are required. The batteries located there are in condition for service, and shelter for troops is greatly needed.

Also to his report on the condition of Bonita Point, Cal. (Lime Point Reservation), as to which he uses the following language:

At this place the work of the engineers is approaching completion, and nothing has been done as yet looking to the housing of a garrison. The setting up of the mounts of the high-power guns is going on, and the auxiliary batteries are approaching completion, and it is very desirable that provisions be made for an artillery command in the vicinity to secure proper care and attention for this expensive material.

This subject is especially deserving of early consideration, as the local conditions would render life under canvas on the storm-swept point very objectionable.

These remarks of the department commander simply illustrate the urgent and imperative necessity of having buildings properly constructed to shelter the garrisons when the engineers have completed the fortifications and the Ordnance Department has supplied the guns for these expensive coast defenses.

The same condition exists in the Department of the Columbia, where three companies of artillery are now in tents and some of the officers living in huts not suitable to shelter public animals. Of course, this is discouraging to the troops, injurious to the health of the garrisons, and no doubt is the cause of some desertions; and I would call attention to the fact that hundreds of thousands of dollars are being used, especially for cavalry, while a very small amount is being used to afford shelter to the artillery exposed to the severe climates along the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts. These troops are required to be located adjacent to the fortifications, notwithstanding the exposed position of many of them, and I see no reason why buildings should not be properly constructed in time to be occupied, when it is known for years exactly where and when they will be required.

I believe it would be advisable to divide the appropriations made by Congress for military buildings and grounds and for transportation between the geographical departments in proportion to the number of troops in each, the same to be used to construct and keep in order the necessary public buildings under the excellent system that formerly prevailed.

I also call attention to the incomplete condition of the fortifications, especially on the Pacific coast, where millions have been expended in

engineering and ordnance work, and yet the commands have not been properly supplied with ammunition, electrical plants, and other appliances essential to the effective use of these fortifications in actual warfare.

The senior officers of the Army composing the board convened by order of the Secretary of War to report upon the retention, location, or abandonment of certain military posts in the United States, gave the subject great care, according to their best judgment and long experience. They took into consideration the strategic advantages of the stations that they recommended retained, and of the additional ones that they recommended to be established, and I recommend that their report be adhered to in the disposition of the different arms of the service.

The withdrawal of the troops from Cuba, the reduction of the garrison in Porto Rico to the minimum, and the reduction by at least one-half in the number of troops serving in the Philippine Islands, render it necessary to provide additional accommodations for the shelter of troops that are required to be stationed within the United States, and the appropriation for the next year should be largely increased.

The condition of the Indians is quite satisfactory, and there has been no disturbance of importance among them during the last twelve months. This is accounted for principally by three reasons: First, just and humane treatment of the Indians and the judicious management of their affairs; second, their gradual transition from a condition of barbarism to that of a semi-civilized people; and third, the close proximity of the military garrisons, which are always available in case of threatened disturbance.

The experience during the great civil war, and years of campaigning along our Western frontier, afforded the best schools of practice for our Army in former years. The attention given to calisthenics and gymnastic and military exercises made our small Army a corps of athletes, while the elementary schools established for enlisted men, the post libraries, the post lyceums and officers' schools, the various schools of instruction and practice for officers, as well as the Military Academy, produced an army of such excellence that I was able in my annual report for 1896 to state:

The personnel of the Army was never in better condition.

This was proven to be true by the fortitude, skill, and heroism displayed in every serious campaign on every field of mortal combat wherever the Army has been engaged in any part of the world during the last four years. During that time many changes have occurred, and the Army has been very largely increased. The long and varied service of the senior officers, their experience in organizing, disciplining, instructing, and leading their commands, as well as the excellent

discipline, instruction, and exemplary conduct of the soldiers of the army of '98, have been the leaven of the Army of the present time. Evils may creep into any system or great organization. Such as have affected our Army have been or will be eradicated.

The Army has maintained its character for more than a hundred years with great credit to itself and honor to the nation; and the same rules of rigid integrity, of honor, impartial and exact justice to all, and proper recognition of faithful, valuable, and distinguished services that have prevailed in the past are the only ones by which it can be sustained in the future.

As our Government is different in character from any of the great powers of the world, our Army must necessarily be unlike in some respects other great armies.

It has been my endeavor, in general orders and in other ways, to impress upon all that their devotion to the principles of our Government was of the first and highest importance.

Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,
Lieutenant-General.

THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF ARTILLERY.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,
Washington, September 19, 1902.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters of the Army.

SIR: In compliance with the provisions of General Orders, No. 50, Adjutant-General's Office, series of 1901, I have the honor to submit the following report:

Since the rendition of the last report all the energies of the Artillery Corps have been devoted to the assimilation and instruction of the large number of recently appointed officers and newly enlisted men. The total number of lieutenants appointed to the Artillery Corps since February 2, 1901, is 297.

In view of existing conditions, it has been considered indispensable that all officers of rank and experience should remain with their organizations and commands, and it has therefore been necessary to greatly curtail leaves of absence to which these officers would otherwise have been entitled.

The organization of the seacoast into artillery districts has, as a rule, worked well, and it is thought that much more progress in artillery efficiency has been made under this system than would have been possible under the old regimental plan. With a view to further increasing efficiency, General Orders, No. 97, Adjutant-General's Office, current series, was issued. This order provides that target practice shall take place three times a year, in different quarters, and under the general supervision of the district commander, who is required to be present and to correct all defects, the time of holding practice not to be communicated to any post commander more than one day prior to its commencement. It is believed that great benefit will be derived therefrom, as it will require post and district commanders to be ready at all times for action.

Such progress in the equipment of the present system of fire control and direction as was hoped for has not been made, the failure to do so being largely due to unforeseen and uncontrollable conditions. Two districts, Narragansett and New London, have been completely equipped, and the installation at Fort Barrancas is rapidly nearing completion. At the latter place an entirely new system of position finding is being established, and it is thought that the result of the experiments may warrant its adoption for low sites. It was devised by a board of officers convened at Fort Wadsworth, and the methods outlined by them are now being installed under an allotment from the Board of Ordnance and Fortification. It is hoped that a test of the merits of the system will be had some time during the month of October of this year.

Attention is again invited to the insufficient allowance for target practice for seacoast companies, as is set forth in General Orders, No. 62, Adjutant-General's Office, current series, which is 6 service and 10 practice rounds for each 12, 10, and 8 inch B. L. rifle, and 10 service rounds for each 6, 5, 4.7, and 4 inch R. F. gun. It is earnestly recommended that all practice be with full service charges and subcaliber, and it is believed that the wisdom of this policy has been fully shown by the experimental firing both during the recent maneuvers and in the tests of disappearing gun carriages as conducted by the board of officers convened by Special Orders, No. 166, Adjutant-General's Office, current series. So far as is known, no subcaliber practice has been held during the current year.

The Artillery School, which was reorganized in July, 1901, has been conducted in a satisfactory manner, and the class of student officers has recently been increased to include 30. As this number can not be comfortably quartered at Fort Monroe, it is recommended that steps be taken to increase the capacity of officers' quarters before the next class reports. If possible, the number of student officers should be further increased to 50, but this is impracticable until adequate quarters are provided.

The School of Submarine Defense, Fort Totten, N. Y., was established under the provisions of General Orders, No. 145, Adjutant-General's Office, series of 1901, and on February 2, 1902, a small class, consisting of 2 captains and 4 lieutenants, was ordered to report to the commandant of the School of Submarine Defense to undergo a course of instruction. It is the intention to send a class of 10 student officers there to report on the 15th of October. The remarks with regard to the number of officers' quarters at Fort Monroe are equally applicable to Fort Totten. In order to maintain a class of 10 student officers, it will be necessary to quarter some at Fort Slocum and at Fort Schuyler, which, while undesirable, is nevertheless made necessary in order that in the shortest possible time skilled and instructed officers may be able to take charge of the torpedo and submarine-mine system at each of the more important posts. It is earnestly recommended that before the close of another fiscal year an increase in the number of officers' quarters be made for this post. Excellent work in planting mines was done at Gardiners Point during the combined maneuvers by the Fifty-fourth Company, Coast Artillery (Landers'), under direction of Major Murray, commandant of the School of Submarine Defense at Fort Totten, N. Y.

Attention is invited to the necessity of increasing the pay and the number of electrician-sergeants. The act of Congress approved February 2, 1901, provides one electrician-sergeant for each artillery post having electrical appliances. Experience has shown that each post garrisoned by coast artillery requires at least one electrician-sergeant, and in case of the larger posts two or more; but under the present law, quoted above, only one can be so assigned. At many artillery posts there are numerous electrical appliances, each requiring intelligent supervision, and it is difficult to find enlisted men capable of properly caring for the delicate and complicated mechanism connected therewith or possessing the requisite qualifications for appointment as electrician-sergeants. It is believed that a material increase should be made in their pay, in order that young men from civil life who have had technical training in electricity may be induced to take these posi-

tions. As continuous service day and night is necessary, the present number is insufficient for this duty with due regard for the proper amount of rest.

During the recent maneuvers between the Army and Navy it was found necessary to assign temporarily to the following-named posts the number of electrician-sergeants indicated:

Fort H. G. Wright	3	Fort Greble	2
Fort Mansfield	2	Fort Wetherill	1
Fort Michie	5	Fort Adams	2
Fort Terry	4	Fort Rodman	1

The law only provides one for each of the above-mentioned posts. These extra men were obtained by withdrawing them from other garrisons where their services were needed.

The pay of a first-class sergeant of the Signal Corps, whose duties are certainly no more important than those of electrician-sergeants, is \$45 per month, while that of the latter is but \$34. In addition, it may be urged that capable young men in civil life are reluctant to bind themselves for three years, and additional advantages are necessary to induce them to enter the service, as well as to retain those who are already in it.

It is therefore recommended that Congress be requested to allow 125 electrician-sergeants with the pay and allowances of first-class sergeants of the Signal Corps.

The recent maneuvers have clearly shown the necessity for thoroughly trained and reliable men at the more important positions, namely, at the fire and battery commanders' stations. These observers must not only be intelligent men, but they must be ready and alert at all times, for upon them a large portion of the strain will fall in case of actual hostilities. Upon the efficient performance of their duties largely depends the result of the action, as with the number of commissioned officers provided by law for each company of coast artillery it would be impossible for them to perform the duties of observers at the different position-finding stations. It is therefore recommended that Congress be requested to allow five gunnery specialists for each company of coast artillery, who, upon being qualified for such classification, shall receive an extra allowance of \$5 per month. The total cost of this provision would be \$37,800. The benefit derived would be incalculable, and trained enlisted men would have an incentive to remain in the Artillery Corps. It has been found that under present conditions, upon expiration of their enlistment, the temptation is to transfer to some other branch where the duties are less exacting and the service more congenial.

With reference to the inspections required in paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 50, Adjutant-General's Office, series of 1901, the necessity for the constant presence of the Chief of Artillery in Washington during the completion of the organization of the corps has rendered it impossible for him to make all the inspections required. It is believed that much benefit would be derived from more frequent inspections, and it is therefore recommended that this duty be performed under instructions from the Chief of Artillery by two artillery officers of suitable rank, to be detailed for that purpose. This in no way interferes with those devolving upon the Inspector-General's Department, relating, as they will, exclusively to artillery efficiency, and with a view to

rendering to the Secretary of War, through the Lieutenant-General, reports showing the condition of each coast-defense fortification—whether it is in all respects ready for service in case of attack, and if not, how it is defective. To require the Chief of Artillery to make these inspections in person would necessitate traveling for a period of about four months.

Congress during its last session appropriated \$17,000 for the purchase of submarine-mining material and for the continuation of torpedo experiments. The returns for this submarine property are now rendered to the Chief of Engineers. This system worked well so long as the Chief of Engineers retained control of the appropriation for the purchase of such submarine material as was necessary, but at present an anomalous condition exists, the returns being rendered to the Chief of Engineers and requisitions being made to him for new supplies, of the necessity for which he can in no way be cognizant and for the purchase of which he has no funds. As the Chief of Artillery has been directed to make estimates for the purchase of such submarine-mining material as may be necessary, it is recommended that all returns of such property be made to him, and that the appropriation be disbursed by an artillery officer at the school of submarine defense under his direction.

The combined maneuvers of the Army and Navy were replete with interest, and the information gained will result in incalculable benefit to the service. Much of the installation of range and position finders, instruments for the transmission of ballistic and other data, and search-lights was accomplished in a very limited period, involving an immense amount of labor upon the part of the Engineer and Ordnance departments and the Signal Corps, and the success of the operations was largely due to their earnest and hearty cooperation. It is recommended that if practicable similar combined maneuvers take place annually.

The subschool of field artillery at Fort Riley, Kans., consists of four batteries of field artillery. A fifth battery will also be stationed there as soon as barracks, quarters, and stables can be provided. Two batteries of field artillery are stationed at the general service and staff college at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., the number to be increased to three when another battery can be provided for.

At present in the equipment of an artillery post the Engineer Department furnishes the source of power for ammunition hoists, lighting emplacements, F. C. and B. C. stations, and for telautographs; the Ordnance Department, electric motors for the manipulation of the gun carriages; the Signal Corps, the various electrical devices for transmitting technical and ballistic information between the range and position finders and the guns, and the Quartermaster's Department runs the plants for post illumination. This divided responsibility results in much confusion, and frequently plants are installed which have not sufficient power to meet all the demands upon them—a condition arising from the fact that the department which makes the installation is not always fully informed as to what calls will be made upon it. It is recommended, in the interests of good administration and economy, that all the electrical installation at artillery posts be combined under one head.

At many posts garrisoned by companies of coast artillery and batteries of field artillery the troops are either occupying temporary quarters or are in camp, thus entailing much hardship on both officers

and men. As the permanent stations for these organizations are now definitely known and have been announced in orders, it is recommended that Congress be asked to appropriate the necessary funds to commence the construction of barracks, quarters, and stables.

It is recommended that officers of artillery promoted to fill original vacancies created or caused in the artillery branch of the Army by the act approved February 2, 1901, take rank from that date in the same manner as officers of cavalry or infantry promoted to fill original vacancies of that date created or caused in their respective branches by that act.

It is recommended that the pay of Mr. John G. Urquhart, who has been performing the onerous duties of chief clerk in the office of the Chief of Artillery since its establishment, be increased to \$1,600 per annum.

Very respectfully,

WALLACE F. RANDOLPH,
Chief of Artillery.

REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT P. HUGHES, U. S. ARMY, COMMAND- ING THE DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL,
San Francisco, Cal., August 19, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: Pursuant to requirements of existing orders, the following report of military affairs of the Department of California for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1902, is hereby submitted:

The department was commanded by Maj. Gen. S. B. M. Young until March 15, 1902, at which date he relinquished command in accordance with General Orders, No. 60, current series, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office.

The undersigned assumed command of the Department April 5, 1902, pursuant to instructions published in General Orders, No. 62, current series, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office.

On assuming command, the department staff was found to be as follows: Adjutant-general, Col. J. B. Babcock, Adjutant-General's Department; inspector-general, Lieut. Col. John L. Chamberlain, Inspector-General's Department; judge-advocate, Maj. John A. Hull, Judge-Advocate's Department; chief quartermaster, Lieut. Col. D. D. Wheeler, Deputy Quartermaster-General; chief commissary, Capt. George W. Ruthers, Subsistence Department; chief surgeon, Col. Robert M. O'Reilly, Assistant Surgeon-General; attending surgeon and also medical superintendent, army transport service, Maj. Ogden Rafferty, surgeon; sanitary inspector, Maj. James D. Glennan, surgeon; chief paymaster, Col. Frank M. Coxe, Assistant Paymaster-General; engineer officer, Lieut. Col. David P. Heap, Corps of Engineers; ordnance officer, Lieut. Col. John R. McGinness, Ordnance Department; artillery inspector, Maj. Wm. E. Birkhimer, Artillery Corps.

Attached staff: Capt. Benjamin C. Morse, Seventeenth Infantry, assistant to adjutant-general, and temporarily in charge of the office of the signal officer.

The only changes that occurred in the department staff between the date of my assuming command and June 30, 1902, were the relief of Major Glennan, surgeon, sanitary inspector, Maj. Richard W. John-

son, surgeon, being assigned in his stead. Lieut. Col. James Allen, Signal Corps, assumed the duties of signal officer of the department June 9, 1902.

TROOPS OF THE DEPARTMENT.

The headquarters, staff, band, and Troops E, F, H, I, K, L, and M, Fifteenth Cavalry, which were in the department at date of last annual report, were transferred to the Division of the Philippines. The First Battalion of the Eighteenth Infantry, which formed part of the command June 30, 1901, was transferred to the Department of Texas.

The following organizations have continued in the department during the year:

Artillery Corps.—Third Band, Artillery Corps; First Battery, Field Artillery; Fifth Battery Field Artillery; Eighteenth Battery, Field Artillery; Twenty-eighth Company, Coast Artillery; Twenty-ninth Company, Coast Artillery; Thirtieth Company, Coast Artillery; Sixty-sixth Company Coast Artillery; Sixty-seventh Company, Coast Artillery; Ninety-second Company, Coast Artillery; One hundred and fifth Company, Coast Artillery.

The following troops were assigned and reported for service in the department during the year: Arrived October 28, 1901, from the Division of the Philippines—Sixtieth Company, Coast Artillery; Sixty-first Company, Coast Artillery; Sixty-second Company, Coast Artillery; Sixty-third Company, Coast Artillery; Sixty-fourth Company, Coast Artillery; Sixty-fifth Company, Coast Artillery; Sixty-eighth Company, Coast Artillery; Seventieth Company, Coast Artillery; Seventy-first Company, Coast Artillery.

Headquarters Second Squadron and Troops E and F, Third Cavalry, arrived from the Philippine Islands, May 23, 1902, and were assigned for station to the Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.

Headquarters, band, and Companies F and L, Seventh Infantry, arrived from the Department of the Columbia, May 8, 1902, and took station at the presidio of San Francisco, Cal. Company G, Seventh Infantry, arrived from Alaska, June 7, 1902, and took station at the presidio of San Francisco, Cal.

The Nineteenth Infantry arrived from the Philippine Islands June 21, 1902, and was assigned to duty with the depot of recruit instruction (about to be organized) at the presidio of San Francisco, Cal.

Organized in the department during the year: Twenty-fourth Battery, Field Artillery, at the presidio, September 26, 1901.

One hundred and fifteenth Company, Coast Artillery, at San Diego Barracks, August 14, 1901.

The department troops on the 30th day of June, 1902, were distributed as follows: Alcatraz Island—Sixty-third Company, Coast Artillery; Sixty-fourth Company, Coast Artillery; Seventy-first Company, Coast Artillery. Fort Baker—Sixty-first Company, Coast Artillery; Sixty-eighth Company, Coast Artillery. Fort Mason—Sixty-second Company, Coast Artillery. Fort McDowell—Sixty-fifth Company, Coast Artillery. Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.—Headquarters Artillery District of San Francisco; Third Band, Artillery Corps; First, Fifth, Eighteenth, and Twenty-fourth Batteries, Field Artillery; Twenty-eighth, Twenty-ninth, Sixtieth, Seventieth, Ninety-second, and One hundred and fifth Companies, Coast Artillery; Headquarters Second Squadron and two troops, Third Cavalry (temporary

duty in the national parks); headquarters, band, and Companies F, G, and L, Seventh Infantry, Nineteenth Regiment of Infantry. San Diego Barracks, Cal.—Headquarters Artillery District of San Diego; Thirtieth and One hundred and fifteenth Companies of Coast Artillery. Camp McKinley, Hawaii—Headquarters Artillery District of Honolulu; Sixty-sixth and Sixty-seventh Companies, Coast Artillery.

In addition to the foregoing troops regularly assigned to the department, there has been a kaleidoscopic condition existing throughout the year in and about San Francisco in the expatriating and repatriating of troops pertaining to the Division of the Philippines, and in the distribution of recruits and casuals.

Various organizations and establishments have been set up and put in operation for the protection of the health and welfare of commands not pertaining to the regular departmental organizations.

A commodious and well equipped hospital was maintained at the presidio of San Francisco, Cal., under the able and careful management of Lieut. Col. A. C. Girard, deputy surgeon-general, into which the sick from the Division of the Philippines were welcomed. The records show that this establishment had 139 patients July 1, 1901, and received during the fiscal year 4,551 patients, and that there are now present 402 patients. The average number of patients in the hospital at any one time was 480. It was not considered advisable to return patients to the Philippines directly, but upon being found qualified to do duty the medical authorities considered it wise to discharge the sick belonging to the Division of the Philippines into some organization here, and so keep them under observation for at least three months prior to definitely deciding upon their fitness for returning to a tropical climate. In order to carry this idea into effect, companies of convalescents were organized at the presidio of San Francisco, Cal., which were afterwards transferred to Angel Island and Benicia Barracks, Cal.

Convalescent Company, No. 1, at the Discharge Camp, Angel Island, California, on June 30, 1902, numbered 67.

Convalescent Company, No. 2, at Benicia Barracks, Cal., on June 30, 1902, numbered 74.

In order to make room for incoming patients from the Philippines and to prevent the possibility of overcrowding the general hospital at the Presidio, it became necessary to obtain authority to send to other departments convalescents from this hospital who, in the opinion of the medical authorities, were not as yet fit for life under canvas, as was the convalescent company to which they would have been sent ordinarily. The necessary authority having been obtained, 108 convalescent patients of the class above named were sent in two detachments to Fort Logan, Colo.

The demand for better instruction of the men enlisted for the Hospital Corps led to the organization of a school for the instruction of these men at Fort McDowell. The records show that 823 men have been sent to this school during the year and that 752 have been transferred for duty at stations or in the field, 342 of the number going to the Philippines.

A school for instruction of Signal Corps men has been maintained at Fort McDowell, Cal. One hundred and forty-nine men have been instructed in telegraphy and signaling. Of these 126 were sent to the Division of the Philippines and 23 to the Department of Alaska.

DISCHARGE CAMP.

It was found that the large number of enlisted men being transferred from the Division of the Philippines was the cause of much annoyance through unfair dealings of small traders and agents from the city of San Francisco, and that disturbances were of too frequent occurrence. For this reason it was decided to establish a camp for this class of arrivals from which all business men and agents would be excluded. Such a camp, known as the Discharge Camp, was established on the east shore of Angel Island. This camp was established November 1, 1901.

A general railway ticket office and an office of Wells, Fargo Express Company are located in the camp, in order that the men on discharge can secure tickets in the camp direct to their homes and money orders payable only to themselves for such money as they may wish to secure in that way. The number of men paid at this camp up to June 30, 1902, was 10,840.

Amount expended for transportation, \$466,547.93.

Amount in purchase of money orders, \$1,793,866.10.

Approximate total paid to discharged men, \$3,356,000.

RECRUIT CAMP.

A recruit camp has been maintained at the Presidio of San Francisco, Cal., during the year, to which recruits were sent from the Western States of the Republic.

	Number.
Recruits on hand June 30, 1901.....	187
Recruits joined during—	
July, 1901.....	296
August, 1901.....	423
September, 1901.....	214
October, 1901.....	172
November, 1901.....	1,288
December, 1901.....	2,086
January, 1902.....	1,490
February, 1902.....	2,422
March, 1902.....	822
April, 1902.....	425
May, 1902.....	314
June, 1902.....	277
Total.....	10,416
Assigned to various organizations during the year.....	8,977
Discharged for disability during the year.....	89
Discharged for other causes during the year.....	63
Died during the year.....	14
Deserted during the year.....	533
Total loss during the year.....	9,676
Remaining in camp June 30, 1902.....	740

The loss in this camp by death is above the normal, but such a condition may be attributed to the fact that the great mass of recruits are young, away from former social influences, and are somewhat reckless. The losses by discharge are too numerous and it is expected that with the reduced activity in recruiting, greater pains will be exercised in the examination of applicants, and the probationary period will be enforced.

Efforts are being made to secure better shelter for recruits coming to this depot, and to secure a more regular and effective system of instruction.

MILITARY PRISON.

This establishment began the fiscal year with 333 prisoners. The following table gives the gains and losses during the fiscal year by months:

	Gains.	Loss.	On hand.
July, 1901:			
On hand first day of month			333
Received from various sources	141		
Released by expiration of sentence		24	
Released by order		27	
By transfer		26	
Escaped		2	
Total	141	-79	+62
August, 1901:			
Received from various sources	48		
Released by expiration of sentence		28	
Released by order		35	
By transfer		9	
By death		1	
Total	48	-73	-25
September, 1901:			
Received from various sources	31		
Released by expiration of sentence		19	
Released by order		23	
By transfer		1	
Total	31	-43	-12
October, 1901:			
Received from various sources	42		
Released by expiration of sentence		23	
Released by order		16	
Escaped		5	
Total	42	-44	-2
November, 1901:			
Received from various sources	12		
Released by expiration of sentence		11	
Released by order		24	
By transfer		1	
Escaped		6	
Total	12	-42	-30
December, 1901:			
Received from various sources	117		
Released by expiration of sentence		24	
Released by order		21	
By transfer		8	
Escaped		1	
Died		2	
Total	117	-56	+61
January, 1902:			
Received from various sources	54		
Recaptured	1		
Released by expiration of sentence		17	
Released by order		13	
Escaped		8	
Total	55	-33	+22
February, 1902:			
Received from various sources	72		
Recaptured	1		
Released by expiration of sentence		12	
Released by order		15	
By transfer		6	
Total	73	-33	+40
March, 1902:			
Received from various sources	46		
Released by expiration of sentence		21	
Released by order		10	
Total	46	-31	+15

	Gains.	Loss.	On hand.
April, 1902:			
Received from various sources	24		
Released by expiration of sentence		21	
Released by order		17	
By transfer		1	
Total	24	-39	-15
May, 1902:			
Received from various sources	38		
Released by expiration of sentence		23	
Released by order		28	
Total	38	-51	-13
June, 1902:			
Received from various sources	71		
Released by expiration of sentence		28	
Released by order		48	
Escaped		2	
Total	71	-78	-7
Grand total on hand June 30, 1902			429

RECAPITULATION.

On hand June 30, 1901	388		
Received from various sources	696		
Recaptured	2		
Released by expiration of sentence		251	
Released by order		277	
By transfer		62	
Escaped		19	
Died		8	
Total	1,081	-602	429

As will be seen by the foregoing, the number of prisoners has increased during the year; 454 were sent from the Division of the Philippines, 38 were from the Department of Colorado, 60 were received from the Department of the Columbia, and 140 were from the Department of California.

The great majority of the last named are from the depot of recruits. Of the total received 163 were convicted of desertion.

It is believed that the prisons of the Division of the Philippines have been emptier, and it is hoped that the military prison here may soon drop down to a better showing.

There are several depots of supplies in the department:

First. Quartermaster's depot, San Francisco, Cal.

Second. Commissary depot, San Francisco, Cal.

Third. Medical supply depot, San Francisco, Cal.

Fourth. Quartermaster's depot, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Fifth. Commissary depot, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Sixth. Medical supply depot, Honolulu, Hawaii.

The depots in San Francisco find full employment in supplying the troops of this department and those in the Division of the Philippines. The work done during the year has been exceedingly satisfactory. The depots at Honolulu, Hawaii, are equipped and supplied in readiness to give prompt succor and relief to troops on transports entering that harbor in need. The supplies are limited to such quantities as will secure relief to troops and crews of transports until further aid can be procured from San Francisco, if it is found necessary to do so.

INSTRUCTION.

Three batteries of field artillery and the Twenty-eighth, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, Sixty-sixth, Sixty-seventh, Ninety-second, and One hundred and fifth companies, coast artillery, are the only organizations that have been in the department during the entire year. The coast artillery stationed at the Presidio of San Francisco, Cal., have received careful instruction and the system of artillery fire command having been established at that station, the heavy gun-practice firing was held there during the month of April. This practice pertained to the fiscal year 1901. It is proposed to hold the artillery target practice at the Presidio and Lime Point garrisons for the fiscal year 1902 in the coming October. Much interest has been shown in this instruction.

The batteries of field artillery have had no target practice yet, but a suitable site has been found and this experience is to be had at some later date.

The two cavalry troops assigned to the department landed from Manila, May 23, 1902, and were promptly mounted and sent to the Yosemite and Sequoia parks for ranger duty.

The infantry troops of the department which have lately arrived from Alaska and Manila and encamped on the Presidio reservation at the depot of recruit instruction, have been utilized for the purpose of caring for and instructing recruits before sending them out to regiments.

There is some difficulty found in carrying out the most vital point of the infantryman's instructions, viz, rifle practice. Prior to my arrival in the department firing on the range, which has been in use since 1898, had been stopped, on account of the objections of the owners of the land behind the targets. The ball stop was on foreign territory and not of sufficient height to stop all the balls, and the owners of the land on which overshots fell very naturally objected.

Efforts have been made and are still being made to find a suitable site for service-range firing and in the meantime an effort is being made to provide a range for short-distance firing on the Presidio reservation over which the recruits may be taught to use the rifle properly and given all the theoretical instruction, so that a little practice at service ranges will qualify them for actual service.

INSPECTIONS.

All the commands, posts, disbursing officers' accounts, depots, military departments of colleges, the general hospital, Presidio of San Francisco, the military prison at Alcatraz Island, and the recruiting stations within the department and the national cemetery at Presidio of San Francisco, Cal., and all outgoing transports have been duly inspected.

The inspector recommends that the certified signature of a discharged soldier should appear upon his discharge certificate as a means of identification; that special provisions should be made for enlisting bakers, for as matters now stand he finds "in many garrisons it is impossible to find competent bakers;" that "time books" should be systematically kept by all disbursing officers employing laborers, etc. There is obvious merit in these recommendations.

JUDGE-ADVOCATE'S DEPARTMENT.

The records of the office show the following number of trials during the year:

Enlisted men tried by general court-martial:	
Of whom were acquitted	28
Sentences disapproved	7
Convictions	261
Total	294

The bulk of the trials fell under the following headings:

Absent without leave	81
Desertion	70
Fraudulent enlistment	44
Larceny	28

The total number of desertions from the various commands in the department numbered 826.

They deserted from the following organizations:

Casual detachment of recruits	487
Casual detachment, Fort Baker, Cal	1
Fifteenth Cavalry	66
First Battery, Field Artillery	13
Fifth Battery, Field Artillery	34
Eighteenth Battery, Field Artillery	40
Twenty-fourth Battery, Field Artillery	8
Twenty-eighth Company, Coast Artillery	20
Twenty-ninth Company, Coast Artillery	37
Sixtieth Company, Coast Artillery	9
Sixty-first Company, Coast Artillery	1
Sixty-sixth Company, Coast Artillery	14
Sixty-seventh Company, Coast Artillery	9
Sixty-eighth Company, Coast Artillery	2
Seventieth Company, Coast Artillery	7
Ninety-second Company, Coast Artillery	27
One hundred and fifth Company, Coast Artillery	16
Third Regiment of Infantry	13
Seventh Regiment of Infantry	8
Eighteenth Regiment of Infantry	14
Total	826

The foregoing figures are not pleasant to dwell upon. Of course the loss in the recruit camp is not to be taken as an index of the character of the men now being recruited, as a very large percentage of desertions from that group are due to the fact that the men were guilty of some former offense which they could not conceal when they were brought in touch with men from all sections of the country who had seen previous service and who could identify offenders.

But the losses in the artillery can not be explained away in that manner. They certainly indicated a lower order of men than those enlisted prior to 1898. It would appear to be a wise policy to try and select recruits with greater care now that the number required has been so greatly reduced, and with judicious activity of recruiting officers it seems possible to raise the standard of accepted recruits by looking more carefully into their character and previous course of life.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

The data submitted by the chief surgeon of the department shows as follows:

Total loss of time by reason of sickness during the year is equivalent to,	
days per man.....	9.8
Loss by discharge on certificates of disability.....	3 per cent.
Loss by death.....	2.76 per 1,000.

There were no deaths from contagious or infectious diseases during the year. There were a few cases of variola in the command, but prompt isolation of the affected and vaccination of the command prevented the disease from spreading.

As it is quite probable that Fort McDowell will be maintained as an artillery station, it is very desirable that the present hospital at that place be replaced by a new structure, as the one now used has lived its life and should disappear.

Fort Miley is still without a hospital, but one is under construction and it is hoped that provisions will be completed for supplying this deficiency in the near future.

The school of instruction for men of the Hospital Corps now in operation at Fort McDowell is accomplishing good work, and in time it is expected that the men of this corps will improve in efficiency. We are endeavoring to improve the class of men assigned to the Hospital Corps by sending promising recruits to the school of instruction on probation, and in this way avoid transferring unsuitable men to that corps through a lack of knowledge of their fitness for the work required.

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

There has been considerable building done in the department during the year. Localities and buildings as follows:

Fort Baker: Completed—One barrack, four sets officers' quarters, three sets noncommissioned officers' quarters, hospital, quartermaster's storehouse, guardhouse, bakehouse, stable, fuel shed. Under contract—One barrack, three sets officers' quarters, administration building.

Fort Miley: Completed—One barrack, four sets officers' quarters, four sets noncommissioned officers' quarters, administration building, guardhouse, quartermaster's storehouse, ordnance storehouse, stable. Under contract—Hospital, one set quarters for hospital steward, bakehouse, fuel shed.

Presidio of San Francisco: Under construction—One barrack, three sets officers' quarters, two quartermasters' storehouses, ordnance repair shop, garbage crematory.

General Hospital, Presidio: Completed—Rebuilding of Ward F.

Alcatraz Island, California: Completed—Quartermaster's storehouse.

Fort Mason: Completed—Post hospital.

Fort McDowell, California: Completed—Hospital steward's quarters.

The following construction is necessary for the sheltering of the commands as assigned in General Orders, No. 126, series of 1901, and General Orders, No. 37, current series, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office.

Fort Miley: Barracks and quarters for officers and men of one company of coast artillery; quarters for two noncommissioned staff officers.

Fort Baker: Barracks and quarters for officers and men of one company of coast artillery; quarters for four noncommissioned staff officers.

Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.: Quarters for the officers of one squadron of cavalry.

Camp McKinley, Hawaii.—This camp was a temporary arrangement in an emergency, erected by the troops in 1898. Now that the situation is pretty definitely settled, it is very desirable that a site for the permanent post should be secured and the necessary barracks, quarters, etc., be erected for such garrison as may be determined upon.

Fort Rosecrans.—An entire post for two companies of coast artillery, and the usual buildings for the noncommissioned staff, administration, etc., are required.

The batteries located there are in condition for service, and shelter for troops greatly needed.

Bonita Point, California—Lime Point Reservation.—At this place the work of the engineers is approaching completion and nothing has been done as yet looking to the housing of a garrison. The setting up of the mounts of the high-power guns is going on and the auxiliary batteries are approaching completion, and it is very desirable that provisions be made for an artillery command in the vicinity to secure proper care and attention for this expensive material.

This subject is especially deserving of early consideration, as the local conditions would render life under canvas on the storm-swept point very objectionable.

Presidio.—For sanitary reasons it is necessary that some better shelter be provided at the Presidio for the depot of recruit instruction. As the demand on the appropriation for barracks and quarters renders it impossible to construct permanent buildings, the possibility of securing a better state of things by means of a temporary cantonment is under consideration.

Wharves.—Contracts have been let and work begun in constructing new wharves at Forts Baker and McDowell. The life of wooden piles is so short in the waters of this harbor, owing to the unusual activity of the teredo, that iron standing piles have been used in their construction, and it is believed that they will prove the cheapest in the long run.

Water supply.—The question of securing an ample supply of good water for the stations about San Francisco has been a bothersome one for some years. As the population of the city of San Francisco and suburbs increases the difficulties are likely to increase.

In May a contract was entered into with the Jewell Filter Company, of this city, to install a filtering plant near the mouth of Lobos Creek on the Presidio reservation. It is expected that, when this arrangement is accomplished, an ample supply of good water will be secured for the garrison and transient troops on that reservation.

The supply at Fort McDowell is precarious and is apt to run short. All the water for the Discharge Camp or practically all the potable water used there has to be carried over in water boats. It is the intention of the department commander to have a careful examination

of the springs of the island made during the latter part of the dry season and see if by some labor the supply of water can not be increased.

The data of the chief quartermaster's books show that the total money expended during the fiscal year under the various appropriations is as follows:

Regular supplies	\$256,682.63
Incidental expenses	85,491.26
Purchase of horses	15,486.12
Barracks and quarters	179,591.33
Transportation	320,764.90
Hospitals	11,982.75
Hospital stewards' quarters	3,526.83
Clothing and equipage	11,843.07
Military posts	119,100.86
Transportation of remains of deceased officers and soldiers	893.25
Shooting ranges	500.00
Grand total	1,005,863.00

SUBSISTENCE.

The subsistence department was in charge of Capt. George W. Ruthers, commissary, during the year, and his work was very thoroughly done. The records show that 1,853,712 rations were issued at a cost of 16 $\frac{1}{10}$ cents per ration, exclusive of 84,000 rations which were issued at Honolulu (Camp McKinley) and which cost 24 $\frac{1}{10}$ cents per ration. The loss of supplies and property by condemnation during the year has been exceedingly small, being in money value \$345 for stores and \$55.13 for property.

Post schools.—Schools for enlisted men were held at all the permanent posts in position to do so. The average daily attendance at these schools is reported as follows:

	Per cent.
Alcatraz	3.76
Fort Mason	3.70
Fort McDowell	13.84
Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.	6.12
San Diego Barracks	12.38
Camp McKinley	6.91

The average number of days of soldiers' school seems to have been seventy-five. It will be noticed that at Fort Mason and Alcatraz the daily attendance was exceedingly small, being 3^a and 7^a, respectively. Under the regulations one school-teacher is under pay all the year through. If the daily average attendance is not sufficient to justify the payment of this one school-teacher, as would seem to be the case in the two instances above mentioned, the provisions of paragraph 357, Army Regulations, should not maintain.

TRANSPORT SERVICE.

This branch of the service seems to have been run with success and safety during the year. The data of the office show that during the

^a Evidently a clerical error; should be "3.76 and 3.70, respectively."

year there have been transported on account of the military service as follows:

From San Francisco to Manila:		
Officers.....	576	
Contract surgeons.....	29	
Veterinary surgeons.....	3	
		608
Enlisted men.....	12,212	
Nurses.....	29	
		12,241
Total.....		12,849
From Manila to San Francisco:		
Officers.....		768
Enlisted men.....	25,863	
General prisoners.....	405	
		26,268
Total.....		27,036

The administrative departments have spared no pains in their efforts to make this branch of our service a success. Since my assuming command of the Department of California it certainly has run with great smoothness and regularity.

Respectfully submitted.

R. P. HUGHES,
Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. FREDERICK FUNSTON, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE COLORADO.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE COLORADO,
Denver, Colo., August 31, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the affairs and administration of the Department of the Colorado for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1902.

The following table shows the distribution of troops in the department at that date:

Stations of troops.

Posts.	Commanding officer.	Troops.
Fort Apache, Ariz.....	Capt. W. O. Clark, Twelfth Infantry.	Troops G and L, Third Cavalry; Companies E and F, Twelfth Infantry.
Fort Douglas, Utah.....	Col. J. W. Bubb, Twelfth Infantry.	Headquarters, Band, and Companies A, B, C, and D, Twelfth Infantry; Twelfth and Twenty-second Batteries Field Artillery.
Fort Duchesne, Utah.....	Capt. C. W. Abbot, jr., Twelfth Infantry.	Companies G and H, Twelfth Infantry.
Fort Grant, Ariz.....	Col. T. C. Lebo, Fourteenth Cavalry.	Headquarters, Band, and Troops I, K, L, and M, Fourteenth Cavalry.
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.....	Maj. C. M. O'Connor, Fourteenth Cavalry.	Troops B and D, Fourteenth Cavalry.
Fort Logan, Colo.....	Lieut. Col. C. L. Cooper, Fourteenth Cavalry.	Troops E and H, Fourteenth Cavalry; Companies A, B, C, D, I, K, and M, Eighteenth Infantry.
Fort Mackenzie, Wyo.....	Capt. M. M. McNamee, Fourteenth Cavalry.	Troop C, Fourteenth Cavalry.

Stations of troops—Continued.

Posts.	Commanding officer.	Troops.
Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.....	Col. J. M. J. Sanno, Eighteenth Infantry.	Troop A, Fourteenth Cavalry; Headquarters, Band, and Companies E, F, G, and H, Eighteenth Infantry; Thirteenth Battery Field Artillery.
Fort Washakie, Wyo.....	Capt. W. C. Brown, First Cavalry..	Troop E, First Cavalry.
Whipple Barracks, Ariz.....	Capt. E. E. Hatch, Eighteenth Infantry.	Company L, Eighteenth Infantry.
Fort Wingate, N. Mex.....	Maj. F. H. Hardie, Fourteenth Cavalry.	Troops F and G, Fourteenth Cavalry.

Indian scouts.—Fort Apache, 10; Fort Grant, 11; Fort Huachuca, 2; Fort Wingate, 4; total, 27.

The movements of troops within the department, or entering or leaving it during the period covered by this report, are shown in the following tabulated statement:

Changes in stations of troops during fiscal year 1901-2.

Troop or company.	Regiment or corps.	Departure.		Arrived.	
		Date.	From—	Date.	At—
G.....	Third Cavalry.		Division of the Philippines.	June 24, 1902	Fort Apache, Ariz.
H.....	do		do	do	Do.
E.....	Fifth Cavalry.	Aug. 7, 1901	Fort Grant, Ariz.	Aug. 13, 1901	Do.
E.....	do	June 24, 1902	Fort Apache, Ariz.		Division of the Philippines.
F.....	do	June 8, 1902	Fort Huachuca, Ariz.		Do.
G.....	do	June 24, 1902	Fort Apache, Ariz.		Do.
H.....	do	June 1, 1902	Fort Duchesne, Utah.		Do.
Headquarters.	Fourteenth Cavalry.		Department of the Missouri.	Sept. 16, 1901	Fort Grant, Ariz.
A.....	do		do	Feb. 10, 1902	Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.
B.....	do		do	Feb. 13, 1902	Fort Huachuca, Ariz.
C.....	do		do	Feb. 10, 1902	Fort Mackenzie, Wyo.
D.....	do		do	Feb. 13, 1902	Fort Huachuca, Ariz.
E.....	do		do	Sept. 15, 1901	Fort Logan, Colo.
F.....	do		do	Sept. 16, 1901	Fort Wingate, N. Mex.
G.....	do		do	do	Do.
H.....	do		do	Sept. 15, 1901	Fort Logan, Colo.
I.....	do		do	July 25, 1901	Fort Grant, Ariz.
K.....	do		do	do	Do.
L.....	do		do	do	Do.
M.....	do		do	do	Do.
Twelfth battery.	Field Artillery.		Division of the Philippines.	Sept. 28, 1901	Fort Douglas, Utah.
Thirteenth battery.	do		do	Sept. 29, 1901	Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.
Twenty-second battery.	do		Organized at post; G. O. 116, A. G. O., 1901.		Organization, Fort Douglas, Utah, completed Dec. 28, 1901.
G.....	Tenth Infantry.	Feb. 10, 1902	Fort Mackenzie, Wyo.		Department of the Missouri.
Headquarters.	Twelfth Infantry.		Division of the Philippines.	May 9, 1902	Fort Douglas, Utah.
A.....	do		do	do	Do.
B.....	do		do	do	Do.
C.....	do		do	do	Do.
D.....	do		do	do	Do.
E.....	do		do	May 15, 1902	Fort Apache, Ariz.
F.....	do		do	do	Do.
G.....	do		do	May 16, 1902	Fort Duchesne, Utah.
H.....	do		do	do	Do.
Headquarters.	Eighteenth Infantry.		do	Oct. 21, 1901	Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.
A.....	do		Department of Texas.	May 10, 1902	Fort Logan, Colo.
B.....	do		do	do	Do.

Changes in stations of troops during fiscal year 1901-2—Continued.

Troop or company.	Regiment or corps.	Departure.		Arrived.	
		Date.	From—	Date.	At—
C.....	Eighteenth Infantry.		Department of Texas.	May 10, 1902	Fort Logan, Colo.
D.....	do		do	do	Do.
E.....	do		do	Oct. 21, 1901	Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.
F.....	do		do	do	Do.
G.....	do		do	do	Do.
H.....	do		do	do	Do.
I.....	do		do	Oct. 27, 1901	Fort Duchesne, Utah.
I.....	do	May 3, 1902	Fort Duchesne, Utah.	May 10, 1902	Fort Logan, Colo.
K.....	do		Division of the Philippines.	Oct. 19, 1901	Fort Douglas, Utah.
K.....	do	Apr. 29, 1902	Fort Douglas, Utah.	Apr. 30, 1902	Fort Logan, Colo.
L.....	do		Division of the Philippines.	Oct. 19, 1901	Fort Douglas, Utah.
L.....	do	Apr. 26, 1902	Fort Douglas, Utah.	Apr. 29, 1902	Whipple Barracks, Ariz.
M.....	do		Division of the Philippines.	Oct. 19, 1901	Fort Douglas, Utah.
M.....	do	Apr. 29, 1902	Fort Douglas, Utah.	Apr. 30, 1902	Fort Logan, Colo.
I.....	Twenty-third Infantry.	Sept. 16, 1901	Fort Wingate, N. Mex.	Sept. 17, 1901	Do.
I.....	do	Jan. 7, 1902	Fort Logan, Colo.		Department of the East.
K.....	do	Nov. 25, 1901	Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.		Do.
L.....	do	Nov. 23, 1901	Fort Douglas, Utah.		Do.
M.....	do	Jan. 7, 1902	Fort Logan, Colo.		Do.

Changes in personnel (enlisted).

Gain:		
Enlistments.....		1,001
Reenlistments.....		281
From desertion.....		65
Loss:		
Discharged (expiration term service).....		1,411
Discharged (disability).....		82
Discharged (by order).....		164
Retired.....		8
Died.....		28
Deserted.....		265

The strength of the department, present and absent, June 30, 1901, was 37 commissioned officers and 844 enlisted men. The strength of the department, present and absent, June 30, 1902, was 167 commissioned officers and 3,019 enlisted men.

Whipple Barracks, Ariz., which was abandoned on the outbreak of the Spanish-American war in 1898, was regarrisoned on April 29, 1902, by order of the War Department, and the post has been ordered reconstructed to accommodate a battalion of infantry. It is temporarily garrisoned by one company of the Eighteenth Infantry.

All troops and supplies were withdrawn from San Carlos, Ariz., to Fort Grant, Ariz., and the buildings, except office rooms for signal corps men as telegraph operators, were turned over to the Interior Department in October and November, 1901, under letter of instructions from the Adjutant-General's Office dated October 8, 1901.

During March and April, 1902, under War Department instructions of March 5, 1902, a detachment of 107 convalescents was formed at Fort Logan, Colo., by transfers from the Presidio of San Francisco, Cal., and on June 30, 1902, only 22 of these remained at the post, the others having been either discharged on surgeon's certificate of disability, transferred to other organizations, or returned to their companies as recovered.

FIRES.

Fires have occurred at several posts in the department, destroying property as follows: At Fort Apache, Ariz., December 25, 1901, supposed incendiary, loss, 20 tons of hay; Fort Grant, Ariz., four minor fires in the fall of 1901, supposed incendiary, loss, partial destruction of troop blacksmith shop and \$49 worth of material; Fort Huachuca, Ariz., June 26, 1902, partial loss of quartermaster's corral, mechanics' shop, 1 troop stable, and quartermaster and other stores amounting to about \$1,000 in stores and \$400 in buildings.

WATER SUPPLY.

The long-standing controversy between the city of Cheyenne, Wyo., and the authorities of Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo., regarding certain water rights has reached such a stage as to render it necessary that the rights of the Government be ascertained and upheld, or the post abandoned, or the garrison greatly reduced. This matter has already been made the subject of an official report forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army. With the report was forwarded all available data bearing on the subject.

The water supply at Fort Grant, Ariz., has been a source of much trouble and annoyance for a number of years, and during the past summer it has been necessary to send the greater portion of the garrison, with live stock, to encamp in the mountains several days' march north of the post. Live stock left at the post had to be taken several miles to water, while water for domestic purposes is being hauled in wagons. Officers who have served at Fort Grant and are familiar with conditions there agree that any reservoirs that could be constructed to conserve water for that post would in a few years fill up with silt, gravel, and other débris owing to the tremendous floods and cloud-bursts that visit that region at certain seasons. In addition, the pipe line to connect the reservoirs with the post would be very expensive, as much blasting would have to be done in order to get pipe below the surface, thus avoiding freezing in winter. A system of large iron tanks to be filled during the rainy season would be probably practicable, but enormously expensive. The completion of the railroad to San Carlos Agency makes it possible to rapidly concentrate troops at the Indian agency from various other posts in New Mexico and Arizona in case the Indians show signs of hostility. In view of these facts, I desire to recommend that Fort Grant be abandoned, or the garrison reduced to one troop of cavalry, in which case wells should be sunk, and would probably supply sufficient water for a reduced garrison. The buildings at Fort Grant are all old and not in good repair.

NEW POST.

The board of officers appointed by Special Orders, No. 261, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, series 1901, recommended the construction of a post at Albuquerque, N. Mex., presumably on account of its strategic advantages, being an important railroad junction. I desire to recommend that before definite action is taken on that matter a board of officers be appointed to visit not only Albuquerque, but Las Vegas and Santa Fe, carefully looking into the question of water supply, climate, salubrity, available sites, etc. The

citizens of Las Vegas inform me that they are willing to donate twenty thousand or more acres of beautiful, rolling, well-sodded prairie land immediately adjoining the city on the east. Practically a limitless supply of water can be obtained from the Gallinas River, which has its source in the Pecos Forest Reserve.

LYCEUMS.

Lyceums at all posts in the department except Whipple Barracks, Ariz., were as far as possible conducted in accordance with the provisions of General Orders, No. 51, of 1897, War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, until superseded by officers' schools. Reports from the various post commanders show that gratifying progress was made.

OFFICERS' SCHOOLS.

General Orders, No. 155, Adjutant-General's Office, 1901, prescribing "the system of instruction" for officers, was received at these headquarters on December 7, 1901. About three weeks prior to this date (on November 16, 1901), a general order (No. 26, series 1901), had been issued from these headquarters prescribing the lyceum season and course of instruction at posts for the ensuing winter season. By the terms of General Orders, No. 155, paragraph 5, it was declared that "the instruction (in officers' schools at posts) will be regulated by special instructions issued by the War Department." Upon receipt of this order the question immediately arose whether "the officers' schools at posts" thus prescribed by General Orders, No. 155, were to supersede the post lyceum, and in reply to this inquiry the following copy of indorsement was sent to all posts:

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE COLORADO,
Denver, Colo., December 23, 1901.

Respectfully returned to the commanding officer * * * General Orders, No. 155, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, current series, does not "take the place of any former order on the subject."

The instruction prescribed in paragraph V of that order is as stated in paragraph I for "elementary instruction of officers," and this course must be taken by all lieutenants and captains of less than ten years' service and continued until they have been pronounced proficient as required in the sixth section of paragraph V of the order above referred to, and is in addition to the lyceum course prescribed in General Orders, 26, c. s., Department of the Colorado.

By order of Colonel Sanno.

The interpretation, however, did not seem to be generally understood, and the following further inquiry was received from Colonel Lebo, Fourteenth Cavalry, commanding Fort Grant:

FORT GRANT, ARIZ., January 29, 1902.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to request to be informed if the provisions of section 5, General Orders, No. 155, Adjutant-General's Office, 1901, are to be carried into effect before the issue of the "special instructions" mentioned in the first paragraph of that section, or if the paragraphs which follow the first are to be considered as the special instructions referred to.

To which the following answer was returned:

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE COLORADO,
Denver, Colo., February 8, 1902.

Respectfully returned to the commanding officer, Fort Grant, Ariz.

The major-general commanding is of the opinion that the provisions of section 5, General Orders, No. 155, Adjutant-General's Office, 1901, are not to be carried into effect until the special instructions referred to herein have been promulgated by the War Department.

By command of Major-General MacArthur.

In view of these different rulings there appears to have arisen some doubt in the minds of the post commanders, and as a result at two posts—Fort Grant and Fort Logan—no action looking to the establishment of officers' schools was taken. At all other posts the provisions of General Orders, No. 155, above referred to, were carried out, though the work has necessarily been much interfered with by the many changes of garrison. As the distribution of troops contemplated by General Orders, No. 37, current series, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, is now about completed so far as this department is concerned, there is no doubt that the work to be carried on during the ensuing year will be much more satisfactory.

TRIALS BY COURTS-MARTIAL.

During the period covered by this report one commissioned officer was tried by general court-martial and acquitted; 194 enlisted men were tried by general courts-martial for offenses classified below:

For violation of the seventeenth article of war.....	7
For violation of the twentieth article of war.....	1
For violation of the twenty-first article of war.....	8
For violation of the thirty-second article of war.....	19
For violation of the thirty-third article of war.....	9
For violation of the thirty-eighth article of war.....	8
For violation of the thirty-ninth article of war.....	9
For violation of the fortieth article of war.....	1
For violation of the forty-seventh article of war.....	62
For violation of the fiftieth article of war.....	1
For violation of the sixtieth article of war.....	8
For violation of the sixty-second article of war.....	92

Total..... 225

As compared with the preceding year the percentage of average enlisted strength tried by general courts-martial has nearly doubled.

Twenty-five men were tried for violation of more than one article of war at the same trial.

Of the 194 men tried 14 were acquitted, and 97 were dishonorably discharged from the service.

DESEPTION.

Per cent of average enlisted strength deserting:

1899-1900.....	3.20
1900-1901.....	7.50
1901-1902.....	11

It is therefore plain that there has been a deplorable increase of offenses in general and of desertion in particular. In my opinion there are two principal causes for this state of affairs; first, resentment to unaccustomed limitations and restrictions felt by men returning from field service to the monotony and routine work of garrison life; second, the abolition of the canteen feature of the post exchange. Since this action was taken saloons of the lowest type have been established just outside the boundaries of the various reservations. Their proprietors are, in almost every case, unprincipled scoundrels who leave nothing undone to debauch the soldiers and obtain their money. Being in all cases outside the limits of any city the proprietors of these resorts are subject to no municipal police regulations and sell liquor regardless of hours and whether the buyer is already intoxicated or not. Gambling is universal in these "dives," and they are frequented by dissolute women. The soldier whose desire for a drink would ordinarily be satisfied by a few glasses of beer in the canteen of the post exchange, goes to one of these resorts and does well if he escapes before he has spent or gambled away all his money, overstayed his leave, or engaged in an altercation. As a rule the local authorities regard the existence of these places with indifference or approval, as it causes the soldier to spend his money in the community. The efficiency of the Army or the ruin of a good soldier is nothing to them. There can be no reasonable doubt that most of the trials by general courts-martial and summary courts, at least so far as this department is concerned, are directly traceable to this cause. Since I have had command here there has taken place the ruin and degradation of several noncommissioned officers of long service and fine record. In short, the recent legislation by Congress on this question, so far as this department is concerned, has had no effect except to lower the discipline of the Army, ruin scores of good soldiers, and fill the pockets of a lot of saloon keepers, gamblers, and prostitutes.

INDIANS.

During the period covered by this report the department has been entirely free from Indian troubles. Some alarm was occasioned during the past summer among the Indians at the San Carlos Agency owing to a rumor that their rations were to be diminished, and it was feared that in case this action was taken the Indians impelled by hunger would kill cattle and sheep belonging to ranchmen, and thus bring retaliation. The contemplated action, however, not being taken, all cause for alarm rapidly passed away.

The following table will show the strength of the various tribes living within the limits of this department.

Indian agencies and agents in this department and approximate number of each tribe.

Agency.	Agent.	Post-office.	Telegraph station.	Tribes.	No.	Total.
Colorado River.	Jesse C. Moore..	Parker, Yuma County, Ariz.	Yuma, Ariz.....	Mojave	518	1,700
				Mojave, at Needles.	500	
				Mojave, at Fort Mojave.	582	
				Chimehuevis ...	100	
Truxton ...	J. S. Perkins, industrial teacher.	Truxton, Ariz....	Hackberry, Ariz..	Hualapai	600	850
				Supai	250	
Navajo	George W. Hayzlett.	Fort Defiance, Ariz.	Gallup, N. Mex...	Navajo.....	18,000
Moqui	Charles E. Buntton.	Keams Canyon, Ariz.	Winslow, Ariz....	Moqui Pueblos..	1,986	
				Navajo, Nomadic	1,926	3,862
Pima	Elwood Hadley.	Sacaton, Pinal County, Ariz.	Casa Grande, Ariz	Pima	4,400	
				Maricopa	350	8,150
				Papago	1,275	
				Papago, Nomadic	2,125	
					
San Carlos.	George D. Corson.	San Carlos, Ariz..	San Carlos, Ariz..	Coyotero Apache	647	3,402
				San Carlos Apache.	1,288	
				Tonto Apache ..	863	
				Mojave	562	
				Yuma	42	
White River.	C. W. Crouse	White River, Ariz.	Fort Apache, Ariz.	White Mountain Apaches.	1,952
Southern Ute.	Joseph O. Smith	Ignacio, La Plata County, Colo.	Ignacio, La Plata County, Colo.	Moache	220	
				Capote	200	965
				Wimminuchee Ute	545	
Mescalero Apache.	James A. Carroll, superintendent.	Mescalero, Otero County, N. Mex.	Tularosa, N. Mex.	Mescalero Apache.	452
Jicarilla	N. S. Walpole ...	Dulce, N. Mex....	Dulce, N. Mex....	Jicarilla Apache	831
Pueblo	C. J. Crandall ...	Santa Fe, N. Mex.	Santa Fe, N. Mex.	Pueblos (11)....	
Pueblo	Ralph P. Collins	Albuquerque, N. Mex.	Albuquerque, N. Mex.	Pueblos (7).....	3,300
					
Uintah and Ouray.	Howell P. Myton	White Rocks, Uintah County, Utah	Fort Duchesne, Utah.	Uintah Ute.....	457	1,631
				White River Ute	354	
				Uncompahgre Ute.	820	
Shoshone..	H. G. Nickerson.	Shoshone Agency, Fremont County, Wyo.	Fort Washakie, Wyo.	Shoshone (or Snake).	804	822
				Northern Arapahoe.	
Total	1,626
						51,836

NOTE.—The area of this department is 522,385 square miles; of this there are 36,642 square miles of Indian reservations.

Population, including Indians, 1,227,221.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

The report of the chief surgeon of the department shows that the total admissions to sick report during the year for diseases incurred in line of duty were 2,596; not in line of duty, 413; for injuries in line of duty, 720; not in line of duty, 84. Aggregate for all causes, 3,813, giving rate of 1,570 per thousand of mean strength.

Twenty-four deaths occurred within the command during the year. Nineteen of the deaths reported were on account of diseases, wounds, and injuries incurred in line of duty, and 5 for causes not incident to the service.

During the year there were 57 enlisted men discharged on surgeon's certificate of disability; of these cases 31 were for disabilities incurred in the service in line of duty, 21 for disabilities that existed before enlistment, and 5 for disabilities incurred in the service but not in line

of duty. Three enlisted men were sent from the department during the year to the Government Hospital for the Insane, near Washington, D. C.

Medical and hospital supplies have been liberally provided and were of the best quality.

Exclusive of the chief surgeon, the personnel of the medical department on June 30, 1902, consisted of 2 surgeons, 5 assistant surgeons, 11 contract surgeons U. S. Army, 1 contract dental surgeon U. S. Army, 11 hospital stewards, 5 acting hospital stewards, 2 lance acting hospital stewards, and 91 privates of the Hospital Corps.

BARRACKS AND QUARTERS.

The inspector-general of the department reports that as a general rule the barracks and quarters at most posts are not in as good repair as they should be, owing to the limited allotments made for this purpose, probably due to the fact of previous small garrisons. Most of the barracks are only suited for housing 60 men. Should a garrison be occupied by a number of organizations equal to the number of barracks, the latter would be overcrowded and unsanitary. At present this is generally avoided by two organizations occupying three barracks. He also reports that bathing facilities for enlisted men at most posts are not adequate. For instance, Fort Logan, Colo., a comparatively modern post, has an allowance of 3 tubs for a company of 80 men. The lavatories generally are not of sufficient capacity.

When it is considered that all public buildings owned by various departments of the Government, transports and naval vessels, and almost all towns and villages in the vicinity of outlying posts are lighted by electricity, it seems that the Army is very antiquated in its lighting of military posts. When the original cost, transportation, and handling of oil is considered, to say nothing of the cost and transportation of the lamps, wicks, and chimneys, the unsanitary condition produced in barracks by the large consumption of oxygen and the production of carbonic acid gas by oil, and cost of labor in cleaning and calcimining barracks and quarters, etc., it certainly would seem to be economical for the Government to establish electric-light plants or buy electric lights furnished by private corporations.

OBSOLETE AMMUNITION.

At many posts the magazines are encumbered by a lot of ammunition for 3-inch muzzle-loading cannon manufactured in the sixties and seventies, consisting of percussion shells, time shells, case shells, and canister. This ammunition would probably cause accident if firing was attempted. And even where field artillery is stationed practice had by firing this material would be of no benefit to the artillery. It is recommended that some disposition be made of this useless and dangerous material at the various posts.

Attention is invited to the report of the adjutant-general of the department, transmitted herewith, on the condition and progress of the post schools, as required by Army Regulations, 358.^a

^a Not printed.

Since the close of the fiscal year the following changes of station have taken place:

Troop A, Fourteenth Cavalry, from Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo., to Fort Duchesne, Utah.

Troop E, Tenth Cavalry, from Division of the Philippines to Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.

Troop F, Tenth Cavalry, from Division of the Philippines to Fort Washakie, Wyo.

Troop G, Tenth Cavalry, from Division of the Philippines to Fort Mackenzie, Wyo.

Troop H, Tenth Cavalry, from Division of the Philippines to Fort Mackenzie, Wyo.

Troop C, Fourteenth Cavalry, from Fort Mackenzie, Wyo., to Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Troop E, First Cavalry, from Fort Washakie, Wyo., to Division of the Philippines.

Very respectfully,

FREDERICK FUNSTON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. GEORGE M. RANDALL, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE COLUMBIA.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE COLUMBIA,
Vancouver Barracks, Wash., July 5, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the Department of the Columbia for the past year:

In accordance with section 1, General Orders, No. 97, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, series 1901, the territorial limits of the department were extended to embrace again, as formerly, the Territory of Alaska on September 30 of last year, on which date the Department of Alaska was discontinued, and the department commander and his staff sailed from Fort St. Michael for Vancouver Barracks, Wash. I arrived at these headquarters and assumed command of the department October 29, 1901. The posts of Fort Lisicum and Camp Skagway, Alaska, were inspected en route.

The Twenty-eighth Infantry was organized in the department during the summer of last year and left for service in the Philippines on November 12, 1901. The Eighth and Tenth batteries of Field Artillery arrived in the department in August and July, respectively, and the headquarters and two battalions of the Seventeenth Infantry in April of this year from service in the islands. The other troops of the department have not engaged in any military operations or field service during the year beyond the work of construction of the military road and telegraph line in Alaska, to be referred to later.

The department had been without a commander stationed at these headquarters for several years, and this fact, together with the insufficient and frequently changing garrisons at most of the posts, resulted naturally in some neglect of buildings and grounds and in a consequent deterioration and loss to the Government. Under the circumstances there is reason for congratulation that the loss has not been greater. During the same time much new construction has been in progress in

the department in addition to the work of the Engineer Corps upon the seacoast fortifications.

The conditions existing in the department are varied, and the results of my inspection may be better set forth by taking up the posts separately.

DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS.

The building used for headquarter offices should be enlarged. Four additional offices are needed to properly accommodate the department staff and clerical force; also a large record and store room. Many of the records are now stored in a garret and not convenient of access. The addition could be made without great expense. Quarters for the department staff will be ample upon the completion of the two additional sets recently authorized.

VANCOUVER BARRACKS.

This post is garrisoned at present by the headquarters, band, and one battalion of the Seventeenth Infantry and two batteries of field artillery, with another battalion of the Seventeenth soon to arrive. The post will then be greatly crowded, both in barracks and quarters. It being understood that this post is to be a permanent station for field artillery, barracks should be immediately constructed of suitable size to house the field batteries of 120 men each. A portion of one of the batteries has been living in tents since its arrival at the post. The remainder of the battery occupies the old cavalry barracks, near which the stables are located. The other battery occupies two sets of infantry barracks. The barracks at the post are nearly all old and antiquated and many of them in need of extensive repairs. A new building for bachelors' quarters and mess is needed. In case the War Department decides to carry out the contemplated plan of enlargement of this post to accommodate a regiment of infantry and two field batteries, it would be well to have a special inspection of the post made by a board of officers to determine what buildings are worth repairing and to prepare a general plan of reconstruction and enlargement. The reservation contains 639.2 acres. It has no suitable range for long-distance infantry fire or light-artillery practice. A board of officers has been detailed to select, if possible, a proper range within marching distance of the post, with a view to its rental temporarily until an appropriation can be secured from Congress for its purchase. The erection of a crematory at this post is most necessary, in order to properly dispose of the stable manure and other refuse.

FORT WALLA WALLA.

This post has been a station for cavalry for many years, and is now garrisoned temporarily by two batteries of field artillery. It is listed as a temporary post, and extensive repairs or alterations would not therefore be desirable. The buildings are delapidated, however, and some repairs will be necessary before the assigned garrison can be accommodated even temporarily. It is hoped that the two light batteries may be provided for in some other department before the arrival of the cavalry battalion designated for station in this department. The battery commanders both at Walla Walla and Vancouver Barracks, working with new horses, mostly new men, and under adverse

conditions, especially at Vancouver Barracks, of a long rainy season, have made excellent progress toward perfecting their organizations in drill and instruction.

BOISE BARRACKS.

This post was garrisoned upon my arrival by two companies of the Twenty-eighth Infantry, afterwards by a small detachment of short-term men, and now by one company Seventeenth Infantry. Although Boise is also scheduled as a temporary post in the plan of concentration and the construction of permanent posts for the Army, I respectfully suggest the advisability of deferring any action looking to its abandonment in the near future. It is the only post remaining in the State of Idaho. It occupies a position near the capital city, favorable to its influence in the State, and of strategic value for the stretch of country traversed by the railroad from Pendleton, Oreg., to Greeneriver, Wyo. The quarters are in fairly good condition and sufficient for a garrison of two companies, or one company and one troop, and the barracks, with the addition of new floors and enlargement to the extent of accommodating 80 men, would be satisfactory for many years. The post is healthful, and the sentiment of the people in the vicinity strongly favors its retention as a station for troops.

FORT WRIGHT.

Garrisoned by two companies of the Seventeenth Infantry. This post is of modern construction, but not completed. It is well located, both from a sanitary standpoint and strategically. The town of Spokane, 4 miles distant, is a railroad center, where troops may be readily concentrated and supplied and whence they may be quickly moved either toward the northern border or to any of the restless mining districts of that region. Although the present plan only contemplates a garrison of one battalion at this post, I am of the opinion that the location and conditions favor a larger establishment, and I recommend that steps be taken to provide for a regimental headquarters and two battalions. A suitable target range for the post is now being constructed along the valley of the Spokane and within the limits of the reservation.

FORT LAWTON.

This post is new; now practically completed to accommodate a garrison of two companies of infantry, with the exception of a few small buildings. It was garrisoned until recently by two companies of coast artillery, which have been ordered to station temporarily at Fort Liscum and Camp Skagway, Alaska. Present garrison, one company Seventeenth Infantry. The entire reservation is now being inclosed by a wire fence. The parade ground has been cleared and graded, and a target range constructed up to three hundred yards. An extension of the range up to one thousand yards is necessary for infantry and will require a considerable expenditure of money and labor.

FORTS STEVENS, COLUMBIA, AND CANBY.

These posts constitute the artillery district at the mouth of the Columbia River. Stevens is garrisoned at present by two companies coast artillery, Canby by one, and Columbia by a small detachment,

the buildings at the last-named post not being completed. The question of a water supply for Stevens has been a troublesome one. My present belief is that the safest plan would be to pipe the water from the Lewis and Clark River, a distance of 13 or 14 miles. This would cost perhaps \$80,000 (estimated by the post commander), but considering that about \$40,000 have been already expended upon wells, tanks, etc., without satisfactory result obtained or in prospect, the expense would seem to be justified. An abundant supply of good water is considered absolutely necessary for a permanent post of this character, especially in the event of war, and the system of bringing it in from Lewis and Clark River would insure this, and at a small expense for maintenance after once established. The water now in use at the post comes partly from wells and partly collected in tanks from the rain. That from the wells is condemned as unfit for use. Alternative propositions are, first, to connect with the Astoria waterworks; second, to pipe the water from Fort Columbia across the Columbia River in case the supply shall be found to be sufficient at Columbia; third, to collect water in large reservoirs during the rainy season. Besides the water supply the principal needs of the post are an additional double set of quarters and a field officers' set, and the removal of the headquarters building from the parade ground in order to give more room for foot drills. A crematory should also be built for the disposal of refuse.

The post of Fort Columbia is approached from the wharf along a trestle about one-half mile in length, which is at present dangerous, particularly in windy weather, being without the protection of guard rails. I recommend that a rail be placed the entire length on each side. The selection of the site for this post was made by a board of officers, but in my opinion the buildings are badly located, being only from 100 to 200 yards from the batteries, and the hospital less than 100 yards directly in the rear of one of the 8-inch guns. They will not only be shaken and damaged by the fire of the guns, but present a conspicuous target just in the rear of the batteries on rising ground and plainly visible from the vicinity of the mouth of the river. More suitable ground could have been found in the vicinity. The buildings will probably be ready for occupancy about the 1st of September.

The approach to Fort Canby by water is difficult, and possible only at times of high tide. If it be the intention of the War Department to retain Canby as a permanent post new modern barracks, guard-house, and storehouses should be constructed. The armament at this post is old, and the company stationed there has been sent once a week to drill with the batteries at Fort Columbia.

PUGET SOUND.

The artillery district of Puget Sound embraces at present the posts of Flagler, Casey, and Worden, the last two named having been formally transferred to the district commander by the engineers about the 15th of June. Fort Flagler has its proper garrison of two companies with buildings practically completed. Fort Worden is garrisoned by one company and Casey by a detachment, the troops being housed temporarily in buildings turned over by the Engineer Corps pending the construction of regular post building by the Quartermaster's Department. This construction should be expedited as much as possible in order that the garrisons may be placed at these points.

The needs of the various posts in the way of buildings were more particularly set forth by letter to the Quartermaster-General of the Army, dated May 24, 1902. The question of a proper water supply at the posts of Flagler, Casey, and Worden has also given much concern. Latest developments indicate that the first two named may be satisfactorily supplied by means of wells. Worden has obtained water from the Port Townsend waterworks, but of inferior quality. A suitable boat should be provided for the use of the district commander of the Puget Sound district.

At all the coast artillery stations above mentioned in the two districts the engineer work on emplacements is completed for the contemplated armament, so far as known, with the exception of Fort Casey, which is well on toward completion. The armament at the different points is in various stages, not being entirely complete at any post. The same may be said of the torpedo and mining systems; casemates have been completed at some of the posts and material on hand for installation. Electric lighting of batteries and telephone connections are partially established at Stevens and Columbia, but none as yet at the posts on Puget Sound. The water and drainage systems of the batteries are generally good. The guns, carriages, material, and equipments were in excellent condition where there were troops to care for them. The works at Bean and Middle Points are understood to be progressing and will probably require garrisons in about a year.

POSTS IN ALASKA.

CAMP SKAGWAY.

The company at Skagway has been quartered in rented buildings in the town for nearly three years. The buildings now occupied are the best available, but not suited to the purpose of a garrison. Company L, Twenty-fourth Infantry (colored), was stationed at this place from July 28, 1899, until May 15, 1902. The general appearance and behavior of the officers and men at the time of my visit evinced an excellent discipline, although the conditions were unfavorable thereto, the company having been surrounded by saloons and demoralizing influences.

This post is regarded as an important one, and I earnestly recommend the construction of permanent barracks and quarters at the earliest practicable date.

FORT LISNUM.

Last October was my first opportunity to visit the post of Fort Lisnum, established in May, 1900. I found the post satisfactorily located, the buildings completed and well placed for drainage, although not in accordance with the usual arrangement. As known to the Department, this post was established as a base of operations for the military road and telegraph construction from Port Valdez to the Yukon River, and for the maintenance of law and order in that part of Alaska. The necessity for its continuance as a station for troops beyond the immediate future will depend upon the developments which take place in that region and in the interior. A Government wharf was constructed here a year ago last winter, but recent reports show that it is now almost destroyed by teredos. Instructions have been given to have it repaired and made safe for use, this season and the advisability of its further maintenance will be considered later. The troops at this post

and on the Yukon River and northwest Alaska have been largely occupied, as in the preceding year, in the work of construction and maintenance of the military telegraph line.

TRANS-ALASKAN MILITARY ROAD.

Under date of December 9, 1901, I reported the condition of the Trans-Alaskan military road at that time, as follows:

From Valdez, 2 miles out, trail not passable for wagons; thence 12 miles, wagon road, passable except in midsummer; thence 66 miles, trail not passable for wagons; thence 137 miles, open, passable for wagons; thence 30 miles to Tanana River trail. From the Tanana to Fort Egbert on the Yukon the route has been blazed. Where practicable the streams have been bridged, some ten or twelve substantial bridges having been constructed, ranging in length from 400 feet down. The total cost of exploration and construction in this work up to date approximates, as nearly as can be made out from the figures in my possession, \$200,000, embracing the expenditures from both Quartermaster's and Subsistence departments, and from the special appropriation for "Roads and bridges in Alaska."

The following extract is taken from Major Abercrombie's report:

The Copper River Valley is about 150 miles long and 70 miles wide. This area is inclosed by massive mountain ranges capped for most part by glaciers that have been grinding them away for centuries and filling the valley below with silt to great depth. On top of the silt, which is a very fine-grained, light-colored clay, has grown a sheet of moss, the decomposition of which has laid down enough matter for a dense growth of stunted spruce trees to take root. When this subsoil dries out the moisture from the frost in the spring of the year, this clay foundation is hard and soon gets cut up by travel and very dusty, but just as soon as the rain sets in the dust changes into a light-colored mud, to which there appears to be no bottom. At such a period not only is wagon traffic suspended, but it is with the utmost labor that pack animals with light loads can get along. I have cut roads on side hills, on top of hills, and along embankments with about the same results, viz, extremely boggy roads in rainy weather. A road can be built over which traffic can pass at any season of the year, but the cost of construction would be enormous.

I also remarked in report of December 9 that—

A further expenditure, therefore, at present upon the military road, except to maintain it in repair for a time, at least until the military telegraph line now being constructed along the same route is completed, does not seem to me advisable. * * * The region is no longer unknown; the line of the telegraph will be a guide to travelers, and the stations can afford them shelter in cases of sickness and distress.

All the transportation pertaining to this work was turned over to Captain Burnell, of the Signal Corps, to enable the latter to push the work of the telegraph construction as rapidly as possible.

I see no reason to modify my recommendations of that date. The military needs of the country do not justify the expenditure which would be required to build a wagon highway across the Territory, nor are there any other reasons to warrant, in my opinion, such an outlay. The interior is unquestionably rich in copper and gold deposits, but in going farther than it has already, the Government would, it seems, be departing from its established policy in the past. In the event, however, of Congress approving such work and making the necessary appropriation therefor, such appropriation should be included, I think, in the sundry civil bill, instead of being charged against the Army, and its further supervision would properly come under the Engineer Corps.

NOME AND ST. MICHAEL.

The conditions at Nome and vicinity have been normal and the troops at Fort Davis have performed only routine garrison duty. On

the reservation of St. Michael every effort was made to enforce the law and carry out the orders of the War Department relative to the sale of intoxicating liquors, but only with partial success. Licenses were issued by the district court to persons who established rum shops on the ice of the bay near the shore line, and the post commander was powerless to prevent it. Captain Howell, Seventh Infantry, in command at St. Michael, is commended for his effort to keep the reservation clear of this element. The buildings at Davis and St. Michael are in good condition and excellent work has been done in the way of drainage and preparation of the ground for drills. The cable between St. Michael and Nome has failed utterly since last November, and a contract has been entered into by the Chief Signal Service Officer of the Army for the installation of a wireless system between these two points.

YUKON RIVER POSTS.

Fort Gibbon has been largely constructed of green lumber, which at best is of rather inferior quality in that section. At the time of my inspection last year I found the buildings open to the weather, owing to the shrinkage of material, and upon my return to St. Michael ordered 100,000 feet of lumber shipped up the river to complete the post. The buildings are much improved and the post is now practically finished. Fort Egbert requires for its completion one double set of officers' quarters and three sets noncommissioned officers' quarters. The infantry at these two posts has been assisting Company D, Signal Corps, in the work of constructing and maintaining the telegraph line, the St. Michael company furnishing details also at the permanent stations as far east as Kaltag.

During the year the line from St. Michael to Fort Gibbon has been maintained and given satisfactory service. A temporary line was also installed between Gibbon and Rampart. The line between Valdez and Fort Egbert, under direction of Captain Burnell, working from Valdez, and Lieutenant Mitchell from Fort Egbert, has been pushed vigorously and should be completed about the end of July. One hundred and ten miles of permanent line and 150 miles of temporary line were constructed by the working parties under direction of First Lieut. George S. Gibbs, Signal Corps, from Fort Gibbon eastward along the Tanana River to connect with Eagle and Valdez line. It is expected that connection will be made by the latter part of April, which will furnish communication with the States by the line through Canada. In report of 1900, Department of Alaska, I recommended—

that a cable be laid from Seattle, via Juneau and Skagway, to Valdez, connecting with the telegraph line now being built over the all-American route from Valdez to Fort Egbert, and down the Yukon River to Fort St. Michael, which, with the cable now contracted for from the latter point to Nome, will give continuous communication between all important parts of Alaska and the States.

Cordial support and assistance were given by the post commanders on the Yukon in details of men and other facilities during the winter, and both officers and enlisted men have throughout applied themselves laboriously and faithfully to this work, under many privations and hardships, and under conditions of isolation at times which try the stoutest heart, and all without hope of special honor or reward.

The following comment of the inspector-general of the department is worthy of note:

The work in Alaska has been harder upon the army than will ever be realized; not the pure work of soldiering, but that attending the building of posts, roads, and

telegraph lines in this country, near the arctic circle, which a few years ago was thought to be uninhabitable except by the Esquimaux. Troops have lived in tents while working on the telegraph line when the thermometer was 60° below zero.

HEALTH OF COMMAND, STAFF DEPARTMENTS, EFFICIENCY AND DISCIPLINE—RECOMMENDATIONS.

The health of the troops in the department has been generally good, especially in the interior of Alaska. The highest daily noneffective rate was at Fort Flagler, with a record of 50.45 per 1,000; the lowest, Fort Gibbon, with a rate of 19.26 per 1,000. There were a few cases of contagious diseases, smallpox, measles, and mumps, but not sufficient to attract particular notice or cause any alarm. The deaths in the department numbered 20.

The departments of supply have been well conducted and the officers serving by detail in subordinate capacities in those departments have performed their duties in a satisfactory manner and the interests of the service have been carefully safeguarded. The supplies of food and clothing have been abundant and suited to the climatic conditions at the different posts. Contracts have been made at all posts, wherever practicable, for the supply of fresh beef and mutton, flour, and fresh vegetables. Other supplies have been sent from Portland and Seattle.

The total strength of the department was increased from 46 officers and 1,614 enlisted men on June 30, 1901, to 122 officers and 2,767 enlisted men on June 30, 1902.

Post schools were established at all posts where conditions would admit, and officers' lyceums were conducted wherever a sufficient number of officers could be assembled for that purpose.

During the target year of 1901, all companies of coast artillery, except the One hundred and twenty-sixth, fired at 200 and 300 yards, the average per cent ranging from 45.3 to 65.2 at 200 yards, and from 33.8 to 53 at 300 yards.

Of the eight companies of the Seventh Infantry stationed in Alaska, only two companies—E, stationed at Fort Gibbon, and G, at Fort Liscum—completed the record practice at rectangular targets and as skirmishers, the average per cent for all firings of the former being 32.7 and of the latter 28.5.

The Twenty-eighth Infantry held the required record practice, but was ordered to the Philippine Islands before reports could be rendered, except those of Companies E and H, stationed at Boise Barracks, the average per cent for all firings of the former being 29.8 and of the latter 29.3.

Company L, Twenty-fourth Infantry, stationed at Camp Skagway, Alaska, fired at 200 and 300 yards only, regular practice being impracticable for lack of range.

Four men qualified as sharpshooters and eighteen as marksmen in the department during the target year of 1901.

There was no cavalry stationed in the department, consequently no revolver practice was had.

The army being composed at present to a large extent of recruits and untrained men, I recommend an increase in the allowance of ammunition for small arms to 500 rounds per man per annum.

It is also recommended that company commanders be empowered to debar men who fail, during an enlistment, to qualify higher than "third class" from the privilege of reenlistment by entering upon

their discharge certificates "Not suited to the service by reason of inability to shoot."

Considering the frequent changes in personnel, with insufficient garrisons at some of the posts, as noted before, I am pleased to report that with a few exceptions the officers and men give evidence of marked efficiency in the performance of their duties. The troops are well drilled, and instructed in their field duties and exercises, so far as the conditions and facilities permitted. On account of the long period of winter at the Alaskan posts and a long one of rain at many of the posts in Oregon and Washington, I recommend a drill hall be provided suitable to the needs of the garrison at every post designed to be permanent.

There was a considerable increase over the preceding year in the ratio of trials by court-martial to the average of enlisted strength. This is believed to be due in part to the large number of recruits, but in part also to the abolition of the sale of beer at post exchanges. The number of desertions has also been large, and the largest from posts whose locations would seem to lead to contentment. The smallest percentages were from the posts in Alaska. As remedies, increased care in making enlistments, more diligence in the pursuit of deserters, and severer punishments are suggested. I recommend that the reward for capturing a deserter be increased to \$50. Facilities for amusement and recreation should be increased and improved, and every encouragement given to the men to make deposits with the paymaster. The Pay Department is entitled to credit for giving special attention to this last subject in the particular case of making provision for deposits at posts in the interior of Alaska, where the money for the monthly payments was advanced by the Northern Commercial Company. The chief paymaster of the department is commended for perfecting the arrangement, under approval of the Paymaster-General and Secretary of War, for procuring the payment of the troops at those remote posts regularly in the winter, through the courtesy of this company, and without expense to the Government.

I recommend legislation enabling officers on the active list to make deposits from their pay with the paymaster in a manner similar to that now authorized for enlisted men.

The following remarks of the inspector-general of the department bearing upon this subject are quoted as offering a strong argument in favor of such legislation:

It is a bad thing for an officer to be engaged in or identified with investments or business in the localities where he serves, and further than that he is employed by the Government to devote his whole time and abilities to the Government service, and at retirement is provided for the rest of his life. But, at the same time, he should have an opportunity and inducements to save his money to provide for his family, and such a system of deposits would, I think, obviate many of the cases of destitution in the families of officers who die in the service.

With the number of posts now in the department and the long distances to be traveled in visiting some of them, the work of the acting inspector-general is more than should be placed upon one man, and I recommend an assistant be assigned to that office. All the posts, depots, and recruiting stations have been visited during the year, also six schools and colleges having military instruction, which required his absence from the headquarters almost the entire year.

I recommend the establishment of a regular depot of supplies at Seattle similar to the one at San Francisco, and that it be made the home port for transports plying between Seattle and Alaska.

The acting engineer officer of the department is preparing a new map of the department, embracing the latest information regarding Alaska, which will be ready for publication in a short time.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE M. RANDALL,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM A. KOBBE, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF DAKOTA.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF DAKOTA,
St Paul, Minn., August 29, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.:

The last annual report of this department was made August 13, 1901, by Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, then temporarily in command, who also made a supplementary report August 26, 1901.

Major-General Otis assumed command temporarily of the department February 21, 1901. He relinquished command February 25, 1902, having passed to the retired list of the Army on that date.

Col. Edward M. Hayes, Thirteenth Cavalry, commanded the department from March 25, 1902, until I assumed command April 26, 1902, by assignment of the President, announced in paragraph 14, Special Orders, No. 65, Headquarters of the Army.

At the date of last annual report the posts in the department were garrisoned by 3 troops of the First and 10 troops of the Thirteenth Cavalry and 4 companies each of the Eighth and Fourteenth Infantry.

On June 30, 1902, the posts in this department were garrisoned by squadron headquarters and 2 troops of the First Cavalry, headquarters and band of the Third Cavalry, the Thirteenth Cavalry, First Battalion headquarters and 2 companies Eighth Infantry, the Twenty-first Infantry and 1 company of the Twenty-fourth Infantry. Of these, the First Cavalry and Eighth Infantry were under orders to proceed to the Philippines and Alaska, respectively, and 2 squadrons Third Cavalry and the rest of the Twenty-fourth Infantry were under orders to proceed from the Philippines and take station in the department.

ARRIVALS.

Headquarters, band, and Second Battalion Fourteenth Infantry, 13 officers and 408 enlisted men, accompanied by 1 contract surgeon and 2 hospital corps men, arrived and took station at Fort Snelling, Minn., August 30, 1901, from the Philippines.

Troops B and D, Thirteenth Cavalry, consisting of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas, 6 troop officers and 1 medical officer, 125 enlisted men and 166 cavalry horses, arrived at Fort Meade, S. Dak., April 29, 1902, from Fort Robinson, Nebr. Left Fort Robinson April 20 and marched overland; distance traveled, 156 miles.

Company L, Twenty-fourth Infantry, consisting of 2 officers and 70 enlisted men, arrived at Fort Missoula, Mont., May 22, 1902, by rail from Seattle, Wash. Left Seattle May 21.

Companies A and D, Twenty-first Infantry, 3 officers and 121 enlisted men, arrived at Fort Keogh, Mont., June 15, by rail from San Francisco, Cal.

Headquarters, band, Companies B and C, and Second Battalion Twenty-first Infantry, 18 officers, 417 enlisted men, arrived at Fort Snelling, Minn., June 16, 1902, by rail from San Francisco, Cal.

The Third Battalion Twenty-first Infantry, consisting of 9 officers and 219 enlisted men, arrived at Fort Yates, N. Dak., June 18, 1902, from San Francisco, Cal. Traveled by rail to Bismarck, N. Dak., thence by boats on Missouri River to Fort Yates.

Headquarters and band, Third Cavalry, 3 officers and 40 enlisted men, arrived at Fort Assiniboine, Mont., June 20, 1902, by rail from San Francisco, Cal. Left San Francisco June 16.

DEPARTURES.

Company C, Eighth Infantry, consisting of 3 officers and 88 enlisted men, accompanied by 1 contract surgeon, left Fort Missoula, Mont., May 28, 1902, and the town of Missoula by rail at 4 a. m., May 29, 1902, for Seattle, Wash., en route to Alaska.

Troop H, First Cavalry, consisting of 2 officers and 71 enlisted men, dismounted, accompanied by 1 hospital corps man, left Fort Keogh, Mont., June 9, 1902, by rail for San Francisco, Cal., destined for the Philippines.

Company B, Eighth Infantry, consisting of 1 officer and 87 enlisted men, left Fort Yates June 29, 1902, by steamer for Bismarck, N. Dak., thence proceeded on Northern Pacific train July 3, 1902, for Helena, Mont., where it joined headquarters First Battalion and Companies A and D, Eighth Infantry, and proceeded July 4 by rail to Seattle, Wash., en route to Alaska.

Headquarters, band, and Second Battalion Fourteenth Infantry, 14 officers and 256 enlisted men, accompanied by 1 contract surgeon, left Fort Snelling, Minn., June 16, 1902, by trolley cars for St. Paul, thence by rail for Fort Wayne, Mich., for station.

CHANGES OF TROOPS WITHIN DEPARTMENT.

Headquarters First Battalion and Company A, Eighth Infantry, 3 officers and 76 enlisted men, accompanied by one medical officer, left Fort Snelling, Minn., by rail, about 8.30 p. m., August 31, 1901, to take station at Fort Harrison, Mont. Arrived September 2.

Troops G and H, Thirteenth Cavalry, 2 officers and 158 enlisted men, left Fort Meade, S. Dak., September 11, 1901, by rail, for Fort Assiniboine, Mont. Arrived September 14 and took station.

Troop H, First Cavalry, 2 officers and 72 enlisted men and 81 horses, left Fort Meade, S. Dak., November 5, 1901, and marched overland to Fort Keogh, Mont. Arrived November 12 and took station. The headquarters second squadron, First Cavalry, were transferred from Fort Meade and established at Fort Keogh November 3.

Troop L, Thirteenth Cavalry, 2 officers and 70 enlisted men, accompanied by one medical officer, left Fort Meade, S. Dak., May 4, 1902, and marched overland to Fort Yates, N. Dak., for temporary duty. It became expedient to make this change for the double purpose of

providing shelter for this troop, whose barracks at Fort Meade were destroyed by fire April 27, and of furnishing a garrison for Fort Yates upon the departure of Company B, Eighth Infantry, for Alaska, pending the arrival of troops from the Philippines destined to garrison that post. Troop arrived at Fort Yates May 12.

Troops A and C, Thirteenth Cavalry, 5 officers and 151 enlisted men, left Fort Assinniboine, Mont., May 15, 1902, at 8 a. m., and marched overland to Fort Yellowstone, Wyo., for temporary duty in the Yellowstone National Park during the tourist season. Arrived June 3; distance marched, 413 miles.

Company D, Twenty-first Infantry, 2 officers and 72 enlisted men, left Fort Keogh, Mont., by rail at 10.20 p. m., June 25, 1902, for Fort Harrison, Mont., to garrison that post after the departure of Companies A and D, Eighth Infantry, for Alaska, and until the arrival from the Philippines of troops destined to garrison that post. Arrived June 26.

PRACTICE MARCHES.

Company B, Eighth Infantry, then stationed at Fort Yates, made a practice march of 127 miles in October, 1901.

Troop H, First Cavalry, had a practice march of 213 miles from Fort Meade, S. Dak., to Devils Tower, Wyoming, in October, 1901.

Company D, Eighth Infantry, 1 officer and 98 enlisted men, had a practice march of 154 miles in October, 1901, from Fort Harrison.

These and the marches in changing station of Troops B and D, Thirteenth Cavalry, from Fort Robinson, Nebr., to Fort Meade, S. Dak., 156 miles; of Troop L, Thirteenth Cavalry, from Fort Meade, S. Dak., to Fort Yates, N. Dak., 210 miles, and of Troops A and C, Thirteenth Cavalry, from Fort Assinniboine, Mont., to Fort Yellowstone, Wyo., 413 miles, were the practice marches made since last annual report.

Department orders require that the troops of each post make a practice march of not less than 150 miles in distance.

TARGET PRACTICE.

The months of June and July, for rifle and carbine, and August, for revolver, were designated as the target-practice season for 1902; but in order that troops of First Cavalry have advantage of practice before leaving for the Philippines—likewise the First Battalion, Eighth Infantry, before leaving for Alaska—the target season for these troops was fixed at an earlier period. The practice of these troops was completed by June 15.

OFFICERS' LYCEUMS.

The months of December, 1901, and January, February, and March, 1902, constituted the lyceum period for 1901-2.

Before commencing the season each post commander submitted to the department commander for his approval a scheme of instruction to be pursued during the season. Forty-three essays on as many subjects were read and discussed during the season.

FIRES.

Since last annual report two fires occurred at Fort Meade. The first, on October 26, 1901, destroyed an old frame structure which was

occupied by stablemen of Troop H, First Cavalry, and the Thirteenth Cavalry band. It was erected about 1880 by the labor of troops and had no money value. The second, on April 27, 1902, partially destroyed barracks No. B 10 and 11, occupied by Troop L, Thirteenth Cavalry, which originally cost \$5,960; also the dry-earth closet connected therewith, which cost \$159.94. The barracks are being converted into a temporary squad room.

HEALTH.

The general health of the troops has been good, if slight epidemics of typhoid fever at Forts Assiniboine and Keogh in September and October, 1901—21 cases, only 2 deaths—may be excepted. The death rate was very small—10 deaths, including 2 accidental, with a mean strength of 1,755 enlisted men. The ratio per 1,000 mean strength of those "constantly noneffective" was 42.10—larger, with one exception, than it has been in any one year for the past decade, and it is considered due in part to recent insular service and in part to the unusual number of accidents and injuries, nearly 25 per cent of the total admissions to hospital.

DISCIPLINE AND INSTRUCTION.

Discipline and instruction are good, because, as a rule, officers are capable and painstaking. Generally speaking, the soldier is what his officer makes of him. A gain in efficiency would follow if officers remained single until rank, pay, and allowance enabled them to provide against common exigencies of service.

The battalions Eighth and Fourteenth Infantry and the two troops First Cavalry, transferred to other departments, were fitted for any kind of service. This is true also of the Twenty-first Infantry, after recent insular service, and is rapidly becoming true of the newly organized Thirteenth Cavalry, under efficient management.

Paragraphs 267, 270, 271, Army Regulations, and 179, Infantry Drill Book, basing discipline and instruction on squads, are very valuable if properly observed. I believe the system might be extended to provide for the training of a permanent squad as scouts in each company and troop, providing thereby a necessary body of expert special troops when the regiment is consolidated in whole or in part for active service.

The inspector-general of the department, Maj. Alfred Reynolds, reports that he is "inclined to the opinion that the abolition of the beer feature in post exchanges has not materially increased the number of trials by courts, nor called for other extra disciplinary measures."

The troops have been paid promptly on each monthly muster; at Fort Snelling by the paymaster in person, at other posts by checks or currency. Fort Meade is paid from the Department of the Missouri.

No commissioned officers and 200 enlisted men were tried by general courts-martial, resulting in 182 convictions; of these 97 were dishonorably discharged, 47 for desertion, and 21 through use of previous convictions by summary courts.

POSTS.

Excepting the new posts near Helena, Mont., and Bismarck, N. Dak., the military stations of the department date back to the days of Indian

warfare and are intimately connected with frontier history. There are about 50,000 Indians on reservations, and the posts were originally placed with reference to them, well located then as now. With the exception of Fort Yates, they should, I think, all be retained and placed in condition, and, where necessary, enlarged. Recommendations looking to the gradual relinquishment of Fort Yates, also to an increase of garrison at Fort Keogh, etc., will be forwarded in due time. Attention is invited to the unsatisfactory status of the reservation at Fort Missoula. The original Executive order in 1877 set aside section 31, township 13 north, range 19 west, Territory of Montana. By mistake a part of section 36, range 20 west, a school section, was occupied and most of the post buildings erected on it. The right of occupancy was claimed by the military authorities here and sustained in letter of December 5, 1898, from the Adjutant-General of the Army. The Secretary of War repeatedly called attention of the Congress to the matter, requesting legislation, but no action was taken. (See Ex. Doc. No. 79, Senate, Forty-ninth Congress.) I fully concur in the remarks of Major-General Otis in his last year's report when he says of Fort Missoula:

I know of no better or cheaper location for the quartering of troops, nor any post where they would be more readily available for service. * * * It is also a favorite station for both officers and enlisted men.

Attention is invited to the report of the adjutant-general of the department upon post schools, which is appended pursuant to Army Regulations 358.^a

W. A. KOBBE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN R. BROOKE, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
Governors Island, New York City, July 21, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: During the time that I have had command of this department not only has the number of troops serving in it been increased, but its territorial limits have been extended so as to include Porto Rico and the adjacent islands and the troops in the island of Cuba.

Attention is again invited to the fact that apparently no provisions have been made for the land defense of our most extensive fortifications. This has been emphasized in preparing plans for the coming army and navy maneuvers. As fortifications are made stronger the necessity for consideration of the subject of land defense becomes more pronounced. Where such strong fortifications are erected that the enemy can not hope to force a passage in his ships, his only recourse will be to capture the defenses through land attacks. No forts or earthworks have been constructed to aid in repelling such attacks, and, so far as I know, no plans have been made looking to the consideration of this subject in the near future.

^a Not printed.

Arrangements for the army and navy maneuvers at the eastern entrance to Long Island Sound, to be held the latter part of August, have been progressing satisfactorily. The desire of all concerned to make these maneuvers a success—and by success I mean that there shall be acquired the greatest amount of practical knowledge possible to obtain by this method, and nearly approaching in results the teachings of actual warfare—has entailed a great amount of work and original theoretical study. The plan for the maneuvers on the part of the Army has been worked out as far as possible up to this time. The troops will be put in position about August 1, so that they may become accustomed to their surroundings and new duties and prepare the necessary tables and charts.

There are now serving in this department 4 companies of engineers; headquarters, band, and 10 troops of the Second Cavalry; headquarters, band, and 12 troops of the Seventh Cavalry; 79 companies of coast artillery; 5 batteries of field artillery; 5 bands, Artillery Corps; headquarters, band, and 11 companies Ninth Infantry; 4 companies of the Fourteenth Infantry; headquarters, band, and 8 companies of the Sixteenth Infantry; headquarters, band, and 12 companies of the Twenty-third Infantry; headquarters, band, and 8 companies which make up the Porto Rican Provisional Regiment of Infantry.

During the past year many letters have been written from these headquarters calling attention to the needs of the various posts in this department and making suggestions regarding them. These letters are on file in the Adjutant-General's Office, and therefore are not repeated in this report. It is believed that it would be well to take up these communications in connection with this report.

The reports of the staff officers serving at these headquarters show an enormous amount of work accomplished, and I believe the work has been efficiently and ably done. The reports of the inspector-general of the department of inspections made from time to time during the year indicate that there is an admirable condition of discipline and instruction in the various commands.

Attention is again and finally invited to the urgent need of providing more suitable quarters for officers and barracks for enlisted men at the seacoast posts throughout this department, and especially to the need of quarters and barracks at the various southern posts suitable to location and climate. All posts should have sufficient accommodations for the troops necessary to form an adequate garrison for them. At this time the present restricted strength of the seacoast artillery does not give at any post one relief at the guns. The reservations should also be made more attractive, and the fortifications themselves beautified and improved by the growing of grass upon them. It has been found by actual test that the shifting sands which surround most of the southern seacoast defenses may be controlled and retained in place by the planting of grass. This method of controlling these sands not only beautifies the posts, but is very desirable from an economical point of view. As it is now the sand blows into the working parts of the guns and carriages, damaging them and seriously interfering with their easy manipulation, and drifts into the fortifications, requiring constant attention and care by the troops, whose time is already occupied by other pressing duties.

The quartermaster dock and forage shed at San Juan, Porto Rico, should be retained, and not given over to the island authorities. Should

this dock be given up it will become necessary to obtain ground elsewhere for the same purpose for which this is used, and probably at great expense.

The shops, quarters for employees, and the corral at San Juan were hastily and flimsily constructed for the immediate and pressing needs of the troops that first went to Porto Rico. They should now be replaced by others of a permanent and substantial character, either on the site now occupied or, preferably, on one equally good, but the ownership of which shall be unquestioned.

The chief quartermaster of the district of Porto Rico recommends that the employees of the Quartermaster's Department serving in the Tropics be granted an increase of pay, with the understanding that they shall be transferred to the United States proper after some definite time. This recommendation, I think, is a very good one, as these employees hold classified positions under the civil service, and their foreign service discriminates against them as compared to others of the same classification by reason of climatic conditions and the increased cost of living.

The exorbitant charge levied by the city of San Juan for water used by the army could be removed by the erection of a distilling plant with sufficient extra power to supply electric current, an ice plant, and the introduction of a secondary water system using salt water for policing purposes.

The chief paymaster calls attention to the inadequacy of the allowance of commutation of quarters. The present allowance was established many years ago, under entirely different conditions from those that prevail to-day, and rents having more than doubled in all our large cities since it went into effect, officers with a moderate salary serving therein have the greatest possible difficulty in making both ends meet.

The matter of allowance of quarters is also spoken of by the chief paymaster. I concur in his remarks that "a brigadier-general is now allowed five rooms as quarters, or commutation therefor, at \$60 per month. I do not believe this sum would cover more than one-third the rent he would be forced to pay if stationed in New York City." In this connection I desire to say that the allowance of rooms, having been made many years ago, is not adequate to the present necessities, for it is seen all about us that the houses occupied by people who were wealthy years ago are now entirely too small and uncomfortable for people who have in these days an income equal to that of the former occupants. An increase of the room allowance is recommended to meet the conditions prevailing throughout the country. Starting with an allowance of two rooms for a second lieutenant, it seems only reasonable that each higher grade should be allowed an additional room over the grade below.

The chief paymaster also makes the following recommendation:

It has always seemed to me that marksmen and sharpshooters in the Infantry and Cavalry arms of the service should receive additional pay, say \$1 per month for the former and \$2 for the latter. Certainly a soldier who can hit the object aimed at with his rifle is more valuable to the Government than one who can not. A small increase of pay would, in my judgment, stimulate effort in this direction and do much toward improving the marksmanship of the Army.

I think this suggestion an excellent one, and would recommend it for favorable consideration.

There are now in the coast artillery a large number of young officers who have come into the service under the provisions of the act of February 2, 1901. These young officers, while they have had in most cases service in the field or in garrison, have had no experience whatever in the handling of the rapid-fire and large guns with which our present fortifications are armed; nor have they had the necessary technical education that will enable them to take hold of the duties they are now called upon to perform, with the grasp of the conditions that exist, and aptitude with which to readily fit themselves for onerous duties, that are so essential to the modern artilleryman. It is absolutely necessary therefore that these young officers should secure a fundamental training that will enable them to undertake and carry on their new duties understandingly. As long as they are compelled through the necessities of the case to perform the various post staff duties, they can not have time to devote themselves to technical study. These routine post duties, with which they are almost as unfamiliar as they are with the artillery duties proper, take all the time that they should be asked to devote to hard mental and physical work. It is recommended that several of the well-equipped posts be utilized for the special training of these officers in courses of study similar to those at the Fort Monroe school, as that school is not large enough to accommodate all these officers at once, nor to give them the necessary instruction within a reasonable time.

In conclusion I wish to say that never during a service of over forty-one years have I seen the Army in such excellent condition as it is to-day. As was the case in 1866, it will be necessary to train the young officers, as well as the young soldiers, in their several duties. This remark applies especially to the artillery, the armament of which has been revolutionized within the last few years, and it will require time to evolve the best methods necessary to make it the success we all hope for.

Having spent my life since early manhood in the service of my country, I am now about to retire from active service with my interest in the progress of our Army unabated, and with the hope to see it reach that professional standing which appears to be near at hand.

To my staff I wish to say that their duties have been performed in a manner which evidences their ability and their loyalty both to their country and their commander.

I shall carry with me into my retirement feelings of deepest gratitude to all, both officers and soldiers, for the evidence they have shown of the discipline, officer-like conduct and soldierly bearing, which have always been the pride and glory of our Army.

I desire, finally, to record my appreciation of the uniform courtesy I have always experienced at the hands of my superiors throughout my whole service. This has enabled me to perform all the duties assigned to me with the feeling that former efforts were approved and succeeding ones would receive due consideration.

Very respectfully,

JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General, Commanding.

REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. ARTHUR MACARTHUR, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE LAKES.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE LAKES,
Chicago, Ill., August 15, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of matters pertaining to this territorial department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1902:

The department was from the beginning of the year covered by this report until March 25, 1902, under the command of Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis, who was retired on the date mentioned and temporarily succeeded by Col. William S. McCaskey, Twentieth Infantry, under the provisions of paragraph 213, Army Regulations. On March 29, 1902, I assumed command of the department in compliance with paragraph 14, Special Orders, No. 65, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, March 18, 1902.

Since the rendering of the last annual report the following movements of troops have taken place in the department:

INCOMING TROOPS.

Headquarters, field, staff and band, and First and Third Battalions Twentieth Infantry, returning from the Philippines, arrived at Fort Sheridan, Ill., March 23, 1902, and took station thereat.

The Second Battalion Twentieth Infantry arrived at Columbus Barracks, Ohio, on April 9, 1902, and took station at that post.

Headquarters, band, and seven companies Third Infantry, returning from the Philippines, arrived at Fort Thomas, Ky., on April 29, 1902, and took station at that post. Company K, Third Infantry, took station at Columbia Arsenal, Tenn., on the same date.

On April 29, 1902, detachments of Troops L and M, Second Cavalry, in charge of the horses of those troops, arrived at Fort Sheridan, Ill., from Cuba, being followed, on May 11, 1902, by the remainder of the troops. The command took station at Fort Sheridan.

Headquarters, staff and band, and Companies E, F, G, and H, Fourteenth Infantry, arrived June 17, 1902, at Fort Wayne, Mich., for station, being transferred from Fort Snelling, Minn.

OUTGOING TROOPS.

Headquarters, band, and Second and Third Battalions Twenty-ninth Infantry left Fort Sheridan, Ill., February 20, 1902, for San Francisco en route to the Philippines:

The First Battalion Twenty-ninth Infantry left Columbus Barracks, Ohio, on February 22, 1902, for the same destination.

The First Battalion Second Infantry left Fort Thomas, Ky., April 10, 1902, for the same destination.

Changes of station of troops within the department were made as follows:

July 23, 1901, First Battalion Twenty-ninth Infantry from Fort Sheridan, Ill., to Columbus Barracks, Ohio.

July 24, 1901, Company D, Second Infantry, from Columbus Barracks, Ohio, to Fort Thomas, Ky.

September 18, 1901, Company C, Fourteenth Infantry, was ordered from Fort Wayne, Mich., to Canton, Ohio, as a guard to the tomb of the late President McKinley, at Westlawn Cemetery.

February 14, 1902, a detachment from the garrison at Fort Wayne was sent to Columbia Arsenal, Tenn., to take charge of the arsenal, the same having been turned over by the Ordnance Department. The detachment returned to its proper station on April 30, 1902, being relieved by Company K, Third Infantry.

April 8, 1902, the First Battalion of the Twentieth Infantry left Fort Sheridan for station at Columbus Barracks.

June 16, 1902, field and staff, First Battalion, and Companies B, C, and D, Fourteenth Infantry, left Fort Wayne for station at Fort Brady, Mich.

June 30, 1902, a detachment of the garrison at Fort Thomas, Ky., was sent to Indianapolis Arsenal, Ind., to take charge of Government property upon its being turned over by the Ordnance Department.

In the year just closed the number of recruits sent from Columbus Barracks, Ohio, to various points, was as follows:

Infantry	1,687
Cavalry	1,580
Coast Artillery	1,188
Field Artillery	178
Engineers	33
Total	4,666

Practice marches were made during the year by the Second and Third Battalions Twenty-ninth Infantry, from Fort Sheridan, Ill.

The artillery battalion at Fort Sheridan participated in the Horse Show and the Memorial Day exercises in Chicago. Companies I and M, Twentieth Infantry, participated in the Memorial Day exercises at Muskegon, Mich.

The strength of the command, present and absent, June 30, 1902, was as follows:

	Present.	Absent (within and without the depart- ment).	Total.
Commissioned officers	116	39	155
Enlisted men	2,693	217	2,910
Aggregate	2,809	256	3,065
ATTACHED.			
Commissioned officers	8	3	11
Enlisted men			
Aggregate	8	3	11

These troops occupied the following posts:

Fort Brady, Mich., Company A, Fourteenth Infantry.

Columbia Arsenal, Tenn., Company K, Third Infantry.

Columbus Barracks, Ohio, Companies A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H, Twentieth Infantry.

Fort Sheridan, Ill., Companies I, K, L, and M, Twentieth Infantry; Troops L and M, Second Cavalry; Ninth and Twenty-first batteries, Field Artillery.

Fort Thomas, Ky., Companies A, B, C, D, I, L, and M, Third Infantry.

Fort Wayne, Mich., Companies B, C, and D, Fourteenth Infantry.

Maj. Cunliffe H. Murray, Fourth Cavalry, acted as adjutant-general of the department until March 31, 1902, when he was relieved by Capt. Francis J. Kernan, Second Infantry, aid-de-camp. Col. Arthur L. Wagner, assistant adjutant-general, was assigned to duty as adjutant-general of the department by paragraph 7, Special Orders, No. 30, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, February 5, 1902, and reported for duty May 7, 1902.

POST SCHOOLS.

Schools were conducted during the year in accordance with existing requirements at all the posts in the department except Columbus Barracks, Ohio, where, owing to the continual changes in the personnel of the troops of the garrison, it has not been considered expedient to hold a post school. The four months commencing December 1, 1901, and ending March 31, 1902, were prescribed as the school season. One hundred and seventy-two enlisted men attended school. The enlisted men detailed as teachers seem to have been commendably efficient. The schoolrooms were reported satisfactory in their arrangements and in good condition, with the exception of the one at Fort Thomas, Ky., which is in a frame structure, of insufficient size, and is almost impossible to heat during severe weather. The books, desks, etc., are in fair condition.

Libraries and reading rooms have been in operation at all the posts, but the supply of books is inadequate. For purposes of instructive reading a supply of military books is needed; for entertaining reading a good supply of works of fiction should be provided. The books now on hand are mainly old novels, which are being read and re-read.

INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Col. Ernest A. Garlington, inspector-general, U. S. Army, assumed charge September 13, 1901, relieving Maj. Harvey C. Carbaugh, judge-advocate, U. S. Army, who had been in temporary charge of the office since July 31, 1901. Inspections were made during the year in accordance with existing regulations. Nothing of an unusual character was developed. Such irregularities and defects as were observed by the inspector were noted in the report made, and a copy furnished to the respective commanding officers for remedial action. The conditions existing at each station were set forth in detail in reports forwarded.

The behavior of the troops at each post was reasonably satisfactory. The offenses committed were for the most part of a minor character, and probably had their origin in conditions incident to short service and to the natural enthusiasm incident to the return home from foreign service. The inspector reports the discipline not up to a satisfactory standard. He says:

The troops are now passing through the period following war, always a severe test to discipline, and at this particular time the difficulty is accentuated by the presence with troops of so many young officers of some active service with rank superior to that now held, but untrained in many of the fundamental principles pertaining to the profession of arms. As a rule they appear to be imbued with the soldierly spirit

and a desire to perfect themselves in the details of their chosen profession. Post commanders have the grave responsibility of organizing and conducting schools based upon schemes of instruction that will afford the proper incentive and opportunity to this class of officers.

The troops, largely recruits or men who on account of the necessities of the service have received little preliminary training in the school of the soldier, are reported to show the need of setting up. Instructions have accordingly been given to post commanders to pay especial attention to the preliminary training as set forth in the school of the soldier. It is recommended that facilities in the way of properly equipped gymnasia be provided for the training of the soldiers.

I concur in the following recommendations of Colonel Garlington:

That the campaign hat be made of wool, of natural color, thus avoiding the deleterious effects of dye and rendering it practicable, at least, to issue hats uniform in color.

That the toggle attached to the steel collars of the wheel and swing harness of the light batteries be made longer. There is a perceptible downward pull on the necks of the horses of the wheel and swing teams which not only prevents the proper line of traction but will in service cause many sore necks.

That the issue of gun slings within the United States be discontinued, they being more or less expensive and possessing no value as a means of carrying the rifle in garrison. Hundreds of slings are presented for condemnation which have been worn out by being strapped tight and close to the rifle.

That the spring in the bayonet scabbard be made stronger, the present spring being so weak as to cause the bayonet to fall out in going through thick brush; and that the attachment for fastening the scabbard to the belt be made stronger, as it pulls loose from the scabbard.

The inspector-general reports that he found the guardhouses at all the posts to be overcrowded with general prisoners undergoing sentence and awaiting trial, usually for desertion. This condition is extremely unsatisfactory from every point of view, and indicates a necessity for the existence of a military prison. The remarks of the inspector-general on this subject are worthy of careful attention. He says:

The presence of a large number of military prisoners, partly or wholly in uniform, about a garrison, always in evidence, and more or less in contact with young soldiers, is demoralizing to them, and an unpleasing picture to residents at the posts and to visiting civilians. It entails large guards and interferes with instruction without any material compensation. The system affords little or no opportunity to reform or reclaim the offender, reduces the punitive feature to a minimum, and reacts deleteriously as exemplary punishment. It is practically impossible under the system to enforce a sentence of hard labor, and the labor performed is unsatisfactory and out of all proportion to the number employed. Many prisoners escape under circumstances suggesting connivance on the part of sentinels but not susceptible of proof.

There is a maudlin sympathy for military offenders, especially deserters, and it will exist as long as human nature remains as it is. The separation of young soldiers from men who have demonstrated their contempt for the obligations imposed upon them by their oaths of enlistment should be as complete as possible. The relation of sentinel and prisoner should, of course, present no opportunity for any kind of personal influence by the prisoner upon the sentinel; but we should meet conditions as they really exist. The best solution would seem to be the establishment of a military prison at some central location.

JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Lieut. Col. Enoch H. Crowder, judge-advocate, U. S. Army, assumed charge of the office of judge-advocate of this department November 23,

1901, relieving Maj. Harvey C. Carbaugh, judge-advocate, U. S. Army.

In the period covered by this report there were 2 officers and 335 enlisted men tried by general court-martial, this being an increase of 50 over the last year. It should be remarked, however, that 97 of the enlisted men tried in this department belonged to other departments. Of the officers tried, 1 was convicted and the other is awaiting the promulgation of the action of the court in his case. Of the enlisted men tried by general court-martial 316 were convicted, 14 were acquitted, and in the cases of 5 the sentences were disapproved. The number of enlisted men tried by summary court was 3,002, and 16 were tried by garrison courts. The number of convictions for desertion was 182.

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

Col. Edwin B. Atwood, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. Army, chief quartermaster of the department, submits the following statement of financial operations pertaining to his office during the year:

Appropriations.	Receipts.	Disbursements.	Remaining on hand June 30, 1902.
Regular supplies.....	\$144,550.30	\$142,183.30	\$2,367.00
Incidental expenses.....	94,901.65	93,674.88	1,026.77
Cavalry and artillery horses.....	78,474.00	78,474.00
Army transportation.....	426,289.78	407,116.44	19,173.34
Barracks and quarters.....	58,668.93	58,417.91	251.02
Clothing and equipage.....	242,582.89	223,252.86	19,330.03
Hospitals.....	90.00	90.00
Quarters for hospital stewards.....	150.00	135.50	14.50
Shooting galleries and ranges.....	533.20	533.20
National cemeteries.....	33.00	33.00
Total.....	1,046,273.75	1,004,111.09	42,162.66

In addition to these amounts there was received from the Treasury and disbursed from appropriations for prior fiscal years the sum of \$296,143.54.

Maj. William H. Miller, quartermaster, U. S. Army, assistant to the chief quartermaster of the department since August 19, 1901, at which date he relieved Maj. John T. French, jr., quartermaster, U. S. Army, reports transportation furnished as follows:

Paymasters's funds.....	\$279,827.55
Passengers.....	3,034
Animals.....	711
Freight.....pounds..	13,809,711

Major Miller reports the force of employees in his office considerably decreased during the year, there being 101 employed on June 30, 1901, and on June 30, 1902, only 67.

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

Capt. William H. Hart, commissary, U. S. Army, was in charge of the office of the chief commissary of the department from July 1, 1901, to September 1, 1901, during the absence on leave of Lieut. Col. Abiel L. Smith, deputy commissary-general; Maj. Charles R. Krauthoff, commissary, U. S. Army, served as chief commissary of the department from September 1, 1901, to February 1, 1902, when he was relieved by Maj. Albert D. Niskern, commissary, U. S. Army, assigned to temporary duty as chief commissary.

The subsistence stores and subsistence property required by the troops in the department have been supplied upon requisition by the purchasing commissary, Chicago, excepting Columbia Arsenal, which, on account of its proximity to St. Louis, Mo., has been supplied from that point. Contracts were duly made for the supply of fresh vegetables and fresh beef to the various posts in the department, and arrangements were made for supplying enlisted men en route to station from or through Chicago with meal tickets. The meal-ticket system has given excellent satisfaction, no complaints having been received from enlisted men on account of insufficiency or quality or of delay in receiving meals at the proper hour. Neither have any complaints been received from the railroads on account of misbehavior of enlisted men while traveling. The system of meal tickets is believed to be superior to the method of paying commutation of rations. The meals are served in dining cars or at eating stations; the surroundings are clean, pleasant, and conducive to neatness, and the men furnished tickets leave the city promptly. If furnished with commutation, some would be tempted to spend it for liquor, with resulting delay in departure, often terminating in desertion. After spending their money men have been known in some cases to disgrace their uniform by begging their food from the public, claiming that the Government had not provided the necessary food to subsist them. Subsistence stores at posts are reported to have been properly handled, stored, and cared for.

The money accountability of the chief commissary is reported as follows:

Appropriation, subsistence of the Army, 1901:

Balance per last report	\$12,946.30
Received during the year	1,744.25
Total accountability	14,690.55
Disbursed	\$1,829.10
Transferred	718.80
Deposited to credit of Treasurer United States	12,142.65
	14,690.55

Appropriation, subsistence of the Army, 1902:

Receipts	200,604.17
Disbursed	\$27,559.34
Transferred	157,442.50
	185,001.84
Balance June 30, 1902	15,602.33

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

The medical department was during the year under the able management of Lieut. Col. Timothy E. Wilcox, deputy surgeon-general, U. S. Army.

The number of deaths among the troops in the department during the time covered by this report was 37, of which number 23 were caused by disease or injury contracted in line of duty and 14 not in line of duty. Forty-six men were discharged on surgeon's certificate of disability, 22 being on account of disease or injury contracted in line of duty and 21 not in line of duty. The admissions to sick report for disease or injury were 3,531. The admission rate per thousand was 1,271. The total number of days lost by sickness, 39,256. The average number of days lost by each sick man, 14. The number of

men transferred to the Army and Navy General Hospital at Hot Springs, 13; transferred to Fort Bayard, N. Mex., 5; transferred to Army General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 1; transferred to Fort McPherson, Ga., for change of climate, 2; transferred to the Government Hospital for the Insane, Washington, D. C., 4.

In the movements of troops every precaution has been taken to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, by careful inspection immediately before departure and prompt isolation of cases occurring en route. The success attending such precautionary measures was most marked in the transfer of the Twenty-ninth Infantry from Fort Sheridan to San Francisco. An epidemic of measles delayed this movement for some days, and then each section of the train (four in all) was provided with a tourist sleeper, which was fitted up as a hospital car for the reception of cases occurring en route. The sections followed each other closely, and it was found practicable to devote the hospital car on the rear section to developed cases, while another car afforded space for suspected ones. The results were most satisfactory. This epidemic of measles originated at Columbus Barracks and developed at Fort Sheridan in the person of a man sent to the post. Seventy-nine cases developed at Columbus Barracks, with 12 deaths. Thirty-three cases developed at Fort Sheridan, none of which terminated fatally. The chief surgeon of the department is of the opinion that autoinfection with toxins produced by the disease is less likely to occur while the patients are treated in tents. His opinion is based on experience during the Great War, and seems to be confirmed by results at Fort Sheridan, where tents were used.

The Hospital Corps has been kept in a thoroughly efficient state, and the instructions from the Surgeon-General relative to the training and drill of the Hospital Corps have been carefully carried out by the post surgeons. The deficiencies in quota for the different posts have been supplied from the school at Fort Sheridan and from Columbus Barracks. It has not been necessary to receive assistance from without the department to fill any vacancies.

The chief surgeon reports that the dental surgeon has found ample room for the exercise of his vocation, and that this addition to the medical resources of the Army is highly appreciated. Separate rooms or buildings should be supplied for the dental surgeon at his permanent post. Hospital accommodations at Fort Sheridan are insufficient, and quarters for the hospital steward are needed at that post. The water supply at Columbus Barracks has been insufficient and bad. Artesian wells are to be provided for the purpose of increasing the supply at that post. The medical and hospital supplies at the various posts have been reported sufficient in quantity and of exceptional quality.

PAY DEPARTMENT.

Col. Albert S. Towar, assistant paymaster-general, U. S. Army, assumed charge of the office of chief paymaster of the department February 24, 1902, in compliance with paragraph 14, Special Orders, No. 244, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, October 21, 1901, relieving Capt. Seymour Howell, paymaster, U. S. Army, who had been in charge of the office from November 10, 1901, on which date Lieut. Col. Charles H. Whipple, deputy paymaster-general, U. S. Army, was relieved as chief paymaster of the department.

The troops in the department have been paid monthly and with promptness and regularity.

The receipts and disbursements during the year were as follows:

On hand July 1, 1901.....	\$109,641.90	
Received from Treasurer United States.....	1,126,000.00	
Received from paymasters.....	476,513.60	
Received from soldiers' deposits.....	49,173.98	
Received from collections.....	31,047.69	
Total.....		\$1,792,377.17
Disbursed in payment of troops.....	1,575,970.21	
Unexpended balances refunded to Treasurer United States.....	22,524.10	
Collections deposited with Treasurer United States.....	31,047.69	
Total.....		1,629,542.00
Balance on hand June 30, 1902.....		162,835.17

Capt. Seymour Howell, paymaster, U. S. Army, was on duty in Chicago from July 27, 1901, to April 25, 1902; Maj. Harry L. Rees, paymaster, U. S. Army, from April 5, 1902, to date.

OFFICE OF ENGINEER OFFICER.

Lieut. Col. Oswald H. Ernst, Corps of Engineers, was on duty as engineer officer of the department during the entire year.

In addition to the usual routine work of the office, a survey was commenced of two tracts of land of about 3,200 acres each in McHenry, Nunda, and Wauconda townships, Illinois. Maps have been furnished for the information of officers of the command, and surveying instruments have been issued to the engineer officers at posts of the department.

OFFICE OF ORDNANCE OFFICER.

Capt. Frank B. McKenna, Twenty-eighth Infantry, assumed charge November 11, 1901, relieving Maj. Cunliffe H. Murray, Fourth Cavalry, acting adjutant-general.

The business of this office has been of a routine character. Owing to the recent arrival at nearly every post in the department of troops returning from foreign service with arms and equipments deteriorated, an unusual number of requisitions for supplies has been acted upon. They have in all cases been promptly filled by the Ordnance Department.

OFFICE OF SIGNAL OFFICER.

Capt. Frank B. McKenna, Twenty-eighth Infantry, assumed charge June 16, 1902, relieving Capt. John J. Bradley, Fourteenth Infantry, who had been in charge of the office since April 15, 1901.

Existing regulations relating to instruction in military signaling have been generally complied with throughout the department, in so far as present conditions permit.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR OF SMALL-ARMS PRACTICE.

Capt. Francis J. Kernan, Second Infantry, aid-de-camp, assumed charge April 1, 1902, relieving Maj. Cunliffe H. Murray, Fourth Cavalry, acting adjutant-general.

The results of the small-arms firing for the year 1901 were published in General Orders, No. 2, June 18, 1902, these headquarters. Practice for this year is now being carried on.

State of appropriation for galleries and ranges:

Allotted to department, to be expended at discretion of department commander.....	\$2, 223
Allotted to Columbia Arsenal	\$20
Allotted to Fort Sheridan.....	1, 250
Allotted to Fort Wayne.....	350
Total	1, 620
Balance held in reserve	603

Forts Brady, Sheridan, and Thomas have post ranges, but practice for the troops at Columbia Arsenal and Fort Wayne is held on leased land. Columbus Barracks has no range, but arrangements are contemplated to have the garrison practice on the State range at Newark, Ohio.

Owing to the limited time that I have been in command of this department, I have deemed it best to withhold any detailed recommendations and suggestions until I can familiarize myself, by personal inspection, with the needs of my command.

In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 57, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, May 31, 1902, the reports of the chiefs of the several staff departments at these headquarters have been epitomized and incorporated in this report.

Very respectfully,

ARTHUR MACARTHUR,
Major-General, Commanding.

REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN C. BATES, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Omaha, Nebr., June 30, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the administration and affairs in this department for the year ending June 30, 1902:

In compliance with the orders of the President, published in paragraph 8, Special Orders, No. 140, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, series of 1901, I assumed command of the department August 13, 1901, relieving Brig. Gen. Henry C. Merriam. On that date the troops in this department consisted of the following organizations, viz: The First Squadron, Eighth Cavalry; First Squadron, Eleventh Cavalry; Troops B and D, Thirteenth Cavalry; headquarters, field, staff, band, First and Second Squadrons, Fourteenth Cavalry; the Sixth, Seventh, Sixteenth, Nineteenth, and Twentieth Batteries, Field Artillery, and Ninth Band, Artillery Corps; headquarters, field, staff, band, and Companies E, F, and H, Tenth Infantry, and detachment of Indian scouts. Those now in the department are as follows: The First Battalion of Engineers; the Fourth Cavalry, Eighth Cavalry, and the headquarters, field, staff, band, and the First and Third Squadrons, Tenth Cavalry; the Sixth, Seventh, Sixteenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-eighth, and Twenty-ninth Batteries of

Field Artillery, of which the Sixteenth is a siege and the Twenty-eighth a mountain battery; the Ninth Band, Artillery Corps; the Twenty-second Infantry, and detachment of Indian scouts. The roster^a of troops attached hereto (Appendix A^a) shows the stations of the several organizations in the command. The Sixth Infantry is at this date en route from San Francisco, Cal., for Fort Leavenworth, Kans., where it will take station, and the Twenty-fifth Infantry, under orders for this department, will, on its arrival, the date of which is uncertain, be stationed at Fort Niobrara, Nebr., and Fort Reno, Okla., with the headquarters, band, and two battalions at the former post. The organizations which have been ordered from within the limits of the department, with dates of departure and destinations, are shown in the record of events (Appendix B^b).

The very satisfactory orders of my predecessor for the practical instruction of the troops prescribed for the season from April 1 to November 30, 1901, inclusive, were continued in force.

I deemed it proper to personally inspect as early as practicable the several military posts within the limits of my command, and by November 8, 1901, these visits were completed. It was found, naturally, that the small number of men composing the garrisons and the frequent changes among the troops due to the exigencies of the service since the outbreak of hostilities with Spain had resulted in the buildings and grounds showing the neglect of that care and attention which more favorable conditions had previously led us to expect. As stronger and more permanent garrisons have been established, the necessary repairs to buildings and improvements to the grounds have received the earnest and unremitting attention of the post commanders, and with very beneficial results. In this connection I desire to express my thanks to the Quartermaster-General of the Army for the generous response he has given to calls for assistance; for while no request has been made for money or supplies until after due investigation and consideration, it has nevertheless been a source of satisfaction to have received such prompt and cordial cooperation as has been given in placing the several posts in a better condition, thus adding materially to the health and comfort of the command.

INSTRUCTION.

The military instruction given throughout the department, while considerable, has not been as thorough and complete as it is intended to make it next year. This is due to the recent return of many of the organizations from hard service in the Tropics with officers and men run down in health and with many of the former absent for one reason or another, and because other commands are newly organized and mounted. A tendency has been observed among those returning from foreign service to assume there is no longer the need, formerly acknowledged, of constant instruction to officers and men in all that pertains to our profession, and in some instances there has been lacking that interest in gymnastic exercises so essential to the proper setting up of the men and to their health and resulting self-reliance and contentment. These conditions improved, however, as the year advanced and as the health and energies of the members of the command became more vigorous

^aThis roster includes the Sixth Infantry, which arrived and took station at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., July 2, 1902.

^bNot printed.

in a colder climate. The concentration of the troops in larger bodies also permitted more and varied instruction than was practicable in the small detachments which for a time the necessities of the service abroad demanded, and this increased the interest in the work.

The months of December, January, February, and March were designated as the season for theoretical instruction at all the posts in the department except Fort Riley, where, under orders from the Headquarters of the Army, it was fixed from January 10 to May 10. The instruction was first prescribed as directed for the lyceum in General Orders, No. 51, series of 1897, Adjutant-General's Office, but later was changed so as to conform to the requirements of General Order 155, series 1901, from the same source. The schools for enlisted men were conducted during the same season. (See Appendix C.^a) Except where the troops arrived too late to take up theoretical work, the monthly reports submitted show the progress made was creditable. The examinations prescribed in General Orders, No. 155, mentioned above, for officers at the close of each school season will, it is thought, produce excellent results; but in order to obtain uniformity it is believed the examinations should be conducted under well-defined orders from the Headquarters of the Army, so that the certificates of proficiency given at the various posts will indicate substantially the same attainments, and that when an officer is transferred from one command to another during the school season he be examined in so much of the course as he has completed and be given a written statement of his proficiency to be presented to his new commanding officer.

In order to maintain the bearing and dexterity of the troops attained during the more laborious work of the drill season, my orders required that during the months designated for theoretical instruction such outdoor exercises be held during fair weather as post commanders might designate within the scope of the Drill Regulations and Butt's Manual of Physical Drill and that athletic games be encouraged. It was further directed that the hours assigned for these exercises be such as to facilitate the attendance of the greatest number of men.

The period prescribed for practical instruction for the present season extends from April 1 to November 30, inclusive. In imparting this instruction it has been my constant effort to impress upon post commanders the importance of requiring all members of their commands not specially excused by Army Regulations to attend all drills and exercises, and that the efficiency of an organization depends on the average of proficiency of its members, rather than upon the attainments of a few highly developed men. The time authorized for the instruction of recruits before being taken up for full duty in their respective companies has been extended from fifteen days for infantry and twenty days for mounted troops to not to exceed one month for the former or eight weeks for the latter. The labor expended in giving the recruit a good knowledge of his duties previously to placing him on guard and requiring him to attend drills before he is able to do so with justice to himself or the organization to which he belongs is time well spent, and materially lessens the probability of the young soldier becoming discouraged by being reprimanded or more severely punished for shortcomings which his education does not permit him to fully appreciate. No period of a soldier's enlistment is more

^a Not printed.

important, if he is to be made thoroughly efficient, than his first few months of service, and post commanders can not too carefully supervise his instruction at this time.

Until October 1 my orders require that field exercises be distributed throughout the drill season, except that portion devoted to small-arms practice, commencing with one practice per week, and that after the date stated these exercises be held oftener, so as to make up the full forty days prescribed by the War Department. Owing to the many changes of station that occurred last summer and fall, and to the late arrival within the department of some of the organizations, this exceedingly important and usually highly interesting instruction, assimilated as nearly as possible to war conditions, did not receive last year the attention I hope to have bestowed upon it during the coming autumn. These exercises should not only show the comparative proficiency attained by the separate organizations as a result of a year's labor properly divided between theoretical and practical instruction, but they should and will be made to furnish a school for education in the higher and more complicated problems of our profession, where considerable numbers are assembled and the conditions incident to war are imposed upon commanders as far as practicable. The object of the instruction prescribed throughout the year looks to the gradual development of entire units, and the autumn maneuvers should afford the officers of the several commands a good opportunity to judge of the relative efficiency attained by their respective organizations. No small amount of the advantages to be derived from these maneuvers consists in the opportunity for discussion and exchange of ideas among the participants. These exercises, together with the prescribed gymnastics, naturally cultivate a love for field sports of all kinds, and life in the open, which breeds health and correct habits.

For several years past the exacting nature of our foreign service has been such as to materially lessen the amount of instruction formerly given in rifle practice, but more favorable conditions have permitted this important part of the soldier's education to be systematically taken up during the present season, and with fairly satisfactory results. With the renewal of the department and army competitions formerly held, there is no reason why this highly essential work should not command its former interest, with the corresponding general efficiency.

NEW ORGANIZATIONS.

Upon the date of the last annual report the Fourteenth Cavalry, the Nineteenth and Twentieth Batteries, and the Ninth Band, Artillery Corps, were being organized, the cavalry at Fort Leavenworth and the artillery at Fort Riley. The First Squadron, Eleventh Cavalry, arrived at Jefferson Barracks, Mo., from Fort Ethan Allen, Vt., in July, and in the same month Troops B and D, Thirteenth Cavalry, reached Fort Robinson, Nebr., from Fort Meade, S. Dak. The Twenty-eighth Battery (Mountain) has been organized at Fort Leavenworth, and the Twenty-ninth Battery reached Fort Sill, Okla., January 9, 1902, from Cuba, but without equipment. All these organizations have made good progress, and the officers and enlisted men connected therewith are complimented upon their efforts. The Twenty-ninth Battery, however, has not yet received its guns. All of the cavalry mentioned under this head has been transferred from the department prior to the date of this report.

DISCIPLINE.

The discipline of the command has been good, although there have been more trials by court-martial than should be necessary hereafter, under more favorable conditions. Many of these, however, are directly chargeable to the large number of recruits who were required to meet the demands of new organizations and of others which were filled for foreign service. Many desertions are undoubtedly due to homesickness on the part of the recruit, and because a considerable number of young men enlist with little knowledge of the life of a soldier, and without mature deliberation. A trial for a few days at a military post is perhaps the best way to determine if an applicant for enlistment will probably make a desirable soldier, and it would also enable the man to decide understandingly if the life will suit him. It is believed to be practicable to apply this test in most instances.

REPORTS OF STAFF OFFICERS.

There is nothing calling for special remark in the reports of the acting inspector-general, signal officer, inspector of small-arms practice, and ordnance officer at these headquarters. In fact, these officers, and the judge-advocate have, through necessity, been changed so frequently during the year that it has been difficult for them, although working diligently and intelligently, to become perfectly familiar with the particular work in hand, and to introduce and carry out any improvements if needed. Details recently made indicate a more favorable condition for the ensuing year, but the department is now without its regularly assigned judge-advocate, and the chief surgeon, under orders to join since April 15, 1902, has not yet reported.

ENGINEER OFFICER.

General Orders, No. 14, c. s., these headquarters, promulgated a systematic scheme of engineer operations to be carried on at all the garrisons in the department, by the acting engineer officers, assisted by subaltern officers and enlisted men. The order calls for the preparation of suitable maps of posts and reservations, with the instruction of lieutenants in military topography and sketching.

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

The following recommendations, contained in the report of the chief commissary, are concurred in, viz:

The quality of the articles furnished for issue and sale has, on the whole, been excellent, and the losses occurring by deterioration through climatic influence or accident have been slight, and in most instances the loss has been on potatoes and onions, due mainly to natural causes occurring in transportation and storage at posts in the vicinity of which none of those vegetables could be procured.

The issuance of meal requests to individual soldiers and detachments traveling under orders has been found to be a great convenience to all concerned, and the results have been far better than under the former system of payment of commutation.

The privilege of purchasing stores and exceptional articles has been liberally used. In this connection it is respectfully suggested that the convenience of purchasers of stores would be enhanced by the addition of the following articles to the list of stores now authorized to be kept on hand for sale to officers and enlisted men:

Razors and shaving soap; we now sell razor strops.

Pens, holders, and points; we now sell ink.

Thread, cotton, and linen, white and black; three sizes of each.

Needles, assorted sizes, or, preferably, needle books.

Buttons, trousers.

Envelopes, note.

Paper, note; we now sell letter paper and envelopes only; the smaller sizes would be more convenient.

Cigars.—The number of brands to be kept on hand at each post to be increased from two to four, for the reason that desires differ so materially in cigars that two varieties poorly cater to the tastes of the smokers. No wastage or additional expense need be incurred by handling two or more varieties in addition to those now authorized.

Toilet soaps could also be increased in the same proportion.

The commissary storehouse at Fort Leavenworth should be considerably enlarged, or a new building for the purpose erected. The great increase in the size of that garrison will make the building now used as a storehouse, salesroom, etc., entirely too small.

PAY DEPARTMENT.

The work of this department has been unusually onerous, due to the organization of new commands, to the large number of enlisted men discharged from regiments returning from foreign service, and to frequent changes in the several garrisons as well as among the paymasters. \$1,774,491.15 have been disbursed to troops with reasonable promptness.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

Lieut. Col. Henry S. Turrill, deputy surgeon-general, U. S. Army, is under orders to report at these headquarters as chief surgeon, but has not yet joined. In the meantime Capt. Paul F. Straub, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, is in charge of office.

On June 30 there were 23 medical officers on duty in this department, 2 dental surgeons, and 161 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps, of whom 11 were hospital stewards and 16 acting hospital stewards. It is reported the plan inaugurated by the Surgeon-General December, 1900, whereby the chief surgeons of the departments were made responsible for the recruitment, instruction, and discipline of the Hospital Corps men serving under them, has produced satisfactory results. The enlisted men have been instructed at least five hours weekly in the duties and scientific knowledge pertaining to their service. The efficiency of the said detachments is reported as satisfactory. The school for instruction of the Hospital Corps men established at Fort Leavenworth furnishes a satisfactory reserve from which to draw in case members of this corps are needed at any post or for other emergencies.

Sanitary conditions.—At Jefferson Barracks malarial fever has continued to be quite prevalent, the number of cases during the past two years being greater at that post than at any other in the Department. On the recommendation of the present post surgeon, who believes these fevers are transmitted by mosquitos, energetic measures have been taken to exterminate them as nearly as practicable, and it is hoped to secure beneficial results thereby.

The water at Fort Leavenworth continues to be the subject of criticism and recommendation by the post surgeon. Several cases of typhoid fever which appeared at that post during the past year were attributed to impure water. Analyses show plainly that the water at Fort Leavenworth is impure; moreover, it is very much doubted if the present system will give a sufficient supply for the rapidly increasing garrison. It is thought immediate steps should be taken to establish a new sys-

tem of waterworks at this post, both as a sanitary measure and as a precaution against fire. A recent chemical examination, in the office of the Surgeon-General, of this water revealed the presence of a considerable amount of vegetable matter held in solution, and in this respect the filtered water was as impure as that taken from the taps. The percentage of diarrhea and dysentery patients is greater at this post than at any other in the department.

Accompanying tables (Appendix D^a) show the percentage of the command rendered noneffective through disease and the number of cases of illness at the different posts.

Discharged for disability.—One hundred and twenty-four discharges were made during the year on certificates of disability. Forty-one were for disability incurred prior to enlistment, which would seem to indicate that the physical examinations to which recruits are subjected are not sufficiently exacting.

New hospitals.—During the year two new hospitals were completed, one at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., and the other at Fort Robinson, Nebr. The former is a fine building and quite up to date in its equipment; the latter is not sufficiently large for the needs of the post and an early addition has been recommended.

At Fort Riley there is urgent need for the erection of a new hospital, constructed on a modern plan, having at least a 100-bed capacity.

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

The administration by the chief quartermaster of the affairs pertaining to this department has been satisfactory. Certain detailed information will be found in Appendixes E^a and F.^a

Posts.—Building on an extensive scale has been carried on during the year at Fort Leavenworth and also to a considerable extent at Fort Riley. Both of these posts will continue to serve for an indefinite period as important garrisons; and in addition to housing and permitting of the instruction of a large number of troops, there is every reason to believe the Government will be amply rewarded for the money and labor expended upon them by the general information and technical knowledge to be gained by the young officers who will take the course of instruction at the "General Service and Staff College" soon to be established at the former, or at the "School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery" at the latter post. I recommend that the liberality which has been shown recently in improving these garrisons be continued until such conveniences are secured as will permit the schools named to be conducted so as to secure all possible advantages.

In this connection I invite attention to the fact that while a school has been established at Fort Monroe for the special training of artillery officers, and another at Fort Riley for those belonging to the cavalry and field artillery, no similar provision has been made for infantry officers. Indeed, the latter seem to have lost by the newly arranged scheme for instruction, insomuch as they formerly had the "Infantry and Cavalry School" at Fort Leavenworth, which apparently is not to be included in the new system of postgraduate instruction. In view of the great importance of the infantry arm and the urgent need of keeping the officers thereof abreast with modern improvements and

^a Not printed.

ideas, I earnestly recommend that some suitable provision be made for a special school for officers of infantry.

Fort Riley has been selected as a site for yearly autumn maneuvers to be conducted on a scale hitherto unknown in this country. It is admirably adapted to the purpose stated, and surveys have recently been made looking to the proper encampment of about 20,000 men. Because of the size of the reservation and the natural advantages of its terrain for the operations of mounted troops, I am of the opinion and recommend that the cavalry there should be increased to two regiments as early as the necessary additional buildings can be erected.

Fort Crook is a handsomely built post. The sanitary conditions are good. It has sufficient barrack capacity to quarter eight small companies and a band, and should be sufficiently enlarged to accommodate a full regiment of infantry. It is proper to state, however, it has not yet been practicable to arrange for target practice at this post with entire safety to the surrounding farmers. It is believed, although not definitely determined, the difficulty can be overcome by building a high embankment immediately in rear of the "butts," and this plan is now under consideration. If this proves to be impracticable it will become necessary to buy a proper site for a range. This site should be preferably, but not necessarily, near the post, and it is doubtful if any suitable ground can be had near by at a fair valuation. If located at a distance, practice marches can be combined with target practice, as was done this year when the troops were sent for the latter purpose to the Omaha Indian Reservation, 80 miles from the post. It is not thought it will be practicable to hold further target practice on the said reservation, or at least only for a season or two, the land having been allotted in severalty and some of the occupants being disposed to object.

It is recommended only such repairs be made at Fort Niobrara, Nebr., as may be necessary to make the troops stationed there comfortable, and that as early as practicable it be discontinued and its garrison transferred to other stations.

Fort Robinson, including the wood and timber reserve, has a fine reservation of 36 square miles. Our comparatively few large military reservations are becoming very valuable, because of the increased size of the Army and the great range of modern firearms, and it would seem to be a wise policy to build in the future so as to utilize the best of these large tracts of land to the greatest advantage. For like reasons Forts Sill and Reno, Okla., are worth continuing; the former has a reservation of 77,920 acres, including the wood reserve. There are, however, about 260 Apache prisoners of war located on it. The reservation at Fort Reno contains 9,493 acres. These two posts also possess the advantage of being located in a mild climate where troops can be instructed in the open for the greater part of the year. Both need extensive repairs. Reno had better be rebuilt outright, the old buildings being allowed to stand until the new ones, which should be erected on corresponding lines in the rear, are completed.

Fort Logan H. Roots is well built, but small and comparatively unimportant.

Jefferson Barracks, Mo., now garrisoned by eight skeleton troops of cavalry to be used as instructors for recruits, is not well adapted for mounted troops and should be converted into an infantry garrison.

It is expected work will be pushed vigorously during the ensuing year on the new post to be built near Des Moines, Iowa.

APACHE PRISONERS OF WAR.

These Indians were located on the Fort Sill Reservation, Okla., in 1894, and since that date about 28,000 acres of land have been added to the original 23,040 comprising the reservation, with a view to the permanent location thereon of the said Indians as well as for military purposes. There is also a wood reserve of 26,880 acres, lying about 15 miles from the main reservation, thus making a grand total of 77,920 acres. A bill was introduced, with my approval, in the last session of Congress recommending that certain grazing lands on the above-stated reservation, including the wood reserve, be rented for grazing purposes for the benefit of these Indians. It did not become a law, and it should, I think, be renewed at the next session, unless it be determined to permanently divide the reservation, so as to assign one part for military purposes and the other to the Indians. Sufficient land may be assigned the latter from the reservation and the wood reserve combined to give each Indian 160 acres, when allotment in severalty becomes desirable, and still leave for military purposes nearly 36,000 acres. It is believed the time has come for some such division. Unless this be done the progress of the Indians will be retarded sooner or later, or military instruction at Fort Sill materially limited. The Indians now have some 3,400 head of cattle, and the herd is materially increasing from year to year, and it is necessary for them to cultivate some of the soil. It will be unfortunate for them if they be allowed to make extensive improvements on ground that may later be permanently assigned to the military.

They are under charge of Capt. Farrand Sayre, Eighth Cavalry, who has displayed great energy, interest, and good judgment in the discharge of this unusual duty. Although the general health of the tribe was much better during the last year than the one preceding, there were 22 deaths and but 12 births. Captain Sayre assigns the general improvement in health to the fact that the Indians have been prohibited from having dances in cold and inclement weather during the past year. He states the large death rate is due mainly to the fact that a number of infants died of intestinal troubles during the hot weather of last summer.

The progress these Indians are making toward civilization is commendable, and humanity dictates that if they be assigned to a certain part of the reservation, and in consequence thereof have to establish new homes and shops, the Government deal with them with the utmost liberality, in order that they may not be pecuniarily injured by the change, or their interest in their work dampened. They are no longer, in any sense, prisoners, and many of them have been born since the original number arrived at Fort Sill.

Very respectfully,

J. C. BATES,
*Major-General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Department.*

**REPORT OF COL. WILLIAM C. FORBUSH, TWELFTH U. S. CAVALRY,
COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS.**

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, Tex., August 1, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the annual report of the Department of Texas for the year ending June 30, 1902.

In compliance with paragraph 213, Army Regulations, I assumed command of the department on the 20th of January, 1902, and relinquished the command of same April 4, 1902, to Col. W. F. Spurgin, Fourth Infantry. I again assumed command upon the retirement of Brig. Gen. W. F. Spurgin, U. S. Army, May 29, 1902.

In the month of May Forts Brown, Ringgold, and Camp Eagle Pass, unoccupied for from one to two years except by small detachments, were regarrisoned by the Fourth Infantry.

On the 8th of May the First Battalion of the Eighteenth Infantry was transferred from Fort Bliss to the Department of the Colorado, with station at Fort Logan.

The Third Battalion, Twelfth Infantry, arrived from San Francisco, Cal., and took station at Fort Bliss, Tex., on May 8, 1902.

On the 26th of June, 1902, the two companies of coast artillery—the Twelfth and One hundred and twenty-fifth—one of which—the One hundred and twenty-fifth—was organized at Fort Clark, Tex., during the past year, were transferred to the Department of the East, one company being sent to Fort Wright, N. Y., and the other to Fort Trumbull, Conn., for station.

The garrison of Fort McIntosh has been changed from Twelfth Cavalry to Fourth Infantry.

The headquarters, band, and Second and Third squadrons, Twelfth Cavalry, have been changed from Fort Sam Houston, Tex., to Fort Clark, Tex., and the headquarters Fourth Infantry and First Squadron, Twelfth Cavalry, have been moved to Fort Sam Houston, Tex., from Forts Clark and Bliss.

The water supply at Fort Ringgold is still a matter of considerable annoyance, but it is thought that the sinking of an artesian well, as approved by Colonel Wheelan while in command of the Department, will furnish a permanent supply of water for all time.

The present status of Fort Brown, as to the encroachments of the Rio Grande upon the military reservation, remains unchanged.

The regular lyceum course for the season was held throughout the Department. Circular No. 8, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, current series, for the establishment of the school in the place of the lyceum, as set forth by General Orders, No. 155, Adjutant-General's Office, series of 1901, was not received till March 20, 1902—too late for any progress this season. Schools for enlisted men were held at all posts except Forts Brown, Ringgold, and Camp Eagle Pass, which were garrisoned by detachments. Schools for noncommissioned officers were held at all posts during the time allotted for the purpose.

The Twelfth Cavalry has passed through its second season of target practice, with a very marked improvement over that of the first season.

Practical instruction in both close and extended order, map reading, map making, small and large patrols, and all phases of security and

information, using pack trains, principally, for transportation, has been practiced, as far as possible, by the cavalry and field artillery. The infantry have just returned from the Philippines, and have done all that could be expected of them with the men at hand, principally recruits.

The placing of a steamer on the route from Galveston to Point Isabel, which occurred in the early part of May last, makes the sending of supplies to Fort Brown, Tex., more practicable and satisfactory.

INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

[In charge of Maj. Thomas R. Adams, Artillery Corps, Inspector-General.]

During the year all the posts in the department have been inspected, besides three colleges, one arsenal, and two recruiting stations; also the accounts of all disbursing officers, in accordance with law and Army Regulations.

Property inspected amounted to \$280,240.31, and value of property condemned, \$250,969.45.

Two national cemeteries were inspected.

JUDGE ADVOCATE'S DEPARTMENT.

[In charge of Capt. C. D. Roberts, Seventh Infantry, Acting Judge-Advocate.]

No commissioned officers were tried. Number of trials of enlisted men by general court-martial, 280; also 1 general prisoner.

One of the great difficulties experienced concerning the administration of military justice has been the small capacity of the guardhouses and keeping the different grades of prisoners separate and enforcing prison discipline.

It is believed that the old system of a central military prison (or a number of them) would be better for discipline. At present a deserter is confined at post guardhouse. He gets the same food as the faithful soldier whose duty it is to guard him day and night. The "hard labor" to which he is sentenced generally consists of the easiest and laziest kind of police work during a few hours of the day, while he gets every night in bed. His life is easier than that of the soldier, and the important object of his punishment, viz, to deter others from committing crime, is not realized.

If the present system of confining general prisoners at posts is to be continued, a regular prison should be built at some post in the department with a capacity of at least 50 general prisoners.

The increase in the reward paid for the apprehension of deserters makes their capture more certain.

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

[In charge Lieut. Col. J. L. Clem, Quartermaster's Department.]

Disbursements.

Appropriations.	Received.	Disbursed.	On hand.
Regular supplies	\$181,404.17	\$171,964.99	\$9,419.18
Incidental expenses	36,840.00	33,825.67	3,014.33
Army transportation	198,472.00	153,434.12	45,038.88
Barracks and quarters	26,367.85	24,536.11	1,831.74
Shooting galleries and ranges	1,673.82	1,631.61	42.21
Hospitals	281.55	274.49	7.06
Hospital stewards' quarters	761.10	730.27	30.83
Clothing and equipage	969.76	895.26	74.50
Total	446,771.25	387,312.52	59,458.73

Two artesian wells have been sunk at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., with successful results.

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

[In charge of Capt. S. B. Bootes, subsistence department.]

Generally the market depot of supply has been St. Louis, Mo. Fresh vegetables for Fort Clark, Fort Sam Houston, and Camp Eagle Pass have been purchased at San Antonio, Tex.; for Fort Bliss at El Paso, Tex.; for Forts McIntosh and Ringgold at Laredo, Tex., when prices have been lower than at San Antonio. Onions for Fort Ringgold for nearly the entire year have been purchased at Rio Grande City. Fresh vegetables for Fort Brown have been purchased at Brownsville, Tex.

Issue flour, since June 1, has been purchased at San Antonio, Tex., from local mills, quality comparing favorably with that purchased heretofore at St. Louis, Mo., saving to Government the transportation of 44 cents per 100 pounds.

Issue bacon is furnished from Kansas City or Chicago.

Rice, coffees, sugars, molasses, cane sirup, and shrimps are purchased at New Orleans.

Fresh beef has been furnished by contract at all the posts, at satisfactory rates and in a satisfactory manner, as shown by monthly reports of the commissaries at all posts.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

[In charge of Col. Peter J. A. Cleary, medical department.]

The number taken on sick report was 3,549, giving a ratio of 1,699.47 per 1,000. Of those admitted to sick report, 74 were discharged on certificates of disability and 13 died.

The general health of the department has been good; but an epidemic of typhoid fever at Fort Clark, lasting all the summer of 1901, and growing in intensity into the autumn of the year, prevailed. This, as determined by the post surgeon at Fort Clark, was due to flies hatched in cavalry stables and blown into the kitchens and dining rooms, where they existed in great numbers, going through the men's sinks on the way.

The destruction of the flies, which are known to be carriers of disease, will reduce the probability of further trouble from this matter in future.

With the establishment of new sewer system, with water-closets, now in process of construction, it is hoped all difficulty of whatever nature will be obviated which tend to the spread of disease.

The two dental surgeons in the department have rendered good service, 1,296 dental operations having been performed.

DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS.

PAY DEPARTMENT.

[In charge of Maj. Charles Newbold, pay department.]

Balance on hand July 1, 1901	\$12,513.23	
Received by official transfer.....	719,090.23	
Soldiers' deposits.....	26,946.09	
Paymaster's collections	32,982.52	
	<hr/>	\$791,532.07
Disbursed	734,047.73	
Paymaster's collections deposited to credit Treasurer United States	32,982.52	
Unexpended balances deposited to credit Treasurer United States	11,154.82	
	<hr/>	778,185.07
Balance June 30, 1902		13,347.00

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

[In charge of Lieut. Col. A. L. Varney, ordnance department.]

The duties mainly have been limited to a supervision of the supply of ordnance stores to troops in the department.

SMALL-ARMS PRACTICE.

[In charge of Capt. C. D. Roberts, Seventh Infantry.]

All cavalry troops have completed their carbine and revolver firing for the present year.

Owing to the late arrival of the Fourth and Twelfth Infantry from the Philippines and the fact that a large number of recruits were required to fill these organizations to the required strength, it has been necessary to extend their practice to the fall months.

Thorough instruction in the use of the rifle, carbine, and revolver is at present especially important, owing to the large number of recruits found in all organizations.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

[In charge of Capt. C. S. Riché, Corps of Engineers.]

Took charge May 5, 1902, per General Orders, No. 12, Department of Texas, 1902, relieving Capt. C. D. Roberts, Seventh U. S. Infantry, but retaining station at Galveston. Since that time Captain Roberts has given attention to all matters at this station which could not well be attended to from Galveston.

During the greater part of the year the operations of the office have been only to supply troops with engineering material when required. For this purpose, in October, 1901, a requisition for instruments and materials was made, and the property received has nearly all been issued.

Work on the military map of Texas will be continued and blue-print maps furnished as soon as the proper instruments arrive, for which requisition has been made.

SIGNAL OFFICE.

[In charge of Capt. C. D. Roberts, Seventh Infantry.]

Troops in department are required by General Orders, No. 8, current series, Headquarters Department of Texas, to be instructed in signaling and to keep up the proficiency required by Army Regulations.

Complete telephone systems have been established at Forts Bliss, Clark, McIntosh, and Sam Houston, and materials are being furnished for the installation of these systems at Forts Brown, Ringgold, and Camp Eagle Pass.

All posts in the department are supplied with proper signal equipments and stores.

Under instructions from the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, a Signal Corps supply depot is to be established at these headquarters, from which all posts will be supplied in future.

There were three sections of military telegraph line in this department in operation during the year, viz:

	Miles.
Fort Bliss-El Paso section.....	6
Fort Clark-Spofford Junction section.....	9½
Fort McIntosh-Fort Brown section, about.....	237

Very respectfully,

W. C. FORBUSH,
Colonel, Twelfth Cavalry, Commanding.

**FINAL REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. LEONARD WOOD, U. S. ARMY,
COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF CUBA.**

[Covering the period from July 1, 1901, to May 20, 1902, when discontinued.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *August 13, 1902.*

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the military operations in the Department of Cuba during that part of the fiscal year from July 1, 1901, the date of the last report, until the American evacuation, May 20, 1902, during which time I was in command of the department, the geographical limits of which were comprised within the island of Cuba and the Isle of Pines. During the year past I personally inspected every post in the department, and have found them all well administered and the troops comfortably supplied and housed.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Capt. H. L. Scott, Seventh Cavalry, adjutant-general.

The troops on duty in the department July 1, 1901, were as follows:

Regiment.	Company.	Headquarters.
Second Cavalry.....	A.....	Hamilton Barracks.
	B.....	Do.
	C.....	Do.
	D.....	Do.
	E.....	Do.
	F.....	Do.
	G.....	Do.
	H.....	Do.

Regiment.	Company.	Headquarters.
Second Cavalry.....	I.....	Rowell Barracks.
	K.....	Do.
	L.....	Do.
Seventh Cavalry.....	M.....	Do.
	A.....	Columbia Barracks.
	B.....	Do.
	C.....	Do.
	D.....	Do.
	E.....	Do.
	F.....	Do.
	G.....	Do.
	H.....	Do.
	I.....	Do.
	K.....	Do.
	L.....	Do.
	M.....	Do.
Eighth Cavalry.....	E.....	San Luis.
	F.....	Morro Castle, Santiago.
	G.....	Do.
	H.....	Do.
	I.....	Puerto Principe.
	K.....	Do.
	L.....	Do.
	M.....	Do.
Tenth Cavalry ^b	A.....	Manzanillo.
	B.....	Holguin.
	C.....	Bayamo.
	D.....	Holguin.
	E.....	Do.
	K.....	Do.
	L.....	Manzanillo.
	M.....	Do.
Field Artillery.....	Third Battery.....	Columbia Barracks.
Coast Artillery.....	Seventeenth Company.....	Fort No. 3, Habana.
	Eighteenth Company.....	Pirotecnia, Habana.
	Nineteenth Company.....	Cabaña Barracks, Habana.
	Twentieth Company.....	Do.
	Twenty-first Company.....	Do.
	Twenty-second Company.....	Fort No. 4, Habana.
	Twenty-third Company.....	Santa Clara Battery, Habana.
	Twenty-fourth Company.....	Fort No. 5, Habana.

^aTroop A was at Fort Dixon, Ind. T.; Troops B and D were at Fort Riley, Kans., and Troop C was at Fort Sill, Okla.

^bTroops E, F, G, and H, Tenth Cavalry, were at Manila, P. I.

The following movements of troops took place in the department during the past year:

August, 1901.—Eighteenth Company Coast Artillery, from Pirotecnia Militar to Cabaña; Seventeenth Company Coast Artillery, from Headquarters Artillery Defenses to Pirotecnia; Nineteenth Company Coast Artillery, from Cabaña Barracks to Artillery Defenses.

December 20, 1901.—Troop E, Eighth Cavalry, from San Luis to Morro Castle.

December 21, 1901.—Troop C, Tenth Cavalry, from Bayamo to Manzanillo.

February 25, 1902.—Band, Eighth Cavalry, from Camp Mackenzie to Morro Castle.

April 13, 1902.—Twenty-first and Eighteenth Companies Coast Artillery, from Cabaña Barracks to Rowell Barracks.

April 14, 1902.—Twenty-second Company Coast Artillery, from Artillery Defenses to Cabaña Barracks.

April 22, 1902.—Seventeenth and Nineteenth Companies Coast Artillery, from Artillery Defenses to Morro Castle.

The following troops were relieved from duty in the department and ordered to the United States upon the dates and ships opposite their respective destinations:

Troops.	Date.	Vessel.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Animals.
	1902.				
Twenty-ninth Battery	Jan. 4	Aranzas	3	63
Headquarters F. S. Band and Second Squadron, Second Cavalry	Jan. 17	Olinda	30	257
Detachment Seventh Cavalry	Apr. 12	Corvaja	1	30	124
Troop C, Seventh Cavalry	Apr. 13	Parran	2	73	473
Detachment Seventh Cavalry	Apr. 18	Europa	3	52	225
Detachment Second Cavalry	do	Uto	1	33	143
Do	Apr. 22	Albis	1	96	355
A, B, D, Seventh Cavalry, and Third Battery	Apr. 19	Morro Castle	7	232
Headquarters F. S. and Third Squadron, Eighth Cavalry	Feb. 25	Curityba	21	251
Detachment Tenth Cavalry	Apr. 21	Fri	1	106	394
Detachment Eighth Cavalry	do	Uto	1	11	219
First Squadron, Second Cavalry	Apr. 23	Curityba	9	211
Detachment Seventh Cavalry	Apr. 25	Corvaja	1	11	156
Troops F and G, Seventh Cavalry, headquarters F. S. Band, and A, C, L, M, Tenth Cavalry	Apr. 26	Seguranca	4 9	135 255
Detachment Second Cavalry	do	Parran	1	18	75
Third Squadron, Second Cavalry	Apr. 30	Santiago	9	208
Headquarters Second and Third squadrons, Seventh Cavalry	May 20	Morro Castle	46	458	8
Troops E and H, Eighth Cavalry	do	13	209
B, D, I, K, Tenth Cavalry	May. 6	Olinda	9	196
Detachment Third Battery	Apr. 29	Hydra	1	30	208

The following posts were ordered abandoned during the year:

San Luis, December 20, 1901; Bayamo, December 21, 1901; Camp R. S. Mackenzie, Puerto Principe, February 25, 1902; Hamilton Barracks, Matanzas, April 23, 1902; Guantanamo, April 17, 1902; Manzanillo, April 25, 1902; Holguin, May 5, 1902; Columbia Barracks, May 20, 1902.

The district of Santiago, under Col. S. M. Whitside, Tenth Cavalry, was abolished as per General Orders, No. 9, Headquarters Department of Cuba, April 5, 1902.

The following officers and troops were present in Habana and Santiago May 20, 1902, and took part in the ceremonies attending the evacuation:

Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood, U. S. Army, military governor.
 First Lieut. M. E. Hanna, Second Cavalry, aid-de-camp.
 First Lieut. F. R. McCoy, Tenth Cavalry, aid-de-camp.
 First Lieut. E. Carpenter, Artillery Corps, acting aid-de-camp.
 Capt. H. L. Scott, Seventh Cavalry, adjutant-general.
 Col. G. H. Burton, inspector-general, U. S. Army, inspector-general.
 Maj. George M. Dunn, judge-advocate, U. S. Army, judge-advocate.
 Capt. C. B. Baker, captain of infantry, chief quartermaster.
 Lieut. Col. W. L. Alexander, deputy commissary-general, U. S. Army, chief commissary.
 Maj. W. C. Gorgas, surgeon, U. S. Army, chief surgeon.
 Maj. J. C. Muhlenberg, paymaster, U. S. Army, chief paymaster.
 Maj. H. F. Hodges, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, chief engineer.
 Capt. O. A. Nesmith, signal officer, U. S. Army, chief signal officer.
 Maj. T. H. Bliss, Subsistence Department, U. S. Army, chief of customs service of Cuba.

Maj. J. R. Kean, surgeon, U. S. Army, superintendent department of charities.

Maj. J. L. Bullis, paymaster, U. S. Army.

Capt. W. S. Scott, quartermaster, U. S. Army.

Capt. W. B. Barker, quartermaster, U. S. Army.

Capt. R. H. Rolfe, quartermaster, U. S. Army.

Capt. J. E. Bloom, Subsistence Department, U. S. Army.

First Lieut. W. J. Barden, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, chief engineer, city of Habana.

Maj. D. T. Lainé, surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, attending surgeon.

Lieut. Col. W. S. Edgerly, Seventh Cavalry, assistant inspector-general.

Capt. H. J. Slocum, Seventh Cavalry, superintendent rural guard.

Capt. F. S. Foltz, Second Cavalry, supervisor of police of Habana.

Capt. A. Moses, Artillery Corps, acting chief ordnance officer.

First Lieut. R. S. Wells, Eighth Cavalry, special duty, department headquarters.

First Lieut. Evan H. Humphrey, Seventh Cavalry, assistant to chief quartermaster of the department.

COLUMBIA BARRACKS.

Col. T. A. Baldwin, Seventh Cavalry.

Capt. D. C. Howard, surgeon, U. S. Army.

Capt. S. P. Vestal, quartermaster, Seventh Cavalry.

Capt. W. H. Paine, Seventh Cavalry.

First Lieut. E. E. Booth, Seventh Cavalry.

First Lieut. G. E. Lovell, Seventh Cavalry.

Capt. E. P. Brewer, Seventh Cavalry.

Capt. J. C. Waterman, Seventh Cavalry.

Capt. S. R. H. Tompkins, Seventh Cavalry.

Capt. F. H. Beach, Seventh Cavalry.

Capt. M. C. Butler, jr., Seventh Cavalry.

Chaplain J. M. Moose, Seventh Cavalry.

First Lieut. D. T. E. Casteel, Seventh Cavalry.

First Lieut. W. J. Kendrick, Seventh Cavalry.

First Lieut. A. F. Commiskey, Seventh Cavalry.

Second Lieut. R. S. Bamberger, Seventh Cavalry.

Second Lieut. T. H. Jennings, Seventh Cavalry.

Second Lieut. W. A. Austin, Seventh Cavalry.

Second Lieut. H. E. Mann, Seventh Cavalry.

Second Lieut. J. P. Barney, Seventh Cavalry.

Second Lieut. N. M. Cartmell, Seventh Cavalry.

Second Lieut. H. J. McKenney, Seventh Cavalry.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

Col. S. M. Whitside Tenth Cavalry, commanding district of Santiago.

Maj. G. K. McGunnegle, Third Infantry.

Capt. R. G. Paxton, Tenth Cavalry.

Capt. S. D. Rockenbach, Twelfth Cavalry.

First Lieut. H. C. Whitehead, Tenth Cavalry.

First Lieut. W. W. Whitside, Tenth Cavalry.

The above-mentioned officers and troops left for their stations in the United States on the afternoon of May 20, with the exception of

Majors Gorgas and Lainé, medical department, ordered to remain in Cuba, the former by paragraph 2, Special Orders 91, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, D. C., April 17, 1902, and the latter by direction of the Secretary of War under date of May 13, 1902.

The following officers and batteries were left in Cuba, May 20, and were then transferred to the jurisdiction of the commanding general Department of the East by General Orders, No. 31, Adjutant-General's Office, March 25, 1902:

HABANA, CUBA.

Battery.	Officers.
Twentieth Company Coast Artillery	Capt. E. T. Brown, First Lieut. E. A. Stuart, Second Lieut. J. E. Myers.
Twenty-second Company Coast Artillery	Capt. D. E. Aultman, First Lieut. H. J. Watson, Second Lieut. Howard S. Miller.
Twenty-third Company Coast Artillery	Capt. Andrew Moses, Second Lieut. W. J. Whitthorne, Second Lieut. F. L. Perry.
Twenty-fourth Company Coast Artillery	Capt. G. W. Gatchell, First Lieut. Granville Sevier, Second Lieut. William H. Menges.

SANTIAGO, CUBA.

Seventeenth Company Coast Artillery	Capt. C. H. Arnold, First Lieut. Albert C. Thompson, Second Lieut. Graham Parker.
Nineteenth Company Coast Artillery	Capt. T. Q. Ashburn, First Lieut. L. T. Waldron, Second Lieut. William N. Michel.

ROWELL BARRACKS, CIENFUEGOS.

Eighteenth Company Coast Artillery	First Lieut. Elijah B. Martindale, Jr., Second Lieut. Chas. C. Burt.
Twenty-first Company Coast Artillery	Capt. J. W. Brady, First Lieut. J. W. Gulick, Second Lieut. R. I. Taylor.

Your attention is invited to the valuable services performed by the chief clerk, Mr. F. Steinhart, as reported in my last annual report, and I beg leave to state that his services have been invaluable to the Government, and that the fine corps of clerks under him have labored with him day and night at all seasons of the year. It is recommended that these gentlemen be kept in the employ of the military service of the United States, as they are highly trained, most efficient, and men of exemplary character.

INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Col. G. H. Burton, inspector-general U. S. Army, inspector-general.

The inspector-general has been assisted by Maj. G. K. McGunnegle, Third Infantry, acting inspector-general, stationed at Santiago; by Capt. R. H. Rolfe, quartermaster, U. S. Army, special inspector, and by Maj. Ezra B. Fuller, Tenth Cavalry, acting inspector-general, from the beginning of the fiscal year to April 9, 1902, and by Lieut. Col. W. S. Edgerly, Seventh Cavalry, acting inspector-general, from January 16, 1902, to date.

During the past year 2,099,483 articles of United States property, borne on 537 sets of inventory and inspection reports, have been inspected and disposed of as follows:

	Articles.	Known value.
Continued in service.....	356, 475	\$24, 879. 72
Destroyed.....	236, 848	89, 518. 29
Broken up.....	8, 154	14, 142. 00
Sold.....	1, 286, 431	340, 184. 74
Turned into depot.....	211, 575	35, 498. 83
Total.....	2, 099, 483	504, 223. 58

In addition to the above, 36 sets of inventory and inspection reports, containing 168,253 pounds of subsistence and other stores, were acted on and the property disposed of as follows:

	Pounds.	Known value.
Continued in service.....	799	\$96. 81
Destroyed.....	83, 705	3, 414. 31
Sold.....	83, 749	4, 973. 68
Total.....	168, 253	8, 484. 80

A large amount of this property was acted upon in consequence of the abandonment of the Department of Cuba, and the greater bulk of it sold because of the phenomenally high prices worn property commands at public auction in Cuba.

The accounts of all officers disbursing United States funds have, as far as practicable, been inspected tri-yearly during the period in question to the number of 94, involving \$7,202,804.99. No defalcations and but few irregularities were discovered in these inspections.

The department has been called upon to make numerous investigations, such as the general transport service; commissary supplies for the army in Cuba; alleged theft of quartermaster property at Matanzas, transfer of alleged inferior men from the Seventh Cavalry to the artillery defenses of Habana; dispute between quartermaster and commissary departments relative to quarters for civilian employees at arsenal; escape of military prisoners from Morro Castle, Habana; condition of Eighth Cavalry horses at Camp R. S. Mackenzie; charge of lack of harmony among officers of Artillery Corps at Cabaña Barracks, etc. These investigations were generally made by the inspector-general of the department in person.

All posts, subposts, depots, arsenals, etc., have been inspected and reports thereof rendered, as follows:

Columbia Barracks, Quemados, garrisoned by headquarters, post and regimental noncommissioned staffs, band, detachment of Hospital Corps, Troops A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, and M, Seventh Cavalry, and the Third Battery of Field Artillery—by the inspector-general.

Artillery defenses of Habana, with headquarters, post and regimental noncommissioned staffs, band, detachment of Hospital Corps, stationed at Vedado, and five companies of Coast Artillery, embracing

the following subposts: Battery No. 3, garrisoned by Nineteenth Company Coast Artillery; Battery No. 4, garrisoned by Twenty-second Company Coast Artillery; Battery No. 5, garrisoned by Twenty-fourth Company Coast Artillery; Santa Clara Battery, garrisoned by Twenty-third Company Coast Artillery, and Pirotecnia Militar, garrisoned by Seventeenth Company Coast Artillery—by the inspector-general.

Cabaña Barracks, a separate post of the artillery defenses of Habana, except for fire purposes, across the bay from Habana, with noncommissioned staff, detachment of Hospital Corps, and three companies of Coast Artillery, embracing Battery No. 1, in charge of Twenty-first Company Coast Artillery; Battery No. 2, Twentieth Company Coast Artillery, and Velasco Battery, Eighteenth Company Coast Artillery—by the inspector-general.

Hamilton Barracks, Matanzas, garrisoned by Troops A, B, C, and D, Second Cavalry, noncommissioned staff, and detachment of Hospital Corps—by the inspector-general.

Morro Castle, Santiago, garrisoned by Troops E, F, and H, Eighth Cavalry, noncommissioned staff, and detachment of Hospital Corps—by Maj. G. K. McGunnegle, acting inspector-general.

Rowell Barracks, Paso Caballos, garrisoned by Troops I, K, L, and M, Second Cavalry, noncommissioned staff, and detachment of Hospital Corps—by Lieut. Col. W. S. Edgerly, Seventh Cavalry, acting inspector-general.

Guantanamo, garrisoned by Troop G, Eighth Cavalry, noncommissioned staff, and detachments of Hospital Corps—Maj. G. K. McGunnegle, acting inspector-general.

Manzanillo, garrisoned by headquarters, post and regimental noncommissioned staffs, detachment of Hospital Corps, band, and Troops A, C, L, and M, Tenth Cavalry—by Lieut. Col. W. S. Edgerly, acting inspector-general.

Holguin, garrisoned by Troops B, D, I, and K, Tenth Cavalry, noncommissioned staff, and detachment of Hospital Corps—by Maj. G. K. McGunnegle, acting inspector-general.

Camp R. S. Mackenzie, Puerto Principe, garrisoned by headquarters, post and regimental noncommissioned staffs, band, detachment of Hospital Corps, and Troops I, K, L, and M, Eighth Cavalry—by Lieut. Col. W. S. Edgerly, acting inspector-general.

Quartermaster depot, Habana, Capt. C. B. Baker, captain of infantry, quartermaster, U. S. Army, chief quartermaster Department of Cuba, and depot quartermaster—by the inspector-general.

Commissary depot, Habana, Lieut. Col. William L. Alexander, chief commissary Department of Cuba, and depot commissary—by the inspector-general.

POSTS.

The posts in their general character, respecting cleanliness, sanitation, and repair, have been maintained at a high standard. Columbia Barracks, commanded by Col. T. A. Baldwin, Seventh Cavalry, was exceptionally well maintained in these respects.

DISCIPLINE.

The following statistical matter collected from company officers bears on this subject, but it is not a fair or just résumé of the general

behavior of the men, because of the different lights in which small infractions of discipline are viewed by different officers:

Number of cases tried in the department by general courts-martial: Officers, none; enlisted men, 293. Of this number there were 20 acquittals. Number of different enlisted men tried, 277. The offenses consisted principally of—failure to report for duty, 57; absence without leave, 53; drunkenness on duty, 27; conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline, 69; desertions, 23; disobedience of orders, 37; disorderly conduct, 52; disrespect to noncommissioned officers, 15; assault, 27; larceny, 18. The remainder are made up of numerous offenses of a minor nature.

The total arrests and confinements in the department during the past fiscal year numbered 2,144; individual men arrested, 852. The greatest number of arrests and confinements in one organization was from Troop E, Eighth Cavalry, being 133; while the least number was 13, from Troop A, Second Cavalry.

The greatest number of men not arrested from any one organization was 93 per cent, of Troop B, Second Cavalry, while the least number of men not arrested from any one organization was 2.7 per cent, of Troop F, Eighth Cavalry.

The average strength of the command was 3,184; number of desertions, 68. The most desertions from any one organization numbered 14, from Troop E, Eighth Cavalry, stationed at Santiago, while there were ten organizations which had no desertions. The percentage of desertions from the entire command was 2.1 per cent.

MESSING.

The mess of the enlisted men has been uniformly good. The variety of edibles is not so extensive in Cuba as in the States, but the cooking and general service of the food are about the same as in our own country. The bread supplied throughout the island has been exceptionally good. At the smaller posts the field oven is used, while at the more important ones regularly constructed bakeries obtained.

QUARTERS

All troops in the department have been quartered in barracks during the period under consideration, except the squadron of the Eighth Cavalry at Camp R. S. Mackenzie, Puerto Principe, which was under canvas stretched over frames, with raised floors, and comparatively comfortable.

PUBLIC ANIMALS.

The cavalry horses in Cuba have during the past year been generally deteriorating. Many of them were war-emergency purchases, upon which time, service, and a tropical sun brought out all the distinctive blemishes originally overlooked in hasty selection. A large number of them have been retained in service for purpose of instruction when entirely unfit for field service, only because of the anticipation of an early discontinuance of the department and their final disposition by sale. This culmination necessitated the elimination of 863 from the various regiments in the department at phenomenally high prices and a decided gain to the Government. In contradistinction to the horses it is a gratification to state that the mules in the island, in their general excellence and serviceable condition, rated very high in standard.

The least serviceable of them were selected for sale because of the high prices obtainable and the excess of the needs of the service reported in the States.

GUARD AND GUARDHOUSES.

The guards in all of the commands have been tested with reference to their instruction and fitness for the duty imposed, and the condition in which they were generally found is very creditable. The guardhouses were also found in as good order as could be expected under the varying circumstances.

HOSPITALS.

The hospitals throughout the island are a great credit to the Medical Corps in their equipment, care of the sick, high class of stores and medicines, and excellent administration. There has not been a serious criticism made by the inspectors against the condition of any of them. Some have rated higher than others, but all were up to a satisfactory standard of excellence. I may specially mention the one at Columbia Barracks, under the charge of Capt. D. C. Howard, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, as being among the best.

STOREHOUSES.

The storehouses at the various posts have been reported by the inspectors generally as commendable. There have been a few criticisms of a minor nature, but not of sufficient importance to impair the general result of good administration. As a general rule the commissary storehouses have presented a commendable state of good order, cleanliness, and classification of supplies. The stores have been generally satisfactory. There was a large lot of supplies sent to Cuba with the army of intervention, which gradually became surplus as troops were removed, and which became the subject of criticism because of age and consequent deterioration. They have been sold, however, in the general break-up, at very remunerative prices.

STABLES.

The cavalry and quartermaster stables throughout the department have been kept in a good state of preservation, and good condition of the animals has been the result with few exceptions.

EXCHANGES.

The exchange buildings throughout the department are generally such as have been constructed by post means, and usually of waste lumber. They have been maintained in a very efficient state. Although not the source of pleasure the exchanges are in the States, they have been a great comfort to the troops.

LAUNDRIES.

The laundry work for the enlisted men has ordinarily been done by citizens, except at Columbia Barracks, where they have an effective and efficient steam laundry, doing excellent work for officers and men at reasonable cost. The satisfactory service of a steam laundry, as exemplified at Columbia Barracks, causes an increased desire on the part of those of experience that such machines may be supplied to all posts of any considerable magnitude and permanency.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

A large number of cavalry officers recommend that greater care be exercised in the enlistment of troops for that arm of the service, particularly now that the emergency for men has passed. As an inducement to intelligent men to enlist for the mounted service, they think cavalry privates' pay should be at least \$2 more per month than for infantrymen. They advance the reasonable claim that the duties of a trooper are more arduous; that he has greater wear and tear on his clothing; that his laundry bill is greater, particularly in a warm climate, and his care of horses and equipment is particularly arduous, while the foot soldier, especially the infantryman, has nothing but his rifle and belt to look after. In this connection it is suggested that the rate of pay for men by enlisted terms be changed for the first six years as follows, and that it remain as at present for succeeding years:

	First 3 years.			Second 3 years.		
Pay of private at present	\$13	\$13	\$14	\$15	\$16	\$18
Pay as recommended	13	13	13	18	18	18

This change, it is thought, would be an inducement to reenlistment.

It is claimed, generally by officers, that there is a surplus of heavy clothing issued to recruits leaving rendezvous for regiments in tropical climates. Especially is this true respecting the overcoat, which, if brought, should be treated as the ordnance kit, i. e., turned into depot. This would lessen the amount of clothing charged on the clothing and descriptive cards. The overcoats turned in could, if necessary, be cleaned at the soldier's cost and returned to rendezvous for reissue at reduced rate. It is considered unfair to the recruit to make him purchase an article for which he will have no need, and which, in a tropical climate, rapidly deteriorates when stored.

Dress and over coats made by the Quartermaster's Department are ordinarily cut too narrow in the chest for a well-developed soldier. Several officers have mentioned this as a defect that needs remedial action.

There is at present urgent demand, on the part of the cavalry official personnel, that one or more cavalry officers of known experience, taste, and adaptability for the purpose be detailed to pass upon the merits of all horses intended for cavalry service. They claim that many horses have been issued to the cavalry the last few years which were utterly unable, from their conformation, to perform the duties required of them, and were subsequently condemned and sold at great loss to the Government, all of which could have been obviated had an officer with knowledge of the exacting requirements of the service selected them.

While it is believed in the cavalry that our present saddletree is one of the best in the world, it is generally claimed that it could be very much improved if the arch of the pommel was raised about 1½ inches. Owing to the low arch of the present saddle, many otherwise excellent horses with high withers can not be used in our service.

A suitable and increased quantity of cleaning material for fair leather should be supplied to the troops.

Straps for mounted officers' spurs should be used in lieu of chains.

The bowspring brakes now in use on the wheels of gun carriages for light batteries, to check recoil, are not of sufficient strength to stand the strain of continuous firing. The experience of the light batteries in Cuba is that several have broken under different strains, one at the sixth shot and another at the twentieth. In both cases the material did not appear to be defective, but the fault seemed to lie in the light weight of the metal.

Side lines add much to the burden of an already overweighted horse with full equipment. They should be replaced by light hobbles.

Time and the conditions of the service have demonstrated that the responsible officer should sign all inventory and inspection reports of property. The troop commander, for instance, being in daily contact with his horses in the field and in camp or station, knows all their defects, and is naturally more interested in having a serviceable mount than the accountable quartermaster, who may be and often is stationed many miles from the troops and does not see them for months. At such times it often becomes embarrassing to get the accountable officer's signature to the inventory and inspection reports to present them to an inspector.

In all post returns there should be columns with these headings: "Number of men fit for field service;" "Number of horses fit for field service;" "Number of mules fit for field service;" "Number and kind of wagons and aparejos fit for field service." This would furnish department commanders means of knowing at all times what force to depend upon at each post in case an emergency required troops to take the field suddenly.

For tropical climates the quarters and stables should all have tile or thatched roofs, and should be more commodious than is necessary in the temperate zone. There is no merit in favor of the iron roofs; on the other hand, the heat stored up by them renders their use in the Tropics very objectionable.

The campaign hat is excellent in shape and color, but should be made of better material. One thorough wetting destroys its shape, and nothing but resizing will restore it. The additional cost would be more than compensated by increased durability, and with a better hat uniformity of appearance would be preserved, which is now impossible.

The leather at present in use is usually brittle, and flakes and breaks easily, especially after it has once been thoroughly wet. It lacks pliability. It is believed that stuffed russet leather should be used.

GENERAL REMARKS.

Considering the department in all its phases, respecting military instruction, discipline, care of men, animals, buildings, stores, transportation, property, etc., its condition is improved over the fiscal year of 1901. This is especially noticeable in primary instruction of the school of the soldier. The messing is improved, and the general state of preparation for service of every character is high.

INSTRUCTION.

The troops throughout the department have been kept in an efficient state of instruction in all the schools, especially in those of the troops

and squadron, and practice marches have been ordered from every post as follows:

Columbia Barracks.—Troops F and G, Seventh Cavalry, left post January 16 and returned March 3; total distance marched, 320 miles.

Troops E and H, Seventh Cavalry, left post January 17 and returned February 13; total distance marched, Troop E, 200 miles; Troop H, 224 miles.

Troops L and M, Seventh Cavalry, left post February 28 and returned April 2; total distance marched, 562½ miles.

Third Battery, Field Artillery, left post February 13 for target practice near Guanajay and returned February 24; distance marched, 46 miles.

Manzanillo.—Troops A and L, Tenth Cavalry, left post February 20 and returned March 25; total distance marched, 550 miles.

Holguin.—Troop B, Tenth Cavalry, left post February 17 and returned April 14; distance marched not known.

Guantanamo.—Troop G, Eighth Cavalry, left post March 24, en route to Baracoa, and returned April 15; distance not reported.

Rowell Barracks.—Troop I, Second Cavalry, left post March 1 and returned March 15; distance marched not stated.

Morro Castle.—Troops F and H, Eighth Cavalry, left post March 4 and returned March 27; distance marched, 420 miles.

SCHEME OF INSTRUCTION FOR ARTILLERY FOOT TROOPS, DEPARTMENT OF CUBA, 1901-2.

[Synopsis.]

January and February: Artillery target practice, examination of gunners, vessel tracking, preliminary target practice (small arms).

March and April: Small arms target practice up to and including 300 yards range, artillery instruction when not firing.

May and June: Infantry drill, seacoast artillery drill and instruction, litter drill, and "first aid to the wounded."

July, August, and September: Infantry drill, seacoast artillery drill and instruction, signal drill.

October, November, and December: Service of the piece, nomenclature, loading and aiming tests for speed, mechanical maneuvers, elementary cordage, range and position finding, instruction to candidates for classification as gunners and gunnery specialists, signal instruction to selected squads between October 15 and December 15.

The cannoneers of the various companies of coast artillery have advanced appreciably in the art of gunnery and knowledge of the piece over their state of instruction of last year, as reported by the inspector-general.

The schools of the officers and men of the mounted troops in packing under the orders of this office of last year have been productive of the best results. The pack trains were all reorganized, and up to date of their breaking up and shipment to the United States they were exercised daily, except Sundays, carrying their loads, and were in the highest state of readiness and efficiency.

As the pack train is so essential to the success of mounted troops in war, and as the source from which the expert packers were drawn in the past was our western frontier, which has disappeared, it is recommended that the Quartermaster's Department, in order to preserve alive the art, establish a nucleus at some point near the Rocky Mountains or one of our large military schools, keeping some pack trains continually on hand and giving instruction continually to new men, as

otherwise this system, which has been developed heretofore by the Quartermaster's Department and is undoubtedly the best the world has ever seen, will be lost to the Army, to the great detriment to the efficiency of the mounted service.

JUDGE-ADVOCATE'S DEPARTMENT.

Maj. George M. Dunn, judge-advocate, U. S. Army, judge-advocate.

Maj. George M. Dunn took charge of the office of judge-advocate May 20, 1901, relieving Lieut. Col. Edgar S. Dudley. The conduct of the troops has been uniformly good. No complaints were received during the year from inhabitants of the island against any officer or enlisted men, and no officer has been tried by courts-martial.

Cases tried by general courts-martial.

Trials of enlisted men	293
Trials and acquittals of enlisted men	20
Number of different enlisted men tried	277
Cases outstanding	3

Character of offenses.

Violation of seventeenth article of war:	
Spoiling horse	1
Losing accouterments	1
Selling clothing	5
Losing clothing	1
Losing arms	3
Violation of twentieth article of war:	
Disrespect to commanding officer	2
Violation of twenty-first article of war:	
Disobedience of orders	12
Violation of thirty-second article of war:	
Absence without leave	53
Violation of thirty-third article of war:	
Failure to report for duty	57
Violation of thirty-eighth article of war:	
Drunkenness on duty	27
Drunkenness on guard	3
Violation of thirty-ninth article of war:	
Leaving post	4
Sleeping on post	9
Violation of fortieth article of war:	
Quitting guard	5
Violation of forty-seventh article of war:	
Desertion	23
Violation of sixtieth article of war:	
Misappropriating Government property	2
Larceny	1
Violation of sixty-second article of war:	
Conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline	69
Abusing horse	1
Disobedience of orders	25
Disorderly	52
Drunkenness	4
Committing nuisance	8
Disrespect to noncommissioned officers	15
Neglect of duty	13
Insubordination	3
Assault	27
Threatening noncommissioned officers	4
Disrespect to commanding officer	3
Threatening commanding officer	1

Violation of sixty-second article of war—Continued.

Larceny	18
Permitting prisoner to escape	1
Permitting prisoner to obtain liquor	1
Malingering	1
Making false statement	3
Fraudulent enlistment	5
Introducing liquor into post	4
Resisting arrest	10
Breaking arrest	14
Embezzlement	1

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

Capt. C. B. Baker, captain of infantry, quartermaster, chief quartermaster.

This officer has been charged with the general supervision, throughout the department of Cuba, of the work of the quartermaster's department and with the administration of the Habana depot. In addition, he was charged with the duties in the insular government of fiscal accountability, his administrative jurisdiction consisting briefly as follows: Disposition of insular funds for his department; payment of civil employees; construction, care, and illumination of public buildings; payment of rentals for quarters—property occupied for central military purposes and for various purposes as directed by the military governor; purchase, receipt, disposition, and accounting for school furniture for the schools of the island, throughout the department of Cuba, and for the settling of accounts of various contractors, held, issued, and accountable for insular property placed under the supervision of the chief quartermaster of the department; issuing of insular bills of lading and transportation requests, upon due authority, for transporting freight and passengers, and the supervision of transportation matters connected with the administration of the quartermaster's department pertaining to the insular establishment throughout the department of Cuba; the administration of the electric-light plant at "La Fuerza" and at Municipal Hospital No. 1, and the ice plant at Municipal Hospital No. 1; operation and maintenance of the Tricornia Railway; operation and maintenance of machine shops and marine ways at the arsenal; general work of construction, maintenance and repair of public buildings in the city of Habana; examination of various deeds, contracts, and leases in connection with the occupation of buildings and lands and other matters of a similar nature, including the purchase of certain lands occupied for public purposes. On the 27th of January, 1902, the insular disbursing officer took over the accountability of funds and property, and similar action was taken at all points throughout the department, thus affording the United States officers in charge of insular duties the necessary time in which to close their accounts and obtain official discharge from the island auditor for insular accountability. The transfer of accountability thus effected did not relieve the United States officers from supervisory duties over insular property and funds or of work being carried on and disbursement made under their scrutiny and upon their approving certificates of respective officers in each case.

FINANCIAL.

United States funds for the purpose of the quartermaster's department of the island of Cuba were supplied on regular monthly estimates, based on the requirements of various disbursing quartermasters. These funds have been uniformly placed to the credit of the chief quartermaster with the assistant treasurer of the United States in New York City. Because of the high rate of exchange demanded, and the difficulty of cashing checks on New York at the various posts throughout the department, it has been necessary, in the majority of instances, to make shipment of funds by express as in the past, thus involving additional expense. Owing to the lack of banking facilities it has also been necessary for disbursing officers to carry large amounts of funds at their own risk. The receipts of disbursing officers of funds pertaining to the operation of the department are shown in the following statements:

WAR 1902—VOL 9—6

Receipts, disbursements, and transfers of quartermaster's funds, July 1, 1901, to May 19, 1902.
 [Capt. Chauncey B. Baker chief quartermaster, Department of Cuba.]

	Regular supplies	Incidental expenses.	Cavalry and artillery horses.	Transportation of the army.	Clothing and equipage.	Miscellaneous receipts.	Bringing home remains of officers and soldiers who died abroad.	Total.
RECEIPTS.								
By transfer from officers.								
Reimbursements							\$2,648.27	\$2,648.27
Total receipts							61.21	61.21
DISBURSEMENTS.								
Civilian employees.								
Transportation of freight							574.67	574.67
Transportation of passengers							108.30	108.30
Reimbursement of traveling expenses.							538.25	538.25
Miscellaneous expenditures							348.80	348.80
							31.42	31.42
Total disbursements							1,598.54	1,598.54
Balance							1,110.94	1,110.94
							2,709.48	2,709.48
<i>Fiscal year 1900.</i>								
RECEIPTS.								
By transfer from officers.				\$8,000.00				8,000.00
Reimbursements and collections				65.42				65.42
Total receipts				8,065.42				8,065.42
DISBURSEMENTS.								
Transportation of freight				2,298.94				2,298.94
Transportation of passengers				2.00				2.00
Lighterage and wharfage				465.92				465.92
Miscellaneous expenditures				201.00				201.00
Total disbursements				2,967.86				2,967.86
Deposited with United States Treasurer				65.82				65.82
Balance				101.74				101.74
				3,065.42				3,065.42

Fiscal year 1901.

RECEIPTS.

RECEIPTS.					
Transfers from officers.....	\$1,287.85	\$1,055.35	30,947.57	\$401.56	38,641.88
Reimbursements and collections.....			900.77		900.77
Mileage collections.....			4.35		4.85
Total receipts.....	1,287.85	1,055.35	31,852.69	401.56	39,546.95

DISTRIBUTEMENTS.

LITHUANIA 1975		
Civilian employees	77.33	77.33
Transfers to officers	447.32	447.32
Transportation of freight	16,910.40	16,910.40
Transportation of passengers	8,378.74	8,378.74
Transportation of funds	797.89	797.89
Transportation of goods	131.96	131.96
Lighterage and wharfage	71.65	71.65
Miscellaneous expenditures	44.82	44.82
		116.47
		181.96
		797.89
		8,378.74
		16,910.40
		447.32
		77.33

Total disbursements.

Deposited with United States Treasurer.

Balance.

Fiscal year 1902.

RECEIPT:[illegible]

DISBURSEMENTS.				
Total receipts.....	312,135.83	111,470.01	384.07	635,228.83
Civilian employees.....		69,145.65		87,938.95
Transfers to officers.....		37,173.75		324,686.82
Transportation of freight.....	146,501.98			27,853.58
Transportation of passengers.....				14,269.35
Transportation of funds.....				6,085.52
				1,149,106.79
				156,483.90
				609,513.66
				27,853.58
				14,269.35
				6,085.52
				1,149,106.79
				156,483.90
				609,513.66
				27,853.58
				14,269.35
				6,085.52
				1,149,106.79

perage and wharfage.

Purchase of fuel	100
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CLOTHING AND EQUIPAGE.

The quality of the clothing supplied the troops in this department during the fiscal year has been of the most approved character. A continuous improvement, wherever opportunity existed, has been noted.

The results of the experience afforded during the occupation of the island has been such as to bring about the supply of a class of both inner and outer garments of demonstrated suitability for the use of troops under actual service conditions in tropical climates.

Khaki uniforms.—Continued improvement has been apparent in the quality of khaki material furnished, and it is believed that a high degree of excellence and serviceability has been obtained.

Riding breeches.—Riding breeches have been in good demand, affording universal satisfaction, requisitions therefor being in excess of the available supply, their use being found preferable to the mounted trousers hitherto issued to cavalry troops.

Underclothing.—The underclothing furnished for issue has afforded satisfaction in all respects, with the exception of certain undershirts and drawers remaining in stock from early contracts, upon which linen bar buttons were found rusted into the fabric. The subsequent use of pearl and bone buttons has obviated this trouble in articles of later manufacture.

Campaign hats.—Continued observation as to the merits of the corrugated sweat bands in campaign hats confirms the opinion that the hat, though well made and of excellent material, soon loses its shape through exposure to sun and rain and by continued use in a tropical climate.

Slickers.—The "Manhattan" brand slickers are in all respects superior to the "Fish" brand furnished this department. Slickers of the "Fish" brand have been the subject of many complaints on account of adhering together and subsequent unserviceability for any purpose. A number of these defective slickers were returned to the manufacturer in the United States. In March, 1902, notification was received that 150 "Fish" brand pommel slickers would be furnished for use under observation, report to be furnished as to merits. One hundred of these slickers were received and necessary action taken by this office, but owing to the almost immediate discontinuance of the Department of Cuba, it will not be practicable to furnish the report required, sufficient time not having elapsed for the desired test.

Field ranges.—The adoption of the Buzzacott field range and Buzzacott oven, or K. K. K. outfit, is recommended as being the desirable standard pattern.

Army ranges.—Army ranges Nos. 1 and 4, with equipment as now furnished, meet all the demands of permanently garrisoned posts.

Tentage.—The tentage remaining on hand with organizations of this department has been long in service, and not being deemed worth the cost of return to the United States, has been inspected and sold in Cuba.

Paulins.—The supply of oiled paulins for general use is recommended, continued use having demonstrated their superiority in every respect for all purposes in this climate.

CAVALRY AND ARTILLERY HORSES AND MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION.

Similar conditions have prevailed during the past year with reference to the animals of this department as those set forth in the report of the chief quartermaster of the department of the previous year. Constant

vigilance has been necessary in order to prevent a general outbreak of glanders, which has made its appearance from time to time among Government stock. In such cases infected animals have been promptly destroyed, together with such articles as might spread the disease. Many animals having become, through long service under climatic conditions, either unserviceable or of decreased value to the Government, have been brought before the inspection officers and sold, in all cases at fair prices to the Government, a good demand existing for animals throughout the island. Upon the discontinuance of the Department of Cuba the following animals were left for the service of the troops at each of the four stations occupied:

	Mules.	Draft horses.
Habana:		
Cabaña barracks.....	39	7
Headquarters artillery defenses.....	50	4
Cienfuegos: Rowell barracks.....	42	4
Santiago: Morro Castle barracks.....	42	4

This is believed to be an ample supply of transportation for all purposes.

WHEEL TRANSPORTATION.

The wheel transportation in the department has been kept up by necessary timely repairs. It requires greater frequency in the island of Cuba than in the United States, owing to climatic conditions and the bad state of most of the roads traversed. It has been necessary to maintain a sufficient amount of Government wagon and pack transportation throughout the island to perform the service of the Quartermaster's Department, inasmuch as it has not been practicable to contract with local parties for hauling and handling freight.

PACK TRAINS.

The systematic improvement of the pack-train service in this department as to personnel, animals, and equipment has been constantly maintained. Daily practice marches and special practice under actual service conditions have been regularly carried out.

Chief Packer H. W. Daly recently completed a tour throughout the island, the results of which were highly satisfactory and the outcome of which still further improved the conditions of all pack trains and equipments of both officers and men of troops serving in the Department of Cuba with the proper organization, and the acquaintance of both officers and men of the troops serving in the Department of Cuba with the proper organization, equipment, and use of the facilities offered by pack-train service.

It was reported by an officer of the mounted service, and so reported to the Quartermaster-General, that the Moore pack saddle was better for a certain class of troops than the aparejo. This was considered to be a heresy which threatened the efficiency of the mounted service, and a practice march was ordered from the city of Puerto Principe, under date of June 4, 1901, with two equal parties of mules, one under the packmaster chosen by the officer in question, the mules having Moore pack saddles, the other party of mules having aparejos, under charge of Packmaster H. W. Daly, quartermaster's department, and both trains under the charge of Capt. Robert J. Duff, Eighth Cavalry,

who was directed to cause the conditions to be as nearly equal for both trains as practicable and to report the result. At the end of the fifth day the Moore pack-saddle train was obliged to give up. This result was fully expected, as the Moore pack saddle is fundamentally wrong in principle and can not be administered, with average loads, so as to keep the animals' backs in condition, either by experts or nonexperts. Many long marches in the West and in Cuba have, however, demonstrated the efficiency of the aparejo when used by experts.

My recommendation that Chief Packer Daly be given the title of chief packer, quartermaster's department, with suitable compensation, is renewed.

Following is a list of the pack trains in the Department of Cuba, giving their designating number and the stations where assigned for duty; also the number of mules attached to each train June 30, 1901:

Station.	Pack trains.	Designating number.	Mules on hand July 1, 1901.
Santiago.....	2	2-9	128
Morro Castle	1	25	63
San Luis.....	1	6	49
Guantanamo.....	1	1	62
Manzanillo.....	2	3-8	108
Bayamo.....			
Holguin.....	2	12-13	86
Camp Mackenzie.....	1	5	64
Matanzas.....	3	24-29-31	194
Rowell Barracks.....	1	26	64
Columbia Barracks.....	3	25-27-33	209
Total.....	17		1,027

Upon the abandonment of posts throughout the department the following pack trains were transferred from points designated to points in the United States, as noted, the remaining trains being broken up, namely:

From—	To—	Number.
Morro Castle.....	Jefferson Barracks.....	2
Manzanillo.....	Fort Riley.....	3
Camp Mackenzie.....	St. Asaph.....	5
Holguin.....	Fort Riley.....	9
Columbia Barracks.....	Chickamauga.....	23
Rowell Barracks.....	Fort Riley.....	24
Morro Castle.....	Jefferson Barracks.....	25
Columbia Barracks.....	Chickamauga.....	27
Matanzas.....	Fort Riley.....	29

SALE OF CONDEMNED ANIMALS.

During the year sales were effected at public auction throughout the department after due advertisement. As heretofore, exceedingly good prices were realized for all classes of condemned stock sold upon the discontinuance of the department, pursuant to authority General Orders 31, Adjutant-General's Office, March 25, 1902. One mule at Baracoa remaining in the hands of the quartermaster at that post at its abandonment and not carried upon his papers was found by a board of officers to be the property of a resident at that place. The animal was taken possession of by the Spanish Government for military purposes, and turned over by them to the United States authorities. Upon recommendation by the board the mule was turned over to its owner.

FUEL, FORAGE, AND STRAW.

During the year the use of native grass has been continued in the feeding of public animals and extended wherever possible. At a number of posts the exclusive use of native grass was found practicable during a large portion of the year, and quartermasters at all posts in the department were instructed to use as large a portion of native grass as could be done with due regard to the maintenance of animals in a condition of constant efficiency for active service. A small supply of American hay was kept constantly on hand for use in case of emergency, which, in order to avoid expense of transportation, etc., was ordered consumed toward the close of the occupation, the use of green forage in such cases being ordered discontinued. The hay and oats furnished for the period July 1, 1901, to December 31, 1901, were supplied from the United States through the port of New York, and were of uniformly good quality. For the period from January 1, 1902, to the close of the occupation the oats were supplied upon orders of this office by W. P. Ketcham, upon contract entered into with the depot quartermaster, New York, the hay being supplied, as hitherto, through the port of New York. The rapid withdrawal of troops caused to be left on hand at various points considerable quantities of forage, disposition of which was made, however, to good advantage by sale at public auction, in some instances resulting in a fair profit to the Government over contract cost. The forage remaining on the island at the close of the occupation, after disposition of surplus by sale under public advertisement, will supply about six months, based upon the continuance of the use of not less than half the ration of hay in native green forage, to be supplied by purchase at the four posts at which artillery companies have been ordered retained. Funds necessary for the payment of green forage and native hay for bedding and for settlement of accounts in payment of oats furnished since January 1, 1902, were included in the monthly estimates of the chief quartermaster.

FIREWOOD.

The wood supplied by the quartermaster's department during the year has been purchased entirely at points of consumption, being native hard wood of the island of Cuba. All ordinary requirements have been satisfactorily met by this fuel, which has been supplied at an average cost of \$3.50 $\frac{1}{4}$ per American cord. Firewood remaining on hand at Habana and Rowell Barracks is estimated as sufficient for requirements for the ensuing six months. At Santiago approximately 50 cords additional will be required for that period, and necessary steps have been taken for the supply of that amount.

COAL.

Coal has been supplied according to the needs of the department, at a cost at Habana of \$5.15 per ton for bituminous coal, and at the average price of \$8.55 per ton for anthracite. These prices, in view of the comparatively small amount consumed, are considered reasonable and the best that could be obtained.

FORMAL CONTRACTS.

In view of the withdrawal of troops no formal contracts have been entered into for the supply of wood, and action upon the subject of

green forage and native hay was ordered suspended in consideration of the small amount prospectively required. The quartermaster, artillery defenses of Habana, was instructed to relieve the chief quartermaster, on May 1, of purely local duty in connection with artillery organizations remaining on duty. Current formal contracts for supply of wood, native hay, and green forage were turned over to him for final closing, and all papers in connection with proposed new contracts for wood and green forage for the ensuing fiscal year were also turned over to the same office for necessary action.

DISCONTINUANCE OF ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE.

On June 30, 1901, the transport service between the United States and Cuban ports was, by direction of the Quartermaster-General, abandoned, upon which date the following vessels pertaining to the service remained at various ports in the island of Cuba:

Port.	Vessel.
Habana	Dispatch boat Kanawha, steam lighter Baker, tug Gibbon, Launch No. 1, lighters Bartley and Mocha.
Matanzas	Tug Richardson.
Cienfuegos	Steam lighter Williams.
Rowell Barracks	One 8-oared barge.
Santiago	Tug Ord.
Manzanillo	Sloop Miguel.
Gibara	Sloop Esperanza.

By authority of the Quartermaster-General the following vessels were permitted to remain in Cuban waters, at the expense of the insular government, to wit:

Port.	Vessel.
Habana	Kanawha, Baker (under orders for New York), Launch No. 1.
Cienfuegos	Steam lighter Williams.
Santiago	Tug Ord.
Gibara	Sloop Esperanza.

The crews were transferred to insular pay rolls, to date from July 1, 1901, and from which fund also the subsistence of crews and supplies for maintenance of vessels have been drawn. On July 9, 1901, the tug *Gibbon* was transferred to New York City. On September 5, 1901, the steam lighter *Baker* was transferred to the United States, with orders to report to the depot quartermaster, New York City, to relieve the tug *Reynolds*, and was replaced in these waters by the steam lighter *Kearney*, then on duty at Fort Dade, Fla., relieved by the *Reynolds*, the *Kearney* taking station at Habana. Subsequently, on November 12, 1901, the *Williams* and *Kearney* were ordered to exchange places, the *Williams* being more suitable for outside work to be performed from Habana, particularly in connection with placing buoys and other similar duty for the insular light-house service. On August 26, 1901, after due advertisement, the lighters *Bartley* and *Mocha* and tug *Richardson* were sold at public auction at Habana for the sum of \$12,045, and upon the same date the sloop *Miguel* was sold at auction at Manzanillo for \$500. The eight-oared barge at Rowell Barracks

was withdrawn from sale, and, under instruction of the Quartermaster-General, transferred to San Juan, P. R., on October 16, 1901. The lifeboat reported at Santiago by the quartermaster at that point was withdrawn from sale and retained as a tender for the tug *Ord*. At the close of the occupation there remained in Cuban waters the following vessels:

Port.	Vessel.
Habana	Kanawha, Launch No. 1, steam lighter Williams.
Cienfuegos	Steam lighter Kearney.
Santiago	Tug <i>Ord</i> .
Gibara	Sloop <i>Esperanza</i> .

Disposition of these vessels has been directed as follows:

Vessel.	Disposition.
Kanawha	Transferred to Washington, D. C.
Launch No. 1.	Retained at Habana.
Steam lighter Williams	Transferred to Fort Totten, N. Y.
Steam lighter Kearney	Transferred to depot quartermaster, Washington.
Tug <i>Ord</i> and tender	Transferred to Cienfuegos.
Sloop <i>Esperanza</i>	To be sold to insular government of Cuba.

The following vessels pertaining to insular service have been in use during the year, under the supervision of the Quartermaster's Department, at the stations named:

Station.	Vessel.
Santiago	Launch Wm. E. Shipp, launch Floyd, 1 large lighter.
Manzanillo	Steamship <i>Valeda</i> (plying between Manzanillo and Cauto).
Rowell Barracks	Launch <i>Fornance</i> .

ABANDONMENT OF DEPOTS.

The work of abandonment of depots outside of Habana, at Matanzas, Cienfuegos, and Santiago, was effected as rapidly as practicable in view of the circumstances in each case, the new and serviceable supplies being transferred to surrounding posts where required or to the United States and to Manila, all worn and unserviceable articles being disposed of at public auction at fair prices to the Government.

Since March 1, 1902, subsequent to the abandonment of the Santiago depot, a quartermaster's agent has discharged the necessary duty of receiving and transmitting supplies at and between Santiago and the post of Morro Castle. Quartermaster's agents for similar purposes were necessarily maintained at Gibara, Nuevitas, and Cauto until the withdrawal of troops, in connection with supply of which these employees were required; also at Batabano for the transshipment of property and supplies to south coast ports.

The quartermaster at Cienfuegos was also continued since the abandonment of the depot on duty of like character necessary for the supply of the post at Rowell Barracks. At Matanzas the post quartermaster continued the discharge of the various duties required by the work of the Quartermaster's Department at that point.

HABANA DEPOT.

The Habana depot has been conducted since July 24, 1900, under the immediate supervision of the chief quartermaster. During the past year the consolidation of the offices has been of peculiarly apparent benefit, in view of the rapidly reduced expense of administration and the more speedy and immediate conclusive action rendered possible in the multiplied details of the various steps taken looking to and in the act of the termination of the occupation of the island. On June 30, 1901, the following posts and stations were supplied either in whole or part from the Habana depot: Columbia Barracks; military station, Quemados; Pirotecnia; batteries 3, 4, and 5, Vedado; Santa Clara Battery, Cabaña Barracks, Cienfuegos, Rowell Barracks, Manzanillo, Bayamo, Santiago, Morro Castle, San Luis, Guantanamo, Baracoa, Holguin, Camp R. S. Mackenzie, Nuevitas, Matanzas.

All these have since been successfully abandoned, leaving only three points on the island still garrisoned: Habana—Cabaña Barracks, headquarters artillery defenses; Cienfuegos—Rowell Barracks; Santiago—Morro Castle.

Two companies of artillery being stationed at each of the four posts named.

At each point supplies sufficient for six months' time, as far as found on hand in the department available for the purpose, were transferred to the quartermaster in charge, following which final disposition was made of all supplies then found surplus at the Habana depot, as well as the various posts throughout the island.

The chief quartermaster was instructed to invoice and take receipt of the quartermaster, artillery defenses of Habana, for all office furniture and equipment, the property of the United States, pertaining to his accountability, in actual use by the officers on duty at department headquarters, Habana, in order that such officers might continue the use of such property in the necessary discharge of their duties until the actual moment of departure. This action simplified the matter of disposition of such property, leaving its final sale, if unserviceable, or return to the United States, if so directed, to the action of the quartermaster, headquarters artillery defenses of Habana, subsequent to departure of officers and troops.

HABANA QUARTERMASTER'S CORRAL AND SHOPS.

As heretofore, the maintenance of adequate land transportation in the city of Habana and vicinity has been necessary, reductions being made from time to time, however, as fast as practicable.

The shops of the depot corral have performed the necessary repairs to transportation attached to the depot; also repairing unserviceable vehicles turned in and issuing serviceable transportation in lieu thereof.

On March 10, 1902, the corral was removed from the site hitherto occupied to a new location at the arsenal and navy-yard, where it was found practicable to provide suitable accommodations in view of reduced requirements for the purpose.

TRISCORNIA MILITARY RAILWAY.

During the year the principal purposes for which the Triscornia Military Railway and terminal facilities have been used have been for warehouse and storage of Government property and of coal for the

Navy Department. A limited amount of wood and forage has been handled over the road.

At the close of the occupation the property was turned over in perfect order, both as to roadway, rolling stock, and general equipment.

All outstanding claims have been adjusted except that in connection with parcel No. 13, the owner of which refuses to enter into any amicable arrangement for the transfer of his rights.

The property comprising the water front continues under lease from Señora Juana Pascual, Viuda de Carreras, with an option permitting purchase by the insular government.

NAVY-YARD.

The quartermaster's department has continued to occupy the old Spanish navy-yard for general purposes in connection with the receipt, shipment, and distribution of Government stores and property. Buildings fitted up at that place by this department at insular expense were occupied by the commissary department on November 7, 1901, and by the ordnance depot on February 5, 1902. Other buildings temporarily made suitable at the same place were occupied for quarters by officers of the department staff subsequent to February 1, upon which date other public quarters in Habana previously assigned for officers' use were turned over for occupancy by the University of Habana.

The Habana depot corral was removed on March 10, 1902, to vacant ground in the same reservation, and on April 19, 1902, the offices of the chief quartermaster, chief commissary, and chief paymaster were removed to the arsenal from the lieutenant-governor's palace, that building being required for use of the Cuban Congress.

The arsenal shops and marine ways were continued under the supervision of the chief quartermaster, performing necessary work of repairs to the insular vessels of the customs, engineer, immigration, post-office, and marine-hospital service, also for quartermaster's vessels on insular duty, launches attached to the office of the captain of the port, for the light-house board, Tricornia Military Railway, for insular purposes account ordnance department, and for sundry other insular purposes.

TRANSPORTATION.

On March 28, 1902, the office of the chief quartermaster of the department was advised of the intention of the War Department to move all troops except the coast artillery out of Cuba by May 20, and was called on to furnish information as to the number of officers and men, members of families, amount of impedimenta, etc., for which transportation was consequently to be furnished, and as to ports of embarkation, in such detail as would enable that officer to invite competition in rates for the transportation service. This information was gathered and reported as directed, and the personnel and impedimenta of the army of occupation was moved under contracts made by the New York office, except as hereinafter mentioned.

Meanwhile bids were invited for the movement of the animals, artillery and cavalry horses, pack and draft mules, etc., and attendants to accompany and care for same; and for transportation of the equipment, baggage, etc., thereof, and for the public property and stores not authorized to be sold here.

In this movement the chief quartermaster was handicapped and the competition was limited by the existence of a contract with the two only regular lines of carriers between Cuba and the United States having facilities for furnishing all of the transportation required within the time allowed for the movement, and by virtue of which contract those lines had acquired the right to do all the carrying between the ports in Cuba from which the troops, animals, and property were to be embarked and the port in the United States to which these carriers plied. These lines proposed to take all or none of the business offered, and which conditions virtually excluded all competition, except for such portion of the business as might be handled by independent carriers between Cuba and ports other than New York. As a result the following movements were accomplished under direction of this office at the cost indicated:

From Habana, via Mobile, to Lytle Station, Ga., via steamship *Giuseppe Corvaja*, April 12, 124 horses and mules, at \$14.50 each; 31 attendants, at \$18.50 each, and 6,800 pounds forage by rail from Mobile, at 50 cents per 100 pounds, \$2,405.50.

From Habana, via Mobile, to Lytle Station, Ga., via steamship *Parran*, April 13, 473 horses and mules, at \$14.50 each; 130 attendants, at \$18.50 each; 65,000 pounds public property, at \$1.90 per 100 pounds, and 13,628 pounds forage by rail from Mobile, at 50 cents per 100 pounds, \$10,566.50.

From Habana, via Mobile, to Lytle Station, Ga., via steamship *Europa*, April 19, 225 horses and mules, at \$14.50 each; 65 attendants, at \$18.50 each; 8,970 pounds public property, at \$1.90 per 100 pounds, and 9,000 pounds (estimated) forage by rail from Mobile, at 50 cents per 100 pounds, \$4,680.43.

From Habana, via Mobile, to Lytle Station, Ga., via steamship *Giuseppe Corvaja*, April 25, 164 horses and mules, at \$14.50 each; 49 attendants, at \$18.50 each; 54,685 pounds public property, at \$1.90 per 100 pounds, and 6,560 pounds (estimated) forage, at 50 cents per 100 pounds, \$4,356.31.

From Cienfuegos, via Mobile, to Fort Sheridan, Ill., via steamship *Uto*, April 18, 146 animals, at \$26 each, and 34 attendants, at \$32 each, \$4,884.

From Santiago, via Mobile, to Jefferson Barracks, Mo., via steamship *Uto*, April 21, 220 animals, at \$25 each; 50 attendants, at \$30 each; 7,500 pounds (estimated) public property, at \$2 per 100 pounds, and 8,800 pounds (estimated) forage, at 50 cents per 100 pounds, \$7,194.

From Cienfuegos, April 18, 139 animals and 61 attendants, and from Matanzas, April 23, 217 animals and 38 attendants, 7,350 pounds (estimated) public property, and 14,240 pounds (estimated) forage, per steamship *Albis*, via New York, to Fort Ethan Allen, Vt., at \$22.05 per animal, \$22.65 per attendant, \$1 per 100 pounds property, and 50 cents per 100 pounds forage, \$10,236.85.

From Manzanillo, April 21, 257 animals and 63 attendants, and from Gibara, April 25, 137 animals and 43 attendants, 10,000 pounds (estimated) public property, and 15,760 pounds (estimated) forage, per steamship *Fri*, via Mobile, to Fort Robinson, Nebr., at \$28 per animal, \$52 per attendant, \$1.40 per 100 pounds of property, and 50 cents per 100 pounds of forage, \$17,062.80.

From Matanzas, via New York, to Fort Ethan Allen, Vt., per steamship *Parran*, April 26, 75 horses and 18 attendants, at \$22.05 per animal and \$22.65 per attendant, \$2,084.10.

The above movements were made under contract with the Munson Steamship Line. The following movements were accomplished under contract with Benemlis Steamship Company, a private concern, for the marine transportation only:

From Manzanillo to Mobile, per steamer *Nord*, April 27, 165 animals and 35 attendants, at \$12 each, \$2,400.

From Cienfuegos to Mobile, per steamship *Hydra*, April 24, 68 animals, 20 attendants, and pack-train equipment, at \$12 per head (equipment free), \$1,056.

From Matanzas to Mobile, per steamship *Hydra*, April 28, 131 animals and 29 attendants, at \$12 each, \$1,920.

From Habana to Mobile, per steamship *Hydra*, April 29, 207 animals and 50 attendants, at \$12 each, \$3,084.

These movements were all effected without injury or loss to the animals being transported, and considering the exigency which required that the service be contracted for and completed within so short a time the result has been extremely gratifying. Detailed statement showing movements of troops and horses is as follows.

Movements of troops changing stations between garrisons in Cuba and returning to the United States occurred in Cuba during the period covered by this report as shown in the following tabulation:

Date.	Organization.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Horses.	From—	To—
1901.						
Aug. 21	18th Company Coast Artillery.....	3	101	Pirotecnia.....	Cabaña Barracks.
Aug. 21	17th Company Coast Artillery.....	3	101	Battery No. 3.....	Pirotecnia.
Aug. 21	19th Company Coast Artillery.....	2	101	Cabaña Barracks.....	Battery No. 3.
Dec. 20	Troop E, 8th Cavalry.....	1	72	83	San Luis.....	Morro Castle.
Dec. 21	Troop C, 10th Cavalry.....	2	100	79	Bayamo.....	Manzanillo.
1902.						
Jan. 4	29th Battery Field Artillery.....	3	63	Columbia Barracks.....	United States.
Jan. 17	Headquarters, field, staff, band, and 2d Squadron, 2d Cavalry.	20	257	80	Matanzas.....	Do.
Feb. 25	Headquarters, field, staff, and 3d Squadron, 8th Cavalry.	21	251	Camp Mackenzie.....	Do.
Feb. 25	Band, 8th Cavalry.....	1	23	do.....	Morro Castle.
Apr. 12	Detachment 7th Cavalry ^a	1	30	124	Columbia Barracks.....	United States.
Apr. 13	C, 7th Cavalry ^a	2	73	330	do.....	Do.
Apr. 13	18th Company Coast Artillery.....	3	97	Cabaña Barracks.....	Rowell Barracks.
Apr. 14	22d Company Coast Artillery.....	1	95	Artillery defenses.....	Cabaña Barracks.
Apr. 17	17th Company Coast Artillery.....	3	85	do.....	Morro Castle.
Apr. 18	Detachment 7th Cavalry ^a	3	52	225	Columbia Barracks.....	United States.
Apr. 18	Detachment 2d Cavalry ^a	1	96	355	Matanzas.....	Do.
Apr. 18	do.....	2	70	282	Rowell Barracks.....	Do.
Apr. 19	Detachment 7th Cavalry ^a	4	56	211	Columbia Barracks.....	Do.
Apr. 19	A, B, D, 7th Cavalry, 3d Battery Field Artillery.	7	232	do.....	Do.
Apr. 20	21st Company Coast Artillery.....	3	103	Cabaña Barracks.....	Rowell Barracks.
Apr. 21	Detachment 10th Cavalry ^a	1	63	257	Manzanillo.....	United States.
Apr. 21	Detachment 8th Cavalry ^a	1	11	88	Morro Castle.....	Do.
Apr. 23	Field, staff, and 1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry.	9	211	Matanzas.....	Do.
Apr. 24	19th Company Coast Artillery.....	4	96	Artillery defenses.....	Morro Castle.
Apr. 25	Detachment 10th Cavalry ^a	1	43	137	Gibara.....	United States.
Apr. 25	Detachment 7th Cavalry ^a	1	11	48	Columbia Barracks.....	Do.
Apr. 26	F and G, 8th Cavalry.....	4	135	Morro Castle.....	Do.
Apr. 26	Headquarters, field, staff, and band, and A, C, L, M, 10th Cavalry.	9	255	Manzanillo.....	Do.
Apr. 26	Detachment 2d Cavalry ^a	1	18	75	Matanzas.....	Do.
Apr. 29	Detachment 2d Battery, Field Artillery. ^a	1	30	112	Columbia Barracks.....	Do.
Apr. 30	3d Squadron, 2d Cavalry.....	9	208	Rowell Barracks.....	Do.
May 6	B, D, I, K, 10th Cavalry.....	9	196	Holguin.....	Do.
May 20	Headquarters, band, 2d and 3d Squadrons, 7th Cavalry.	22	447	Columbia Barracks.....	Do.
May 20	E and H and band, 8th Cavalry..	6	154	Morro Castle.....	Do.

^a Detachment sent as attendants on horses shipped to United States in advance of withdrawal of troops.

The enactment by the insular government of laws establishing uniform tariffs, which has just been realized and is about to be put into effect, will tend to materially lessen the labors of those who may hereafter be charged with furnishing railroad transportation in Cuba at the expense of the United States.

MILITARY POSTS.

The general status of property leased and occupied for military posts throughout the department remained unchanged during the year. In case of abandonment of posts whereon buildings were erected, paid for, or reimbursed from insular funds, the policy has been to dispose of buildings at public auction to the highest bidder for insular account, unless required for school purposes or for occupancy by organizations of the Cuban Rural Guard.

Just prior to and in view of the ultimate abandonment of all posts in the department, instructions were issued that all buildings at posts remaining and thereafter to be abandoned throughout the department should be immediately taken charge of by detachments of the rural guard for final action under the supervision of the insular secretary of finance.

BURIAL PARTY.

The burial party organized by the office of the chief quartermaster under instructions of the Quartermaster-General, dated March 26, 1901, and operating during the period December 26, 1901, to February 9, 1902, removed the remains of 27 soldiers and authorized civilian employees of the War Department, 2 employees of the Navy, and 2 remains for account of the island of Cuba.

The work, which necessitated a complete circuit of the island, the remains being interred at sundry points throughout the department, was performed with facility and with an entire absence of untoward incident.

Bills for reimbursement of this department by the Navy Department and from insular revenues for amounts expended in removals in each case were duly rendered through the office of the Quartermaster-General. Full reports on this subject have been hitherto submitted.

Subsequent to the completion of the operations of the burial corps, interments were made at various posts throughout the department as follows, due reports being rendered in each case:

Santiago.—United States soldier inclosed in casket and stored in sanitary storehouse, in custody of post quartermaster, Morro Castle. Thomas Brown, cook, quartermaster corral; died March 28, 1902; city cemetery, Santiago; grave marked with headboard.

Manzanillo.—Edward Watkins, private, Troop A, Tenth United States Cavalry; died March 19, 1902; grave No. 20. Thomas White, private, Troop C, Tenth United States Cavalry; died February 23, 1902; grave No. 12. James Crolley, private, Troop M, Tenth Cavalry; died March 21, 1902; grave No. 21.

Cienfuegos.—Machinist Herbert Allen Beebe, U. S. S. *Yankton*; died February 10, 1902; interred in cemetery, Cienfuegos.

Rovell Barracks.—John S. Pangburn, teamster; died May 5; buried in post cemetery.

Columbia Barracks.—John Shea, civilian employee, office chief quartermaster; died February 6, 1902; interred in grave No. 174. Walter H. Cullen, private, Troop H, Seventh Cavalry; died March 8, 1902; interred in grave No. 175.

In order to finally fix the fact that the remains reported above, according to the records of this office, comprised all interments in the

department subject to future removal, all quartermasters of the department were telegraphed asking for statement of interments, and answers were received confirming the list as herein given.

CARE OF PUBLIC BUILDINGS, GENERAL CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR, AND RENTALS.

The buildings which have been placed under the charge of the chief quartermaster for maintenance and repair are: Governor-general's palace; palacio del Segundo Cabo; Tacon No. 1; Maestranza building; Castillo del Principe.

Arsenal: Buildings (quarters, etc.), shops, warehouses; La Punta, commissary depot; headquarters stables, Zulueta and La Punta; chief quartermaster's corral, Principe; Quinta de los Molinos; hospital San Ambrosio; electric-light plant, "La Fuerza;" electric-light and ice plant, municipal hospital No. 1; Capitania; naval station; admiralty building; Machina.

During the fiscal year the buildings mentioned have received the necessary care as required for their maintenance in good order and condition; sundry sets of quarters for officers have been overhauled, repainted, whitewashed, and the necessary sanitary appliances placed in various buildings and quarters not hitherto supplied.

PERSONNEL.

At the close of occupation the following quartermasters, post quartermaster-sergeants, and quartermaster's agents were on duty in the Department of Cuba:

Capt. C. B. Baker, U. S. Infantry, quartermaster, chief quartermaster of department, Habana.

Capt. Robert H. Rolfe, quartermaster, U. S. Army, assistant to chief quartermaster, Habana.

First Lieut. Evan H. Humphrey, Seventh Cavalry, acting quartermaster, assistant to the chief quartermaster, Habana.

Capt. O. A. Nesmith, Signal Corps, U. S. Army (chief signal officer), acting quartermaster, Habana.

Capt. Andrew Moses, Artillery Corps, U. S. Army (acting ordnance officer), acting quartermaster, Habana.

Capt. S. P. Vestal, regimental quartermaster, Seventh Cavalry, U. S. Army, post quartermaster, Columbia Barracks, Cuba.

Capt. H. J. Slocum, Seventh Cavalry, U. S. Army, acting quartermaster, military station, Quemados.

First Lieut. H. W. Schull, Artillery Corps, U. S. Army, quartermaster, headquarters artillery defenses, Habana.

First Lieut. Edward A. Stuart, Artillery Corps, U. S. Army, quartermaster, Cabaña Barracks, Habana.

Capt. Walter B. Barker, quartermaster, U. S. Army, Cienfuegos, Cuba.

First Lieut. E. P. Orton, Second Cavalry, U. S. Army, post quartermaster, Rowell Barracks.

Capt. Charles H. Grierson, Tenth Cavalry, U. S. Army, post quartermaster, Manzanillo.

First Lieut. John Watson, Eighth Cavalry, U. S. Army, post quartermaster, Morro Castle, Santiago.

Second Lieut. Frank Keller, Eighth Cavalry, U. S. Army, post quartermaster, Guantanamo.

First Lieut. Bruce Palmer, Tenth Cavalry, U. S. Army, post quartermaster, Holguin.

Second Lieut. George Garity, Second Cavalry, U. S. Army, post quartermaster, Matanzas, Cuba.

Capt. W. S. Scott, quartermaster, U. S. Army, Nuevitas, Cuba.

Post quartermaster-sergeants.—W. Bramstedt, Santiago; F. C. Cleaver, Holguin; C. G. Colesworthy, Morro Castle; James E. Flynn, Matanzas; N. MacLeod, Guantanamo; P. N. Merzig, Habana; Louis Rutter, headquarters artillery defenses; G. Wirth, Rowell Barracks; Herman Roth, Morro Castle, Santiago.

Quartermaster's agents.—C. N. Bear, Habana office, chief quartermaster; J. T. Douglas, Tricornia, Tricornia Military Railway; A. Silva, Gibara; J. P. Clarkson (acting), Batabano, transfer of freight between south coast points; R. L. Woodmansee, Nuevitas; Thad. C. Ham, Santiago.

The following officers of this department remained on duty with artillery organizations at posts finally retained:

Habana: First Lieut. H. W. Schull, Artillery Corps, U. S. Army, quartermaster artillery defenses of Habana; First Lieut. E. A. Stuart, Artillery Corps, U. S. Army, quartermaster, Cabaña Barracks.

Cienfuegos: First Lieut. J. W. Gulick, Artillery Corps, U. S. Army, quartermaster, Rowell Barracks.

Santiago: First Lieut. John Watson, Eighth Cavalry, U. S. Army (successor not announced), quartermaster, Morro Castle, Santiago.

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

Lieut. Col. W. L. Alexander, deputy commissary-general, U. S. Army, chief commissary.

The troops of the department were well supplied throughout the year. There were some supplies on the island that came here in 1898-99, brought when purchases were large, deliveries were required in great haste, and conditions were not favorable for the careful inspection usually given by the purchasing officer. The continued withdrawal of troops from the island made it difficult to estimate what would be required. Notwithstanding these conditions, a comparatively small amount of supplies remained to be sold at auction. Those that were in good condition brought as much, and in many cases more than the invoice price, while those that were deteriorated from age and entirely worthless to the Government brought unexpectedly good prices. The posts remaining on the island, and that will hereafter form part of the Military Department of the East, have been supplied either in kind or by orders for shipment made on the purchasing commissary, New York City, service to include August 30, 1902, in all except fresh beef and fresh vegetables. These are covered by contracts up to and including June 30, 1902, and after that date the commissaries of the various posts are authorized to purchase these articles monthly in such quantities as may be required. The chief commissary, Department of the East, has been advised of the action taken in the matter. The ration as now fixed seems well adapted for use in Cuba. It is, however, suggested that in tropical climates the addition of canned milk would be a most welcome one. The purchase of this article by soldiers in Cuba has been constant, and in quite large quantities. Its admirable keeping qualities recommend it as a component of the ration,

the losses of certain kinds of it being practically nothing. It would, of course, add to the cost of the ration if no reduction was made in other components. It is suggested that dried fruit can safely be reduced 50 per cent, and other components could be selected for reduction to make up in part, if not entirely, the increased cost of making milk an article of issue. Aside from its consideration in connection with milk, the dried-fruit issue should be reduced, or savings allowed on it. In Cuba not over one-half of what has been issued has been eaten by the troops, the balance having been sold, and that on a market where all consumers of fruit relish the endless varieties of nature's fresh fruits. Consequently the disposition of the unconsumed portion brought little to be reexpended for other articles of food. This recommendation pertains only to stations where fresh fruits are obtained. The only complaint as to stores furnished during the current fiscal year was from the artillery at Habana, and was based on the assertion that the fresh-meat ration was deficient in quantity, no complaint being made as to its quality. As this complaint was received quite recently, and as it referred only to the quantity of meat (it was also in direct conflict with the published assertions of experienced medical officers that the meat ration was too large for the Tropics), no action was taken thereon.

It is believed that the present ration of refrigerator beef as issued in this department under contract is right, both as to quantity and quality. Contracts in force in the department during current fiscal year were as follows:

Beef contracts, July 1, 1901, to June 30, 1902.

REFRIGERATED BEEF.

Contractor.	Post.	Price per pound.
		<i>Cents.</i>
Swift & Co.....	Habana	16.12
Do.....	Columbia Barracks.....	16.12
Do.....	Matanzas	16.12
Do.....	Morro Castle (Santiago).....	16.12
Do.....	Cienfuegos	16.12
Do.....	Guantanamo	17.37
Do.....	San Luis.....	17.37

FRESH BEEF.

Rafael Santalaben	Bayamo	13
Swift & Co.....	Baracoa	15
Franco Gutierrez.....	Manzanillo	14
S. M. Ramires	Puerto Principe	12.75
Wenceslao Infante	Holguin	14

DEPARTMENT OF CUBA.

Fresh vegetable contracts.

JULY 1, 1901, TO DECEMBER 31, 1901.

Contractor.	Post.	Potatoes (price per pound).	Onions (price per pound).
		<i>Cents.</i>	<i>Cents.</i>
Morris Oldstein	Habana	2.2	2.8
Do.	Columbia Barracks	2.4	3
Do.	Cienfuegos	3.2	3.9
Do.	Morro Castle (Santiago)	3.4	4.5
Do.	Matanzas	2.4	
Do.	San Luis	4.5	6
Jacob Barker	Matanzas		3.24
Morris Oldstein	Baracoa	3.5	4.5
José Farran	Guantanamo	3	3.5
Antonio Perez	Puerto Principe	3.4	4.4
Enrique Roca	Manzanillo	3	4
Luis Benitez	Holguin	3	5

JANUARY 1, 1902, TO JUNE 30, 1902.

Morris Oldstein	Habana	2.2	2.8
Do.	Columbia Barracks	2.4	3
Do.	Rowell Barracks	3.5	4
Do.	Morro Castle (Santiago)	3.6	4.75
Do.	Guantanamo	4	5
Do.	Holguin	4	5
Do.	Hamilton Barracks	2.4	3.2
Antonio Perez	Camp Mackenzie	3.35	4.4
A. R. Arguelles	Baracoa	3.5	4.5
Enrique Roca	Manzanillo	3.5	4

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

Maj. W. C. Gorgas, Medical Department, U. S. Army, chief surgeon.

The health of the troops in this department has been remarkably good, having progressively improved since the first year of the occupation, 1898; the sick report of 1898 was very large, giving reason to believe that the health of American troops serving in Cuba would be just as bad as that pictured in the darkest years of the English service in the East Indies in former times, but the health conditions of the troops have been improving year by year until this year, when it is believed that the health rate will be better than that of the Army either in the United States or in any of our foreign possessions.

The statistics in the report published by the Surgeon-General, for comparison, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, bring the tables down to December 1, 1900.

The admission rate for the fiscal year, in Cuba, ending June 30, 1902, if the rate for the first ten and two-thirds months be kept up, would be 1,575; that for the whole Army for the calendar year ending December 31, 1900, was 2,312, and for the Pacific islands 2,622. The cases in Cuba seem to have been of very much milder character, the total death rate from all causes being only 3.82, while that of the army at large was 22.74, and for the Pacific islands 28.75. In Cuba the total number of deaths for the ten and two-thirds months ending May 30, 1902, was 14. Of these 14, 8 were deaths from violence, leaving 6 due to disease. This would give a rate for disease of only 1.67, which is very much lower than that in the territory of the United States in any other part of the world.

The army at large has a rate of 15.79, and in the Pacific islands 20.26. The lowest, with the exception of Cuba, was continental United States, with a rate of 4.83. This means that the chances of a soldier dying from disease in the United States were three times greater than in Cuba.

Taking the individual diseases, the tables show an equally favorable condition of affairs. In malaria the admission rate for the army at large was in the neighborhood of 700 per 1,000; in Cuba 186 per 1,000. Last year in Cuba in was 473. This decrease is believed to be due to the measures taken at the various posts to destroy mosquitoes and to protect men from their bites. The admission rate for yellow fever last year was 29 per 1,000. This year there was but 1 case. The rate for typhoid fever was about one-fourth of what it was last year. The percentage of admission for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, was 0.37. Number of deaths, 5. In venereal diseases there has been a considerable decrease, but not so great as the other diseases mentioned. Alcoholism has increased from 31 to 44 per 1,000. Not a single case of smallpox occurred among the troops during the year, nor, for that matter, in the whole island.

MEDICAL OFFICERS RETAINED IN CUBA.

Maj. W. C. Gorgas, Medical Corps, U. S. Army, ordered to take station in Habana, for the purpose of continuing his investigations in regard to the relations between yellow fever and the mosquito, per paragraph 2, Special Orders, No. 91, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, April 17, 1902.

Maj. D. T. Lainé, surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, with station at the artillery post, Vedado.

Capt. D. C. Howard, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, with station at artillery post, Vedado.

First Lieut. Edward F. Geddings, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, at Morro Castle, Santiago de Cuba.

First Lieut. J. R. Devereux, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, at Cabaña Barracks, Habana.

First Lieut. James L. Bevans, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, at Rowell Barracks.

Contract Surg. Rollin T. Burr, U. S. Army, at Cabaña Barracks, as assistant to the surgeon.

The number of noncommissioned officers and privates remaining on duty in Cuba are as follows:

Artillery post, Vedado:	
Hospital steward	1
Privates	2
Cabaña Barracks:	
Hospital steward	1
Acting hospital stewards	2
Privates	7
Rowell Barracks:	
Hospital steward	1
Acting hospital steward	1
Privates	7
Morro Castle, Santiago:	
Hospital steward	1
Acting hospital steward	1
Privates	7

Ratio of admission to sick report per 1,000 of strength for all posts in Cuba for ten and two-thirds months ending May 20, 1902 (and for the year ending June 30, 1902, provided admission rate and strength of command remain constant), as compared with that of the same posts for the year ended June 30, 1901.

Posts.	Total admissions.	Mean strength of command.	Ratio per 1,000 of strength, ten and two-thirds months ended May 20, 1902.	Ratio per 1,000 of strength, year ended June 30, 1902.	Ratio per 1,000 of strength, year ended June 30, 1901.
Columbia Barracks.....	1,896	1,159	1,204	1,355	1,089
Hamilton barracks ^a	704	561	1,255	1,537	1,902
Rowell Barracks.....	269	289	981	1,045	1,355
Cabafia Barracks.....	267	294	908	1,020	1,528
Department headquarters and artillery defenses of Habana.....	628	581	1,081	1,217	1,989
District headquarters, Morro Castle, and yellow-fever hospital, Santiago.....	347	248	1,399	1,577	3,089
Manzanillo and Bayamo ^a	725	424	1,710	2,099	3,049
Holguin and Baracoa.....	516	312	2,615	2,939	2,560
Guantanamo ^a	122	91	1,341	1,626	8,158
Camp Mackenzie.....	474	326	1,455	1,940	2,791
San Luis.....	113	68	1,776	2,368	3,333

^a Abandoned April 24, 1902.

Comparative health statistics between troops in Cuba and in the entire Army, Pacific islands, continental United States, and Porto Rico.

[Figures for entire Army, continental United States, Pacific islands, and Porto Rico are for the year ended December 31, 1900.]

	Mean strength of command.	Total admissions.	Total deaths.	Ratio of admissions per 1,000 of strength.	Ratio of deaths from disease per 1,000 of strength.	Ratio of deaths from injury per 1,000 of strength.	Ratio of total deaths per year ended June 30, 1901.
Entire United States Army, year ended Dec. 31, 1900.....	100,389	232,080	2,283	2,312	15.79	6.95	22.74
Pacific Islands, year ended Dec. 31, 1900.....	66,882	175,362	1,923	2,622	20.26	8.49	28.75
Porto Rico, year ended Dec. 31, 1900.....	2,180	3,440	11	1,578	5.05	0.00	5.05
Cuba, year ended June 30, 1901 ^a	5,366	9,863	67	1,927	9.70	2.80	12.50
Cuba, 10½ months ended May 20, 1902.....	4,187	5,861	14	1,400	1.43	1.91	3.34
Cuba, year ended June 30, 1902, providing admission rate, death rate, and strength of command remain constant.....	4,187	6,593	16	1,575	1.67	2.15	3.82
Continental United States, year ended Dec. 31, 1900.....	20,690	31,262	161	1,511	4.83	2.95	7.78

^a Strength of command for admissions, 5,116.

Comparative health statistics between troops in Cuba and in the United States.

[Figures for the United States are for year ended December 31, 1900.]

	Mean strength of command.	Total admissions.	Total deaths.	Ratio of admissions per 1,000 of strength.	Ratio of deaths per 1,000 of strength.
United States, year ended Dec. 31, 1900.....	20,690	31,262	161	1,511	7.78
Cuba, year ended June 30, 1901.....	5,116	9,863	67	1,927	12.50
Cuba, 10½ months ended May 20, 1902.....	4,187	5,861	14	1,400	3.34
Cuba, year ended June 30, 1902, providing strength of command, admission rate, and death rate remain constant.....	4,187	6,593	16	1,575	3.82

Department of Cuba, percentage of admissions.

	Diar- rhea.	Dys- en- tery.	Mala- rial fever.	Yel- low fever.	Ty- phoid fever.	Tu- ber- culo- sis.	Other infec- tious dis- eases.	Syph- ilis.	Other ven- ereal dis- eases.	Alco- hol- ism.	All other cases. dis- eases.	Total.
July, 1901	2.308	0.169	2.541	0.085	0.085	0.169	1.694	0.423	11.073	18.547
August, 1901	1.096	.165	2.233	0.021	0.063	.082	.165	1.509	.393	9.284	15.012
September, 1901770	.041	2.164021	.041	.250	1.540	.187	8.177	13.191
October, 1901640	.041	2.105	.041062	.867	.207	2.002	.330	10.506	16.800
November, 1901684	.021	1.929705	.166	1.410	.394	9.270	14.579
December, 1901487	.021	1.291021	.423	.169	1.439	.317	8.567	12.735
January, 1902230853046	.069	.115	1.198	.300	7.511	10.322
February, 1902154	.026	.292051	.103	.128	.796	.308	6.596	8.444
March, 1902245	.054	.598054	.218	.109	1.006	.489	7.096	9.869
April, 1902694	1.058038	.926	.165	1.290	.628	4.266	9.060
May, 1902	1.967	1.563932	.207	1.242	.207	3.727	9.835
Total 10½ months ending May 20, 1902	9.275	.538	16.607	.062	.085	.371	4.431	1.850	15.126	3.976	96.072	138.394
Total year ending June 30, 1902, pro- vided admission rate and strength of command re- main constant	10.436	.605	18.688	.070	.096	.418	4.984	2.081	4.473	96.831	155.694
Total for year end- ed June 30, 1901	13.440	2.560	47.360	2.970	.370	.440	1.720	2.720	3.140	97.650	192.680

Number of deaths:

Homicide	4
Accidental	3
Suicide	1
Appendicitis	1
Typhoid fever	1
Pneumonia	1
Malarial fever	1
Tuberculosis	1
Heart disease	1
Total	14

Mean strength of command	4,519
Percentage of deaths 10½ months ended May 20, 1902	0.33
Percentage of deaths year ended June 30, 1902, providing death rate and strength of command remain constant47
Percentage of deaths year ended June 30, 1901	1.25

MEDICAL SUPPLY DEPOT.

Maj. M. C. Wyeth, Medical Department, U. S. Army, medical supply officer.

Major Wyeth was on duty in charge of the medical supply depot at Habana from March 14, 1899, as per paragraph 5, Special Orders, No. 40, series 1899, Division of Cuba, and was relieved from duty in the department February 14, 1902, per paragraph 11, Special Orders, No. 37, current series, Department of Cuba, based upon Special Orders, No. 15, from the Headquarters of the Army, dated January 18, 1902, which directed him to proceed to Fort Trumbull, Conn.

In Special Orders, No. 19, current series, Headquarters of the Army, Maj. W. C. Gorgas, U. S. Army, was assigned to duty as disbursing officer of the medical department at Habana and the medical supply depot was broken up.

PAY DEPARTMENT.

Maj. J. C. Muhlenberg, paymaster, U. S. Army, chief paymaster.

All payments to officers and troops in this department have been promptly made. The following statement shows the disbursements by

officers of the pay department during the period from July 1, 1901, to April 30, 1902:

Balance on hand July 1, 1901	\$179,600.55	
Received from United States Treasurer	35,000.00	
Received from soldiers' deposits	137,511.55	
Received from army paymasters' collections	80,720.90	
Received from paymasters outside the department	1,312,525.46	
Total receipts		\$1,745,358.46
Disbursed as per abstract of payments	\$1,477,070.09	
Collections deposited to credit of United States Treasurer	80,114.42	
Unexpended balance deposited to credit of Treasurer ..	50,452.45	
Transfers to paymasters outside the department	50,000.70	
Total disbursements		1,657,636.96
Balance on hand May 20, 1902		87,721.50

PERSONNEL.

Maj. J. C. Muhlenberg, paymaster, U. S. Army. Station, Habana, Cuba; chief paymaster, Department of Cuba, since April 24, 1901, per Special Orders, No. 66, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, March 21, 1901. Under orders to take station at Omaha, Nebr., as chief paymaster, Department of the Missouri. Left Habana, Cuba, for the United States May 20, 1902, and arrived in the United States May 27, 1902.

Maj. John L. Bullis, paymaster, U. S. Army. Station, Habana, Cuba; reported for duty in this department August 26, 1901, per paragraph 16, Special Orders, No. 163, Adjutant-General's Office, 1901. Under orders to take station in the Philippine Islands. Was at Habana, Cuba, May 20, 1902, perfecting arrangements for his departure for the Philippine Islands.

Capt. Otto Becker, paymaster, U. S. Army. Station, Habana, Cuba. Relieved from duty in the department and ordered to Washington, D. C., per paragraph 16, Special Orders, No. 163, Adjutant-General's Office, 1901.

Capt. John R. Lynch, paymaster, U. S. Army. Station, Santiago, Cuba. Under orders to take station at Omaha, Nebr. Left Santiago, Cuba, May 20, 1902, and arrived in the United States May 27, 1902.

THE ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

Maj. Harry F. Hodges, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, chief engineer.

The military work done by this department consisted of a survey of the permanent fortifications defending the harbor of Habana, of military reconnoissances in various parts of the island, and of certain miscellaneous surveys and maps made from time to time under orders of the department commander. Previous to January 1, 1902, the modern seacoast defenses had been surveyed and careful maps made, which were submitted with the civil report of the chief engineer for the six months ended June 30, 1901. In addition to this, surveys of certain of the old permanent works had been made and maps prepared.

Photographic reproductions on a small scale of the plans of Morro, Cabaña, Principe, and Atares castles were submitted with the civil report for the period ended December 31, 1901.

During the period covered by the present report the details remaining unfinished at the beginning of the year have been completed so far as practicable, and sheets of cross sections to accompany the plans have been finished for the castles of Morro and Cabaña. Surveys, not yet finished, have been made of San Diego, of the Pirotecnica Militar, and of the old castle of La Punta. The modern battery adjoining the last named was included among the coast-defense batteries, of which maps were finished in the first half of 1901.

The incomplete files and records of the survey of fortifications were left, as insular property, with other records of the chief engineer's office, in Habana. Tracings of the maps which had been completed have been forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army. Among them will be found tracings of the temporary fortifications erected by the Spaniards for the defense of Habana, and of the modern coast-defense batteries. The surveys and maps of the temporary works and the greater part of the seacoast batteries were completed under the direction of Maj. William M. Black, Corps of Engineers. The original tracings have permanent value and have been forwarded to the Adjutant-General for file, where they may be reproduced if desired. It is believed they should be placed on record in the office of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army.

The total expenses for the survey of fortifications during the period covered by this report have been \$10,769.51, and have been paid from insular funds.

SURVEY OF THE DEPARTMENT.

The engineer department has had in hand the preparation of a military map of Cuba, as complete as the means available would permit. In connection with this work the topographical features of certain landing places on the island have been surveyed and many reconnoissances have been made by the troops. A great deal of information was collected from the surveys made by the department of public works, by railroad companies, and other private enterprises. As a great part of the field work was accomplished during the last four months of the occupation, it was not practicable, owing to lack of time, to consolidate the results obtained into a single map, but the chief engineer of the late department is now engaged in compiling such a map. Maps of the harbors of Mariel, Cabañas, and Bahía Honda, and a portion of the north coast between Mariel and Habana have been finished and transmitted to the Adjutant-General of the Army. The total cost of the survey of the department since January 1, 1902, has been \$5,920.65, and was paid from insular funds.

The following is a list of tracings and maps prepared by the engineer department of the Department of Cuba, and forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army on July 28, 1902:

Tracings of modern coast-defense batteries.

[Portfolios of solar-print copies of these accompanied the civil report of the chief engineer, Department of Cuba, for the six months ended June 30, 1901.]

	Sheet number.
Title page.....	0
Index chart.....	1
Battery No. 1:	
Horizontal projection.....	2
Six cross sections.....	3
Details of 7 buildings.....	4

	Sheet number.
Battery No. 2:	
Horizontal projection.....	5
Six cross sections.....	6
Details of 10 buildings.....	7
Battery No. 3:	
Horizontal projection.....	8
Six cross sections.....	9
Details of 17 buildings.....	10
Battery No. 4:	
Horizontal projection.....	11
Three cross sections.....	12
Details of 13 buildings.....	13
Battery No. 5:	
Horizontal projection.....	14
Six cross sections.....	15
Details of 13 buildings.....	16
Battery Santa Clara:	
Horizontal projection.....	17
Twelve cross sections.....	18
Details of 14 buildings.....	19
Battery Velasco:	
Horizontal projection.....	20
Five cross sections.....	21
Details of 5 buildings.....	21
Battery La Punta Annex:	
Horizontal projection.....	20
Two cross sections.....	20
Title page, portfolio of photographs.....	00
Index chart, portfolio of photographs.....	000

NOTE.—These batteries are designated, according to official announcement of Major-General Ludlow in circular No. 4, Headquarters Department of Habana, dated February 16, 1899.

Tracings of old type works, etc.

1 tracing of horizontal projection of Fortress La Cabaña.....	21A
1 tracing of horizontal projection of Fortress El Morro.....	22
1 tracing of horizontal projection of Principe Castle.....	23
1 tracing of horizontal projection of Atares Castle.....	24
1 tracing of progress chart showing approximate progress of mapping relative to final topographical map of Habana and vicinity.....	25
1 negative (2 sheets) of the map showing location of temporary fortifications erected by the Spanish for the land defenses of Habana; also known as the "Map of the Department of Habana".....	26

Tracings of temporary fortifications.

[For locations see map of Department of Habana, Inclosure 26.]

Aa-AAm. Battery on Cojimar Bay.....	27
Ad-Yl (Ae-Yq). Trenches.....	28
An-AAb. Parapet and trenches.....	29
Ba-Xt (Bg-Yo). Parapet and battery.....	30
Bb-Xi. Redoubt.....	31
Bb-Yk. Ingenito, battery.....	32
Bc-Xe (Cb-Xh). Batteries.....	33
Bd-AAi. San Pedro, trenches.....	34
Be-Yp (Ca-Xr). Battery and trenches.....	35
Bh-Zk. Trenches.....	36
Bi-Xg (Gd-Qd). Parapet and embankment.....	37
Bm-Wl (Ff-Yg). Battery and parapet.....	38
Bq-Yt (Dq-AAa and Gl-Xb). Trenches.....	39
Br-Zh (Co-Ze). Aguadita, redoubt.....	40
Ca-Yc. Ingenito, redoubt.....	41
Cb-Xl (Gm-Wq and Hm-Ud). Parapet and trenches.....	42
Dk-Rd. Azotea, redoubt.....	43
Do-Yt (Ej-Qi). Vista Hermosa, redoubt.....	44

Sheet
number.

Dp-Rc (Ef-Ya). Trenches.....	45
Ds-AAg. Chipre, redoubt.....	46
Eg-Tm. Animas, lunette.....	47
Eg-Xn (Ej-Xh). Trenches.....	48
Ek-Ss Hj-Ti). Trenches.....	49
El-Qb (Gc-Tj). Acueducto, battery.....	50
El-Sj. Monserrat, lunette.....	51
Em-Ym. Loma de la Cruz, redoubt and battery.....	52
En-AAa. Corral Falso, redoubt.....	53
Eo-Qf (Gd-Wg). Blockhouse and trenches.....	54
Es-Qb (Et-Rq). Trenches.....	55
Fb-AAe (Fh-Zq). Trenches.....	56
Fc-Qa (Fl-Rt). Parapet and trenches.....	57
Fd-AAb. Rosario, redoubt.....	58
Fg-Qa. Parapet and trenches.....	59
Fh-Uk (Hm-Uf and Hp-Vf). Parapet and trenches.....	60
Fh-Yb. San Felipe, redoubt.....	61
Gb-Rt. Battery.....	62
Gc-Ro. Mordazo, redoubt.....	63
Ge-Qp. La tropical, redoubt.....	64
Gi-Vo. Trenches.....	65
Gk-Xg. Trenches.....	66
Gm-Un (Ht-Xg). Loma de Luz, battery.....	67
Gn-Pe. Buena Vista, redoubt.....	68
Gn-Xk. Jacomino, battery.....	69
Go-Ua. San Miguel, battery.....	70
Gs-Vg. Parapet and trenches.....	71
Gt-Qs. Ceiba, redoubt.....	72
Gt-Xk. Jacomino, redoubt.....	73
Ha-Tq. Cruz del Padre, redoubt.....	74
Hb-Rp. Bello, redoubt.....	75
Hi-Ta. Mazo, redoubt.....	76
Hj-Ur (Ho-Uk). Trenches.....	77
Hn-Vb. Timon, redoubt.....	78
Hr-Wk (Jl-Zm). Trench and blockhouse.....	79
Ht-Wa. Ingenito, redoubt.....	80
Ht-Wr. Rio Hondo, redoubt.....	81
Je-Rb. Trenches.....	82
Lk-CCp. Cototto, defenses.....	83
Ms-Rl. Vento vicinity.....	84
Nc-Rk. Vento blockhouse.....	85

Maps of landing places, etc.

Map of harbors of Mariel, Cabañas, and Bahia Honda.....	86
Map of portion of north coast adjoining same.....	87
Progress map showing area covered by reconnoissance of troops.....	88

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

Capt. Andrew Moses, Artillery Corps, U. S. Army, chief ordnance officer.

The supply of arms, ammunition, equipment, and ordnance material has been well maintained at the depot, and requisitions from the troops for these supplies have been promptly filled. The reputation of the Ordnance Department for always furnishing stores of a superior quality has been fully maintained during the year and no complaints of defective equipment have been received.

ORDNANCE AND ORDNANCE STORES.

Cartridges for small arms are now issued in zinc-lined packing boxes with thumb screws to admit an easy opening, and as these are

not subject to climatic influences, they are giving much better satisfaction. These zinc-lined cases did not reach the Habana ordnance depot, however, in time for issue for the regular annual target practice, but were furnished to those troops who had their practice toward the close of the season.

FAIR-LEATHER EQUIPMENT.

The demand for fair-leather equipments has been general throughout the island, which shows how favorably the equipment is considered by officers serving in this department, and as fast as the black-leather goods are condemned they are replaced by fair leather. The Ordnance Department has issued this season sweat leathers to most of the troops on the island, which have proven a great protection to the khaki clothing.

NEW MODEL 1901 WIND-GAUGE SIGHT.

The new model 1901 wind-gauge sight for rifles was received in December and placed upon all of the arms used by the artillery, but those for the carbines were not received until March of this year; so many of the cavalry troops had finished their annual target practice before these sights could be supplied them. They have met with much favor and all arms issued hereafter will be supplied with them.

REMOVAL OF ORDNANCE DEPOT.

In the first days of February this depot was removed from the Pirotecnia Militar to a storehouse in the grounds of the arsenal. The latter location was found to be much more convenient for the transaction of business of the depot, owing to its better facilities for the shipping and receiving of stores.

REPAIRS TO SEACOAST DEFENSES.

During the present fiscal year many minor repairs have been made to the seacoast guns and their carriages, money being allotted for this purpose from insular funds. Expenditures have been made from this fund for the manufacture of gun covers, etc., at Cabaña Barracks, and at the same place the entire saluting battery of 21 guns have had their vents rebored and new metal bushings put in, and they are now in serviceable condition. All of the belts and cartridge pouches for the Cuerpo de Artilleria were manufactured here under the supervision of the depot saddler.

CUBAN ARMS.

The arms formerly belonging to the Cuban army were transferred to the arsenal with the depot, where they still remain, having been, however, receipted for by the commanding general of the rural guard. The majority of these arms are valueless except as relics.

SIGNAL CORPS.

Capt. O. A. Nesmith, Signal Corps, U. S. Army, chief signal officer. The telephone and telegraph lines were operated as pertaining to the island of Cuba, and will be covered in my report of civil affairs.

SMALL-ARMS PRACTICE.

First Lieut. Edward Carpenter, Artillery Corps, U. S. Army, acting aid-de-camp, inspector of small-arms practice.

Owing to the evacuation of the island and the preliminary withdrawal of certain of the troops, which had been in progress for some time, the summaries of reports of target and revolver firing are necessarily incomplete, the troops in question having been withdrawn before the completion of their work.

The following is a list of the organizations which have completed the prescribed course in target firing: Second Cavalry—Troops A, B, C, and D. Seventh Cavalry—The entire regiment. Eighth Cavalry—Troops E, F, and H. Tenth Cavalry—Troops I and K. Coast Artillery—Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-first, Twenty-second, and Twenty-third companies.

The greatest number of sharpshooters in any one organization was 10 in Troop K of the Tenth Cavalry; 13 troops had none.

The greatest number of marksmen in any one organization was 7 in Troop M of the Seventh Cavalry; 4 had none.

The greatest number of first-class men in any one organization was 26 in Troop I of the Tenth Cavalry.

The greatest number of second-class men in any one organization was 25 in Troop I of the Tenth Cavalry.

The greatest number of third-class men in any one organization was 62 in Troop E of the Eighth Cavalry.

The highest average per cent in firing at rectangular targets was obtained by Troop K, Tenth Cavalry, with 59.6; second, Troop E, Eighth Cavalry, 56.71; third, Troop I, Tenth Cavalry, 55.96.

The highest average per cent in firing as skirmishers was obtained by Troop L, Seventh Cavalry, with a percentage of 46.60; Troop C of the Second Cavalry, second, with 37, and Troop K, Tenth Cavalry, third, with 34.90.

The highest average per cent for all firing was obtained by Troop I, Tenth Cavalry, with 54.09; second, Troop K, Tenth Cavalry, 49.50; third, Troop L, Seventh Cavalry, 48.90.

The climate as well as the duties performed by the troops in this department rendered impracticable certain of the details of small-arms practice, but every effort has been made with the means at hand and under the conditions prevailing to make the troops as efficient as possible.

The following is a report of revolver firing of troops and target firing in the department:

Summary of reports of revolver firing of troops stationed in the Department of Cuba for the year 1902.

Troop and regiment.	Dis-mounted practice.		Mounted practice.				Average number firing. Average per cent for all firings.		Remarks.
	Number firing.	Average per cent.	Course at Target D.		Course at Target K.				
			Number firing.	Average per cent.	Number firing.	Average per cent.			
Second Cavalry:									
Troop A	55	58.36	54	63.70	54	50.29	54	57.45	Station, Hamilton Barracks.
Troop B	80	67.06	74	71.66	70	73.16	74	70.62	Do.
Troop C	85	62.23	79	56.14	73	56.35	79	58.24	Do.
Troop D	59	72.96	56	66.77	56	63.46	57	67.73	Do.
Troop I	77	64.38	74	62.23	74	69.21	75	64.94	Do.
Troop K	48	69.16	48	50.67	48	52.78	48	57.51	Do.
Troop L									Left department before completion of target season.
Troop M	84	54.52	84	52.66	84	58.09	84	55.09	Station, Hamilton Barracks.
Total of regiment	488	64.81	499	63.26	439	60.48	431	61.37	
Seventh Cavalry:									
Troop A	75	68.40	75	53.15	75	52.63	75	58.06	Station, Columbia Barracks.
Troop B	71	55.83	71	74.92	71	71.97	71	67.57	Do.
Troop C	76	47.00	75	43.55	75	41.56	75	44.04	Do.
Troop D	75	55.41	75	51.36	75	44.32	75	50.36	Do.
Troop E	71	54.10	71	64.70	71	53.70	71	57.51	Do.
Troop F	60	46.43	60	48.50	60	43.21	60	46.05	Do.
Troop G	76	58.97	75	79.05	75	68.59	75	65.54	Do.
Troop H	79	62.05	79	63.50	79	59.06	79	61.98	Do.
Troop I	74	62.76	74	52.35	74	52.50	74	55.86	Do.
Troop K	68	71.91	68	69.50	68	73.32	68	71.58	Do.
Troop L	74	71.11	74	54.55	74	52.34	74	59.33	Do.
Troop M	76	73.50	76	76.49	76	67.27	76	72.42	Do.
Total of regiment	875	60.62	873	60.97	873	56.89	873	59.19	
Eighth Cavalry:									
Troop E									No reports received.
Troop F									Do.
Troop G									Do.
Tenth Cavalry:									
Troop A									Left department before completion of target season.
Troop B									On practice march; returns incomplete.
Troop C									Left department before completion of target season.
Troop D									On practice march; returns incomplete.
Troop I	65	77.29	64	57.96	63	53.18	64	62.81	Holguin, Cuba.
Troop K	62	73.65	58	58.97	58	53.86	59	62.16	Do.
Troop L									Left department before completion of target season.
Troop M									Do.
Total of regiment	127	75.47	122	58.46	121	53.52	123	62.38	

Report of the target firing of the troops in the department of Cuba for the year 1908.

[See Part IV, Chap. IV, Firing Regulations for Small Arms.]

Regiments and companies.		Number firing and average per cent of the scores in individual practice.													
		200 yards.		300 yards.		500 yards.		600 yards.		800 yards.		1,000 yards.		As skirmishers.	
		Num- ber firing.	Average per cent of scores.	Num- ber firing.	Average per cent of scores.	Num- ber firing.	Average per cent of scores.	Num- ber firing.	Average per cent of scores.	Num- ber firing.	Average per cent of scores.	Num- ber firing.	Average per cent of scores.	Num- ber firing.	Average per cent of scores.
Second Cavalry:															
Troop A.....		74	62.35	74	54.08	74	45.22	74	29.29	74	19.84
Troop B.....		42	64.26	41	64.02	40	58.15	40	39.72	10	47.60	40	29.00
Troop C.....		64	61.30	61	49.60	54	40.90	54	39.90	5	63.40	1	54.00	52	37.00
Troop D.....		73	65.34	73	56.12	73	42.79	73	37.88	1	71.60	73	16.26
Troop E.....	
Troop F.....	
Troop G.....	
Troop H.....	
Troop I.....	
Troop K.....	
Troop L.....	
Troop M.....	
Total of regiment.....		253	63.30	249	55.95	241	46.76	241	36.68	16	68.60	1	54.00	239	28.02
Seventh Cavalry:															
Troop A.....		74	64.90	74	58.60	74	51.70	74	38.60	9	54.10	7	21.60	74	20.50
Troop B.....		70	59.28	70	46.20	70	36.71	70	35.70	2	47.50	1	51.00	70	20.62
Troop C.....		74	63.60	74	55.10	74	39.90	74	31.40	5	69.40	5	25.60	73	20.00
Troop D.....		76	57.32	76	55.38	76	43.47	76	33.79	4	50.75	2	51.50	76	46.47
Troop E.....		72	60.90	72	48.80	72	39.90	72	28.40	5	37.40	1	18.00	72	16.90
Troop F.....		64	60.88	64	54.58	64	45.50	64	35.73	6	48.67	4	21.75	71	19.84
Troop G.....		78	60.38	78	49.52	73	45.35	72	30.50	9	55.33	6	37.17	71	19.84
Troop H.....		79	64.00	79	43.20	79	31.30	79	28.50	4	65.70	4	50.00	78	16.90
Troop I.....		73	63.00	73	61.40	73	50.10	73	37.60	5	51.60	5	28.20	73	58.50
Troop K.....		68	56.10	68	51.10	68	46.20	67	30.50	5	62.60	4	50.00	67	46.60
Troop L.....		75	61.80	74	55.80	74	45.00	71	32.60	7	60.30	6	49.00	68	46.60
Troop M.....		77	68.60	77	58.30	77	46.10	75	34.10	13	49.00	9	19.70	75	22.50
Total of regiment.....		880	61.73	876	53.00	874	43.44	867	38.12	74	54.36	44	32.45	858	22.84
Eighth Cavalry:															
Troop E.....		65	55.70	65	41.90	61	35.90	61	22.90	1	30.00	54	30.65
Troop F.....		71	63.40	71	50.70	71	50.90	71	44.20	8	42.60	5	43.00	69	16.70
Troop G.....		68	59.80	68	54.40	67	56.70	67	54.30	20	45.30	12	47.80	66	34.60
Troop H.....	
Total of regiment.....		204	59.63	204	52.33	199	47.83	199	40.47	29	39.80	17	45.40	189	20.49

Report of the target firing of the troops in the department of Cuba for the year 1902—Continued.

Regiments and companies.	Individual classification.						Average per cent in firing at rectangular targets.	Average per cent in firing as skilsmen.	Average per cent in volley firing.	Average per cent for all firing.	Remarks.
	Sharpshooters.	Marksmen.	First-class men.	Second-class men.	Third-class men.	Not classified.	Total of company.				
Tenth Cavalry:											
Troop A.....											Left department before completion of target season.
Troop B.....											On practice march. Return not rendered.
Troop C.....											Left department before completion of target season.
Troop D.....											On practice march. Return not rendered.
Troop E.....											Do.
Troop F.....											Station, Holguin, Cuba.
Troop G.....											Do.
Troop H.....											Left department before completion of target season.
Troop I.....											Do.
Troop J.....											
Troop K.....											
Troop L.....											
Troop M.....											
Total of regiment.....	12	6	46	51	40	5	180	57.78	64.60	51.79	
Coast artillery:											
Seventeenth Company.....							67				Proteccion Militar, Habana, Cuba.
Eighteenth Company.....							92				Cabaña Barracks, Cuba.
Nineteenth Company.....							111				Battery No. 3, Vedado, Habana, Cuba.
Twentieth Company.....							96				Cabaña Barracks, Cuba.
Twenty-first Company.....							101				Do.
Twenty-second Company.....							109				Battery No. 4, Vedado, Habana, Cuba.
Twenty-third Company.....							105				Santa Clara Battery, Habana, Cuba.
Total of companies.....							681				

In conclusion, I desire to express my appreciation especially of the faithful and able performance by Capt. H. L. Scott, Seventh Cavalry, adjutant-general, of all duties pertaining to his position; also to my personal aids—First Lieut. Matthew E. Hanna, Second Cavalry; First Lieut. Frank R. McCoy, Tenth Cavalry, and First Lieut. Edward Carpenter, Artillery Corps—for able and faithful performance of duty; also to the following officers of the department staff, who have discharged the duties assigned to them in an efficient and satisfactory manner:

Col. George H. Burton, inspector-general, U. S. Army, inspector-general.

Maj. George M. Dunn, judge-advocate, U. S. Army, judge-advocate.

Capt. Chauncey B. Baker, quartermaster, U. S. Army, chief quartermaster.

Lieut. Col. William L. Alexander, deputy commissary-general, U. S. Army, chief commissary.

Maj. William C. Gorgas, surgeon, U. S. Army, chief surgeon.

Maj. John C. Muhlenberg, paymaster, U. S. Army, chief paymaster.

Maj. Harry F. Hodges, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, chief engineer.

Capt. Andrew Moses, Artillery Corps, U. S. Army, ordnance officer.

Capt. Otto A. Nesmith, Signal Corps, U. S. Army, signal officer.

Capt. William S. Scott, quartermaster, U. S. Army, quartermaster.

Capt. Walter B. Barker, quartermaster, U. S. Army, quartermaster.

Capt. Robert H. Rolfe, quartermaster, U. S. Army.

Capt. Jacob E. Bloom, commissary, U. S. Army, assistant to depot commissary.

Maj. Darnaso T. Lainé, surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, attending surgeon.

Maj. John L. Bullis, paymaster, U. S. Army.

Capt. John R. Lynch, paymaster, U. S. Army.

First Lieut. William J. Barden, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, chief engineer of the city of Habana.

Lieut. Col. Winfield S. Edgerly, Seventh Cavalry, assistant to the inspector-general.

Maj. George K. McGunneagle, Third Infantry, assistant to the inspector-general.

Maj. Ezra B. Fuller, Tenth Cavalry, assistant to the inspector-general.

First Lieut. Evan H. Humphrey, Seventh Cavalry, assistant to the chief quartermaster.

Contract Surg. Aristides Agramonte, U. S. Army, in charge of department laboratory.

First Lieut. Rush S. Wells, Eighth Cavalry, special duty at department headquarters.

On May 20 the government of the island was turned over to the officers of the Republic of Cuba, and the Department of Cuba was discontinued pursuant to the instructions contained in General Orders, No. 31, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, series of 1902.

Respectfully submitted.

LEONARD WOOD,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

H. L. SCOTT,

Captain, Seventh Cavalry.

(For and in the absence of Brigadier-General Wood.)

**REPORT OF COL. JACOB A. AUGUR, TENTH U. S. CAVALRY,
COMMANDANT GENERAL SERVICE AND STAFF COLLEGE.**

GENERAL SERVICE AND STAFF COLLEGE,
Fort Leavenworth, Kans., July 24, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit my report as in command of the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School, as it has been continued since the school closed in the spring of 1898.

Nothing has been done except the expenditure by the secretary of the school of the funds set aside for the use of the school library.

Attention is invited to the report of Captain Koehler, Fourth Cavalry, the secretary, which gives in detail the expenditures.

It has been my aim to thoroughly equip the school, so far as the funds were available, to enable the new Staff College to start as well equipped as was possible, although I could not learn anything definite as to number of student officers to be sent here; still, enough material has been purchased to enable the school to make its beginning under favorable conditions as to equipment and other material necessary for the student officers.

Very respectfully,

J. A. AUGUR,
Colonel Tenth Cavalry, Commandant.

GENERAL SERVICE AND STAFF COLLEGE,
Fort Leavenworth, Kans., July 1, 1902.

The COMMANDANT, U. S. GENERAL SERVICE AND STAFF COLLEGE,
Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

SIR: I respectfully submit the following report for the year ending June 30, 1902:
An allotment of \$5,000 was received November, 1901, and has been expended as follows:

Additions to library	\$2, 938. 32
Office furniture	1, 017. 35
Engineering department	641. 60
Photographic department	160. 69
Printing department	221. 41
Miscellaneous expenses	21. 00
 Total	 5, 000. 00

No school in operation during the year
Civilians: One clerk as librarian.

Very respectfully,

L. M. KOEHLER,
Captain, Fourth Cavalry, Secretary.

**REPORT OF COL. CAMILLO C. CARR, FOURTH U. S. CAVALRY,
COMMANDANT CAVALRY AND FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL.**

CAVALRY AND FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL,
Fort Riley, Kans., September 13, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: In accordance with the requirements of paragraph 9, Regulations for the Cavalry and Field Artillery School, I have the honor to submit for the information of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army the following report of the progress and wants of the school for the year ending August 31, 1902.

On my arrival here with the headquarters, band, and first squadron of the Fourth Cavalry, September 11, 1901, I assumed command of the school, and appointed my adjutant, Capt. George H. Cameron, Fourth Cavalry, secretary. From his report the following extracts are made:

Financial report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1902.

RECEIPTS.

Received from the Treasurer of the United States	\$5,000.00
Received from the sale of duplicate library book	1.50
Total receipts	<u>5,001.50</u>

DISBURSEMENTS.

Printing office supplies (including new Gordon press, new type, paper, cardboard, repairs, etc.)	494.70
Library fixtures, office and school supplies (including 3 book stacks, card-index system and cabinet, typewriter, desk and chair, stationery, textbooks, transit and other mathematical and drawing instruments, etc.) ..	1,356.54
Magazines (25 standard military, scientific, and literary monthly and weekly American, English, and French journals)	115.10
Freight and express (charges paid on commercial shipments other than books)	27.05
Books (1,691 professional, reference, and scientific works, etc.)	2,821.86
Miscellaneous (services for repairs and for Tabard Inn Club Service circulating library)	183.75
Postage (purchased per precedents established, but disallowed by decision of Comptroller)	1.00
Turned into the Treasury of the United States	1.50
Total disbursements	<u>5,001.50</u>

During the year the library was increased by the addition of 1,691 volumes, at a cost of \$2,821.26, adding strength to each of the general departments, and bringing the total number of volumes up to 5,821. The average cost of books purchased was in excess of \$1.67 above indicated, since a few War Department reports and several valuable volumes from the Adjutant-General's Office and the Department of State were added without cost.

The library is well selected and of broad utility, considering its size. About 100 volumes are constantly in the hands of borrowing officers on memorandum receipt. Accessions to the library at this time are needed in military technical works, late authoritative works of general science, and representative Spanish and German literature.

The need of at least two additional book stacks is imperative, the present stacks being so crowded as to render convenient arrangement and classification impossible, while without them further accessions will have to be stored or stacked on tables and floor. It is considered to be dangerous to place more weight upon the floor

of the present library room, which condition, together with the problem of space, light, and table (and chair) room renders an early removal to more commodious quarters absolutely necessary.

Additional cases and shelving are also badly needed for preservation of the school's mathematical, drafting, and surveying instruments, as well as for noncommissioned officers' school supplies. Some of these instruments have now to be piled on the floor in the secretary's office.

The fitting up of a dark room with all necessary appliances and supplies for practical instruction in photography and the use of student officers in connection with their reports, lyceum essays, etc., is recommended.

* * * * *

The entire library has been provided with a card-index system, a modification of the expansive and decimal systems adapted by Mr. H. M. Higday, librarian and school clerk. The index as it now stands is an alphabetical catalogue, covering titles, authors, and subjects.

A complete catalogue has also been prepared designed to serve two uses: (1) as a shelf guide for the librarian and officers, and (2) as a classified catalogue to supplement the dictionary catalogue upon the card system. It will prevent duplication of the not inconsiderable labor which has been expended upon arrangement of the library and the card system, and will be a comprehensive explanation of the system adopted (for the guidance of a new administration), each book in the library being permanently classified and marked according to the system.

It was expected to have published this catalogue in order to place it in the hands of all officers of the post, the congested condition of the printing plant alone preventing. It is especially recommended that this be done at the earliest date practicable.

* * * * *

It is submitted that in view of the conditions above set forth it would be expedient and progressive to erect a small building at this post adapted to the exclusive use of the Cavalry and Field Artillery School, as distinguished from the regular garrison administration, providing for present needs and future growth of this important institution, in the following at least:

(a) Library quarters, (b) reading room, (c) school office, (d) drafting and instrument room, (e) lecture hall, (f) photographic dark and light rooms, (g) printing office and bindery.

The regular annual estimate for funds for the school covers the articles mentioned above as needed, and it is hoped that it will meet with the approval of those charged with the allotment of the appropriation made for the various service schools.

I heartily concur in the recommendation that a separate building be provided containing room for the school library (rapidly growing and already overflowing the too limited space assigned it) and other rooms and offices to be devoted to the use of the school exclusively.

The theoretical and practical instruction of the members of the Hospital Corps under Maj. Paul Shillock, Medical Department, has been well extended and the results are considered satisfactory.

THE SUBSCHOOL OF CAVALRY.

While the progress of this school has been all that could be reasonably expected under the conditions of frequently changing components of the cavalry garrison, it has fallen somewhat short of that prescribed by the regular schedule. The object kept in view has been to hold on to what has been already gained with a view to renewing the course of instruction next January according to the scheme which time and experience have proven so comprehensive and effective, to be changed with the approval of the school staff as circumstances or altered conditions may suggest improvements.

In his report as director of the subschool of cavalry, Maj. Alexander Rodgers, Fourth Cavalry, shows the difficulties which have had to be

contended with in the way of new mounts for the squadron of the Fourth Cavalry, the virtually dismounted condition of the Third Squadron, Eighth Cavalry, a part of the permanent garrison, and the loss of trained and experienced men by discharge on account of expiration of term of service. In the First Squadron, Fourth Cavalry, alone, the number has reached the startling total of 241 out of 265—90 per cent. In the Third Squadron, Eighth Cavalry, of the 300 that arrived here March 6, 1902, 159, or 53 per cent, have been discharged in six months.

Theoretical instruction by means of the lyceum to the date of its discontinuance, officers' schools and lectures, and practical instruction by the veterinarian, Alexander Plummer, aided by the fine anatomical specimens contained in the Kiernan Museum, have been imparted in a regular, systematic, and effective manner to the great advantage of those participating. The classes of noncommissioned officers and selected privates have also been thoroughly instructed theoretically and practically in the subjects upon a knowledge of which an efficient performance of their duties so materially depends.

The uninterrupted two months' schedule of recruit instruction has produced the best results I have ever seen.

Attention is specially invited to the difficulty of keeping the organizations in the cavalry subschool provided with the number of officers absolutely necessary for the proper training and instruction of men and horses in all that pertains to the important, varied, and indispensable duties of cavalry in modern war, especially scouting, reconnoissance, field sketching, and kindred subjects. At the present date there is but one commissioned officer available for duty with each troop of cavalry instead of the three provided by law. It is respectfully submitted that in such a condition not only the best results can not be reasonably expected but not even satisfactory ones. If officers must be taken from the troops at this school for the performance elsewhere of duties for which they are especially qualified, other officers should be sent here to replace them, so that the course of instruction could go on without interruption, and without being hampered by the lack of a sufficient number of instructors to train small squads of men in scouting and other work of a similar kind on the varied ground offered by this military reservation. This sort of training to be effective must be given to individuals or small squads of men and not to whole organizations or large portions of them, and the officers must be thoroughly instructed in everything pertaining to the subject before they can be intrusted to teach the enlisted men.

THE SUBSCHOOL OF ARTILLERY.

Col. George B. Rodney, Field Artillery, director of the subschool of artillery, in his annual report, cites the theoretical instruction of officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates, as in the report of the subschool of cavalry. (The schedule adopted by the school staff is the same in both subschools.) The very thorough practical course of the artillery subschool comprised the following drills and exercises distributed progressively throughout the year: Horse exercise, road marches, school of the soldier, mounted and dismounted, gymnastic and calisthenic drills, loading and unloading batteries on cars, preliminary instruction for target practice, subcaliber practice, school of the

driver, signal drill, school of the battery, target practice, construction of gun pits, revolver practice, school of the battalion, and field exercises. These latter were held one day each week. Battery service practice was carried on under the immediate personal supervision of the director. Varied problems covering the general hypothesis indicated in memorandum No. 2, Adjutant-General's Office, 1898, were formulated and carried out in the most satisfactory manner.

The following remarks and recommendations of the director of the subschool of artillery are indorsed by me after careful consideration:

AMMUNITION AND TARGETS.

The ammunition allowance of 100 rounds per gun for the light batteries stationed at the school is ample, but in order to insure the full benefit possible from such a generous allowance moving and disappearing targets should be provided. The varied ground of this reservation gives ample opportunity to exercise the batteries at target practice under conditions approaching very closely to those of actual service, it being possible to so arrange targets that they can be approached from any direction at any gait; not seen until a certain point is reached, then only one target visible at the same time. Full advantage is being taken of these conditions in the battery-service practice, but in the elementary practice, where the real training is given the gunner, we should have a series of moving and disappearing targets, and it is urgently recommended that an allowance of money be asked for to supply this deficiency.

TOURS OF DUTY AT SCHOOL.

I renew my recommendation of 1900 that the tour of duty of the batteries at this school be limited to a fixed period, so that as many batteries as possible may receive the benefit of the school allowance of ammunition for target practice and the training made possible by the superior facilities offered by the extended ranges and varied ground of this reservation. I also recommend that batteries designated or to be designated for service in the Philippine Islands be sent here for instruction in target practice for a reasonable period.

INCREASED STRENGTH OF BATTERIES—MEN AND HORSES.

I strongly recommend that the enlisted strength of the field batteries while stationed at the school be raised from 120 to 135 men each. With the present allowance of 120 the average strength will be 110 or less, and it is very important that the enlisted strength be ample to meet all contingencies.

In this connection I invite attention to General Orders, No. 63, current series, Adjutant-General's Office, and General Orders, No. 55, current series, Adjutant-General's Office. These orders, respectively, allow the troops of cavalry serving at the school of application of cavalry and field artillery 10 extra privates each and 10 extra horses. As the batteries serving here are in every way self-sustaining in the matter of all extra and special duty details, fatigue, etc., the entire command being a mounted one, they do not come under paragraph 437, Army Regulations, and will, therefore, not be on an equal footing with the other troops of this command, unless their personnel is raised. In the matter of additional horses I recommend that 10 be allowed each battery. The work here is severe, and battery commanders report that 100 horses do not meet the contingencies arising at this school.

MAGAZINE AND ORDNANCE STOREHOUSE.

With the increase of this command to 5 batteries, the present magazine and also the ordnance storehouse will be inadequate for the accommodation of the necessary ammunition and ordnance stores of this command. It is therefore recommended that the capacity of the magazine be doubled and that the ordnance storehouse be enlarged according to the plans which have been previously submitted. The plans referred to call for a small shop, which is very necessary for the building and repair of targets.

SHOPS.

Attention is invited to the urgent necessity for the immediate construction of shops. The original plan of this subpost contemplated the erection of shops for each battery, but as yet only two have been completed. Two stables now stand without shops, and no allotment has yet been made for them, nor for one for the stable now under construction.

BUILDINGS.

With the completion of the two new double barrack buildings, respectively east and west of the disused general mess hall, and the finishing of the alterations and additions making in and to the old cavalry barracks, there will be ample accommodation for three squadrons of cavalry at this cavalry post, except that no provision has yet been made for quarters for the band, temporarily occupying a portion of the old mess hall.

Seven workshops should be provided for the use of the cavalry troops now without them.

A stable of suitable dimensions should be provided for the horses of the cavalry field officers and noncommissioned staff, both as a matter of convenience and to obviate the necessity of their depending upon troop officers to furnish them as a matter of courtesy what they should have as a matter of right.

The new artillery barracks now in process of construction will probably be completed by the latter part of November, 1902, and the Twentieth Battery, Captain Snow, which had to be sent to Fort Robinson, Nebr., for shelter last winter, and which has been living in tents since its return to Fort Riley in April last, will be suitably and comfortably quartered.

Should the recommendations made in regard to altering the old mess hall so that it will accommodate the post gymnasium and post exchange—as it can be easily made to do—be favorably considered, the building at present occupied by the post exchange could be used for band quarters and the accommodation of unmarried men of the post noncommissioned staff. If not, then a suitable set of barracks should be provided for the regimental band.

Four new cavalry stables of modern design are urgently needed and should be provided in order to better insure the health and comfort of the horses and remove a number of unsightly buildings from their present location.

Plans for a modern veterinary hospital are now under consideration, and it is hoped that within a year the building may be completed ready for use.

REMARKS.

The change made in the status of the cavalry subschool by General Orders, No. 40, Adjutant-General's Office, dated April 30, 1902, by which paragraph 14, school regulations, is altered to read as follows—

14. This school shall consist of a cavalry command and subpost. The organization of the cavalry command and subpost will be as far as practicable complete within itself for purposes of administration and instruction—

has remedied an evil which has been permitted to exist, through an oversight perhaps, since the organization of the school. The subschool of cavalry being now on exactly the same semi-independent footing as that heretofore enjoyed by the subschool of artillery only, the commandant of the school is relieved from the direct command and supervision of the details of the cavalry subpost and has more time to devote to the improvements and progress of the school, while his control over the entire command is made generally more effective.

In conclusion, I desire to testify to the zeal, energy, and enthusiasm

displayed by all of the officers and men of the command in the performance of their allotted duties. Under existing conditions the discipline has been alike creditable to the command and to the Army.

Respectfully submitted.

C. C. C. CARR,
Colonel Fourth Cavalry, Commandant.

**REPORT OF LIEUT. COL. JOHN P. STORY, ARTILLERY CORPS,
COMMANDANT ARTILLERY SCHOOL.**

ARTILLERY SCHOOL,
Fort Monroe, Va., September 1, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report on the artillery school for the year which ended August 31, 1902:

The work of the school during the year has been conducted in accordance with the orders, regulations, and special instructions governing it, and the progress made has been very satisfactory, the student officers generally evincing proper interest in the instruction given. The instructors have been zealous and efficient in the performance of their duties. During the period covered by this report instruction was given in the subjects prescribed by General Orders, No. 109, Adjutant-General's Office, August 15, 1901, namely: Ballistics, seacoast engineering, electricity, mines, mechanism, artillery, coast defense, chemistry, explosives, customs of the service, usages, the preparation of property returns and accounts current with vouchers, correspondence, regulations, board of survey, guard duty, and courts-martial. A general statement showing the character of the instruction in each department follows.

DEPARTMENT OF BALLISTICS AND SEACOAST ENGINEERING.

Fifty-nine school days were allotted to this department.

Instruction was given by the head of the department, Capt. F. S. Harlow, Artillery Corps.

(a) *Exterior ballistics.*—Gunnery definitions, ballistic coefficient, coefficient of form, values to be employed in absence of experiment, resistance of air to the motion of oblong projectiles, empirical formulas for same; ballistic formulas and tables, their construction and use.

1. *Direct fire.*—General formulas for same. Auxiliary tables. Jump. Numerical solution of all important problems involving range, time of flight, muzzle velocity, angle of elevation, angle of departure, angle of fall, striking velocity, striking energy, penetration of armor, drift, effect of head, rear, and cross wind. Correction for altitude; principle of rigidity of trajectory; plotting trajectories; determination of danger spaces; velocity of rotation of rifle projectiles. Probability of fire; calculations of 50 per cent zones and probable rectangles. Method of computing a general range table, effect of variation of different elements, preparation of battery commander's and gun commander's tables. Shrapnel range tables. Formulas and tables for

low velocity firing. Application to curved fire and numerical solution of important problems in same.

2. *High-angle fire*.—Formulas and tables for same. Euler's and Ingalls's methods. Numerical solution of problems.

3. *Ballistic machines*.—Boulengé chronograph. Practical work in measuring muzzle velocities and jump. Instruction under this head was given by Capt. F. E. Harris, Artillery Corps, temporary assistant.

(b) *Interior ballistics*.—Inflammation and combustion of grains and charges of powder. Comparison of curves of pressure of fine-grained and coarse-grained powders; of quick and slow powders. Gravimetric density, density of loading, initial air space. Combustion of grains of different forms. Velocity and pressure at any point in bore of a gun. Construction of velocity and pressure curves. Amount of powder burned in gun. Characteristics of powder. Maximum pressure on projectile. Maximum pressure on breech. Sarrau's binomial and monomial formulas. Elastic strength of guns.

(c) *Seacoast engineering*.—Laying out and accurately measuring a base with steel tapes. Corrections for sag, stretch, temperature, and level. Determination of azimuth of lines by observation of Polaris near elongation. Execution of a triangulation for determination of harbor base lines. Adjustment of the triangles. Orientation and graduation of gun and mortar circles. Leveling. Principles of hydrographic surveying.

DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICITY, MINES, AND MECHANISM.

Sixty-five school days were allotted to this department.

Instruction was given in this course by Capt. Henry C. Davis, Artillery Corps, the head of the department.

Mechanism—Mechanics.—Principles, definitions, and units under the following heads:

Energy, force, velocity, acceleration, work, moments, composition, and resolution of forces; mass, density, moments of inertia; pressure, flow, and expansion of fluids; harmonic motion and curve, composition and resolution of same. Illustrative problems.

Machines.—Theory; simple machines and their application to the transmission of power and motion. Study and manipulation of such as are available. Problems.

Steam.—Description, installation, operation, and care of the steam boiler and its accessories, with inspection and test. Description, theory, installation, operation, and care of the steam engine and accessories; indicator diagrams and brake test.

Oil engines.—Kinds, theory, description, installation, manipulation, and care; accessories and test.

Electricity—Currents.—Manifestation, transmission, units, laws of flow, conductors, circuits, effect, heat, magnetism, attraction, induction; coils, transformers, rheostats; problems.

Electrical measurement.—Principles, description, installation, manipulation, and care of instruments; testing.

Production of currents.—Chemically: Primary batteries; theory, description, installation, and care of such kinds as are available. Mechanically: Theory and laws. Dynamo: General description; D. C. and A. C. generators; shunt and compound winding; regulation and combination; special dynamos; installation, operation, care, and test.

Motors.—Theory, description, and uses; D. C. and A. C. motors and their installation, operation, and care.

Storage batteries.—Kinds, installation, care, and test.

Electric lighting.—Theory, circuits, transmission of power; lamps, installation and testing; specifications for plant.

Electrical apparatus.—Theory, description, installation, operation, testing, and care of; switch board, telegraph, telephone, telephotos, bells, annunciators, anemometers, time-interval instruments, fuses and exploders, searchlight; X-rays and wireless telegraphy.

DEPARTMENT OF ARTILLERY, COAST DEFENSE, CHEMISTRY AND EXPLOSIVES.

Seventy-three school days were allotted to this department.

Instruction was given by Capt. Erasmus M. Weaver, Artillery Corps, the head of the department.

Chemistry and explosives.—Essential principles of chemistry. Chemistry of substances composing service powders and high explosives. Service tests of powders and high explosives. Experiments in handling and using high explosives.

Artillery.—Properties of gun steel. Details of built-up guns studied from plates and at the pieces. Rifling. Breech mechanisms.

Different types of coast carriages; modes of checking recoil, of traversing, and of giving elevation.

Telescopic, open and auto-sights. The quadrant. Principles of azimuth and deflection scales.

Methods of supplying ammunition; the hoists, trolleys, cranes and trucks, used in connection therewith.

Kinds of projectiles used in coast defense; properties of projectile metals; principles controlling the use of shell, shot, shrapnel, and capped projectiles. Care, storage, and shipment of projectiles. Kinds and properties of service powders. Care, storage, and shipment of powder and high explosives.

Details and functioning of friction and electric primers and of time, percussion and combination fuses. Principles of delayed action fuses.

Kinds of ship armor and characteristic properties of each kind. Strength of armor. Consideration of formulas for perforation of armor. The distribution of armor on war ships.

Classes of war ships and their capacities for attack and defense in action against coast forts. Identification study of the characteristic features of individual war ships. Outline target drawings of war ships. The authorized system of coast defense, organization, fire control and fire direction. Installment, adjustment, and practical manipulation of instruments and apparatus used in range and position finding. Aiming and laying guns and mortars by each of the three "cases" of firing. Duties of fire commanders, battery commanders, and gun commanders. Plotting boards and difference charts, their preparation and use. Artillery practice, applying the principles of fire direction and fire control as prescribed in the Drill Regulations for Coast Artillery.

Coast defense.—Principles governing the location, kind, and use of the armament, submarine mines, and other obstacles; forms of naval attack against coasts; landings; relation between the fixed and floating defenses; organization of the personnel of coast artillery; organization and function of a coast-guard corps. Problem in the attack and defense of coasts.

DEPARTMENT OF SPECIAL COURSES.

Thirty-five school days were allotted to this department.

Instruction in the department under the direction of Capt. Ira A. Haynes, Artillery Corps, the head of the department, included military law, customs, and usages of service, property returns and accounts current with vouchers, correspondence, regulations, boards of survey, guard duty, and courts-martials.

ARTILLERY SCHOOL LIBRARY.

The additions to the library during the year have been limited to such books on military subjects as have been purchased from the school appropriation or have been furnished from the War Department, the other Government Departments, and a few other sources. The library has been used constantly by the student officers in their studies and investigations and by others who are accorded the privilege.

The library now contains on its shelves 12,558 volumes, 11,778 pamphlets, and 1,382 maps. During the year 513 volumes, 128 pamphlets, 143 topographical sheets of the maps of the United States Geological Survey, and 43 miscellaneous maps have been added to it.

The library also has the benefit of the exchanges of the Journal of the United States Artillery, which is printed on the Artillery School press. These exchanges comprise 146 foreign and domestic periodicals. Collectively, these offer to the student officer the current professional thought of the world on military and other scientific subjects. It is estimated that the annual value of these exchanges amounts to over \$500.

The back volumes of these periodicals are bound at the school bindery and the bound volumes are then entered in the catalogue of the library.

In this way, year by year, a unique collection of periodical literature is being made.

No doubt the Artillery School library has now one of the most complete collections of modern technical artillery literature in the United States, and it is of great value to all artillery officers.

Attention is invited to the great danger from fire to which it is exposed. The building now used is an ordinary frame structure, 60 by 35 feet, heated by stoves, and lighted by electricity. It is walled and ceiled on the interior with yellow-pine boards, very pitchy. A fire starting from any cause would instantly spread over this pitchy surface and make it impossible to save any considerable portion of the library.

The capacity of the building is far too small. A large room in an adjacent building had to be fitted with shelves on which were placed books and pamphlets for which there was no room in the library proper. This room was filled to its utmost capacity. It recently became necessary to use it for other school purposes, and the books and pamphlets that were formerly kept there have been stored in an old ordnance stable, thus rendering them comparatively inaccessible.

It will be seen, therefore, that a new library building of larger capacity and fireproof in its construction is most urgently needed. This building should be of such capacity as not only to contain the present library but also to allow for future additions at the rate of about 1,000 volumes a year.

Attention is also invited to the necessity of a more permanent and scientific management of the library. It has been the policy in the past to appoint an officer on duty at the post of Fort Monroe as librarian and to allow, as an assistant, an enlisted man from one of the companies of the garrison, this man being placed on extra duty for that purpose.

This arrangement has not conduced to good administration, and the best interests of the United States and of the library itself have not been fully served. Officers so detailed have, by the necessities of the service, been relieved from time to time, and no continuous policy or direction has been possible.

But what is more objectionable, the limited amount of funds available in the past has rendered necessary the use of various expedients and makeshifts for records, catalogues, indexes, and other details of library management. With such apparatus it is impossible to develop and present the full possibilities of the library to all who use it.

The development of library science has made it evident that a library in the true sense of the term is not merely a certain number of books gathered together in one place, but rather a collection of books so arranged that they may be conveniently used for reading and reference; and the true measure of a library's efficiency is not the number of books on its shelf list, but the ease with which they may be consulted by the student.

To realize its full efficiency, scientific classification and administration according to modern methods are necessary, and they can be arrived at only with modern library equipment.

In view of the special character of this library and its importance to the artillery service, it is urgently recommended that its proper housing and other pressing needs receive immediate attention. It is most necessary that its condition be brought to a high standard, and maintained there.

BINDERY AND PRINTING PRESS.

The bindery and printing press connected with the artillery school have been efficiently and economically managed, and have contributed materially to the needs of the different departments of the school.

THE SCHOOL FOR ELECTRICIAN SERGEANTS.

This school was established at this post December 22, 1899, and was made a branch of the artillery school by General Orders, No. 71, Adjutant-General's Office, May 22, 1900. By General Orders, No. 157, Adjutant-General's Office, 1901, it was abolished and the enlisted men then undergoing instruction were sent to the school of submarine defense, Fort Totten, N. Y.

SEARCHLIGHTS.

The 30-inch light loaned to the school by the Engineer Department and the 60-inch light loaned by the Ordnance Department were both used in the instruction of the class of 1902. The former was mounted on its artillery truck and the latter temporarily in an old frame building near the class room.

In these positions they were used merely to familiarize the student officers with their handling. At my instance, the post engineer officer has submitted a requisition for buildings for these two, and for another belonging to the post, to be located along the water front and so distributed that the effect of the lights on ships and their use with guns may be studied during night practice. It is hoped that these installations may be completed in time for use with the class of 1903.

SUBMARINE MINES.

The submarine mine equipment was not turned over to the artillery in time to give the last class any work in that line.

It is proposed to give the next class an elementary course in the care and preservation of the equipment, and to so familiarize them with the various parts that they may take charge of this class of property at posts. In addition to the foregoing it is proposed, if conditions are favorable, to give the class instruction in setting up a triple group and in firing by observation; also, to go as far into the general handling of this branch of coast defense as time will permit.

It is hoped that the visit to this post of the tug from Fort Totten may take place during the time allotted to this work.

REMARKS.

The student class graduated from the artillery school this year numbered thirteen members, as follows: 1, First Lieut. W. F. Stewart, jr., Artillery Corps; 2, First Lieut. Edward Kimmel, Artillery Corps; 3, First Lieut. Wright Smith, Artillery Corps; 4, First Lieut. J. R. Procter, jr., Artillery Corps; 5, First Lieut. F. W. Phisterer, Artillery Corps; 6, First Lieut. P. C. Hains, jr., Artillery Corps; First Lieut. P. P. Bishop, Artillery Corps; 8, First Lieut. E. J. Wallace, Artillery Corps; 9, First Lieut. W. F. Hase, Artillery Corps; 10, First Lieut. David McCoach, Artillery Corps; 11, First Lieut. W. R. Doores, Artillery Corps; 12, First Lieut. A. A. Starbird, Artillery Corps; 13, First Lieut. J. W. Kilbreth, jr., Artillery Corps.

The following-named officers, who entered with the class, were not graduated, having been relieved from duty at the school before the course of instruction was completed (April 22, 1902, by par. 2, Special Orders, No. 75, Headquarters of the Army, March 29, 1902): 1, Capt. R. H. McMaster, Artillery Corps; 2, Capt. A. G. Jenkins, Artillery Corps; 3, Capt. R. E. Wyllie, Artillery Corps; 4, Capt. William Forse, Artillery Corps; 5, Capt. H. L. Steele, Artillery Corps; 6, Capt. C. F. Armistead, Artillery Corps; 7, Capt. J. B. Mitchell, Artillery Corps.

The class is arranged according to rank in the artillery.

Student officers who lack capacity to master the course, or who, having the capacity, fail to give the necessary study and application, will never make competent artillery officers, and it is recommended that legislation be asked which will eliminate such officers from the artillery service.

The Military Academy dismisses cadets who are deficient, and the reasons are even stronger that artillery officers who are not qualified for their professional duties should be discharged the service.

J. P. STORY,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Artillery Corps, Commandant.

REPORT OF MAJ. ARTHUR MURRAY, ARTILLERY CORPS, COMMANDANT SCHOOL OF SUBMARINE DEFENSE.

SCHOOL OF SUBMARINE DEFENSE,
Fort Totten, N. Y., October 20, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: In compliance with paragraph 17, General Orders, No. 145, Adjutant-General's Office, 1901, I have the honor to submit the following report on the school of submarine defense for the year ending October 15, 1902:

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SCHOOL.

The artillery having been charged with the care and use of submarine mines and torpedo defenses by the act of February 2, 1901, it was decided by the War Department, during the following summer, to transfer the United States Engineer School, at which all instruction relating to submarine mining and torpedo work was formerly given, from Fort Totten, N. Y., to Washington Barracks, District of Columbia, and establish a torpedo school under charge of the artillery at Fort Totten. Accordingly, on September 3, 1901, an order was issued by the War Department directing this transfer of the engineer school. The commandant of that school then received instructions from the Chief of Engineers to turn over to me, the senior artillery officer at the post of Fort Totten, all torpedo material, electrical apparatus, and boats heretofore used at the engineer school in connection with torpedo instruction, and this was practically done. In addition to this property a number of copies of about a dozen different books and professional papers on subjects relating to submarine mines and torpedoes were turned over to me. All other engineer-school property, including the entire school library, the whole museum collection of models of engineering works, as well as of torpedo systems and material, and all machinery and tools heretofore used in repairing both engineering instruments and torpedo apparatus, was taken by the engineers to Washington Barracks.

On October 8, 1901, the engineers left Fort Totten for Washington Barracks, and on October 17 a special order was issued by the War Department assigning me to the command of the "United States torpedo school, Fort Totten, N. Y.," and directing Maj. Charles D. Parkhurst and Captains John W. Buckman, Charles F. Parker, and George F. Landers, Artillery Corps, to report to me as commandant of the school for assignment to duty. This was the first recognition of the school in orders.

On November 8, 1901, a general order was issued by the War Department (see appendix A^a) prescribing regulations for the government of the school, designating its different departments, and changing its name from the "United States torpedo school," as published in the special order above referred to, to the "School of submarine defense."

In accordance with verbal instructions received from the Chief of

^aNot printed.

Artillery, as the above-named officers reported to me I assigned them to duty in the different departments of the school as follows:

Major Parkhurst, as instructor of the electrician sergeants' division; Captain Ruckman, as instructor of the department of chemistry and explosives; Captain Landers, as instructor of the department of electricity, mines, and mechanism; Captain Parker, as adjutant of the school.

SCHOOL BUILDINGS.

On examination of the buildings formerly used by the engineer school for instruction purposes but one was found at all suited to the needs of a school department. Even this building, a substantial two-story brick structure with a good basement and a finished attic, was without proper lavatory arrangements, and its heating apparatus was entirely inadequate; but it was decided that it could be put in good condition for use of the electrician sergeants' division at comparatively little expense, and it was turned over accordingly to Major Parkhurst, instructor of the division. At his request, approved by me, the Engineer Department built a good brick addition to the building, containing a large room suitable for a steam plant, and the Quartermaster's Department put in a new and adequate heating plant. By means of funds allotted the school by the Secretary of War, new and suitable lavatory arrangements were put in the building; and besides a number of minor changes were made which very much increased its usefulness for the purposes for which it was needed. The building as thus altered and remodeled is well adapted for instruction purposes, and fulfills all the essential requisites of a good school building for the use of the electrician sergeants' division.

As no building was found suitable for the use of either the department of chemistry and explosives or the department of electricity, mines, and mechanism, it was decided, as soon as funds were available for the purpose, to remodel and enlarge the brick building formerly used as an engineer school library and museum sufficiently to accommodate both of these departments. For this work, in addition to the school funds available for the purpose, \$11,750 of the \$12,000 appropriated by the act of March 2, 1901, for an addition to this particular building was also found to be available. In explanation of this, I would state that when the engineer school was ordered transferred to Washington Barracks the Comptroller of the Treasury decided in effect that this appropriation having been made for an addition to a permanent building, known as the engineer school library and museum building, located at a particular place, it could not be expended elsewhere; further, that as the engineer school had itself been transferred to another place the appropriation consequently lapsed, and the amount appropriated should therefore be turned in to the Treasury. On learning that such a decision had been rendered, I at once wrote a letter to the Comptroller, through military channels, inviting his attention to the fact that the former engineer school had not been moved in its entirety to Washington Barracks, but that a large part of the work of that school was still to be carried on at Fort Totten, though by another arm or branch of the service and under another school name. On receipt of this information the Comptroller promptly reversed his former decision and decided that the appropriation could properly be expended in building an addition to the building in question. This

decision was rendered to the Chief of Engineers, and the latter decided that as the appropriation had been made for the Engineer Department it could only be expended by that department. The engineer officer of this district was thereupon directed to take charge of this work, prepare plans for the same, submit the same to me for approval, and then forward them for the approval of the Chief of Engineers. This was done, and in accordance with the plans thus approved the building is being enlarged and remodeled. The work is now well under way, and when completed it is considered that the building will answer well for a school building for the lecture-room work of both the department of electricity, mines, and mechanism and the department of chemistry and explosives. This building is nothing like so substantial as that assigned the electrician sergeants' division, and its architectural features are by no means in keeping with what it is thought those of a service school of this Government should be, but still it is believed that the building will answer all the essential needs of the two departments for lecture-room work for a number of years to come.

In addition to the building thus provided for the lecture-room work of the department of electricity, mines, and mechanism, other buildings are necessary for use in connection with the practical work of this department. Among these are an enlisted men's laboratory for the instruction of soldiers in the practical details of torpedo work, a mining casemate, a torpedo storehouse, a loading room, and a boathouse. A good and suitable enlisted men's laboratory has already been provided by the engineers. This building was also used during the past year in the instruction of student officers, and if necessary will be used for the same purpose during the present school year until the lecture-room building is completed. The mining casemate, as turned over by the engineers, was found to be inadequate and unsuitable by Captain Landers, instructor, and at his request, approved by myself, the Engineer Department has enlarged and improved the casemate until it is perfectly satisfactory, and it is thought that it might well be used as a model in future construction of casemates. The torpedo storehouse, loading room, and boathouse now provided are by no means suited to the purposes for which they are needed, and suitable buildings for these purposes should be constructed as soon as practicable.

For a school library it was decided, after carefully considering the buildings available for the purpose, to take that portion of the officers' mess building formerly used as a military engineering library, this building being centrally located and readily accessible to all officers. The portion of the mess building thus chosen for a library has been remodeled and suitably arranged by means of school funds. The library thus provided will readily hold from 12,000 to 15,000 volumes, and will, it is thought, fill the needs of the school in this respect for many years.

The building used as administration building is an old and dilapidated frame structure, originally built for a hospital, not now worth repairing; and, besides, entirely inadequate and unsuited to the purpose for which it is being used, as well as utterly incompatible, in dignity and character, with a proper headquarters building for an important Government post and school.

The quarters for officers are also frame buildings, and, with a few exceptions, old, inconvenient, uncomfortable, and generally unsanitary. In number they are entirely inadequate to the needs of both the

post and school, as there are just 22 sets of quarters at the post, including 9 bachelor sets, and therefore if each of the 5 companies stationed at the post had its full complement of officers there would be just enough quarters to accommodate the present post and school staff and these company officers, leaving no quarters whatever for student officers. Appendix B^a fully sets forth the needs of the post in regard to buildings and general improvements.

WORK OF THE SCHOOL.

During the month of December, 1901, a class of 7 electrician sergeants and 10 candidates for appointment as such reported at the school in compliance with War Department orders. As fast as these men reported they were put to work arranging the building selected for the electrician sergeants' division for school work, and as soon as practicable after January 1, 1902, the regular instruction of this class began.

On June 30, 1902, 16 of these men, having completed the prescribed course satisfactorily, were given certificates; one candidate, at his own request, was ordered back to his regiment by the War Department during the course.

On June 20 another class, composed of 20 candidates for appointment as electrician sergeants, selected in accordance with General Orders, Nos. 22 and 28, c. s., Adjutant-General's Office (see Appendixes C and D^a), reported at the school, and on July 1 this class began work on the course it is now taking.

On February 28, 1902, a class of 6 officers, selected from among the company officers stationed at the post, was ordered by the War Department to take a special course at the school, beginning March 15 and ending October 15, 1902. Five of the class finished the course and were given certificates. One member was relieved by the War Department during the course and detailed on staff duty. In addition to the work done by this class at the school, it assisted in the work of planting a line of mines near the entrance to Gardiners Bay during the recent Army and Navy maneuvers.

The work at the school, considering the circumstances and conditions under which it has been done, has been exceedingly satisfactory, and all officers and men in any way connected therewith are thought to be deserving of much credit for the interest, zeal, and energy they have at all times shown. The work done at the entrance to Gardiners Bay was of the greatest possible value to the school on account of the practical experience thereby afforded of planting mines under the most strenuous of war conditions, the knowledge gained as to the working of mines planted under such circumstances, and the confidence thereby inspired in the value of the submarine mine system as adopted in our service.

PROGRAMMES OF INSTRUCTION.

The programmes of the different departments for the school year of 1902, as arranged by the school board and approved by the Commanding General of the Army, are as follows:

Department of Electricity, Mines, and Mechanism; Capt. George F. Landers, Artillery Corps, instructor.—Instruction will be given daily

^aNot printed.

(Sundays excepted, and Saturdays ordinarily so) from March 15 to August 15 in the subjects enumerated below. Officers undergoing instruction are expected to devote not less than forty-two hours per week to their school work.

General electrical principles, laws, measurements, and the introduction to their application.

Practice in the accurate use of voltmeter and ammeter for the measurement of E. M. F. S., currents and resistances.

The principles, construction, and operation of:

- (a) Oil and gas engines;
- (b) Steam engines and boilers;
- (c) Direct-current dynamos and motors;
- (d) Alternating-current dynamos and motors;
- (e) Searchlights.

The installation and care of storage batteries;

Electric lighting and distribution of electric power;

The telegraph and telephone;

Cable testing;

The arrangement and wiring of a mining casemate and of the switchboard;

Practical work in preparing and planting submarine mines;

Practical work in taking charge of the preparation and planting of submarine mines;

Organization of working parties for submarine-mine work;

Experimental work and testing of new devices.

The course throughout the year is to be supplemented by visits to the various factories, machine shops, and power plants in the vicinity of New York.

An examination for proficiency will be held at the end of the course. This examination will be mainly of a practical nature in the management of the various power plants and machinery used during the course, in the use of the various electrical instruments, and in planting and operating submarine mines. Each officer is expected to demonstrate his ability to care for, operate, handle, and use any of the machines and appurtenances of seacoast fortifications. This practical examination will also be supplemented by a written one, including the solution of problems bearing upon the principles involved in the work during the year.

The time allotted this department for work in the special course prescribed was five months. For report of Captain Landers upon the work in his department during this time, see Appendix F.^a

Department of chemistry and explosives; Capt. John W. Ruckman, Artillery Corps, instructor.—This course should embrace thorough theoretical and practical instruction, and combine them in such a manner as to lend mutual strength to each other. In the absence of suitable laboratories, a complete and satisfactory execution of this idea becomes impossible, and it may even be impossible to give any theoretical instruction until a laboratory be prepared and equipped. The scheme is, therefore, tentative.

Theoretical instruction: From the present outlook and the reasons above stated, this important branch of the course will be limited to study of a suitable text-book and lectures.

^a Not printed.

Practical instruction: It is in contemplation to make this branch of the course as extensive and thorough as practicable, with available and obtainable resources and facilities. It will embrace practical considerations connected with the manufacture, transportation, and storage of primers, fuses, powders, and explosives, and their application to military purposes.

Special emphasis will be laid upon considerations relative to the safety of the various kinds of explosives, and special attention devoted to the subject. Physical tests, as far as possible, will be applied to various explosives to determine their condition.

Not more than two months, it is estimated, can be advantageously employed in the execution of this scheme for the current year.

The time allotted this department in the special course prescribed was two months; but, owing to the absence of the class during the Army and Navy maneuvers, this time was necessarily reduced to one month. For report of Captain Ruckman on the work in his department during this time, see Appendix G.^a

Electrician sergeant's division; Maj. C. D. Parkhurst, Artillery Corps, instructor.—(1) Setting up, care, and use of common forms of primary batteries.

(2) Setting up, charging, and discharging, and use of secondary batteries.

(3) Elementary principles of electricity and magnetism.

(4) Testing and the care and use of testing instruments.

(5) Motors and dynamos; direct and alternating current, their principles and use.

(6) Incandescent and arc lighting, and wiring circuits for their use.

(7) Searchlight.

(8) Oil and gas engines, their principles and use.

(9) Steam engines and boilers, their principles and use.

(10) The switch board, its wiring, use, and management.

(11) Telephone, telegraph, call bells, and annunciators.

(12) Elements of mechanism and workshop practice.

(13) Principles and use of submarine mines.

(14) Practical work in all of the above branches.

(15) Property accountability.

The course to be of six months, from January 1 to June 30 and from July 1 to December 31 of each year.

Hours of attendance from 8 a. m. till 11.30 a. m. and from 1 p. m. to 4 p. m. daily, Saturdays and Sundays excepted.

Instruction and practical work to be supplemented by visits to prominent power houses and plants whenever practicable.

For special report of Major Parkhurst regarding work in his course, see Appendix H.^a

SCHOOL FUNDS.

Soon after the school was established estimates were forwarded to the War Department for funds for school purposes, and upon these estimates the Secretary of War allotted \$39,194.16 to the school.

By means of these funds the building assigned the electrician sergeants' division and that chosen for a library have, as already stated, been remodeled and arranged for the purposes for which they are

^a Not printed.

needed; the building selected for the department of electricity, mines, and mechanism, and the department of chemistry and explosives is being put in order; an excellent printing plant, with presses operated by electrical power, has been installed in school headquarters, and such scientific books and books of reference as are needed for immediate and daily use of the different departments have been purchased for the school library.

With the unexpended balance of these funds and the funds that were appropriated by the acts of June 6 and June 30, 1902, for the school, it is thought that it will be possible to arrange all school buildings suitably for instruction purposes, to supply the different departments with sufficient apparatus to start them on a good working basis, and to equip the library with such scientific and military books, as well as such books of reference and such current scientific and military periodicals, as are necessary for the immediate use of the school.

BOATS FOR MINE WORK.

On the departure of the engineers for Washington Barracks, five large rowboats, or yawls, in good order, and a steam launch, or small tug, and a naphtha launch, both in bad condition, were turned over for the use of the school.

As the spring of 1902 opened, and the time for practical submarine mining work approached, estimates were forwarded to the War Department for fuel for the steam and naphtha launches, which were then considered worth repairing, and at the same time it was stated that a steam lighter was also needed by the school for instruction purposes. Instructions were received to turn the launches over to the depot quartermaster, New York City, and I was informed that the Quartermaster's Department would then supply them with fuel, furnish them crews, and send them here for use for school purposes; also that this department would, as soon as practicable, send the lighter needed and supply her with a crew and the necessary fuel.

The launches were turned over accordingly to the depot quartermaster, who, after he had had them carefully inspected by the marine experts of his office, decided that the naphtha launch was not worth repairing, that it would be cheaper and better in the end to replace her with a new launch, and that the steam launch was only worth such temporary repairs as would enable her to be used until another boat of the same type could be built.

About the middle of July a steam lighter was sent here by the Quartermaster's Department, and a little later the steam launch which had been turned over to the depot quartermaster was temporarily repaired and also sent here—both boats being supplied with competent crews. Still later a new 30-foot electric launch was sent to replace the naphtha launch, which had been found unfit for repair. At the present time the school is therefore supplied with a steam lighter, a small steam launch or tug, an electric launch, and five yawls.

After the steam lighter had been given a thorough practical test as to her suitability for submarine mine work it was reported to the depot quartermaster that she was not well fitted for such work for a number of reasons. The depot quartermaster then sent the marine experts here to see the actual work of planting and raising mines, with a view to enabling them to decide from the practical knowledge

thus obtained as to what type of boat was best suited for such work. Later these experts were sent to Gardiners Point to observe the work of mine planting in the deep and swift waters of that vicinity and note what was needed for work in such waters. It is understood that these experts are now engaged in designing a seagoing boat that will be in every way well fitted for submarine mine work in any water where such mines can be planted.

Besides such a seagoing boat as this, a small steam launch of the general type of that now in use here is needed for special work in connection with instruction at the school, and it is understood that the experts referred to are also engaged in designing a boat of this type to replace the old one.

There is no question, in view of the importance of the prompt and proper instruction in all work relating to submarine mine defense, but that both these boats should be built and sent here at the earliest practicable moment. When such boats are received, the school will be well equipped in this respect for instruction in submarine mine work.

THE TORPEDO COMPANY.

With a view to providing for the proper training of enlisted men required to perform the necessary manual labor connected with practical instruction in submarine mine work at the school, the Fifty-fourth Company, Coast Artillery, commanded by Captain Landers, instructor in the department of electricity, mines, and mechanism, was designated as a "torpedo company," assigned to torpedo work only, in addition to its ordinary routine post duties. Every effort was then made toward hastening the practical and proper training of this company in submarine mine work. During the indoor season of 1901-2 the company was instructed in all manual details relating to cable and mine connections and the loading of mines; and as the weather permitted, and the spring of 1902 opened, the training of the company in such of its duties on the water as could be performed with the boats available was begun. When a steam lighter and a steam and electric launch were obtained during the summer, the training of the company was extended until it included all manual labor on the water necessary in connection with submarine mine work.

The Fifty-fourth Company was taken to Gardiners Point to plant the mines it was decided to place in that vicinity during the Army and Navy maneuvers, and the way it performed its difficult duties in connection with that work not only spoke well for the company as soldiers but also showed that they had been well trained in all their duties pertaining to submarine mining.

TORPEDO INSTRUCTION AT OTHER POSTS.

In intimate if not direct connection with the instruction in submarine mining given at the school is that now given at artillery posts supplied with a mine equipment. Prior to the passage of the act of February 2, 1901, reorganizing the artillery into a corps and charging it with the care and use of the submarine mine defense, the Engineer Corps was charged with these duties, and, in order to obtain the trained personnel necessary to plant and operate the mines, maintained at this place a battalion of three companies of engineer troops,

which were specially trained in submarine mining work, and intended to be divided into detachments and distributed among the different posts provided with a mine equipment on the outbreak of war.

As the number of trained men thus provided was evidently not enough to furnish all places supplied with a mine equipment with a full complement of trained men, each engineer officer in charge of a mining plant was instructed to keep the Chief of Engineers informed, in time of peace, as to the number of trained men considered necessary for his station, so that an equitable division of the men available could be made in case the total number asked for by all stations on the outbreak of war could not be furnished.

In the spring of 1902 the torpedo board, recognizing the importance of beginning the training of artillery officers and men in this work as promptly as possible, and also the fact that the number of such officers and men who could be trained at the school was small when compared with the total number necessary for all posts supplied with a mine equipment, made recommendations to the War Department on the subject which were approved by the Secretary of War, and published in General Orders No. 51, c. s., Adjutant-General's Office. (See Appendix I.^a)

At the present time there are about 35 artillery posts for which a mine equipment has been provided, but in a number of instances the equipment for several posts in a harbor is concentrated at one place, and in the majority of cases the equipment for the different posts appears incomplete in a number of details. With a view to fully equipping each post, except in regard to lighters and other boats, estimates for the necessary material have been prepared by Capt. Charles J. Bailey, Artillery Corps, in charge of the submarine mine depot at this place, and submitted to the War Department.

As to the number of men necessary to plant and operate the mines at the 35 posts provided with a mine equipment, there are required, according to the Torpedo Manual, for a single post, as a minimum, 2 trained officers and 27 trained and 40 untrained men; for the 35 posts there are therefore required at least 70 trained officers and 945 trained men. At each of these 35 posts actually supplied with a mine equipment which has been turned over to the artillery there should now be, if General Orders, No. 51, referred to have been carried out, at least 1 officer and 15 enlisted men fairly well trained in all that pertains to the care of the mining equipment, and who possess an elementary knowledge of the setting up and working of the casemate apparatus, and of how to make the necessary cable connections of a single or triple group of mines. Where this instruction has been given it should be a comparatively easy matter to double the number of officers and men already instructed during the coming winter, and thus provide the post with a number of officers and men equal to that required for planting and operating the mines, who have had at least a good elementary training in practically all that relates to submarine mining, except the actual loading and planting of the mines.

As it would manifestly be too expensive to undertake to provide each post supplied with a mine equipment with the steam lighter, the launch, and four yawls necessary for planting mines for instruction purposes in time of peace, and it is still considered necessary to actually plant mines in each harbor to be mined, with a view to overcom-

^a Not printed.

ing any difficulty that might arise in connection with mine planting in any particular harbor before the outbreak of war, the complete scheme of instruction as contemplated by the torpedo board, and also, it is understood by the chief of artillery, includes the equipment of least 3 seagoing lighters, 2 for the Eastern and 1 for the Western coast, the providing of each of these lighters with an officer and about 20 men skilled in submarine mine work, and the sending of vessels from harbor to harbor for the purpose of planting a group of mines in each harbor, and of discovering and overcoming, in time of peace, any difficulties connected with mine planting in the harbor.

As it would also be manifestly impossible for the few boats, equipped as contemplated for instruction purposes in time of peace, to plant mines at all posts supplied with a mine equipment on a sudden outbreak of war, and as the elementary training contemplated by General Orders, No. 51, does not include actual loading and planting of mines, the War Department lately directed the torpedo board to make such recommendations regarding the organization and strength of the Fifty-fourth Company, Coast Artillery (the "torpedo company" at this post), as to provide a nucleus of trained men in each artillery district capable of planting and operating submarine mines in case of an emergency. The recommendations made by the board have not yet been acted upon by the War Department; but it is believed that if they are approved and carried out, the desired nucleus will soon be provided.

If, in addition to the system of instruction as contemplated above, the four officers who lately completed a special course here, and have since been detailed as submarine-mine officers of particular districts, should be sent round not only as instructors and inspectors in their particular districts, as contemplated by General Orders, No. 51, but also in adjoining districts where there is any question as to the carrying out of the provisions of this order, it is fully believed that a large start will have been made toward the solution of the question of the care and use of submarine mines by the artillery.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. That the scheme for the improvement of the buildings and grounds of the post, the school, and the submarine-mine depot, as recommended by the board of officers appointed by Special Orders, No. 136, Headquarters Department of the East (see Appendix B^a), be carried out at the earliest practicable moment, if necessary, that a special appropriation be obtained, if possible, for the requisite funds for the purpose. At the present time the post, the school, and the depot are seriously crippled from lack of proper and adequate buildings, and the sanitary condition of the post is considered bad on account of exceedingly defective plumbing and sewerage, as well as improper surface drainage and marshy ground on and near the reservation. The special needs of the post, the school, and the depot, in the matter of buildings and improvements, are clearly set forth in the report of the board.

2. That after the graduation of the class of June 30, 1903, the electrician sergeants' course be lengthened from six to ten months; that the class of candidates which under present regulations would report

at the school on June 20, 1903, be directed to report on October 28, 1903, and that succeeding classes of candidates be ordered to report on the same corresponding date. The time now allotted this course is unquestionably too short considering the amount of work in the course. The lengthening of the course as recommended would therefore not only enable the candidates to be given more thorough instruction, especially in submarine mine work, than is now possible, but would also give the instructor, who under the present regulation has no period whatever for rest, a much-needed rest and intermission of two months annually.

3. That hereafter the graduating class of the student officers be relieved from duty at the school on October 1 of each year. The present method of relieving this class on October 15, the day the new class reports for duty, is the cause of much discomfort and annoyance to both the incoming and the outgoing class; and besides this, no time is allowed for making minor repairs nearly always found necessary when quarters are vacated.

4. That every effort be made to have the two boats needed for the school, for which the marine experts of the depot quartermaster, New York City, have the necessary data, constructed as expeditiously as practicable, for it will not be possible to carry on the work of instruction in submarine mining at the school and at other artillery posts provided with a mine equipment properly until these and the three other seagoing boats referred to under the preceding heading are procured. If no funds are now available for building such boats it is most earnestly and urgently recommended that a special appropriation for their construction be obtained, if possible, at the next session of Congress.

Very respectfully,

ARTHUR MURRAY,
Major, Artillery Corps, Commandant.

SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS CONNECTED WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, JULY 1, 1901, TO JUNE 30, 1902.

1901.

- July 1.—First Lieut. James V. Heidt, Sixth Infantry, reports expedition against ladrones at Jandoc and Lanag, barrios north of Igaras, Panay. Captures 46 ladrones, 20 bolos, and kills 4 ladrones.....First Lieut. George I. Feeter, Nineteenth Infantry, strikes a band of insurgents near Calavera, Cebu, killing 8 and capturing 6 bolos.
- 2.—Col. Pedro Alfonso Castillo, 5 captains, 13 lieutenants, and 35 men, with 158 rifles, 6 revolvers, and over 1,000 rounds of ammunition, surrender to Capt. Harry H. Bandholtz, Second Infantry, at Lucena, Tayabas.Capt. George B. Duncan, Fourth Infantry, strikes cuartels of insurgent Carillo, near barrio of Majaba, kills 5, captures 4, 2 of the latter wounded, also 7 rifles, ammunition and belts, officers' swords, and bolos. The cuartels are destroyed, with uniforms and small quantity of supplies. Captured men say that there were only 26 in the party, as others left some days ago on account of difficulty in getting supplies, and that Carillo died recently in Manila.....Since June 14 31 rifles, 26 revolvers, and 471 rounds of ammunition have been captured

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or surrendered at Tayabas.....First Lieut. Charles F. Bates, Twenty-fifth Infantry, commanding a detachment of Company F, of the same regiment, with native police of Botolan, Zambales, surprises a camp of tulisanes in the mountains northeast of that town. Captures 10 rifles and 100 rounds of ammunition, and the wife of the chief, Joaquin Soriano. No casualties.....First Lieut. William K. McCue, First Infantry, reports that he sent a detachment from Cervantes, Loac, into the neighborhood of Lope de Vega, Samar, and killed 3 natives and wounded 1 in the act of setting bamboo traps.

- July 3.—Results of six weeks' field operations in the Department of Mindanao and Jolo for period ending this date: Rufino Deloso, with 300 followers, are driven from Misamis district beyond trocha toward lake, where troops from Zamboanga, Cotabato, Malabang, Tukuran, Iligan, under Lieut. Col. Walter T. Duggan, Tenth Infantry, and Maj. James S. Pettit, First Infantry, disperses or captures them. Deloso, fugitive, endeavoring to escape. Gunboat watching both coasts. No other insurgents in this department.....Captain Alipop, whose real name is Cayetano Vida, surrenders at Santa Cruz, Marinduque, and takes oath of allegiance at Boac.
- 4.—The following surrender at San Juan de Bocboc, Batangas: Lieut. Ferilo Reyta, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 3 men, 4 German rifles, 1 Mauser, and 1 Krag rifle (No. 173672).....Col. Almond B. Wells, First Cavalry, reports from Batangas, Batangas, that he is informed by an officer of Malvar's command that about 50 insurgents were killed and many more wounded by command under Capt. William S. McNair, Thirty-first Company Coast Artillery, during his two days' fighting with them recentlyGeneral Vito Belarmino surrenders at Legaspi, Albay, to Col. Theodore J. Wint, Sixth Cavalry, with 5 staff officers, 27 company officers, 218 men, 16 presidentes, tax collectors, etc. Belarmino turned in 214 rifles, 1 revolver, and about 3,000 rounds of ammunition, making total 1,081 officers and men surrendered since June 30.
- 5.—Comandante Nicolas Espada and Juan Selazan, with 12 officers, 37 men, 38 rifles, 3 revolvers, and 100 cartridges, surrender to Col. Theodore J. Wint, Sixth Cavalry, at Legaspi, Albay; also Colonel Peña and Padre Felipe Orenz.....Transport *Meade* sails from Manila.
- 6.—Col. Bernardo Peroja, with 2 officers, 9 men, 8 rifles, and Antonio Dizon, chief of police of Manila, surrenders to Col. Theodore J. Wint, Sixth Cavalry, at Legaspi, Albay.....First Lieut. Patrick A. Connolly, with detachment Twenty-first Infantry, from San José, Batangas, captures, in barrio Aya, insurgent tax collector with 1 beef cattle and 1 pony and destroys storehouse containing 4,000 pounds palay.....Comandante José Osuñil and Lieutenant Olanas surrender at Guinobatan, Albay.
- 7.—William Victor and Fred Hunter, deserters from Troop G, Ninth Cavalry, with carbines, belts, and ammunition, are brought into Legaspi, Albay, by officers of Belarmino's command and turned over to Col. Theodore J. Wint, Sixth Cavalry.
- 8.—First Lieut. Archibald I. Harrison, with detachments of Twenty-first Infantry and native police, scouting southeast from Atimonan, Tayabas, exchanges a number of shots with band of insurgents. A prisoner named Clementi Morales, acting as guide, is killed while attempting to escape. Cuartel and quantity of rice destroyed; 2 insurgents reported killed and 1 wounded. No casualties on our side.....Total surrenders to command under Col. Theodore J. Wint, Sixth Cavalry, from June 30

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- to date, amount to 58 officers and 447 men.....Lieut. Col. José Hernandez, with 29 men, 21 rifles, and 1 revolver, surrenders to Col. Theodore J. Wint, Sixth Cavalry, at Legaspi, Albay.....Garth Shores, a deserter from Troop H, Ninth Cavalry, is brought in wounded, and surrendered by Colonel Bober, of General Belarmino's staff, to Col. Theodore J. Wint, Sixth Cavalry, at Legaspi, Albay.
- July 9.—Seven soldiers of Castillo's command surrender at Lucena, Tayabas. Arms had previously been surrendered by Castillo.....Expedition of a detachment First Infantry, in neighborhood of Hernani, Samar, captures 4 men with daggers, about 5 miles from Hernani. After passing through Hernani strikes outpost of enemy, who is driven from outpost with about 30 killed. Second Lieut. Grosvenor L. Townsend, First Infantry, slightly wounded in right arm.
- 10.—Transport *Buford* sails from San Francisco.....One officer and 4 men with 2 rifles surrender to Col. Theodore J. Wint, Sixth Cavalry, at Legaspi, Albay.....Orio Era, 1 officer, 11 men, with 2 rifles and 3 bolos, surrender at Nueva Caceres, Camarines Sur.....Col. Ramon Santos, Lieut. Col. Rufino Navils, 3 lieutenants, 34 men with 33 rifles, 1 shotgun, and 817 rounds of ammunition, surrender at Ligao, Albay.....Capt. George H. McMaster, Twenty-sixth Infantry, with 30 men, attacks force of 50 insurgents at Capalonga, Camarines Norte, and drives them from town, capturing 2 rifles and ammunition. No American casualties. Enemy's loss unknown.
- 11.—One captain, 12 soldiers with bolos, no rifles, surrender at Libong, Albay.....Capt. Porneto Saleses and 4 men surrender at Polangui, Albay.....General Gebarro, Comandante José Verchez, 8 officers, 45 men, 2 civil officers, with 5 rifles, surrender at Legaspi, Albay.....Capt. John D. L. Hartman, First Cavalry, from Bauan, Batangas, scouting in vicinity of Balata, captures 168 suspects, who will be examined with a view to identifying insurgents among them.....Second Lieut. Grosvenor L. Townsend, First Infantry, Pambujan, Samar, reports that detachment of 8 men, Company K, and 35 men, Company H, First Infantry, under Capt. Alva S. Pinto, assistant surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, left the post on an expedition lasting three days. While crossing river about 2 miles from post are fired upon, and 1 enlisted man wounded; 2 of the enemy are killed and large quantity of the enemy's supplies at Quinapundan, Samar, destroyed.
- 12.—Col. Ingracisio Ovensen, Comandante Pablo Madera, 3 officers, and 23 men, with 21 rifles, surrender to Col. Theodore J. Wint, Sixth Cavalry, at Legaspi, Albay.
- 13.—At Sibonga, Cebu, insurgents kill barrio lieutenant and 1 member of police force.....About 10.30 p. m. insurgents, armed with 7 rifles, several revolvers, and bolos, fire into lower end of the city of Cebu, Cebu, killing 1 member of police force and wounding 1.
- 14.—Maj. Joseph F. Huston, Nineteenth Infantry, with detachment, scouting in vicinity of Cebu, Cebu, locates and captures a band of 15 insurgents which had lately been firing into Cebu.....Three men of Talo's command surrender with 3 serviceable rifles at Legaspi, Albay.
- 15.—Transport *Sumner* sails from Manila.....Transport *Hancock* arrives at Manila.....Expedition consisting of 40 men under First Lieut. William M. Fassett, Twenty-first Infantry, left Batangas, Batangas, at 2 a. m. yesterday for Isla Verde and returned at 2 p. m. to-day. Not finding hostile party on Isla Verde as expected, being about twelve hours late,

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follows men to Calupan, island of Mindoro, and attacking at an early hour this morning, kills 12 insurgents, captures 8 prisoners, 6 rifles, 3,000 rounds of ammunition, and 1 box of papers, and rescues 2 white soldiers, named Krider, Company H, Thirty-eighth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, and John Blake, Company B, Twenty-eighth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers.....Six insurgents surrender and take oath of allegiance at Boac, Marinduque.....Raymundo Recalde, former lieutenant of insurgents on the island of Marinduque, with 13 men, 45 rifles, including 15 Krag's, 1,521 rounds of ammunition, 11 United States cartridge belts, and 1 trumpet, surrenders to First Lieut. Walter C. Sweeney, Thirtieth Infantry, at Santa Cruz, Marinduque. All of these men are supposed to have fled from the island when the insurgents were pushed so hard last January and February.

July 16.—Transport *Grant* sails from San Francisco for Manila.

17.—First Lieut. William S. McNair, with detachment Coast Artillery, visits Batangas from Taysan, Batangas, which neighborhood they had been scouting for several days; captures insurgent lieutenant and 9 men, 2 rifles, 2 revolvers.....A detachment of 20 enlisted men, First Infantry, on their way to Catarman, Samar, for rations, are fired on from trenches on river bank and 1 man wounded. First Lieut. William K. McCue, First Infantry, learning of this attack, took a detachment out and destroyed a large number of carabao on which the enemy were subsisting. Had 1 enlisted man wounded by bamboo trap and 1 man accidentally wounded by falling on a sharp snag while descending hill.....Transport *Pennsylvania* arrives at San Francisco from Manila.

18.—Joaquin, with 7 men, 5 rifles, and 100 rounds of ammunition, is captured by Capt. Hiram I. Bearss, Marine Corps, First Lieut. Frederic M. Wise, jr., Marine Corps, and detachment of men belonging to command under Maj. Littleton W. T. Waller, Marine Corps, from Subig, at Maquinas, Zambales, at 3.30 a. m.

20.—Transport *Sherman* sails from Manila for San Francisco.

21.—Maj. Frederick A. Smith, inspector-general's department, receives surrender at Laguan, Samar, of a company of insurgents consisting of Capt. Marcos Espina, 2 lieutenants, 91 men, with 2 field guns, 30 small arms, 72 bolos, 375 rounds of ammunition.

24.—Lieut. Col. E. Zurbano, 4 majors, 25 captains, also lieutenants, 500 men, 18 cabezas, with 243 rifles, about 4,000 rounds of ammunition, and 100 bolos, surrender to First Lieut. Edwin A. Hickman, First Cavalry, at Tayabas, Tayabas.

25.—Capt. Charles D. Rhodes, Sixth Cavalry, with a detachment of that regiment from Binang, Laguna, captures Pedro Almira, Lieut. José Maliquid, and 2 men, all of Malvo's battalion, and 1 Remington rifle, 1 D. A. Spanish revolver, caliber .44, and some cartridges.....Insurgents, with about 50 rifles and 2 small cannon, attack Cebu at 1 o'clock a. m.; are driven off by police and patrol. No casualties.....10 bolomen with bolos surrender on the island of Batag.....Maj. Moises Modlera and 1 man of del Mundo's command surrender at Daet, Camarines Norte, with 2 serviceable rifles.....Fernando Opinion, former presidente of Palapag, surrenders at Palapag, Samar.

26.—Capt. John D. L. Hartman, First Cavalry; First Lieut. Roger S. Fitch, First Cavalry; Second Lieut. Arthur M. Graham, First Cavalry, with detachment from Bauan, Batangas, capture greater part of command of Comandante Nacario Villanueva and Bernabe Magdohos, bringing

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in 34 prisoners, 22 serviceable rifles, 4 bolos, and 2 daggers. This force constituted the force of Bauan. Comandante Villanueva is one of Malvar's officers, in whom he places much confidence.....Six hundred bolomen, followers of Zurbano, surrender at Tayabas, Tayabas, to First Lieut. Edwin A. Hickman, First Cavalry, and take oath of allegiance to the United States.....First Lieut. Aylmer E. Hendryx, Philippine Scouts, and Second Lieut. Walter C. Jones, Eleventh Infantry, commanding detachments scouting in western part of Leyte, are attacked by insurgents, of whom 1 is wounded and captured. Insurgent quarters and surrounding houses are burned.

July 27.—First Lieut. Edward Croft, Nineteenth Infantry, with detachments of Company A, Nineteenth Infantry, and Cebu Scouts, strike 60 insurgents at barrio Labangon, San Nicolas, Cebu, killing 7 and capturing 13. Lieutenant Croft and 1 man of Company A, Nineteenth Infantry, and 1 man of Company A, Cebu Scouts, slightly wounded.

28.—Nine bolomen with bolos surrender on the island of Batag.

31.—Capt. John D. L. Hartman, First Cavalry, and First Lieut. James M. Graham, Nineteenth Infantry, with 50 men Troop K, First Cavalry, capture Capt. Lucio Tuneafe and 4 other insurgents near Batangas, Luzon; also 1 bolo and 5 ponies.....First Lieut. William K. McCue, First Infantry, reports that while he was absent from post Cervantes, Samar, was attacked by insurgents, armed with about 20 rifles and 6 bamboo cannon, who fired from hills on opposite bank of river. After firing about twenty-five minutes, withdrew with several wounded.

Aug. 1.—Detachment of 10 men, Company H, Nineteenth Infantry, and detachment of Argao police ran into band of insurgents at a dance at barrio Mandiquit, near Argao, Cebu, killing 20 insurgents and wounding several. One enlisted man and 1 native policeman wounded. Insurgents had 6 rifles and a number of revolvers.

2.—Police of Tojagon, Cebu, have a fight with band of ladrones, capturing 1. Three rifles, 1 sword, and 20 rounds of ammunition are captured by a detachment of Company F, Twenty-first Infantry, in barrio of Calansaan, San Jose, Batangas.

3.—Detachment of First Infantry, under First Lieut. Lambert W. Jordan, in expedition from Laguan, Samar, captures 18 and kills 2 insurgents.

5.—Capt. Traber Norman, Eighth Infantry, with detachments H, I, L, and M companies, same regiment, left Majayjay, Laguna, the morning of the 3d and marched to Panalapan about south of Lilio, Laguna, distance not known. First Lieut. Bert H. Merchant, Eighth Infantry, with detachments H and L companies, same regiment, finds a cuartel south of Taytay abandoned the day before by Caballes, burns it, and returns to Panalapan. The same day Captain Norman took detachments of I and M companies up the mountain to a point at which he was informed there was another cuartel; he captures an armed outpost, but the enemy escapes before he reaches the cuartel, leaving their dinner cooking, clothing, etc., and some of Caballes's records, among which are some commissions dated August 2. Destroys the cuartel and large quantities of rice, dried fish, and salt. He follows insurgents on different trails, but they scatter until he can find no further trace of them; then returns to Taytay, Rizal, and arrives at Majayjay, Laguna, at 10 a. m. to-day.

6.—Second Lieut. Elliot Caziarc, Eighth Infantry, with detachments, Eighth Infantry, from Majayjay, Laguna, captures, while scouting near the barrios Gagolot and Baquio, Lieut. Sotero Arcenal, 1 corporal, and 5 pri-

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vates, belonging to second company Majayjay, of Caballes's command; 3 Amberg rifles, 6 Remingtons, 1 revolver, and 25 cartridges.....Second Lieut. Elliot Caziarc, Eighth Infantry, with detachment, scouting from Majayjay, Laguna, in conjunction with a detachment under First Lieut. Bert H. Merchant, same regiment, from Magdalena, Laguna, captures 1 first and 1 second lieutenant, 10 privates, 1 revolver, 9 rifles, and some ammunition.

- Aug. 7.—Capt. Oscar J. Brown, First Cavalry, with Troop C; Second Lieut. Horace N. Munro, First Cavalry, commanding Troop M; Sergt. Michael J. Whalen, commanding, and First Lieut. Chase Doster, Twenty-first Infantry, commanding Company I, same regiment, strikes a strong force of insurgents at barrio Ibanga at foot of Mount Niaga or Ynaga Loboo range, about 9 miles northeast of Loboo. Fighting begins by attack on head of the column; after allowing advance column to pass by, fire at short range, which is immediately returned, but there are no casualties at this time. The cavalry dismounts to fight on foot, the infantry is brought up, and in a short time all are engaged. The enemy is driven from one position to another and finally into the high mountain range, where their reserve forces are stationed. They seem to have an unlimited amount of ammunition, as there is constant firing from 6.30 a. m. to 12.30 p. m. On the advance to the high mountains, Privates Harry Bechtel, Troop M, First Cavalry, and James Kocoureck, Company I, Twenty-first Infantry, are instantly killed. No other casualties. It is believed that the enemy lost heavily. Houses, cuartels, and a carriage factory, all containing ammunition, are destroyed. A number of ponies are captured.....Second Lieut. Fred C. Doyle, Twenty-first Infantry, with detachment same regiment, from Tiaong, Tayabas, destroys insurgent cuartel at Cabarga, and captures papers giving names of natives who contribute to insurgent cause.....First Lieut. Russell T. Hazzard, First Cavalry, burns an insurgent camp about 12 miles north of Naujan, Mindoro. It was composed of 7 barracks built for soldiers, a large nipa house of the governor of the island, Atienza, with 30 tons of rice.....Commanding officer, third district, reports capture of Leon Cajols and Anters Pasco, armed insurgents, at Talisay, Negros, en route from Cebu to Sinalay, Negros, to join band there.....First Lieut. W. M. Fassett, Twenty-first Infantry, with detachment, on scout from Batangas, Batangas, kills 2 insurgents and captures 2. No American casualties.
- 8.—Scouts of Company G, Twenty-sixth Infantry, from Libmanan, Camarines Sur, captures Comandante Tomas Cortez and 10 cordons bolomen.....Captain Bunfalidt surrenders at Bauan, Batangas, with 1 unserviceable rifle.
- 10.—First Lieut. Josephus S. Cecil, Nineteenth Infantry, with detachment scouting in vicinity of Sibonga, Cebu, runs into small band of ladrones and kills 4.
- 13.—Detachments of Company M, Eleventh Infantry, and Leyte Scouts strike band of insurgents near Abuyog, Leyte, killing 1 and wounding 1.
- 14.—Capt. Policarpio Aransaso, Lieut. Ambrosio de Lanio, 2 sergeants, and 3 privates of the Sixth Company of Malvar's command, with 3 Remington rifles in excellent condition, 1 revolver, and 2 bolos surrender at Cabuyao, Laguna. Captain refused to allow the men to accept money for arms, saying that they did not surrender for pay, but for peace. They came in to get supplies, but decided to surrender.....Col. Julianio Pangani-

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- ban, Capt. Jorge Perez, Lieutenant Vyronde, and 20 enlisted men, with 14 Mauser rifles, 9 Remington rifles, 1 Krag (215087), model '98, 2 Remington carbines, and 375 rounds of ammunition, surrender near Luyos, Batangas, to Capt. Morton F. Smith, Twentieth Infantry. This is part of Malvar's force under immediate control of Gonzales. Oath of allegiance is administered at Tanauan, Batangas, and prisoners released. Detachment Company M, Eleventh Infantry, and Leyte Scouts strike band of insurgents near Abuyog, Leyte, killing 1 and wounding 1. First Lieut. Walter S. Grant, Third Cavalry, with detachment from Taal, Batangas, captures Col. Martin Cabrera, his adjutant, Capt. Urbano Ponsalan, and 6 other insurgents, and burns cuartel. This is a most important capture, as Colonel Cabrera controlled all the insurgents and country in southern Batangas and west of town of Batangas. Detachment from Santa Cruz, Laguna, surprises the magazine of Caballes in Lumbang. Large quantities of supplies captured. Brigildo Malasco, the agent, and 3 others are taken into custody and prisoners and supplies brought into Santa Cruz.
- Aug. 15.—Detachment of Company B, Twenty-sixth Infantry, from Pasacao, Camarines Sur, in an engagement with insurgents, kills Lieut. Zebastia Angeles, brother of General Angeles, 1 sergeant, 5 privates; captures 3 Remington rifles, 3 Krag carbines, and Krag, Remington, Mauser, and revolver ammunition; burns cuartel and captures 1 major and 2 captains, and 9 privates of cordons.
- 17.—Transport *Buford* arrives at Manila. Near Batangas, Batangas, 1 major, 1 captain, 2 first lieutenants, and 2 men, with 7 Remingtons, 1 Mauser, 50 cartridges surrendered to Second Lieut. W. H. Bell, jr., First Cavalry.
- 18.—Transport *Sheridan* arrives at San Francisco. First Lieut. George W. Helms, Nineteenth Infantry, reports from Dumanjug, Cebu, that with First Lieut. Josephus S. Cecil, Nineteenth Infantry, and Second Lieut. Oscar C. Monday, Philippine Scouts, and detachments he ran into a portion of Godines' band near Pua, Cebu; several insurgents wounded; balance scattered into the mountains. Police of Argao, Cebu, run into band of insurgents in mountains, killing several and capturing 1; 1 policeman wounded by bolo.
- 20.—A detachment of 17 men, Twenty-first Infantry, en route from Lipa, Batangas, to Tiaong, Tayabas, is fired upon by about 50 insurgents at barrio Palita, Alaminos, and Sergt. Henry Waring, Company C, Twenty-first Infantry, wounded in calf of leg, slight. An engagement with 25 insurgents takes place near Tanauan, Batangas, in which 11 insurgents are killed and 9 captured, including 3 wounded, and 15 serviceable rifles captured. Troops are well managed by Capt. Harry C. Hale, Twentieth Infantry; only 1 soldier wounded. Insurrectos had a strong position, were intrenched, and while endeavoring to draw part of our force into a trap were cleverly outflanked by another column. Captain Hale started out again this morning with 250 men to look for the enemy.
- 21.—Transport *Thomas* arrives at Manila. Thirty-three rifles, 1 shotgun, and 1 revolver are surrendered at Ligao, Albay.
- 23.—First Lieut. John W. French, Nineteenth Infantry, reports that patrol from Argao, Cebu, strikes band of insurgents between Barili and Carcar, Cebu, killing 4.

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- Aug. 24.—First Lieut. Russell T. Hazzard, Third Cavalry, reports the capture of Arthur Howard, lieutenant-colonel insurgent forces. With civil scout Ferguson and 8 Macabebes, disguised as insurgents, he entered the insurgent camp near Naujan, Mindoro, about 8.30 p.m., and abducted Howard, without being discovered by the insurgents. Colonel Atienza was in command in person, and had with him 240 rifles and 200 bolomen.
- 25.—Transport *Grant* sails from Manila.....Capt. Harold L. Jackson, First Infantry, reports results of expedition in Catarman, Cervantes, and Pambujan mountains, Samar, beginning August 13, 1901, in the capture of Capt. Luciano Sinko and Lieutenant Tapio, Lucban's wife and mother-in-law, 1 rifle, and some ammunition, and all of Lucban's papers and correspondence, killing 3 of Lucban's guard; 1 officer wounded, believed to have been Lucban, who escapes. In returning Contract Surgeon Conn R. Ohlinger was drowned in Pambujan River, August 20, by swamping of barota; body not yet recovered.....Colonel Loriel, with 17 officers and 47 rifles, surrenders to Col. Frank D. Baldwin's command at Talisay, Batangas. Two schooners, *Narced* and *Cayasay*, with crews of 9 and 10 men, respectively, are captured cruising along north coast of Maricaban Island and brought to Batangas. Having no licenses nor papers of any kind, they are believed to have carried on an illicit trade with Mindoro.
- 26.—Scouting party, Fourth Infantry, from Indang, Cavite, captures 15 identified ladrones in barrios south of Alfonso.....First Lieut. James H. Bradford, Nineteenth Infantry, with detachment of that regiment, attacks insurgents in mountains of Bohol Island, in what proves to be an inaccessible position. First Lieut. John L. Bond, Nineteenth Infantry, and 3 men have gunshot wounds, and 7 men wounded by bamboo spikes; none dangerously.
- 27.—Three hundred and fifty insurrectos under Gonzales are encountered in foothills near San Bartolome, Santo Tomas jurisdiction, Batangas, by a force consisting of 50 men of Companies B, E, F, G, and H, Twentieth Infantry, under Capt. Harry C. Hale, Twentieth Infantry, and company commanders. Malvar present and nearly captured. Enemy is driven over mountains in direction of Calamba; 15 rifles captured; several insurrectos known to have been killed and many wounded. Insurgents are badly frightened and finally run, throwing away rifles. Captain Hale now has 200 men upon mountains and is pursuing the enemy beyond the scene of fight. Capt. Jacob G. Galbraith, First Cavalry, reinforces Captain Hale just before the close of the fight. Capt. Morton F. Smith, Twentieth Infantry, goes out to reinforce with 50 men.....Capt. John Pitcher, First Cavalry, attacks the position of Colonel Atienza, near Lake Naujan, island of Mindoro, encountering his rear guard, and capturing the insurgent camp. The capture of Howard two days previous alarmed Atienza, and he had retreated northwest toward Abra de Ilog, leaving only a small party in his camp.
- 28.—Transport *Hancock* arrives at San Francisco.....Municipal police of Nagcarlan, Laguna, captures in barrio Talaguan 1 Remington carbine, 1 revolver, 21 cartridges, and 3 insurgents.....Capt. William S. Graves, Twentieth Infantry, with detachment First Cavalry, from Santo Tomas, Batangas, captures in adjoining barrios 4 insurgents and 1 Remington carbine.....First Lieut. George W. Helms, Nineteenth

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- Infantry, from Dumanjug, Cebu, reports that detachments near Barili struck band of insurgents, killing 3.
- Aug. 29.—A detachment of native scouts of Company F, Eighth Infantry, surprises party of about 20 insurgents in barrio Buboy, Magdalena, Laguna, killing 2, one being Lieutenant Paylon, and capturing 7 rifles. About the same time, and near Magdalena, First Lieut. Bert H. Merchant, Eighth Infantry, with detachment, encounters a small party of the enemy, wounding 2, one of whom soon afterwards died. Detachments of Company B, Eleventh Infantry, and Leyte Scouts strikes band of insurgents near Ormoc, Leyte, capturing 10, and 4 rifles. Insurgent casualties, unknown; Americans, none.
- 30.—Second Lieut. Arthur L. Bump, Eighth Infantry, with detachment, and scouts from Cavinti, Laguna, while pursuing insurgents, captures at barrio Lupoc, San Antonio, 19 Remington rifles and 1 Mauser; 18 rifles are recovered from a river where they were concealed before the insurgents scattered in the mountains. Detachment of Twenty-first Infantry, from Calamba, Laguna, under First Lieut. Marion M. Weeks, captures at barrio Mayapa, near Calamba, Capt. Juan Rubio, 5 soldiers, 6 rifles, 400 cartridges.
- 31.—A scouting party of Eleventh Infantry, from Malitbog, Leyte, burns quarters of Alas Alas and 5 others, with many supplies, powder, and repair shop. Captures 4 rifles, and 10 insurgents. Enemy's loss unknown. No casualties to American troops. A band of 15 or 20 insurgents, crossing Lipa road at San Galo, Batangas, going in the direction of Lake Taal, is attacked by a patrol of 3 men of Twentieth Infantry. The fire is not returned, the enemy flying and abandoning their ammunition and food and clothing.
- Sept. 1.—Private Frederick Kopp, Company E, Ninth Infantry, is killed at Dapdap, Samar, by insurgent trap. General Angeles with 2 field officers, 19 line officers, 42 men, 8 rifles, 7 revolvers, and some bolos, surrenders at Libmanan, Tayabas. Detachments Eleventh Infantry and Leyte Scouts attack insurgents near Leyte, Leyte, killing 2; 2 Leyte Scouts slightly wounded; capture 9 rifles, including 1 Krag, 1 Springfield, and 2 revolvers, 300 rounds of ammunition (Remington), 100 rounds Krag.
- 2.—Lieut. Col. Morris C. Foote, Ninth Infantry, reports that a party of 12 men of that regiment sent from Basey, Samar, along telegraph line is attacked about 2 miles out, 2 enlisted men being killed and 2 wounded, 1 probably fatally, 1 rifle lost; 15 of the insurgents are known to have been killed or wounded. Burned barrio near where this fight occurred. Second Lieut. Ray Hoover, Philippine Scouts, with detachment of soldiers and native scouts, locates party of insurgents in vicinity of San Sebastian, Samar, burns huts, kills 1 insurgent and captures 2.
- 4.—First Lieut. George W. Helms, Nineteenth Infantry, reports from Dumanjug, Cebu, that a guerrilla named Eustaquio surrenders. Claudio Lopez, chief of the Second Guerrillas of the Fifth Fraccion, under command of Rosario, surrenders, with his brother, who is a captain, and 5 Remington, 3 Krag, 1 Colt, and 1 Winchester rifles, 1 revolver, and 265 rounds of ammunition, at Dumanjug, Cebu.
- 5.—Supply train of Capt. William M. Swaine, First Infantry, is attacked near Catbalogan, Samar, by rifle and bolomen and 6 mules killed. Insurgents have 1 officer and 5 men killed. Town of La Castellana, Negros, is attacked by ladrones and 3 native scouts killed and five wounded; 6 rifles captured by ladrones. Second Lieut. Oscar C.

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Monday, Philippine Scouts, on expedition in mountains of Alcantara, Cebu, surrounds a house, kills two insurgents and captures 3; latter are killed while attempting to escape.

- Sept. 6.—First Lieut. Josephus S. Cecil, Nineteenth Infantry, with detachment, strikes band of insurgents near Sibonga, Cebu, killing 1 and capturing a bundle of papers which show they were with a collector of funds. Returning, a boloman, armed with bolo and dagger, is killed, supposed to have been of the same party..... One captain, 5 lieutenants, and 71 men surrender at Oroquieta, Mindanao..... Grave of Naval Apprentice Venville, of the Gillmore party, is found in the mountains 3 miles from San José de Casignan, and 12 miles from Baler, Principe Province. Part of remains recovered and funeral services, with full military honors, held at Baler..... Lieut. Roman Palo, who escaped from Martinez, surrenders, with 10 men and 11 rifles, at Libmanan, Tayabas, to Capt. Otho B. Rosenbaum, Twenty-sixth Infantry.
- 7.—Capt. Traber Norman, Eighth Infantry, with detachment Company I, same regiment, from Majayjay, Laguna, captures in barrio Barol 2 Remington rifles, 1 Mauser and 1 shotgun, 45 rounds Remington and 33 rounds Mauser ammunition, and a quantity of unloaded shells, lead, powder, and reloading outfit; also 2 storehouses, containing clothing, flags, and other supplies. All except the flags are destroyed. Two insurgents and the chief collector in that part of the country, Lylvestrio Gruesa, are captured and brought in.
- 8.—One captain, 3 lieutenants, and 82 men surrender at Oroquieta, Mindanao..... First Lieut. Thomas J. Fealy, First Infantry, with 25 men Company D, same regiment, captures an insurgent arsenal, about 8 miles from Sulat, Samar, destroying building and tools and material found.
- 9.—Capt. Jacob G. Galbraith, First Cavalry, with detachment, captures in barrio San Miguel, Alaminos, Laguna, five identified insurgents and 2 flags; also burned cuartel at Mapait.
- 10.—First Lieut. Charles P. Faulkner, Eighth Infantry, with 30 men, Company M, same regiment, strikes a cuartel of insurgents at Nagcarlan, Laguna, under Pedro Cortez, in barrio Cabuyao, Lilio. Action lasts about three-quarters of an hour. Enemy's loss, 3 killed and 5 wounded; American, 1 enlisted man, severely wounded. Cuartel and a quantity of ammunition, uniforms, and supplies destroyed. Enemy retreats toward Magdalena, Laguna.
- 11.—Capt. Andrew S. Rowan, Nineteenth Infantry, attacks an insurgent stronghold in the mountains of Colajogman, near Calape, Bohol. Drives the enemy out and forces them to scatter; captures considerable correspondence and destroys large amount of food supply. 1 enlisted man slightly wounded.
- 12.—Lieut. Bernardo Nestio, with 5 men and 5 rifles, surrenders to First Lieut. James Conway, Philippine Scouts, at Luisiana, Laguna.
- 13.—Detachment of Company M, Eleventh Infantry, and Leyte Scouts, capture 12 bolomen..... Aguinaldo's personal guards, from Palanan, Isabela, consisting of Major Alhambra, Capts. Pascual Velasco and Miguel de los Santos, Lieuts. Agatin Taba and Basilio Palaning, 29 soldiers, with 28 guns in good condition and 600 cartridges, surrender at Casiguran, Principe. All officers and men take oath of allegiance and are set at liberty..... Troops of Thirteenth Infantry, from Calupan, Mindoro, encounter armed insurgents at Belino, a barrio of Calupan. The insurgents, who are under command of Colonel Atienza, the insurgent governor of Min-

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doro, fly, making but little resistance. During the fight the presidente of Taal, Señor Ylagin, held as a prisoner, came into Calupan, Mindoro, and has given much valuable information concerning the enemy. Troops of Thirteenth Infantry captured the families of Colonel Atienza and his lieutenant-colonel in an insurgent camp on island of Mindoro; also the insurrecto commissary officer and the insurrecto treasury, with about \$700 in Mexican silver. By surrender and capture have secured 25 rifles and 400 rounds of ammunition. Capt. William F. Creary, Twelfth Infantry, left Calupan, Mindoro, with 50 American soldiers and 20 Mindoro scouts. Found insurgents with more than 200 rifles, according to reports of natives. They ran at first fire. Colonel Atienza was with them. Three officers and 7 men surrendered, as result, at Calupan, Mindoro. They report 1 insurgent killed; sent in 1 prisoner and 4 captured rifles.

Sept. 16.—Barrio Binambangan, of Indang, Cavite, is invaded by 10 natives, armed with rifles, at midnight. They kill 1 man and wound 1 woman and 1 boy. The man killed had given information of insurgents to Capt. George B. Duncan, Fourth Infantry, at Indang, and the object of the attack was for the purpose of killing this man. Telegraph party finds wire cut and about 200 yards torn off poles 8 miles east of Lopez, Tayabas, in barrio Esperanza. At 3 p. m., while eating, party is attacked by 30 insurgents. Firing lasts 20 minutes, when detachment, which consisted of 5 men, retreats. No casualties.

18.—Col. Charles F. Robe, Ninth Infantry, reports from Calbayog, Samar, that 4 native police and 25 volunteer ex-insurgents, out on expedition in mountains, from 11th to 18th, at Tilibasag, captured some bolos and spears and burn quarters of insurgents; at Mongabong, near Megara, destroy 4 barracks; at Dumagsaped capture 2 natives with supplies for insurgents. Burn barracks of Lieut. Mazario Dimaguiling, at Camausi. Brought in 1 officer and 26 men, thought to be insurgents.

19.—Francisco Colleges, Lucban's presidente of Santa Margonta, Samar, surrenders to Col. Charles F. Robe, Ninth Infantry, at Calbayog, Samar, and takes oath of office.

20.—Detachment of 10 men, Company C, Twenty-first Infantry, under Sergt. Henry O. Russell, acting in conjunction with constabulary, has engagement at barrio Quinatihan, near Candelaria, Tayabas, kills 1 insurgent, wounds 2, captures 3, and 25 tons rice and 100 insurgent uniforms. No American casualties. Lieutenant-Colonel Lapaldo, Major Tenume, and 4 men with arms surrender at Oroquieta, Mindanao. All officers of any importance in that district captured or surrendered. Pascual Picon, cabeza of barrio Santo Filimino, San Pablo, Laguna (uncle of Somato Picon), while attempting to escape from prison at Bay, Laguna, is shot by sentinel and dies from effects of wounds.

21.—Insurrectos try to kill presidente of Carmona, Cavite, but municipal police stand them off, killing two. Second Lieut. Oscar C. Monday, Philippine Scouts, with detachment, strikes band of insurgents in mountains near Badian, Cebu, killing several. Second Lieut. George W. Sager, Nineteenth Infantry, with detachment, strikes insurgents near Maulbual, Cebu, killing 2, and later killing 2 bolomen. Second Lieut. Allen T. Crockett, Twenty-first Infantry, strikes battalion under Colonel Banaad at barrio Aliminongin, Lipa, Batangas; 2 natives killed; bodies found. Cuartel destroyed and four Remington rifles captured.

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- Sept. 22.—Insurgent Capt. Sisenando Dizon is killed near barrio San Marcos by scouting party from San Pablo, Laguna, under Second Lieut. Shelton W. Anding, Eighth Infantry. One Colt's revolver, caliber .45, and 35 rounds of ammunition found on his person; also considerable quantity of papers, including commissions, rolls, orders, and correspondence, signed by Malvar and other insurgent leaders of section.....First Lieut. Henry A. Hanigan, Sixth Infantry, kills 1 insurgent at El Pardo, Cebu; finds and destroys gunsmith's tools in a house in the town..... First Sergt. Wesley Bickhart, Company H, Ninth Infantry, with detachment from post of Oras operating in vicinity of San Eduardo, Samar, on trail in mountains to the barrio of Yabo, captures 2 natives, one with hands tied behind him, who claimed to be a prisoner; the other armed with bolo. They led the detachment to the position of the enemy, which is attacked. Enemy is driven from trenches with 2 killed. Small amount of Krag, Remington, and Mauser ammunition captured and destroyed.
- 24.—Detachment of Unisan, Tayabas, fired into by band of natives; 3 men wounded slightly.....Capt. Pedro Dorado and Lieut. Alberto Rafael, of the insurgent forces, surrender at Villaba, Leyte, with 2 Remington rifles and 1 Colt carbine.....Detachment of Eleventh Infantry kills Roque Tajaro, delegate for Capili, on island of LeyteFirst Lieut. Thomas L. Brewer, Twenty-first Infantry, strikes a force of about 300 insurgents in a strong position 10 miles north of Candelaria, Tayabas, north of the barrio of Maybobo. At first fire Second Lieut. Allen T. Crockett, Twenty-first Infantry, is killed and 2 men wounded. Capt. Lawrence J. Hearn, Twenty-first Infantry, with 50 men, same regiment, and 20 constabulary, scouting in vicinity, hears the firing and reaches Lieutenant Brewer, who is still slightly engaged. The fight is at 5 o'clock renewed and lasts until dark; enemy is driven out of large cuartel, in strong position, containing 30,000 pounds of rice and several hundred rounds of ammunition, which is all destroyed. One American wounded. This morning advanced to the enemy's position, but during the night he had disappeared. Scouting farther, find and destroy 4 barracks. Enemy's loss unknown.
- 26.—Transport *Sheridan* arrives at Manila.....Capt. Bernardo de la Cruz surrenders with this command. It is reported that this clears the country in vicinity of Nueva Caceres, Camarines Sur.....Juan Climaco, an insurgent chief, surrenders at Carmen, Bohol.....Contract Surg. James K. Ashburn, in charge of Dumanjug, Cebu, during absence of post commander in field, reports that insurgents attacked guardhouse in town. Enemy driven off with loss of 1 officer and 2 men killed, several more wounded. Captured 10 prisoners.....Maj. Torribio Natividad, with 2 sergeants of Colonel Julian's command, surrenders at Tanauan, Batangas, and turns in 10 rifles and 60 rounds of ammunition.....First Lieut. Samuel R. Gleaves, First Cavalry, captures 3 identified insurgent lieutenants at Santo Tomas, Batangas.
- 27.—First Lieut. George W. Helms, Nineteenth Infantry, reports that returning from trip to Badian, Cebu, struck a band of insurgents, killing 3 and capturing 10 prisoners; also captured 1 lieutenant of bolomen, who is killed while attempting to escape.....Second Lieut. George W. Sager, Nineteenth Infantry, surprises a party of bolomen at barrio Blactique, Cebu, and kills 5.....Maj. Thomas C. Woodbury, Nineteenth Infantry, reports on return to Tagbilaran, Bohol, that at Punta Gorda the enemy tried to ambush his party, but it was discovered and

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the enemy driven from position. Captured 2 brass and 2 wooden cannon.

- Sept. 28.—On September 18 a friendly Moro murdered near Sugut, 10 miles north of Paran-paran, Mindanao, by followers of Dato Amani Mindang, the head of a robber gang living near Sugut, and who has always been unfriendly to Americans. September 25, Second Lieut. Betah Smith, Seventeenth Infantry, and 32 men same regiment, Mr. Tuckerman and 10 mountain muchachos proceeded by water toward dato village. Mr. Tuckerman, Lieutenant Smith, and native police enter the loophole stockade and demand the murderer, but the chief refuses to give him up, his men beating war drums and attack Lieutenant Smith and native policemen, when troops rush from place of concealment. In the engagement the native police and 11 Moros are killed, including dato, 8 wounded, and captured 4 lantacas, 1 Remington, 100 kris and knives. Lieutenant Smith slightly wounded. The escaping Moros, estimated from 100 to 300, fled to mountains. Troops were without transportation and equipment for jungle work and obliged to march to Paran-paran, two of their three boats having been swamped in the breakers in landing. Arrived back in Paran-paran September 26. Mr. Tuckerman especially mentioned for bravery and valuable service. Maj. Lea Febiger, Seventeenth Infantry, authorized the expedition; and the demand for the surrender of the murderers, and believes the chastisement will have a very beneficial effect on the others, particularly the datos. Says Amani was recognized and known by great majority of Moros as a freebooter and enemy of all who were peaceable.....Capt. Luis Briones, leader of anting anting movement, was killed in night attack at Gate, Sorsogon. His body was found some 300 yards from the church.....Twenty-four men, Company C, Ninth Infantry, arrive at Basey, Samar, from Balangiga, Samar, 11 of them wounded; remainder of company killed. Insurgents secure all company supplies and all rifles except 26. The town was attacked by 400 natives with bolos at about 6.20 a. m. All officers killed. Company numbered about 72 men. About 140 natives killed in *mélée*. Many soldiers were killed in quarters, being caught without time for preparation. Officers killed were: Capt. Thomas W. Connell, Ninth Infantry; First Lieut. Edward A. Bumpus, Ninth Infantry; Maj. Richard S. Griswold, surgeon, U. S. Volunteers.
- 29.—Capt. Jose Fumenod surrenders at Bay, Laguna.....Scouting party in vicinity of Guincharan, near Margarita, Samar, kills 2 and captures 3 insurgents, including 1 lieutenant.....Transport *Buford* sails from Manila.
- 30.—One hundred *ladrones* attack detachment of Fifteenth Infantry at Gate, Sorsogon; 8 insurgents are killed, including Capt. Luis Briones, leader of anting anting movement; wounded not known. No casualties on our side.....First Lieut. Chase Doster, Twenty-first Infantry, surprises band of Mariano Libres, at barrio San Benito, Lipa, Batangas, killing 1 lieutenant, wounding 4 men. Captured 11 rifles, 70 rounds of ammunition per rifle, 2 Mausers, and 9 Remingtons. Brought in 11 prisoners, and burned 2 *cuartels* with rice.
- Oct. 1.—Capt. Francis H. Schoeffel, Ninth Infantry, captures 2 lieutenants and 12 bolomen, and 3 bolomen surrender at Mutiong, Samar.....Transport *Hancock* sails from San Francisco.....Transport *Meade* sails from Manila.

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- Oct. 2.—First. Lieut. Harry A. Hegeman, Nineteenth Infantry, captures Sabas Estrella, an insurgent colonel, at Tuburan, Cebu.....Second Lieut. George W. Sager, Nineteenth Infantry, and Second Lieut. Oscar C. Monday, Philippine Scouts, strike band of bolomen in mountains near Ronda, Cebu, and kill 11. Lieutenants Sager and Monday slightly wounded by being struck with stones.....Transport *Thomas* arrives at San Francisco.
- 4.—Twelve bolomen of Silvestre Canete's band surrender at Talisay, Cebu.
- 7.—Detachment of Sixth Cavalry, under Second Lieut. Olney Place, captures insurgent Captain Titi, near Taal, Batangas.....Maj. Thomas C. Woodbury, Nineteenth Infantry, reports that the insurrection in Bohol is breaking up. One of the old police force who deserted with Samson has surrendered, and 447 natives have come in to Loan, Bohol, and taken oath of allegiance.....Detachment of Ninth Infantry, scouting from Calbayog, Samar, fired on near Erefias, and 2 enlisted men wounded. Estimated insurgents had 30 rifles. Their loss unknown.....Band of about 30 insurgents, armed with bolos, enter town of Catanag, Tayabas, and capture entire force of municipal police, numbering 11.
- 8.—Town of Lopez, Tayabas, is attacked by about 20 armed insurgents, who are driven off toward Guinayangan, Tayabas, and dispersed. No casualties on our side.....First Lieut. Archibald I. Harrison, Twenty-first Infantry, with detachment same regiment, encounters about 300 men with rifles heavily entrenched at the foot of Mount Malaray, Batangas. Fight lasts about two hours, when Lieutenant Harrison withdraws to await reinforcements. Being joined by detachments under First Lieut. Josiah C. Minus, Twenty-first Infantry, and Second Lieut. Guy Kent, First Cavalry, they proceed in pursuit of the enemy, who had in the meantime left the trenches and retreated back to the mountains. Second Lieut. Robert R. Bean, Philippine Scouts, is killed, and 1 Macabebe wounded.....Sixteen bolomen surrender at Dumanjug, Cebu.
- 10.—Detachment of Company M, Eighth Infantry, under Sergt. Myron J. Denison, from Nagcarlan, Laguna, encounters party of 25 insurgents at Barrio Banan, of Lilio, and exchanged shots for about twenty minutes. No casualties. Cuartel and uniforms destroyed.....Asidillo, chief of insurgents in Oras, Samar, district, is killed by United States troops.....Transport *Ingalls* arrives at Manila.
- 12.—Transport *Kilpatrick* arrives at San Francisco.
- 13.—Party of 15 natives, armed with native bolos, returning to Bailen from market at Maragondon, Cavite, is attacked by a band of 15 ladrones, armed with rifles; latter defeated, with loss of 1 killed and 5 wounded. Two rifles are captured by natives and brought into Maragondon.....92 bolomen surrender and take the oath of allegiance at Dumanjug, Cebu.
- 14.—Transport *Sumner* arrives at Manila.....Interpreter Barendt, with 10 municipal police from Indang, Cavite, attacks 16 ladrones, under Pedro Arraro, at Barrio Pajo, about 6 miles from Indang, killing 8 and wounding several, including Arraro, who, however, escapes.
- 16.—First Lieut. George W. Wallace, Ninth Infantry, with detachment of 46 men, Company E, same regiment, is attacked by 400 bolomen while in camp on Lower Gandara River, Samar. Casualties: Americans, 10 men killed, 6 wounded; insurgents, 83 men killed. Three Krag rifles captured from enemy.....Transport *Sheridan* sails from Manila.....Transport *Thomas* sails from San Francisco.

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- Oct. 18.—Garrison at Weyler, Samar, is attacked on 17th instant by about 10 riflemen and 100 bolomen; 1 enlisted man, Company L, First Infantry, killed. Enemy driven off. After about one hour attack is renewed from the hills to the north and east of the town, lasting about two hours. Renewed again the 18th instant and lasts until the arrival of a detachment of the Twenty-sixth Infantry under Second Lieut. Channing E. Delaplane, Twenty-sixth Infantry. Enemy's loss, 3 killed and 1 wounded. Captured from enemy, 1 Remington rifle and 100 rounds ammunition.....Two native bull carts, drivers, and fresh meat from Calamba, Laguna, for Lipa, Batangas, are captured near Barrio Itiga by 20 armed insurgents. Detachment Troop D, First Cavalry, from Santo Tomas, sent in pursuit, and near foothills of Maquiling, Batangas, finds carts and carabaos, and destroys cuartel and storehouse.....Transport *McClellan* sails from Manila.....Rafael Ala, commissary of Malvar, captured in market place of Calamba, Laguna.
- 19.—Nine bolomen surrender at Dumanjug, Cebu.
- 20.—Second Lieut. William B. Graham, Fifteenth Infantry, with detachment Company C, same regiment, has an engagement with insurgents in mountain pass, back of Marinap, Sorsogon, and kills 5. No American casualties.....Nineteen bolomen surrender at Dumanjug, Cebu.....Capt. Frederick G. Lawton, Nineteenth Infantry, captures 3 large forts, with trenches and parapets, near Duero, Bohol; 20 insurgents are killed and 4 cannons and 3 rifles captured. No American casualties.
- 22.—Papers captured in barrio of Sorasora, near Carmona, Cavite, showing reorganization of battalion of tiradores. Company roll shows membership of 3 officers and 50 men, commanded by Capt. Jacinto Amorante. There are also two other companies in battalion, commanded by Noriel and Plisardo, that of latter frequenting vicinity of San Francisco de Malabon.....Enrique Lorenga, insurgent chief, with 16 men, 8 Remingtons and 1 Winchester rifle, surrenders to Capt. Frank McIntyre, Nineteenth Infantry, at Guadalupe, Cebu.....First Lieut. Samuel R. Gleaves, First Cavalry, surprises and captures on Mount Maquiling, Batangas, Comandante Igralisco Maloles and Capt. Santiago Malijam, with 3 followers, 5 rifles, and some papers. Lieutenant Gleaves is assisted by Second Lieut. Walter Harvey, Sixteenth Infantry, and Second Lieut. Christian Bach, Twentieth Infantry, with detachments of cavalry, infantry, and Macabebes.
- 23.—First Lieut. James D. Tilford, First Cavalry, with detachment of Troops D and I, same regiment, scouting the country east of Taysan, Batangas, strikes band of insurrectos under Capt. Biristo Castillo, mortally wounding 1 and capturing 2. Found and destroyed barracks and storehouse containing 8,000 pounds of rice, 32 uniform coats, 30 numbered blankets.....Private Leo Norden, Company F, Second Infantry, and Packer G. A. Kinney are drowned in the Tayabas River, a short distance from Lucena, Tayabas, while hauling water to Cota. Two mules are drowned, and wagon floated downstream.
- 24.—Native police and scouts at Barrio Sabang, near Nasugbu, Batangas, are attacked by a band of 30 ladrones, under Silvester Bebing, and 1 scout is killed, 2 policemen, 2 Krag rifles, 2 shotguns, and 200 rounds of ammunition captured by enemy. The captured policemen afterward escaped.
- 25.—Capt. Charles D. Rhodes, Sixth Cavalry, and First Lieut. Stuart Heintzelman, Sixth Cavalry, capture in barrio Timbao, near Bifang, Laguna,

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6 of Captain Fabal's company, Tiradores Battalion, 3 Remington rifles, and 28 rounds of ammunition. . . . Justo Cabajar, insurgent chief, surrenders at Guadalupe, Cebu, to Capt. Frank McIntyre, Nineteenth Infantry, with 35 men, 1 Krag, 2 Mausers, 2 Colt, and 2 Remington rifles. . . . Transport *Hancock* arrives at Manila.

Oct. 26.—Troadio Galicano, insurgent chief, surrenders at Barili, Cebu, to First Lieut. George W. Helms, Nineteenth Infantry, with 6 officers, 109 men, 1 Springfield, 1 Colt, 1 Murata, and 7 Remington rifles.

27.—Mateo Luga, insurgent chief, surrenders at Guadalupe, Cebu, to Capt. Frank McIntyre, Nineteenth Infantry, with 38 men, 3 Krag, 2 Murata, 1 Colt, and 10 Remington rifles, 4 shotguns, and 1 brass cannon. . . . Nicolas Godinez, insurgent chief, surrenders at Dumanjug, to First Lieut. George W. Helms, Nineteenth Infantry, with 250 men, 8 officers, 2 Krag, 1 Winchester, 24 Remington rifles, and 2 rifles of unknown make. . . . Angel Libra, insurgent chief, surrenders at Dumanjug, Cebu, to Capt. Amos H. Martin, Nineteenth Infantry, with 1 Springfield, 1 Colt, 2 Winchester, 3 Remington rifles, and 1 rifle of unknown make. . . . Arcadio Maxilon, insurgent chief, with 40 men and 16 Remington, 2 Colt, 1 Mauser, 3 Springfield, and 7 rifles, 1 of unknown make, 4 shotguns, 4 cannons, and 1 revolver, surrenders at Tuburan, Cebu, to First Lieut. John L. Bond, Nineteenth Infantry.

28.—Second Lieut. Cleaveland Hilson, Twenty-first Infantry, with 25 men, same regiment, and detachment of constabulary, from Candelaria, Tayabas, strikes insurgents in barrio of Montesillo, 12 miles southwest of Sariaya, Tayabas, and captures Capt. Clemente Gatdula, 1 lieutenant, 1 sergeant, 2 privates, and kills 1 insurgent corporal. Captain Gatdula has been engaged in organizing a company to join Marques's Battalion. Valuable information obtained as the result of the capture. No American casualties. . . . Transport *Meade* arrives at San Francisco.

29.—Eschavez, subchief of Godinez, surrenders at Dumanjug, Cebu, to First Lieut. George W. Helms, Nineteenth Infantry, with 1 Winchester rifle.

30.—Capt. Edmund Wittenmyer, Fifteenth Infantry, operating in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, reports killing of Florentino Baloydoy, insurgent captain. . . . The insurrecto forces on the island of Cebu have come in and laid down their arms in good faith, in obedience to a demand of the people for peace; 150 rifles, 8 brass pieces, 60 officers, and 470 men. . . . Marquides Lassalla, insurgent chief, surrenders at Danao, Cebu, to Capt. Edward P. Lawton, Nineteenth Infantry, with 2 Krag, 7 Mauser, 3 Murata, 6 Remington rifles, 3 Remington carbines, 1 sporting rifle, 3 shotguns, and 1 revolver.

31.—Francisco Rodriguez, insurgent chief, surrenders with 1 Winchester carbine at Toledo, Cebu, to First Lieut. Harry A. Hegeman, Nineteenth Infantry.

Nov. 1.—Transport *Kilpatrick* sails from San Francisco.

5.—Maj. Frank West, Sixth Cavalry, with detachment, scouting near Tayabas, Tayabas, finds and destroys the barracks and supplies of Maj. Miguel Gachtian and Captain Blosnoble. Desultory firing between advance guards and enemy's pickets, but no casualties.

6.—Capt. George H. Estes, jr., Twentieth Infantry, with detachment, scouting in mountains above Alaminos, Laguna, captures Capt. and Commissary Julio Lazaro and 14 men who were collecting rice for insurgents; kills 1 insurgent and burns about 2,000 pounds of collected rice. Five tenientes of barrios arrested and confined. . . . First Lieut. Patrick A. Connolly, Twenty-first Infantry, with detachment, scouting west of

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Mount Macolod and Buquil, Batangas, finds and destroys 2 cuartels and fires on retreating bands twice.....Maj. William L. Pitcher, Eighth Infantry, commanding Mindoro expedition, reports that the garrison at Abra de Ilog was attacked by insurgents under command of Deogracio Leycos. It was apparently an attempt to repeat the Balangiga tactics, but the insurgents were completely routed, leaving the bodies of 5 of their killed on the field. American casualties, 1 man seriously wounded.....The American deserter, Henry Richter, late Battery C, Sixth Artillery, was captured by First Lieut. Samuel W. Noyes, Thirtieth Infantry, who made the trip across the mountains from Palanan with 50 men, Second Infantry. Richter was in uniform of an insurrecto lieutenant when taken. Capt. Frederick B. Shaw, Thirtieth Infantry, and Lieutenant Noyes are pushing Leycos hard and it is hoped will destroy him.....Maj. William L. Pitcher, Eighth Infantry, reports his return from southern Mindoro, where he captured 3 officers and part of a company, all armed and well supplied with ammunition.

Nov. 7.—Transport *Hancock* sails from Manila.

11.—In an engagement at Parang, Samar, Corpl. William J. Brighley, Company E, Ninth Infantry, is killed, and Private Ero Evaresto, Thirty-sixth Company, Philippine Scouts, wounded. Enemy's loss, 3 bolomen and, it is thought, several riflemen.

12.—Transport *Thomas* arrives at Manila.....Capt. John D. L. Hartman, First Cavalry, with detachment from Bauan, Batangas, has engagement with about 400 insurgents, half of whom have rifles, on Bauan-Taal road, where they had taken position and constructed rifle pits. Captain Hartman succeeds in striking them in the flank and kills 25, wounds many, and captures 2 men, 9 guns, and 11 bolos. The enemy is completely routed and scatters in every direction. Cavalry from Batangas and Bauan sent out in pursuit. American casualties: Corpl. William E. McNabney and Private William I. Rudd, First Cavalry, wounded.

13.—Col. Pedro Caballes, Lieut. Cols. Bernaldo Marques and Sebastian Canso, Maj. Tomas Roda, Capts. Claudio Yalbuena and Marcos Salazar, 2 lieutenants (one of them from Mauban, Tayabas), occupy Sampaloc, Tayabas, with 200 men, all armed with rifles, uniformed in khaki, shoes, leggings, and American campaign hats; parade is held, after which officers call a meeting of the principal men of the town, stating their intention to remain under arms until death and assuring the people of their protection, saying they proposed marshaling 2,000 troops for operations in dry season. Expressed intention of assembling at Gumaca, Tayabas, thence proceed to some garrison on Pacific coast; expect to receive arms from Binangonan. Told presidente to notify commanding officer, Mauban and Lucban, of their presence in Sampaloc; ordered a baile and marched out, leaving letter signed "Bernaldo Marques.".....Cosme Caro and Eustebio Colocotog are captured at San Francisco de Malabon. Caro was captain of insurgents; surrendered some time ago and took oath of allegiance; since then he has been chief of band of 50 or more men in province of Cavite, associated with Julian Montalon and others. Caro will be tried for violating his oath.

15.—Capt. Herman Hall, Twenty-first Infantry, with detachment of 30 men, accompanied by Dr. Lowe, on two days' scout in and about mountains 13 miles south of San Juan de Booboc, Batangas, destroys main camp of Tomas Ruidas, which contained about 10 buildings, and 50,000 pounds of palay, and captures official in charge of palay. Has 4 engagements

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with about 30 insurgents and drives them farther away each time except the last, when they attack from the rear and their fire is silenced. The country was very rough and the troops could not close on them, as they kept far away, and the men became exhausted. Surrendered insurgent, now a scout, guided Captain Hall to the camp. No American casualties. Insurgent casualties not known.....Transport *Grant* sails from San Francisco.

Nov. 16.—Capt. Felipe Morales, while attempting to steal cattle, is killed in Barrio Antipolo, Lipa, Batangas, by natives friendly to the United States.....Jaen, Nueva Ecija, is entered by ladrones, but they are driven out by municipal police after a number of shots had been fired.....Transport *Rosecrans* sails from Portland.....Transport *Meade* sails from San Francisco.

17.—Maj. Littleton W. T. Waller, Marine Corps, with detachment of marines, strikes enemy's stronghold in Sojoton, Samar, destroys 3 camps, kills 30 men, captures and destroys 30 bamboo guns, rice, and stores, and their position, almost impregnable. Numerous trails with poisonous spear pits. The cliffs, rising sheer from the river for 200 feet, were lined with boulders in cages ready to be precipitated on the Americans, whose attack was a surprise. Troops chased them up cliffs by bamboo ladders.....First Lieut. James O. Ross, Fifteenth Cavalry, with detachment and native laborers, working on telegraph line from Oroquieta to Langaran, Mindanao, surprised apparently through treachery, and 2 soldiers are killed, 1 escapes, and 1 missing. One of the assailants was remembered as having surrendered and taken oath September 4. He is captured and in custody. Another was captured and in attempting to escape is killed.

19.—Second Lieut. James V. Guthrie, Twentieth Infantry, scouting through Loboo Mountains, Batangas, with detachment of Twentieth Infantry and 50 men, Macabebe scouts, encounters a small force of insurgents, which scatters and eludes pursuit. Large amounts of palay are found and destroyed.

21.—First Lieut. Lawrence P. Butler, Second Infantry, with detachment of 40 men, Company L, from Pitogo, Tayabas, defeats 150 armed insurgents, part of Col. Ruperto Rio's force, under Capt. Protasio Silvala, about 8 miles northeast of Macalelon, Tayabas. No American casualties. Insurgent losses not known.

22.—Second Lieut. Arthur L. Bump, Eighth Infantry, with 11 men, same regiment, and 10 Macabebes from Cavinti, Laguna, has an engagement at Batahan, barrio of Luciana, Laguna, with about 60 insurgents. One Macabebe is wounded. Insurgent casualties unknown, but several are seen carried away.....Sergt. Frederick Schneider, with detachment of 12 men of Troop C, Sixth Cavalry, proceeds from Santa Rosa, Laguna, to barrio Manhalasan, where it was reported there were 5 ladrones. Sergt. Schneider finds 23 insurgents, of which number 2 are wounded and 13 captured, including the 2 wounded. No American casualties.

23.—Detachment of Company H, Fourth Infantry, from Nasugbu, Batangas, encounters band of 200 ladrones, under Comandante Siriaco Arraro. Enemy's loss, 8 killed, 3 wounded and captured. First Lieut. Louis J. Van Schaick, Sixteenth Infantry (attached to Fourth Infantry), is severely wounded by bolo.....Second Lieut. Christian Bach, Twentieth Infantry, with detachment, finds barrio of Dolores, 2 miles from

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this point, partially fortified and 350 sacks of rice stored in it. All destroyed on account of evident insurrecto occupation. Capt. Harry C. Hale, Twentieth Infantry, with 190 men, consisting of 4 detachments same regiment and 1 detachment Eighth Infantry, started for divide between San Cristobal and Mount Banajao, Tayabas, on the 21st instant, with instructions to find and attack from rear the position known as Tres Tarrques. Column reached the divide on 21st instant, came down Tarrques River from its source, surprised cuartel from rear on left bank of river; 20 men in cuartel, who dropped their arms and ran; 1 wounded and 17 rifles captured. Column proceeded down the river on 23d and made conjunction with Capt. William M. Morrow, Twenty-first Infantry, and detachment same regiment, which had proceeded from Candelaria, Tayabas, toward reported cuartel and maestranza of Malvar, with orders to meet Captain Hale's column there. It consisted of cuartel and cave, in which reloading machinery had evidently been used. Position is struck by Captain Hale's column on 21st instant. Captain Morrow destroyed barrio Abacaban, containing great quantity of stored rice. All insurrecto resorts which bore evidence of being such have been destroyed. No American casualties.

- Nov. 25.—A detachment Company B, Fourth Infantry, with native police of Indang, Cavite, under Scout Interpreter Frank Berhendt, encounters party of ladrones 2 miles south of Indang; kills 6 and captures 5 ladrones; also captures 1 Remington rifle, several bolos, and 2 carabaos reported as stolen on recent raid to Nasugbu, Batangas. Among casualties was Juan Cabrear, a ladrone captain, of Maragondon, Cavite. A detachment Ninth Cavalry, from San José de Lagonoy, Camarines Norte, accompanied by constabulary, captures 17 ladrones with bolos.
- 26.—First Lieut. George M. Wray, Philippine Scouts, with detachment, scouting from Polangui, Albay, in search of band of ladrones, locates camp, killing 1, and destroying 100 sacks of rice and palay; he follows them two days through mountains, but loses track. Albero, employed by quartermaster at Tanauan, Batangas, is murdered in the street, in view of people of 13 houses, because he did not contribute most of his pay to the insurgents and cease being friendly to the Americans. Capt. John E. Morrison, Twentieth Infantry, warned people that if they did not furnish information he would burn the houses; demand not being complied with, they are accordingly burned. Meat wagon between Magdalena and Majayjay, Laguna, is attacked by insurgents. Sergt. John Peterson and Private Edward J. Britton, Company I, Eighth Infantry, badly wounded; Privates Ora L. Dunn and Frederick M. Freuing, Company I, same regiment, captured; also 2 horses and equipments, 3 rifles, 3 revolvers, and 300 rounds ammunition. First Lieut. George I. Feeter and Second Lieut. Richard Wetherill, Nineteenth Infantry, are wounded by bamboo spikes in pitfall, near Carmen, Bohol; Second Lieut. Ira A. Smith slightly hurt.
- 27.—First Lieut. Bert H. Merchant, Eighth Infantry, with detachment same regiment, strikes part of Caballes' force of insurgents, going to Sampaloc, Laguna, and kills 1, but fails to overtake party.
- 28.—Maj. Daniel Cornman, Twenty-fourth Infantry, with detachment, returns from scout in vicinity of Mount Maquiling, Batangas, during which he captured 4 insurgents and destroyed a cuartel containing a quantity of powder and dynamite.

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- 29.—Second Lieut. Allen J. Greer, Fourth Infantry, with detachment, strikes band of ladrones, or insurrectos, at barrio Amadeo, near Indang, Cavite, and kills 1, captures 1 lieutenant and 3 men. Capt. Traber Norman, Eighth Infantry, with detachment, strikes part of Caballes' force at Taytay, Morong, kills 1 and captures 3 ladrones. First Lieut. Henry R. Richmond, First Cavalry, captures 1 officer in uniform, with revolver and bolo, and 1 soldier unarmed.
- Nov. 30.—Detachments Fourth Infantry and native police, under Scout Interpreter Frank Berhendt, operating near Indang, Cavite, strikes armed ladrones twice, killing 3, wounding several, and capturing 1 rifle and 50 rounds ammunition.
- Dec. 1.—Transport *Buford* arrives at New York.
- 2.—Transport *Kilpatrick* arrives at Manila. First Lieut. Mack Richardson, Twenty-sixth Infantry, returns to Atimonan, Tayabas, from three days' scout. While in Gumaca, Tayabas, police report 8 insurgents in barrio Bamban and ask for revolvers, which are supplied; police succeed in capturing entire party of insurgents, armed with bolos, and rescue 9 recruits, whose arms had been tied, all recruiting of insurgents being done forcibly. Insurgent party consisted of Capt. Balbino Sartin, who was killed during the fight; Lieut. Dianses Anca, 1 sergeant, and 5 soldiers, who are in confinement at Atimonan, Tayabas. First Lieut. Edgar T. Collins, Eighth Infantry, of Col. T. J. Wint's column, strikes 60 insurgents on top of Lipa Mountain, Batangas; burns 14 cuartels and captures 2 insurgents, 4 Mausers, and 1 Remington.
- 4.—Detachment Twenty-first Infantry, near barrio Bacol, 3 miles east of Calamba, Laguna, captures 3 insurgents, 2 Mausers, 1 Remington, and 150 rounds of ammunition.
- 5.—Transport *Crook* sails from New York. Mounted detachment, Fourth Infantry, and local police from Indang, Cavite, under Scout Frank Berhendt, strikes band of ladrones near that place, killing 2, wounding several, and capturing several revolvers. At Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, a native, Anastasio Bartolome, brings in 2 Remington rifles, 1 Winchester rifle, 1 Colt's revolver, caliber .38; 1 pair saddlebags, 1 pair field glasses, 19 cartridges, and the head of an American negro, which, he says, is Fagan's. He also brings in the class ring of First Lieut. Frederick W. Altstaetter, Engineer Corps, U. S. Army, and Fagan's commission as second lieutenant, signed by Lacuna, and as captain, signed by Alejandrino. The man states that while hunting near Umay, on Pacific coast, with 5 companions, they met Fagan, his wife, and 2 negritos. While all were eating they assailed Fagan's party at a given signal, killing Fagan and wounding the negritos, who escaped, the woman jumping into the water.
- 7.—Transport *Sheridan* arrives at San Francisco. In action at Loboo, Batangas, Sergt. Carl M. Secrest and Private W. B. McGeary, Company L, Twentieth Infantry, and 1 Macabebe are killed; Private C. H. Huff, Company L, Twentieth Infantry, is mortally wounded and dies next morning. Filipino and 1 negro are known to have been killed. Nacarlán, Laguna, is fired on by outlaws and a number of the natives in the town are killed; outlaws driven off. Native policemen participate in action and are complimented by commanding officer. Chief of police of Bauan, island of Marinduque, captures 1 lieutenant and 3 ladrones.

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- Dec. 8.—Alaminos, Laguna, and Lipa, Batangas, fired on during night and morning of 8th. Troops chase outlaws until they scatter. No casualties..... Capt. William S. Graves, Twentieth Infantry, captures 10 ladrones, with 3 rifles, near Amado, Cavite.
- 9.—In two engagements this morning between San Pablo, Laguna, and Tiaong, Tayabas, the enemy receives some loss, but amount is unknown at present. Insurgents soon retreat, with our troops in pursuit. Two dead insurgents found in field. American casualties: Private Charles A. Warnstaff, Company I, Twenty-first Infantry, shot through body, serious..... Capt. John K. Miller, Eighth Infantry, with 40 men, strikes Pedro Cortez's band of 60 insurgents 2 miles from Pila, Laguna; the latter fled, leaving 2 killed and 11 wounded. Captain Miller's casualties are: Private William Howard, shot through both legs, severe; Private Chris. Erickson, shot through right shoulder, moderate; Private E. E. Wyatt, shot through right forearm, slight; all of Company I, Eighth Infantry. Country south and west of town cleared. Enemy again concentrates, but is soon scattered by detachment sent out..... Ambulan, Batangas, is fired on this morning; no casualties.
- 10.—An attack is made this morning on Candelaria, Tayabas, and gallantly repulsed by detachment under Sergt. George W. Smith, Company C, Twenty-first Infantry. The insurgents numbered about 100 strong. One-third of their force, keeping up a hot fire on men's quarters and telegraph, office attempt to rush the detachment, getting within 60 yards. Signal Corps men Edward A. Johnson and Michael Doran remain at their instruments during the entire fire, trying to connect with other stations. Sergeant Smith pursues with his men and captures 2 rifles. Capt. George B. Duncan, Fourth Infantry, Indang, Cavite, reports capture, during night, of 3 ladrones.
- 11.—Insurgents attack Alaminos, Laguna, at 2 a. m., and burn 1 house. They came very close, firing buckshot. No casualties..... Second Lieut. Frederick B. Hennessy, Artillery Corps, U. S. Army, with 40 Ilocanos (Seventeenth Company Native Scouts), scouting northeast of Lipa, Batangas, captures insurgent captain, 2 Mausers, 1 Remington, valuable papers, and 7 war bolos..... Detachment of 10 men, Twenty-first Infantry, scouting near Calamba, Laguna, strikes insurgent outpost, wounds 1 insurgent, captures 2, with 2 Mausers and 108 rounds of ammunition. No casualties..... First Lieut. Samuel W. Widdifield, Eighth Infantry, commanding Tenth Company Native Scouts, at Cuenca, Batangas, captures 7 insurgent soldiers, with valuable information..... First Lieut. Beverly A. Read, Sixth Cavalry, with 40 men, strikes insurgents near Calaca, Batangas, and has running fight for about 2 miles. No casualties.
- 12.—Transport *Grant* arrives at Manila..... Capt. Harry H. Bandholtz, Second Infantry, captures First Lieut. Emelerio de Silva, and Capt. Hilario Valisano near Sariaya, Tayabas. One second lieutenant, 1 sergeant, with 1 serviceable revolver, surrenders to Capt. John D. L. Hartman, First Cavalry, at Bauan, Batangas..... Second Lieut. Frederick B. Hennessy, Artillery Corps, U. S. Army, with 1 American scout and 6 men, Seventeenth Company Ilocano Scouts, surprises and captures, well up on end of Lipa Mountains, this morning at daybreak, the forces of Maj. Mariano Ilabres, consisting of 42 men and 21 rifles, Mausers and Remingtons, with 40 rounds of ammunition per gun. Not a shot fired..... First Lieut. William M. Fassett, Twenty-first Infantry, scouting near Tayasan

1901.

Batangas, strikes band of insurgents, has running fight for several hours, during which Corpl. C. H. C. Beach, Company G, Twenty-first Infantry, is killed, and 1 man, Seventh Company Macabebes, slightly wounded in foot.

Dec. 14.—Lieut. Lorenzo Remequillo, a noted ladrone chief, who was formerly a scout for Troop C, Sixth Cavalry, but deserted, is shot and killed by municipal police of San Pedro Tunasan, Laguna.

15.—Transport *Warren* sails from Manila.

16.—Transport *Hancock* sails from San Francisco.....Capt. Guy H. B. Smith, Fourth Infantry, with 90 men of the Fourth and Twenty-eighth Infantry, strikes body of insurgents near Looc, Batangas, killing 3. No casualties on American side.....Capt. Jacob G. Galbraith, First Cavalry, found and destroyed the camp of Col. Dalmacio Fernandez, including numerous cuartels of recent construction. Enemy did not await attack and surprise was impossible.....First Lieut. George V. H. Moseley, First Cavalry, scouting southeast of Batangas, Batangas, with 30 men, Troop I, First Cavalry, strikes a force of about 125 insurgents, including 30 riflemen, at barrio San Isidro, 4 miles from Batangas. After sharp skirmish the enemy fled, leaving 7 dead. They were seen to carry away several dead and wounded. No casualties.....First Lieut. William M. Fassett, Twenty-first Infantry, with 30 men of Company G of that regiment, strikes about 75 bolomen and 15 riflemen at barrio Colod during afternoon. The enemy soon fled, leaving 3 dead.....First Lieut. Boss Reese, Philippine Scouts, with 25 men of Fourth Company Macabebes, scouting toward Loboo, Batangas, has running fight with small band. Several were seen to fall, but are carried away. Burns 2 cuartels with gun racks for 20 rifles.....First Lieut. James D. Telford, First Cavalry, scouting east of Batangas, strikes small band of insurgents and kills 2. No casualties.

17.—Second Lieut. Albert U. Faulkner, Third Infantry, with Macabebe Scouts; strikes about 20 insurgents near Sampa, barrio of San Luis, Batangas, captures 1 Remington rifle. No casualties.

18.—Capt. Benito Nagbao and First Lieut. Cecillio Castillo, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 2 privates, all of Santa Cruz Battalion, surrender at Bauan, Batangas.....Municipal police, Batangas, Batangas, capture 2 insurgents.....Second Lieut. Horace N. Munro, First Cavalry, at barrio Liplo, Batangas, captures 2 insurgents, 2 bolos, and important papers.

19.—Transport *Thomas* arrives at San Francisco.....Transport *Dix* arrives at Manila.

20.—Capt. John D. L. Hartman, First Cavalry, with Troop K, First Cavalry, from Bauan, Batangas, locates and destroys 6 deserted cuartels, near south end of peninsula, opposite Point Pagalanit. Two gun pits had been constructed commanding trails.....Capt. John S. Parke, jr., Twenty-first Infantry, at Biting, Laguna, where part of the Fifth and Twenty-first Infantry rendezvoused last Monday, destroys about 10 tons of rice, 4 beef cattle, and some 4 or 5 buildings that constituted the quarters and storehouse of the 200 men reported there. On the approach of the Americans they took to higher tops of the mountains. After scouting that neighborhood, Captain Parke took 25 men of the Eighth and Twenty-first Infantry, and followed trail of 1 company of 70 men, with 40 guns, far up into the mountains, and surprised them at 3 p. m. while getting ready to eat, killing 2—1 officer—wounding 3; also captures 2 prisoners, half a dozen uniforms of officers, company rolls and records.....First

1901.

Lieut. Robert E. Brooks, Philippine Scouts, with 30 men of the Seventh Company of Macabebes, and Company K, Twentieth Infantry, strikes insurgents under Captain Barcelino 10 miles east of Taysan, Batangas. Kills 6, including 1 officer, captures 1 Remington rifle, 50 rounds of ammunition, and 17 bolos; destroys the insurgents' barracks, with 3 tons of palay. No American casualties.

Dec. 21.—Two detachments sent out from Bauan, Batangas, to peninsula between Bauan and Taal, Batangas, made the following captures: First Lieut. Percy W. Arnold, squadron adjutant, First Cavalry, and 18 native scouts, Second Company of Macabebes, find 15 Remingtons, 14 Mausers, 3 Muratas, 1 Krag-Jørgensen rifle, model 1898, No. 156612, and 50 rounds of ammunition for Krag. Of the above arms 5 Remingtons and 2 Mausers are unserviceable; all in poor condition. This brings the number of rifles captured by force at Bauan, Batangas, since November 12, 1901, to 66.....Capt. William S. Graves, with Capt. George H. Estes, jr., 25 men of Company G, 15 men of Company A, all of the Twentieth Infantry, and 45 Macabebe scouts, while scouting from Ambulan, Batangas, strikes insurgents west of Calocan about noon. Enemy's force estimated at from 50 to 150, holding an intrenchment extending from vertical cliff to Lake Taal, Batangas, a distance of about 100 yards, the only approach being by a narrow trail, intended as a trap, the insurgents hoping that attack by Americans with small force would be made. It being impossible to flank the enemy, Captain Graves, with a few men, quickly followed by Captain Estes, carries the intrenchments by a direct frontal attack, in column of files, killing 7 insurgents and capturing 1; also captures 2 Mausers and 2 Remington rifles. Insurgents retreat, leaving no wounded. Sergt. Isaac I. Cooper, Company A, the first man to reach the trench, seized an insurgent, threw him down, and commenced firing on the others. Ascent of the mountain difficult and exhausting. Captain Estes' command had been on march since midnight. Three Americans and 1 Macabebe wounded.....Band of robbers near Pidig, Ilocos Norte, who, on December 3, carried away 4 policemen of a barrio of that town, has been successfully hunted down. Esperanza, chief of the band, is shot and killed by the presidente of the barrio, who was a prisoner in the hands of Esperanza.

22.—Transport *Rosecrans* arrives at Manila.

23.—Company F, Twenty-first Infantry, has desperate hand-to-hand encounter with bolomen in a deep gorge near Soro Soro, 6 miles south of San Jose, Batangas, killing 22 of the enemy; destroys insurgent barracks and captures 7 head of cattle and several bolos. A boloman rushes upon First Lieut. Patrick A. Connolly, Twenty-first Infantry, and is shot once by Musician Nelson Gilbert, Company F, and twice by Lieutenant Connolly; during a struggle between the lieutenant and boloman, both fall from a rock into the water, the boloman is knocked insensible with the butt of Connolly's revolver and held under until drowned. Lieutenant Connolly received ugly bolo wound on left cheek. Private Edward Carney is also attacked by 2 men, one of whom he bayonets; the other is bayoneted by Private Harry Hillibush while in the act of hacking up Carney who receives six bolo cuts on neck and shoulders.....Five officers and 175 men surrender at Tagbilaran, Bohol; all take oath of allegiance.

24.—Transport *Grant* sails from Manila.....Pedro Samson, Insurgent leader, Mutasaron, Bohol, surrenders with 56 officers, 127 men; also 28 cannon and 48 rifles.....During scout near Dapdap, Samar, Capt.

1901.

Francis H. Schoeffel, with detachment of 18 men of Company E, all of the Ninth Infantry, is attacked by large force of bolomen, who spring from thickets. Severe hand-to-hand fight ensues, during which Sergt. John P. Swisher, Corpl. James Caughan, John Maren, Frank McAndrew, Joseph A. Weippert, and George Bedford are killed, Captain Schoeffel and Private Arthur Bonnicastle slightly wounded, Corpl. John H. Russell, Daniel L. McPherson, and George Claxton severely. One other killed, 1 wounded; names to be sent later. No property lost. Enemy driven from field suffering heavy loss. Lang's detachment, Philippine Scouts, arrive soon after, and assist in removing and caring for wounded.

- Dec. 25.—Second Lieut. John P. Hasson, Sixth Cavalry, with force of cavalry and scouts, while scouting from San Pablo, Laguna, locates and destroys 13 cuartels of Luis Baan, kills 4 of the 7 bolomen in charge, and captures papers implicating Padre and others.
- 27.—Second Lieut. Alister M. Maonab, Philippine Scouts, with detachment of Third Company of Scouts, and Company G, Eighth Infantry, find 1 cuartel partly built and 2 others completed while in mountains between Luisiana and Majayjay, Laguna. Later strikes insurgents' storehouse and 7 armed insurgents, who immediately fled; wounds 1, indicated by trail of blood; also destroys 1,000 pounds of palay, which, on account of roughness of the trail, is impossible to save.
- 28.—First Sergt. Peter Courtney, with detachment of Company M, Eighth Infantry, and 10 native police, strikes force of the enemy, estimated at 40 armed men, near Lake Yambo, Laguna; after an engagement of about 20 minutes the enemy retreats in direction of San Pablo, Laguna. Detachment destroys 3 cuartels, a quantity of rice, blankets, and cooking utensils. No casualties on our side; enemy's loss not known..... First Lieut. Nicolas Encarnacion and 14 soldiers, with personal arms and 16 serviceable rifles, and First Lieut. Ricardo Maxsino, with 1 soldier and 1 rifle, present themselves at Taal, Batangas..... Second Lieut. Charles H. Danforth, Tenth Infantry, stationed at Cagayan, Misamis, with detachment, surprises insurgent camp, capturing 4 men, 2 Krag and 2 Remington rifles; also quantity of ammunition and supplies. No casualties.
- 29.—First Lieut. Samuel W. Widdifield, Eighth Infantry; Civilian Scout Drake, and 30 native scouts of Tenth Company of Macabebes, strike about 20 insurgents on Lake Taal, north of Mount Macolod, Batangas, killing and wounding 5; also capture 3 prisoners and a few bolos.
- 30.—An insurgent arsenal is discovered by First Lieut. Edgar A. Myer, Eleventh Infantry, near Ormoc, Leyte; surprises it and captures a large quantity of machinery, lathes, loading tools, sulphur, refining plant, also 4 rifles, 4 shotguns, 2 revolvers, 8,000 caps, and considerable correspondence; cuartel near by, from which is taken rifles, 2 shotguns, and 10,000 pounds of rice; destroys what could not remove. On return of Myer's party to Ormoc, the town is fired upon by insurgents, who fled.
- 31.—Capt. Daniel H. Boughton, Third Cavalry; First Lieut. Charles W. Exton, Twentieth Infantry; Mr. Morris, of the Quartermaster's Department at Manila, and Crispulo Patajo unexpectedly encounter about 20 insurgents in the mountains near Taysan, Batangas. They charge at once with revolvers and defeat them, capturing 3 ponies and equipments..... Capt. Charles D. Rhodes, Sixth Cavalry, and 2 enlisted men strike 15 armed insurgents near San Nicolas, Cavite; capture 1 Remington rifle, 1 Colt revolver, and 1 web belt full of ammunition. No casualties.

1902.

- Jan. 1.—Transport *Sheridan* sails from San Francisco.....First Lieut. William M. Fassett, Twenty-first Infantry, commanding Company G, same regiment, while landing near Loboo, Batangas, has an engagement with enemy. Privates Harry H. Brown and Elmer Scott are wounded. Enemy's casualties unknown.....First Lieut. Leon L. Roach, Eighth Infantry, with 40 men, same regiment, strikes forces of Cortes and Virey. The enemy fled without firing a shot. They were pursued a long time by our men. Five houses used as barracks are destroyed. Casualties among enemy unknown.....Capt. Harry R. Leman, assistant surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, with privates George W. Gibson and Sankey Gray, Company L, Eighth Infantry, accompanied by 9 natives of the town of Pila, Laguna, armed with revolvers and bolos, leaves for barrio of San Felipe, where they capture Manuel Saniler, Nicolas Santiang, and Leon de Villan, with 2 revolvers. Had information that they were agitators and were trying to secure new members for the Katipunan. This was accomplished by the loyal natives here, as they gave the information and volunteered to go out and capture them.....First Lieut. Edwin A. Hickman, First Cavalry, with Troop L, same regiment, attacks insurgents at barrio Mianet, Lucban, Batangas. Saddler Fred. W. Schwartz and Trumpeter Julius F. Pallasch are wounded. Juan Maderal, lieutenant of Tayabas police, is killed, and native guide wounded. Enemy scatters; no trace of them are found. Capture 1 Remington, 1 shotgun, Spanish make, and 1 revolver, German make.
- 2.—Majors Castellio and Geronimo are captured at Mount Solo by 11 policemen and 10 native volunteers under Escolastico Atienza.....Capt. Benjamin H. Hartshorne, jr., Seventh Infantry, is killed in ambush at or near Lanang, Samar.
- 3.—Second Lieut. Frank E. Barendt, Philippine Scouts, with native scouts, strikes Joaquin's band of 20 ladrones; kills 1 and captures 5, with 1 rifle, 1 shotgun, and 2 war bolos, and burned barrio of Inal, Joaquin's headquarters. Lieutenant Barendt also brought in Arrario, ladrone chief, for sending warning to Joaquin.....First Lieut. Charles P. Faulkner, Eighth Infantry, with detachment same regiment, strikes band of insurgents near Taal, Batangas; kills 1 insurgent. No American casualties.....A command consisting of 3 companies Fifth Infantry; Troop M, Sixth Cavalry; Troop C and detachment Troop D, First Cavalry; Companies E and L, Twenty-first Infantry; Fourteenth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, and Twenty-first companies Ilocano Scouts, all under command of Col. Theodore J. Wint, Sixth Cavalry, started in line of small columns of about 50 men per column on the morning of January 1 from the Taysan and San Juan de Bocoboc road, and searched the country thoroughly between the road and the sea. The country was full of insurgents and the mountain region was a vast storehouse, containing accumulated supplies of palay, cattle, hogs, carabaos, chickens, and corn, sufficient to last 20,000 men for six months. The Twenty-first Ilocanos, under First Lieut. John H. Neff, had a sharp engagement during forenoon of January 3, but the enemy fled from their trenches upon being flanked by Capt. De Rosey C. Cabell, Sixth Cavalry, with 40 men Troop M, same regiment, and First Lieut. Harry R. King, Philippine Scouts, with Sixteenth Ilocanos. Other troops had unimportant skirmishes, encountering many separate bands of insurgents, most of which made no stand. Enemy's loss unknown. No American casualties. Colonel Wint had under his command 24 officers and 800 men.

1902.

The line from Taysan to Batangas, under command of Col. Almond B. Wells, First Cavalry, consisting of Troop I, First Cavalry, 3 companies Twenty-first Infantry, and 3 companies Twenty-eighth Infantry, with Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and Seventeenth companies Native Scouts—in all about 1,000 men. They sweep the whole western half of the Loboo Peninsula and have several sharp engagements. They find and destroy a number of cuartels, 1 immense intrenched position containing about 30 small barracks, fitted up with arm racks and bunks and containing horses, cattle, and hogs; destroy over 500 tons of insurgent palay, 3,000 bushels of corn; kill 9 insurgents; capture 8, with 2 rifles, 800 rounds ammunition, 650 uniforms, and much other insurgent property. Colonel Wint's column finds and destroys about 900 tons of palay in the Loboo Mountains.

- Jan. 4.—First Lieut. Clarence S. Nettles, Twentieth Infantry, with 30 men same regiment and Twenty-first Infantry, strikes Lott's cuartel, near Bali-teon, Lake Taal, Batangas, and kills 7 bolomen; burns cuartels and storehouse containing about 300 bushels of rice.
- 7.—Capt. George H. Estes, jr., Twentieth Infantry, with men same regiment, strikes band of about 12 riflemen foraging near barrio San Isidro, Batangas, kills 2, captures 1 rifle, and camp supplies of the entire party; also strikes about 15 bolomen near San Francisco, Batangas, kills 2. Private Charlie C. Morison, Company E, Twentieth Infantry, wounded First Lieut. Lorenzo Taganiban, of Major Villanueva's command, who surrendered the 6th instant, comes in to Bauan, Batangas, and surrenders 1 revolver and 1 bolo. Claims to have been sick and unable to come in Monday with command. Crispulo Patajo, accompanied by Urelío Ramos, post interpreter, and 6 native scouts, captures in mountains near Batangas 14 insurgents. First Lieut. Maurice Manadé, Philippine Scouts, with Twentieth Native Scouts, strikes and destroys an insurgent camp near Sampaloc; captures about 4,000 pounds palay, a quantity of clothing, insurgent uniforms, and 32 bolos. Insurgents fled, leaving food still cooking. Second Lieut. William B. Bonham, Second Infantry, with detachment same regiment, strikes and destroys an insurgent camp; captures 1 revolver, and small amount ammunition and powder. Three bronze cannon, with small quantity of ammunition, 4 rifles, 3 shotguns, and 6 bolos, are surrendered at Mauban, Tayabas.
- 8.—Col. Anastacio Marasigan, accompanied by Maj. Mariano Cabrera, brother of Martin, and the renegade priest Magdaleno Castillo, who has been out with the insurgents for a year or more, enters Taal, Batangas, and makes unconditional surrender of themselves and their entire command. This surrender, if complete, will entirely clear occidental Batangas of insurgents. There are 1,500 men in this town just returned from the Loboo expedition. Their presence here brought about this surrender. Fifty bolomen surrender, with their bolos and 1 Mauser, at Bauan, Batangas.
- 9.—Maj. Littleton W. T. Waller, 4 officers and 50 men, Marine Corps, 36 native bearers, 4 days' rations, started last week of December from Lanang, on the east coast of Samar, to cross the island to Basey, about 35 miles on map. Trail at one time existed, but found in places only. Second Lieut. De Witt C. Lyles, Twelfth Infantry, accompanied command. Incessant rains from the start, swollen streams, and other natural obstacles, made progress slow. When rations consumed, men exhausted rapidly, dropping on the way. Major Waller, separated

1902.

from Captain Porter, First Lieut. Alexander S. Williams, Marine Corps, and major part of the men, proceeding to Basey, Samar, where he arrived January 9 with 2 officers, 13 men, also Lieutenant Lyles. He returned to the mountains next day with relief, but returned to Basey about ten days later unsuccessful. Porter was to build rafts, but timber would not float. Second day after separating from Waller, Porter moved toward Lanang, Samar, arriving January 11 with 2 men, all exhausted physically and mentally. Lieutenant Williams and over 30 men left in mountains in similar condition, with native bearers. Relief expedition under Second Lieut. Kenneth P. Williams, First Infantry, delayed starting two days by storm raging and torrent river. Started 13th, reached marines 18th, saving Lieutenant Williams, Marine Corps, and all except 10 men not found, who are no doubt dead from starvation, viz, Privates Eugene Sanjule, Thomas Brett, George Nelson Foster, Joseph Baroni, Timothy Murray, Francis Frank Brown, Morgan Bassett, Lockette Archer Bailey, James Woods, and Patrick John Connell. Richard Kittle died in hospital, Tacloban, Leyte, January 23. Captain Porter, Lieutenant Williams, Marine Corps, and 18 men are in hospital, not very clear in mind regarding much of the time covered by period of suffering. All will probably recover. Major Waller at present disordered in his recollections. Suffering of this command of twenty days can not be described. Efforts of Lieutenant Williams, First Infantry, and his relief party, unequalled for courage and labor.

- Jan. 11.—Transport *Hancock* arrives at Manila.....Second Lieut. Cleaveland Hilson, Twenty-first Infantry, with detachment same regiment, captures cuartel containing 25,000 pounds palay 9 miles from Sariaya, Tayabas.....Capt. Miguel Cuevas Cruz, with 2 soldiers of First Company Battalion of Santa Cruz, with 2 rifles and 1 revolver, surrenders to Capt. John D. L. Hartman, First Cavalry, at Baanan, Batangas.....One lieutenant, with 1 sergeant, and 14 privates of Lucies band, surrenders near Manila.....First Lieut. Robert E. Wood, Third Cavalry, with detachment same regiment, captures 12 Remingtons, 6 Mausers, 6 Krag carbines and 1 Krag rifle, 1 small revolver with holster, 2,100 rounds Remington, 1,500 rounds Krag, 200 rounds Mauser ammunition, and 11 waist and 6 long cartridge belts, in the mountains of barrio Mangadi, jurisdiction of Batac, Ilocos Norte.
- 12.—First Sergeant Courtney, with 35 men Company M, Eighth Infantry, captures cuartel of Tomas Virey's force, at the foot of Mount Atimila, Nagcarlan Mountains, Laguna, destroys it with large quantity of palay and a store of fruits and insurgent clothing, and brought away a quantity of Krag ammunition. Enemy fled over mountain and is pursued to other side in direction of Calauang; captures 30 head of cattle.
- 13.—Transport *Hancock* arrives at Manila.....Colonel Marasigan formally surrenders at Taal, Batangas, to Capt. George H. Morgan, Third Cavalry, and Capt. John P. Ryan, Sixth Cavalry, with 3 companies Battalion De Gracia, 2 companies Battalion Payapa, 1 company Battalion Luyong, composed as follows: 1 colonel, 3 lieutenant-colonels, 1 major, 5 captains, 12 lieutenants, 245 enlisted men, 224 rifles, 10 revolvers, and about 5,000 rounds ammunition.....Capt. De Rosey C. Cabell, Sixth Cavalry, with 2 scout companies, encounters in the mountains north of Taysan and San Juan de Boeboc road, Batangas, several bands of insurgents, kills 4, captures 3, and captures 1 Mauser and 3 Remington rifles, also destroys several insurgent outpost buildings.....First Lieut. Lawrence

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P. Butler, Second Infantry, with detachment of Company L same regiment, has engagement four hours' march from Hingosa, Tayabas, kills 2 insurgents, probably more wounded and escaped into woods; captures 2 rifles. American casualties: Serjts. Joseph H. Adamson and Charles K. Scott and Private Hiram J. Borders are wounded.

- Jan. 14.—First Lieut. Frank L. Nickerson, Philippine Scouts, with First Company, Macabebes Scouts, encounters small band of insurgents near Santa Clara, Batangas, kills 4, and captures 1.....First Lieut. John F. James, Eighth Infantry, with 15 men Company F, same regiment, destroys 2 insurgent cuartels 5 miles out from Lilio, Laguna, also vino factories and the remnants of six barrios used by insurgents.....Capt. Traber Norman, Eighth Infantry, with detachment same regiment, destroys 5 cuartels near Bulacan River, Bulacan, also the insurgent barrios of Gagalool, Piet, Batnay, and Isabang.....Three hundred and sixty-five insurgents surrender and take oath of allegiance at Tagbilaran, Bohol.
- 15.—Detachment Fifteenth Cavalry, of 300 men, operating in 3 columns on Mount Maquiling, Laguna, and surrounding knolls, finds and destroys many shacks; 1 column of men under Capt. George C. Barnhardt, Fifteenth Cavalry, cooperating with a column of 100 men under Capt. George W. Kirkpatrick, Fifteenth Cavalry, about 1 mile apart, strikes insurgents in trenches on the Laguna de Bay side of Mount Maquiling and drives them out. Enemy falls back and are struck by column under Captain Kirkpatrick at their base and engages at close range. Enemy escapes south and west, going toward San Pablo; is pursued by Captain Kirkpatrick as far as trail can be traced. Third column, under Capt. Howard R. Hickok, Fifteenth Cavalry, finds and destroys some supplies. Enemy numbered about 60 guns. American casualties, 1 wounded and 1 killed; enemy's casualties unknown. All outposts, intrenchments, cuartels, and supplies destroyed.....First Lieut. Samuel W. Widdifield, Eighth Infantry, with 80 Macabebes of Tenth Company, strikes Briccio Laqui's band of insurgents on north slope of Mount Macolod, Batangas. Enemy soon fly, leaving the dead. A quantity of palay and number of uniforms and 150 rounds of ammunition are captured. An intrenched barrio on the summit of Mount Macolod is captured.
- 16.—Transport *Meade* sails from Manila.....Transport *Kirkpatrick* sails from San Francisco.....Capt. Peter W. Davison, Twenty-sixth Infantry, with Company L, same regiment, has engagement with insurgents in vicinity of Batangas, Batangas; kills 5 or 6 insurgents and burns 2 cuartels.
- 18.—Second Lieut. Charles C. Winnia, Fifth Cavalry, with 45 scouts of his company, is sent out from Bifang, Laguna; strikes Captain Felix's company of insurgents, Maquilins's battalion, of about 70 men and 50 guns, at Bayabasan, attacks them and drives them from the hill; kills 1 insurgent and captures 1; burns 8 cuartels and 4 tons of rice.
- 20.—Lieutenant-Colonel Briccio Laqui, with 1 major, 2 captains, 5 lieutenants, and 39 rifles, 950 rounds ammunition, with reloading outfit, surrenders to First Lieut. Samuel W. Widdifield, Eighth Infantry, at Cuenca, Batangas.....One insurgent captain, 1 lieutenant, 5 privates, with 7 Remingtons, 4 Mausers, 1 revolver, and 600 rounds ammunition, also some official papers, surrenders to Second Lieut. Frederick B. Hennessy, Artillery Corps, at Lipa, Batangas.
- 21.—Transport *Grant* arrives at San Francisco.....Transport *Buford* sails from New York.....Maj. Hugon Rosales, 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 6 men with

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- 4 rifles, 4 revolvers, and a number of bolos, surrenders to Maj. Robert J. C. Irvine, Ninth Infantry, at Tacloban, Leyte.....A patrol of Twelfth Infantry from gunboat *Charleston*, in small boat, with Colt automatic, strikes bunch of blockade-running bancos off mouth of Pagsanjan River, Laguna; destroys 1 banco, kills 4 blockaders.....First Lieut. George C. Lewis, Third Infantry, with landing party of 10 men, same regiment, from gunboat *Charleston*, strikes large cuartel near Los Baños de Galas, Laguna; destroys cuartel, 13 houses, and some Remington ammunition.
- Jan. 22.—First Lieut. William L. Karnes, Sixth Cavalry, with detachment same regiment, from Santa Cruz, Laguna, captures 1 insurgent captain and 1 soldier.
- 23.—Second Lieut. Emory S. West, Sixth Cavalry, with detachment same regiment, encounters several small parties insurgents on Volcano Island, Laguna de Taal. No casualties known.....First Lieut. Halsey E. Yates, Fifth Infantry, with detachment same regiment, strikes cuartel of Mamerto Guerra, of Luis Banaad's command, near San Pablo, Laguna; wounds 3 and captures 2 insurgents.....First Lieut. James Conway, Philippine Scouts, with Third Company Native Scouts, attacks force under Cabelles at Malaguid, Laguna; destroys cuartel; 4 Remingtons, 2 revolvers, 17 shotguns, and 2 war bolos are surrendered.....Second Lieut. Alistair M. Macnab, Philippine Scouts, with Third Company Native Scouts, attacks insurgent cuartel in mountain east of Sumacet, Laguna; captures 2 insurgents, 7 war bolos, and some ammunition.....Second Lieut. Alfred C. Arnold, Eighth Infantry, with detachment same regiment, strikes small insurgent supply party in vicinity Magdalena, Laguna; captures quantity of supplies, also 7 carabaoes and 2 ponies.....Four shotguns and 2 revolvers are surrendered at Magdalena, Laguna.....Capt. Traber Norman, Eighth Infantry, with 3 officers and 80 men, Companies F, I, and M, same regiment, crossed Mount Banajao and on Tayabas slope finds and destroys Caballes's central cuartel, with 10 tons rice, \$3,000 worth of clothing, 5 sewing machines, and a large quantity salt; captures 13 rifles, 1 pistol, and Caballes's papers, and destroys large quantity ammunition.....First Lieut. George O. Duncan, Fifteenth Cavalry, with Second Lieut. Jens E. Stedje and Troop K, same regiment, surprises insurgent outpost near summit of Maquiling, Laguna; kills 1 insurgent and wounds 1, and captures 1 Mauser and 1 Remington.
- 24.—Transport *Rosecrans* sails from Manila.
- 26.—Transport *Sheridan* arrives at Manila.....Comandante Gregorio Lot, with 1 captain, 1 first and 2 second lieutenants, 37 soldiers, 40 bolos, 10 rifles, and 3 revolvers, surrenders at Batangas, Batangas.....Second Lieut. Clenard McLaughlin, Twenty-first Infantry, with detachment 25 men, Company K, same regiment, scouting in vicinity of Mount Maquiling, Laguna, encounters an outpost of insurgents; kills 3, captures 1 Mauser, 1 Remington, 1 Mauser carbine, and 30 rounds ammunition.
- 28.—First Lieut. George M. Wray, Philippine Scouts, with Thirty-second Company Scouts, strikes Reo's force in mountains 9 miles from Lopez, Tayabas, majority of which are officers, with 3 rifles and 1 shotgun; wounds Lieutenant-Colonel Reo, Maj. Eusebio Florido, 2 captains, and kills 5 men; captures 1 Krag rifle and all correspondence and personal effects belonging to Colonel Reo.....First Lieut. Patrick W. Guiney, Sixth Cavalry, with detachment same regiment, captures 1 sergeant of Luis Banaad's command. Lately, with this man as guide, Maj. Matthias W. Day, Fifteenth Cavalry, strikes camp of Luis Banaad, in Lipa Moun-

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tains; has slight engagement with personal guard of Rosendo Banaad; kills 1 insurgent and wounds 2; later captures Lieut. Ygnacio Paitarin, of Rosendo Banaad's command, with papers mostly of local value.

Jan. 30.—Augustin Dimaculangan surrenders with 131 men, 38 rifles, 8 revolvers, 44 bolos, at San Jose, Batangas.....Col. Damaso Yabarra, Maj. Lucio Buenefe, Capt. Eutalio Buenefe, 5 lieutenants, 22 soldiers, with 21 rifles, 3 revolvers, and 9 bolos, surrender at Batangas, Batangas.....Second Lieut. Alister M. Macnab, Philippine Scouts, with detachment scouts, captures Captain Nicomedes, with 1 lieutenant, 2 sergeants, 1 private, with 3 rifles and 1 revolver, at barrio Santo Tomas of Luisiana, Laguna.....First Lieut. Joseph Herring, Twenty-fourth Infantry, with 23 Macabebes and 3 civilian scouts scouting in vicinity of Nasugbu, Batangas, and surrounding mountains, discovers an insurgent outpost of 1 man, January 27, who ran upon his approach and, being fired upon, was captured. The prisoner then led the detachment to a cuartel in the mountains which is used as a rendezvous for bands operating in this section. Lieutenant Herring fired at the outpost where there were 12 men with guns in the cuartel, who immediately ran away. The detachment left night of 27th, scouted country 28th and 29th, returning to cuartel early the morning of 30th, but was discovered and fired upon from different directions. Lieutenant Herring then charged the cuartel and captured 6 insurgents with bolos and kills 1; also captured 8 or 10 tons rice.

31.—First Lieut. Frank Nickerson, Philippine Scouts, with detachment of scouts, scouting 3 days in vicinity of Tanauan, Batangas, strikes pack train at Ildefonso, Alaminos, going to mountains, scatters it in all directions, and kills 5 men.....First Lieut. Malin Craig, Sixth Cavalry, with 25 men, Troop C, same regiment, scouting 3 days from San Nicolas southward to Bayabasan, Laguna, kills 1 lieutenant of Major Felizardo's force at Paliparan on 30th. Strikes outpost of Major Amorante's battalion at Bayabasan, about 8 miles southwest of Bifang, Laguna. Cannon prevented close attack and enemy ran away. Wounds 1 insurgent, captures 1 gun, burned 5 cuartels, and destroys 5 tons rice.

Feb. 1.—Transport *Thomas* sails from San Francisco.....Transport *Hancock* sails from Manila.....Lieutenant Fausto, of Col. Nicolas Villegas's force, comes into Calamba, Laguna, during the night, and surrenders to Col. Jacob Kline, Twenty-first Infantry, with 9 soldiers of his company, 1 revolver, 4 Remington and 2 Mauser rifles.....Second Lieut. Ralph H. Leavitt, with 5 men and a corporal of Company M, all of the Twenty-eighth Infantry, while scouting between Naic, Maragondon, and Indang, Cavite, about 4 miles out from Maragondon, and while entering barrio Malaina Viego, is fired upon by an outpost of ladrones, who immediately ran. Refusing to halt when ordered, the native is fired on and pursued by 2 men, who subsequently capture him. Barrio is entered and 1 native who tried to escape is captured. Fifty yards farther about 15 ladrones are found congregated in a house, nearly all of whom have arms, but run upon the approach of the troops, and refusing to halt are fired upon, 2 being killed and 3 wounded, 2 of the wounded getting away. Guns and 6 prisoners are taken to Naic. One of the natives killed said to be Captain Cirilio, a noted ladrone.

2.—Capt. Pablo Cortez, of Fifth Company, Calamba Column, with 13 men, 3 Mauser and 6 Remington rifles and 1 revolver, all serviceable, also 100 rounds of ammunition and 2 bolos, surrenders at Calamba, Laguna.....One lieutenant, 1 corporal, and 7 privates of Capt.

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Anacelto Recto's Company, near Tiaong, surrenders at Lipa, Batangas, this morning, with 6 serviceable guns and 3 bolos.....Detachment from Pila, Laguna, has skirmish near barrio Laugan, and Lieut. Ciriaco Ortega, commanding Second Company, Virey's Battalion, is killed; several others known to have been killed or wounded, but bodies not found. No casualties.

- Feb. 3.—Transport *Crook* arrives at Manila..... Insurgent Capt. Benito Pauganiban, with 3 Filipino deserters from Gonzales's command, surrenders at Tanauan, Batangas.....Lieut. Fortunato Abinuja, of Atienza's command, surrenders at San Pablo, Laguna, with 2 soldiers, also 1 Remington and 1 Mauser, serviceable.
- 4.—Lieutenant Gonzaga, with 21 soldiers and 12 rifles, surrenders at Calamba, Laguna, to Twenty-first Infantry. A United States magazine rifle, No. 88757, is surrendered among the 12.....Detachment sent out under Second Lieut. Emory S. West, Sixth Cavalry, from Taal, Batangas, is attacked by insurgents with bolos in vicinity of Belete, near Spanish fort; detachment succeeds in killing 4 insurgents and wounding 1, also captures 9 prisoners.
- 5.—Maj. Pablo Hedreyda, with 4 soldiers, 3 rifles, and 1 revolver, surrenders to Twenty-first Infantry at Calamba, Laguna.....First Lieut. Warren Dean, Fifteenth Cavalry, with scouting party, returns from Lipa Mountains, Batangas; party strikes outpost of 6 bolomen, killing 2 and capturing 4; also captures some papers and 1 serviceable revolver and destroys about 1 ton of rice and some insurgent uniforms.
- 6.—Lieut. Col. Domingo Ramos, with 7 lieutenants of his staff and 2 assistants, surrenders at San Pablo, Laguna, unconditionally. States that he and his troops all collected to come in, but that they mutinied and refused to do so.....Lieut. Felipe Biglet, of Emeterio Bris's command, surrenders, with 1 revolver.....Comandante Antonio Mandigma surrenders this p. m. at Lipa, Batangas, with 5 captains, 4 first and 3 second lieutenants, 67 enlisted men, 34 guns, 3 revolvers, also a lot of ammunition and bolos.....Commanding officer, Pila, Laguna, reports the capture of 3 soldiers of Virey's force, with 1 revolver.....Commanding officer, Lipa, Batangas, reports that Lieut. Col. Manuel Reyes surrenders, with 1 captain, 1 first lieutenant, and 18 enlisted men, 14 good rifles, 2 good shotguns, and 1 pistol.....Commanding officer, Santa Cruz, Laguna, reports that Inspector Sorenson of the constabulary and detachment of Company G, Eighth Infantry, capture Maj. Sanito Calbelo, Lieut. Mariano Malapot, Sixto Evangelista, and Luis Sanchez, 7 men, 1 serviceable Remington carbine, 1 unserviceable shotgun, 3 revolvers, also a lot of papers.....Detachment of Companies F and M, under First Lieut. John F. James and First Lieut. William E. Hunt, of the Eighth Infantry, strikes force of Col. Tomas Virey on east side of Mount Nagcarlan, Laguna, at 8.30 this a. m., killing 7 and mortally wounding 3 insurgents; also captures 6 rifles and destroys cuartels, 150 uniforms, and 16,000 rounds of ammunition. Of the 10 insurgents killed and mortally wounded, 5 are officers, viz: Capt. Blas Rufino, Capt. Isabello Bautista, adjutant of Caballes; Lieut. Justo Solomayor, Virey's adjutant; Lieut. Marcus Umali, and Lieutenant Iya. Rufino, before dying, stated that he joined Virey from Caballes to a place in mountains near Dolores, where he saw the two prisoners of Company I, Eighth Infantry; also that Virey has 150 or 200 rifles. Insurgent soldiers captured say that Virey is holding his forces together by the harshest measures.

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Have learned from different sources that Virey is wounded, but can not confirm it.

- Feb. 7.—Scouting of Alabat, Tayabas, by Capt. George E. Houle, Twenty-sixth Infantry, results in the surrender of 17 tulisanes and 4 rifles.....First Lieut. Rowland Whitely and Second Lieut. Floyd L. Frisbie, both of the Philippine Scouts, together with Company C, Twenty-first Infantry, strike band of insurgents near sitio of Sampoloc, about 11 miles southwest of Tiaong, Tayabas, killing 3 of the enemy and wounding 1; capture 2 Remington rifles; also capture Capt. Pedro Hernandez, with his revolver. No casualties on our side.
- 8.—Transport *Grant* sails for Manila.....First Lieut. Allen Walker, Philippine Scouts, while on a scout in the vicinity of Loguilocon, Samar, and about 12 miles down the river from that town, meets and has fight with a band of ladrones, killing the leader and 8 of his men; captures 1 Krag rifle, No. 20429, model 1898; 40 rounds of ammunition, 1 army revolver, caliber .45; 14 rounds of ammunition, 2 spears, and 11 bolos; supply of palay found; also finds cuartel recently occupied by Rafael and captures papers on which the ink was hardly dry. The leader proved to be a white renegade, on whose person was found a commission as second lieutenant from Lucban. The name on the commission is John Winfrey.
- 9.—Two insurgent soldiers with 3 rifles surrender to Col. Jacob Kline, Twenty-first Infantry, at Calamba, Laguna, this morning.....Capt. Norberto de Torres, with 1 first lieutenant, 1 second lieutenant, and 18 enlisted men, 11 rifles, 1 shotgun, 1 pistol, and a lot of ammunition, surrenders at Lipa, Batangas, this p. m.
- 10.—Commanding officer, San Pablo, Laguna, reports that 2 soldiers of command of Martin Diquito surrender, with 2 Remington rifles, and 1 soldier of Blas Ygmen, with 1 shotgun Second Lieut. Frank E. Barendt, Philippine Scouts, reports from cuartel Santo Domingo, Laguna, that he has a skirmish with the enemy, exchanging shots and capturing 6 pack ponies; no casualties on either side.
- 11.—First Lieut. George M. Wray, Philippine Scouts, telegraphs that 26 insurgents, late of Reo's command, in province of Camarines Sur, surrender and take oath of allegiance to the United States.....First Lieut. Frank Nickerson, Philippine Scouts, while scouting headwaters Tanauan River, saw insurgents and exchanged a few shots without results; following them into Lipa Mountains, Batangas, catches them on a steep mountain grade, where insurgents made something of a stand, killing 5 insurgents. One Macabebe wounded, right thigh, moderate. Insurgents dressed exactly like native scouts. Dying insurgent said there were 70 of them, but only 25 rifles.....Commanding officer, San Pablo, Laguna, reports surrender of Pantaleon Berlarmino, lieutenant and quartermaster of Rosendo Banaad, with 1 revolver; Juan Bulano, captain of Colonel Sebastian, at present no command, and 1 soldier of Eluterio Bunal, with 1 Mauser.
- 13.—Capt. Potenciano Escano, belonging to the command of Major Buquid and of Gonzales, surrenders at Lipa, Batangas, with 1 first lieutenant and 13 soldiers and 13 guns; also Second Lieut. Felipe Landiche, with 13 soldiers, 9 guns, and 3 bolos.....Command of Col. Mariano Lot, Maj. Gregorio Layiste, Capt. Simeon Esteagui, First Lieut. Adriano Laviste, Second Lieut. Adriano Laviste, Second Lieut. Maximo Mendosa, 2 corporals, 17 privates, with 15 serviceable and 2 unserviceable rifles, and 2 revolvers, 1 of which is serviceable, surrenders at Lipa, Batangas.

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- Feb. 14.—Sergt. James S. Penny and 4 men of Company G, Second Infantry, has skirmish with insurgents at San Narciso, Tayabas, driving insurgents to the hills. Sergeant Penny is wounded in shoulder, not serious. Insurgent loss unknown.....Second Lieut. William G. Murchison, with 20 men of Company F, Eighth Infantry, surprises insurgent camp in San Roque de Majayjay, Laguna. Kills 4 insurgents and captures 4 rifles and 131 rounds ammunition.
- 15.—One insurgent lieutenant is captured south of Candelaria, Tayabas, and gives information concerning Colonel Caballes and his forces in the vicinity of Mount Banajao, Tayabas. On the 15th a force of 25 men, accompanied by the prisoner, scouted in the vicinity. A large insurgent out-post of about 25 men is struck. One insurgent is killed and 1 captured. The prisoner captured confirmed the report of insurgent lieutenant captured on the 15th, which is as follows: Caballes is in command, with Lieutenant-Colonels Mesencay and Mayo. They have 300 rifles and between 300 and 400 bolomen; in all, between 600 and 700, with large amount of supplies. They also report Lieutenant-Colonel Maratija, who is General Malvar's secretary, as there, but have failed as yet to give any information concerning General Malvar.....Reports during week ending 15th: Two captains, 5 lieutenants, and 58 enlisted men, with 64 guns, 5 revolvers, and about 1,000 rounds ammunition, and a quantity of bolos are surrendered at Lipa, Batangas.
- 16.—Comandante Rivera and 6 men, with 5 rifles, 1 revolver, surrender at Santa Cruz, Laguna.....Second Lieut. Obatdo Poso, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 9 privates, of command of Gregorio Laviste, with 11 rifles and 1 pistol, surrender at Lipa, Batangas.....First Lieut. Junius J. Boyle, Philippine Scouts, with detachment of scouts, strikes small band of insurgents near summit of Mount Gonzales, Batangas; captures 4 bolos, 1 revolver, with 10 rounds ammunition, 4 ponies and equipment, and 2 head of cattle; kills 1 insurgent and captures 3 ponies.....Transport *Warren* sails from San Francisco.....Transport *Sheridan* sails from Manila.....Two lieutenants, 12 enlisted men, and 3 shotguns surrender on the 15th and 16th at San Pablo, Laguna.....Transport *Kilpatrick* arrives at Manila.....Second Lieut. Milton G. Holliday, Fifteenth Cavalry, with detachment same regiment, strikes camp of Capt. Pedro Alimagno, of Comandante Lorenzo Mendez's command, near Dolores, in Tayabas; captures 3 insurgents, with 1 shotgun, 2 Remington rifles, and 1 Remington carbine; 1 insurgent is wounded. Sistrando Belen, military administrator of Domingo Ramos, with all his papers, surrenders.
- 17.—Capt. Simon Elihano and 3 soldiers, with 1 Remington carbine, surrender at Calamba, Laguna.
- 18.—Transport *Meade* arrives at San Francisco.....Transport *Egbert* sails from Manila.....The Bifang Battalion, which consists of Maj. Jacinto Ameranto, 2 captains, 5 lieutenants, and 98 enlisted men, with 5 revolvers, 66 rifles, and 1,220 rounds ammunition, surrenders at Bifang, Laguna.....Column from Laguan, Samar, under command of First Lieut. Alphonse Strebler, Philippine Scouts, in connection with others, reached Luchan's headquarters and captures him, his secretary, 2 rifles, and all his correspondence, and diary from August 1 to date. Also roster of all his officers and correspondence of Colonel Gibara, chief of staff.
- 19.—Capt. Tomas Alviar and Second Lieut. Juilano Marinca, with 14 soldiers, and 3 revolvers, all of Second Company Calamba Column, surrender at

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Calamba, Laguna. Lieut. Col. Nicolas Villegas, the most prominent insurgent leader in this vicinity, is killed in personal encounter with Capt. Tomas Alviar while trying to prevent the above surrender..... Cortez surrenders at Santa Cruz, Laguna.

- Feb. 20.—Jose and Juan Pilar, insurgent captains, with 2 revolvers and ammunition, surrender to expedition north line Lake Taal, Batangas.....Lieut. Col. Prospero Dimayuga, 1 major, 1 captain, and 1 lieutenant surrender at Tanauan, Batangas, with 1 revolver and ammunition, also seal; claimed to be adjutant-general and assistants and to control 4 guns.
- 22.—Second Lieut. Frank Pratt, First Infantry, captures at Cagbayan, Samar, William Dunston, said to be deserter Company C, Eighth Infantry, with a quantity of arms, ammunition, and all Abuque's tools for making ammunition; destroys cuartel and arsenal, kills 11 soldiers, and captures all his correspondence.
- 24.—Captain Vicente, insurgent captain, and Guadencia Macaisa surrender at Tanauan, Batangas.....Sergt. John J. Lynch, Company G, Twenty-eighth Infantry, is sent from Indang, Cavite, with 25 men same regiment, in charge of Balaben, to Looc, Batangas, where they have an engagement with a body of Julian Ramos's men and kill 2.
- 25.—Transport *Rosecrans* arrives at San Francisco.....Capt. Petronilo Elan-gos, First Lieuts. Agapito Mangeron and Quintin Viga, Second Lieut. Felix Pagtachan, and 31 soldiers Fourth Company, Calamba Column, with 21 rifles, 2 revolvers, and ammunition, surrender at Calamba, Laguna.
- 26.—Lieut. Col. Elezo Claudio, with 1 lieutenant and 1 soldier, are captured by the presidente and detachment of Company G, Twenty-first Infantry, in the barrio of Calumpit, Bulacan.....Two hundred bolomen in uniform attack scouting party of friendly natives and detachment Twenty-first Infantry from Paranas, Samar. Casualties: Eighty bolomen killed. No American casualties.
- 28.—Company G, Twenty-first Infantry, captures, in vicinity of Loboo, Batangas, 1 sergeant, with 2 guns.....Six rifles, 2 pistols, and numerous bolos are surrendered at Loboo, Batangas.....Pedro Flores, with 7 rifles, surrenders at Loboo, Batangas.....First Lieut. Frank W. Rowell, First Lieut. Rowland Whitely, Second Lieut. Floyd L. Frisbie, all of Philippine Scouts, with 50 Ilocanos, Eighteenth Company, and 1 civilian scout, strikes body of insurgents under command of Major Martinez, 2 captains, 4 lieutenants, and 50 men, at Sitio Bunjo, of barrio Cabar, pueblo of Tiaong, Tayabas. Insurgents were entirely dispersed by Lieutenant Whitely's command. Two insurgents are killed, 1 lieutenant wounded, 1 soldier, 6 rifles, 1 Remington, 1 shotgun, 2 revolvers, 10 war bolos, some papers, seals, 475 rounds ammunition, 12 ponies, and 1 carabao, are captured; 1 Ilocano wounded.....First Lieut. Patrick W. Guiney, Sixth Cavalry, with detachment same regiment, strikes cuartel of Blas Ygamen, near San Pablo, Laguna, and has engagement with about 60 insurgents. Enemy's casualties: five killed. American casualties: Lieutenant Guiney, wounded.....Ampil, presidente of Cainta, Rizal, and 2 policemen, with 11 guns and 8 revolvers, are captured.
- Mar. 1.—Transport *Meade* sails from San Francisco.....One insurgent captain, 3 lieutenants, 2 sergeants, 1 corporal, and 8 privates surrender at San Juan de Boboc, Batangas, with 6 rifles, 4 revolvers, 6 bolos, and 221 cartridges.....First Lieut. Roger S. Fitch, First Cavalry, with detachment 12 men same regiment, and native scouts, while scouting in

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vicinity of Mount Banoi, Batangas, captures 1 corporal and 3 privates; also 4 rifles, and captures relatives of Major Montalbos.Transport *Kilpatrick* sails from Manila.Corpl. Campbell Reed, Troop I, Fifth Cavalry, with 6 men same troop, has engagement near Bosoboso, Rizal, with insurgents. No casualties.

- Mar. 2.—Bargos surrenders, with 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, and 37 soldiers, and 7 Mausers, 14 Remingtons, 1 pistol, and some ammunition at Lipa, Batangas.Two insurgents, with 1 Mauser and 80 rounds ammunition, are captured by volunteers under First Lieut. Alexander E. Williams, Second Infantry. They also have a skirmish with a small force of enemy in vicinity of Lipa, Batangas. Destroy cuartel; 1 Mauser, 7 shotguns, 7 bolos, and 20 soldiers surrender.
- 3.—Transport *Thomas* arrives at Manila.Victorian Viltanen, military administrator of Domingo Ramos, surrenders at Alaminos, Laguna.One insurgent cabeza, 9 soldiers, 6 Remingtons, 1 Mauser, 3 shotguns, 2 revolvers, and 270 rounds of ammunition, and 3 Colts revolvers surrender at Tiaong, Tayabas.
- 4.—Lieut. Doroteo Buenonida, of Virey's command, with 2 sergeants, 1 corporal, and 6 privates, with 1 shotgun, 1 revolver, 56 rounds ammunition, and 8 bolos surrenders at Nagcarlan, Laguna.
- 4.—Capt. Guillermo Catapang, with 1 corporal and 4 privates, with 2 Remingtons and 3 shotguns, surrenders at San Pablo, Laguna.
- 6.—Transport *Crook* sails from Manila.
- 8.—Captures and surrenders in Isla Verde: Two complete companies bolomen, with officers and men numbering 80, with bolos and rifles, Capt. Grispon Dovolos and Flavio Cuesto, two noted ladrones. All these officers had commissions signed by Briccio Cosala, regular forces, Maj. Potenciano Montalbo and Capts. Endigio Soriano, Manuel Guico, and Martes Illustre, and 6 lieutenants. These officers surrender, with 20 soldiers, 31 rifles, 7 revolvers, and over 1,000 rounds ammunition.Two officers and 14 soldiers of Tomas Ruides's, with 2 revolvers and 152 cartridges, surrender at San Juan de Bocboc, Batangas.One captain and 7 men surrender to General Cailles at foot of Mount Bonapoa, Laguna, with 1 revolver, 1 dagger, 5 rifles, 176 cartridges, and some supplies.Seven insurgents surrender at Nagcarlan, Laguna, with their arms.First Lieut. Charles P. Faulkner, Eighth Infantry, captures family of Capt. Ramos Espina, of Virey's Third Company, with some papers, in the vicinity of Santa Cruz, Laguna.Eleven soldiers, with 3 Remingtons, 1 Winchester, 2 shotguns, 74 rounds ammunition, and 5 bolos, surrender at Tiaong, Tayabas.Two soldiers of Virey's command, with small amount of ammunition, surrender at Nagcarlan, Laguna.Sergeant O'Malley, with detachment Company I, Eighth Infantry, finds and destroys cuartel between Majayjay, Laguna, and Lucban, Tayabas, 1,700 pounds rice, some clothing, and reloading outfit, shells, powder, ammunition, and parts of rifles destroyed on the 6th.Twenty-one insurgents, with 2 revolvers and 9 rifles, surrender to General Cailles in vicinity of San Pablo, Laguna.Two officers, 3 soldiers, with 1 revolver and 4 rifles, surrender to General Cailles at Siniapan, Laguna.Capt. George W. Kirkpatrick, Fifteenth Cavalry, with detachment same regiment, strikes cuartel Julian Aviando, 5½ miles southwest of Alaminos, Laguna.
- 9.—Two captains, 6 soldiers, 9 rifles, 2 shotguns, and 231 rounds ammunition surrender at Tiaong, Tayabas. The captains pertain to command of Lieu-

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- tenant-Colonel Mayo.....Four soldiers, with 1 shotgun and 4 bolos, surrender at San Pablo, Laguna.
- Mar. 10.—Transport *Grant* arrives at Manila.....Capt. De Rosey C. Cabell, Sixth Cavalry, with detachment same regiment, strikes cuartel of Nicolas Donz, of Sebastian's command, in vicinity of San Pablo, Laguna. Kills 1 insurgent and captures 1 insurgent and 1 gun.
- 11.—Eleven insurgents, with 2 revolvers, surrender to General Cailles, at Santa Cruz, Laguna.....Three men of Virey's command, with 1 revolver and 1 shotgun, surrender at Nagcarlan, Laguna.....Two officers and 14 soldiers, with 3 rifles, 1 revolver, 2 daggers, and 4 bolos, surrender to General Cailles in vicinity of Santa Cruz, Laguna.
- 12.—Transport *Sheridan* arrives at San Francisco.
- 13.—Civilian scout, with 20 men Seventh Company, native scouts, scouting in vicinity Mount Matado, Batangas, captures Geronimo Harnilla, Capt. Rosino Macorega, 1 lieutenant, 1 surgeon, 1 corporal, 4 privates, with 2 rifles and 150 rounds ammunition, 1 revolver, and 15 bolos.....Commandante Enterio Bris, 1 lieutenant, and 10 soldiers, with 2 Kraggs, 1 Mauser, 4 Remington, and 1 Colt's revolver, surrender to Capt. George W. Kirkpatrick, Fifteenth Cavalry, at Alaminos, Laguna.....Second Lieut. Alistar M. Macnab, Philippine Scouts, with 8 Macabebe scouts, ambush Cartes Caballes and 5 soldiers in barrios San Roque, Tayabas. Kills 3 and wounds 3.....Three soldiers of Virey's battalion, with 1 Mauser rifle, a shotgun, some powder, lead, and 150 rounds ammunition, surrender at Nagcarlan, Laguna.....Two officers surrender at Majan, Laguna.....First Lieut. Junius J. Boyle, Philippine Scouts, with detachment of scouts scouting in vicinity of Mount Gonzales, Batangas, surprises small party insurgents. Kills 3, captures 1, with 4 bolos, 1 shotgun, 1 Mauser rifle, and 2 ponies.
- 14.—Capt. Claudio Juelbuena, with 4 men, with 2 rifles, 1 revolver, 2 bolos, 1 cartridge belt, and 40 rounds ammunition, surrenders at Pagbilao, Tayabas.
- 15.—Transport *Hancock* sails from San Francisco.....Maj. Cayetano Cantos, Maj. Juan Cantos, Capt. Pedro Manalo, alias Bancos, Lieut. Victor Delagardia, administrator of Casala, Lieut. Filimon Casanas, Lieut. Doroten Castillo, Lieut. Modesto Gutierrez, Lieut. Rafael Pabul, Lieut. Bernadino Salva, Lieut. Placido Frani, and 32 soldiers, surrender at Batangas, Batangas.....One major and 2 company officers of Malvar's force, with 2 rifles and 1 revolver, surrender to General Cailles, at Rizal, Rizal.....Six soldiers of Major Martinez's command, of Tiaong, Tayabas, with 5 rifles, 1 shotgun, and 265 rounds ammunition, surrender at San Juan de Bocboc, Batangas.....First Lieut. Chase Doster, Twenty-first Infantry, with detachment same regiment, strikes small party of insurgents in southern end of Lipa Mountains, Batangas, kills Lieut. Lucio Bautista and 4 soldiers of his command, wounds 1, captures 4 shotguns and 1 revolver.....Detachment under Scout Morris, scouting through barrios of Pitogo, Tayabas, has two engagements with band of insurgents; kills 10, wounds several, and captures 3 prisoners.....First Lieut. William D. Forsyth, Fifteenth Cavalry, with detachment of 17 men Troop A, same regiment, with packer and pack mules, while exploring and working trails from Paran-paran, Cotabato, toward Lake Lanao, Mindanao, and aided by friendly Moros, are surrounded and attacked by 200 Moros in dense jungle about 25 miles north and slightly east of Paran-paran. American casualties: Private Charles Keller, Troop A, killed. Enemy's

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- casualties: Eight killed. Loss to American forces, 18 horses, with equipment, and 2 pack mules.
- Mar. 16.—First Lieut. Samuel R. Gleaves, First Cavalry, with 40 men, Troop B, same regiment, and Second Lieut. Constant Cordier, Fifth Infantry, with Company I, same regiment, encounter Sixth Company of Santo Tomas column, about 20 men, at Saimsang Batoon, Mount Maquiling, Laguna, and capture 1 lieutenant, 1 corporal, with 4 rifles, 2 revolvers, 125 rounds ammunition, kill 4 and wound 2 insurgents. No American casualties.....Capt. George W. Kirkpatrick, Fifteenth Cavalry, with detachment same regiment, destroys main cuartel of Julian Avenido in vicinity of Alaminos, Laguna. Captures 1 prisoner and 1 Remington.
- 18.—Capt. Talesfero Callesado, of Magdalena, Laguna, and 3 soldiers, with 2 rifles, surrender to Inspector Sorensen, constabulary at Santa Cruz.Col. Theodore J. Wint, Sixth Cavalry, with detachment same regiment, finds and destroys camp of insurgents near Santa Cruz, Laguna. Captures and destroys camp property.....Capt. Hugo Sayat, of Sixth Company, Tiaong column, with 6 soldiers, 5 rifles, 5 shotguns, 2 bolos, and 67 cartridges, surrender at San Juan de Bocboc, Batangas.
- 19.—Transport *Meade* sails from San Francisco.....First Lieut. Samuel R. Gleaves, First Cavalry, with detachment same regiment, and Second Lieut. Constant Cordier, Fifth Infantry, has engagement on top of Mount Maquiling, Laguna, with Fourth Company, Santo Tomas's column of about 20 men and guns. Destroys 3 cuartels. No American casualties. Enemy's casualties, 4 killed and 1 wounded.
- 20.—Capt. Emilano Ordenz, 4 officers and 13 men, with 8 rifles, 2 revolvers, 2 bolos, and 50 rounds ammunition, surrender to Capt. Traber Norman, Eighth Infantry, at Majayjay, Laguna.
- 21.—Transport *Buford* arrives at Manila.....Capt. Sixto Solomayer, 2 lieutenants, 13 soldiers, with 7 Remington rifles, 1 revolver, 2 bolos, 1 dagger, and quantity of ammunition, surrender to General Cailles, at Santa Cruz, Laguna.....Capt. Frank Tompkins, Eleventh Cavalry, with detachment same regiment, strikes small outpost of San Pablo column to west of Tiaong, San Pablo road, Tayabas, mortally wounds 4 bolomen and destroys large cuartel.....One lieutenant and 20 soldiers of Tomas Ruedes, with 9 rifles, 1 revolver, 10 war bolos, and 60 cartridges, surrender at San Juan de Bocboc, Batangas.
- 22.—Lieut. Marcelino Fandilan and 2 privates, of Maximinio Atienza, with 2 rifles and 1 bolo, surrender at San Pablo, Laguna.
- 23.—Comandante Alecis, and 15 men of Caballes's command, with 8 Remingtons, 1 Mauser, 2 revolvers, 2 bolos, and 76 rounds ammunition, surrender at Majayjay, Laguna.....Capt. Vicente Guarano, 1 lieutenant and 5 soldiers, with 5 guns and 2 revolvers, surrender Lilio, LagunaComandante Bernardo Macalinao, with 18 men of Caballes's command, surrenders at Magdalena, Laguna.....Two captains, 1 lieutenant, and 26 soldiers, with 10 Remingtons, 3 Mausers, 2 Amberg, 6 revolvers, 71 war bolos, and 473 rounds ammunition, surrender at Batangas, Batangas.....Capt. Frank E. Bamford, Twenty-eighth Infantry, with detachment same regiment, captures near Manunung, Tayabas, Gen. Mariano Noriel, Comandante Villegas, and Captain Berez, Lieutenant Magano, 5 soldiers, with personal effects, and papers of Malvar.
- 24.—One private of Julian Avenido, with 1 rifle, surrenders at Alaminos, Laguna.

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- Mar. 25.—Sergt. Owen Learson and Blacksmith William Buwalda, Troop I, First Cavalry, make a very important capture in the person of Maj. Domingo Maratija and Lieutenant Braga, in vicinity of Rosario, Batangas.
- 27.—Transport *Egbert* arrives at San Francisco.....Insurgent presidente of Alaminos, Laguna, with bodyguard of 11 men, surrenders at Alaminos, Laguna.....General Caballes, with 2 lieutenants and 3 soldiers of his force, with 1 revolver, 2 rifles, 1 Mauser and 1 Remington, surrenders at Santa Cruz, Laguna.....Maj. Blas Ygamen, with 1 captain, 6 lieutenants, and 27 men, with 19 rifles and 2 shotguns, surrenders at Santa Cruz, Laguna.
- 29.—First Lieut. Frank Nickerson, Philippine Scouts, with First Company Native Scouts, from Tanauan, Batangas, has engagement with insurgents near Santa Clara. Kills 2, wounds and captures Second Lieut. Edmedio Galtalo, of Col. Domingo Ramos's command, Alaminos, Laguna; also finds enough rice to load 150 ponies. No American casualties.....Three detachments of 8 men each, of Eleventh Company Macabebe Scouts, captures Capt. Ramon's band of ladrones in mountains of Calaca, Batangas. Kills 1, captures 4, and 3 shotguns, 1 war bolo, 72 Remington ball cartridges, 4 khaki uniforms, 7 insurgent uniforms, and 3 caches of palay, about 40 cavans in each. No American casualties.
- 31.—Transport *Kilpatrick* arrives at San Francisco.....Transport *Grant* sails from Manila.
- Apr. 1.—Transport *Sheridan* sails from San Francisco.
- 2.—Transport *Crook* arrives at San Francisco.
- 3.—Transport *Warren* arrives at Manila.....Maj. Saturnino Caspino, Capt. and Surg. Florentino Aquino, and 2 soldiers, with 1 Remington rifle, 1 shotgun, 2 revolvers, 1 bolo, and 50 rounds ammunition, surrender at Tiaong, Tayabas.....First Lieut. George B. Pillsbury, Engineer Corps, with small detachment, has engagement with insurgents in vicinity of San Pablo, Laguna. Kills 1 captain, supposed to be Agapito Diriquito, of Bunal's command.....Two soldiers of Capt. Marcos Magundayao, of Martinez column, surrender, with 1 Mauser, 1 Remington, and 59 rounds ammunition, at San Juan de Bocboc, Batangas.
- 4.—Capt. Faustino Villanueva and 2 soldiers, with 1 revolver and 2 bolos, surrender at Nagcarlan, Laguna.....First Lieut. Mack Richardson, Twenty-sixth Infantry, strikes Destajos's company of insurgents at Mauban, Tayabas. Captures 1 Remington and small amount of ammunition; burns 1 house belonging to a sergeant in Destajos's company, used as outpost. No casualties.....One lieutenant and 3 soldiers of the Taysan column surrender, with 4 Remington rifles, 1 revolver, and 100 cartridges, at San Juan de Bocboc, Batangas.
- 5.—Second Lieut. Francis M. Boon, Twenty-sixth Infantry, with detachment of scouts, has engagement with insurgents near Poulouse, Batangas. One Philippine scout is wounded and 1 insurgent killed.....Capt. Nicolas Encallabo, with 8 rifles, surrenders at Mauban, Tayabas.....Lieuts. Severo Reyes, Mariano Leydo, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, with 3 rifles, 1 revolver, and 118 rounds ammunition, surrender to First Lieut. Samuel A. Price, Twenty-eighth Infantry, at Ibaan, Batangas.....Second Lieut. Constant Cordier, Fifth Infantry, with detachment same regiment, captures Col. Delmacio Hernandez and his adjutant, Lieut. Juan Neer, and his 2 boys, near the sitio of Lapad, about the top of Mount Maquiling, Laguna.....Sixteen officers and 24 soldiers of Santo Tomas column surrender at Batangas, Batangas.

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- Apr. 6.—Second Lieut. Constant Cordier, Fifth Infantry, with detachment same regiment, has engagement with party of Santo Tomas troops on top of Mount Maquiling, Laguna. Kills 3 bolomen and wounds several.
- 7.—Maj. Albero Sumasera and Lorenzo Mendoza, with 2 soldiers and 2 Remington rifles, surrender at Lilio, Laguna.....Comandante Juan Saret and 3 soldiers, his brother, of General Rios's command, with 1 Remington rifle, 2 revolvers, 1 bolo, 10 rounds ammunition, surrender at Santa Cruz, Laguna.
- 8.—Second Lieut. Constant Cordier, Fifth Infantry, with detachment same regiment, attacks camp of Capt. Maximo Reno Laurel, Santo Tomas column, on Mount Maquiling, Laguna. Kills Laurel, 1 lieutenant, and 4 soldiers; wounds 3 insurgents. Captures 1 revolver and 35 rounds ammunition.
- 9.—Comandante Emeterio Bunal, Capt. Fausto Villanueva, Martin Alvero, Pedro Alimango, Mamerto Guerra, Florencio Quijano, Lieuts. Cayetano Aliena, Bernardo Alimago, Francisco Colayo, and 24 soldiers, with 16 rifles and 6 revolvers, surrender at San Pablo, Laguna.....Commanding officer, Taysan, Batangas, Capt. Frank Tompkins, Eleventh Cavalry, reports capture of Comandante Fernando Garcia, Capt. Ilabio Africa, and Sargeno Mateo, Second Company, Taysan.....Scout McCoy, in charge of a party of scouts, surprised 5 uniformed insurgents in vicinity of Santo Tomas, Batangas, April 8 and 9; fires upon a party of about 20 uniformed insurgents. Kills 1.
- 12, 13.—Transport *Hancock* arrives at Manila.....Colonel Caneo, with Lieut. Col. Jacinto Malixi, Lieut. Col. Marcial Alimario, Comandante Nicolas Dones, 6 staff officers, 2 captains, 3 first lieutenants, 2 second lieutenants, and 139 soldiers, with 4 revolvers, 23 Remingtons, 2 shotguns, 8 Mausers, 3 Amberges, and 3 Krags, surrender at San Pablo, Laguna.....Guillermo Valasvo, captain of Comandante Emeterio Bunal, with 11 soldiers, 9 Remingtons, 1 shotgun, also 1 soldier of Rosendo Banaad, with 1 Remington, 500 rounds ammunition, surrender at San Pablo, Laguna. In addition, about 400 members of the column came in with Caneo.....Comandante Philipil, Capt. Cipriano Fazroza, Juenez, instructor, Capt. Pedro Hernandez, First Lieut. Marciano Manto, Second Lieut. Cristen de Nosta, Partolene Malayba, Candido Gevarra, and 23 soldiers, all of Santo Tomas column, with 8 Remingtons, 5 Amberges, 1 revolver, and 285 rounds ammunition, surrender at Santo Tomas, Batangas.....Lieut. Weinceslao Basor, of Captain Baristos's band, with 1 gun, surrenders at Ibaan, Batangas, on April 12.
- 16.—Malvar surrenders to Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, U. S. Army, at Lipa, Batangas.....Transport *Sheridan* sails from San Francisco.....Rusio and 43 men, with 9 guns, surrenders on island of Negros.
- 17.—Rufio surrendered yesterday to First Lieut. Alfred Roeder, Philippine Scouts, at Isio, Negros, with 73 insurgents, 5 rifles, 4 shotguns; more rifles with his band to come later. About one week ago 23 insurgents surrendered, and on 15th 62 more, with 1 Mauser, 1 revolver, surrendered. Papa Isio will probably surrender within a few days. He claims there are about 600 bolomen in his band. Many scattering insurgents have previously surrendered at Isabela and Castellana, Negros.....Five soldiers of Julian Avenido, with 2 Remingtons and shotgun, also Capt. Marcelino Gapas, with 2 soldiers and 1 Colt's carbine, and Lieut. Limeon de la Concepcion, with 1 revolver, of Sebastian Canor, surren-

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der at Alaminos, Laguna.....Capt. Ferdinand W. Kobbé, Twenty-eighth Infantry, reports Private Frank Lease, Company A, same regiment, while scouting in vicinity of Nasugbu, Batangas, finds 2 armed ladrones, who open fire on him. He kills 1 ladrone, the other escapes with both rifles. Private Lease captures 2 Remingtons and 14 rounds ammunition.....Three insurrecto soldiers of Petacio Martinez's command, with 2 Remington rifles, 1 bolo, and 40 cartridges, surrender at Lipa, Batangas.....One Mauser rifle and 60 rounds ammunition, pertaining to Colonel Mansagacayas's command, are surrendered at Tiaong, Tayabas.

Apr. 18.—Capt. Francisco Alcala, Dolores column, surrendered, with his 2 brothers, at Tiaong, Tayabas.

20.—Comandante Luciano Atienza, Capt. Maximiano Atienza, Lieut. Prudencio Clavia, and 7 soldiers, with 1 revolver, 1 Krag, 1 Mauser, and 2 Remingtons, surrender at San Pablo, Laguna.....Col. Norberto Mayo, 2 lieutenants, and 33 soldiers, with 30 guns, 2 bolos, and 1,000 rounds ammunition, surrender at Lipa, Batangas.....One hundred and forty men, with 110 guns, 7 revolvers, and 25 bolos, of Gonzales's command, surrender at Tanauan, Batangas.

21.—Transport *Meade* arrives at Manila.....Transport *McClellan* arrives at Manila.....Transport *Crook* sails from San Francisco.....Colonel Hernandez, of Santo Tomas column, and 39 officers, 56 noncommissioned officers, and about 200 men, with 110 guns, surrender to Capt. William T. Johnston, Fifteenth Cavalry, at Tanauan, Batangas.....Capt. Celistino Bapayango, with First Lieuts. Narciso Osorio, Sergio Aberion, Abdon Pasco, Pasucal Urjina, Victoris Baulan, Teodoro Regao, and 23 soldiers, with 3 Remington rifles, 1 Amberg, 1 Mauser; 2 soldiers of Captain Avenido, with 2 Remington rifles; 5 soldiers of Captain Atienza, with shotguns; Capt. Apolino Lacsam and 3 soldiers, with 2 revolvers, 1 Remington, and 1 Mauser, surrender through General Cailles at San Pablo, Batangas.

22.—Marello Luyo, with 44 men, 1 rifle, 44 bolos, and 7 daggers, surrenders at Isabela, Negros.....Col. Frank D. Baldwin, Twenty-first Infantry, reports the following, via Malabang, Cotabato: "Puala's hostiles constantly harassing and flying red flag over fort. This morning capture the place after slight resistance. No casualties. Very soon after the neighboring fort of Ganasi, the second strongest in the country, threw open its doors and hoisted white flag, and delivered up their own flag. Bad element thoroughly demoralized."

23.—Transport *Buford* sails from Manila.....Salustiano Brogat, Capt. Gregorio Luze, 1 first lieutenant, and 3 soldiers, with 3 Remington rifles, 1 pistol, and 13 rounds of ammunition, surrender at Lipa, Batangas. They belong to Norberto Mayo's command.....First Lieut. Francisco Hernandez, Second Lieut. Pedro Malabanan, and 7 soldiers, with 6 rifles, 1 bolo, 1 pistol, and 221 rounds of ammunition, surrender at Lipa, Batangas.

25.—Nine men, with 5 rifles, 3 Remingtons, 1 Mauser, and 1 Amberg, surrender at Lilio, Laguna, through the efforts of Col. Jacinto Malicisi, who surrendered at San Pablo, Laguna.....Col. Rosendo Banaad, Lieut. Col. Serapio Banaad, Captains Andres Alcos, Teodoro Cavino, Leoncio Aranez, and Raymundo Campos, First Lieuts. Segundo Brento, Francisco Alitagtag, Second Lieuts. Segundo Banayo and Jose Alimango, and 15 soldiers, with 7 Remingtons, 1 Krag, 1 Mauser, 1 shotgun, 2 revolvers, and 174 rounds ammunition, surrender at San Pablo, Laguna.

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Apr. 26.—Salvino Rodrell, captain of ladrones or insurgents, with 6 rifles, surrenders at Catanauan, Tayabas.

27.—Transport *Grant* arrives at San Francisco.....Seven hundred insurrectos, with 375 rifles, surrender at Catbalogan, Samar.....Gen. Claro Guevarra, Col. Francisco Rafael, Colonel Sebastian, Lieut.-Col. Narciso Abuke, Majors Guiousor, Daza, Sibrio, Fermosiela, and Garfen, 14 captains, 12 first lieutenants, 30 second lieutenants, 12 civil officials, 236 riflemen, 443 bolomen, with 112 Krag rifles, 1 Krag carbine, 78 Remingtons, 31 Mausers, 14 miscellaneous guns, and 8,000 rounds ammunition, surrender at Catbalogan, Samar.

28.—Major Proslasio, Capt. Antonio Putalla, Lieut. Mariano Asia, and 6 soldiers, with 9 rifles and 102 rounds ammunition, surrender to First Lieut. Lawrence P. Butler, Second Infantry, at Pitogo, Tayabas.....First Lieuts. Valerio and Gamdo, of First and Second companies, Taysan, 4 second lieutenants, and 25 soldiers, with 1 Mauser, 3 Amberges, 15 Remington rifles, 2 revolvers, 500 rounds ammunition, and 8 bolos, surrender at Taysan, Batangas.

30.—Briccio Casala, Evarato Juno, Yeineo Bibat, Faustino Magohos, Agtio Endaya, Simeon Estayala, and 33 soldiers, with 31 guns, 1 revolver, and 3 bolos, surrender at San Juan de Bocboc, Batangas.....Victoriano Vardadero, comandante, 6 officers, and 22 men, with 2 rifles, surrender at Pitogo, Tayabas.....Angelo de Chares is killed while resisting arrest of police, at San Jose, Batangas.

May 1.—Transport *Sheridan* arrives at Manila.....Transport *Logan* sails from San Francisco.....Capt. Regino Yulde, with 2 rifles, surrenders at Catanauan, Tayabas.....Basilio Surase, Modesto Sayes, Fortunate de Villa, Honario Maranan, and Vicente Paral, of Luis Banaad's command, with 2 rifles and 3 shotguns, surrender at Lipa, Batangas.....Pedro Marcigan and 4 soldiers, with 2 revolvers, surrender at San Pablo, Laguna.

2.—Night and morning of the 1st and 2d outpost of American camp near Bayan, Cotabato, is fired upon; no reply until morning, when two squads are sent out and drive away assailants. At 12 o'clock troops advance on the first Moro fort, which is shelled, but not taken until the infantry is in the ditch. It was very strong and was defended by some 200 or 300. In its capture we have no casualties. On a hilltop in a strong position is Fort Pandapatan, about 2,000 yards distant. This is their strongest work. It is shelled admirably, but not vacated. Our troops advance upon and surround it at 3 o'clock, and it is taken by assault, the troops engaging in a hand-to-hand fight with the Moros in the ditches under the walls of the fort. Our casualties are 1 officer and 7 enlisted men killed, and 4 officers and 41 enlisted men wounded, as follows: Killed—First Lieut. Thomas A. Vicars, Corpl. Michael Golden, Privates William Lorenz, John Langdon, Alfred J. Callahan, Frederick Cornell, Company G; James J. McGrath, Charles Reynolds, Company F; all Twenty-seventh Infantry. Wounded—Maj. Ralph S. Porter, surgeon, Volunteers; Capt. James T. Moore, Second Lieut. Albert L. Jossman, Twenty-seventh Infantry; First Lieut. Henry S. Wagner, Fourteenth Infantry, aid-de-camp; Sergt. James A. Means, Privates Peter Sullivan, John Sullivan, Thomas F. Gannon, Joseph Lyons, James J. Haley, Herbert Chatterton, William H. Winn, Joseph A. Adams, William M. Wheeler, Company B, Twenty-seventh Infantry; Q. M. Sergt. George J. Beckley, Corpl. William Bakewell, Privates William Brown, Charles B. Allen, Company E, Twenty-seventh Infantry; Q. M. Sergt. John Whe-

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lan, Sergt. Eugene L. McCarthy, Corpls. Henry G. Millington, Edward H. Keeler, Floyd Groff, Cook John Brady, Privates Frank A. Perry, Arthur A. Smith, Walter F. Dammers, Everett E. Marshall, Charley Cobb, John M. Quinn, Robert McCarmack, Company F, Twenty-seventh Infantry; Corpls. Otto P. A. Fick, George A. DeCair, Privates Claude Damon, Walter E. Eldridge, James P. Smith, Fred Cross, Harmidas Viola, John Daley, Frank B. Early, Evert H. Shelton, William H. Brogan, Company G, Twenty-seventh Infantry; Privates Edward W. Blair, John O'Donnell, Company H, Twenty-seventh Infantry; Battalion Sergt. Maj. Albert H. Ingold.

May 3.—The survivors of Bayan, 83 in number, surrender. The Sultan of Bayan, the Raja Muda, of Bayan, also the Sultan Pandapatan, and all their leading datos are dead, and many of their followers. The assault of the principal fort which was surrounded last night was one of the most gallant performances of American arms, for which Col. Frank D. Baldwin, Twenty-seventh Infantry, and his regiment deserve all praise..... Moro prisoners taken at Bayan, while disarmed and sitting on open hilltop surrounded by a strong guard, attempt to escape. Guard and 1 company open fire without orders, killing 35; 9 recaptured; others escaped.

6.—Transport *Meade* sails from Batangas.....Two soldiers of Casales's command, with 6 rifles, surrender at San Juan de Bocboc, Batangas..... Five men of Luis Banaad's command, with 2 Remington rifles and 3 shotguns, surrender at Lipa, Batangas.

14.—Transport *Warren* sails from Manila.

16.—Transport *Thomas* sails from San Francisco.

20.—Transport *Crook* arrives at Manila.

22.—Transport *Warren* sails from Nagasaki for San Francisco.

23.—Transport *Buford* arrives at San Francisco.

24.—Two lieutenants, 1 corporal, and 3 privates, first company Casivi's band, with 4 rifles, 1 shotgun, 1 bolo, and 43 rounds ammunition, surrender to Capt. Robert S. Offley, Thirtieth Infantry, at Naujan, Mindoro..... Lieut. Robert C. Humber and Sergt. Roland W. Peddigree, Tenth Infantry, while going from Root's Camp at outlet of Lake Tapao to Camp No. 3, are attacked by a Moro and the sergeant is badly wounded. The Moro drops his kris and the white flag he was carrying and escapes in the high grass.

25.—The sentinel at the fort at Paran-paran, Mindanao, is approached by two Moros, one of whom hands a pass to the sentinel, who reads it and returns it, when the other Moro slashes at the sentinel with a working bolo and cuts his arm badly.

26.—Transport *Logan* arrives at Manila.

27.—Transport *Hancock* sails from Manila.

28.—Transport *Sherman* sails from Manila..... Four ladrones, 2 bolos, and 27 rounds ammunition captured near Calapan, Mindoro, by Lieut. John Holtman, Philippine Scouts.

29.—Commanding officer Calapan, Mindoro, reports the surrender of Pantaleon Quintero, commissioner of General Malvar; Capt. Elias Tometa, first sergeant, and 3 privates, with 1 U. S. magazine rifle, 1 Mauser, 2 Remington rifles, and 223 rounds ammunition at Mangarin to Lieut. Edward R. Stone, Thirtieth Infantry.

30.—Sergeant Stewart and 6 men of Troop M, Fifth Cavalry, while on their way from Tanay, Rizal, to Binangonan to decorate the grave of a com-

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rade, are attacked by insurgents and 5 of them captured and afterwards killed.

May 31.—General Bell reports following arms and insurgents captured and surrendered during month of May in the provinces of Batangas, Tayabas, Laguna, and Cavite: Rifles captured 6, surrendered 33, total 39; carbines surrendered 1; revolvers, 12; shotguns, 19; bolos captured 3, surrendered 12, total 15; ammunition captured, 3,427 rounds, surrendered 225, total 3,652; officers surrendered 8; men captured 1, surrendered 25, total 26.

June 1.—Transport *Meade* arrives at San Francisco. While on a visit to two friendly datos, on their invitations, escorted by Dato Grande and the sultan of Ganasi, five shots are fired into the camp of Brig. Gen. Frank D. Baldwin, near the fort of the sultan of Busac, 8 miles east of Vicars, Mindanao, and First Sergt. Christian Peterson, Twenty-seventh Infantry, is shot through the neck and killed; no other casualties. The troops return the fire; 3 slightly wounded Moros found; their wounds are dressed and they are liberated.

2.—Transport *Buford* sails from San Francisco.

4.—Dato Pantuan and Sultan Minisas present themselves at Vicars, Mindanao, and declare their friendship.

10.—Transport *Thomas* arrives at Manila.

11.—Dato Adta, of Paigay, Mindanao, presents himself and says he wishes to be an amigo; also asks for a flag, which is refused until he shall return the rifle taken from the soldier his men murdered at this place early in April, at which time he was openly hostile and some of his men were killed at Bayan. He promises to return the rifle in a few days.

12.—Transport *Warren* arrives at San Francisco. Transport *Logan* sails from Aparri, Luzon. Sultan of Lanao, sultan of Butig and Lumbatan present themselves at Vicars and declare their friendship; they state the datos and sultans of a branch of the lake population are friendly inclined toward us.

13.—Private Dickens, Company F, Engineers, while on post as sentinel at Mataling Crossing, Mindanao, is slashed by a Moro; not dangerous; rifle and ammunition safe; Moro escaped.

16.—Transport *Meade* sails from San Francisco.

19.—Transport *Kilpatrick* arrives at San Francisco.

20.—Transport *Hancock* arrives at Fort McDowell, Angel Island, Cal.

22.—Transport *Sherman* arrives at San Francisco. Transport *Sheridan* sails from Manila. Five men Company I, Twenty-seventh Infantry, are attacked by 10 Moros on Makadar trail, 10 miles from Malabang, Cotabato. One man cut in head seriously, 1 wounded in arm. Moros secured 1 rifle.

24.—Capili surrenders at Malitbog, Leyte, to constabulary, with 34 rifles and carbines and 15 shotguns, 49 men, and 40 officers.

DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, JULY 1, 1902.

DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

[Consisting of all the territory within the geographical limits of the Philippine group of islands. Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, U. S. Army, Commanding. Headquarters: Manila, P. I. (Estado Mayor.)]

TROOPS IN DIVISION.

Battalion of Engineers, Companies E, F, G, H; Signal Corps, Companies E, F, H; First Cavalry, Headquarters and Troops A, B, C, D, I, K, L, M; Fifth Cavalry, ^a Headquarters and Troops A, B, C, D, I, K, L, M; Sixth Cavalry, entire regiment; Ninth Cavalry, entire regiment; Eleventh Cavalry, entire regiment; Fifteenth Cavalry, entire regiment; Field Artillery, Fourteenth Battery, Fifteenth Battery, Twenty-fifth Battery; Coast Artillery, Twenty-fifth Company, Twenty-seventh Company, Thirty-first Company, Thirty-sixth Company; First Infantry, entire regiment; Second Infantry, entire regiment; Fifth Infantry, entire regiment; Eighth Infantry, ^b Headquarters and Companies E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M; Tenth Infantry, entire regiment; Eleventh Infantry, entire regiment; Fifteenth Infantry, ^b entire regiment; Twenty-fifth Infantry, ^b Headquarters and Companies E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M; Twenty-sixth Infantry, entire regiment; Twenty-seventh Infantry, entire regiment; Twenty-eighth Infantry, entire regiment; Twenty-ninth Infantry, entire regiment; Thirtieth Infantry, entire regiment; Native Scouts, 50 companies.

En route to United States.—Troops I, K, L, M, Third Cavalry; Companies B, G, H, M, Sixteenth Infantry.

DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES.

[Including all that portion of the Philippine Archipelago lying north of a line passing (southeastwardly) through the west pass of Apo or Mindoro Strait to the twelfth parallel of north latitude, thence east along said parallel to 124° 10' east of Greenwich, but including the entire island of Masbate, thence north to San Bernardino Straits. Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, U. S. Army, temporarily commanding. Headquarters, Manila, P. I. (No. 384 Calle Gral. Solano.)]

Troops in department.—Battalion of Engineers, Companies E, H; Signal Corps, Companies E, F; First Cavalry, Headquarters, A, B, C, D, I, K, L, M; Fifth Cavalry, Headquarters, A, B, C, D, I, K, L, M; Sixth Cavalry, entire regiment; Ninth Cavalry, Troops A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H; Eleventh Cavalry, entire regiment; Field Artillery, Fourteenth and Fifteenth batteries; Coast Artillery, Twenty-fifth, Twenty-seventh, Thirty-first, Thirty-sixth companies; Second Infantry, entire regiment; Fifth Infantry, entire regiment; Eighth Infantry, Headquarters, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M; Eleventh Infantry, E, F, G, H; Fifteenth Infantry, Headquarters, I, K, L, M; Twenty-fifth Infantry, Headquarters, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M; Twenty-sixth Infantry, Headquarters, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I, K; Twenty-eighth Infantry, entire regiment; Thirtieth Infantry, entire regiment; Native Scouts, Companies One to Thirty-four inclusive (Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth companies temporarily on duty in the Department of South Philippines).

SECOND SEPARATE BRIGADE. ^c

[Embracing provinces of Abra, Benguet, Lepanto-Bontoc, Cagayan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Union, Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Rizal (north of Pasig), Tarlac, Zambales, island of Luzon, and Principe, Infanta and Iala Polillo, now part of Tayabas Province. Brig. Gen. William H. Bissbee, U. S. Army, commanding. Headquarters, San Fernando, Pampanga, Luzon.]

Troops in brigade.—Fifth Cavalry, Headquarters, A, B, C, D, I, K, L, M; Fifth Infantry, entire regiment; Eleventh Infantry, Company F, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Company K; Native Scouts, First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-second, Twenty-fifth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth.

THIRD SEPARATE BRIGADE.

[Embracing provinces of Rizal (south of Pasig, excluding Pasay Barracks), Laguna, Tayabas (west of a north and south line through Atimonan), Batangas and Cavite, island of Luzon, islands of Tablas, Romblon, and Sibuyan, Romblon Group, and the islands of Marinduque, Mindoro, and all adjacent islands. Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, U. S. Army, commanding. Headquarters, Batangas, Batangas, Luzon.]

Troops in brigade.—First Cavalry, Headquarters, A, B, C, D, I, K, L, M; Sixth Cavalry, Headquarters, A, B, C, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M; Ninth Cavalry, Troops F,

^a En route to division from United States: Second Squadron, Fifth Cavalry.

^b Under orders to return to United States.

^c NOTE.—Including First Brigade consolidated with Second Brigade, July 1, 1902.

G, H; Second Infantry, Headquarters, Companies A, B, C, D, E, F, H, I; Eighth Infantry, Headquarters, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M; Twenty-eighth Infantry, Headquarters, A, B, C, H, I, K, L, M; Thirtieth Infantry, Companies E, F, G, H, L, M; Native Scouts, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, Fourteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-first, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, Thirty-first, and Thirty-fourth companies.

FOURTH SEPARATE BRIGADE.

[Embracing province of Tayabas (east of a north and south line through Atimonan and including that town), Camarines Norte, Albay, Camarines Sur, and Sorsogon, island of Luzon, islands of Masbate, Burias, Ticao, Catanduanes and all adjacent islands. Col. Constant Williams, Twenty-sixth Infantry, commanding. Headquarters, Nueva Caceres, Camarines Sur, Luzon.]

Troops in brigade.—Ninth Cavalry, Troops A, B, C, D, E; Second Infantry, Companies G, K, L, M; Fifteenth Infantry, Headquarters, I, K, L, M; Twenty-sixth Infantry, Headquarters, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I; Native Scouts, Thirty-second and Thirty-third companies.

POST OF MANILA.

[Embracing the city of Manila; beginning at the Boca de Vitas, the line follows Maypajo Creek until it reaches the Lico road produced; thence along said line and road to Lico; thence to the junction of the two roads in front of the Chinese hospital; thence along the road in front of said hospital to the north corner of the hospital wall; thence to blockhouse No. 4; thence by blockhouses 5, 6, and 7 to San Juan del Monte Creek at the Aqueduct Bridge; thence down said creek and up the river Pasig to the mouth of Concordia Creek; thence by Concordia and Tripa de Gallinas creeks to a point opposite where road from Singalon to Pineda turns, taking in Pasay cavalry barracks; thence by the road to Maitubig, and thence to mouth of Malate Creek. Lieut. Col. George G. Greenough, Artillery Corps, commanding. Headquarters: Manila, P. I. (Paseo de Bagumbayan.)]

Troops.—Sixth Cavalry, Troop D; Field Artillery, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Batteries; Coast Artillery, Twenty-fifth, Twenty-seventh, Thirty-first, Thirty-sixth companies; Eleventh Infantry, Companies E, G, H; Thirtieth Infantry, headquarters, Companies A, B, C, D, I, K.

DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH PHILIPPINES.

[Embracing all that portion of the Philippine Archipelago lying south of the dividing line described for the southern boundary of the Department of North Philippines. Brig. Gen. James F. Wade, U. S. Army, commanding. Headquarters: Cebu, Cebu Island.]

Troops in Department.—Battalion of Engineers, Companies F, G; Signal Corps, Company H; Ninth Cavalry, Headquarters, I, K, L, M; Fifteenth Cavalry, entire regiment; First Infantry, entire regiment; Tenth Infantry, entire regiment; Eleventh Infantry, Headquarters, A, B, C, D, I, K, L, M; Fifteenth Infantry, Companies A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H; Twenty-sixth Infantry, Companies H, L, M; Twenty-seventh Infantry, entire regiment; Twenty-ninth Infantry, entire regiment; native scouts, companies Nos. 35 to 50, inclusive, Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth companies from the Department of North Philippines, on temporary duty in this department.

FIFTH SEPARATE BRIGADE.

[Embracing islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Bohol, and Paragua, Calamianes group, Busuanga and adjacent islands. Col. Edward S. Godfrey, Ninth Cavalry, commanding. Headquarters, Iloilo, Panay.]

Troops in brigade.—Ninth Cavalry, Headquarters, I, K, L, M; Tenth Infantry, Companies A, B; Twenty-ninth Infantry, entire regiment; native scouts, Fortieth, Forty-first, Forty-second, Forty-third, Forty-fourth, Forty-sixth, Forty-seventh, Forty-eighth companies.

SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE.

[Embracing islands of Leyte, Samar, and all adjacent islands. Brig. Gen. Frederick D. Grant, U. S. Army, commanding. Headquarters, Tacloban, Leyte.]

Troops in brigade.—First Infantry, entire regiment; Eleventh Infantry, Headquarters, A, B, C, D, I, K, L, M; Fifteenth Infantry, Companies A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H; Twenty-sixth Infantry, Companies H, L, M; native scouts, Twenty-third, Twenty-fourth, Thirty-fifth, Thirty-sixth, Thirty-seventh, Thirty-eighth, Thirty-ninth, Forty-fifth.

SEVENTH SEPARATE BRIGADE.

[Embracing islands of Mindanao, Jolo group, and all adjacent islands. Maj. Gen. George W. Davis, U. S. Army, temporarily commanding. Headquarters, Zamboanga, Mindanao.]

Troops in brigade.—Fifteenth Cavalry, entire regiment; Field Artillery, Twenty-fifth Battery; Tenth Infantry, Headquarters, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M; Twenty-seventh Infantry, entire regiment; native scouts, Forty-ninth, Fiftieth Companies.

List of garrisoned towns in the Philippine Islands, with provinces, islands, and departments, July 1, 1902.

Station.	Province.	Island.	Department.	Troops.
Abra de Nog.....		Mindoro.....	North Philippines.	F, 30th Infantry.
Alphonso XIII.....		Paragua.....	South Philippines.	48th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Angata ^a	Bulacan.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	5th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Angeles ^b	Pampanga.....	do.....	do.....	A, 5th Cavalry.
Antipolo ^a	Rizal.....	do.....	do.....	Detachment I, 5th Cavalry.
Aparri ^c	Cagayan.....	do.....	do.....	M, 5th Infantry; B, G, H, M, 16th Infantry; 28th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Arayat.....	Pampanga.....	do.....	do.....	9th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Argao.....		Cebu.....	South Philippines.	C, 29th Infantry.
Atimonan ^c	Tayabas.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	B, I, 26th Infantry.
Bacolod.....		Negros.....	South Philippines.	L, 29th Infantry; 43d Company, Philippine Scouts.
Bacon ^a	Sorsogon.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	I, 15th Infantry.
Balangiga.....		Samar.....	South Philippines.	C, 15th Infantry.
Balayan ^a	Batangas.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	Headquarters 3d Squadron, and M, 1st Cavalry.
Balluga ^a	Bulacan.....	do.....	do.....	M, 25th Infantry; 6th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Bamban ^a	Tarlac.....	do.....	do.....	C, 11th Cavalry.
Basey ^a		Samar.....	South Philippines.	A, 15th Infantry.
Batangas ^c	Batangas.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	Headquarters 3d Separate Brigade; Headquarters 1st Squadron, A, D, I, 1st Cavalry; Headquarters 1st Battalion 2d Infantry; 4th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Banua ^a	do.....	do.....	do.....	K, 1st Cavalry.
Bay ^a	Laguna.....	do.....	do.....	G, 9th Cavalry.
Baybay ^c		Leyte.....	South Philippines.	C, 11th Infantry.
Bennihan.....	Camarines Sur.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	Detachment D, 26th Infantry.
Binalonan.....	Pangasinan.....	do.....	do.....	Detachment F, 5th Infantry.
Bifang.....	Laguna.....	do.....	do.....	Headquarters 1st Squadron; C, K, 6th Cavalry.
Binangonan ^a	Rizal.....	do.....	do.....	1st Company, Philippine Scouts.
Bobon.....		Samar.....	South Philippines.	I, 1st Infantry, Detachment 23d Company, Philippine Scouts.
Bogo.....		Cebu.....	do.....	K, 29th Infantry, detachment 40th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Bolinao ^c	Zambales.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	G, 25th Infantry.
Bongabon.....	Nueva Ecija.....	do.....	do.....	8th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Bongao ^c		Tawitawi.....	South Philippines.	I, 15th Cavalry.
Borongan.....		Samar.....	do.....	Headquarters, F, K, M, 1st Infantry.
Bosoboso.....	Rizal.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	16th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Bulan ^c	Sorsogon.....	do.....	do.....	M, 15th Infantry.
Cabanatuan.....	Nueva Ecija.....	do.....	do.....	22d Company, Philippine Scouts.
Cabancalan.....		Negros.....	South Philippines.	42d Company, Philippine Scouts.
Cabuyao ^a	Laguna.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	G, 6th Cavalry.
Cagayan ^c		Jolo.....	South Philippines.	Detachment K, 15th Cavalry.
Calaca ^a	Batangas.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	Detachments E and G, 6th Cavalry.
Calamba ^d	Laguna.....	do.....	do.....	Headquarters, H, L, 6th Cavalry.
Calapan ^d		Mindoro.....	do.....	Headquarters 2d Battalion, M, 30th Infantry; 34th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Calasiao ^b	Pangasinan.....	Luzon.....	do.....	E, 5th Infantry.
Calbayog ^c		Samar.....	South Philippines.	Headquarters 2d Battalion, G, H, 15th Infantry; Headquarters 3d Battalion, H, L, 26th Infantry; 24th, 36th Companies, Philippine Scouts.
Calivo ^c		Panay.....	do.....	D, 29th Infantry.
Caloocan ^b	Rizal.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	Detachment D, 11th Cavalry.
Calauang.....	Laguna.....	do.....	do.....	Detachment K, 9th Infantry.
Canaman.....	Camarines Sur.....	do.....	do.....	B, 9th Cavalry.
Capiz ^d		Panay.....	South Philippines.	M, 9th Cavalry, 46th Company Philippine Scouts.
Caranian.....		Samar.....	do.....	D, 1st Infantry.

^a Telephone stations.

^b Railroad stations.

^c Ports.

^d Telegraph stations.

List of garrisoned towns in the Philippine Islands, etc.—Continued.

Station.	Province.	Island.	Department.	Troops.
Carigara <i>d c</i>		Leyte	South Philippines.	D, 11th Infantry.
Catanauan	Tayabas	Luzon	North Philippines.	K, 2d Infantry.
Catarman		Samar	South Philippines.	C, 1st Infantry, 23d Company Philippine Scouts.
Catbogan <i>d c</i>		do	do	Headquarters E, F, 15th Infantry; M, 26th Infantry; 35th Company Philippine Scouts.
Catubig		do	do	A, 1st Infantry.
Cauayan <i>d</i>	Isabela	Luzon	North Philippines.	K, 5th Infantry, detachment 25th Company Philippine Scouts.
Cavinti <i>a</i>	Laguna	do	do	Detachment G, 8th Infantry; detachment 3d Company Philippine Scouts.
Cebu <i>d c</i>		Cebu	South Philippines.	Headquarters Department South Philippines; H, Signal Corps Headquarters; Headquarters 2d and 3d Battalions; E, F, 29th Infantry.
Cervantes <i>a</i>	Lepanto	Luzon	North Philippines.	12th Company Philippine Scouts.
Concepcion <i>d</i>		Panay	South Philippines.	B, 29th Infantry.
Coron		Busuanga	do	B, 10th Infantry.
Corregidor <i>d c</i>		Corregidor	North Philippines.	Detachments 28th Infantry.
Cotabato <i>d c</i>		Mindanao	South Philippines.	Headquarters 2d Battalion, G, H, 10th Infantry.
Cuenca <i>a d</i>	Batangas	Luzon	North Philippines.	18th Company Philippine Scouts.
Daet <i>a c</i>	Camarines Norte.	do	do	Headquarters 1st Battalion, F, 26th Infantry, 33d Company Philippine Scouts.
Dagupan <i>d b c</i>	Pangasinan	do	do	Headquarters C, D, 5th Infantry.
Dapitan		Mindanao	South Philippines.	L, 10th Infantry.
Dasmariñas <i>d</i>	Cavite	Luzon	North Philippines.	I, 28th Infantry.
Davao <i>c</i>		Mindanao	South Philippines.	Detachment Engineers; Headquarters 3d Squadron; G, 15th Cavalry; E, 10th Infantry.
Dolores		Samar	do	G, 1st Infantry.
Dulag <i>a</i>		Leyte	do	M, 11th Infantry.
Dumaguete <i>d c</i>		Negros	do	M, 29th Infantry.
Dumanjug <i>d</i>		Cebu	do	G, 29th Infantry.
Echague <i>d</i>	Isabela	Luzon	North Philippines.	25th Company Philippine Scouts.
Gerona <i>a b</i>	Tarlac	do	do	D, 11th Cavalry.
Gubat <i>a c</i>	Sorsogon	do	do	Detachment I, 15th Infantry.
Guinayangan <i>a d</i>	Tayabas	do	do	G, 2d Infantry.
Guiguis	do	do	do	Detachment E, 2d Infantry.
Guilan		Samar	South Philippines.	I, 11th Infantry.
Gumaca	Tayabas	Luzon	North Philippines.	Detachment B, 26th Infantry.
Iba <i>d c</i>	Zambales	do	do	F, H, 25th Infantry.
Ibaan	Batangas	do	do	21st Company Philippine Scouts.
Ilagan <i>d</i>	Isabela	do	do	L, 5th Infantry, 27th Company Philippine Scouts.
Iligan <i>d</i>		Mindanao	South Philippines.	Detachment Engineers; Headquarters 1st Squadron; C, D, 15th Cavalry Headquarters; Headquarters 3d Battalion; C, D, M, 10th Infantry; detachment 50th Company Philippine Scouts.
Iloilo <i>d c</i>		Panay	do	Headquarters 5th Separate Brigade Headquarters; Headquarters 3d Squadron; K, L, 9th Cavalry Headquarters; 1st Battalion; H, I, 29th Infantry.
Imus <i>a</i>	Cavite	Luzon	North Philippines.	B, 6th Cavalry.
Indang	do	do	do	Headquarters 1st Battalion; D, C, 28th Infantry.
Indan	Camarines Norte.	Luzon	do	Detachment F, 26th Infantry.
Jaro <i>d</i>		Leyte	South Philippines.	37th Company Philippine Scouts.
Jolo <i>d c</i>		Jolo	do	Detachment engineers, headquarters B, F, H, K, 15th Cavalry.
Laguan		Samar	do	B, 1st Infantry, 39th Company Philippine Scouts.

a Telephone stations.*b* Railroad stations.*c* Ports.*d* Telegraph stations.

List of garrisoned towns in the Philippine Islands, etc.—Continued.

Station.	Province.	Island.	Department.	Troops.
Laguimanoc.....	Tayabas.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	I, 2d Infantry.
Lacagac.....	Ilocos Norte.....	do.....	do.....	Headquarters 1st Squadron, L, M, 11th Cavalry, 15th Company Philippine Scouts.
Legaspi.....	Albay.....	do.....	do.....	E, G, 26th Infantry.
Legatiga.....	Panay.....	South Philippines.	Detachment D, 29th Infantry.
Lian.....	Cavite.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	Detachment A, 28th Infantry.
Lilloa.....	Laguna.....	do.....	do.....	F, 8th Infantry.
Lingayend.....	Pangasinan.....	do.....	do.....	A, B, 5th Infantry.
Lintogo.....	Mindanao.....	South Philippines.	Detachment I, 10th Infantry.
Lipa.....	Batangas.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	A, D, 2d Infantry.
Lobo.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	2d Company Philippine Scouts.
Loom.....	Bohol.....	South Philippines.	Detachment A, 29th Infantry.	
Lopez.....	Tayabas.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	32d Company Philippine Scouts.
Los Baños.....	Laguna.....	do.....	do.....	Headquarters 2d Squadron, E, 6th Cavalry.
Luchan.....	Tayabas.....	do.....	do.....	E, 2d Infantry.
Lucena.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	C, 1st Cavalry; headquarters F, 2d Infantry.
Luisiana.....	Laguna.....	do.....	do.....	Detachment G, 8th Infantry, 3d Company Philippine Scouts.
Maasin.....	Leyte.....	South Philippines.	A, 11th Infantry.
Macar.....	Mindanao.....	do.....	E, 15th Cavalry.
Magallanes.....	Cavite.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	Detachment M, 28th Infantry.
Magdalena.....	Laguna.....	do.....	do.....	H, 8th Infantry.
Majayjay.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	I, 8th Infantry.
Malabang.....	Mindanao.....	South Philippines.	E, F, engineers; headquarters 2d Squadron; A, L, 15th Cavalry; 25th Field Artillery; headquarters 2d and 3d Battalions; A, B, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, 27th Infantry; detachment 50th Company Philippine Scouts.
Malabon.....	Rizal.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	Headquarters K, 25th Infantry.
Mambulao.....	Camarines Norte.....	do.....	do.....	Detachment A, 26th Infantry.
Mangaldan.....	Pangasinan.....	do.....	do.....	G, 5th Infantry.
Mangarin.....	Mindoro.....	do.....	G, 30th Infantry.
Manila.....	Rizal.....	Luzon.....	do.....	Headquarters Department North Philippines.
	Calle Gral. Solano, No. 348.....			Casuals en route to United States.
	Camp Wallace (Luneta).....			25th Coast Artillery.
	Cuartel Infanteria.....			A, B, C, D, 30th Infantry.
	Cuartel Melsic.....			Headquarters Division Philippines.
	Estado Mayor.....			27th, 31st, 36th, Coast Artillery.
	Fort Santiago.....			E, H, engineers; E, G, H, 11th Infantry.
	Malate Barracks.....			Headquarters post of Manila.
	Paseo de Bagumbayan.....			I, K, L, M, 3d Cavalry; D, 6th Cavalry; 14th, 15th, Field Artillery.
	Passay Barracks.....			Headquarters I, K, 30th Infantry.
	Santa Mesa.....			D, 28th Infantry.
Mariquina.....	Rizal.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	F, 11th Infantry.
Mariveles.....	Bataan.....	do.....	do.....	Headquarters 2d Battalion, E, 25th Infantry.
Masinloc.....	Zambales.....	Luzon.....	do.....	L, 15th Infantry.
Matnog.....	Sorsogon.....	do.....	do.....	L, 1st Infantry.
Mauo.....	Samar.....	South Philippines.	I, 10th Infantry.
Misamis.....	Mindanao.....	do.....	Detachment I, 1st Infantry.
Mondragon.....	Samar.....	do.....	Detachment I, 5th Cavalry, E, 28th Infantry.
Montalbon.....	Rizal.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	Detachment D, 28th Infantry.
Muntinlupa.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	40th Company Philippine Scouts.
Naga.....	do.....	Cebu.....	South Philippines.	A, 6th Cavalry, M, 28th Infantry.
Naic.....	Cavite.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	A, 28th Infantry; detachment, 11th Company Philippine Scouts.
Nasugbu.....	Batangas.....	do.....	do.....	H, 30th Infantry.
Naujan.....	Mindoro.....	do.....	

^a Telephone stations.

^b Railroad stations.

^c Ports.

^d Telegraph stations.

List of garrisoned towns in the Philippine Islands, etc.—Continued.

Station.	Province.	Island.	Department.	Troops.
Nueva Caceres <i>b c</i> ..	Camarines Sur	Luzon	North Philippines.	Headquarters 4th Separate Brigade, Headquarters 1st Squadron, A, C, D, E, 9th Cavalry, Headquarters, C, 26th Infantry.
Oras <i>a</i>		Samar	South Philippines.	E, H, 1st Infantry.
Ormoc <i>d c</i>		Leyte	do	Headquarters 1st Battalion, B, 11th Infantry.
Oroquieta <i>a</i>		Mindanao	do	49th Company Philippine Scouts.
Oslob <i>d</i>		Cebu	do	Detachment C, 29th Infantry.
Paete <i>a</i>	Laguna	Luzon	North Philippines.	G, 8th Infantry.
Pagbilao <i>d</i>	Tayabas	do	do	31st Company Philippine Scouts.
Pagsanjan <i>a</i>	Laguna	do	do	E, 8th Infantry.
Palawan		Mindoro	do	L, 30th Infantry.
Pambujan		Samar	South Philippines.	K, 26th Infantry.
Paniqui <i>b</i>	Tarlac	Luzon	North Philippines.	A, 11th Cavalry.
Paracale	Camarines Nte	do	do	A, 26th Infantry.
Paranas		Samar	South Philippines.	45th Company Philippine Scouts.
Paran-paran <i>d</i>		Mindanao	do	Detachment Engineers, Headquarters, Headquarters 1st Battalion, C, 27th Infantry.
Pasacao <i>d c</i>	Camarines Sur	Luzon	North Philippines.	Detachment B, D, 26th Infantry.
Pascologa	do	do	do	Detachment D, 26th Infantry.
Pasig <i>d</i>	Rizal	do	do	Headquarters 3d Squadron, K, 5th Cavalry.
Pila <i>a</i>	Laguna	do	do	Headquarters 3d Battalion, L, 8th Infantry.
Pinamalayan		Mindoro	do	E, 30th Infantry.
Pitogo	Tayabas	Luzon	do	L, 2d Infantry.
Point Binatic		Samar	South Philippines.	D, 15th Infantry.
Pola		Mindoro	North Philippines.	17th Company Philippine Scouts.
Puerto Princesa		Paragua	South Philippines.	Headquarters 1st Battalion, A, 10th Infantry.
Pulo <i>c</i>	Mallig Island.	Laguna de Bay.	North Philippines.	H, 28th Infantry.
Reina Regente		Mindanao	South Philippines.	50th Company Philippine Scouts.
Rosales <i>d</i>	Pangasinan	Luzon	North Philippines.	F, 5th Infantry.
Salcedo <i>a</i>		Samar	South Philippines.	38th Company Philippine Scouts.
Sampaloca	Tayabas	Luzon	North Philippines.	20th Company Philippine Scouts.
San Esteban	Ilocos Sur	do	do	13th Company Philippine Scouts.
San Fabian <i>a</i>	Pangasinan	do	do	H, 5th Infantry.
San Felipe Neri <i>b</i>	Rizal	do	do	Headquarters, L, 5th Cavalry.
San Fernando <i>b</i>	Pampanga	do	do	Headquarters 2d Separate Brigade, Headquarters 1st Squadron, B, D, 5th Cavalry.
Do <i>b c</i>	Union	do	do	Headquarters 2d Squadron, 11th Cavalry.
S. F. de Malabon <i>d</i>	Cavite	do	do	Headquarters; headquarters 3d Battalion; K, 26th Infantry.
San Isidro <i>d</i>	Nueva Ecija	do	do	C, 5th Cavalry; headquarters 3d Battalion; I, 25th Infantry.
San Joaquin <i>d</i>		Panay	South Philippines.	I, 9th Cavalry.
San Jose <i>d</i>	Batangas	Luzon	North Philippines.	B, 2d Infantry.
S. J. de Buena Vista <i>c d</i>		Panay	South Philippines.	47th Company, Philippine Scouts.
S. J. de Bocboa <i>a</i>	Batangas	Luzon	North Philippines.	C, 2d Infantry; 14th Company, Philippine Scouts.
San Mateo <i>a</i>	Rizal	do	do	I, 5th Cavalry; F, G, 28th Infantry.
San Miguel <i>a</i>	Bulacan	do	do	L, 25th Infantry.
San Pablo <i>d</i>	Laguna	do	do	Headquarters 2d Squadron; F, H, 9th Cavalry; headquarters 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry.
San Pedro Tunisana	do	do	do	30th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Santa Barbara <i>d</i>		Panay	South Philippines.	41th Company, Philippine Scouts.

a Telephone stations.

b Railroad stations.

c Ports.

d Telegraph stations.

List of garrisoned towns in the Philippine Islands, etc.—Continued.

Station.	Province.	Island.	Department.	Troops.
Santa Cruz ^a	Cavite.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	L and detachment B, 28th Infantry.
Do, ^d	Laguna.....	do.....	do.....	I, detachment K, 6th Cavalry; headquarters; K, 8th Infantry.
Santa Rita ^a	Samar.....	South Philippines.	Headquarters 1st Battalion; B, 15th Infantry.
Santa Rita Island.....	do.....	do.....	Detachment B, 15th Infantry.
Santa Rosa ^a	Laguna.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	Detachment C, F, 6th Cavalry.
Santo Tomas ^d	Batangas.....	do.....	do.....	M, 6th Cavalry.
Siassi ^c	Siassi.....	South Philippines.	M, 15th Cavalry.
Siniloan ^d	Laguna.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	M, 8th Infantry.
Sorsogon ^c	Sorsogon.....	do.....	do.....	Headquarters 3d Battalion; K, 15th Infantry.
Spanish Fort.....	Batangas.....	do.....	do.....	Detachments F, H, 6th Cavalry.
Surigao ^{c d}	Mindanao.....	South Philippines.	K, 10th Infantry.
Taal ^c	Batangas.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	B, L, 1st Cavalry; detachment 3d Company, Philippine Scouts.
Tacloban ^{c d}	Leyte.....	South Philippines.	Headquarters 6th Separate Brigade; L, 11th Infantry.
Talavera.....	Nueva Ecija.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	19th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Talisay.....	Batangas.....	do.....	do.....	29th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Tanauan.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	10th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Do, ^d	Leyte.....	South Philippines.	Headquarters; headquarters 3d Battalion; K, 11th Infantry.
Tanay.....	Rizal.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	M, 5th Cavalry.
Tarlac ^{b d}	Tarlac.....	do.....	do.....	Headquarters 1st Squadron; B, 11th Cavalry.
Tayasan ^a	Batangas.....	do.....	do.....	7th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Tubig.....	Samar.....	South Philippines.	Detachment G, 1st Infantry.
Tubigon ^d	Bohol.....	do.....	A, 29th Infantry.
Tuburan.....	Cebu.....	do.....	41st Company, Philippine Scouts.
Tucuran ^d	Mindanao.....	do.....	D, 27th Infantry.
Tuegarao ^d	Cagayan.....	Luzon.....	North Philippines.	I, 5th Infantry; 26th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Tuy ^a	Batangas.....	do.....	do.....	11th Company, Philippine Scouts.
Unisan.....	Tayabas.....	do.....	do.....	M, 2d Infantry.
Vigan ^{c d}	Ilocos Sur.....	do.....	do.....	Headquarters; I, K, 11th Cavalry.
Zamboanga ^{c d}	Mindanao.....	South Philippines.	Headquarters 7th Separate Brigade; detachment Engineers; F, 10th Infantry.

^a Telephone stations.^b Railroad stations.^c Ports.^d Telegraph stations.

**REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. ADNA R. CHAFFEE, U. S. ARMY,
COMMANDING THE DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES.**

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., September 30, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: At date of my previous annual report, October 1, 1901, operations by the troops for suppression of the insurrection were in progress in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna, island of Luzon; in the island of Mindoro, and in the island of Samar. The islands of Cebu and Bohol were under military jurisdiction, but the military there was not active and apparently little or no interest had by local military or civil authorities to suppress the parties opposing government in the latter islands.

In several other parts of the archipelago scattered remnants of the insurrection still maintained a predatory war, frequently against the native population as well as against the forces of the government, the existence of which was largely due to enforced contributions and frequently to downright robbery. These bands, variously termed *ladrones*, *tulisanes*, or *insurrectos*, were of little military importance and are now so reduced and dissipated that the insular constabulary feels it can eventually rid the country of them. There was one band of considerable more importance than the rest, under the leader "Rufino Deloso," that operated in north Mindanao between Misamis and Dapitan, principally in the mountains back of Oroquieta, whose power was finally overthrown and his surrender effected, an account of which is covered in the report of Maj. Gen. George W. Davis, as commander of the Seventh Separate Brigade. The disturbances in October and November, 1901, caused by *anting-anting* fanatics in the province of Sorsogon, following the close of the campaign the preceding summer in the adjacent provinces of Albay and the Camarines, are referred to simply to call attention to the incident. An account of them and the action taken by troops will be found in the report of Col. Constant Williams, Twenty-sixth Infantry, as commander of the Fourth Separate Brigade.

CEBU.

Brig. Gen. Robert P. Hughes (now major-general), commanding the Department of the Visayas, had been personally in the island of Samar for several months prior to September, 1901, and as a consequence could not give to Cebu his personal attention, but on the 15th of that month transferred his field office to Cebu, from whence he set on foot such operations as made it positively certain that nothing short of surrender or ultimate destruction of the hostile forces was his object and invariable purpose. The effect of this military activity and evident determination to suppress the hostile element brought about the desired result in less time than two months. On October 27, 1901, the surrender of Maxilom and his followers, with their arms, was practically completed. General Hughes's report to November 30, 1901, is appended. On December 17, 1901, the civil governor was informed that no military reason appeared to exist why civil government should not be reestablished in Cebu, so by act No. 322 of the Philippine Commission,

so much of act No. 173, of July 17, as transferred the province to military control was revoked. Civil government was reestablished at 12 o'clock noon, January 1, 1902.

BOHOL.

On the surrender of Maxilom and his forces it was suggested to General Hughes that no time should be lost in pressing the situation in the island of Bohol to an early conclusion. Under his direction a battalion of infantry was soon transferred from Cebu to Bohol and through a well-conceived plan of work for these troops the enemy's chief cuartel and place of refuge was captured and destroyed on October 11; and on November 27, near Carmen, another decisive encounter took place where we suffered a loss to our force of two officers and several men wounded. Soon afterwards communication was opened with the leader Samson and arrangements effected for his surrender, which was made on December 23, 1901, thus ending active insurrection in Bohol. On March 3, 1902, the Philippine Commission passed act No. 365, revoking act No. 173 of July 17, so far as said act affected the island of Bohol. No change in provincial officers had been made by the military during the time the province was under our control, so on April 1, 1902, the civil authorities reentered upon their duties.

The Adjutant-General of the Army, who was in Manila at the time, at my suggestion, sent the following cablegram to the War Department:

MANILA, July 17, 1901.

AGWAR, Washington.

Adna R. Chaffee desires organize separate brigades within several departments. This will improve administration and efficiency generally. It is opinion of department that such separate brigade commanders could legally convene general court-martial, etc. Favorable action recommended. Reply soon as possible.

CORBIN.

The real purpose of this proposition was to give authority to officers who by their rank were properly entitled to share full responsibilities of command and bear such burden as legitimately belonged to the rank of a general officer. "District" is an unmilitary term, having no definition or military recognition in the Articles of War; it is offensive to the military ear; its commander can not convene a general court-martial for the trial of a soldier alleged to be guilty of the slightest offense, albeit the administration of justice is an important factor of command. At the time referred to general officers were commanding "districts" occupied by from five to nine thousand men, and not one of them could assemble a court-martial. A further idea was to shift the burden of duty to the command itself in its own sphere; not permit it to be drawn elsewhere to the detriment of economy of administration. By organizing separate brigades full power is conferred on the commander in time of war.

The response to the cablegram of the Adjutant-General was in the affirmative. Brigade organizations were at once decided upon and commanders selected, but orders were not issued until October 8, to take effect November 1. The reason for delay was in consequence of the presence of General Hughes, department commander, in the island of Samar, where he was personally directing operations against Lucban's forces. I desired that to him should fall the credit of that campaign, if success could be obtained within the period of time hoped for.

SAMAR.

General Hughes withdrew to Cebu on September 15; the unfortunate loss at Balangiga, Samar, took place September 28. Gen. Jacob H. Smith, who had already been selected for the command of the Sixth Separate Brigade, was called to my headquarters and given an order to proceed to Tacloban, Leyte, and take command of the First District of the Department of the Visayas.

The only other instructions or orders given him were verbal and in words, to wit:

We have lost 100 rifles at Balangiga and 25,000 rounds of ammunition. You must get them back. You can have \$5,000 gold. Capture the arms if you can, buy them if you must; whichever course you adopt, get them back.

I deemed it of much importance to secure those arms, as the result of our loss at Balangiga was too liable to injuriously affect the public mind of those still in insurrection against the government and it was necessary to counteract this harmful influence for peace at a time when the cessation of hostile acts by the natives in the Visayan Islands was nearing successful conclusion.

The general orders and circulars issued by General Smith bearing on the operations in Samar, which in the course of time reached headquarters of the division, are shown in Appendix A. Due to irregular mail facilities, these written instructions were often weeks old before reaching me, but I have noted nothing in them which, in my opinion, was not justified by the conditions there to be overcome.

The command to which General Smith was assigned embraced the islands of Leyte and Samar; in the former, civil government had been established; in the latter, hostilities actively existed. Both islands pertained to the command of Lucban, leader of the insurrection in that section of the Archipelago, and his authority was as potent in the one island as in the other. The islands are separated for about 20 miles of shore line by the San Juanico Strait, which nowhere within the distance named is more than 2 miles wide, the greater part much less. The ports of Samar being closed to trade, as a military measure, smuggling of rice across the strait was resorted to and, as regards the inhabitants of Leyte, became very profitable, warranting any amount of risk. Lucban's agents collected funds in Leyte, as in Samar, and his forces in the former were nearly as numerous as in the last-mentioned island. If reports be true, nearly five hundred men and over two hundred firearms, three cannon, and other munitions of war have been surrendered to the constabulary in Leyte since hostilities ceased in Samar. General Smith had in view imposing greater difficulties on the insurrecto forces in obtaining food supplies and collection of funds when he issued his Circular No. 2, dated November 6, 1901, restricting and controlling trade in Leyte. The circular was not intended as a willful interference with civil control in that province, and its provisions were in effect agreed upon by the provincial governor and General Smith, but this view was not accepted by the Philippine Commission when passing upon a complaint of a trader whose business was interfered with, notwithstanding his business may have indirectly contributed to prolong the opposition to our troops. General Smith's object was to defeat insurrection in his brigade, which included the island of Leyte. It all resulted in correspondence

between the vice civil governor and myself, which has in part appeared in public print. Notwithstanding the cause of this correspondence has quite disappeared by the surrender of the enemy in both islands, I think it best that all papers appear of record, and they are hereto appended, marked "B."

Prior to October, 1901, the number of troops in Samar were too few to campaign for a peace. The most that could be done under the circumstances was for the soldiers to remain idle in the numerous occupied stations and talk; many stations were inadequately garrisoned, particularly was this so after the successful attack on Company C, Ninth Infantry, at Balangiga. This affair was followed on October 16 by an attack on a detachment of Company E, Ninth Infantry, near the mouth of the Gandara River, resulting in a loss of ten of our men killed and six wounded, nearly all by bolos. There seems to have been six rifles in the attacking party, three of which were captured on the field. Other attempts were made to rush our small stations, notably at Calbiga and at Dapdap, which were unsuccessful, and at Weyler, where a small force was practically besieged for a day or two.

Being satisfied that unceasing military activity, which should harass, fatigue, and positively distress for food and supplies of every kind necessary to warfare by the active forces of the insurrection, would soonest end opposition to the United States authority, that idea was pushed to the end in Samar. Enough additional troops were forwarded to the island as soon as possible after the Balangiga affair to strengthen the weak places and provide a force for active scouting. It fell to the lot of these troops to surmount apparently impossible physical difficulties, and to withstand the demoralizing influence of prolonged mental strain due to apprehension of ambush made possible at every step through the tropical jungle. Only the officers and men who actually participated in the work of hunting for the enemy in the pathless wilderness of the island can form an appreciative idea of the hardship which the terrain and climate exacted from all the scouting parties.

The end of the insurrection in Samar was secured quite as soon as could be hoped for. Lucban was captured February 18, 1902, by a scouting party composed of soldiers and native scouts commanded by First Lieut. Alphonse Strebler of the Thirty-ninth Company, Philippine Scouts. Lucban, on being asked to use his influence with a view to the surrender of his officers and men, demurred at first, but subsequently changed his mind and wrote several letters, which were sent out, being carried by friendly natives.

Guevara succeeded Lucban, and forbade his men to give attention to the latter's letters. Later Guevara consented to meet General Smith on the Gandara River, and did so about March 15. It was agreed that hostilities should cease for fifteen days, that Guevara should discuss matters with his officers, and on April 15 to surrender all the men he could control. The date of surrender was postponed to the 20th, and finally fixed for the 26th and 27th, on which dates it was effected at Catbalogan to Gen. Frederick D. Grant, who had succeeded General Smith in command of the Sixth Brigade.

Provincial civil government for the island was established on June 17, 1902, by act No. 419 of the Philippine Commission, which was announced to the troops serving therein on June 21, 1902, in General Orders, No. 133, from headquarters Division of the Philippines.

BATANGAS, LAGUNA, AND TAYABAS.

On the organization of the division into seven separate brigades, the third embraced the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and the island of Mindoro, also the provinces of Cavite, the eastern half of Tayabas, and the southern half of Rizal, wherein civil government had been established and was in operation.

June 24, 1901, an important surrender was effected in Laguna (General Cailles and his men), and a considerable force in Tayabas on July 24 (Colonel Zurbano and his troops). These events are referred to as important only for the reason that it was believed by some the surrenders would influence for like action other forces under the leadership of Malvar, and thus end in Batangas the widespread opposition in that province. But Malvar, the recognized leader of the insurrection in the islands at this time, and personally in command of the force in Batangas and adjacent provinces, made no sign that he would surrender. Appeals were made to him to do so, as was alleged by persons who could communicate with him. As one instance: In July, 1901, a petition numerously signed by women of Lipa was dispatched to the wife of Malvar, begging her influence for a cessation of the war.

Malvar continued to organize and enroll the inhabitants. Our troops scouted as frequently as information (usually proved false or late) gave indication of the location of any station of Malvar's force. For five months much work on the part of the troops was practically barren of beneficial results. The discontinuance of the Department of Southern Luzon, November 30, brought under control of one department commander all the troops located in the island of Luzon; this enabled one general officer to act upon the whole island with directness, and as conditions justified moving troops as required. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner was transferred to the First Brigade, Gen. James F. Bell to the Third Brigade, to take effect November 30.

I may remark that the changes indicated were talked about as preparations for a campaign that when once undertaken would not cease until Malvar's troops should surrender. The purpose of this was to rouse men of influence, who talked against Malvar and for peace but did nothing actively toward that end, to exert themselves, and as a consequence a public meeting was held in Manila November 12, at which suitable resolutions were adopted and committees appointed. On request of this committee, 37 passes were issued by me authorizing bearer to convey messages to Malvar; the permits were limited as regards time to December 31. Seemingly it was not an easy matter to communicate with Malvar; all who supported him were loyal, and guarded the avenues to him with very great care and caution. A communication from Señor Paterno to Malvar, indorsed by me in December, to the effect that no obstacle, by our troops, should be put in the way of its delivery, was received by Malvar only a day or two before his surrender, April 16.

On October 18 I received from Governor Taft a communication informing me that Señor Felipe G. Calderon, a prominent Filipino attorney of Manila, was desirous of undertaking a mission to Malvar. (For a copy of this letter and my reply thereto see Appendix C.) Señor Calderon called at my headquarters and I gave him all the assistance requested, and released Señor Martin Cabrera, an influential

resident of Taal, whom he desired should accompany him. They proceeded to Batangas, where they secured the assistance of Señor Potenciano Hilario, who was alleged to be an influential adviser of Malvar, and by some thought to be insurgent governor of Batangas. Señor Calderon soon returned to Manila to attend to his law business. He informed me that he would be called by telegraph as soon as communication with Malvar should be arranged for. Shortly after General Bell assumed command of the brigade he ascertained that Señor Hilario was Malvar's governor of Batangas province. Both Hilario and Cabrera were arrested and confined by General Bell, but later gave assistance of value to him and were released. A copy of my letter to Governor Taft was furnished to General Bell as a basis of the terms which could end military operations in his command; and General Wheaton, department commander, was verbally requested to support him with advice and all the troops necessary. Malvar knew, of course, that he could secure a cessation of hostilities at any time by a surrender of his troops with their arms. Pending communication or other action on his part for a surrender the duty of the troops was not difficult to discern, and no attempt was permitted to befog the purpose in view—to compel his surrender.

The long-continued resistance in the province of Batangas and in certain parts of the bordering provinces of Tayabas, Laguna, and Cavite had made it apparent to me and to others that the insurrectionary force keeping up the struggle there could exist and maintain itself only through the connivance and knowledge of practically all the inhabitants; that it received the active support of many who professed friendship for United States authority; some of these lived in the large towns and others were scattered in barrios over the entire territory. The intelligent element of the section controlled the ignorant masses as perfectly as ever a captain controlled the men of his company. General Bell's investigations developed evidence satisfactorily alike to himself, to the department commander (General Wheaton), and to me that the inhabitants of the province of Batangas were largely insurrectionary; that either directly and willingly, as was the case with the more intelligent class from which the leaders were drawn, or by coercion of the uneducated and ignorant, over whom that class exerted a powerful influence, a considerable number of armed and unarmed men living in protected places actively served the cause of the insurrection, either as soldiers in the field, as occasion required, or as agents in the towns and barrios supplying food, clothing, and information. Such a state of affairs might have continued to exist for months, if not for years, unless prompt and effective steps were taken to put an end to these conditions.

General Bell's interpretations of the laws of war for the guidance of his troops, which in no instance are strained by said interpretations, made operative measures that required the people who were disposed toward peace and order and living outside military observation should separate themselves with their effects from such as were not disposed to peace, and that while so separated required their actions to be honestly neutral, or, if not neutral, honestly hostile to the enemy. The object in view was peace, not war—the recognition of United States authority where it was presumed that authority was properly entitled to be respected by all the inhabitants. The effect of the policy was

the disturbance of a minor, not the major, part of the people in their homes, as the latter lived in the many pueblos and barrios occupied by the troops. The scattered inhabitants who were easiest preyed upon by the armed insurgents moved from their houses to the towns. It was found necessary to arrest and confine three or four hundred of the intelligent class in order to remove the influence of the masters over the masses of the population, not a few of whom were officials for the insurgents as well as for the army administration, or, if not officials, then active agents of the insurrection professing loyalty to the United States while living within the protection of her troops. These arrests gave confidence to many fearful and half-hearted natives, who, freed from domination by the insurgents and afforded sure and ample protection within our lines, gave active and hearty support to our troops. All the conditions justified the course of action determined upon as the most humane as well as the most certain to speedily end the insurrection. Events proved this beyond any question. With efforts to end the war went ample preparation to meet the unusual condition occasioned by such assembling of the inhabitants as was effected. As a single item in this regard, 15,000,000 pounds of rice were transported by the Government to the several places where needed and sold at a less cost than obtainable in ordinary times, and, so far as known, the life of no native was lost as a consequence of insufficient food.

The first operations of General Bell were begun January 1, 1902, and terminated with the surrender of Malvar, April 16. The island of Mindoro had previously been quieted. A detailed account of the field operations which brought about the foregoing results will be found in the report of Brig. Gen. James F. Bell, as commander of the Third Separate Brigade.

It is proper, and certainly just, that I request removal of all censure that has been publicly passed upon General Bell with reference to his telegraphic circulars of instruction to the troops of his command during the period referred to. These circulars came to me daily as issued and it was, of course, within my authority to disapprove of any one or to all of them. I think it best that responsibility attach, not to my subordinate when acting within my personal knowledge, but to me, who was kept advised and could have quickly disapproved if deemed advisable to do so.

On June 23, 1902, by act No. 421 of the Philippine Commission, so much of act No. 173, of July 17, 1901, as transferred the province of Batangas to military control was revoked. Civil government was reestablished in the province at 12 o'clock noon, July 4, 1903. On July 1, 1902, the Philippine Commission organized the province of Laguna for civil government by the passage of act No. 424, thus extending on that date "the provincial government act" to that section. On June 23, 1902, by act No. 423 of the Philippine Commission, the island of Mindoro was annexed to the province of Marinduque, and, with certain modifications, "the provincial government act" became effective on that island, thus extending to it the benefits of civil government. The passage of the foregoing acts was duly announced in general orders from the headquarters of the division for the information and guidance of the troops serving within those sections.

SEVENTH SEPARATE BRIGADE. MINDANAO, JOLO.

MORO SOVEREIGNTY, HOSTILES, ETC.

An account of the engagement of May 2, commonly termed "the bayan fight", but more properly, "the assault on the cotta of Pandapatan" is fully recited by Generals Davis and Baldwin, and is deserving of mention here not only because of the gallantry displayed by our troops, but because of the fact that it is believed to be the first instance of record where a successful attack has been made on the southern Lake Lanao Moros, who had always considered themselves invincible. Of their fortifications and methods of resistance much is historically new, though both savor of mediæval times.

It will require time, tact, and patience to establish United States authority over all the Moro settlements, but the purpose to do so should never be lost sight of. The sooner the sultan of Jolo's title, actual or assumed, as sovereign and as sole owner of land in the Jolo Archipelago is quieted the better for the situation. Probably there is little doubt that a money consideration would relieve the situation of his claim and presence; and if this be done, laws, just but simple and so plainly stated as to be understood by the Moro population generally, could be enforced through the *datos* upon their followers without much trouble or frequent resort to force. It will be impossible for many years to ignore chieftainships—*datos*—and to deal directly with the individual Moros as is done with civilized, Christian people. It will, however, be a long step ahead for the inhabitants of the Jolo Archipelago when the *datos* are independent of the sultan and recognize the United States as the only sovereignty to whom allegiance is due, and as the only authority empowered to enact laws for the government of the inhabitants and the country; that all the inhabitants are equal before the law; that Christian people have a right to live. These few simple propositions acknowledged, the government of the Moro people would not be at all difficult. But to advance so far will consume much time, and may result in occasional conflict; for the modification of present beliefs to accord with the above ideas will in some cases require that military force be used.

We have this very plainly shown in our dealings thus far with the Lake Lanao Moros in Mindanao. In this instance we have used force only to the degree that has been necessary to make it plainly understood that murder of unoffending soldiers or other persons entitled to protection is a matter that can not be permitted to pass unnoticed; also that the authority of the United States over the territory inhabited by them may not be questioned to such an extent as forcibly resisting troops that visit that region in a friendly spirit, or other persons who in the future may desire to do so. At the present time and notwithstanding every assurance we can give that our presence at the lake is not intended to disturb the Moros in their homes, customs, or religion; that we have demonstrated our desire not to use force to crush them, we are still disdained and treated contemptuously by several of the most powerful *datos* in that section. Our reason for inaction, though the troops have often been provoked by the repeated murdering of unoffending soldiers, is misunderstood by these *datos*, who believe us to be cowards—afraid to attack their defenses. The fight at Bayan on May 2 seems not to have convinced them to the contrary. We can

do nothing to change the war spirit and the desire for conflict associated in the minds of such chiefs without the application of force to humble them in their pride and assumed invincibility. I fear this will have to be done in three or four instances. Our intercourse with the Moros at the lake has not extended beyond the south shore and does not include all of that, though an army officer unattended has upon invitation visited some of the Moros at the northern end without molestation.

Special attention is invited to the report of Maj. Gen. George W. Davis in command of the Moro country from the last of August, 1901, to July 10, 1902, when he was relieved by General Sumner. General Davis very carefully presents the results of his experience as commanding general, and submits his opinion of the character of the inhabitants of Mindanao and of the Jolo and adjacent group of islands, involving Christian, Moro, semisavage, and savage. He refers to the overlapping of civil and military administration due to the presence of Moro inhabitants in sections under civil administration, and to the fact that the civil laws do not apply to Moros as to Christians. General Davis's report of October 24, 1901, was referred to the civil governor of the archipelago, it being understood that the Philippine Commission had under consideration the enactment of laws to especially apply to the Moro country and non-Christian tribes, and it was believed the Commission would be pleased to receive for consideration any suggestion that General Davis might offer. Other papers received from General Davis treating of matters affecting the Moro tribes, their trade relations, organization of provincial government, etc., have likewise been sent to the civil governor with the view of placing in the hands of the Philippine Commission—the lawmaking power—all the information obtained by the Army which might be of use to it when framing laws. It is believed by the undersigned that the War Department will look directly to the Philippine Commission for a solution of this question of government for Moros and others not included in past legislation.

Probably no civil process can be enforced in Moro communities for a long time without the presence of a military force adequate to the occasion, whatever that may be. Usually it will need to be so strong as to produce apprehension that harm may result to numbers if compliance with demands be not acceded to. There is danger to harmony involved where the military are called upon to enforce writs issued by civil courts, as it is an easy matter to formulate a writ, but it will not be often executed without opposition, perhaps necessitating the actual use of force by troops. Tact and discretion by the military in such a situation is of the utmost importance, but if discretion in carrying out the orders of a court are not permissible a crisis may be precipitated; if discretion is permissible, the exercise of it is likely to become a source of criticism and on occasion lead up to serious embarrassment between civil and military officials. Superior to both these branches of government there should be one head. Therefore, in my opinion, the best government for the islands of Mindanao and the Jolo Archipelago is military-civil; the governor to be a general officer selected for his administrative ability for civil as well as for military affairs, to be assisted by three or four civilian lieutenant-governors with duly prescribed duties of administrative control over clearly defined sections of country. The division commander, after consulta-

tion with the civil governor, should appoint lieutenant-governors, judges, magistrates, and other civil officials necessary to administer those duties, collect revenues, etc. Revenues of every character should be created a separate fund and made available for public improvements, instruction, salaries, police, etc., to be expended for the advancement and benefit of the inhabitants of this undeveloped country. The division commander should prepare and announce in orders, rules, and regulations for the guidance of civil officials and formulate and publish such simple laws and rules of conduct as experience would prove applicable and workable for the government and control of the simple and half-savage Moros and primitive natives who constitute more than 85 per cent of the population. On the minds of this class the military power of the governor would have a more potent influence, whether used or not, than can be exerted by a purely civil administrator through civil officials. The small percentage of the population (less than 15 per cent) which has attained to a higher plane of civilization ought to be required to accommodate itself to such a scheme. By the adoption of the foregoing suggestions the governor would be the executive and responsible head, with authority over both civil and military subordinates and with an adequate force at his immediate command to enforce law, order, and respect for United States authority.

OTHER SECTIONS OF THE DIVISION.

In the provinces and other sections embraced by the First, Second (into which the First was merged June 30, 1902), Fourth, and Fifth Separate Brigades, beyond a considerable reduction in the strength of each and the evacuation by the troops of numerous stations, little of special interest has occurred. In the territory included in these brigades the military arm has used its best endeavors to assist civil officials in the transition of authority that has taken place, and as rapidly as it was possible to do so have transferred the police power to the insular constabulary which the Commission organized as a substitute. As this force was organized, recruited, and prepared to assume the responsibilities of police, the military turned over those duties; and at this writing the Army in the above brigades is on a peace status. In the sections recently disturbed troops are being withdrawn from all participation in civil affairs as rapidly as civil organization in its various details can be perfected. This has practically been completed in all of them except Batangas and Samar, where it is expected to be accomplished by the end of next December.

By act No. 422 of the Philippine Commission the Cuyos and Calamianes groups of islands, and all that part of Paragua lying north of the tenth parallel, were organized into a civil province and transferred to civil control, which was announced to the troops on July 3, 1902, by General Orders, No. 149, Division of the Philippines.

All parts of the archipelago, except what is known as the Moro country, have been formally organized for civil government and turned over to its officials, thus freeing the Army from supervisory or actual control over its inhabitants or their affairs.

CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS AND REDUCTION IN STATIONS.

In my report of last year I referred in anticipation to partial concentration of the troops in the division and to the necessity of pro-

vision being made for quartering them. For the three months following, i. e., October, November, and December, 1901, it was impracticable to effect any concentration, and in fact, the number of occupied places was increased during this period to 639, as is shown on the maximum station map transmitted with this report. However, about the middle of December conditions in certain parts of the division warranted the withdrawal of troops from many occupied places. This was begun in that part of the island of Luzon north of the Pasig River by the withdrawal of troops from that section, some of which were used in other parts of the division and others returned to the United States. Wherever it was possible to withdraw a garrison from a town without jeopardizing good order it was done. The same policy of abandoning stations was continued in other parts of the division as rapidly as conditions seemed to warrant, and with the exception of the Third and Sixth Brigades, a very material reduction in the number was effected by the 1st of April last. Since that time the collapse of the insurrection in Batangas and in Samar has enabled a material reduction in the number of stations in those provinces also, so that at this writing there are 178 occupied places. These are shown on the minimum station map transmitted with this report. Thus a reduction in the number of stations amounting to 461 has been made as shown. This has been effected, as already stated, by the material reduction of troops, and in large measure by the withdrawal of company detachments to the station of the captain. There are very few places in the Philippine Islands that afford shelter for more than one organization without material inconvenience to the inhabitants. I have directed that amicable arrangements be made for the use of all private property occupied by us; that in no instance shall private property be seized and held contrary to the wishes of the owner.

Owing to active operations extending to as late a date as April, the selection of sites for battalion garrisons has not been made by me to the extent that I hoped for by this time; another reason, too, I was not informed until quite recently that funds would be furnished to provide shelter for troops, and necessarily continued arrangements as heretofore. The million and one-half dollars authorized to cover troops this year will not accomplish more than to provide what I may term "temporary shelter," i. e., buildings constructed from native material, sides and roof of nipa or grass. Sites for permanent posts should not be purchased until the locality has been tested for health, water, etc. It would, I think, be better to lease for a year or two ground upon which to construct temporary buildings than to purchase outright.

On the island of Mindanao and in the Jolo Archipelago circumstances have practically determined the sites which we must occupy, and nothing will be lost as regards economy if the troops stationed there are immediately well covered by erecting substantial buildings.

POST NEAR MANILA.

Land has been secured for a large post to be built on the left bank of the Pasig River about 6 miles from Manila, and a board of officers convened to carefully consider the various details connected with its establishment. The general plan for barracks and quarters has re-

ceived my approval, and a wagon road from the river landing to the high ground where the principal buildings are to be erected has been laid out, which will be macadamized and completed within a few months. The rainy season seriously impedes work of any kind.

The project for the post contemplates a garrison of 2 regiments of infantry, 2 squadrons of cavalry, and 2 batteries of field artillery, and provisions for quartering a command of this size have been considered. The estimates for construction, so far as we are yet able to present them, will average about \$13,000 a barrack for each company organization and \$4,500 per set of officer's quarters. In providing for the latter it is assumed two-thirds of all grades will be present. Five plans for officers' quarters, varying in size and estimated cost, will be required, viz: No. 1, colonel, \$6,000; No. 2, other field officers, \$4,500; Nos. 3 and 4, captains and lieutenants, \$4,000; No. 5 (to accommodate 8 single officers), \$4,500; for 1 general officer, \$10,000.

The constructing quartermaster's estimate of buildings required and costs, clearing of ground, making roads, water service, etc., is as follows:

ESTIMATE OF COST OF CONSTRUCTING THE NEW POST NEAR MANILA.

[For two regiments of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and two batteries of field artillery, to be commanded by a brigadier-general.]

The buildings necessary for one regiment of infantry are as follows:

12 barracks, at \$13,000.....	\$156,000
1 band barrack.....	6,000
1 officer's quarters, No. 1 (colonel).....	6,000
2 officers' quarters, No. 2, at \$4,500 (field officers).....	9,000
20 officers' quarters, Nos. 3 and 4, at \$4,000 (captains and lieutenants).....	80,000
2 officers' quarters, No. 5, at \$4,500 (brigade officers).....	9,000
Noncommissioned staff quarters.....	5,000
Administration building, including schoolrooms.....	5,000
Guardhouse.....	5,000
3 storehouses, at \$4,000.....	12,000
Total for one regiment.....	293,000
Total for two regiments.....	586,000

One squadron of cavalry.

4 barracks, at \$13,000.....	52,000
1 officer's quarters, No. 2.....	4,500
4 officers' quarters, Nos. 3 and 4, at \$4,000.....	16,000
1 officer's quarters, No. 5.....	4,500
1 storehouse.....	4,000
4 stables, at \$5,000.....	20,000
Total for one squadron.....	101,000
Total for two squadrons.....	202,000

Two batteries of field artillery.

2 barracks, at \$20,000.....	40,000
1 officer's quarters, No. 2.....	4,500
4 officers' quarters, Nos. 3 and 4, at \$4,000.....	16,000
2 gun sheds, at \$2,000.....	4,000
2 stables, at \$6,000.....	12,000
1 storehouse.....	4,000
Total for two batteries.....	80,500

Additional buildings for cavalry and artillery subpost.

1 band barrack	\$6, 000
1 officer's quarters, No. 1	6, 000
2 officers' quarters, Nos. 3 and 4, at \$4,000	8, 000
1 administration building	5, 000
1 guardhouse	5, 000
Quarters for noncommissioned staff	5, 000

Total	35, 000
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Total for two squadrons and two batteries	317, 500
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Buildings for general purposes.

Commanding general's quarters	10, 000
4 officers' quarters, No. 2, at \$4,500	18, 000
7 officers' quarters, Nos. 3 or 4, at \$4,000	28, 000
1 officer's quarters, No. 5	4, 500
General administration building	12, 000
Hospital, 150 beds (5 per cent of command)	90, 000
Officers' club	12, 000
5 picket guardhouses, at \$1,000	5, 000
Quartermaster stables for 200 animals	12, 500
Bakery	10, 000
Shops	9, 000
Barracks for employees	20, 000

Total	231, 000
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Water supply.

8,000 feet 12-inch, 10,000 feet 8-inch, 10,000 feet 6-inch, and 12,000 feet 4-inch cast-iron pipe—800 tons, at \$40	32, 000
15,000 feet 2-inch, 15,000 feet 1-inch, and 10,000 feet $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch wrought-iron pipe—40,000 feet	5, 000
80 fire hydrants, at \$20	1, 600
200 yard hydrants and street washers, at \$5	1, 000
14 tons lead fittings, etc.	2, 000
Pumping machinery and boilers	10, 000
Pump house	3, 000
Wells	15, 000
Reservoir, 500,000 gallons capacity	50, 000
Labor	10, 000
Foundations for machinery, 300 cubic yards, at \$5	1, 500

Total	131, 100
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Roads, walks, etc.

12 miles of road, 18 feet wide, 126,720 square yards, at 30 cents	33, 016
20 miles of walks, 6 feet wide, 70,400 square yards, at 15 cents	14, 080
Picket lines, 4,000 square yards, at 20 cents	800
Company parades, 5,000 square yards, at 15 cents	750

Total	53, 646
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RECAPITULATION.

For buildings	1, 134, 500
For water supply	131, 100
For roads, walks, etc	53, 646

Total	1, 319, 246
Add 5 per cent for contingencies	65, 962

Total	1, 385, 208
Add to this the cost of the land	55, 000

Total	1, 440, 208
Deduct (already appropriated)	500, 000

Leaves still required	940, 208
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The quartermaster remarks:

These estimates, with the exception of that for roads and walks, are all based on the cost of material in the United States, contemplating no payment from the appropriation for this post for transportation or handling from the point of purchase to the site of the post.

The necessary expenditures for transportation will be large, and even if all material were brought over on ships owned by the United States at practically no cost for ocean transportation very considerable expense will be involved in transporting it up the river to the site. On lumber alone it is estimated this will cost about \$3.40 a thousand. I should say that the cost of transportation of material from the bay to the site alone would cost at least \$50,000.

The data from which these estimates are made up can not be considered in all cases reliable, as it is not based on actual experience, but it is believed the cost will more likely be over than under the figures given.

In the estimate for "roads and walks," I have taken roads at a width of 18 feet. A portion at least of the roads will have to be a little wider. Those now under construction by the Engineer Department are 30 feet wide; but neither the estimates for the roads and walks nor the water supply are based on actual measurements on the ground, but the lengths estimated on are taken roughly from the map of the reservation, and it is believed that they are the minimum quantities that will be required.

I am not able to furnish even an approximate estimate of what the sewer system would cost, and there is also much grading and land drainage to be done, which will cost many thousand dollars.

In my opinion, the least amount which will be required in addition to the \$500,000 already appropriated to complete the post will be \$1,000,000; but I do not think more than half of this will be required during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1904.

In my report of last year I made a rough estimate of \$500,000 for cost of construction—lumber, pipe, iron, etc., from the United States. Later I informed the Department that the cost of the latter items would be additional to \$500,000; that is to say, I assumed that \$500,000 would be necessary to expend for labor, and that material would be brought here in Government transports. It has been observed from communications received from the War Department that the purchase price of the site has been charged against the \$500,000 appropriated for this post, also that material of all sorts needed for preparation and construction is to be made a charge against it; therefore I recommend an additional appropriation amounting to \$1,000,000.

The land which has been purchased is admirably adapted for the purpose in view. The elevation is sufficient and the roll of the surface such as to admit of excellent drainage when the rice-paddy dikes have been leveled and the ground rolled. But with almost perfect drainage the soil is of such a character that all roads and walks have to be macadamized. The expense will be considerable for this item; also to properly clear the ground. Securing of competent mechanics in this vicinity in such numbers as will be desirable may present a very serious question for solution. It will certainly be serious on account of expense, if the men have to be brought from the United States at rate of wages hitherto paid.

STAFF OFFICERS' REPORTS.

The reports of the adjutant-general (Appendix A^a), inspector-general (Appendix B^a), judge-advocate (Appendix C^a), chief quartermaster (Appendix D^a), chief commissary (Appendix E^a), chief surgeon (Appendix F^a), chief paymaster (Appendix G^a), chief engineer (Appendix H^a), chief ordnance officer (Appendix I^a), and chief signal officer (Appendix J^a), hereto appended, cover a wide field of administration, to which

^a Not printed.

attention is respectfully invited for details and statistical information, always important. The time necessary to properly summarize these reports in order to comply with General Orders, No. 47, Adjutant-General's Office, May 31, 1902, received the middle of August, was not available. They have been prepared with care and with an evident desire to exhibit a true condition of the affairs of each department by its superior chief in the division.

Briefly I may say with reference to the departments of supply and equipment that commerce between the islands is not yet of sufficient volume to support regular lines of steamers for call at even one-half the coast points occupied by troops, so it is impossible to depend on commercial ships for regularity and promptness in the transportation of troops and supplies. Regularity of communication and supply is too important a matter to be neglected; without it serious hardship and much discontent among the troops follow, and great and expensive delay to the public business ensues. It is therefore necessary for the Quartermaster's Department to provide and control such facilities for transportation as are deemed necessary to reasonably meet all the demands of the service. Stress has occasionally forced some departure from the intent to limit the use of transportation to our controlled facilities, but this will be less frequent the current year than during the one just passed. The abandonment of many stations will count for large economy in time consumed by ships in making ports and discharging cargo. Effort has been made, not always with success, to have a ship touch at all occupied coast towns as often as twice each month. The volume of business in this line conducted by the Quartermaster's Department—handling of passengers, freight, and animals—has been very large, as is shown by the report of the chief quartermaster, yet at no time has the public interest with reference to economy of this costly branch of the service in the division been lost sight of. No just complaint may properly be lodged by other departments against the Quartermaster's Department because of a failure to provide transportation for stores the very day called for. To avoid occasional complaint on this head transportation facilities would need to have been doubled.

The subsistence of the troops has been markedly successful, all conditions of sea and roads, all circumstances of locality and manifold difficulty of communication, being fairly considered. Fresh meat and vegetables have not reached all stations in quantity to be desired. The chief commissary has duly explained the impossibility to adequately supply the former by local purchases.

Entirely satisfactory repair at the Manila ordnance depot can now be made to a large part of the soldier's equipment—unserviceable but repairable—which otherwise would be destroyed as not being worth the expense of return to an arsenal in the United States. Considerable storage facilities are found located in the wall inclosing the depot on two sides which are at present unfit for general use because of great dampness, as stated in the report of the chief ordnance officer. The roof should be cleared of vegetation, seams pointed up, the surface concreted and covered with cement mortar. It may be practicable to make the necessary repairs from funds allotted for the present year. Some change in the occupancy of the buildings to be amicably arranged for the convenience of the ordnance depot and the artillery

garrison at Fort Santiago is practicable, and if done will certainly add to the comfort of the officers of artillery who are at present inadequately provided with quarters. The change of power from steam to electricity is perhaps desirable, but I do not believe it really necessary just now.

It is needful for one to possess accurate information of conditions attending upon the situation here where a large military force is widely dispersed over a great archipelago, with infrequent water communication and limited mail service on land, to fully appreciate the valuable services of the officers and men of the Signal Corps. The telegraph and telephone service is indispensable to the operation of government in these islands, and it is no exaggeration to say public business would become extremely tedious and burdensome without their present ramifications. The service can not be curtailed because of expense for maintenance, and whatever the cost it must be cheerfully borne, for the telegraph is a very potent factor in contributing toward the maintenance of peace and order. To the enlisted men of the corps, especially to those operators who undergo much isolation and the line men who are seldom at rest, all thoughtful persons will extend hearty congratulations for a condition of telegraph service generally satisfactory, and which can be obtained in no other way than through their high sense of duty. Commendable efficiency can be alleged as effecting this corps during the year. Seemingly nothing of value has yet resulted from what may be termed a tentative effort to teach telegraphy to the natives, and I apprehend it will be a long time before a sufficient number can be so instructed as to fully and effectively man the more than five thousand miles of wire and cable now in use.

A cable repair ship will always be necessary in these waters. The transport *Burnside* is equipped for this service and for laying cable with facility. As regards the latter work, the end is practically at hand. When Marinduque is connected with Masbate via Romblon (the cable is arriving), cable extension will be completed up to the limit of provision by the insular government. The demand for the ship will then depend on accidents to cables. Of the several occurring during the year all but two were caused by ship anchors. When the cable was originally laid anchorage grounds should have been avoided. When the *Burnside* is not employed in cable work she is liable to the service of the Quartermaster's Department, but her stern and midship cable tanks are much in the way for proper handling of freight. In my opinion they should be removed. The forward tank will answer for all purposes of cable repair and extension up to 200 miles. If some delay and inconvenience is occasioned by overhaul of cable it is a small matter which may not happen once in a year. It is only natural that the chief signal officer should wish the transport kept in its present fully equipped condition for cable service, but this does not, I think, satisfy fully the public interest; to maintain the ship exclusively for the occasional use of one department would not be economy, when without crippling it for that use a few changes will render it a valuable auxiliary for emergencies of transportation. The expert personnel of the cable service should be utilized on shore when the ship is in the service of the Quartermaster's Department.

The oscillation of the percentage of sick in the command has not exceeded two and one-half points during the year. The maximum was

8.51 per cent for August, 1901; the minimum 6.01 per cent for May, 1902. The deaths in the division for the year as a result of battle are 9 officers and 125 enlisted men, as against 20 officers and 219 enlisted men for the previous year. Of the 26 causes of death tabulated by the chief surgeon, dysentery is the most prominent, viz, 3 officers and 180 enlisted men. The total deaths for the year were 27 officers and 856 men, as against 43 officers and 1,285 men for the previous year. Three officers and more than 175 men have died from Asiatic cholera since March. Many of the deaths from this cause among soldiers are undoubtedly due to willful disregard of timely explained dangerous practices and failure to avoid known localities of infection. I have heard of no instance where army medical officers and also other officers of the military service have not willingly extended aid to suppress the disease when desired or when they were permitted to do so. While the number of deaths of natives and others not of the military service reaches nearly 44,000 the lives of many thousands of natives have been saved through the influence exercised by the Army in localities where precaution is regarded as of little or of no avail.

The inspector-general mentions in some detail a disease that has generally attacked American stock throughout the archipelago, and has been specially virulent in the islands of Luzon and Panay, though that part of Luzon north of Dagupan has not suffered to so great an extent as further south. The disease is called "surra." Effort has been made to trace its origin; how it is transmitted, and for some specific remedy for its treatment or cure, without any measurable degree of success. It is supposed that the disease is transmitted by the fly or mosquito. Many persons believe that it arises from the consumption of native grasses by American stock, but personally I do not support this theory. It seems that the disease is worse during the rainy season than during the dry weather. As yet no specific remedy has been discovered for its treatment or cure, and so far as is known no animal that has been attacked has recovered. Its ravages are rapidly depleting our horses and mules. The loss due to this disease presents a trying problem in maintaining the proper number of animals for efficient service.

Owing to infrequency of opportunity for travel from island to island, and between many stations on the same island that can be reached by water only, the officers of the inspector-general's department undergo very considerable difficulties and experience long and tedious delays in the performance of their duties. For the same reason much time is necessarily consumed in making inquiry into matters specially referred to the officers of this staff department for investigation which involve travel to enable compliance.

The dispersion of the troops at more than six hundred stations, many of them small barrios offering little storage room, afforded inadequate facilities for ample protection of public property, a part of which was necessarily more or less exposed; then, too, as the military situation changed, frequent and sudden movements of troops were required for field service, often leaving but a small guard to care for the station during the absence of its garrison; as a natural result, particularly in this climate, more than ordinary damage to property and stores resulted, which explains in some measure the considerable amount of property presented to the inspectors for final disposition. Such loss is the result of a condition of war and follows in its wake.

A very considerable reduction of troops in the division during the past year has left a large surplus of stores not necessary for present requirements. Retaining at least a year's supply for 20,000 men, much of the surplus that is new and fit for issue is being returned to the United States. If retained here the stores will deteriorate and loss will ensue before all can be issued in the division.

Troops have been paid with a fair degree of regularity, but the officers of the Pay Department, like the inspectors mentioned above, have encountered the same difficulties and delays in reaching commands.

The officers and men of the Engineer Corps have largely been engaged in civil work in superintending the building of roads, bridges, and wharves in various parts of the archipelago from funds provided by the insular government, but some reconnoissance work and mapping have been done. For the details of this work attention is invited to the report of the Chief Engineer Officer, who, in referring to roads and trails, remarks:

To properly connect the important military and commercial centers of the islands with the various sections of rich agricultural country will require many years in time and millions in money.

In which I fully concur. From a personal knowledge of their present condition, of the terrain generally and of the climate, I know the above statement to be true.

PHILIPPINE SCOUTS.

In September, 1901, it seemed the conditions formerly requiring a few natives, as scouts, to be attached to each regular organization had so changed that consolidation into actual company organizations could be effected; therefore, General Orders, No. 293, was issued on September 27, 1901. It required that all natives of the islands employed in the military service and known generally as "native scouts" should be organized into companies following the organization, control, and administration of a company of infantry, with a total authorized strength of 104, but where circumstances warranted the total authorized strength need not be employed. The companies to be officered by first and second lieutenants preferably of the Philippine scouts when available. The provincial name of natives forming each company should appear. The Department of Northern Luzon was directed to organize 28 companies; the Department of Southern Luzon, 6; The Department of Visayas, 13, and the Department of Mindanao and Jolo, 3—50 companies in all; to be armed with the Springfield rifle or carbine, caliber .45; organization to be gradual, beginning in the Department of Northern Luzon. The order contemplated the natives so employed to be contract scouts, paid as formerly from insular funds; but on September 30 telegraphic instructions from the War Department, of September 28, directed the discharge of all scouts, and the enlistment for three years of natives so employed, thus putting into effect section 36 of the act approved February 2, 1901; these men to be paid from regular army appropriations. In these particulars only was it necessary to modify the order of September 27.

A little difficulty was experienced in securing natives for a three years' enlistment, many desiring some assurance that they would not be transferred for duty to any great distance from their home localities, but this prejudice to a considerable degree has been overcome, and now 50 companies are completely organized and equipped, with a total

strength in round numbers of 5,000. Fifty first and 50 second lieutenants each, holding a provisional appointment for four years, have, after careful selection, been appointed and assigned to duty, 1 first and 1 second lieutenant to each company. These officers are proving satisfactory and capable, and of the number 3 are natives of the islands—1 a Tagalog, 1 an Ilocano, and 1 a Viscayan.

This force consists of 11 companies Macabebes, 13 companies Ilocanos, 4 companies Cagayans (Northern Luzon), 4 companies Tagolos, 2 companies Bicolis, 6 companies Visayans, and are serving as any other regular company organizations. They are fairly efficient and effective on the whole, and when carefully officered and looked after serve their purpose well. They may be regarded as a successful adjunct to the regular military establishment in the archipelago. To better enable this native soldiery to learn by contact our methods, ideas, and conduct generally of soldiers toward civilians, it is deemed best in its distribution to station one or more companies of natives, as far as practicable, in garrison with organizations of United States troops. At present this is often impossible, but with building of cantonments or permanent garrisons it should be done.

The act of Congress authorizing this force provided that the captains for organized companies were to be selected by the President from the first lieutenants of the line of the Regular Army, and appointed provisionally for four years, and while it is desirable that this be done, yet I hesitate to recommend it now, because of the fact that a large number of officers are already detached from regiments for many and various reasons, so that they are poorly prepared to spare the 50 first lieutenants for the purpose of furnishing captains for the 50 organized companies of native troops. The native companies have usually two officers present, and are in better condition than are regular organizations, which rarely have more than this number actually present for duty with them. It does not seem the time has yet arrived for organizing native troops into battalions, and, for the present, it is not recommended.

ASSISTANCE FROM THE NAVY.

The assistance which the Navy has given to the Army during the year is, in times, too numerous to detail; in character of service, variable. It has efficiently patrolled much of the coast line from Manila south to the extreme limit of the archipelago; aided the landings of troops on Mindoro; in the Samar operations; in curtailing piracy in the Jolo Sea. It has gone to the relief of our transports in distress. We are indebted to the special services of Lieut. Philip Andrews, with naval tug and other appliances, for the rescue of the transport *Wright*, when sunk near Daram Island, off the west coast of Samar. Every request has been cheerfully responded to and assistance often tendered. Upon hearing of the attack made on Company C, Ninth Infantry, at Balangiga, Rear-Admiral Frederick Rodgers called in person at division headquarters and offered the services of 300 marines, and to take them to Samar on his flagship. His offer was accepted with pleasure; this assistance was effective and opportune, as considerable time elapsed before I could gather additional troops and forward them by transport. A marine battalion served there with efficiency for about four months, under most difficult and trying circumstances.

GENERAL CHARACTER OF DUTY.

The officers and enlisted men of the Army who have served in the division during the past year have faithfully and efficiently performed duty as it fell to their lot. A very considerable part have been dispersed by company or detachment to occupy stations for purposes of observation, and to give moral support to municipal authorities and municipal police. This duty has been performed without friction so far as known to me, with but comparatively few exceptions. Some alleged wrongs done natives by soldiers it has been impossible to redress because of failure to identify the responsible party or parties, but the cases are rare indeed where alleged wrong or injury have been disregarded—the complaint not investigated—by the officer in immediate command, and when established disciplinary measures enforced. The assumption and statement that the presence of soldiers in a community is very demoralizing with respect to the natives is not true as a broad proposition; in my opinion the opposite view is most worthy to be noted. An individual soldier here and there has no doubt wronged a native, or with threat of physical force compelled obedience to his demands, but these instances are exceptional, not the rule, so that unless the alleged demoralizing influence broadens so as to make the presence of the white race, as a race, demoralizing to the native races, the influence for evil by the soldiers is indeed small and undeserving of comment compared with their many virtues, which by precept and example are object lessons for good. The troops that have participated in active field service for the establishment of order so that civil government might securely extend its sway and execute its duty with safety have done so cheerfully, and feel compensated for excessive fatigues and performance of unpleasant duties, often misunderstood and unappreciated, in the knowledge that the results accomplished have decisively furthered the object in view and as a consequence met with the approbation of the Government.

STUDY OF NATIVE LANGUAGES.

An important duty as yet not taken up seriously by the officers of the Army serving in the division, but which ought not to be longer neglected if they would meet to the full the demands which the situation requires and may be reasonably expected of them as enhancing their efficiency when serving here, is the acquirement of a workable knowledge, both oral and written, of the native dialect where stationed. When this is done we will be able to get at and serve to a good purpose the masses who are now led not so much for improvement of the many as in the interest of a few persons. The native dialects will not cease to be valuable in these islands for a hundred years, and the more the Army knows of them the better. As it is unreasonable to suppose that an officer will attempt to master all the dialects, he should seriously lay hold on one—the major dialect of his station—and Spanish, Ilocano, Pangasinan, Tagalo, Bicol, Visayan, and Moro are of the most importance. I believe that the interests of the Government are deeply involved in this matter and it ought to encourage both officers and intelligent enlisted men to perfect themselves. Therefore I recommend that Congress be asked to give a bonus of \$200 to each officer and intelligent enlisted man who shall attain a state of proficiency in a native dialect, and \$100 additional for proficiency in Spanish.

The officers serving at division headquarters, both on my personal and on the division staff, have at all times given me hearty and intelligent support, and to them my thanks are due for earnest and conscientious effort.

Very respectfully,

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,
Major-General, U. S. Army,
Commanding the Division of the Philippines.

APPENDIX A.

ORDERS AND CIRCULARS ISSUED BY GEN. JACOB H. SMITH AND FREDERICK D. GRANT
BEARING ON THE POLICY AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN SAMAR.

FIELD ORDERS, }

No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, FIRST DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Catbalogan, Samar, P. I., October 21, 1901.

All barotos, bancas, or boats of any kind to be available for use on the waters off coast of Samar, or the adjacent islands under the same military control (except fishing boats, or those in the employ of the United States, or authorized by the military authorities), will be painted red, with the name of boat and home port thereon. Persons who desire to go out in such boats will procure passes signed by the commanding officer or adjutant of the military station at their home port, which will show the nature of the business in which the owner is engaged; the number and description of the baroto, banca, etc., the exact dates for which the pass is good, and the names of the passengers and crew entered thereon.

Passes not exceeding six at any one place, which will be numbered, may be given to well-known fishermen located in towns occupied by American troops which will be good for the current calendar week. Holders of these passes will exhibit them to all gunboats in their harbor or in their vicinity, both on going out and on their return; on meeting a gunboat or on their approach they will proceed to it and exhibit their pass. Fishermen will be confined to narrow limits about the military post from which the pass is given; their boats need not be painted red, but by day shall show a white flag and by night a white light, and their passes shall prescribe the limits in which the boat is allowed to fish, and shall also show the names of the crew.

All commanding officers are requested to limit their passes to absolute necessities, and both army and navy officers are requested to take all possible precautions to stop illicit trade in rice, hemp, and other contraband of war.

All other barotos, bancas, etc., which are unpainted, without numbers, and without the name of the port at which the owner resides, found on the coast of Samar, including the adjacent islands referred to above, except those in ports occupied by troops, will be considered contraband and will be destroyed or used, if necessary.

Towns, villages, hamlets, etc., in the vicinity of which signal lights or fires are exhibited, will be subject to the fire of gunboats and troops and should be destroyed.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

WALTER T. BATES,
First Lieutenant, Seventeenth Infantry, Aid-de-camp,
Acting Adjutant-General.

[Corrected copy.]

GENERAL ORDERS, }

No. 29.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Tacloban, October 27, 1901.

All traffic by natives and others and all passing to and fro between Samar and Leyte is strictly prohibited until further orders. All natives found passing between these two islands, or afloat on either shore, will be fired upon and killed, if possible, whether on the Samar or Leyte side. All boats, with the exception of those enumerated in Field Orders, No. 1, dated October 21, 1901, from these headquarters, found on either the Samar or Leyte shore will be destroyed or used if necessary.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

J. S. BATTLE,
Captain, Adjutant Eleventh Infantry,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

CIRCULAR, }
No. 2. }

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, November 6, 1901.

During the existence of armed resistance to constituted authority upon the island of Leyte the brigadier-general commanding the military forces thereon is compelled to impose the following restrictions upon trade between the island ports:

1. Vessels are forbidden to load at ports other than Tacloban with crude or manufactured products in the procurement of which money will be put in circulation eventually to find its way into the insurrecto treasury. Supplies of hemp, etc., will not be destroyed, but must be put on the market at the present time.

2. Trade in rice and other food products will be reduced to a minimum, and such trade will be confined to ports in which are located military detachments, native scouts, and native constabulary. Vessels will not be cleared for any port in which there are none of these agencies to superintend the receipt and distribution of those food supplies, to the end that they may be used to subsist the peaceable and friendly inhabitants, and not to sustain those inimical thereto. No objection exists to the barter of rice for hemp, but rice thus obtained is limited in quantity to the actual subsistence needs of the parties receiving it.

3. It is made the duty of all persons representing the authority of the United States in this island to labor to effect the ends outlined in this circular.

4. Merchants and traders affected by this circular are invited to hold a meeting and agree upon a line of action in consonance therewith, and their hearty cooperation is earnestly desired by the commanding general, in the belief that the regulations promulgated are for the ultimate good of all concerned.

Any attempt at evasion of its provisions will, upon conviction, be severely dealt with.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

W. E. AYER,
Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Adjutant-General.

CIRCULAR, }
No. 3. }

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I., November 18, 1901.

There seems to be a misunderstanding in some quarters as to the purpose of Circular No. 2, these headquarters. These purposes are twofold:

1. Not to permit money to be put in circulation among the natives of Leyte at the present time; and,

2. Not to authorize a greater distribution of food supplies than are necessary for the proper sustenance of the native loyal population of the island.

This in no way prohibits the accumulation in the hands of a few merchants of hemp properly received in small amounts in exchange for rice, nor does it prohibit said merchants from bringing hemp thus obtained to Tacloban.

When duly authorized representatives of barrios distant from distribution centers (stations of troops or constabulary) present themselves at such centers for food for their barrios, these representatives should be permitted to draw enough to last their barrios at least a week at a time.

Emphasis is laid upon the point that the brigade commander desires not only to permit proper food supplies to reach all friendly natives, but he particularly desires that these supplies do so reach them.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

W. E. AYER,
Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Adjutant-General.

CIRCULAR, }
No. 4. }

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, December 2, 1901.

The restrictions heretofore imposed upon trade on the island of Leyte by the brigadier-general commanding the military forces thereon are hereby modified as follows:

1. The shore line of the island (including adjacent islands of Biliran and Panaon) is divided into two parts by a general north and south line drawn from Mapuyo to Balaquit (Biliran), entering Leyte at Barugo and issuing therefrom at Cabalian. All the east coast of Leyte and Biliran, and all the island of Panaon are thus east of the subdividing line.

2. For the ports west of this dividing line all restrictions upon trade are rescinded and trade relations revert to their former status.

3. For the ports east of the subdividing line, the restrictions and prohibitions of Circulars Nos. 2 and 3, these headquarters, still obtain, except that ports on the mainland of Leyte, from and including Tanauan south, have full and free permission to trade unrestrictedly with Leyte ports west of the dividing line.

4. All points mentioned as being on the dividing line will be considered in the matter of trade privileges as being east of said line.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

W. E. AYER,

Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Adjutant-General.

CIRCULAR, }
No. 5. }

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, December 7, 1901.

1. Owing to improved military conditions, the commanding general Sixth Separate Brigade is pleased to revoke his Field Order No. 1, requiring boats, barotos, etc., engaged in trade and fishing to be painted red and to display certain signals by night and by day, but this revocation applies only to Leyte and the smaller islands of Maripipi, Biliran, and Panaon.

2. All restrictions upon trade on the island of Leyte and its dependent smaller islands are also removed, and Circulars 2, 3, and 4 from these headquarters are hereby revoked. Leyte, together with the waters belonging to it, thus reverts to its status prior to the imposition of trade restrictions as acts of military necessity.

3. All ports and waters of the island of Samar are still closed to trade. The Straits of San Juanico are declared open on the Leyte side, but any steam or sailing vessel, boat, or baroto found therein on the Samar side without a pass will be confiscated or destroyed.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

W. E. AYER,

Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Adjutant-General.

CIRCULAR, }
No. 6. }

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I., December 24, 1901.

To all station commanders:

The brigade commander has become thoroughly convinced from the great mass of evidence at hand that the insurrection for some time past and still in force in the island of Samar has been supported solely by the people who live in the pueblos ostensibly pursuing their peace pursuits and enjoying American protection, and that is especially true in regard to the "pudientes," or wealthy class.

He is and for some time past has been satisfied that the people themselves, and especially this wealthy and influential class, can stop this insurrection any time they make up their minds to do so; that up to the present time they do not want peace; that they are working in every way and to the utmost of their ability to prevent peace. He is satisfied that this class, while openly talking peace, is doing so simply to gain the confidence of our officers and soldiers, only to betray them to the insurgents, or, in short, that while ostensibly aiding the Americans they are in reality secretly doing everything in their power to support and maintain the insurrection.

Under such conditions there can be but one course to pursue, which is to adopt the policy that will come in all the minds of all the people a burning desire for the war to cease; a desire or longing so intense, so personal, especially to every individual of the class mentioned, and so real that it will impel them to devote themselves in real earnest to bringing about a state of real peace, that will impel them to join hands with the Americans in the accomplishment of this end.

The policy to be pursued in this brigade from this time on will be to wage war in the sharpest and most decisive manner possible. This policy will apply to the island of Samar and to such other portions of the brigade to which it may become necessary to apply it, even though such territory is supposedly peaceful or is under civil government.

In waging this warfare, officers of this brigade are directed and expected to cooperate to their utmost, so as to terminate this war as soon as practicable, since short, severe wars are the most humane in the end. No civilized war, however civilized, can be carried on on a humanitarian basis. In waging this war officers will be guided

by the provisions of General Orders, No. 100, Adjutant-General's Office, 1863, which order promulgates the instructions for the government of the armies of the United States in the field. (Copies of this order will be furnished to the troops of this brigade as soon as practicable. In the meantime commanding officers will personally see to it that the younger and less experienced officers of the command are instructed in the provisions of this order wherever it is possible to do so.) Commanding officers are earnestly requested and expected to exercise, without reference to these headquarters, their own discretion in the adoption of any and all measures of warfare coming within the provisions of this general order which will tend to accomplish the desired results in the most direct way or in the shortest possible space of time. They will also encourage the younger officers of their commands to constantly look for, engage, harass, and annoy the enemy in the field, and to this end commanding officers will repose a large amount of confidence in these subordinate officers and will permit them a large latitude of action and of discretion similar to that hereon conferred upon the commanding officers of stations by these headquarters.

Without warranting in any way carelessness of action or recklessness in the slightest degree, or the relaxation of that constant vigilance which the officer should at all times exercise in the enemy's country and especially in these islands, officers should be encouraged to bear in mind always that we have the decided morale over the natives of the islands and that they must not hesitate to attack them boldly on all occasions and drive home such attack with vigor. They should bear in mind that mere numbers of insurgents should not warrant any other course, unless and until his command is so outnumbered as to render the loss of a major portion thereof a certainty, which contingency is not likely to arise within this brigade.

In dealing with the natives of all classes, officers will be guided by the following principles:

First. Every native, whether in arms or living in the pueblos or barrios, will be regarded and treated as an enemy until he has conclusively shown that he is a friend. This he can not do by mere words or promises, nor by imparting information which, while true, is old or stale and of no value; nor can it be done by aiding us in ways that do no material harm to the insurgents. In short, the only manner in which the native can demonstrate his loyalty is by some positive act or acts that actually and positively commit him to us, thereby severing his relations with the insurgents, and producing or tending to produce distinctly unfriendly relations with the insurgents.

Not only the ordinary natives, but especially those of influence and position in the pueblos who manifestly and openly cultivate friendly relations with the Americans, will be regarded with particular suspicion, since by the announced policy of the insurgent government their ablest and most staunch friends, or those who are capable of skillfully practicing duplicity, are selected and directed to cultivate the friendship of American officers, so as to obtain their confidence and to secretly communicate to the insurgents everything that the Americans do or contemplate doing, particularly with regard to the movement of troops. In a word, friendship with the Americans on the part of any native will be measured directly and solely by his acts, and neither sentiment or social reasons of any kind will be permitted to enter into the determination of such friendship.

Second. It will be regarded as a certainty that all officials of the pueblos and barrios are likewise officials of Lucban and his officers, or at least that they are in actual touch and sympathy with the insurgent leaders, and that they are in secret aiding these leaders with information, supplies, etc., wherever possible. Officers will not be misled by the fact that officials of the pueblos pass ordinances inimical to those in insurrection, or by any action taken by them either collectively or individually. The public acts of pueblo councils that are favorable to the Americans are usually negated by secret communications on the part of the parties enacting them to those in insurrection; therefore such acts can not be taken as a guide in determining the friendship, or lack of it, of these officials for the American Government.

Third. The taking of the oath of allegiance by officials, presidentes, vice-presidentes, consejeros, principales, tenientes of barrios, or other people of influence does not indicate that they or any of them have espoused the American cause, since it is a well-established fact that these people frequently take the oath of allegiance with the direct object and intent of enabling them to be of greater service to their real friends in the field. In short, the loyalty of these people is to be determined only by acts which, when combined with their usual course of conduct, irrevocably binds them to the American cause.

Neutrality must not be tolerated on the part of any native. The time has now arrived when all natives in this brigade who are not openly for us must be regarded as against us. In short, if not an active friend, he is an open enemy.

Fourth. The most dangerous class with whom we have to deal is the wealthy sympathizer and contributor. This class comprises not only all those officials and principales above mentioned, but all those of importance who live in the pueblos with their families. By far the most important as well as the most dangerous member of this class is the native priest. He is the most dangerous and he is successful because he is usually best informed, besides wielding an immense influence with the people by virtue of his position. He has much to lose, in his opinion, and but little to gain through American supremacy in these islands.

It is expected that officers will exercise their best endeavors to suppress and prevent aid being given by the people of this class, especially by the native priest. Wherever there is evidence of this assistance, or where there is a strong suspicion that they are thus secretly aiding the enemies of our Government, they will be confined and held. The profession of the priest will not prevent his arrest or proceedings against him. If the evidence is sufficient they will be tried by the proper court. If there is not sufficient evidence to convict, they will be arrested and confined as a military necessity and held as prisoners of war until released by orders from these headquarters.

It will be borne in mind that in these islands as a rule it is next to impossible to secure evidence against men of influence, and especially against the native priests, so long as they are at large. On the other hand, after they are arrested and confined, it is usually quite easy to secure abundant evidence against them. Officers in command of stations will not hesitate, therefore, to arrest and to detain individuals whom they have good reasons to suspect are aiding the insurrection, even when positive evidence is lacking.

Fifth. Presidentes and officials of the pueblos generally, including the police, will be especially watched by the troops, and wherever sufficient evidence can be found to warrant their convictions before the proper court of the violation of their oaths of office, by reason of their acting as agents of the insurrectos, or by aiding or assisting or protecting these insurgents in any way, they should be arrested and tried by military commission or provost court. In all cases where evidence will warrant conviction, charges will be preferred and duly forwarded for action by these headquarters.

Sixth. In the treatment of natives the officers of this brigade will bear in mind that the ordinary "tauo" is regarded by the natives of influence and standing as but little more than a piece of machinery to be manipulated as may suit his fancy. He is the ignorant tool who follows but too blindly the lead of the man of influence. Let but little attention be paid, therefore, to the ordinary offenses against the laws of war that may be committed by this class.

Their minor offenses can and will be safely and properly disregarded. Their services may be utilized wherever practicable or desirable in operations against their leaders.

In the selection of the guides, however, officers will bear in mind that the more intelligent the native selected the greater the chance of success in the particular undertaking. Guides from the "pudientes," or influential class, should be impressed freely and in numbers sufficient to accomplish the object in view. They should be informed of their duties and responsibilities as such and be held to a strict compliance therewith. This class can at all times communicate with the insurgents when they wish to do so, and this desire can and should be cultivated in them. Even though they may not know any given trail, their facilities for acquiring knowledge thereof are unlimited. Besides, it is quite well established that this class are good barometers and such as will afford ample protection against bamboo trap and similar pitfalls placed in the trails, if they occupy their proper position with the command.

Seventh. Special efforts will also be made to prevent contributions of all kinds to the enemy. Natives living in the pueblos will be informed that they can secure protection from forced contributions whenever they really desire such protection. To secure it, however, reports of attempted collections must be promptly made to the nearest American official, and in time to be of value. Presidentes of pueblos can at all times prevent the collection of contributions within their pueblos if they really wish to do so. Any failure to do this on the part of any official, when known, should be carefully investigated, and unless it is clearly established that he is not at fault, he should be promptly confined and punished.

It is quite common for natives of all classes to claim that they are afraid of the insurgents; that if they assist the Americans or give any information to them they will be killed. There may be some isolated cases in which such claims have a foundation, but they are very rare indeed, and it is quite certain that in all cases this fear may be promptly removed by an honest effort on the part of the party possessing it. This myth of so-called fear will disappear with the first honest effort of the possessor to suppress the insurrection. Officers will furnish protection against

all real dangers directed against those natives who seek such protection within their commands, provided they are friends of the established government and to no one else. All collectors of these contributions will be promptly arrested and proceeded against.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

W. E. AYER,
Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Adjutant-General.

CIRCULAR }
No. 7. }

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, December 27, 1901.

To make more effective the cooperation of the army and navy upon the coast of Samar, and to secure uniformity of procedure throughout the entire coast line of that island, the following regulations are hereby established:

(a) Passes by day to natives for boats, barotos, or other craft, will not be given at all by station commanders, except when such action is by them deemed essential. At such times passes may be issued. These passes must show: (1) For what purpose given; (2) exactly where the boat has a right to go; (3) points and times of departure and return clearly specified; and (4) every such authorized craft must have one or more enlisted men in it. This provision is imperative and must not be neglected. Station commanders will be held responsible for any untoward consequences resulting from such neglect.

(b) Passes by night will in no case be given to natives, except to those engaged in an operation on our side. Whenever it becomes necessary to move an expedition by water at night, at least one lantern should be carried with which to make signals to any naval vessel that may overhail it. Until signaled by the naval vessel the lantern may be kept hidden if so desired.

(c) Whenever, by day or night, an army party afloat upon the water, or even moving upon land close to the water's edge, becomes conscious that it is an object of observation to a gunboat, it will at once signal its identity to the said gunboat; if upon water, it will move toward the naval boat signaling until its signal is answered; if upon shore, it will move into clear view and signal until answered.

(d) In all cases the preliminary signal will be given by the gunboat. This signal may be a gun discharged, waving of a flag or lantern or other convenient signal. When the gunboat has thus signaled, the reply signal must be at once returned. The return signal will be communicated later. All concerned are reminded that failure to carefully observe this order may result disastrously.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

W. E. AYER,
Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 1. }

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, January 28, 1902.

Upon receipt of this order the commanding officer of every garrisoned pueblo in the island of Samar will take steps to organize a municipal government in his pueblo under the provisions of General Orders, No. 43, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, series of 1899.

Any departures from the above-mentioned order found necessary in the establishment of municipal governments under existing conditions in Samar, will be made in the direction of the provisions of the municipal code adopted by the United States Philippine Commission as found in act 82 of said Commission.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

W. E. AYER,
Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Adjutant-General.

FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 4. }

FIELD HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Cutbalogan, Samar, March 18, 1902.

1. An armistice is hereby declared in the island of Samar to continue until further orders from these headquarters.

No expeditions will be sent out, and all troops will be instructed not to fire on insurgents unless it is absolutely necessary to do so in self-defense.

If attacked, United States troops will endeavor to communicate with the insurgents by means of a flag of truce and will inform them that an armistice has been declared by both parties pending negotiations for peace.

A strict compliance with the foregoing order is hereby enjoined.

Notify all substations without delay.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

G. H. SHIELDS, Jr.,

First Lieutenant, Twelfth Infantry, Aid-de-Camp.

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 10.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I., May 20, 1902.

Any funds on hand at posts in this brigade, arising from the sale of confiscated hemp, captured insurgent funds, provost-court fines, will be turned in at once to the treasurer of the Philippine Archipelago, with full report as to the sources from which derived, giving in full detail, place, and date of confiscation, former owner's name, etc.

By command of Brigadier-General Grant:

J. A. PENN,

Captain, Seventh Infantry, Adjutant-General.

CIRCULAR, }
No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, February 12, 1902.

The privileges recently granted certain commercial companies to trade in Samar have become through various means extended beyond the limits intended or desired by the brigade commander. In no case does he intend to authorize the sale of such merchandise as rice, beer, or clothing by wholesale. Such action simply opens the way for these supplies to slip from the view and regulation of military commanders, and makes possible their delivery to parties from whom it is most important to keep them.

Hereafter and until further notice licenses granted by this office to sell, on the island of Samar, supplies of the general nature above mentioned will be understood to mean simply the retailing of said supplies by the licensees or under their immediate supervision, to the end that the said licensees may at all times be held to account for the uses to which such supplies are put.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

W. E. AYER,

Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Adjutant-General.

CIRCULAR, }
No. 2.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, February 13, 1902.

The condition of the native population of the island of Samar and their attitude toward American occupation, as evidenced by the increasing numbers thereof who are daily presenting themselves at garrisoned towns, have changed so materially for the better in the past few weeks that the time is now ripe, in the opinion of the brigade commander, for a change of treatment toward them and a softening of the rigors of war toward the noncombatants.

And in order that all officers and men may know the plans of the brigade commander and his views as to the future conduct of the war, the following outline is published for the information and guidance of all concerned:

The commanding general divides the native inhabitants into two classes: (1) Those in arms, or their friends who collect and forward to those in arms supplies of money, food, and information; (2) all inhabitants who, by not coming actively in class (1), are thereby excluded therefrom.

Toward the first class the brigade commander desires constant, unrelenting prosecution of honorable warfare, so long and wherever such a class exists. Active attack and the cutting off of supplies will be aimed at. Toward the second class the restrictions and prohibitions heretofore imposed will be softened. To enable the population, impoverished by the long period of warfare, to provide for themselves the necessities of life, they will be granted larger privileges in securing and selling hemp, copra, etc., as well as in fishing, but wherever former restrictions are extended the station commander will be held accountable that such extension does not result in

benefit to those remaining in class one. It is the aim of the brigade commander that no persons of class two shall suffer for food or clothing, and that they shall fall only just enough short of full liberty of action to engender in them a real longing for full liberty. This they should be assured can be more speedily secured by their own aid and cooperation than in any other way. Emphasis is laid upon the desirability and importance of utilizing in every possible way the aid of natives disposed to assist us, and officers are enjoined to increase the volume and force of this native assistance in every way that they can devise.

This in outline is "the policy" to be pursued henceforth. A few details are worked out in the following paragraphs, but all concerned are informed that any action on their part conceived and executed in the general spirit of "the policy" outlined above will be approved and commended by the brigade commander.

Commanding officers of all stations will notify all natives living near them that for their protection they will move to within certain prescribed limits, and that so long as they remain peaceful will be afforded all opportunities to obtain food and other necessities. They will in general be paid for all labor and any assistance they are called upon to render the United States forces, and will not be disturbed in their affairs so long as they observe the requirements of loyalty to the United States Government.

All ungarrisoned pueblos and barrios will be thus protected as soon as troops are available.

Commanding officers will see that instructions are given for all inhabitants within the territory they can reach, notifying them that it is dangerous for them to remain in the mountains, where they are not only liable to punishment from the enemies to peace and order, but that their lives and property are not safe outside the jurisdiction of their commands. They will be urged and encouraged to bring their property of all kinds within the limits of the flag's protection.

Commanding officers will regulate the prices of provisions, etc., and do all in their power to disabuse the minds of the natives that they will suffer for lack of food, etc., by coming within the zone of our power to protect them. They should also be cautioned against using provisions permitted for their own welfare for the benefit of the enemy, and any acts tending to show their lack of appreciation of the care the United States forces give them will be severely punished.

As soon as peace has been established they will be encouraged to go to their former homes and be protected in their property and rights.

As long as the war still actively exists, it is not necessary to seek or wait for authority from these headquarters to do anything or take any action which will contribute to its termination. It is desired that all battalion commanders give to their subordinate officers a degree of confidence and latitude in operations, such as is accorded to them by the brigade commander. Such restraint and supervision only should be exercised as is dictated by sound discretion, and as may be essential to securing concert of action and cooperation when desirable, adherence to authorized methods, and a uniform policy and harmonious action in working for a common end. Subordinate commanders and young officers of experience should not be restrained or discouraged without excellent reasons, but should be encouraged to hunt for, pursue, and vigorously operate against armed bodies of insurgents wherever they may be found. Considering the comparative morale of our troops and insurgents and the lack of reliable ammunition and training on the part of the latter, it is not believed there exists any just cause for exceptional caution or apprehension in attacking them bodily. At any rate, under present conditions, legitimate chance should be accepted, as excessive caution will do us incalculable harm. Except when the advantage in position and numbers is overwhelming on the side of the enemy, our troops should always assume the offensive and advance on and pursue them vigorously. The best defense against these people is to assume a vigorous offensive at once. To retire in the presence of this enemy is generally hazardous and discouraging to our troops.

Nothing herein contained will be so interpreted as to warrant or excuse carelessness or lack of well-known and proper precautions. Though troops should be aggressive, they should be military in method, and precautions against surprise and ambush should never be neglected.

In addition to maintaining active operations against bands of insurgents, persistent and systematic efforts will be made through the use of spies, loyal police, native scouts, intelligence officers, provost-marshals and provost courts to discover, apprehend, and punish all agents, collectors, organizers, contributors, and sympathizers who secretly aid, assist, and extend encouragement or comfort to those in arms. Many such persons will unquestionably be found among municipal officials and councils and tenientes or cabezas of barrios.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

W. E. AYER,
Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Adjutant-General,

CIRCULAR, }
No. 3. }

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I., February 22, 1902.

From the reports received of late from every quarter of the island of Samar the brigade commander is constrained to the belief that active opposition to our occupation of the island has crumbled away. There are undoubtedly a considerable number left in the mountains who remain in opposition to us; but their power of resistance has been shattered. We have in the past compelled them to respect our prowess in arms; we must in the future compel them to respect our generosity of heart toward a vanquished foe and our purity of purpose in waging war upon their misguided leaders and their followers.

Henceforth, then, it must be the labor of our officers and men to assist the loyal natives in repairing the ravages of war. No opportunity should be lost to instruct them that the Americans have come among them, not to take from them any of the good things of life, but rather to give them more and in greater measure than they have ever enjoyed before. But every member of the brigade is enjoined never to lose from sight the fact that he is dealing with a people which through peculiarities of their island topography have developed along lines quite divergent from those traveled by the great majority of their fellow Filipinos. Our troops must always keep in mind that the standards of the natives of Samar were announced to the world at Balangiga. Watchfulness and kindness henceforth must go hand in hand.

And now that the period when our troops must be constantly on the move has, in the judgment of the brigade commander, virtually passed, he takes pleasure in revoking his former order forbidding the residence within the brigade, of the families of officers. In taking this step he utilizes the opportunity to thank those officers who have so cheerfully and loyally accepted the necessary restrictions imposed by him, and who have thus been deprived of even those simple comforts of home life which go so far toward reconciling them to duty in this isolated section of the Philippines.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

W. E. AYER,
Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Adjutant-General.

CIRCULAR }
No. 4. }

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, March 5, 1902.

The following telegram from the division commander received at these headquarters is communicated for general information and guidance:

"DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, March 4, N. F., 1902.

"GENERAL SMITH, *Tacloban*:

"Do you know whether or not troops under your command practice water cure on natives? If any such action forbid it."

In order that there may be no possible misunderstanding regarding the strict enforcement of General Orders, No. 100, and the treatment of natives, as is required in Circular 6, dated December 24, 1901, and Circular No. 2, dated February 13, 1902, from these headquarters, the brigade commander directs that if any treatment of natives which could possibly be construed as being in violation of General Orders, No. 100, has occurred at any station in this brigade at any time, that such action must cease.

All officers are enjoined to see that natives are always treated in such a manner by the United States forces that said treatment can not be criticised by any one.

Hereafter all possible efforts will be used to persuade the natives to come into garrisoned towns to live in order that they may be kept under observation, and efforts to this end should be made by all scouting parties, which, if persuasion is of no avail, should endeavor to capture all persons seen, and they should then be taken to garrisoned towns. In this way those yet outside our garrisoned towns will be diminished in numbers and the available source of insurrecto recruits and succor reduced to a minimum.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

W. E. AYER,
Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Adjutant-General.

CIRCULAR }
No. 10. }

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, May 6, 1902.

The brigade commander announces the surrender on April 27, 1902, at Catbalogan, Samar, of the following named insurgent officers: Gen. Claro Guevarra, Col. Francisco Rafael, Lieut. Cols. Narciso Abuke, Agapito Sebastian, Majs. Leonio Guison, Eugenio Daza, Andres Lobrio, Jose Hermosilla, Teodoro Garfin, Cpts. Ramon Serano, Gernimo Abzade, Corme Antonio, Victor Maurino, Luiano Limo, Meliton Almanton, Benito Azanza, Peregrin Albano, Clodoaldo Linero, Severino Linero, Julian Cabeang, Alejandro Mendeniola, Valeriano Abanador, Eulogio Barretto, First Lieuts. Hilario Enriano, Lazaro Giray, Cesario Ortiz, Nazario Dimaquileng, Leonio de Platino, Andres Barandino, Poeniano Mankol, Matias Fajardo, Jose Cultura, Peligio Acosta, Tuciano Ortiz, Cirilo Eprilitano, Second Lieuts. Vicente Roxas, Francisco Limo, Hipolito Rono, Manuel Rasell, Lino Cruz, Poniano Jazenines, Leopoldo Artecha, Mariano, Cueva, Pio Cazalla, Lacarias Base, Esperidion Farrayo, Jose Permosa, Mato Narona, Naruso Roales, Julian Bautista, Benedicto Merillo, Hilario Nunez, Pilonario Laturre, Eliseo Latarre, Santiago Donesa, Juaoquin Obao, Hermogenes Rosales, Eleuterio Neyra, Gregorio de los Reyes, Marelto Mira, Pasaenalena Patricia Comando, Gavino Buenaventura, Balbino Reyes, Miguel de la Sala Valentin Abegasa, Ubaldo Llanar, with 236 riflemen, 444 bolomen, 112 Krag rifles, 1 Krag carbine, 78 Remington, 31 Mauser rifles, 14 miscellaneous guns; total, 236 rifles, practically all serviceable, about 8,000 rounds of ammunition, 7,500 of which was Krag. Since the 27th 5 riflemen and 53 bolomen, with 3 Krags and 1 Remington, have presented themselves at Catbalogan.

This force includes all the armed insurgents on Samar except Lieut. Ignacio Alar and 11 rifles, reported between Calbiga and Borongan, a party of 17 miscellaneous guns between San Julian and the Gandara River, and a party of 8 rifles in the northeast part of the island. The ex-insurgent leaders state that these parties will all present themselves.

2. The brigade commander desires to congratulate the officers and men of the brigade, whose tireless, energetic work during the past six months has brought about these gratifying results.

3. Commanding officers will facilitate in every way the restoration of peaceful conditions throughout the island of Samar, and will establish municipal governments, under General Orders, No. 43, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, 1899, in all towns not now so organized. As far as practicable, commanding officers will follow the wishes of the people as regards the selection of officials, cabezas, etc. In this connection, where the inhabitants desire to rebuild any town or barrio commanding officers will freely grant such permission to such people as have taken the oath of allegiance, and will require such other people as desire to rebuild in said towns to present themselves first to the nearest commanding officer to take the oath of allegiance. The presidente or cabeza of towns or barrios thus organized will be required to keep a United States flag flying over the building used for municipal purposes; to establish schools, keep roads and trails in repair, see that all streets, houses, and surroundings are kept clean and in a sanitary condition; to isolate and care for all cases of infectious or contagious disease; to report promptly any outbreak of smallpox, cholera, or other serious disease; to construct in each town not garrisoned a suitable building for public purpose, which could be used from time to time by detachments of troops to avoid the necessity of using private houses for such purpose; to maintain order, and to show proper respect for the officers in command of districts and their local officials.

4. Permission has been given Señores Rafael, Abuke, and Daza, former insurgent officers, to visit the pueblos, barrios, and sitios for the purpose of encouraging the people to rebuild their barrios and homes, accept in full American sovereignty and control, and to assist in bringing about the full benefits of peace. Their mission is limited to the above, and does not extend to organizing governments of any kind. They will be assisted in their proper mission.

5. While the brigade commander believes the surrender of the insurgent leaders to have been in good faith and that all will labor conscientiously to bring about the full benefits of peace to the people of Samar, yet he takes this opportunity to direct that station commanders take full precautions at all times to guard against the carelessness apt to follow overconfidence in peaceful conditions.

By command of Brigadier-General Grant:

J. A. PENN,
Captain, Seventh Infantry, Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX B.

CORRESPONDENCE GROWING OUT OF ACTION OF BRIG. GEN. JACOB H. SMITH CLOSING THE PORTS ON THE EAST COAST OF LEYTE, OCTOBER-DECEMBER, 1901.

OFFICE OF THE CIVIL GOVERNOR OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., November 23, 1901.

Maj. Gen. ADNA R. CHAFFEE, U. S. Army,
Commanding Division of the Philippines, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to inclose for your inspection a communication from J. H. Grant, governor of the province of Leyte, inclosing a copy of Circular No. 2, issued by Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Smith, commanding separate brigade, with headquarters at Tacloban, Leyte. These papers came into the office of the Executive secretary on the 13th instant, but by oversight were sent to the collector of customs for the Philippine Archipelago, and only reached me yesterday.

It will be seen from a perusal of General Smith's order that he has in effect placed the commerce of the island of Leyte under military supervision, forbidden the sale of hemp indefinitely, and limited the trade of the people of the islands in rice and other food products to a minimum, confining the same to ports in which are located military detachments, native scouts, and native constabulary. He furthermore therein makes it the duty of all persons representing the authority of the United States in Leyte to labor to effect the end outlined in this circular, and declares that any attempt at its evasion will, upon conviction, be severely dealt with.

The island of Leyte, as you are aware, has a provincial government, established by an enactment of the United States Philippine Commission, of date the 22d day of April, 1901. This province was organized upon the statement by your predecessor, Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, to the Commission that it was ready for civil government, and recommending its organization. This circular of General Smith's has the effect of putting very stringent limitations and restrictions upon the right of the inhabitants of Leyte to pursue their ordinary vocations, which are perfectly legitimate under the existing civil laws and government, and attempts to set aside and nullify both. It furthermore seems, by its third paragraph, to require all civil officials in the province to labor to effect the ends outlined in the circular, and finally, in its last paragraph, assumes the right to punish violators, of course by military courts.

The obvious conclusion derivable from all this is that General Smith claims the right to, and has to the extent indicated, superseded the civil government established by the Commission, pursuant to the authority of the President of the United States, and has substituted martial law therefor. It is true he has not in terms removed the civil governor and other provincial officials, but he has largely curtailed their legitimate authority, and if his order is to stand makes it impossible for them to perform the functions imposed upon them by enactments of the Commission.

Having been informed by Governor Grant on the 13th instant that General Smith contemplated the promulgation of this or a similar circular, I had the honor of calling upon you in person and laying before you Governor Grant's communication. At that time I stated to you in substance that while it was contended by the Commission that under the instructions of the President of the United States, when the Commission had established civil government in any portion of the islands the commanding general had no power to set it aside, yet that I was aware that you did not concur in this view; that the Commission appreciated the necessity for cordial cooperation and perfect harmony between the civil and military authorities and that it hoped that you would permit no such action as that contemplated by General Smith until after a conference and joint action by both you and the Commission. I had the pleasure of further stating to you that the Commission was sincerely desirous of sustaining the military authorities in their suppression of insurrection in Samar and elsewhere, and that if it should appear that it was necessary to suspend the operations of civil government in Leyte, in whole or in part, in order to give you a free hand in conducting military operations, appropriate legislation would at once be enacted to that end; and, in short, that so far from obstructing you at any point, the Commission stood ready to facilitate your operations in every way in its power. My understanding from you was that you were not at that time informed as to what, if any, orders had been or were proposed to be issued by General Smith covering the territory of Leyte; that you would communicate with him and advise me further if any action was contemplated by him or thought necessary by you affecting the province of Leyte. Since this conference I have not had the honor of any communication from you relative to any intended action by General Smith, although I infer that you communicated with

him in accordance with your expressed intention and have been made aware of the contents of Circular No. 2. If mistaken in this assumption, then of course, General, you will understand that what follows need not be considered by you. If correct, however, I beg to say that I think that the Commission was entitled to more considerate treatment at your hands, and that it had a right to expect, before any such circular received your sanction, at least an invitation to a conference looking to harmonious and concerted action between you and it.

It is plain to us—and I think a moment's consideration will make it plain to you—that interference by your subordinates in the operation of the various provincial governments established by the Commission must not only have the effect of producing discord between you and it, but must also have the further and more disastrous effect of weakening American authority in these islands. Whilst the proximity of the island of Leyte to the island of Samar makes communication between the two easy and enables the people of the former to give aid in men and supplies to the insurgents in the latter, it does not follow that for these reasons the department commander can at will set aside, directly or indirectly, the authority of the civil provincial government in Leyte, unless he and other department commanders have the same power in their unlimited discretion in every other of the pacified provinces in which civil government has been established.

Standing ready, as it does, to cooperate with you in every way, the Commission can not concede that you, as the commanding general, or any subordinate of yours, can displace the civil provincial governments established by it and substitute martial law instead. The Commission, in the light of the instructions it received from the President of the United States, has believed, and now believes, that when the Commission was directed to establish civil governments which should give to the inhabitants within their jurisdictions individual liberty, freedom from arbitrary arrests, trial by civil courts, and the other benefits specified in the instructions, he meant just what he said. It has always seemed to us that a civil government which only existed and could be set aside at the will and pleasure of a military commander, however able or honest, was a delusion and a farce.

Whether the Commission has acted wisely or not in following the advice of General MacArthur and in so soon establishing civil provincial government in the island of Leyte, or in any of the other provinces of the archipelago, is beside the question. If the Commission has been premature in so doing, it can readily rectify the error by repealing or modifying the act establishing the provincial government, as it has done in Batangas and Cebu, and would do in any other province where such a course seemed essential to successful military operations.

The fundamental question of difference, then, between us is whether or not in the provinces in which civil government has been established the civil or military government is paramount. We insist that the President of the United States, who is both your and our common superior, under whose authority both of us are acting, has, subject to his approval, reposed this authority in the Commission and not in the commanding general. Our reasons for this contention were fully stated by Governor Taft in two letters, one of date the 6th day of March, 1901, addressed to your predecessor, Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, and the other to yourself on the 13th day of October. It is therefore deemed unnecessary to extend this communication by further elaboration of the subject. When the controversy between the Commission and General MacArthur upon this point arose, the correspondence between Governor Taft and the General, setting forth their respective positions, was submitted to the Secretary of War, and he on the 19th day of June cabled to President Taft that the position assumed by the Commission was correct and in accordance with its instructions.

In the recent difference between yourself and the Commission growing out of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the insular supreme court in the Brooks case, and which indirectly presented the question now being discussed in another form, President Roosevelt, upon being appealed to to determine the controversy, directed by cable that Governor Taft and yourself should, if possible, arrive at some basis of adjustment, which resulted in a settlement of that matter, embodied in appropriate legislation by the Commission; but nothing has emanated from either the President of the United States or the Secretary of War which leads us to believe that the position we have taken is unsound or otherwise than in strict consonance with our instructions. Indeed, it had been assumed by the Commission, in view of the correspondence between you and Governor Taft which resulted in this adjustment, that a basis had been reached controlling the relations of the civil and military authorities in the future, and which would prevent further conflict.

We do not, of course, for a moment doubt that you are perfectly sincere in the position you have taken, nor do we mean to intimate for a moment or believe that were such a power vested in you it would be exercised save in furtherance of what you believed the highest and best interests of your and our Government. I am

equally sure that if it were a mere abstract or academic question, neither you nor the Commission would be found wasting time in its discussion; but such is not the fact.

The real situation which confronts both you and ourselves is that civil governments have been established covering the greater portion of these islands. In those territories are several military departments and numerous military posts. It is inevitable, unless the lines of demarcation between civil and military authority are defined with reasonable certainty, and each remains within its own legitimate sphere, that innumerable clashes must occur, with consequent loss of prestige to American authority. Several such clashes have already occurred; that they are so few in number is a striking proof of the patriotism and good sense of both the civil and military subordinate officials. But it needs no discussion to prove that it is unfortunate that they should occur at all, and that under some circumstances they might be disastrous. In any event and under the most favorable circumstances the effect of such conflict, if continued, must be to make the civil administration appear weak and contemptible in the eyes of the Filipino people, and, what is worse, destroy their belief in the sincerity of the utterances of the President of the United States and the Commission. The Commission has on many occasions, in addressing the Filipino people, called especial attention to that portion of the instructions of the President to the Commission which related to the establishment of civil government, and has pledged itself faithfully to carry out those instructions in both their letter and spirit. It is believed by us that these utterances have been largely operative in inducing Filipino insurrectionists then in arms to cease further resistance. The Commission therefore stands honorably pledged in the most solemn way, as far as may be in its power to make good what it has said, by inaugurating, when in its judgment the time is ripe therefor, civil government not only in name but in fact.

In view of these and other considerations which might be mentioned, it is sincerely hoped that you will direct the revocation of Circular No. 2 so issued by General Smith, or at least its suspension, until a conference can be had between yourself and the Commission looking to a *modus vivendi* which will prevent the recurrence of future differences between us. You may rest assured, General, that this subject will be approached by the Commission with the sincere desire if possible of reaching a mutually satisfactory result. We feel that the interests which the American people have at stake in these islands are too large and vital to be unnecessarily impaired by disputes between the military and civil authorities, representing as they do in the aggregate American sovereignty in these islands.

Believing that you fully concur in this sentiment, I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LUKE E. WRIGHT,
Acting Civil Governor.

PROVINCE OF LEYTE, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
Tacloban, November 8, 1901.

A. W. FERGUSON,
Executive Secretary, Manila.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith for your information copy of Circular No. 2, Headquarters Sixth Separate Brigade, together with copy of my letter transmitting same to the municipalities of this province.

I desire to inform you that I had a long conference with General Smith before this circular was issued, and I am satisfied that it will ultimately prove exceedingly beneficial to this province, although its provisions are somewhat contrary to the spirit of civil law, and are bound to cause quite a good deal of dissatisfaction just now.

With the exception of Biliran, where there have been no troops stationed and where the police have not been armed, I consider this province comparatively pacified and believe that if all the troops were withdrawn to Tacloban the constabulary when completely organized could maintain and enforce the law.

I consider conditions here good.

Very respectfully,

J. H. GRANT, *Governor.*

CIRCULAR }
No. 2. }

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, November 6, 1901.

During the existence of armed resistance to constituted authority upon the island of Leyte, the brigadier-general commanding the military forces thereon is compelled to impose the following restrictions upon trade between the island ports:

First. Vessels are forbidden to load at ports, other than Tacloban, with crude or manufactured products, in the procurement of which money will be put into circula-

tion eventually to find its way into the insurrecto treasury. Supplies of hemp, etc., will not be destroyed, but must not be put upon the market at the present time.

Second. Trade in rice and other food products will be reduced to a minimum, and such trade will be confined to ports in which are located military detachments, native scouts, and native constabulary. Vessels will not be cleared to any port in which there are none of these agencies to superintend the receipt and distribution of these food supplies to the end that they may be used to subvert the peaceful and friendly inhabitants and not to sustain those inimical thereto. No objection exists to barter of rice for hemp, but rice thus obtained is limited in quantity to the actual subsistence needs of the parties receiving it.

Third. It is made the duty of all persons representing the authority of the United States in this island to labor to effect the ends outlined in this circular.

Fourth. Merchants and traders affected by this circular are invited to hold a meeting and agree upon a line of action in consonance therewith; and their hearty cooperation is earnestly desired by the commanding general, in the belief that the regulations promulgated are for the ultimate good of all concerned.

Any attempt at evasion of its provisions will upon conviction be severely dealt with.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

W. E. AYER,

Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Adjutant-General.

PROVINCE OF LEYTE, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
Tacloban, November 8, 1901.

The Presidentes, Province of Leyte.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of Circular No. 2, Headquarters Sixth Separate Brigade, for your information and guidance.

It is to be regretted that the friendly and loyal people have to suffer because of the resistance to constituted authority of a few guerrilla bands who inhabit the mountains, not only annoy and disturb peaceable citizens of this province, but aid and assist, by contributions of money and food, the insurrectos on the neighboring island of Samar.

Therefore it behooves all of us, and especially the civil officers who have been honored by their countrymen and who enjoy the confidence and respect of the American authorities, to arouse themselves to greater activity and by one united effort bring these men to justice and let them understand that all good men are opposed to their methods of robbery and that they will not tolerate them.

In this we will speedily remove the present restrictions that are placed on our commerce and this province will take its place as the first province in the archipelago.

The natural wealth and resources of this island, together with the intelligence of its inhabitants, makes it easily the richest and best province in the Philippine Islands, and those of us who are interested in its welfare and who believe there is a great future in store for it and who desire to see capital come into the province and develop its resources, desire to see all lawlessness and disorder quelled, that the blessings of liberty and peace in the fullest meaning of the word may come to the people of this province, and to this end we ask you to devote all your efforts, that the disorderly element may feel the strong arm of the law to such an extent that they will not dare to disturb us again.

You will have this published in your municipality.

By order of the governor:

— — — — —, *Secretary.*

[Copy of indorsements on wrapper inclosing letter from Governor J. H. Grant, November 8, 1901, relative to Circular No. 2.]

[First indorsement.]

OFFICE OF THE CIVIL GOVERNOR OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., November 13, 1901.

Respectfully referred, by direction of the acting civil governor, to the collector of customs for the Philippine Archipelago to note and return.

A. W. FERGUSON,
Executive Secretary.

[Second indorsement.]

PHILIPPINES CUSTOMS SERVICE,
Manila, P. I., November 18, 1901.

Respectfully returned to the executive secretary of the Philippine Islands, duly noted.

This office makes no comment upon the provisions of the within Circular No. 2, affecting the coastwise trade in the island of Leyte, as the reasons given for imposing the terms of that circular are ones which involve a more general governmental policy than that of the customs service.

W. MORGAN SHUSTER.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., November 23, 1901.

Gen. LUKE E. WRIGHT,
Vice-Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands.

GOVERNOR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated November 23 (which is evidently an error, as I received the communication yesterday afternoon, November 22), referring to the issue by General Smith of what is known to us as his Circular No. 2, curtailing trade privileges in the island of Leyte in consequence of the advantage taken of trade in that island by persons inimical to United States authority and friendly to its enemies, to render support to the insurrection in Samar led by one Lucban.

You refer to having made a call on me subsequently to receiving notice from Governor Grant on the 13th instant that General Smith contemplated issuing the said circular. My recollection with reference to that call is that it referred particularly to what I may term the protest of Mr. Higginbotham, agent for the firm of Smith, Bell & Co., against the provisions of the circular of General Smith.

At the date of your call I had received General Smith's circular and its receipt was not known to me until November 18. You will note that the circular is dated November 6, therefore its publication was not contemplated on the 13th or later date, when you called on me—the circular had already been made.

I had, however, noticed reference to it in the newspapers and on the 9th telegraphed General Smith (see inclosures A, B, and C). We have known for a long time that Leyte had been the source of assistance to the insurrection in Samar and that some means would have to be adopted to interfere with this assistance, but I have all the time desired that this might be accomplished without resorting to trespass on the civil government to a degree that would seriously affect its functions.

I may ask to be excused for not entertaining a large amount of sympathy for traders in the vicinity of active hostilities because of what is and has been going on in these islands, as it is well known that no inconsiderable part of the money paid out by them is forcibly collected from the people and turned over to the chiefs of the insurrection, notwithstanding every effort made to prevent it. In Leyte this has been done by the officials of some of the municipalities, as I have heard and believe, which, if true, the civil government is not entirely loyal to us, but that is no cause to discredit the theory of civil government or sufficient reason it should be upset in the island.

The morning following our conversation I telegraphed General Smith (see Inclosure D). Copy of this dispatch was furnished you the same day. This I intended as conveying to you my action as covering our conversation and supposed you would so understand the matter. It is also an answer to General Smith's request to me to secure the transfer of Leyte from civil to military control during the period of hostilities in Samar. General Hughes thinks the military situation would be improved by such transfer, but does not recommend it because of interference with trade, a reason that no military man not an American would dare subscribe his name to, under the circumstances of the whole case. I understand of course that you, as governor, and the commissioners, feel that I should have directed the immediate revocation of the order, but I beg you will look a little beyond what at first blush seems to be the right course to pursue from your standpoint, to the harmful effect which would result from such an order from me, viz, a substantial victory for the insurgent element because of a protest from Mr. Higginbotham about the curtailment of trade privileges.

It would seem from the letter of Governor Grant, also from the private letter from Captain Ayer, in the absence of General Smith, that the latter consulted with the former concerning the circular, and that an agreement rather than a disagreement was arrived at. This is emphasized by the circular letter of Governor Grant to the

presidentes and his letter to the executive secretary, all indicating a cordial understanding between your subordinate on the ground, Governor Grant, and mine, General Smith, so there can be no difference of opinion there. General Smith should not have inserted paragraph 3 and should have omitted the last sentence of his circular, as both assume to direct civil officers, which is improper and might be viewed as a serious infringement upon civil authority.

While I should have preferred General Smith to have adopted the course of action indicated to him in my dispatch of the 16th rather than issue his circular, the latter, already issued, ought not to be so abruptly terminated as to produce harm; but, out of deference to your manifest wishes in regard to the matter, I shall direct the circular be revoked, no matter what effect on the situation generally it may have. This, I think, will remove the objection to General Smith's action as regards Leyte, although I am unable to view his course in the light of serious harm in our mutual endeavors to establish peace in the archipelago.

In this connection I believe it important to state that Leyte pertains to the sphere of action of Lucban, he having taken it into his charge in August. His orders go there and are observed with considerable effect. It is hardly sufficient that we express satisfaction for apparent order on the surface only in Leyte, when there remains an unsatisfied duty to prevent assistance going to Samar to support the insurrection there. Will the civil government please stop this at once?

I inclose copies of all papers received by me bearing on the case.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Division of the Philippines.

[Inclosure A.—Copy of telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Manila, P. I., November 9, 1901.

General SMITH, *Tacloban:*

Papers report you have closed all Leyte ports. Division commander directs, if this be true, you must be certain of evidence that they had been used to further insurrection in Samar. Better submit evidence here with recommendations before directing military control for all Leyte. Blockade east ports tight as you please to prevent communication with Samar. The necessity for this is apparent.

HALL, *Adjutant-General.*

[Copy of telegram.]

TACLOBAN, November 10, 1901, 12 noon.

HALL, *Manila:*

General Smith is in Samar, away from wire communication; he has not entirely closed Leyte ports, but has limited trade to the food needs of the inhabitants. Clearances are daily made; evidence conclusive that Leyte ports have been and are being used to supply Samar. Civil government of Leyte has expressed approval of General Smith's action. I mail copy General Smith's instructions.

AYER, *Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,

Tacloban, Leyte, November 10, 1901.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

DEAR COLONEL: Your telegram relating to General Smith's action in Leyte came this morning, and I replied at once, hoping to give you an outline idea of the situation. The General will reply when he reaches a point where a wire can reach him.

I question if the Leyte situation is fully understood in Manila. The civil governor has not force that he can control. His constabulary is only now being organized. Until the past week our scouts have been guarding his official residence. In the meanwhile there is a well-defined insurrecto body of unknown size operating throughout the island and under one Capili. They fire upon our parties, threaten our small stations, and collect money, men, and supplies for Samar.

The straits of Juanico, separating Leyte and Samar, are for 14 miles no wider than the Pasig River, and we are constantly catching men and rice going over. The straits are tortuous, full of islands, and exceedingly difficult to guard. In my own judgment we have neither men nor gunboats enough to stop the traffic altogether.

Now it is well known that Lucban has Samar, Leyte, and Masbate for his field of authority, and nothing could suit his plans better than to fight on Samar, and use Leyte and Masbate as sources of supplies. The latter island counts for little, but Leyte is quite another proposition. So long as he is allowed to recruit and collect supplies, undisturbed, in Leyte, ways will not be wanting for him to transfer them across the straits.

Many times we have known of boats passing between Leyte ports to unload into barotos for Samar while passing through the intermediate waters. I firmly believe that not to limit food clearances from Leyte ports means an end to any attempt to cut off Lucban's food and war material.

And yet I believe the General is making headway. The difficulties in his way are very great. Wires for communication are almost wholly wanting, and any orders for concerted action have to be given by word of mouth after lengthy journeys by boat. The problems of supply are very pressing. But for all this I feel sure that if Leyte could be bottled up and taken off the map the General would make short work of Samar.

Personally, the General is in the field nearly all the time. He works incessantly and certainly deserves to win.

In closing, it is well to inform you that so far the most cordial relations have existed between the civil and military, and I think I am safe in saying that Governor Grant of Leyte approved all that General Smith has done.

Very respectfully, yours,

W. E. AYER,
Captain, Twelfth Infantry.

[Inclosure B.]

FIELD HDQRS., FIRST DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT OF VISAYAS,
Calbayog, Samar, October 29, 1901.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to request that civil government upon the island of Leyte be suspended and that the island revert to military control until such time as the insurrection now existing in the island of Samar shall have been crushed.

I make this request on two grounds: First, because of the military necessities of the Samar insurrection, and second, because of the actual condition of Leyte itself.

To arrive at a proper understanding of the situation it must be borne in mind that the two islands, Leyte and Samar, lie adjacent to one another, and for a distance of some 18 miles are separated only by the narrow straits of San Juanico—a strip of water in many places very little wider than the Pasig River of Luzon. To pass across this separating water is the work of but a few moments for the native in his "baroto." The topography and general character of the inhabitants of the two islands are substantially identical. It thus becomes evident that from the military standpoint these two islands become but one field of operations, divided in two parts by a body of water no wider than a river.

The people of Leyte are actively cooperating with and assisting the insurgents in Samar by sending food supplies, men, arms, and money across the Straits of San Juanico, and by operating a system of signals to warn all parties of the approach of our gunboats. To the people of Leyte, also, must be given credit for instigating and assisting in carrying out the barbarous assaults upon our forces at Balangiga and on the Gandara River—proven by the identified Leyte dead left upon both fields.

Again, under the present conditions, vessels freely obtain a clearance from one Leyte port to another, and it is impossible to prevent this privilege from being used to supply the Samar insurgents with needed supplies and war material while the cleared vessels are passing through the straits. One such vessel recently captured was loaded with rice and lead, and when overhauled the crew were throwing the lead overboard.

When hard pressed, the insurgents of Samar can pass over to Leyte by boats under cover of darkness, and so long as Leyte remains an asylum to which they may repair in security to rest and recruit, the difficulty as well as the cost in blood and treasure of stifling insurrection in Samar must necessarily be greatly increased.

It is well to note, in passing, that the life of Americans is far from being secure in Leyte. Only a short time ago an American soldier was assaulted in broad daylight

in the capital of the island and his gun and equipments were secured and converted to insurgent uses.

There is also good reason to believe that the recent deplorable death of Ensign Noa at Nipa-Nipa was caused by a party which had been seen to cross from Leyte to Samar a short time before the incident occurred; and further I may state that armed opposition to the authority of the United States still exists in the Island of Leyte.

For these reasons I deem it self-evident that military necessity dictates the course I propose, and I therefore submit the request in the conviction that its adoption will materially aid in quelling the insurrection in Samar and in laying the foundation for a more secure civil government in Leyte than is possible under existing conditions.

A copy of the foregoing has been forwarded to headquarters department of the Visayas.

Very respectfully,

J. H. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[Inclosure C.—Copy of telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., November 11, 1901.

HUGHES, *Cebu:*

General Smith requests suspension of civil government Island of Leyte, reverting to military control until insurrection in Samar is crushed. Division commander desires expression of your views.

HALL.

[Copy of telegram.]

Tagbilaran, November 13, 1901.

HALL, *Manila:*

I do not think the advantage gained would justify suspension of civil government in Leyte. If it were to carry with it the closing of all ports in Leyte there would be a very decided military advantage; but I do not advise that policy, for it would probably be overruled in Washington, as it was when ports were opened. I have asked Smith for his argument but have not received it.

HUGHES.

[Inclosure D.]

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., November 16, 1901—9.55 p. m.

Brig. Gen. JACOB H. SMITH, U. S. ARMY,
Tacloban, Leyte:

It is not good policy to withdraw provinces from civil column and I must not ask for it save as a last resort, every other arrangement failure. I wish you to consult governor Leyte regarding trade restrictions his province. He does not seem to agree with your view regarding necessity so doing. Better we have agreement than division in opinion. Insist on the governor enforcing efficient nonintercourse relation by his people with Samar. Failure to do so will be our justification for military interference to insure that end, but we must have proof of the failure after due warning given to not allow communication. The situation of Leyte is precisely that of a neutral in war. Her government must be permitted to demonstrate efficiency. Proof of failure or impotency will be the natural ending of civil government for the province while hostilities continue in Samar. If civil government can enforce non-intercourse, best so; work heartily for that end.

CHAFFEE.

PROVINCE OF LEYTE, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
Tacloban, November 8, 1901.

A. W. FERGUSSON, *Executive Secretary, Manila.*

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith for your information a letter from Mr. Higginbotham, agent for Smith, Bell & Co., and the reply of General Smith, the said letter of Mr. Higginbotham having been forwarded to him for remarks.

Very respectfully,

J. H. GRANT, *Governor.*

TACLOBAN, November 6, 1901.

HON. J. H. GRANT, *Governor Province of Leyte.*

DEAR SIR: I respectfully beg to bring to your notice that on Monday, the 3d of the month, the military commander of this district gave me verbal orders not to buy hemp on this island, i. e., Leyte; not to send money out to any subagents, but to call what was already out. Furthermore, he told me I could not buy hemp on the open market in Tacloban or import more rice.

I respectfully beg your intercession in this matter, as none of my competitors have been put under the obligation.

I have paid my just taxes to do business on this island and I respectfully beg to ask if there is any reason why I should not carry on same while conforming with the civil laws, and at the same time not interfering with the military operations and abiding by their sublaws when issued.

I am, dear sir, very respectfully,

H. E. HIGGINBOTHAM,
Agent Smith, Bell & Co.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,

Tacloban, November 6, 1901.

HON. J. H. GRANT, *Governor of Leyte.*

SIR: Replying to your indorsement on letter of Mr. Higginbotham, I have the honor to inform you that the same general instructions are being formulated for Leyte as for Samar, applicable to all traders. These regulations will be continued in force while insurrection exists in both islands. My object is to prevent the insurgents from receiving money and food necessary for their continued existence. No discrimination or favoritism will be shown, and a rigid compliance with regulations established is enjoined upon all.

Very respectfully,

J. H. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

FIELD ORDERS, }

No. 1. }

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, FIRST DISTRICT,

DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,

Catbalogan, Samar, P. I., October 21, 1901.

1. All barotos, bancas, or boats of any kind to be available for use on the waters off the coast of Samar, or the adjacent islands under the same military control (except fishing boats, or those in the employ of the United States, or authorized by the military authorities), will be painted red with the name of boat and home port thereon. Persons who desire to go out in such boats will procure passes signed by the commanding officer or adjutant of the military station at their home port, which will show the nature of the business in which the owner is engaged, the number and description of the baroto, banca, etc., the exact date for which the pass is good, and the name of the passengers and crew entered thereon.

Passes, not exceeding six at any one place, which will be numbered, may be given to well-known fishermen located in towns occupied by American troops, which will be good for the current calendar week. Holders of passes will exhibit them to all gunboats in their harbor or in their vicinity, both on going out and on their return; on meeting a gunboat or on their approach they will proceed to it and exhibit their pass. Fishermen will be confined to narrow limits about the military post from which the pass is given; their boats need not be painted red, but by day shall show a white flag and by night a white light; and their passes shall prescribe the limits in which the boat is allowed to fish, and shall also show the names of the crew.

All commanding officers are requested to limit their passes to absolute necessities, and both army and navy officers are requested to take all possible precautions to stop illicit trade in rice, hemp, and other contraband of war.

All other barotos, bancas, etc., which are unpainted, without numbers, and without the name of the port at which the owner resides, found on the coast of Samar, including the adjacent islands referred to above, except those in ports occupied by troops, will be considered contraband and will be destroyed or used, if necessary.

Towns, villages, hamlets, etc., in the vicinity of which signal lights or fires are exhibited, will be subjected to the fire of gunboats and troops and should be destroyed.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

WALTER T. BATES,
*First Lieutenant, Seventeenth Infantry, Aid-de-Camp,
Acting Adjutant-General.*

[Corrected copy.]

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 29. }

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Tacloban, October 27, 1901.

All traffic by natives and others, and all passing to and fro between Samar and Leyte, is strictly prohibited until further orders. All natives found passing between these two islands, or afloat on either shore, will be fired upon and killed, if possible, whether on the Samar or Leyte side. All boats, with the exception of those enumerated in Field Orders, No. 1, dated October 21, 1901, from these headquarters, found upon either the Samar or Leyte shore will be destroyed or used, if necessary.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

J. S. BATTLE,

Captain, Adjutant Eleventh Infantry, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Copy.]

PROVINCE OF LEYTE, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
Tacloban, November 23, 1901.

SIR: I herewith inclose copy of Circular, No. 3, modifying No. 2, Headquarters Sixth Separate Brigade.

There was some trouble about getting food for the people of the island towns and I got General Smith to modify it.

The presidentes, to which your telegram referred, are held as prisoners of war and have been sent to Samar for trial.

Everything is moving along quietly now and indications point to Capili's surrender in the near future.

I start for the southern and western coast to-morrow and will be absent about a week.

Very respectfully,

J. H. GRANT, *Governor.*

Hon. A. W. FERGUSON,
Executive Secretary, Manila.

[Inclosure.]

CIRCULAR, }
No. 3. }

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, November 18, 1901.

There seems to be a misunderstanding in some quarters as to the purposes of Circular, No. 2, these headquarters. These purposes are twofold: (1) Not to permit money to be put into circulation among the natives of Leyte at the present time, and (2) not to authorize a greater distribution of food supplies than are necessary for the proper sustenance of the loyal population of the island.

This in no way prohibits the accumulation in the hands of a few merchants of hemp properly received in small amounts in exchange for rice, nor does it prohibit said merchants from bringing hemp thus obtained from Tacloban.

When duly authorized representatives of barrios distant from distribution centers (stations of troops or constabulary) present themselves at such centers for food for their barrios, these representatives should be permitted to draw enough to last their barrios at least a week at a time.

Emphasis is laid upon the point that the brigade commander desires not only to permit proper food supplies to reach all friendly natives, but he particularly desires that these supplies do so reach them.

By command of Brigadier-General Smith:

W. E. AYER,

Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Adjutant-General.

OFFICE OF THE CIVIL GOVERNOR OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., December 4, 1901.

Official copy respectfully furnished Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, U. S. Army, commanding general and military governor in the Philippine Islands, Manila, P. I.

LUKE E. WRIGHT, *Acting Civil Governor.*

[Copy of telegram.]

TACLOBAN, December 9, 1901.

HALL, *Adjutant-General, Manila:*

Circular No. 2 and all restrictions on Leyte removed the 7th instant.

SMITH, *Brigadier-General.*

(December 10, 1901.)

APPENDIX C.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO ATTEMPT AT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH MALVAR TO BE CONDUCTED BY SEÑOR FELIPE G. CALDERON.

OFFICE OF THE CIVIL GOVERNOR OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., October 17, 1901.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I had a call from Felipe Calderon yesterday, whose letter to Cabrera you sent me a copy of. Calderon is earnestly in favor of peace, as the letter which you sent me shows, and is anxious to bring Malvar in. He is one of the brightest lawyers in the Philippines. He has a great many relations and connections in Batangas. He says that he is in receipt of a letter from one of the citizens in Batangas who says that the conditions in that province are horrible for all persons, and that he feels convinced that if a committee consisting of a prominent man in Batangas, who is a close friend of Malvar, named Hilario, and a padre, whose name he gave but which I have forgotten, and Calderon, were to visit Malvar, they could persuade him to surrender. I know something of Hilario's influence in the province of Batangas. It is very wide, and a committee selected of the above would be, so far as the native opinion goes, a strong committee and likely to yield influence.

If you think it would be wise to attempt anything of the sort and to send Calderon to General Sumner for this purpose, I will notify Calderon to come and see you at once. If you think it better that nothing be done, I shall so advise Calderon.

Very sincerely, yours,

WM. H. TAFT.

Major-General CHAFFEE, *U. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., October 18, 1901.

DEAR GOVERNOR: Replying to your note of yesterday, I beg to say that I have no objection to Señor Calderon and the persons you name visiting Malvar for the purpose of inducing his unconditional surrender and the surrender of his entire force, by which I mean all the insurrectos in Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas provinces, which I claim are practically under his influence if not personal control, he having put forth claim as being chief authority of the insurrectionary forces in these islands, and demanding obedience to his orders.

All arms must be delivered up with the men, that clemency may not be expected for anyone against whom assassination of United States soldiers, native scouts, civilians, native or foreign, in the employ of the United States, under pay, shall be alleged and proved before a military court or commission.

That clemency shall not be demanded or asked by Malvar as a condition precedent for any deserter from the United States Army in his camps, but he may know that their lives shall not be exacted as a penalty for their odious crime if Malvar make any inquiry on this subject, but not otherwise.

Malvar must trust to my clemency for himself and his followers, which he may have every reason to hope will not be withheld from him and his command in any lesser degree than it has been from other portions of the insurrecto forces surrendered in many parts of these islands.

If Señor Calderon thinks he can accomplish, with his proposed associates, the surrender of Malvar and his men under the circumstances before stated, I shall be glad to have him undertake the proposed mission, but Malvar personally, without his men and their arms, is of no consequence to me whatever, nor to the situation from a military point of view. I shall be glad to see Señor Calderon if you think it advisable and can commend to him the propositions hereinbefore set forth, which are made explicitly in order that he may not misunderstand my position and what I am willing to accept.

Military operations can not be suspended by me, but absolute safety will be insured Señor Calderon and his friends from harm by United States troops.

Very sincerely, yours,

ADNA R. CHAFFEE.

HON. WILLIAM H. TAFT,
Civil Governor Philippine Islands, Manila.

[Telegram.]

BATANGAS, BATANGAS, *November 21, 1901.*General CHAFFEE, *Manila:*

Señor Calderon, with Señor Potenciano, of Batangas, and Martin Cabrera, called on me this morning. They have written a letter to Malvar asking him to appoint a place of meeting and urging him to comply with their request for the benefit of his country and its inhabitants. They will send out several runners in different directions with copies of this letter. Potenciano is a very influential citizen of Batangas and is said to be a warm friend of Malvar's. He is thought by many to be the insurrecto governor of Batangas, but so far we have no proof of the fact. Señor Calderon leaves to-night for Manila and will call on you to-morrow.

SUMNER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

EXHIBIT 1.

REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. LOYD WHEATON, U. S. ARMY, COMMAND-
ING DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NORTH PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., May 6, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: My last report was made as the commanding general Department of Northern Luzon, and includes an account of operations in the department to June 30, 1901. Armed resistance to the authority of the United States having terminated within the limits of the Department of Northern Luzon, the forces in that department were diminished and a part of the troops sent to other portions of the archipelago, pursuant to instructions from the division commander. The number of stations occupied by the troops was reduced as rapidly as practicable and the administration of civil affairs turned over to civil authorities in 16 provinces within the department.

By order of the division commander the system of military subdivision into districts within the department was discontinued on October 31, 1901, and two separate brigades constituted within the territorial limits of the Department of Northern Luzon.

By direction of the President the Departments of Northern and Southern Luzon were discontinued and the department of North Philippines was created, the territorial limits of the department to include all that portion of the Philippine Archipelago lying north of a line passing (southeastwardly) through the west pass of Apo or Mindoro Strait to the twelfth parallel of north latitude, thence east along said parallel to 124° 10' east of Greenwich, but including the entire island of Masbate, thence north to San Bernardino Straits. By direction of the President I was assigned to the command of this department, the troops within the territorial limits being organized in four brigades, as follows:

First Separate Brigade, Brig. Gen. S. S. Sumner, commanding; headquarters, Dagupan, Pangasinan.—Provinces of Abra, Benguet, Bontoc, Cagayan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Lepanto, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, and Union.

Second Separate Brigade, Brig. Gen. W. H. Bisbee, commanding; headquarters, San Fernando, Pampanga.—Provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Rizal (north of Pasig River), Principe, Tarlac, Zambales, and Infanta (except island of Polillo).

Third Separate Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, commanding; headquarters, Batangas, Batangas.—Provinces of Rizal (south of Pasig River), Laguna, Tayabas (west of a north-and-south line through Atimonan), Batangas, Cavite; islands of Tablas, Romblon, Sibuyan, Marinduque, Mindoro, and all adjacent islands.

Fourth Separate Brigade, Brig. Gen. Frederick Dent Grant, commanding; headquarters, Nueva Caeres, Camarines Sur.—Provinces of Tayabas (east of a north-and-south line through Atimonan and including that town), Camarines Norte, Albay, Camarines Sur, Sorsogon; islands of Masbate, Burias, Polillo, Ticao, Catanduanes, and all adjacent islands.

The post of Manila, under the command of Col. Chambers McKibbin, Twenty-fourth Infantry, was also under the direction of the department commander. The force within the territorial limits of the department consisted of 2 companies of engineers, 2 companies of signal corps, 32 companies of native scouts, 4 companies of coast artillery, 3 batteries of field artillery, 10 squadrons of cavalry, and 40 battalions of infantry. Strength, officers and men present in the department, 25,162, occupying more than 200 stations over an area of more than 50,000 square miles.

Upon assuming command of the department, active insurrection was in operation in the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas, within the territorial limits of the Third Separate Brigade. The inhabitants of these provinces are Tagalogs, the tribe that has furnished the political, military, and diplomatic leaders for the greater part of the insurrectionary disturbances in the archipelago. The organizers of the Katipunan and the members of the Hongkong junta of conspirators are mainly composed from the inhabitants of the provinces mentioned, which had been in insurrection the greater part of the time since 1896, and were yet in insurrection after a complete military occupation by our forces dating from early in January, 1900.

Funds were furnished the agitators in Hongkong and elsewhere from collections in these insurrectionary provinces, and the whole administration of affairs outside of the quarters occupied by our troops or the ground for the time being marched over was under the control of the insurrectionary brigands and guerrillas assuming to be patriots, but in reality engaged in a system of robbery, enforced by the terrors of assassination. The insurrectionary leaders and chiefs of guerrillas, from their hiding places in the mountains and forests within the territorial limits of the Third Brigade, completed a system of taxation, contribution, and confiscation, which gave them complete control, their executioners in the vicinity of every pueblo and barrio enforcing their mandates with the dagger, or by burying alive, when they found it convenient, those natives who were lacking in obedience to their demands.

No natives of the military age were allowed to marry except on the contribution of 30 pesos or a rifle. One-tenth of all agricultural produce was exacted. Nothing could be carried to market without paying on the highway a tax to an armed collector. Toll was collected for crossing bridges which had stood for more than a century and had never been toll bridges. Brass bands had to contribute one-half their earnings to the insurrection, the municipal police a portion of their wages, and all natives who drew a salary or compensation from the American Government a large portion thereof. Those who rented houses to the Americans likewise paid a monthly tax. There was a regular per capita tax varying from 2 pesos to 50 cents, and in addition extraordinary contributions were frequently demanded and collected for the purchase of guns which were never obtained. Not content with this, many subordinate chiefs levied contributions to supply their own immediate desires and those of their commands. The padre regularly divided church fees and tithes with the insurgents and acted as collector from others. He paid a regular monthly contribution of 1½ pesos for each thousand persons under his jurisdiction. Taking advantage of the superstition of the common people, the leaders did not hesitate to profane the cause of religion in order to extract money to fill their pockets.

A miraculous image, about the size of a 6-inch doll, known as the "Virgin of Casaysay," is said to have been discovered centuries ago floating along the shores

of Taal in a joint of bamboo. As the legend goes, it was installed by a pious friar in the sanctuary of Casaysay and has ever since been venerated by the superstitious people as a thing of miraculous and marvelous power. A native priest, one Castillo, abandoning his calling, stole this image and joined the insurgents in the mountains, where a majority of the poor "ignorantes" followed to worship at its shrine and contribute money to secure its protective care. The income of this image has been variously estimated, but never less than many thousand pesos per annum. It was soon ascertained that many similar images were being used by individuals to collect money which was divided with the insurgents.

To render these images valuable they are generally sprung upon the natives in some mysterious way. One Jose Rea had an image manufactured and buried on his own land. Then securing a lot of perfume, he sprinkled it upon the ground and had the attention of natives attracted to his perfume. News thereof soon spread and brought a crowd of people to the spot, who, digging in the ground, discovered the image and used it as a source of revenue for himself and the insurrection. Every able-bodied man was subject to enforced service, but was released upon payment of 30 pesos.

Regular contributions were collected from cockpits and markets. Natives were secretly licensed to gamble in private houses who, notwithstanding the towns were governed by Americans, did not dare to gamble without license, for fear of assassination. Small shops in the towns regularly paid a license fee to insurgent collectors and made frequent contributions upon insurgent demands. Chinamen were special sufferers from heavy imposition. The penalty to all who resisted their demands was death. These taxes were regularly collected by insurgent tax collectors, several of whom were in each town and one in each barrio. Each one was required to turn in a fixed amount, depending upon the wealth and number of the people collected from. In the majority of cases these tax collectors were town officials or "cabezas" of barrios placed in office by the American Government after taking an oath of allegiance binding them to well and faithfully perform the duties of their offices.

In Cavite province, which has long been under civil control, a part of Malvar's force was operating under Noriel, San Miguel, Montalon, and Felizardo. In Batangas every town was supporting regularly organized insurgent columns. In Laguna Caballes was commanding guerrillas, subject to Malvar's orders. In Tayabas, also subject to Malvar's orders, were numerous officials and forces. Five thousand guerrillas were in the field. Adding to this the army of collectors, agents, spies, cargadores, etc., a large percentage of the people were actually serving Malvar and obeying his orders.

Any man found rendering service to the Americans without contributing a large portion of his compensation to the insurrection, or any citizen who showed friendship for Americans, was marked for secret assassination.

The insurgent guerrilla forces were in the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas, generally located within the jurisdiction of the towns to which they pertained, hidden in the jungle or in the deep volcanic ravines, which cut these provinces in all directions. Whenever pursued by American operations they took to thickly wooded and difficult mountains, which abound in all these provinces. The island of Mindoro is covered by densely wooded mountains, among the highest in the Philippine Islands. Mounts Sungay and Gonzales are in Cavite and Batangas; Mount Bacolod and the Loboo Mountains in Batangas; the Lipa Mountains in Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas; Mount Maquiling in Laguna, and Mounts San Cristobal and Banajao, very high twin mountains, stand between the province of Tayabas and the province of Laguna. There never was a terrane more admirably suited to guerrilla warfare. The Loboo Mountains cover a large district, and are so densely wooded and difficult of penetration that villages of ladrones have inhabited them from time immemorial without paying any tribute to government or being disturbed by it.

In the province of Tayabas conditions were as bad as in any province in Luzon. The civil governor, Maj. Cornelius Gardener, Thirteenth Infantry, had been either deceived or had not informed himself of the conditions throughout his province. The state of affairs in the town of Tiaong, as found upon investigation by officers of the Third Brigade, showed that in May, 1901, a junta, the greater number of the officials of the town and the insurgents in the vicinity being present, decided to send a delegation to Major Gardener, who was expected to be in the vicinity for the purpose of organizing town governments. These delegates of insurrection conferred with Major Gardener, and were instructed to return to Tiaong and prepare for election. For the

appointive officers of the town such men were selected as were designated by the guerrilla leaders. To an insurgent colonel was allotted the organization of the police force. The man selected as vice-presidente was appointed fiscal of the church, collector for the town, and contractor for supplies for the American troops, one-half profits going to the insurgents. Wherever investigation of organization of municipalities under the civil government was made, a similar state of affairs was found to exist. The principal and most important duty of the police force was to give the insurgents notice of the movements of the American forces. Another duty of the police in this province was to furnish misinformation to the commanding officers of American forces relative to the operations of guerrillas. In Tiaong insurgent officers and soldiers were in and about the town whenever they choose to be. People were arrested in the outskirts of the town and turned over to insurgent forces near by and murdered. Two native scouts, Macabebes, sent to Tiaong by Colonel Wint, Sixth Cavalry, were taken by the insurgents and afterwards killed. A Filipino was suspected of being friendly to the Americans, and was captured in the town, taken to a near-by river and boloed, and his body thrown into the river in the presence of a number of people. An order of Malvar, dated September, 1901, directed the insurgent chiefs to have one or more candidates for presidente in the different pueblos governed by the American forces. In the vicinity of this town of Tiaong there were 270 rifles in the hands of guerrillas. All this is reported at some length in order that the conditions in the insurrectionary provinces may be understood.

This condition is without parallel in the history of any country long occupied by an invading and conquering army. It was brought about by the kindness and forbearance of my predecessors in the command of these provinces. They had been endeavoring to suppress insurrection by the occupation of the principal towns, by marching the troops to every place where it was believed any armed resistance could be encountered, by the utmost kindness and consideration for the natives, and by carefully guarding them in every possible way from any infringement of any rights of person or property. Surrounded by a dense population of semicivilized natives, belonging to a race whose every impulse is to treachery and perfidy, it was attempted to reduce them to obedience to law and order by the gentlest and most conciliatory methods.

Upon assuming command, I recognized the fact that to reduce these disturbed provinces to order the most determined methods consistent with a humane construction of the laws of war was necessary, as the insurrection would continue indefinitely under the policy heretofore followed. Instructions were given the commanding general, Third Separate Brigade, to inaugurate a policy that would separate the well-disposed from the irreconcilable and to reduce the refractory to submission by every action authorized by the laws of war as defined in the humane code published by the War Department in General Orders, No. 100, of 1863. Active operations were immediately commenced and continued with unrelenting persistence, Malvar surrendering April 16, 1902. The following, reported by Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, explains the methods followed, and which should be a model in suppressing insurrections under like circumstances:

Upon careful consideration of the situation, terrain, and attitude of the people night and day for a week after my arrival, during which time I interviewed every prominent intelligent Filipino within my reach who had the reputation of really desiring peace,

it became apparent that the only way that I could possibly succeed in putting an end to insurrection within the territorial limits of the brigade would be by cutting off the income and food of the insurgents, and by crowding them so persistently with operations as to wear them out. To avoid as far as possible doing damage to persons who wished for peace, it was plainly desirable and essential to afford this class an opportunity to separate themselves from the irreconcilable. I had learned of the impositions and exactions, and was assured that there were many people who contributed to and assisted the insurrection solely through fear of refusing to do so. It was impossible to judge who wanted peace and who not. It was earnestly desired to avoid making war against any who really wanted to be peaceful, and to protect them against the vengeance of insurgents. It was not desired to confiscate or destroy their food, but it was learned that the insurgents had accumulated large quantities of food in the mountains and other hiding places formerly uninhabited, and that a large number of natives, either under compulsion or from choice, were aiding and assisting or living with them. Insurgents claimed they had enough food accumulated to last Malvar's forces for two years. It was necessary to confiscate and to bring into the towns, or destroy this food. It was also necessary to prevent the people living in outlying districts from contributing food to the insurgents.

Some of the leading people who were in control in Bauan, a place 4 miles from the town of Batangas, had concluded prior to my arrival that they wanted peace had enough to fight for it, but found themselves confronted with the same problems as indicated. They solved the difficulty for themselves without instigation or suggestion from anyone by passing a municipal act requiring all the people to come from the barrios and outlying districts into the towns and to bring all their food with them. When this was accomplished they went after the insurgents, and in a very short space of time succeeded in killing, capturing, or forcing to surrender every insurgent in their jurisdiction. They then had peace, the people returned to their homes, and as a consequence of this determined and voluntary action on the part of the town it has suffered less than any other in the province. One strong-minded and determined man, the chief of police, was really the person to whom credit is due for this sensible attitude and action, and had there been equally strong and determined men in every town the struggle against the insurrection in Batangas would have ended long ago. I had pursued the policy of pacifying the people by turning them against the insurgents when I commanded the northern Ilocano provinces, where a number of towns also voluntarily concentrated themselves in order to assist me in promptly bringing about peace. I began operations there about the 1st of March, 1901, and on the 30th day of April every insurgent in the district had surrendered and peace was completely restored. Profiting by this experience and encouraged by the attitude of Bauan in the belief that I could turn the people against the insurgents, notwithstanding that they were all Tagalogs, I determined to work with this end in view. A policy of permitting no neutrality was consequently adopted, but I realized that it would do no good to try to force the inhabitants to be our friends. To give the pacifically inclined an opportunity to save themselves from hardships and to preserve their property (which practically consisted of food supply alone) and to protect them against enforced contribution to the insurgents, I established zones of protection sufficiently close to all towns to enable the small garrisons to give protection to people living therein against the vengeance and oppressive exactions of the insurgents. As friendship can not be created to order by force, I deemed it best not to compel the people to enter these zones, as the council at Bauan had done, but merely to offer them the opportunity and permit them to decide for themselves whether they would be friends or enemies. As a consequence, no one was forced to enter the zones, but many were forced by the insurgents to accompany them with all their effects to the mountains.

In consideration of this latter fact, before beginning active military operations a period of six days was given to having all troops hunt these intimidated people and bring them with their families and food into protected zones. During this period thousands of natives went out under escort to get and bring into the towns food supplies which they had hidden outside pursuant to orders from insurgents. When operations did begin natives were permitted to accompany the troops by hundreds for the purpose of bringing back to town rice and palay hidden by insurgents in the mountains and found by troops. Many thousand pounds of food which had been taken from the people by insurgents was recovered and restored to them. As a consequence, notwithstanding the concentration, the poor people have this year had larger supplies of food than they have enjoyed for many seasons. There has been absolutely no hunger within the territorial limits of the brigade, and no suffering on that account. As another means to prevent the insurgents from procuring food, the ports had been closed December 10. These provinces had never raised enough rice to feed them through the year. It has always been their custom to import it, and when the rice

supply seemed low it was necessary for the Government to import from Manila millions of pounds of rice for sale to people living in protected zones. To those entirely without means it was distributed free of cost. To enable the poor to earn money with which to buy rice extensive road work was carried on in conjunction with the campaign, the money to pay these laborers being derived by imposing a road tax on those who preferred to pay rather than work, and from special appropriations by the Civil Commission. This has resulted in greatly improving the roads in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna. As the campaign progressed many additional people voluntarily entered the zones of protection. The sentiment for peace waxed stronger every day and natives volunteered assistance to Americans at every hand and in every town.

When these volunteers could be trusted, they were armed and sent to the mountains, and always succeeded in performing service of some value, but more frequently still they returned with hundreds of women and children released from the intimidating influence of insurgents and entering the zones under protection afforded them. Of these people, the able-bodied men were examined and those found to be insurgents were detained as prisoners of war. The rest were permitted to join friends, if they had any, in the zones, but if they had none, food and shelter was provided for them. At the town of Batangas those who were sick were placed in a hospital provided for that purpose, where they were furnished food, medical attendance, and medicine free of charge.

The zones of protection varied in size on account of strength of the garrisons and the individual opinion of commanding officers. At the towns of Batangas, Lipa, and San Pablo, where large garrisons were stationed, large zones existed, irregular in shape, but 5 or 6 miles long and 1 or 2 miles wide. In San Pablo the people were left on all main roads, but as it was found impossible to protect them while so scattered, nothing could be accomplished and the zone was decreased in size. The fact developed during our experience that the efficiency and inefficiency of the protection that could be afforded them by troops was the determining factor in the conduct of many natives. In all cases excepting that of San Pablo and Santo Tomas, as success in decreasing danger from insurgents progressed, zones were increased in size, and during the entire time of the proper season for working land, people were permitted to prepare their land for cultivation under the protection of patrols, except where the land was situated so far away as to render it impracticable to do this. We have succeeded, however, in putting an end to the insurrection so promptly that all land can now be properly prepared before the planting season arrives. Some irrigated land was planted under protection of patrols, and standing crops likewise gathered. When the order establishing zones of protection was first issued the insurgents, naturally apprehensive, forbade the people to enter them or directed that they hide their food outside. Fearing contact of the people with the Americans, they prevented their entering the zones of protection by alleging that Americans would brand them with a red hot iron and commit other atrocities. A reign of terror long existed in the mountains of Loboo, where ladrone chiefs have held some of the people under domination as complete as ever existed in the days of feudalism. We soon realized what has been learned by experience elsewhere, that nothing permanent could be accomplished here until the insurgent organizations of towns were completely broken up. The many insurgent collectors and those municipal officials who have broken their oaths in order to serve insurgents have generally been tried and punished, thus completely destroying their organizations of supply and recruiting, and of security and information. We have handled many thousand prisoners, examining, investigating, releasing, and detaining as the exigencies of the service demanded.

The policy of concentration no sooner went into effect than the insurgents became thoroughly alarmed and aroused, and the result was felt by increased activity on their part, inspired by resentment. As a consequence, during the month of December we had many sharp engagements and numbers of unimportant skirmishes, but this activity on their part resulted in such vigorous and relentless pursuit from our troops that they became thoroughly demoralized, and since the 10th of January there has been no armed encounter worthy of record here. We have pursued them ever since with relentless persistence. Not waiting for them to come out of hiding, we have penetrated into the heart of every mountain range, searching every ravine and mountain top. We have found their barracks and hidden supplies in the most unexpected and remote hiding places. We have burned hundreds of barracks and destroyed their stores, and have pursued them so persistently by night and day for the last two months that they ceased to stay more than twenty-four hours in any one place. We have kept our troops supplied in mountains where no road existed. These troops camped by companies at strategic points on trails, each company sending three or four detachments to bivouac at points radiating several miles from the base of the

company. With five or six days' rations left in charge of a man or two, these detachments started out from their bivouacs and searched the mountains by night and day. In this way it was rendered unsafe for insurgents to travel at any time, and having no longer anywhere to hide themselves they became so scattered and demoralized that they have continued to surrender and be captured in shoals. It need not be supposed, however, that we have been able to continue such operations so persistently without cost to our own troops. At the time of Malvar's surrender we had every mountain range in the brigade full of troops, many of whom had not entered a post for more than a month. Though we managed to keep them supplied with food, it was impossible to get sufficient supplies of clothing to them. Nearly all became ragged and many barefooted, but I wish here to record a fact which I hope will be as gratifying to my superiors as to myself, and that is that I never heard one complaint from any man in the command on account of the hard work. Upon the surrender of Malvar we one and all had the satisfaction of realizing that the most determined, ignorant, and persistent enemy of good order had been literally and unequivocally thrashed into unconditional submission to properly constituted authority after he had scorned many opportunities to submit without humiliation and without inflicting hardship on his people.

We have succeeded in entirely turning the people against their leader, and toward the end of operations many thousand of Batangas natives joined us in our determined hunt for their fugitive leader. Realization of the fact that the people had finally turned against him greatly aided in bringing Malvar to his knees.

Hundreds of people have been brought into intimate contact with the Americans, whom they had never seen or known before, and as a consequence no one will again be able to mislead them as to the real character of Americans.

We have captured and forced to surrender eight or ten thousand persons actively engaged in one capacity or another in the insurrection. We have secured about 3,300 rifles and 625 revolvers with many thousand bolos, rounds of ammunition, etc. The people have now all returned to their homes, where they can live free from molestation or apprehension, and with a feeling of security for lives and property, which they have been unable to enjoy for years. They appear to be relieved from a heavy burden and glad that the delusion has run its course.

In Tayabas the civil governor, Major Gardener, has persisted in representing that no insurrection existed in that province, and that there were no disturbers of public order abroad except a few ladrones, whose number was belittled. I am led to conclude when the people there tired of the active insurrection the most of them simply disbanded their companies, hid their guns, and entered the pueblos, resuming a normal life without surrendering or taking the oath of allegiance. They never ceased collecting, and to justify a continuance of this lucrative privilege the leaders apparently left a handful of men in the field. The officers of my command have worked faithfully and conscientiously under the weight of much discouragement, in the face of annoying opposition from the provincial governor referred to, and are deserving of much credit for the results accomplished.

The foregoing quotations are from information conveyed by Brigadier-General Bell, and are embodied in this report in order that a more complete understanding may be had of the conditions that existed in the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, and Tayabas upon my assuming command of the Department of North Philippines and the methods followed by the commanding general in those provinces to end the insurrection existing at that time. Active operations against the insurgent and guerrilla bands on the island of Mindoro were prosecuted under Maj. William L. Pitcher, Eighth Infantry—the island being within the territorial limits of the Third Separate Brigade. The forces employed were six companies of the Thirtieth Infantry and two companies of native troops. April 14 Major Pitcher reported that the leaders of the insurrection had all been killed or captured, and that the insurrection in Mindoro was crushed and war ended. All other islands adjacent to Luzon remained at peace.

Within the territorial limits of the First Separate Brigade, consisting of the northern provinces of Luzon, the country remained quiet, and no brigandage or serious disorders have been reported since April, 1901. The whole territory of the former Department of Northern Luzon remained at peace until an outbreak of disorder occurred in the

province of Rizal and within 20 miles of Manila. In the latter part of February, 1902, Timoteo Pasay, formerly lieutenant-colonel of insurgents, and insurgent presidente of Cardona, organized a band of 55 men, armed with rifles, and uniformed in imitation of the constabulary. The men composing this band were from various towns in the eastern part of Rizal. The object of Pasay was to kill Exequil Ampil, presidente of Cainta, a noted Americanista, and to plunder Cainta and generally engage in robbery and the murder of Americanistas. The night of February 28, Pasay entered Cainta with his band, seized Ampil and all the municipal officers and police of the town. Pasay plundered the town, and took Ampil, bound, into the jungle intending to dispatch him. Upon information received, the troops in the various stations near Cainta were turned out, and, cooperating with the constabulary, so pressed the outlaws that Ampil succeeded in escaping from them. Soon after this the band dispersed, and, hiding their rifles, returned to the several towns to which they belonged. Pasay has not yet been found by the civil authorities, and the rifles of the band have not yet been taken. This affair is of importance only as indicating liability of future disturbances of this nature, unless drastic measures are taken for the punishment of such disturbers of the peace. A report of this affair, made by Capt. Charles R. Howland, Twenty-first Infantry, aid-de-camp, is forwarded herewith.

In the Fourth Separate Brigade the inhabitants of all the provinces, excepting that portion of Tayabas within the territorial limits of the brigade, claimed to be pacified, and Brigadier-General Grant reported in January that there was little disorder, but that a few armed bands of ladrones were in the mountains.

Throughout the department every assistance required has been given the authorities in provinces under civil control. There has been harmony and cooperation excepting that in one of the provinces under civil government the governor has endeavored to seek cause of dissatisfaction with the military officers stationed or operating therein. In the province of Tayabas the civil governor, Major Gardener, reported December 16, 1901, that "true loyalty and contentment can only come under a benign civil government." It was, however, necessary something should be done to enable the establishing of such a government, which was impossible during the time this officer was governor, as the insurgents were in arms in Tayabas, we having caused, since December 1, the capture or surrender of 44 officers, 365 soldiers, 11 bronze cannons, 644 rifles, and 159 revolvers in that province.

At this time insurrection has ceased in Luzon and adjacent islands. There is no brigandage or disorder reported in the territory comprising the former Department of Northern Luzon, which composed all the island north of Manila. A few small bands of ladrones are in the mountains of southern Tayabas, and there is brigandage in Cavite Province, which the civil authorities state can be coped with by the constabulary.

Upon the surrender of Malvar the following dispatch was sent:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES,

April 16, 1902—11.10 a. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Manila, P. I.:

Malvar having unconditionally surrendered to Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to-day, I report that organized armed resistance to the authority of the United States has terminated in this department.

WHEATON,

Major-General, Commanding.

There is now little to prevent continued peaceful conditions throughout the territorial limits of this department, provided a firm and thorough policy of bringing assassins and disturbers of order to justice is followed.

The discharge of the duties of the several staff corps have been efficient. The troops have been supplied and paid regularly, the construction of roads and bridges has progressed, and 3,423 miles of telegraph, telephone, and cable line kept in repair and used in the administration of public business. Further report relating to the labor of the staff is not made at this time, as the annual reports made June 30 will convey complete information.

For the uniform success attending all military operations and administration, both within this and the former Department of Northern Luzon, I am under great obligations to Brigadier-Generals Sumner, Grant, Bell, Smith, Funston, and Bisbee, who have since my last report at various times held commands within the territorial limits of the department. Their able and energetic execution of all operations committed to them has my highest commendation.

The military forces within the department have successfully executed all action required. I commend their conduct. Their labors have been arduous, and whenever the opportunity offered they have illustrated the courage, the persistent daring, and the considerate humanity for which the American soldier has ever been distinguished.

I authorized the policy and fully approve of the methods by which the insurrection in the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas was ended. The humane code of the laws of war as published during the Administration of President Lincoln was followed in all operations against semicivilized insurgents habitually violating every law of war known to civilized nations, and treating their own people with every barbarity that can be inflicted upon the helpless.

Upon the termination of insurrection within the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas, the following dispatch was sent:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES,

Manila, P. I., April 16, 1902—12.44 p. m.

Brig. Gen. J. FRANKLIN BELL,

Lipa, Batangas:

The department commander, Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, U. S. Army, thanks you and the officers and men of the Third Brigade for the result of the operations terminating with the surrender of Malvar. The methods pursued and the ability, energy, and efficiency displayed by you and your command, will be a model for future operations against the resistance of semicivilized people to the armies of the United States.

By command of Major-General Wheaton:

WALTZ, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

My service in these islands soon terminating, I wish now to express my highest appreciation of the gallant conduct, the courage and humanity of the troops it has been my honor and good fortune to command. The officers deserve the gratitude of their countrymen, and the men the gratitude and love of every patriotic American.

Very respectfully,

LOYD WHEATON,
Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NORTH PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., April 15, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of North Philippines.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in obedience to paragraph 9, Special Orders, No. 57, 1902, Headquarters Department of North Philippines, on the 1st day of March, 1902, I proceeded to the pueblos of Pasig, Cainta, Taytay, Antipolo, Bosoboso, and other places, to investigate the alleged outrages in the town of Cainta upon natives friendly to the United States. I talked with many natives, and, after a thorough investigation, found the following to be facts:

Exequil Ampil is the presidente of Cainta and a pronounced Americanista. In the spring of 1899, when Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, U. S. Volunteers, cleared the country between Manila and the Laguna de Bay of insurgents, Ampil advised the surrender of Cainta and the acceptance of American sovereignty. For entertaining these views he was shot and wounded by the insurgents, and fled to the hills for concealment and safety. At the first opportunity he came to Manila for medical assistance, and when his wound had healed he returned to his native town, Cainta, which was by that time inside the American lines. He announced himself as an Americanista, and used his influence against the Katipuneros, and his services have been of great value to our forces in this vicinity near Manila. He has captured and turned in with his municipal police more than 200 rifles and 20 pistols. He has been most courteous to all Americans who have passed through Cainta; he has volunteered his services freely as a guide or interpreter; he has of his own volition with his police attacked and captured an insurgent recruiting station, and he has also freely given testimony in open court against those who have violated the laws of war and their oaths of allegiance to the United States.

His zealotness in assisting the American forces and his activity in getting rifles won him the hatred of all the irreconcilables in his province, and an attempt was made some time ago to kidnap him, but fortunately he was not at home. To guard against a repetition of this, the constabulary issued to him 11 Remington rifles and ammunition with which to arm his police, even though Cainta is within 20 miles of Manila and but a few miles from Pasig, where we have a garrison.

That was the situation in Cainta in the latter part of February, 1902, when Timoteo Pasay, formerly lieutenant-colonel of insurgents, insurgent presidente of Cardona, province of Rizal, determined to organize a raid to kidnap Ampil and certain of his assistants and take them to the mountains and kill them. He organized and armed a force of about 55 bandits from the following towns in this province: Teresa, Morong, Binangonan, Cardona, Antipolo, and Bosoboso. His assistants were: First, Anastacio Feliz, from Cardona; second, Pedro Feliz, from Cardona, who took the oath of allegiance to the United States at Morong when Major Carey, Forty-second Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, was in command of that station; third, Eusebio, from Cardona, who was arrested some months ago and charged with murder of an American, Mr. Bagge, foreman of the rock quarry at Binangonan. Eusebio escaped from Parian street station, Manila, last Christmas Eve; and fourth, Apolinario Cristobal, from Bosoboso, who surrendered and took the oath of allegiance to the United States at San Mateo with Geronimo. This force completed its organization without any information having been furnished the proper authorities by the natives, who necessarily knew all about it.

About 2.30 a. m., February 28, 1902, Timoteo Pasay surrounded the town of Cainta with this force and took as prisoners all the municipal officers and policemen, instituted a reign of terror, frightening the people, and subjecting the presidente, Ampil, to the indignity of being tied first with his hands behind his back, and later to another man with a rope and compelling him to go about his town announcing himself to his friends as an insurgent. This bandit gang secured from the town the 11 Remington rifles and 400 rounds of ammunition, and 8 pistols and about 100 rounds of pistol ammunition, which the constabulary had issued to Ampil, and after pillaging the town of watches, hats, clothes, shoes, and rings, they left at about daylight taking Ampil with them as a bound prisoner. This band was in uniform similar to that of the constabulary, and when challenged by the municipal police of Cainta replied "policia insular."

As soon as they had left the town the vice-presidente, Epiphania Fernandez, sent a note by carromata reporting the facts to the civil governor of the province at Pasig, Senor Flores, who received the report in plenty of time, so that if he had notified Captain Bishop, the station commander at Pasig, this band could have been intercepted that same morning near Antipolo and Ampil released; but no, the governor did not see fit to inform Captain Bishop of this raid, but instead waited until about 9.30 a. m., and then drove to Cainta in a carromata and decided to surround the

town, in spite of the fact that the note which informed him of the raid also notified him that the raiders had gone. The vice-presidente also notified the station commander at Antipolo by messenger of the raid and requested protection. Meanwhile the raiders marched from Cainta, skirting Taytay, and crossed the road near Antipolo, starting south at about 8 a. m., where they held up an army wagon from Antipolo to Pasig, carrying the United States mail, Corpl. William C. Ocker, Troop L, Fifth Cavalry, Lewis Gardner, teamster, and the following natives—Juan Sumulung, Antonio Leyba and Maria, all of Antipolo. Corporal Ocker took one of the mules out of the team and galloped to Cainta as fast as he could, expecting to notify Ampil that there were insurgents in the country, and knowing that Ampil would go after them with his police. To his surprise he found at Cainta that Ampil was a prisoner in the hands of this same band, so he continued on to Pasig, with the request of the Cainta people to Captain Bishop to do something to save Ampil.

Meeting the wagon on the road near Antipolo was a fortunate incident for Ampil, as according to the statement of Alipio Prospero, a policeman of Cainta who was taken with Ampil, these bandits intended to kill Ampil with bolos on the road, but having been seen they hastened to the hills. It was during this part of the march that Ampil begged piteously to be released, and Timoteo Pasay told him, "No, you have gotten hundreds of guns for the Americans."

As soon as the request of these poor people of Cainta had been received, patrols were ordered out from all the stations, and one of the patrols, under Sergeant Thompson, from Morong, nearly encountered this band, and they changed their direction and went into the hills near Teresa, where they received food from the people of Teresa. They then went to Bujayin, barrio of Teresa. Having been notified that rice had been cached for them at Pulpito, they proceeded to Pulpito, where at 6 a. m., March 2, they were startled by hearing firing at base of hill. All the bandits started to run up the hill, when one of the men called out, "They are not Americans; they are police." Timoteo Pasay then ordered the men to turn around and charge, which they did, defeating the constabulary, 5 of whom returned to Morong on the morning of March 2, 8 that afternoon, and 6 went in to Bosoboso early that same day. The bandits captured 5 men, 2 rifles, and 5 pistols. Corporal Reed, Fifth Cavalry, was at Bosoboso, and when Corporal Blanco of the constabulary with his 6 men came into Bosoboso and reported that the constabulary had been defeated at Pulpito, Corporal Reed started at once for Pulpito with 6 men, found the bandits, and drove them in the direction of Tanay. This prompt defeat of these bandits by Corporal Reed, after they had defeated the constabulary, had a salutary effect on them. The facts were given me by Ampil himself, also by natives of the barrio of Pinuguy, viz, Severo Gatlobayan, Gregorio Bautista, and Maria Bautista.

Ampil stated to me that the bandits were in such terror of the American troops that they abandoned a plan to escape by way of Santa Maria into Laguna, and devoted their whole energy to hiding in the hills, and that the people of the different barrios near which they stayed brought them food. He said that the American troops (Fifth Cavalry) covered the country so thoroughly and pushed the bandits so close that they became tired, worn and hungry, and a little careless. He took advantage of an opportunity to escape while they were in the hills near Morong. He did not dare to enter Morong, as the people there seemed to be in sympathy with the bandits, so he skirted the town and entered Tanay, a town garrisoned by United States troops. He was made as comfortable as possible by the commanding officer of that station, and sent to Pasig on a launch, where I met him, riding in from Bosoboso for that purpose. He was furnished transportation and a proper escort to go to Cainta and see his family. He returned the same afternoon from Cainta with his family and took up quarters in the convent at Pasig, saying that hereafter he would not live outside of a guard of American troops. A few days after this the department commander favorably considered an appeal for protection made by Ampil (presidente of Cainta) and directed that a detachment taken from the garrison at Pasig be stationed at Cainta for the protection of its presidente.

As soon as Ampil escaped from these bandits, the troops returned to their proper stations. Up to the present time the leader of these bandits, Timoteo Pasay, has not been taken, and his guns have not been captured by the constabulary. It is believed that the force is entirely dispersed and the men in hiding, but as long as these guns are out they may be used for unlawful purposes.

In conclusion, Ampil came to me and asked me to convey to the department commander, formally, his thanks for his rescue from the hands of these bandits. He stated that if the troops had not taken the field he could not have escaped.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES R. HOWLAND,
Captain, Twenty-first Infantry, Aid-de-Camp.

APPENDIX A.

REPORTS OF OPERATIONS IN THE FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE.

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, *Dagupan, Pangasinan, P. I., June 30, 1902.*

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit report of First Separate Brigade for period December 2, 1901, to June 30, 1902.

The First Separate Brigade was organized per General Orders, 311, headquarters Division of the Philippines, series 1901, with headquarters at Dagupan, Pangasinan, P. I., where they have remained to date.

Territory of First Separate Brigade includes that formerly organized as first, second, and third districts, Department of Northern Luzon, embracing following-named provinces: Abra, Benguet, Bontoc, Cagayan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Lepanto, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Union.

The undersigned was assigned to command First Separate Brigade per Special Orders, 360, series 1901, headquarters Division of the Philippines, and assumed command per paragraph 1, General Orders, 7, December 2, 1901, First Separate Brigade, relieving Brig. Gen. J. F. Bell, U. S. Army.

At that time there were the following organizations in the brigade: Third U. S. Cavalry, headquarters, 12 troops; Fifth U. S. Cavalry, 1 troop; Fifth U. S. Infantry, headquarters, 12 companies; Twelfth U. S. Infantry, 1 company; Thirteenth U. S. Infantry, headquarters, 12 companies; Sixteenth U. S. Infantry, headquarters, 12 companies; Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry, 3 companies.

Scouts: Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Twenty-fifth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-seventh, and Twenty-eighth Companies; and the strength was: Line 204 officers, 5,889 enlisted; scouts, 13 officers, 511 enlisted; signal corps, 44 enlisted; engineer corps, 8 enlisted; medical department, 56 officers, 388 enlisted; total, 273 officers, 6,840 enlisted.

There were the following stations and substations occupied December 2, 1901:

Province of Abra.—Pidigan, Bangued, San Quintin, Tayum.

Province of Benguet.—Baguio, Trinidad.

Province of Cagayan.—Aparri, Tuguegarao, Iguig, Enrile, Solana, Lal-lo, Abulug, Piat, Tuao, Baggaog, Buguey, Tabuggan, Sanchez Mira, Linao, Pamplona, Claveria, Alcala, Gattaran, Santo Niño, Amulung, Camalaniugan.

Province of Ilocos Norte.—Badoc, Dingras, Batac, San Miguel; Bojeador (L. H.), Solsona, Laoag, Paoay, Currimaog. Laoag Beach, Vintar, Bangui.

Province of Ilocos Sur.—Vigan, Narvacan, Bantay, Santa, Candon, Cabugao, Sinait, Santiago, Santa Maria, Salomague, Lapo, San Emilio.

Province of Isabela.—Cordon, San Luis, Angadanan, Ilagan, San Isabel, Malunu, Cabagan Nuevo, Cauayan, Carig, Echague, San Jose, Tumauni, Gamu, Naguilian, Santa Maria, Reina Mercedes.

Province of Lepanto.—Cervantes.

Province of Nueva Vizcaya.—Solano, Bayombong, Bagabag, Ibung.

Province of Pangasinan.—Dagupan, San Carlos, Malasiqui, San Jacinto, Sual, Manaoag, San Manuel, Mangataren, Tayug, Rosales, Bayambang, San Fabian, Pozorrubio, Mangaldan, Lingayen, Binalonan, Urdaneta, Asingan, Humingan, Santa Maria, Bautista.

Province of Union.—Namagpacan, Bangar, Bagnotan, San Juan, Naguilian, Rosario, Balaoang, San Fernando, San Gabriel, Rosario Engineer Camp, Aringay, Santo Tomas.

By gradual process the strength of the brigade was transferred elsewhere until on June 30, 1902, there remained—

Eleventh U. S. Cavalry, headquarters, 8 troops; Fifth U. S. Infantry, headquarters, 12 companies. Scouts: Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-fifth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-seventh, and Twenty-eighth Companies. Strength: Line, 98 officers, 2,760 enlisted; engineer corps, 3 officers, 35 enlisted; signal corps, 62 enlisted; hospital corps, 44 officers, 170 enlisted; total, 145 officers, 3,027 enlisted.

Stations have been reduced to following named:

Province of Cagayan.—Aparri, Tuguegarao.

Province of Ilocos Norte.—Currimao, Laoag.

Province of Ilocos Sur.—Salomague, Santa Maria, San Esteban, Vigan.

Province of Isabela.—Cauayan, Ilagan, Echague.

Province of Lepanto.—Angaqui, Concepcion, Cervantes, San Emilio.

Province of Pangasinan.—Bautista, Dagupan, Mangaldan, Rosales, Calasiao, Lingayen, San Fabian.

On this date, June 30, 1902, the brigade is discontinued, and the territory formerly included within its limits is now merged into that of Second Separate Brigade, pursuant to telegraphic authority from division commander.

All the provinces in this brigade are now under civil government.

During the period covered by this report the relations between the civil and military has been cordial, and most particularly is this marked in case of the constabulary, where the desire for cooperation has been always plainly apparent.

There have been no military operations of note during the period of existence of this brigade. One expedition was made in January, 1902, by Colonel Markley, Thirteenth Infantry, in command at Humingan. He took a force of Twenty-fourth Infantry through the San Nicolas Pass to the neighborhood of Aritao in Nueva Vizcaya, while a detachment moved toward the same place under Captain Johnson, Sixteenth Infantry, from the Upper Cagayan Valley, in hopes of intercepting Caballes, who was reported in that vicinity with a large command. No result achieved. These operations have been duly reported to superior headquarters. The only other movements of troops were for purpose of changing station or practice marching.

The health of the brigade has been generally good. Epidemic of smallpox among natives in Cagayan Valley and of cholera now raging in Pangasinan; but no epidemics among troops.

Discipline has been maintained and is very good. Instruction has been given as opportunity offered, and as concentration has progressed military instruction became possible in greater degree.

Equipment is in the main complete.

Supplies are generally of good quality and sufficient.

Transportation good generally and sufficient. There have been much glanders and surra among American horses, resulting in great loss to the Government. It is the consensus of opinion that much of this was due to feeding native grass.

Reports of staff officers appended, viz: Report chief surgeon, chief quartermaster, chief commissary, inspector-general, judge-advocate.^a

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. S. SUMNER,

Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
Laoag, Ilocos Norte, P. I., December 26, 1901.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE,

Department of North Philippines, Dagupan, Pangasinan, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to render the following brief report upon the operations of the troops under my command during the past fortnight:

Immediately upon assuming command of this province on the 10th instant I received information from my predecessor and from other sources, that a band of

^a Not printed.

insurgents or ladrones (outlaws, no matter by what name designated) had been operating in the country adjoining Piddig, and that efforts to capture or locate the same had been so far unsuccessful.

I therefore renewed the efforts to run down this band, and sent out several scouting parties from Laoag, Dingras, and Piddig, with the net result up to date that the captain of the band, one Basilio Esperanza, a native of Bagnotan, Union province, has been killed; 6 Remington rifles and about 112 rounds of ammunition and about a dozen members or affiliated persons captured.

Esperanza was a former insurgent sergeant and a companion of Padre Aglipay during the recent guerrilla warfare in this province, and one of Esperanza's prisoners has reported that the ex leader (Esperanza) was in receipt of communications from Aglipay and Isabelo de los Reyes.

That Aglipay and his agents have been collecting money from the people of this province seems to be pretty well accepted, also that there are some 200 to 300 rifles hidden away, which Aglipay did not turn in to the United States authorities when he presented himself, his surrender not being in good faith.

Recently the municipal police of Laoag have seized some 80 new bolos, sharp pointed, uniform in size, shape, and finish, fabricated in Calasiao, Pangasinan, and sent into this province, it is believed by the governor, for no good purpose. They were in transit when seized. The governor informs me this is the first time bolos manufactured in Pangasinan have ever been sent into Ilocos Norte. They were detained farther north for towns not now or very weakly occupied by American troops.

I have the names of six other members of Esperanza's band, not yet captured, but will endeavor to gather them in.

I inclose reports from Lieutenants Cullen, Sterling, and Cook, giving certain details not specified above.

Very respectfully,

E. Z. STEEVER,
Major Third Cavalry, Commanding.

DINGRAS, P. I., December 14, 1901.

THE ADJUTANT, Laoag, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit a report of a scout made by detachment of 35 men of Troop L, Third Cavalry, with 3 pack mules and 1 civilian packer and 2 scouts of the Fifteenth Company, Ilocano Scouts, under my command, made in obedience to telegram from provincial commander, dated December 3, 1901. The detachment proceeded at once to Piddig. After spending the evening there in quest of information, left at 1 o'clock that night, after learning that the band was composed of 6, all armed with rifles, under one Basilio Esperanza, though was unable to find out the direction in which they went after leaving barrio Barnt, where they carried off a concejal named Elias Madamba. Scouted from Piddig to Solsona, reaching the latter place at 4.45 a. m. Consulted at once with presidente, and decided to take him with me to barrio No. 10, north of Solsona, where the band with guns, accompanied by 2 men without guns, had supper the night before. Ascertained that these 2 men were Marcos Alejandro and Lazaro Tomas. Scouted northeast of Piddig and finally captured Marcos Alejandro, also 2 men who occupy the house with him, one being his brother-in-law. Learned that Lazaro Tomas was a constant companion of Esperanza. Reached Solsona that evening, and from there came into Dingras, part of a detachment scouting from Solsona to Banna to Dingras. Considered it useless to stay out longer, as the whole country knew I was out and the force which I was ordered to take was too large to move without being seen in the day and be heard at night.

The evening of the next day sent out a small detachment under Lieutenant Cook, guided by one of the 3 prisoners brought in by me, who knew where Lazaro Tomas and Esperanza lived. Lieutenant Cook captured Lazaro Tomas, but could not secure Esperanza. Lieutenant Cook's report is attached hereto. It is evident that the 6 men with guns are simply ladrones, who assemble at different times, only to scatter in a day or two. They are armed with Remingtons. No one has seen any ammunition on them.

The following is a list of the men who are reported as composing this band of ladrones: Basilio Esperanza, leader, from Bagnotan; Lazaro Tomas, from Barnt, barrio 19, of Piddig; Marcos Alejandro, from Ruburban, barrio 19, of Piddig; Roman Jacinto, from Balbalay, barrio 18, of Piddig; Juan Jacinto, from Balbalay, barrio 18, of Piddig; Santiago Root, from Today, barrio 17, of Piddig; Fernando Palayao, from Buyag, barrio 16, of Piddig; Pedro Andres, from Today, barrio 17, of Piddig; Lucas Martinez, from barrio Santa Ana, of Vintar.

The 11 prisoners are now confined at this post, all of whom have been consorting with the band. If they have not, they know all about Esperanza and will begin to talk very soon, I think.

Very respectfully,

DORSEY CULLEN,
First Lieutenant, Third Cavalry, Commanding.

LAOAG, ILOCOS NORTE, P. I., December 16, 1901.

The PROVINCIAL COMMANDER,

Laoag, Ilocos Norte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

With 20 enlisted men of Troop K, Third Cavalry, and 1 civilian scout I left this station at 11.50 a. m. Saturday, December 14, 1901, pursuant to the following order:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
Laoag, Ilocos Norte, P. I., December 14, 1901.

Second Lieut. E. K. STERLING,

Third Cavalry.

(Through Commanding Officer Troop K, Third Cavalry.)

SIR: A report having been received from Vintar that a band of insurgents or ladrones under Esperanza were in the barrio of Aguapa, jurisdiction of Vintar, last night, the provincial commander directs that you proceed to Vintar with 20 enlisted men, Troop K, Third Cavalry, fully armed and equipped and provided with rations for four days, and thoroughly scout the country in that jurisdiction.

The object of this expedition is to kill or capture this band, and in case you strike them they will be followed until that end is attained.

You will report in person to the provincial commander for further instructions.

Very respectfully,


R. W. LESHER,
Second Lieutenant, Third Cavalry, Adjutant.

I reached Vintar at 12.35 p. m., and immediately sent for the presidente and a man named Marcellino, the muchacho of the school-teacher at Vintar, and while awaiting them I questioned all the policemen I could find. They all claimed that they knew nothing of any ladrones in that vicinity. The presidente, together with the chief of police, appeared in about fifteen minutes. In substance he told that he had not heard the report; that he did not believe that they could be in that vicinity without his being informed of it; that all the entrances of the town were so well guarded that he did not think they would dare enter that town, and that the barrio of Aguapang (which he said was the correct spelling of that word) was between Vintar and Piddig, about or a little more than half way. The chief of police I questioned, but could gain no further information. The man Marcellino appeared after a wait of over half an hour. At first he said that all he knew was what the school-teacher had told him; but when asked whether he had heard any conversation or any talk about ladrones in that vicinity he said he had heard some talk about a party being near there the night before. I asked him if he had heard if they had any guns. He thought there were 2 rifles and the rest of the party had bolos. He claimed he had not heard the number of the band, and either would not or could not tell me where the band had been seen, answering on the road outside of Vintar, at the same time indicating the road to Piddig.

The presidente furnished me two guides—two because the one who knew the trail could not talk Spanish. I then proceeded to find the barrio of Aguapang. It is number 9 of town of Vintar. After a ride of nearly three hours we finally succeeded in finding this barrio. We found a man who took us to the house of the cabeza of the barrio. I questioned this man and also two or three others I found in that vicinity. They all said they had heard nothing of ladrones there, nor had they seen any men with arms except some policemen from Vintar who had been through there a week or more before—to be exact, on the 5th of this month—looking for some ladrones. They all claimed not to know Esperanza even by sight.

I was told here that the trail to Piddig was slightly nearer and easier than to Vintar. For this reason, and also because I knew that he had lived in Piddig, I decided to push in there and see if I could get any trace of him there. I reached Piddig at 5.30 p. m., where we spent the night. That evening I had a long talk with the presidente, who seems to be a very intelligent man, and who gave me everything I requested of him and talked very freely. He said he was positive that Esperanza was not in his jurisdiction, because every morning and every evening someone came in from

each barrio to report. He told me that two of the men whom Esperanza had taken from one of the barrios had returned and had told him they escaped from a barrio



Sketch of route of scouting party which left Laoag, Ilocos Norte, December 14, returning December 15, 1901.

south of Dingras. He described Esperanza to me as below middle height, rather thick set, and hair slightly curly. I asked him if he would give me a man who knew this ladrone to go with me the next day. He told me he would and he did so, the man accompanying us the next day. He told me every man who had to had paid his personal tax in his jurisdiction except Esperanza. The medical officer, Dr. R. C. Stoney, contract surgeon, U. S. Army, told me that one of the men he had taken away from this barrio, but who had not yet returned, was sick, and described to me his illness so that I could recognize him if I came upon him.

The next morning, Sunday, December 15, 1901, I left Piddig about 6.30 a. m. with two new guides from that town, however taking along as well the ones of the former day. I took a different trail from the one of the preceding day, and scouted all morning. Every man I met I required him to show me the receipt for his tax. Only a very few did not have them and my guides when asked said they knew these men. I also stopped at every house and investigated it for the tax receipt and for any sick man. There was a barrio near here, so we investigated it and then rested for dinner until 2 p. m., when I started for Vintar, keeping up my investigation of tax receipts and looking for any sick man or any man attempting to conceal himself. A little after 3 p. m., I reached the house of Señor Martinez, where I believe the man Marcellino said he had heard this report of ladrones, but the señor said that he had heard nothing of the kind, as did everyone else we questioned about it except this Marcellino. I reached Vintar at 3.30 p. m., and at 4 p. m. left there for Laoag, which I reached at 5.15 p. m.

Very respectfully,

E. K. STERLING,
Second Lieutenant, Third Cavalry.

DINGRAS, ILOCOS NORTE, P. I., December 10, 1901.

The COMMANDING OFFICER,

Dingras, Ilocos Norte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of a scouting trip made in the jurisdiction of Piddig, Solsona, and Vintar, from December 5 to December 9, 1901:

Pursuant to verbal orders from the commanding officer, Dingras, I left the above station at 6.30 p. m., December 5, with 1 noncommissioned officer, 1 private, 1 native scout, and a native acting as guide, all mounted, and proceeded to Piddig, which station we left at 12.30 a. m., dismounted, and went to Barnt, in barrio 19, of the eighth district of Piddig, and took a native named Lazaro Tomas, who was reported by Lieutenant Cullen, Third Cavalry, as being an intimate friend of Basilio Esperanza, the leader of a band of ladrones.

From Barnt we went to Magadang and took 3 men, viz, Florentino Pascual, Gregorio Ramos, and Arcadio Nicholas, all of whom were present when their concejal, Elias Madamba, was abducted, but none of whom were inclined to give any information. From Magadang went to Baboos, in barrio 19, district 3, of Solsona, and took Enrique Lagola, who had fed the above-mentioned ladrones at his house, but who would not mention any information concerning them.

From Baboos went to Solsona, arriving at 7 p. m., December 6. Left Solsona on the morning of December 7, with 1 noncommissioned officer and 4 native scouts, leaving the 5 prisoners in Solsona.

Went from Solsona to Today, barrio 17, Piddig, to get Santiago Root and Pedro Andres, but found that both of them had been gone since the morning of the abduction.

From Today went to Buyag, barrio 16, to get Fernando Palayao, but he had also been away from home since the morning of the abduction. From Buyag went to Balbalay, barrio 18, and took Roman Jacinto, who has been seen with this band of ladrones at different times.

From Balbalay went to Piddig, arriving about 10 a. m., December 8, 1901.

At 12 m. left Piddig, mounted, with 1 noncommissioned officer, 1 native scout, and 1 native prisoner, and proceeded to Vintar to get Lucas Martinez, a member of this band, but found that he also had been gone from home since the morning of the abduction.

Left Vintar at 12.30 a. m. and proceeded to Piddig, via Laoag, arriving at 3.30 a. m., December 9, 1901. Had the prisoners brought from Solsona, and proceeded to Dingras, arriving at this station at 10 a. m., December 9, 1901.

The following is a list of the names of the men who are reported as composing this band of ladrones: Basilio Esperanza, leader, from Bagnotan; Lazaro Tomas, from Barnt, barrio 19, Piddig; Marcos Alejandro, from Rubruban, barrio 19, Piddig; Roman Jacinto, from Balbalay, barrio 18, Piddig; Juan Jacinto, from Balbalay, barrio 18, Piddig; Santiago Root, from Today, barrio 17, Piddig; Fernando Palayao,

from Buyag, barrio 16, Piddig; Pedro Andres, from Today, barrio 17, Piddig; Lucas Martinez, from barrio Santa Ana, Vintar.

Following is a list of the men brought in as prisoners and reasons therefor: Lazaro Tomas, reported as belonging to above band; Roman Jacinto, reported as one of the band; Florentino Pascual, Gregorio Ramos, Arcadio Nicholas, were present when the concejal was taken, but would not give any information; Enrique Lagola, entertained the band in his house, but would not give any information; Pedro Castillo and Gregorio Sabado were seen with band of ladrones on the morning of the abduction, but claim they were prisoners.

The above 8 men were confined in the guardhouse at Dingras, Ilocos Norte, on December 9, 1901.

Very respectfully,

SETH W. COOK,
Second Lieutenant, Third Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD SQUADRON, THIRD CAVALRY,
On Board U. S. Army transport Lawton, July 1, 1902.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the march overland from Laoag, Ilocos Norte, P. I., to the province of Tarlac, P. I., of the Third Squadron, Third Cavalry, as promulgated in telegram from headquarters Department of North Philippines, transmitted through headquarters First Separate Brigade, Dagupan, Pangasinan, P. I., May 26, 1902, and paragraph 1, Special Order No. 133, headquarters Department of North Philippines, Manila, P. I., May 26, 1902.

On June 3, 1902, about 3 p. m., the squadron was prepared to move, but on account of heavy rains the river was swollen to such an extent as to make crossing dangerous, and I postponed the crossing until the river had fallen. Finally, about 2 p. m. June 4, 1902, a raft, was found and I ordered the baggage to cross on rafts, intending to swim horses and cross men on rafts, until soon afterward I received an order from Captain Harbord, Eleventh Cavalry, to cross the squadron.

Troop L, Third Cavalry, was in the lead as guard to the wagon train and started across the Laoag River, which was very high, and in crossing lost 5 men and 5 horses drowned. The movement was then postponed until further orders, and the following telegram was sent by me to the adjutant-general, First Separate Brigade, Dagupan, Pangasinan, P. I.:

"HEADQUARTERS THIRD SQUADRON, THIRD CAVALRY,
Laoag, P. I., June 4, 1902.

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Dagupan, P. I.:

"On account of heavy rains squadron was delayed in moving. To-day at 2 p. m., against my protest, I was ordered by Capt. J. G. Harbord, Eleventh Cavalry, commanding Laoag, to take squadron across the Laoag River. Troop L was ordered to cross, and in the movement lost Private Albert Gribble, drowned, with Corpl. Edward Seiglow and Private Bert Wisdom, missing. Two horses were also lost. Private Gribble's body was recovered.

"SIRMYER, Commanding."

This report did not cover the entire loss, due to the fact that there was no communication from Laoag to the other side of the river, and later it was learned that Privates Chester A. Butcher, Roy Ransomer, Bert Wisdom, and Corpl. Edward Seiglow were drowned, and 5 horses instead of 2. None of the bodies were recovered except the one reported in the telegram of June 4. Advices from Laoag received while squadron was on the march show the bodies to be recovered on the following dates, and at the following places the information was received:

Body of Private Butcher, June 6, 1902. Notification received at Cagugao, Ilocos Sur.

Bodies of Corporal Seiglow, Privates Wisdom and Ransomer, June 7, 1902. Notification received at Bantay, Ilocos Sur.

On June 5, 1902, the remainder of the squadron crossed the river, all wagons and baggage being transported across by rafts, and all equipments, both of men and horses, were also placed on the rafts and the horses ridden bareback across by the men. All the squadron and property pertaining thereto was across about 9 a. m., with no casualties.

Myself and staff and officers of the troops of the squadron returned to Laoag at 11 a. m. to attend the funeral of Private Gribble, after which all returned to San Nicolas, at which place the squadron was in camp.

The strength of the squadron before leaving Laoag June 4, 1902, was as follows:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Horses.
Field and staff, and noncommissioned staff, Third Cavalry	2	1	2
General staff (medical department)	1	1
Troop I, Third Cavalry	2	73	87
Troop K, Third Cavalry	2	57	75
Troop L, Third Cavalry	1	57	74
Troop M, Third Cavalry	1	62	92

Second Lieut. S. W. Cook, Tenth Cavalry, commanding Troop M.

Following list of names of officers:

First Lieut. E. A. Sirmyer, Third Cavalry; First Lieut. R. R. Wallach, Third Cavalry; First Lieut. Dorsey Cullen, Third Cavalry; First Lieut. R. E. Wood, squadron adjutant, Third Cavalry; Second Lieut. R. M. Nolan, Third Cavalry; Second Lieut. J. E. Hemphill, squadron quartermaster and commissary, Third Cavalry; Second Lieut. E. K. Sterling, Third Cavalry; Second Lieut. S. W. Cook, Tenth Cavalry; Contract Surg. E. W. Miller, U. S. Army.

At San Nicolas the strength was as follows:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Horses.
Field and staff, noncommissioned staff, Third Cavalry	1	1	1
General staff	1	1

Second Lieut. J. E. Hemphill, squadron quartermaster and commissary, Third Cavalry, remained at Laoag turning over quartermaster's and commissary departments, and 1 horse of the noncommissioned staff was turned over to the quartermaster at Laoag as being unable to travel.

	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Horses.
Troop I, Third Cavalry	2	65	87
Troop K, Third Cavalry	2	55	75
Troop L, Third Cavalry	1	51	69
Troop M, Third Cavalry	1	60	92

Transportation: Eight horses, 36 mules, 14 wagons, 1 ambulance, and 14 teamsters.

The squadron left San Nicolas at 1.35 p. m., June 5, 1902, and arrived at Batac at 4.10 p. m. Left Batac at 4.50 p. m.; arrived at Paoay at 5.20 p. m. Left Paoay at 5.30 p. m.; arrived at Currimao at 6.35 p. m., at which place camp was pitched. Wagon train arrived at 7.40 p. m. Roads from San Nicolas fair. Distance traveled from Laoag, 16½ miles.

Left Currimao at 5.47 a. m., June 6, 1902, and arrived at Badoc at 8 a. m. Left Badoc at 8.30 a. m.; arrived at Sinait, Ilocos Sur, 9.45 a. m. Roads from Currimao to Badoc fair; from Badoc to Sinait poor. Left Sinait at 10.15 a. m., and arrived at Cabugao at 10.40 a. m., at which place camp was pitched. Wagon train arrived about 11 a. m. Roads from Sinait good. Distance traveled from Currimao, 19 miles; from Laoag, 35½ miles.

Left Cabugao at 5.45 a. m., June 7, 1902, and arrived at Lapog at 6.40 a. m. Left Lapog at 7 a. m.; arrived at Magsingal at 8.15 a. m. Left Magsingal at 8.35 a. m.; arrived at Santo Domingo at 9.25 a. m. Left Santo Domingo at 10 a. m.; arrived at Bantay at 11.15 a. m., at which place camp was pitched. Roads from Cabugao to Bantay fair. Distance traveled from Cabugao, 17 miles; from Laoag, 52½ miles. Wagon train arrived about 1 p. m.

Troop M and wagon train (each day the rear platoon of the rear troop acted as guard to the wagon train and each day the order of march was changed) left Bantay at 6 a. m. At the Abra River the wagons were unloaded and transported across on rafts, also the property and the equipments of horses and men. Men also crossed on the rafts. This course was necessary, as the rafts were not of sufficient strength to carry a loaded wagon. The horses were then turned loose and several men took horses and swam the river, the rest of the horses following. All the horses of the squadron were crossed in this manner with no casualties. Troop M and the wagon train left Santa as soon as all the transportation and property was crossed. At Vigan

the following transportation was added to the wagon train: Four horses, 24 mules, 7 wagons, and 7 teamsters. Veterinarian Olaf Schwarzkopf, Third Cavalry, joined the squadron at Bantay.

The remainder of the squadron left Santa about 2 p. m. and arrived at Santa Maria at 10.30 p. m., at which place camp was pitched. No stop was made at Narvacan, on account of heavy rain storm. Wagon train had some trouble at the river north of Santa Maria, but not of a serious nature. Roads from Santa good. Distance traveled from Bantay, 21 miles; from Laoag, 73½ miles.

All wagons were reloaded at Santa Maria before departure, which took place at 9.30 a. m., June 9, 1902. Arrived at San Esteban at 10.20 a. m. Left San Esteban at 10.50 a. m.; arrived at Santiago at 12.20 p. m., but no halt was made, and at 2.30 p. m. arrived at Candon, at which place camp was pitched. Roads from Santa Maria very good. Distance traveled from Santa Maria, 17 miles; from Laoag, 90½ miles.

Left Candon at 6.40 a. m., June 10, 1902, and arrived at Santa Lucia at 8.10 a. m. Left Santa Lucia at 8.40 a. m.; arrived at Santa Cruz at 9.15 a. m., but no halt was made, and at 11 a. m. arrived at Seville. Left Seville at 11.30 a. m.; arrived at Tagudin at 1 p. m., at which place camp was pitched. Wagon train arrived at 2 p. m. Roads from Candon very good. Distance traveled from Candon, 20 miles; from Laoag, 110½ miles.

Left Tagudin at 6.45 a. m., June 11, 1902, and arrived at Bangar, Union, at 8.30 a. m. Wagon train left before the squadron and was overtaken on the road. No stop was made at Bangar, and at 10 a. m. arrived at Namagpacan. Here a halt of some length was made on account of the heat. Roads leaving Tagudin were very bad, due to so many rivers, having a rough, rocky bottom, but not too deep to ford wagons with safety and not get the contents wet. The road was only in poor condition for a distance of 3 miles, the remainder being very good.

Left Namagpacan at 4.30 p. m. and arrived at Bagnotan at 9.45 p. m., at which place camp was pitched. At a barrio between the above-named places is a pontoon bridge very much in need of repairs. The mules and horses with the wagons were taken out of the harness and led across, and the wagons pulled across by the soldiers. Troops crossed, each man dismounting and leading his horse and keeping an interval of three yards. With above exception the road from Namagpacan was very good. Wagon train arrived at 10.03 p. m. Distance traveled from Tagudin, 19 miles; from Laoag, 129½ miles.

Left Bagnotan at 7.45 a. m. June 12, 1902, and arrived at San Juan at 8.25 a. m. Left San Juan at 8.45 a. m.; arrived at Carlatan at 9.45 a. m., but no halt was made, and at 10.15 a. m. arrived at San Fernando, Union, at which place camp was pitched. Roads from Bagnotan good. Wagon train arrived at 10.52 a. m. Distance traveled from Bagnotan, 8 miles; from Laoag, 137½ miles.

At San Fernando telegram was received from brigade commander stating that roads going south were very bad and many bridges were missing, due to the rains swelling the rivers, and directing that the squadron remain at San Fernando to await further orders before moving. On June 13, 1902, orders were received by telegraph from brigade commander to continue the march overland. At San Fernando troops were in camp under tents.

Left San Fernando at 6 a. m., June 14, 1902, and arrived at Bauang at 7.25 a. m. Left Bauang at 8 a. m., and arrived at Caba at 10 a. m., but no halt was made, and arrived at Aringay at 10.45 a. m. At San Fernando, Union, the following was added to the wagon train: One ambulance, 12 horses, 3 wagons, and 3 teamsters. Roads from San Fernando fair. Left Aringay at 4.05 p. m., and arrived at Apog at 5.15 p. m., but no halt was made, and at 6 p. m. arrived at Santo Tomas, at which place camp was pitched. Between the last two named places a heavy rain storm was encountered. Roads from Aringay fair. Distance traveled from San Fernando, 27 miles; from Laoag, 164½ miles.

Left Santo Tomas at 7 a. m., June 15, 1902, and arrived at San Fabian at 1 p. m. From Santo Tomas the trail along the sea was taken, and several times the squadron entered the sea for a distance of 50 yards or more to make the ford. The roads were in a very bad condition, and the two streams north of San Fabian were very deep but narrow. The same course was pursued in crossing wagons, horses, equipments, etc., as that at the Abra River. The entire wagon train did not reach camp until about 9 p. m. Distance traveled from Santo Tomas, 15 miles; from Laoag, 179½ miles.

June 16, 1902: On account of the wide river south of San Fabian, Troop M and the wagon train left at 6 a. m. At this river was a very good ferry, and it was not necessary to unload the wagons, and after all the wagons and Troop M had crossed, the remainder of the squadron left San Fabian, about 11 a. m. Troop M and the wagon train continued the march immediately after crossing. Horses and equipment were crossed in like manner as at the Abra River. All troops had left this

river at 2.40 p. m., and at 3.45 p. m. arrived at Mangaldan. Left Mangaldan at 4.40 p. m., and arrived at Dagupan, Pangasinan, at 5.50 p. m., at which place Troop M and the wagon train were already in camp. One horse and 1 mule, quartermaster's department, were lost between Santo Tomas and Dagupan, the former being drowned in river south of San Fabian and the latter died from exhaustion north of San Fabian. Roads from San Fabian good. Distance traveled from San Fabian, 9 miles; from Laoag, 188½ miles.

At Dagupan the squadron was encamped in a field adjoining a railroad station and this field had a stream in the center of it. During the night a heavy rain fell, causing the stream to overflow its banks, and also almost the entire field, in which condition it remained during our entire stay. A few tents were supplied, but not of sufficient number to allow all the men to sleep under tents, and the men slept under the railroad shed.

All transportation with the squadron taken from Laoag, Vigan, and San Fernando, in compliance with telegram from brigade commander, was turned over to the chief quartermaster, First Separate Brigade, Dagupan, Pangasinan, P. I.

At Dagupan orders were received directing the squadron to proceed overland to Tarlac Province and turn over troop horses to the troops of the Eleventh Cavalry, already stationed at the stations designated for the troops of the Third Cavalry, in telegram from brigade commander, May 27, 1902, and then proceed by rail to Pasay Barracks, Manila, taking temporary station, pending departure for the United States. All property was loaded in cars and the sick men and horses were sent by rail, sick men of each troop being sidetracked at the stations at which their troops were to turn over horses, as follows: Troop I, Third Cavalry, at Paniqui; squadron headquarters and Troop K, Third Cavalry, at Gerona; Troop L, Third Cavalry, at Tarlac; Troop M, Third Cavalry, at Bamban.

On June 19, 1902, Second Lieut. S. W. Cook, Tenth Cavalry, was relieved from duty with the Third Cavalry, per telegram, and left this date for Manila to join his regiment.

June 20, 1902, the squadron left Dagupan at 6 a. m. and arrived at Malisiqui at 12 m., at which place camp was pitched. Roads most of the way were under water and mud and were very bad. Distance traveled from Dagupan, 14 miles; from Laoag, 202½ miles.

Left Malisiqui at 6.20 a. m., June 21, 1902, and arrived at Bautista at 9 a. m. Left Bautista at 1.30 p. m. and arrived at Rosales at 5 p. m., at which place camp was pitched. Heavy rains were encountered and the roads were very bad, being under water and mud. Distance traveled from Malisiqui, 24 miles; from Laoag, 225½ miles. Could not go directly to Paniqui from Bautista on account of bad swamps.

Left Rosales at 6.55 a. m., June 22, 1902, and arrived at Cuyapo at 11 a. m., at Nampicuan at 12.30 p. m., and at Paniqui at 3.45 p. m., at which place camp was pitched and Troop I, Third Cavalry, was left. Roads from Rosales very bad, being most of the way through rice paddies. Distance traveled from Rosales, 21 miles; from Laoag, 247½ miles.

Left Paniqui, with Troops K, L, and M, at 6.30 a. m., June 23, 1902, and arrived at Gerona at 8.10 a. m., at which place squadron headquarters and Troop K were left. Distance traveled from Paniqui, 5 miles; from Laoag, 252½ miles. Troops L and M left Gerona at 9 a. m. and arrived at Tarlac at 10.50 a. m., at which place Troop L was to turn over horses. Troop M pitched camp. Distance traveled from Gerona, 9 miles; from Laoag, 261½ miles. Roads from Paniqui good. Troop L, upon completing turning over horses, boarded the train at 2 p. m. and proceeded to Manila.

Troop M left Tarlac at 6 a. m., June 24, 1902, and arrived at Bamban at 12 m. Roads from Tarlac good. Distance traveled from Tarlac, 20 miles; from Laoag, 281½ miles.

Troop L arrived at Manila at 10 p. m., and Troops K and I arrived at 10.20 p. m., June 23, 1902. Distance traveled by rail by Troop I, 95 miles; troop K, 90 miles; Troop L, 80 miles; Troops I, K, and L marched, dismounted, to Pasay Barracks, arriving at that station about 11.40 p. m., June 23, 1902. Distance marched, 4 miles. Troop M arrived at Pasay Barracks about 9 p. m., June 25, 1902.

Following table shows distance traveled by each troop:

Troop.	Over-land.	By rail.	Dis-mounted.	Total.
	Miles.	Miles.	Miles.	Miles.
I.....	247½	95	4	346½
K.....	252½	90	4	346½
L.....	261½	80	4	346½
M.....	281½	60	4	346½

As shown, the entire distance traveled from Laoag was 346½ miles

Contract Surg. E. W. Miller, U. S. Army, and one private, hospital corps, were left at Bamban, Tarlac.

Except at places where mention is made that troops were under canvas, the convents at the different camps were used to quarter the troops.

At each station orders were issued in regard to drinking water, eating fruit, and entering the native houses, owing to the reported prevalence of cholera in the district through which the squadron marched. Water was boiled each evening by the separate troops in sufficient quantity to allow one canteen full per man for the next day.

There was no sickness of any consequence en route.

Food was in abundant quantity and well prepared.

Good water and of sufficient quantity was had all along the route for the public animals.

Very respectfully,

EDGAR A. SIRMER,
First Lieutenant, Third Cavalry, Commanding Squadron.

APPENDIX B.

REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM H. BISBEE, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING SECOND SEPARATE BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND SEPARATE BRIGADE,
San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, P. I., June 30, 1902.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit annual report of the military operations of the late fourth district and present Second Separate Brigade, Department of North Philippines, covering the period from June 30, 1901, to June 30, 1902.

On June 30, 1901, the old fourth district (organized from the still older fourth, fifth, and part of the sixth districts, Department of Northern Luzon), General Orders, No. 66, Division of the Philippines, 1901, and General Orders, No. 1, 1900, embraced the territorial limits of the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Principe, Bataan, Pampanga, Bulacan, Morong, Infanta, and the islands eastward of Infanta (excepting the Calaguas group), and all that part of the province of Manila north of the Pasig River (Manila and Morong were later organized and designated as Rizal by the civil authorities), and was occupied by troops as follows:

	Aggregate.
Cavalry, regulars and native	1, 670
Artillery, regulars	494
Infantry, regulars and native	6, 240
Total force June 30, 1901.....	8, 404

The towns and camps temporarily garrisoned at this time (June 30, 1901) were:
Pampanga Province.—San Fernando, *Porac, *Bacolor, Angeles, *Macabebe, Arayat, *Apalit, *Florida Blanca, *Mexico, *Mabalacat, *Magalang.

Rizal Province.—Binangonan, Antipolo, *Deposito, Caloocan, *Camp Stotsenburg, Pasig, Mariquina, Tanay, Malabon, San Mateo, Montalban, San Felipe.

Bataan Province.—*Balanga, *Dinalupijan, *Llana Hermosa.

Principe Province.—*Baler.

Nueva Ecija Province.—Talavera, *Pantabangan, *Pefiaranda, *San Antonio, *Cabiao, Cabanatuan, *Santa Rosa, *San Isidro, *Zaragoza, *Aliaga, *Jaen, *Gapan, *Carranglan, *San Jose, *Rosales, *San Quintin.

Morong Province.—Morong.

Pangasinan Province.—*San Nicolas, *Huminagan, *Tayug.

Bulacan Province.—*Malolos, *Hagonoy, Baliuag, *Polo, *Meycauayan, *Marilao, Angat, *Bulacan, *Guiguinto, Calumpit, *San Miguel, *Quingua, *Obando, *Santa Maria, *Bocaue, *Norzagaray, *Bigaa, *Pulilan.

On November 1, 1901, the provinces of Tarlac and Zambales by General Orders, No. 311, Division of the Philippines, were made a part of the command, and the old districts, (fourth, fifth, and part of the sixth, as above), were reorganized and designated as the Second Separate Brigade, Department of North Philippines.

Until November 1, 1901, Brigadier-General Funston had been in command, but from that date the undersigned has exercised this duty under the provisions of General Order, No. 335, Division of the Philippines, series of 1901.

The assignment of Tarlac and Zambales increased the brigade force by the aggregate of the Twelfth and Twenty-fifth Infantry, namely, 2,723, but other changes since the 30th day of June showed the strength November 1 (date of its organization) numerically:

Cavalry, regulars	812
Infantry, regulars	4, 954
Infantry, natives	1, 320
Total	7, 086

By incoming of the Twelfth and Twenty-fifth Infantry on November 1 to brigade jurisdiction, the following towns of Zambales and Tarlac and Nueva Ecija were added to the number of garrisoned places:

Zambales Province.—*Bolinao, *Alaminos, *Agno, *Dasol, *Eguia, *Infanta, *Santa Cruz, *Candelaria, *Masinloc, *Palauig, *San Fernando, *Iba, *Botolan, *Cabangan, *San Felipe, *San Narciso, *San Marcelino, *San Antonio, *Castillejos, *Sual, *San Isidro.

Tarlac Province.—*Moncada, Paniqui, *Victoria, *San Juan de Guimba, Bamban, *Camiling, Gerona, Tarlac, *Capas, *Concepcion.

Nueva Ecija Province.—*Cuyapo.

All towns marked (*) have since been abandoned by the military. A summing up shows that of 98 pueblos occupied from first to last during the year 70 have been vacated, leaving at present but 28 under military occupation in the 9 provinces.

All except Zambales, Infanta, and Principe have been under control since July 20. Zambales, since November 7, 1901, and in the provinces of Infanta and Principe there had been troops at but one station, Baler.

With few exceptions, which will be noted, the surface indications have all been in continuance of the peaceful condition existing a year ago, but how deep seated it may be remains for the test of time to determine. Lawless acts have been clearly those of marauding ladrones rather than as having any connection with insurrection against the United States. It must, however, be viewed affirmatively that a natural race feeling exists among the nations inimical to the Americans, but which does not carry with it necessarily any evidence of dissatisfaction or disloyalty toward established authority; in fact it is easy to believe in connection with ordinary observation of the struggling native officials, setting aside all thought of race feeling, that most of them are eager in all trying situations to accept the guardianship and assistance of firm military control. Many petitions to retain troops, signed by the best native population, have been forwarded from the brigade, and no instance is recalled where application has been made to have the troops withdrawn.

Military commissions and courts.—The trials of natives by military courts since organization of brigade have been by military commission 4 and by provost court none. All native prisoners held awaiting trials under the status of military jurisdiction have been released.

Discipline.—The discipline of the troops has been satisfactory to a commendable degree considering that most of the army is made up of younger men new to army requirements and frequently of roving and foolish disposition. They get along very well with the natives under the trying conditions of peace, which is beyond natural expectations where troops are quartered in immediate contact with the civil population, and this is largely the case. The absence of the older captains and officers of experience has a marked evil effect on the troops, but the younger officers left to bear the burden have done as well or better than might have been expected with their limit of years and knowledge of authorized customs.

Enforced separation of units has deprived young officers of many educational privileges offered by larger posts and it is unfortunate as an early experience when the military foundation is being laid.

The following report was made by the commanding officer Twenty-fifth Infantry (Major Brush), under date of September 30, 1901:

The regiment is now occupying 19 stations in the province of Zambales; but four captains are in command of companies. The lieutenants are all inexperienced and have but little opportunity to study. They are all efficient to the limit of experience and are zealous. The same can be said of the noncommissioned officers. Under these conditions it is evident that progress can be but slow and results unsatisfactory. The greatest need now is the return of all captains and concentration of all the battalions at the earliest practicable moment.

Native troops.—In the early part of the year, September 27, under division General Orders, No. 293, native scouts were reorganized into companies, as announced in War Department General Orders, No. 66, 1901, carrying out the provisions of the act of February 2.

Twenty-five of these companies have served in the brigade from time to time, 8 remaining at present.

Their conduct has been good and their worth, efficiency, and general appearance in proportion to the qualities of their company commanders, some better than others. Scarcely any infractions of the law have been observed. They are armed with the Springfield carbine, caliber .45. A few magazine rifles, caliber .30, have crept in; these should be turned in to arsenal.

Since the discontinuance of civilian scouts these companies are as helpless as other colored troops in the matter of clerical assistance. Enlistment of one or two white clerks for each company should become lawful. Officers doing all the company clerk work are necessarily short in performing other important duties.

A baker, enlisted, or one for every two or three companies, would be beneficial in teaching the natives to make bread if flour is to be issued. This has been an unknown quantity to them heretofore.

The true ration will be determined by experience, very little doubt existing that they would like all the fresh meat, rice, fish, sugar, and coffee they can get up to the limit. The present issue is doing very well. A larger ration of flour is objectionable unless bakers can be obtained.

Another thought is suggested that one or two suitable men from each native company might be sent to Manila to learn bread making.

Supply line.—Supplies to Bataan Province (1 station) 90 miles by water from Manila to Mariveles, the only station.

To Principe Province (1 station) by sea to Baler, the only station. There are rough trails over the mountains to this point from Bongabon, but they are not used for freighting.

To Bulacan Province (5 stations) by Manila and Dagupan Railroad from Manila to Malolos, thence by wagon road to stations via Baliuag.

To Nueva Ecija Province (4 stations) by rail to Calumpit, thence by steamers and cascos to Candating, Cabiao, Arayat, or San Isidro, according to the stage of water; thence by wagon road to stations.

To Pampanga Province (3 stations) by rail direct to stations, except Arayat, and to that station by rail to San Fernando, and thence by wagon road or by rail to Calumpit and thence by boat to station.

To Tarlac Province (4 stations) by rail to all stations.

To Zambales Province (3 stations) to the station of Bolinao by rail to Dagupan, thence by steamer across Lingayen Gulf. To the station of Iba and Masinloc, by sea to Iba and thence to Masinloc by wagon road.

To Rizal Province (10 stations) by wagon road from Manila to all points or stations, or by utilizing the Pasig River from Manila to Pasig by steamers or cascos to that point and thence across Laguna de Bay to stations on its borders.

Infanta Province. No stations in this province.

The difficulties confronting the supply to troops has been materially lessened during the year by abandonment of many of the Zambales stations and a large number off the line of the Manila and Dagupan Railroad; the number of stations having been diminished by 70 from a total of 98 previously supplied.

Attention is invited to the reasonable possibilities of a good road over the Zambales Mountains from the railroad at Capas to Iba on the west coast.

A map of locating survey was forwarded on December 15, 1901.

Telegraphic communication.—Without interruption worthy of note communication by telegraph or telephone has been well kept up by the Signal Corps to all stations, involving 625 miles of line work. This task has been constant and laborious and the Signal Corps is deserving full praise for its success.

Surplus stores.—Due to the advance of troops north from Manila in 1899 and the necessary establishment of supply bases at points on the Manila and Dagupan Railroad, and on the Rio Grande River, notably at Tarlac, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, and Baliuag, and the subsequent withdrawal of troops, large quantities of quartermaster, subsistence, and ordnance stores accumulated in excess of later needs. This excess has been greatly reduced and shipments are still being made, leaving no unreasonable surplus on hand.

These same conditions account for the large quantities of worthless and worn-out quartermaster and commissary supplies, as shown by numerous boards of survey and inspection reports.

Rations and transportation.—With exception of several stations on the Zambales coast and some of the outlying stations in Nueva Ecija, fresh beef and vegetables have been sufficiently supplied with the other components; the same may be said of ice, with a slightly reduced qualification. Lack of transportation has been rare.

Loss of animals.—Surra and glanders in epidemic form throughout the brigade has caused the loss of approximately 1,100 animals, the disease apparently attacking most fiercely the overworked, poorly fed, and worn-out class, a great many of which had been turned in from old scout companies.

Cholera.—Cholera has been prevalent since March and continues its presence in several parts of the brigade territory, mortality being almost exclusively confined to the natives. Activity and organization of health boards by our medical officers in all towns adjacent to stations has obtained and favorable results must be admitted.

Cases among troops has been 19, deaths 11.

Several troops of the Fifth Cavalry and a battalion (4 companies) of the Twenty-eighth Infantry, have been utilized in guarding the Mariquina River against cholera infection since its appearance. This is the source of water supply for Manila.

Road work.—Considerable road repair work had been done throughout the brigade, by engineers under the chief engineer officer of the department, who is presumed to have all the data.

Military prison.—As a large proportion of the native prisoners confined at San Isidro military prison are civil prisoners, it is recommended that the prison be turned over in the near future to the civil authorities, but not until another suitable prison is designated for the military prisoners of the brigade, for at present San Isidro is the only prison within its limits.

Arms and ammunition captured:

Rifles	79
Revolvers	23
Shotguns	3
Bolos	1
Rounds, small-arm ammunition	74

Surrendered:

Rifles	105
Revolvers	10
Shotguns	19
Ammunition	5

Purchased:

Revolvers	6
Rifles	48

Total rifles	232
Total shotguns	22
Total revolvers	39
Total bolos	1
Total ammunition	79

Staff officers.—The following officers have acted in the specified capacities on brigade (or district) staff during the year:

Adjutant-general: Capt. E. V. Smith, Fourth Infantry; Capt. A. C. Macomb, Fifth Cavalry.

Acting inspector-general: Capt. G. H. Preston, Thirteenth Cavalry; Maj. E. B. Bolton, Twenty-fourth Infantry.

Chief commissary: Capt. F. H. Pomroy, subsistence department; First Lieut. W. S. Valentine, Fifth Cavalry.

Chief quartermaster: Capt. W. A. Campbell, Twenty-second Infantry; Capt. N. H. Creager, quartermaster department.

Chief surgeon: Maj. H. S. T. Harris, Medical Department, U. S. Army; Maj. J. R. Hereford, Medical Department, U. S. Volunteers; Maj. C. M. Gandy, Medical Department, U. S. Army; Maj. C. E. Woodruff, Medical Department, U. S. Army.

Acting judge-advocate: First Lieut. I. W. Leonard, Twenty-second Infantry; First Lieut. W. S. Valentine, Fifth Cavalry.

The duties of the staff department have been well conducted and those chiefs who have served under my command are accorded full praise for the commendable result of their labor.

Attention is respectfully invited to the accompanying reports of the brigade staff officers upon the operations of their several departments.^a

All data for this report not received at this writing will be made the subject of a supplemental exhibit and forwarded.

Number of troops in brigade at last report.

	Men.
Regulars:	
Cavalry troops	789
Infantry companies	665
Native scouts:	
Infantry companies	624
Total	2,078

Very respectfully,

WILLIAM H. BISBEE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

^a Not printed.

ATTACKS—SURRENDERS.

September 29: Band of 11 insurgents, remnant of Aguinaldo's Palanan bodyguard, surrendered to Sergeant Wolf, Company H, Twenty-second Infantry, at Casiguran, Principe. Seven rifles and 1 revolver turned in.

November 6: Party of insurgents attacked at night a detachment of Company H, Twenty-second Infantry, under Corporal Linz, at Casiguran, Principe. Insurgents retreated, 1 killed, 3 wounded; captured 2 Mauser rifles. Privates Mason and Breckinridge, Company H, 22d infantry, wounded.

November 16: A band of ladrones fired on town of Jaen, Nueva Ecija, night of November 16. Band reported to have had 6 rifles and 1 revolver; leader unknown. Supposed to have been Damian de la Cruz. Band dispersed by native police of Jaen. No casualties.

Mounted detachment Twenty-second Infantry, from San Isidro, under First Lieut. Raymond Sheldon, Twenty-second Infantry, out several days searching for band, but failed to encounter them.

February 28, at about 2 a. m., armed insurgents entered the town of Cainta, Rizal, captured the presidente, Ampil, many of the police, and carried off all the arms in town.

Later same date band of armed insurgents, supposed to belong to same party, held up escort wagon on road from Antipolo to Pasig and forced wagon to return to Antipolo.

Detachments Fifth Cavalry were ordered out in search of insurgents.

March 2: Detachment of 6 men, troop I, Fifth Cavalry, under Corporal Reed, stationed at Bosoboso, engaged 20 or 30 guerrillas at Pulpito Mountain. Guerrillas retired and detachment failed to encounter them a second time. No casualties.

Detachments Troops I, K, L, and M were in the field from March 1 to 11, but with exception of detachment under Corporal Reed, failed to encounter band. No casualties.

Presidente of Cainta released March 4; reported leader of band as Pedro Cortes, of Laguna.

May 19: A detachment of 3 men Nineteenth Company Native Scouts, Ilocanos, under a corporal, while in pueblo of Zaragoza, Nueva Ecija, was attacked by a band of armed guerrillas numbering about 20. Firing continued from 8.45 p. m. until 12 p. m. No casualties. One guerrilla wounded. Band was pursued by detachment of constabulary.

June 1: Sergeant Stewart and 6 men Troop M, Fifth Cavalry, stationed at Tanay, Rizal, captured by 50 armed guerrillas on road between Morong and Binangonan.

Earlier same date town of Binangonan had been fired on by same band; the presidente, the provincial sanitary officer, and secretary were captured, but later escaped.

Two of the 7 soldiers also escaped. The others have been killed and mutilated by the armed band. American civilian in charge of stone quarry at Binangonan wounded in leg.

Detachment Fifth Cavalry and constabulary in pursuit.

December 5: Head of American negro, said to be that of David Fagen, late corporal, Twenty-fourth Infantry, and deserter to the insurgent forces, brought into Bongabon; also 2 Remington rifles, 1 Winchester, 1 Colt's revolver, caliber .38, 1 pair saddlebags, 1 pair field glasses, 19 cartridges, class ring of Lieutenant Alstæetter, Fagen's commission as second lieutenant, signed by Lacuna, and as captain, signed by Alejandrino.

Above articles were brought in by a native who stated that while hunting with 5 companions he had killed Fagen at a small town in Principe Province, called Umaray. Name of native, Anastacio Bartolome; resident of Santos.

RECORD OF EVENTS.

July, 1901.—Headquarters Fourth district, Department of Northern Luzon, remained at San Fernando, Pampanga, during the month.

Fifth Cavalry: Headquarters field staff and band remained at Deposito during the month. Troop A changed station from San Fernando to Angeles, Pampanga, by marching; left San Fernando July 23, took station at Angeles same date. Distance 10 miles. Troop D from Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija, to San Fernando, Pampanga. Left Peñaranda July 23, marching; arrived and took station at San Fernando July 24. Troops performed their usual garrison duties at the several stations.

Twelfth Battery Field Artillery: Remained Camp Stotsenburg from 1st to 18th; received orders on 8th to go aboard *Sheridan* for United States; order revoked account bubonic plague in camp. Battery placed in quarantine 12th instant and remained in detention camp to include July 31.

Third Infantry: Headquarters, field, staff and band remained at Malabon during month. Detachments of Company M at Bigaa, and Guiguinto withdrawn July 23 and 24, respectively, pursuant to instructions district commander. Companies at various stations performed the usual garrison duties.

Twenty-second Infantry: Headquarters, field, staff and band remained at San Isidro during month. Company E changed station from Arayat, Pampanga, to Balanga, Bataan, arriving latter place 23d on U. S. gunboat *Napindan*. Distance 73 miles; relieved Sixtieth Company Coast Artillery July 25, and 26th sent detachment of 20 men to Orani, Bataan, for station; distance 5 miles. Company M, from Santa Ana and Mexico to Arayat, Pampanga, on July 22 by marching 8 miles. Left Arayat, Pampanga, on July 23, and proceeded to Orani on U. S. gunboat *Napindan*, relieving a company of Coast Artillery there and sending a detachment of 22 men to Mariveles for station. Distance 80 miles. Detachment 25 men took station at Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija, July 22, distance 10 miles. Country generally quiet.

Twenty-fourth Infantry: Headquarters, field, staff and band left Tayug 27th instant, and proceeded to Manila, for station per Special Order 192, division; arriving 29th instant. Companies D and K left Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and joining Company M at Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija, proceeded to Manila per Special Order 192, division. Other companies remained in district under Lieutenant-Colonel Markley, Twenty-fourth Infantry, performed the usual duties at various stations.

Fifth Company Macabebe Scouts: Abandoned stations of Porac and Florida Blanca, Pampanga, and proceeded by marching to Macabebe, Pampanga, for temporary station, July 20.

Third Company Ilocano Scouts: Abandoned station of Zaragoza, Nueva Ecija, and marched to Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, for station, arriving 21st instant.

August, 1901.—Fifth Cavalry: Several scouting parties sent out from various stations, but had no engagements.

Third Infantry: Company F left Angat and Norzagaray on 7th instant and marched to Baliuag, 12 miles, arriving and taking station same date. Detachment of Company E abandoned Bocaue on August 5.

Twenty-second Infantry: Companies I, K, L, left their stations of San Antonio, Gapan, and Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, respectively, and proceeded to Manila, on 26th instant. Journeys were by cascos from Cabiao to Calumpit and on to Manila by rail, arriving and taking station 28th instant.

Twenty-fourth Infantry: Company B left Tayug and Santa Maria on August 28, going to Manila for station. Detachment Company E sent to Santa Maria. Detachment Company I at Villasis withdrawn.

First Company Macabebe Scouts: Company left San Miguel, Bulacan, and proceeded to Angat and Norzagaray, Bulacan, relieving Company F, Third Infantry.

Second Company Macabebe Scouts: Detachment at Pulilan, Bulacan, withdrawn to Quingua.

Fifth Company Macabebe Scouts: Withdrawn from Macabebe to Angeles.

September, 1901.—Fifth Cavalry: Troops A, B, D, I, K, L, and M performed the usual garrison, patrols, and escort duties at their respective stations throughout the month.

Third Infantry: The organizations of the regiment have remained at their respective stations during the month, performing the usual camp and garrison duties.

Twenty-second Infantry: Company B has continued on duty at military prison at San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, as prison guard. On September 28 Companies A and D, and, on the 29th, Companies F and G left their stations and proceeded to Manila for station. Companies A and D, by land to Cabiao and by cascos to Calumpit and thence by rail to Manila, reaching that city September 30. Company E performed garrison duty at Balanga until September 10, on which date it proceeded by cascos 35 miles to Mariveles, at which station performed garrison duty during remainder of month. Company H performed garrison duty at Baler, Principe.

October, 1901.—Fifth Cavalry: Headquarters, field, staff and band remained at Deposito until October 20, when, pursuant to telegraphic instructions from Headquarters Department Northern Luzon, dated October 19, it changed station to San Felipe, where it has since remained. Troop I remained stationed at Montalban until 19th instant, when the troop changed station to San Mateo, distance marched 4 miles, the barracks at Montalban having been wrecked by the storm. Troop L remained stationed at San Felipe until October 20, when the troop proceeded to Taytay, thence patrolling the coast of Laguna de Bay and through mountains to Antipolo to October 24, when it returned to San Felipe, its station.

Third Infantry: The detachment of Company A stationed at Obando was withdrawn October 2, pursuant to instructions of district commander.

Twenty-second Infantry: Eleven insurgents, remnants of Aguinaldo's Palanan bodyguard, surrendered to Sergeant Wolf, Company H, at Casiguran on September 29; 7 rifles and 1 revolver were turned in. Reports received here October 14. A

detachment of 25 men under First Lieut. Raymond Sheldon, battalion adjutant, Twenty-second Infantry, was stationed at Pefiaranda until October 17, on which date the detachment was withdrawn and station abandoned.

Twenty-fourth Infantry: Company F left San Quintin at 1.30 p. m. October 25, en route to Pefiaranda, and marched to Humingan; arrived at 3 p. m., same date. Distance from San Quintin, 5 miles. Left Humingan at 6.30 p. m. October 26, and marched to Rosales; arrived at 2 p. m.; distance from Humingan, 18 miles. Left Rosales at 7 a. m. October 27, and marched to Bautista; arrived at 1 p. m.; distance, 13 miles. Left Bautista 12 a. m. October 28, via Manila and Dagupan Railroad for San Fernando, arriving at 5.15 p. m.; distance from Bautista, 75 miles. Left San Fernando at 6.30 a. m. October 29, and marched to Arayat, arriving at 12 p. m.; distance from San Fernando, 12 miles. Left Arayat at 7.30 a. m. October 30, and marched to San Isidro, arriving at 5 p. m.; distance from Arayat, 16 miles. Left San Isidro at 9.30 a. m. October 31, and marched to Pefiaranda, arriving at 2 p. m.; distance from San Isidro, 9 miles. One officer and 103 men; total distance traveled, 148 miles. Companies A, C, E, and I performed the usual garrison and escort duties during month. Company H left San Nicolas, Pangasinan, 3.30 p. m. October 24, en route to take station at San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, arriving October 30; distance traveled during the movement, 148 miles.

November, 1901.—Fifth Cavalry: Troop M, on October 21, under command of Second Lieut. E. G. English, scouted lake front from Tanay to Mariguina in search of a party of insurgents, returning November 1; distance traveled, 30 miles; no insurgents encountered.

Third Infantry: Detachment of Company A, stationed at Meycanayan, was withdrawn November 27 and station abandoned, and the detachment of Company E, stationed at Marilao, was withdrawn November 26 and station abandoned pursuant to same order.

Twelfth Infantry: The First Battalion in the island of Samar, Department South Philippines. The Second and Third battalions of the regiment in the field in the provinces of Tarlac and Nueva Ecija, Department North Philippines. On the 14th instant the detachment of Company F, consisting of Second Lieutenant Freshwater, Twelfth Infantry, and 25 men, were withdrawn from Aguilar, province of Pangasinan, and proceeded to take station at Concepcion, Tarlac, relieving detachment of Company I, which returned to its proper station; distance traveled—by rail, 70 miles; by boat, 15; marched, 13½ miles; total, 98½ miles. On the 27th the balance of Company F was relieved from duty at Mangataren, Pangasinan, and ordered to take station at Bamban, relieving detachment Company L, there stationed, which on being relieved, to join its company at Gerona, Tarlac. Distance traveled—by rail, 70 miles; by boat, 15; marched, 50½ miles; total, 135½ miles. The following are the substations now garrisoned by detachments from companies: Paniqui, Tarlac, 40 men Company E; Concepcion, Tarlac, 25 men Company F; Capas, Tarlac, 39 men Company L.

Twenty-second Infantry: During the night of November 6 a party of insurgents attacked Casiguran, Principe, where a small detachment of Company H, Twenty-second Infantry, was stationed under Corporal Lintz, Company H. Attack was repulsed with a loss to the enemy of 1 man killed and 3 wounded; 2 Mauser rifles were captured, 2 privates Company H received slight flesh wounds. The town of Jaen, ungarrisoned, was fired on during the night of November 17, supposed to be band of ladrones under Damian de la Cruz. Native police dispersed band. No damage done. First Lieut. Raymond Sheldon, Twenty-second Infantry, with mounted detachment Twenty-second Infantry and 2 native guides, followed trail of Damian de la Cruz for three days, but were unable to capture the man.

Twenty-fourth Infantry: Following is the list of scouts, marches, etc., made by Company C during the month: On the 13th, 15th, and 17th 3 mounted men went half way to San Jose to escort mail, etc., to and from stations; traveled 66 miles. On November 20 and 23, 18 mounted men, escort to paymaster to and from station half way to San Jose; traveled 44 miles. On the 21st 6 men mounted went to Pantabangan, escort to paymaster, returning same day; traveled 22 miles. On the 29th 2 men mounted went half way to Pantabangan; traveled 11 miles. Following is the list of scouts made in the vicinity of Carranglan during the month: November 2, 6 men, northeast, 15 miles; November 5, 10 men, north, 17 miles; November 6, 7 men, north and northeast, 25 miles; November 7, 5 men, south, 12 miles; November 11, 7 men, southeast, 17 miles; November 14, 5 men, northeast, 24 miles; November 16, 5 men, southeast, 21 miles; November 18, 6 men, north, 30 miles; November 21 and 27, 5 men, north and south, 12 and 7 miles, respectively. No captures. No engagements during above scouts. Total distances traveled, 194 miles. Company F performed the usual guard and garrison duty during month. A scouting party consisting of 1

sergeant, 1 corporal, 10 privates left post at 9.30 a. m., November 24, and scouted toward headwaters of the Rio Chico, returning to post at 12.45 p. m., November 29; distance marched, 90 miles. Distance traveled during month, 360 miles. Company G performed the usual guard, escort, and patrol duty during the month.

December, 1901.—Fifth Cavalry: Troop B left station at 7.30 a. m., the 11th instant, fully equipped for the field. First Lieut. E. A. Sturges, Fifth Cavalry, commanding, Second Lieut. E. D. Andrews, Fifth Cavalry, and 49 enlisted men, marched to Lubao, arriving at 11 a. m., same date; distance, 10½ miles. Left Lubao at 1.30 p. m., same date, and marched to Florida Blanca, arriving at 4.30 p. m.; distance, 8 miles; went into camp for the night; left Florida Blanca 12th instant, marched to Angeles, arriving at 11 a. m.; distance marched, 16 miles; left Angeles at 1.30 p. m., same date, and marched to San Fernando, Pampanga—the proper station of troop—arriving at 4.45 p. m.; distance, 12 miles. First Lieut. E. A. Sturges, commanding detachments Troops B and D, fully equipped for the field, proceeded to Bacolor, Pampanga, and escorted prisoners from military prison to Arayat, Pampanga; distance, 18 miles. Left Arayat following day, 9 a. m., December 29, and returned to station, arriving 11.45 a. m.; distance marched, 11 miles.

Troop I had 40 enlisted men on temporary duty at station at Pasig December 4 and 5. Troop M remained at station during month performing usual garrison duties with following exceptions: On December 3, 8 noncommissioned officers and 32 privates of the troop, Second Lieut. E. G. English, commanding, marched from Tanay to Pasig to attend hanging of three natives, returning to station at Tanay December 5; distance marched, 48 miles.

Third Infantry: Company C left Bacolor, Pampanga, December 28, at 6.30 a. m., changing station to San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, arriving at San Isidro December 29, where they have since remained.

Twelfth Infantry: The companies performed the usual duties during the month, in addition to which the companies stationed along the railroad performed the usual patrols.

Twenty-fourth Infantry: During the month of December Company C performed the duties assigned to it at Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, until December 21. On December 21 the company left Carranglan to take station at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, relieving Twentieth Company Native Scouts, Ilocanos. Left 16 men at Carranglan to guard public property. Company arrived at new station December 23; distance traveled, 52 miles.

Company F performed the usual guard and garrison duties during the month. Distance marched by detachments performing escort duty, 135 miles.

First Lieut. R. B. Calvert, with detachment of 17 men, left the post at 1.30 p. m., December 19, and scouted along the Rio Chico River, returning to post at 2.30 p. m., December 21; distance marched, 32 miles. Capt. J. B. Batchelor, jr., with 2 men, left post at 5.30 a. m., December 3, on a hunt, crossed the Rio Chico River at this point and proceeded in a northeasterly direction to mountains. Returned to post 7.30, same date. Distance, 25 miles.

Detachment left San Jose, Nueva Ecija (station of company), December 16 at 1.30 a. m., and proceeded to Pantabangan via Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, arriving at Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija, 10 a. m., December 17.

Twenty-fifth Infantry: The detachment of Company E, at Palauig, consisting of 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 18 privates, were withdrawn on December 28 and returned to their company at Masinloc. Following station abandoned during the month: Infanta, Zambales. The detachment of Company A, consisting of 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 1 musician, and 27 privates, were withdrawn on December 27 and returned to company at Santa Cruz, Zambales, for duties pursuant to telegraphic instructions.

Eguia, Zambales, a detachment of Company D, consisting of 2 sergeants, 1 corporal, 28 privates, were withdrawn December 26 and returned to company at Dasol, Zambales.

One sergeant, 2 corporals, and 22 privates, detachment Company C, on detached service at Agno, withdrawn December 29 and returned to company at San Isidro, Zambales.

January, 1902.—Fifth Cavalry: Troop A, Angeles, Pampanga, performed the usual garrison duties during the month, furnishing an escort of 1 officer and 20 men to party of Engineer Corps surveying road from Capas to Iba, from January 14 to January 30.

Troop D, San Fernando, Pampanga, performed the usual garrison duties at station to January 17, when, pursuant to paragraph 3, orders No. 8, c. s. San Fernando, Pampanga, the troop proceeded to Dinalupijan, Bataan, by marching, arrived there same day. Left there January 20, returned to station at San Fernando, Pampanga, via Porac, arriving at San Fernando January 21. Distance marched, 79 miles.

Troop I performed the usual field duties at station during the month, maintaining a detachment of 4 noncommissioned officers and 28 men, January 16 to January 27, scouting the country from Montalban to Bosoboso, the work being principally dismounted owing to the roughness of the country. Corporal Reed and a detachment of 3 men of Troop I, Privates Berry, Mangas, and Serrup, found and destroyed on January 20 a hut containing ammunition, uniforms, etc., and powdered charcoal to be used in the manufacture of powder.

Troop L, San Felipe, performed the usual garrison duties at station during the month, furnishing a daily patrol of 16 men from January 14 to 31, patrolling country in the vicinity of Chinese hospital with a view of destroying any incoming hostile element.

Troop M, Tanay, performed the usual garrison duties at station during the month, sending out scouting parties as follows: January 5, 20 men to Cardona in search of murderers; January 8, 20 men to Tesig, in search of ladrones; January 14, 1 officer and 23 men to Binangonan, in search of ladrones, and have sent out patrols every night from January 16 to 31, scouting lake front in bancas from Tanay to Angono.

Third Infantry: Company K left Bacolor January 1 and marched to San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, arriving January 2. Distance traveled, 35 miles. Company A abandoned Polo, Bulacan, January 14 and marched to Malabon, Rizal.

Thirteenth Infantry: Company I was relieved from duty at Dagupan January 16, left for Mariveles via Manila, left Dagupan January 16 at 5 a. m., arrived at Mariveles 10.30 p. m., January 16.

February, 1902.—Fifth Cavalry: Troop A performed the usual garrison duties at station Angeles, Pampanga, during the month, furnishing a detachment of 1 sergeant and 4 privates February 20, who marched to Capas for the purpose of receiving pack mules, returning to Angeles February 22.

Troop B, consisting of Second Lieut. E. W. Andrews, Fifth Cavalry, and 70 men, left San Fernando, Pampanga, at 7.30 a. m. February 4, equipped for the field, commanded by First Lieut. E. A. Sturges, Fifth Cavalry, marched to San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, arriving there at 6 p. m. on that date; distance marched, 30 miles. February 5 troop left San Isidro at 7.30 a. m., marched to Aliaga, arriving there 5 p. m.; distance, 29 miles. Troop left Aliaga February 6; marched to Tarlac; arrived at 5 p. m., same date; distance, 29 miles. February 7 troop left Tarlac at 7 a. m., marched to Angeles, arriving there 4.30 p. m.; distance marched, 30 miles. February 8 troop left Angeles, marched to San Fernando, Pampanga, its proper station, arriving there 11 a. m., same date; distance traveled, 12 miles. Total distance marched, 130 miles. February 11 Lieut. E. A. Sturges, Fifth Cavalry, commanding detachment 10 men Troop B, escorted Major Paddock, Fifth Cavalry, across country. February 11 marched to Dinalupijan, distance 30 miles; left there February 12 for Olangapo, 18 miles, arriving there same date; left Olangapo February 13 for Subic City, returning to Olangapo same date; distance marched, 20 miles. Left Olangapo February 14, marched to Dinalupijan same day, distance 18 miles; left there February 15, returned to San Fernando, distance 30 miles. Total distance, 126 miles.

Troop M, stationed at Tanay, performed the usual garrison duties at station during month, sending a detachment of 1 officer and 10 men to Quisao, February 3, in search of ladrones. Furnished a patrol each night during the month for the purpose of patrolling lake front from Tanay to Angono. All available troops of the Third Squadron took the field in search of band of insurgents reported in vicinity of Cavite, 28th instant.

Twelfth Infantry: The substation, Concepcion, was abandoned and the garrison withdrawn on the 5th instant. Companies along the railroad made the customary patrols.

Twenty-fifth Infantry: Second Lieut. J. De Camp Hall, attached to Twenty-fifth Infantry, attached to Company E, and commanding the detachment at Candelaria as guard since November 9, was relieved and returned to duty with company at Masinloc. The detachment under Sergeant Lewis, Company F, Twenty-fifth Infantry, consisting of 1 corporal and 19 privates, stationed at Botolan, Zambales, since September 25, was withdrawn February 23 and returned to duty with company at Iba, Zambales.

Same date, Company C, under command of Capt. R. L. Bush, Twenty-fifth Infantry, left camp at San Isidro, and marched about 16 miles to Alaminos, Zambales, arriving about 10 a. m., February 24.

Twenty-fourth Infantry: Company E left Manila, P. I., January 10, en route to Baler, Principe, with an enlisted strength of 134 men. Arrived at Baler January 14. Company F has performed the usual escort, guard, and garrison duties during the month. Distance marched by detachments performing escort duty, 260 miles.

March, 1902.—Fifth Cavalry: Troop A on practice march, as follows: Twenty-five men, under command of First Lieut. Lewis Foerster, Fifth Cavalry, left station March

10; marched to Arayat, Pampanga, distance 15 miles; March 11, to San Miguel, Bulacan, distance 25 miles; March 12, to Sibul and returned to San Miguel, Bulacan, distance 16 miles; March 13, to Baliuag, Bulacan, distance 16 miles; March 14, to Calumpit, Bulacan, distance 15 miles; March 15, to San Fernando, Pampanga, distance 18 miles; March 16, to Angeles, Pampanga, proper station of troop, distance 12 miles. Total distance marched, 117 miles.

Troop I sent out detachment as follows: Detachment, aggregating 26 men, left station of troop February 28 in search of a band of guerrillas who captured presidente at Cainta, Rizal, on night of February 27, and was subsequently augmented until March 4, when there were 43 men out in various detachments. On March 2 a detachment of 6 men, under Corporal Reed, stationed at Bosoboso, found and engaged a party of 20 or 30 guerrillas at Pulpito Mountain. The guerrillas had previously engaged a force of constabulary, and were returning to their retreat when observed by Corporal Reed's detachment at a distance of about 300 yards. The detachment charged them in line of skirmishers; they returned the fire, but without any casualties to the detachment, which retired a short distance, dismounted, and resumed the advance through the brush on foot, but failed to encounter the guerrillas a second time. The troop furnished a patrol from March 22 to 31 along the Mariquina River from Mariquina to Montalban to prevent bathing of persons in river and washing of clothing in streams during the cholera outbreak in Manila.

Troop K, stationed at Pasig, Rizal, was in the field in search of insurrectos from March 1 to 10; also performing the usual garrison duties at station remainder of month. Troop L, stationed at San Felipe, Rizal, performed usual garrison and patrol duties at station during the month, and with a detachment of 30 men in the field in search of insurrectos from March 1 to 11, under command of First Lieut. Hamilton Foley, quartermaster, Fifth Cavalry.

Troop M was in the field scouting country for insurrectos from March 1 to March 11.

Twenty-fifth Infantry: Pursuant to telegram dated March 3, headquarters Second Separate Brigade, San Fernando, Pampanga, the headquarters and band left Iba, Zambales, about 12.30 p. m. March 8, and proceeded to San Felipe, Zambales, on U. S. transport *Burnside*, arriving at 7.30 p. m. same date, with Third Battalion, consisting of Companies I, K, L, and M; embarked to change station under same orders. Left San Felipe at 3 a. m. and arrived in Manila Bay at 2 p. m., March 10, disembarked at 5 p. m. same date, and proceeded by rail and marching to Malabon, Rizal, where headquarters, band, and Company K took station, relieving the Third Infantry. Arrived at Malabon, Rizal, at 11.30 p. m., March 10. Maj. D. H. Brush, Twenty-fifth Infantry, was assigned to San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, changing station from Iba, Zambales. Maj. W. C. Buttler, Twenty-fifth Infantry, was assigned to station at Malabon, Rizal, changing from San Felipe, Zambales.

Company A left Santa Cruz, Zambales, at 8.30 a. m., March 16, and arrived at Bamban, Tarlac, March 18. Ordered in quarantine camp at 9.15 a. m.; cause, smallpox.

Company B left Alaminos, Zambales, at 11 a. m., March 3, and arrived at Dagupan, Pangasinan, March 24. Ordered in quarantine camp at 9.15 a. m.; cause, smallpox.

Company C left Alaminos, Zambales at 11 a. m., March 23, and arrived at Dagupan, Pangasinan, at 7 a. m., March 24. Ordered in quarantine camp 9.30 a. m., same date; cause, smallpox.

Company D, Dasol, Zambales, March 20, left station and arrived at Moncada, Tarlac, March 22.

Company I arrived at San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, March 11.

Company L arrived at San Miguel, Bulacan, March 11.

Company M arrived at Baliuag, Bulacan, March 11.

April, 1902.—Fifth Cavalry: Troop I was engaged in patrolling the Mariquina River from Mariquina to above Montalban, a distance of about 10 miles, to prevent bathing and washing of clothes and other articles in the river during the cholera outbreak in Manila. The ground was covered by at least three patrols each day, at regular intervals, making the ground passed over at least six times daily.

Troop L patrolled along the Mariquina River from pumping station to Mariquina.

Twenty-eighth Infantry: Detachment of Company D at San Pedro Tunasan, withdrawn April 21, and company moved to San Felipe Neri, province of Rizal; company left in cascos at 7 a. m., 26th instant; Lieutenant Henkes and 13 enlisted men remained to dispose of Government property. Arrived at San Felipe Neri at 12 a. m., and from there marched to Mariquina, province of Rizal, arriving at 7 p. m., where the company took station for quarantine duty.

Company E left Calamba by cascos to San Felipe about 6 p. m., April 26; arrived at San Felipe landing about 10.30 a. m., April 27. Left San Felipe about 2 p. m., April 27, and marched to Montalban, province of Rizal, via Mariquina, arriving at Montalban about 7.30 a. m., April 28, where it has since remained.

Company F left Calamba April 26, boarded *cascos*, and proceeded by water to San Felipe; April 28 marched to San Mateo, Rizal; quarantined at San Mateo, on account of suspected case of cholera in company. Number of miles marched, about 76.

Company G left Laya, Batangas, for San Felipe, to guard Manila water supply from possible pollution, arriving in Batangas on the 21st instant, per transport *Purissima Concepcion*. Left Batangas on the 24th and marched to Calamba, Laguna, arriving on the morning of the 26th. Distance marched, 39 miles.

Loaded on *cascos* and arrived at San Felipe Neri morning of 27th; distance in *cascos* about 30 miles. Left San Felipe Neri the 27th to take station at San Mateo, Rizal, and arrived the same day. Distance marched, 12 miles.

May, 1902.—Fifth Cavalry: Troop I performed the usual garrison duties at station during the month and maintained a detachment of 1 officer, 2 noncommissioned officers, and 7 privates at Antipolo, Rizal; also engaged during the month patrolling small streams that flow into the Mariquina River, to prevent the washing of persons, clothing, etc., that would tend to pollute the water of the Mariquina River.

First Lieut. Hu B. Myers and 20 enlisted men took the field May 31, after a band of ladrones that captured a detachment of Troop M, Fifth Cavalry.

Troop L performed the usual station and patrol duties at station during the month and maintained a detachment of 1 sergeant and 8 privates at Antipolo, Rizal, and furnished a detachment of 1 noncommissioned officer and 3 privates for daily patrol along the Mariquina River from pumping station to Mariquina, Rizal, P. I.

The detachment at Binangonan was withdrawn May 14, on account of cholera breaking out in that town; Corpl. Frederick K. Lee, a member of the detachment, died of the disease on the 13th instant.

Sergts. Louis Stewart and William H. Spree, Corpls. Edmond J. Fenigan, William J. Black, and Privates William D. Crane and Patrick Car, and Musician Charles W. Davis were attacked by armed force of ladrones near Binangonan, Rizal, about 11.30 a. m., May 30. Sergeant Spree and Private Crane made their escape; the other 5 men were captured. Also 3 horses missing, supposed to have been captured.

Twenty-fourth Infantry: Distance marched by detachments of Company F, performing escort duties, 270 miles. The company left Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija, at 3.30 p. m., May 31, en route to Manila, P. I., and marched to San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, arriving at 7 p. m., same date.

Distance from Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija, 9½ miles. Strength of company, 2 officers and 59 men. Total distance marched during the month, 279½ miles.

Twenty-eighth Infantry: Company D, in garrison at Mariquina, Rizal, during the month of May, guarding the Mariquina River from pollution, per paragraph 3, Special Orders, No. 72, headquarters Fifth Cavalry, San Felipe Neri, dated April 26, 1902.

Company E remained at station during the past month guarding the Mariquina River and performing the usual garrison duty.

Company F came out of quarantine May 6; has been doing regular garrison duties; also guarding the Mariquina River, to prevent pollution of same, from the wooden bridge on the Montalban-San Mateo road to the barracks at San Mateo.

Company G performed the usual station duties during the month in addition to which assisted in guarding Mariquina River from possible pollution during cholera epidemic.

Nineteenth Company Native Scouts, Ilocanos: Corporal Aliga, Privates Pascua and Gulla, at Zaragoza, were attacked by force estimated at about 20 rifles at 8.45 p. m. May 19; firing lasted until 12 midnight. No casualties on our side; 1 known of among the ladrones. Force of ladrones said to be under command of Juan Mendoza, of Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija, P. I.

The company was engaged during the month in the usual garrison and escort duties; distance traveled about 300 miles.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND SEPARATE BRIGADE,
SAN FERNANDO, PROVINCE OF PAMPANGA, LUZON, P. I.,
Tanay, Rizal, June 4, 1902.

SQUADRON COMMANDER, THIRD SQUADRON,
Fifth U. S. Cavalry.

SIR: I have the honor to forward the following report: On the morning of Friday, May 30, 1902, a detachment of M Troop, Fifth Cavalry, consisting of Sergeants Stewart and Spree, Corporals Fenigan and Black, and Privates King, Davis, and Crane, left this station with permission to visit the cemetery at Binangonan to decorate the grave of Corporal Lee, late of this troop. When within about a mile and a half of Binangonan this detachment ran into an advance guard of insurgents, consisting of

16 men armed with rifles. This advance guard had a few hours previously attacked the stone quarry near Binangonan, where they captured 1 American and about 30 pounds of dynamite. Leaving Private Crane and Sergeant Spree to hold horses, the other men, from what I can learn, dismounted and, armed only with revolvers, charged the advance guard of the insurgents, broke through that, and ran in upon the main body, consisting, I am informed, of about 50 men armed with boloc. These 5 men were captured. Private Crane got on his horse, which was shot through the neck, and took the back trail to Morong. His horse has since died from the wound. Sergeant Spree (mounted) broke through the insurgents and got to Binangonan, where he got on a launch and returned to this station. Immediately on receiving information by telephone from Private Crane, I took a detachment of 25 men over to Binangonan. Investigations made at Cardona showed that a party of ladrones had passed through there. I sent a detachment through the barrios of Cardona, but got no information. On my return from Binangonan I immediately telephoned the squadron commander for assistance. Having procured rations for my men and forage for my horses, I left at 4 a. m. May 31 for Morong, where Lieutenant Myers with 20 men of K Troop of Fifth Cavalry and Inspector Keithley of the Philippine constabulary with 40 men joined me. Working by different trails we met at San Guillemus about noon and trailed the ladrones across the country up into the El Pulpito Mountain Range. There we lost the trail and divided up into three parties; scouted the country down into Tanay. We arrived here last night. Four prisoners, who have been recognized as members of the ladrone band, have been captured by Lieutenant Myers and Inspector Keithley. I also captured 1 revolver at Santa Teresa. From information recently received, the constabulary has gone again to Cardona. Lieutenant Myers will move from here this evening and I to-morrow morning. The band of ladrones has apparently broken up and doubled on their trail and are now in hiding in the pueblos and barrios above and behind Morong. Up to the present date 6 of the 7 horses have returned and 2 of the men, leaving 5 men and 1 horse which I believe are in the hands of the ladrones. Every effort is being made for their recovery. I regret that the failure of the telephone at this station made it impossible to report immediately.

Respectfully,

GEO. B. RODNEY,
First Lieutenant, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, Commanding M Troop.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND SEPARATE BRIGADE,
DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES,
Tanay, Rizal, P. I., June 7, 1902.

SQUADRON COMMANDER, THIRD SQUADRON, FIFTH CAVALRY,
Pasig, Rizal.

SIR: I desire to call your attention to the fact that in my report made to you concerning the capture of 5 men of M Troop, Fifth Cavalry, by ladrones, on May 30, 1902, I neglected to state that Sergeant Spree (who is in arrest here awaiting sentence of court-martial) was permitted to go with the party and was put under special orders and care of Sergeant Stewart. This permission was given because Sergeant Spree and Corporal Lee (whose grave the detachment was going to Binangonan to decorate) were, I am informed, intimate friends. Further, I was at stables when the detachment was saddling up; I saw Sergeant Stewart and gave him special instructions to take carbines with them. This I believe I neglected to incorporate in my report.

Respectfully,

GEO. B. RODNEY,
First Lieutenant, Fifth Cavalry, Commanding Troop.

APPENDIX C.

REPORTS OF OPERATIONS IN THE THIRD SEPARATE BRIGADE.

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD SEPARATE BRIGADE,
DEPARTMENT NORTH PHILIPPINES,
Batangas, Batangas Province, P. I., July 1, 1902.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with instructions contained in telegram from the adjutant-general, Division of the Philippines, of June 9, 1902, I have the honor to submit the following report upon conditions, operations, and events in the Third Separate Brigade during the past fiscal year, and upon present conditions therein.

A report upon operations and conditions in the territory included in the old first district, Department of Southern Luzon (now included in the Third Separate brigade), up to and including August 26, 1901, is contained in the last annual report of the commanding general, Department of Southern Luzon; therefore this report will commence at that date, and will consist of two parts: Part I, for the first district, Department of Southern Luzon, from August 27 to November 30, 1901, and Part II, for the Third Separate Brigade, from December 1, 1901, to June 30, 1902.

PART I.—August 27 to November 30, 1901.

The first district, Department of Southern Luzon, was commanded by Brig. Gen. S. S. Sumner, and included the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, and Tayabas. Cavite and Tayabas were under civil government, Batangas and Laguna under military control.

Armed resistance.—So far as armed resistance to the United States Government was concerned, however, there was little difference in the four provinces, except that Batangas had by far the largest number of armed men opposing the Government. There were armed parties in each province; many of the people were evidently unfriendly, and nearly all persons of any experience who lived therein believed that a majority of the inhabitants of these four provinces, as a whole, were secretly aiding the insurrection, either voluntarily or involuntarily. The soundness of this belief has been fully demonstrated by subsequent events, to my own satisfaction at least.

On account of the danger from attack by armed bodies of more or less active insurgents, the travel of Americans and distribution of supplies in all four provinces had to be accomplished under guard of from four to thirty soldiers.

Garrisons.—American garrisons were numerous and, in general, small, frequently commanded by second or first lieutenants of from a month to three years' service. In some instances these garrisons were composed of from ten to twenty-five men under noncommissioned officers only.

Few companies had more than one officer, who in many cases had to perform every duty and fill every office, military, staff, and civil, pertaining to his garrison and town. In addition to these time-absorbing obligations, he always had to hold himself in readiness to take the field at a moment's notice, or to repel an attack by

day or night. During this period active scouting was kept up by troops, but on account of existing conditions and the impossibility of obtaining information or assistance of any value from natives (who were aiding insurgents instead) comparatively little was accomplished. Under such conditions it would not, in my opinion, have been possible to achieve success without a radical change of policy.

Creation of Third Brigade.—On November 1, 1901, the first district of the Department of Southern Luzon became a part of the Third Separate Brigade, in the Department of North Philippines. On November 30, 1901, Brig. Gen. S. S. Sumner, U. S. Army, relinquished command of the latter to take command of the First Separate Brigade, and I assumed command of the Third Separate Brigade, beginning my duties therein on the 1st of December, 1901.

Further data referring to the operations and transactions of this period (from August 27 to November 30, 1901) can be found, if desired, in inclosures to this report.

PART II.—*From December 1, 1901, to June 30, 1902.*

Pursuant to the instructions of the department commander, I made, under date of April 22, 1902, a memorandum report indicating the conditions as they existed when I assumed command of this brigade and giving an outline of plan of operations and results. I was informed by the department commander that he intended to use the data contained in this memorandum for a report he contemplated making. Notwithstanding I may thereby repeat matter which may already have been utilized in an official report, I shall have to embody in this document a portion of the material that is contained in that memorandum in order to give a clear understanding of the conditions and operations in this brigade during the seven months ending June 30, 1902. Some of the views expressed in that memorandum have been slightly modified because of impressions formed from knowledge subsequently acquired.

Military and political leaders.—In the insurrections of recent years against Spain most of the political and diplomatic leaders and a majority of the military leaders came from territory included within the four provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas, the relative numbers supplied by each province being in the order in which they are named.

The Hongkong junta and other foreign agencies have always been largely, and are now exclusively, composed of persons from the territory of this brigade. These political and diplomatic leaders and agitators have mostly pursued their occupation under the safe protection of a foreign soil, and have been furnished the sinews of war from money and collections made at home by their families, friends, and military comrades.

Upon the initiation of the present insurrection all of the leading families of these provinces, with very few exceptions, took an active and willing part therein, but as time progressed and it began to appear that armed resistance would be unsuccessful, the respectable portion of the people surrendered or ceased open connection with the insurrection, excepting only those who, partly inspired by pride and a feeling of self-importance, were living luxuriously abroad as diplomatic agents or members of the Hongkong junta. These appear to be so enamored of their elysian existence, and agitation as an occupation seems so natural and agreeable to them, that they never have, and probably never will, voluntarily abandon this pleasant pursuit as long as anyone can be found willing to support them.

The surrender or capture of the respectable military element left the control of affairs and the remainder of the arms in the hands of a lot of persons, most of them ignorant, some criminal, and nearly all pertaining to a restless, irresponsible, unscrupulous class of people whose principal ambition seems to be to live without work, and who have found it possible to do so under the guise of patriotism. This latter element, once in unrestrained power, completely changed the character of the insurrection, which speedily became only an excuse for gratifying quixotic pride to a few, and to others an opportunity for personal enrichment. These leaders imposed such illogical, oppressive, and unjust taxes upon the people that it became necessary for them to introduce, by heartless and cruel assassination, a reign of terror in order to completely dominate and collect involuntary contributions from the poorer classes.

Insurgent collections and contributions.—No man fit for military service was allowed to marry except on the contribution of 30 pesos or a gun to the cause. One-tenth of the agricultural produce was exacted. In some localities nothing could be carried to market without paying on the highway a tax to an armed collector. Toll was collected for crossing a bridge which had stood for years and had never previously been a toll bridge. Brass bands had to contribute one-half their earnings to the insurrection, the municipal police a portion of their wages, and every man who drew a salary or compensation from the American Government a portion thereof. Those who rented houses to the Americans likewise contributed. There was a regular per capita tax varying from 2 pesos to 50 cents, and, in addition, extraordinary

contributions were collected for the purchase of guns which were never obtained. Not content with this, many subordinate chiefs levied occasional contributions to supply their own immediate desires and those of their commands.

Padres divided church fees and tithes with insurgents, and some of them acted as collectors from others. They paid a regular monthly contribution of one peso and a half for each thousand persons under their jurisdiction.

Every able-bodied man was subjected to enforced service, but was released from this obligation upon the payment of 30 pesos for a substitute. They collected the 30 pesos whenever possible, but no one ever saw a substitute.

Regular contributions were collected from cockpits and markets of towns, even though occupied by Americans, and to such an extent that it was found necessary to close both in many places. Natives were secretly licensed to establish gambling houses who, notwithstanding the towns were garrisoned by Americans, would never have dared to do so without paying a license fee to insurgents. The licensees were given the exclusive privilege and others dare not compete. Other classes of licenses were regularly issued and fees collected in most towns occupied by American troops. Small shops in these towns regularly paid a license fee to insurgent collectors, and frequently contributed tobacco, cigarettes, and other articles upon individual insurgent demands. Chinamen were especial sufferers from heavy impositions. Everything it was possible to impose a tax upon was covered. I know of nothing that escaped.

Method of collection.—These taxes were regularly collected by insurgent tax collectors called "pangolos," several of whom were located in each town and one in each barrio. Each one was required to turn in an amount deemed proportionate to the wealth and number of people collected from. In the majority of cases these tax collectors were town officials or cabezas of barrios placed in office by the American Government after they had voluntarily taken an oath of allegiance binding them to loyally and faithfully perform the duties of their office.

Method of enforcing payment.—The penalty for refusing to pay taxes was death. The following extract (see General Orders, No. 259, Division of the Philippines, of 1901) from the written confession of a murderer on his trial, indicates quite clearly the method of procedure in cases of refusal: "I carried a letter of authorization to act as a special agent, which means authority to commit murder. Each time a murder was ordered a letter was sent to one of four men (named above) by one of the chiefs (naming them). Afterwards the letter was taken up and burned. If a man did not pay his contributions to the insurgent collector he was ordered to be killed."

American and insurgent—Municipal officials the same.—Malvar testified, under oath, subsequent to his surrender, that the town officials, except the timid and inefficient ones, who served the Americans were generally delegated or appointed to serve the insurgents in the same capacity, and that special rewards were ordered paid to those who were most skillful in deceiving and playing with American officers.

Malvar's orders.—All these taxes and the collection thereof was specified and regulated in eight general orders issued by Malvar, for the purpose of conducting the war, between April 28 and December 18, 1901. Each of these orders was very complete in detail and served not only as instructions for organization and disposition of troops but was also something in the nature of a book of regulations. They prescribed a very complete organization which was never perfected, but a system of government, including a hierarchy, was partially established with all the customary appointments and with officials performing the usual functions of office.

Religious imposition and superstition.—The shrewder and less scrupulous leaders, taking advantage of the ignorant superstition of the common people, did not hesitate to profane the holy cause of religion in order to extract from their pockets money to fill their own.

An image, known as the "Virgin of Casaysay," is said to have been discovered centuries ago floating along the shores of Taal in a joint of bamboo. As the legend goes, it was immediately installed by a pious friar in the sanctuary of Casaysay and has ever since been venerated by the people as a thing of marvelous and miraculous power. A native priest, one Castillo, abandoning his parochial charge, took this image and joined insurgents in the mountains, where many poor "ignorantes" followed to worship and contribute money to secure its protective care. The income of this image has been variously estimated, but never at less than thousands of pesos per annum. It was finally surrendered and restored to its rightful guardians when Padre Castillo surrendered with Marasigan.

It was soon ascertained that many similar images were being used by unscrupulous individuals to collect money which was divided with insurgents. Most of them had been devised or manufactured by disreputable persons since the days when the restraining hand of the Spanish friar practically maintained the privilege of supplying saints as a corporation monopoly.

To render the false images valuable they were generally sprung upon the superstitious yokels in some mysterious way. For example, one shrewd and conscienceless usurer secretly manufactured and buried an image on his own land. Then securing a lot of perfume he sprinkled it upon the ground and managed to have the attention of some superstitious person attracted to this sweet-smelling spot. News thereof soon spread and collected a crowd of mystified people, who digging in the ground discovered the image. He who owned the soil straightway claimed and used it as a source of revenue for himself and the cause, for it should be understood that he would never have dared collect contributions had he not been permitted to do so by the "patriots."

The provost-marshal of this brigade has now in his possession eleven of these improvised images, all of which have been regularly used within the jurisdiction of the town of Batangas alone to swell the gross receipts of insurgents.

Insurgent plan of operations.—A system of secret post-offices was established, whereby mail was transmitted to and from various commands and to and from the Hongkong junta, but the insurgent army was doing little except hiding to escape observation of Americans and living on the people. They had been advised to hide well, avoid being captured or destroyed, and to prolong the war as long as they possibly could in the hope of wearing out the patience of the American people. They never risked a fair fight in the open, but skulking around by night and hiding in tropical jungles by day they contented themselves with an occasional long-range, harmless attack for the purpose of demonstrating that they were still protesting with arms. They occasionally lay in wait to ambush very small parties of Americans, always taking good care to have a convenient way of escape if necessary. Should favorable opportunity afford they would sometimes attack small detachments of our troops with overwhelming numbers, but they never fired a shot at short range except when discovered and surprised by us. They would then fire a few shots while running away. They were limited to the expenditure of 10 rounds of ammunition per man per year. Even such feeble efforts at opposition as the above entirely ceased when the campaign became very active and vigorous on our part after January 1, 1902.

In the meantime, hiding their guns and discarding their uniforms, they had frequently come into towns garrisoned by us disguised as private citizens to visit their families, take a rest, or cure themselves of fevers or other ills contracted in the mountains. There was no one in the community who would dare to disclose their identity, for all fully realized that it was impossible for Americans to protect them against secret assassination.

Intimidation by assassination.—Any native found rendering voluntary service to the Americans without contributing a large portion of the compensation to the insurrection, and any native who showed any friendship for Americans, or was suspected of being a spy for them, was, regardless of sex, marked for secret assassination by insurgents or their "mandatarios."

It was not astonishing, therefore, to find all natives of the brigade, with few exceptions, rendering implicit obedience to the insurgent government, and it was only by the most determined efforts on the part of Americans that this habit could be broken up and their allegiance to the insurgent cause destroyed.

Treachery of municipal officials.—With rare exceptions the work of active and experienced provost judges has brought out the fact that the principal men, the presidentes and consejales of the pueblos, constituted the eyes and ears, and furnished supplies of money and rations for insurgents in the field.

The presidente of this town of Batangas and the clerk and sheriff of the court of first instance, here located, were self-confessed principal leaders of the insurrection in this vicinity, and continued to be until December, 1901.

Insurgents had such well-concealed and abundant supplies and were so well provided for by Filipinos living with the Americans in garrisoned towns that they could easily have continued their system of warfare indefinitely, so long as the government continued the policy then in vogue.

During all this time no progress was being made toward independence, but the system appeared to be entirely satisfactory to those who managed it, for each person connected with the management probably got his percentage.

Insurgent strength.—According to Malvar, he had under his command during the latter part of 1901 about 2,500 effective guns. This would necessitate the service of 2,500 soldiers actually armed with guns, but according to the insurgent plan at least one additional soldier armed with a bolo must accompany each two riflemen to rescue the guns of those killed or wounded. This would require the incorporation of at least 3,750 men in the regular force in the field. In addition to this each barrio had a lot of bolomen, varying from ten to a full company, armed with war bolos. Every able-bodied man from 16 years upward not thus employed was classed among the reserves, liable to be called out at any moment. Adding to this the army of collectors, agents,

spies, cargadores, etc., it will be seen that of the able-bodied men the majority were actually subject to and obeying insurgent orders.

Malvar's statement.—The following is Malvar's own statement as to the condition of his command in December, 1901. The theater of war was divided into zones corresponding to our departments, though much smaller, and over each zone was a general or colonel, and in a few cases a lieutenant-colonel. His statement is tabulated as follows:

Zone.	Commander.	Guns.
Oriental Batangas	Casala	200
Occidental Batangas	Marasigan	300
Lipa and Bifang	Gonzales	300
Laguna	Caballes	300
Morong	Asuncion	200
Oriental Tayabas	Marques	No report.
Occidental Tayabas	Mayo	150
Alaminos, Bay, Calauang	Ramos	40
Mindoro	Atienza	No report.
Department of the South	Lucban	No report.
Visayan Islands	Maxilom	No report.
Cavite	Noriel	(?) 550
Infanta	Ascarraga	No report.

Malvar remarked that he doubted the report from Cavite, believing that the officers there had exaggerated the number of guns in order to secure an increase in rank. Allowing 300 guns for Marques and 220 for Mindoro, 3,500 would not exceed, according to Malvar, the number of guns in the hands of insurgents in the Third Brigade. He also stated that he ordered all guns in the hands of individuals turned in for the use of the insurgent army, but it became quite evident that this order had not been universally obeyed, for we secured during our operations nearly 3,600 guns.

Disposition of insurgents.—The above-mentioned insurgent forces were located (so far as the territory of this brigade is concerned) generally within the jurisdiction of the towns to which they locally pertained, hidden in the jungle or in some of the many deep volcanic ravines which cut up these provinces in all directions. Whenever pressed by American operations, they took to thickly wooded and difficult mountains which abound in all these provinces.

Terrain.—The island of Mindoro is almost completely covered by densely wooded mountains, one of which is among the highest of those existing in the Philippine Islands. Mounts Sungay and Gonzales are in Cavite and Batangas; Mount Macolod and the Loboo Mountains in Batangas; the Lipa Mountains are in Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas; Mount Maquiling is in Laguna, and Mounts San Cristobal and Bana-jao, very high twin mountains, stand between the provinces of Tayabas and Laguna, their watersheds covering the larger portion of these two provinces. There never was a terrain more admirably adapted to guerrilla warfare. The Loboo Mountains cover a large district, and are so densely wooded and difficult of penetration that villages of ladrones have inhabited them since time immemorial without paying tribute to the government and without being much disturbed by it.

Distribution of insurgent forces.—In Cavite Province, which had for some time been under civil control, a part of Malvar's force had been operating under Generals Noriel and San Miguel and Colonels Montalon and Felizardo, with other minor leaders (such as Ramos and Ciriaco) too numerous to mention.

In Batangas all towns, with two or three exceptions, were maintaining and supporting regularly organized insurgent columns, to name the officers of which would require pages. The principal ones were Malvar himself and General Gonzales, Colonels Garcia, Casala, Marasigan, Hernandez, Luna, Cabrera, and others, with a long list of majors, captains, and lieutenants.

In Laguna Colonel Caballes was commanding forces, all subject to Malvar's orders, consisting of several battalions, including such officers as Colonels Cantos, Ramos, and Banaad and Majors Virey, Capili, and others.

In Tayabas, also subject to Malvar's orders, there were numerous officers under Lieutenant-Colonels Mayo, Masangcay, and Caneo, including Majors Martinez, Maratija, Marquez, and Reos, with a long list of subordinate officials.

Mindoro also had its contingent under Atienza.

The little island of Romblon is and always has been peaceful.

Marinduque insurgents surrendered last year and the island is now peaceful, but about December 1 its internal condition was quite as bad as in southern Luzon. The status of affairs in this island at that time was clearly indicated in a communication from Major Wotherspoon, Thirtieth Infantry, forwarded some months ago.

By way of postscript to Major Wotherspoon's report, it should be added that since his report was forwarded the civil judge of Marinduque has materially assisted in tranquilizing that province. He has tried, convicted, and sentenced three of the insurgent officers concerned in hiding guns; has tried, convicted, and sentenced another to death for killing a prisoner; has discharged the clerk of his court (an ex-insurgent officer), and tried, convicted, and sentenced him for sedition. The ex-insurgent governor of the island was also arrested, with a lot of other minor officials, for complicity in the Marinduque concealment of guns.

The report of Capt. W. T. Johnston, Fifteenth Cavalry, provost judge, gives a comprehensive idea of the special conditions prevailing in the towns of Tiaong and Candelaria, in the province of Tayabas.

A similar investigation made by Lieutenants Hickman, First Cavalry, and Friable, Native Scouts, demonstrated that the town of Tayabas, in province of same name, was in a similar condition. Dolores was equally bad.

I had no opportunity to specially investigate any other towns in Tayabas Province, but of the balance which are included in this brigade I am inclined to believe that in Sariaya, Lucban, and Lucena (the provincial capital) the actual conditions were not so bad as in Tiaong or Candelaria. In Sampaloc, Pagbilao, Mauban, and Laguananoc, however, I have no reason to believe that conditions were any better.

Insecurity of Americans and their supplies.—Though for a time in 1900 and a part of 1901 all outward manifestation of armed insurrection had practically ceased, and though our troops had been in these provinces about two years, no American nor any native who was identified with Americans was safe outside the immediate confines of garrisoned towns. With the exception of a few occasions no American thought of traveling without a guard. All trains of supplies were escorted, and even from Batangas to Bauan, a distance of only four miles, the brigade commander had considered it necessary to direct that officers should not ride alone. In certain localities an American military or civil official would occasionally make a ride between towns alone, but always with risk, against his better judgment, and in disregard of the advice of others.

Americans were liable to be shot at during any time of the day or night if they ventured away from garrisons. Lieutenant Connolly, Twenty-first Infantry, was shot at by about 10 rifles while taking a stroll along the main streets in the outskirts of San Jose one evening in October. Two soldiers were fired on in a similar manner in the outskirts of Tayabas in July. There were more fights, more attacks on wagon trains, more casualties, and more activity on the part of insurgents in the autumn of 1901 than there had been for a year before. Almost the entire population of the four above-mentioned provinces and of Mindoro was a secretly organized camp.

The foregoing sets forth in brief the general conditions existing throughout this brigade on December 1, 1901, and I agree with the department commander in believing that "it was without parallel in the history of any country long occupied by an invading and conquering army."

American forces.—As to our forces, when I joined there were 7,622 American and 680 native troops present for duty in the brigade, pretty evenly distributed over the territory. Nearly every pueblo had a garrison, in the majority of cases consisting of one organization. Some few large centers like Batangas, Lipa, and Tanauan had four companies, a few more of the large places two companies, and a few substations had only detachments. This condition of affairs had existed, except in Mindoro, with more or less fluctuation in the size and number of the garrisons since General Schwan's expedition through this region in the month of January, 1900, at which time it was first occupied. We practically occupied every town in the brigade, the average distance between garrisons being 7 miles.

We now turn to an outline of operations.

Policy.—After careful consideration of the situation, terrain, and attitude of the people for about a week after my arrival (during which time I interviewed every prominent intelligent Filipino in reach who had the reputation of really desiring peace) it became apparent that the only way I could possibly succeed in putting an end to insurrection in this brigade was by cutting off the income and supplies of insurgents and by pursuing them at the same time with sufficient persistence and vigor to wear them out.

Attitude of the people.—Contributions.—I had become aware of all the impositions set forth in the preceding pages, but, notwithstanding my belief that there were people who contributed to the insurrection solely through fear, it was impossible for me to judge who wanted peace and who not. No native's word alone could be relied upon. Many persons unquestionably had sympathy with the insurrection and were perfectly willing to assist it in ways that did not cost them anything, who, on account of scant resources, could not be induced to make contributions except through fear. The rich, all of whom lived in towns under our protection, could regulate their own

contributions and had no especial objection to contributing amounts which were small in proportion to their means. These felt no sympathy whatever for the poor who, living in localities outside of limits within which Americans were able to protect them, were compelled at the risk of their lives to pay whatever was demanded of them. These complications increased the difficulty of distinguishing between friend and foe.

Food supplies.—I also learned that insurgents had accumulated large quantities of food supplies in mountains and other hiding places. They claimed to have enough hidden food to last Malvar's army for two years. It was necessary to confiscate and bring this food into towns for use of the people (from whom it had been taken) or destroy it. But a large number of poor natives, either under compulsion or from choice, were living with insurgents, aiding and assisting them. They, too, had food hidden away, which I did not wish to confiscate or destroy.

Under conditions then prevailing it was impossible to identify or discriminate between the food supply of those who might be desirous of peace and those who were opposed thereto. To prevent, as far as possible, the falling of hardship and damage (during active operations) upon those who desired peace, it was plainly necessary to afford them opportunity to securely separate themselves and their supplies from hostile natives. I was as anxious as anyone could be to avoid making war against those who really wanted peace, and it was my duty to protect them against the vengeance of others.

Warning to noncombatants.—It is customary and the laws of war enjoin the giving of warning to noncombatants, wherever practicable, before beginning operations liable to result in their injury. I could do nothing more than offer such protection as I was able to give, and warn them that unless they accepted that protection their property (which consisted almost solely of food supply) would become "liable" to confiscation or destruction, because it might be impossible to determine whether it belonged to hostile or peaceable people.

(At that time insurgents and people of the mountains were in the habit of leaving their houses and food and sneaking away to hide in the brush whenever they saw Americans approaching. As a matter of fact, no food belonging to people who were with it when it was found was ever confiscated or destroyed, but was brought with them into zones of protection. No other kind of movable property was ever destroyed, except insurgent clothing.)

Zones of protection.—Over and above all these considerations in importance, however, was the absolute necessity of making it impossible for insurgents to procure food by levying contributions upon others.

Therefore, in order to give those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply for themselves and their families, it was determined to establish zones of protection with limits sufficiently near all towns to enable the small garrisons thereof to give to the people living within these zones efficient protection against ruinous exactions by insurgents.

The following telegraphic order was consequently issued by me:

[Telegraphic circular No. 2.]

"To all station commanders:

"In order to put an end to enforced contributions now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts, by means of intimidation and assassination, commanding officers of all towns now existing in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna, including those at which no garrison is stationed at present, will immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredations of armed insurgents. These limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.

"Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits, and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, including rice, palay, chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant land

without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so.

"In the discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking protection.

"As soon as peaceful conditions have been reestablished in the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes and such assistance be rendered them as may be found practicable."

It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these zones, but merely to offer them the opportunity and permit them to decide for themselves whether they would cast their lot with us or with the enemy. The latter, however, drove many of them off to the mountains by means of threats and by frightening the ignorant with shameless lies concerning what the Americans intended to do with them after they entered the zones.

The fact had developed during a former experience with protected zones, that the efficiency or inefficiency of the protection afforded therein was the determining factor in forming the decision and attitude of many natives.

Retaliation.—To put an end to vengeance by assassination, it was reluctantly determined to make use of the right of retaliation conferred by President Lincoln's Order 100, of 1863. A circular telegram was published announcing an intention to retaliate by the execution of prisoners of war in case any more persons were assassinated by insurgents for political reasons. It was a source of profound satisfaction to me that I was never called upon to enforce this order. Its mere publication stopped the crime of assassination at once, and not a single instance occurred after the announcement of the order.

Neutrality.—Strong in the conviction that the people of these provinces, notwithstanding they are Tagalos, could be turned against the insurgents, as the Ilocanos were turned in northern Luzon, it was determined to operate with this purpose in view. A policy of permitting no neutrality was, in consequence, adopted and enforced.

Contributions from fear.—As the campaign progressed, it became more and more apparent that a large number of poor people had contributed through fear, for the power of insurgents to collect soon came to an end after they had lost opportunity to intimidate and impose upon them.

Growth of peace sentiment and volunteers.—From time to time many additional families voluntarily entered zones of protection. The sentiment for peace waxed stronger every day, and natives volunteered assistance to Americans at every hand and in every town. When these volunteers could be trusted they were armed and sent to the mountains, and always succeeded in performing service of some value. They sometimes brought back guns and insurgents (who were detained as prisoners of war), but more frequently still they returned with hundreds of half-famished men, women, and children, who, released from the intimidating influence of insurgents, entered the zones under protection the volunteers afforded them. They were permitted to join their friends in the zones, if they had any, but in case they had none, food and shelter were provided for them.

Treatment of sick.—Those who were sick were furnished food, medicine, and medical attention free of charge. It is always unhealthy to live in the mountains of these islands at certain seasons of the year, and to live there at any time, unprovided with proper food and shelter, conduces to malaria and other ills. Those people who remained in the mountains as long as they could were generally found sick with fever or other ailments when they finally entered protected zones. In the native hospital we established at Batangas we probably treated, from time to time, not less than 1,500 such persons.

Vaccination.—Nearly 300,000 of those who entered zones of protection were vaccinated. As a consequence we have completely escaped the epidemic of smallpox which generally comes each year during the dry season, in the months of January, February, March, or April.

Closure of ports and importation of food.—On December 10 the ports of Batangas and Laguna were closed, it being essential to prevent insurgents from importing food from Manila. But as these provinces never raise enough rice to provide for the local demand, when the supply began to run low it became necessary for the government to bring from Manila and China millions of pounds every month for the people living in protected zones. To those entirely without means and unable to work it has been distributed free of cost. To those who had money with which to buy it has been sold at a reasonable profit, the cost being much less than that which usually prevails during this season of the year. The profit derived from such sales constitutes the poor fund with which we shall be able to prevent any want or suffering until the people have somewhat recovered from the effects of the war and from their loss of work cattle by rinderpest.

When it became necessary merchants were permitted to bring from Manila, on Government boats, supplies of such staple articles as petroleum, coconut oil, sugar, salt, dry goods, tobacco, cigars, cigarettes, matches, and medicines for sale to people living under our protection.

No one has died of starvation in zones of protection, nor, so far as I have been able to learn, has anyone experienced serious hunger.

Road work.—In order that able-bodied men might earn money with which to buy food for their families, extensive road work was carried on during the campaign, the money to pay therefor being derived from a road tax imposed on those who preferred to pay rather than work, and also from special appropriations by the Philippine Commission. Marked improvement in roads has resulted in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna.

Cultivation and gathering of crops.—During the season for working land, laborers, under the protection of patrols, were permitted to prepare the soil for cultivation, except where the land was situated so far away as to render it impracticable to do this. We fortunately succeeded, however, in putting an end to the insurrection so promptly that any land could be prepared before the planting season arrived. During the campaign some irrigated land was planted under the protection of patrols, and standing crops were likewise gathered.

Palay, corn, and camotes for planting, and several thousand hoes, were also procured and distributed gratis to the poor of many towns.

Breaking up insurgent organization.—We soon realized what had been learned by experience elsewhere, that it would be difficult to accomplish anything until the insurgent organization of the towns was completely broken up. The method of doing this is well set forth in the report submitted by Capt. W. T. Johnston, Fifteenth Cavalry.^a Insurgent collectors and those municipal officials who had violated their oaths in order to serve insurgents were generally tried and punished, thus breaking up Malvar's organization, which enabled insurgents to procure income and supplies and insure security and information.

Insurgent alarm and resentment.—People no sooner entered zones of protection than the insurgents became greatly alarmed and aroused, and the result was felt by increased activity and resentment on their part. As a consequence, during the latter part of the month of December we had some sharp engagements and a number of unimportant skirmishes, but this activity resulted in such vigorous and relentless pursuit from our troops that the enemy became thoroughly demoralized, and after the 10th of January there was no armed encounter worthy of record here.

Pursuit of insurgents.—We continued to pursue them with relentless persistence. Not waiting for them to come out of hiding, we penetrated into the heart of every mountain range, searching every ravine and mountain top. We continually found their barracks and hidden food in the most unexpected and remote hiding places. We burned hundreds of small barracks and shelters as fast as they could construct them. We destroyed their clothing and supplies, and pursued them so persistently that they finally ceased to stay more than twenty-four hours in any one place.

We maintained as many as 4,000 troops in the field at once, keeping them supplied in mountains where no roads existed. They camped by companies at strategic points on trails, each sending three or four detachments, with five or six days' rations, to bivouac at points radiating several miles from its base. Leaving their rations in charge of a man or two, these detachments moved out from their bivouacs and searched the mountains by day and night. In this way it was rendered unsafe for insurgents to travel at any time, and, having no longer any safe retreat in which to hide themselves, they became so scattered and demoralized that they continued to surrender and be captured by wholesale.

Insurgent food secured or destroyed.—By this method of campaign we finally succeeded in securing and sending into towns, or destroying, almost every pound of food which the insurgents possessed or could obtain, and about the 1st of April it became exceedingly difficult for them to maintain themselves. Their appearance indicated great want and suffering, and a number were so sick when captured as to need medical attention.

Effect of campaign on command.—It need not be supposed, however, that we were able to continue such operations so persistently without cost to our own officers and men, many of whom came down with fever, dysentery, and other complaints.

At the time of Malvar's surrender we had every mountain range in this province full of troops, some of whom had not entered a post for more than a month. Though we managed to keep them supplied with food, it was impossible to get sufficient clothing to them. Because of the destructive effect of mountain brush and rocks nearly all became ragged and many almost barefooted, but I take pleasure in here

^a See page 285.

recording a fact which I hope will be as gratifying to my superiors as to myself, namely, that I never heard one complaint from any officer or man of this command on account of hard work. On the contrary, as the contest waxed warm and we all realized that Malvar and his few remaining followers were hard pressed and waning in strength, the determination of the command seemed to increase in proportion as the interest and excitement grew intense.

Malvar's surrender.—The day Malvar surrendered (April 16) satisfaction consequent upon success achieved by earnest work took possession of many very tired officers and men. We one and all had the satisfaction of realizing that for the first time in the history of Philippine insurrection the most determined and persistent enemy of Spanish or American sovereignty had been unequivocally forced to submit to legally constituted authority after he had ignored many invitations to surrender on liberal terms, without humiliation and without inflicting hardship upon his people.

Results—Conversion of natives.—We succeeded in turning most of the people against their once highly respected chief, and toward the end of our struggle several thousand Batangas natives joined us in our determined hunt for their fugitive leader, who can never again inspire in them the confidence and esteem he once possessed. Realization of the fact that the people had finally abandoned his standard materially aided in bringing Malvar to his senses.

Contact with Americans—Respect for Government.—Hundreds of people have been brought into intimate contact with Americans, whom they had never seen or known before, and as a consequence no one will again be able to mislead them as to our real character. Notwithstanding the vigor of the campaign, I conscientiously believe we have gained friends. I know that the authority of the United States Government has gained respect. Some of the poor, who came from the mountains into Batangas and who are still remaining, when asked why they do not return to their homes, reply that they would rather remain and work for the Government. (We employ a great deal of labor here.)

Arms and insurgents captured.—We have secured 3,561 guns and 625 revolvers, with many thousand bolos, rounds of ammunition, etc.

We have detected, captured, or forced to surrender some eight or ten thousand persons actively engaged in one capacity or another in the insurrection.

Release of prisoners.—Those surrendering voluntarily with guns were generally released on taking the oath of allegiance. The remainder, numbering several thousand, were held as prisoners of war, but with the surrender of Malvar their release was immediately begun and continued as fast as we could separate those who were held as prisoners of war, on political charges only, from those arrested and held for civil crimes. It did not take long to release all political prisoners, and when the President's proclamation of amnesty arrived it found not a single political prisoner in this brigade.

People return to homes—Ladrones.—The people have returned to homes where they can live free from molestation or apprehension, and with a feeling of security for life and property, which they have been unable to enjoy for years. They appear to be relieved of a heavy burden and glad that the delusion has run its course.

I have thus far not heard of a single ladrone in either Batangas or Laguna since the campaign closed. It is not probable that this state of affairs ever existed before in the history of these two provinces.

Present conditions—Effect of war, plagues, and epidemics.—In addition to the curse of war, the people of the Philippine Islands have, unfortunately, been visited during the past six years by about every plague and epidemic to which man and beast are subject. The bubonic plague, typhoid and dengue fevers, beri-beri, smallpox, cholera, dysentery, and malaria have all contributed their share to the misfortunes of the poor, whilst rinderpest, surra, and glanders have destroyed large numbers of cattle, carabao, and horses.

Tranquillity and disturbance.—With respect to present conditions throughout this brigade, it may be said that the cattle plague has affected all parts thereof, though proportionately a greater number still remain alive in Mindoro, where peace and tranquillity are now completely reestablished.

In Marinduque nearly all the cattle have been lost, but its tranquillity is the same as that of Mindoro.

In Cavite, where no military operations have been conducted since I assumed command of the brigade (the province having been previously placed under civil control), ladrones still operate to the detriment of peace and prosperity. They have been pursued by constabulary, however, for the past seven months, and it is hoped that they may be captured or destroyed soon. This province has always been cursed with ladrones. I have no information concerning economical conditions there.

In that portion of the province of Tayabas in which zones of protection were inaugurated and military operations were conducted to a conclusion profound peace prevails, and as the principal industry is the cultivation of the cocoanut, the people of that section are prosperous. In that portion of the province where zones of protection were not established and where opportunity was not had for concluding a thorough campaign, ladrones still operate to the great disturbance of the people and detriment of industry.

The province of Laguna is profoundly peaceful, and as it is also largely dedicated to the cultivation of cocoanut trees, the people are prosperous.

Agricultural conditions—Batangas.—In the province of Batangas there has been continuous insurrection since 1896, from which agriculture has suffered much. It has now become almost completely paralyzed because the epidemic of rinderpest has destroyed fully three-fourths of the work cattle formerly used for agricultural purposes, leaving an entirely insufficient number to cultivate all the arable land. Peace and tranquillity reign supreme, however, and this is a very great advantage to these people, who have a well-deserved reputation for industry. They have gone to work with a will.

About thirteen years ago Batangas had become one of the richest provinces in the archipelago, for the coffee industry had reached a remarkably flourishing stage, and the coffeee here raised had rendered the name of the province famous; but in the years 1890 and 1891 all the coffee groves in the province were completely destroyed by insects.

The abundance of money during the prosperous times of industry had rendered the people extravagant, and with the destruction of that resource they lost heart. Pure agriculture has been in a languishing condition ever since, though it is now the only resource of the province.

Prime necessities.—In order to revive and promote this most important interest, the people need absolutely everything—modern tools and implements, American animals and machinery, and instruction in the method of using them.

With a few good Spanish jacks they could produce a very serviceable small-sized mule by crossing with their native mares. Well-bred boars are greatly needed to improve their stock of swine. In the mountains sheep would thrive and increase abundantly.

Slow animals.—Burros would be exceedingly useful to them at present, but an objection to the introduction of this cheap and useful little beast is its extraordinary slowness. This quality of domestic animals has already been a great disadvantage to the people. No man can associate in labor with a carabao or a work ox, in a tropical climate, without becoming infected with his slowness. As a consequence, farm laborers here are distressingly deliberate and inefficient. They usually accomplish about one-fourth the amount of work that the average farm laborer in the United States performs.

Agricultural experiments.—Having purchased a lot of modern American agricultural implements, and having secured a still greater number (together with the services of a superintendent) from the agricultural bureau in Manila, we are now engaged in making some agricultural experiments with a view to modernizing and improving agriculture in the province. It is our hope to demonstrate that the people here can raise forage for sale to the Government with advantage to themselves and to the latter.

In these experiments the military establishment is much interested and assists with the labor of teamsters, work stock, and transportation generally. All companies of soldiers will soon be cultivating experimental gardens.

On account of the extraordinary rise in wages of laborers and their small productive capacity landed proprietors will not be able to profit by agriculture as heretofore, unless they adopt modern methods and machinery.

Thrift.—The insecurity of life and property has been such that there has never been any encouragement for thrift. There is little inducement to accumulate when accumulation renders one more liable to imposition and loss and increases the hazard of life.

The establishment of postal savings banks and a land bank in the province would greatly encourage thrift and agriculture.

Conclusion—"Concentration."—So much misapprehension has arisen in the United States regarding the details of the miscalled "concentration" policy, as practiced in this brigade, that I had intended to set forth as comprehensively as possible all the facts bearing upon that subject. But this report has already become very extensive and the rough draft prepared with a view to giving a full exposition of the circumstances leading to and attending "concentration" is even more extensive still. I have therefore concluded it best to make a supplementary and special report on that subject alone, which will be forwarded as soon as completed.

Mindoro.—On assuming command of the brigade I found that Maj. William L. Pitcher, Eighth Infantry, had been conducting a vigorous campaign in the island of Mindoro, which appeared to be entirely satisfactory to the division and department commanders, with whom I first visited the island. Having fully as much as I could properly attend to with the campaign in Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas, I furnished him copies of telegraphic instructions issued by me, authorized him to avail himself of any authority therein contained, and instructed him to continue his work to a completion, which he did.

I never got another opportunity to visit Mindoro, and although I occasionally heard from and saw Major Pitcher, the entire credit for the complete pacification of that island is due and gladly given to him. Mindoro is difficult to communicate with, and as I knew practically nothing about his operations, except in a general way, I am not entitled to share the responsibility or credit for the results there achieved.

Tayabas.—In Tayabas the civil governor (an army officer) had persisted in representing that no insurrection existed in the province, and that there were no disturbers of public order abroad except a few ladrones, whose number was belittled. I have a tabulated statement which shows that the number of insurgents and arms captured and surrendered in the towns of that province since December 1, 1901, was as follows: Forty-four officers, 365 soldiers, 159 revolvers, and 644 guns, together with 11 brass cannon, 1 reloading and repairing outfit, about 1,000 bolos, and many cartridges, shells, etc. A great many soldiers who surrendered with guns individually are not included in the total of soldiers, because released immediately and never held as prisoners of war. Since this governor first reported the province pacified (about the month of March, 1901) a total of 1,355 guns and 209 revolvers, pertaining to that province, have been captured or surrendered.

The commanding officer of the town of Tayabas alone has succeeded in securing from the people of that town since last June 135 firearms. From this fact and others not necessary to mention, I am led to conclude that when the people of that town tired of the active insurrection the most of them simply disbanded their companies, entered the pueblo, hid their guns, and resumed a normal life without surrendering or taking the oath of allegiance. They never ceased collecting, however, and apparently to justify a continuance of this lucrative privilege the political leaders of the town left a handful of armed insurgents in the field.

The officers of my command in the province of Tayabas have worked faithfully and conscientiously under the weight of much discouragement, in the face of annoying and petty opposition from the provincial governor referred to, and are deserving of much credit for the result achieved. It was but natural that an irreconcilable difference of opinion and conviction between the governor and these officers should lead to a feeling that has been of no advantage to the situation.

During the campaign, in which Colonels Dougherty, Eighth Infantry; McCaskey, Twentieth Infantry; Wint, Sixth Cavalry; Wells, First Cavalry, and Anderson, Sixth Cavalry, took a very active and valuable part, there were a number of subordinate officers who had opportunity and rendered service of exceptional value to active operations. Among them were Major Gresham, Sixth Cavalry (during the campaign ending in Malvar's surrender); Captains Brown, Davis, and Hartman, First Cavalry; Boughton and Morgan, Third Cavalry; Rhodes, Furlong, and Ryan, Sixth Cavalry; Johnston, Fifteenth Cavalry; Whitman, Second Infantry; Davison, Fifth Infantry; Stewart, Jones, and Norman, Eighth Infantry; Hale, Morrison, Crawford, Graves, and Estes, Twentieth Infantry; Hearn, Morrow, and Hall, Twenty-first Infantry; Lieutenants Faulkner, Coast Artillery; Hickman, Moseley, and Tilford, First Cavalry; VanVoorhis, Third Cavalry; Guiney, Sixth Cavalry; Van Leer and Ely, Fifteenth Cavalry; Widdifield and Faulkner, Eighth Infantry; Grimes, Twentieth Infantry; Fassett and Connolly, Twenty-first Infantry; Reese, Boone, Frisbie, and Nickerson, native scouts.

Several other officers, among them Captains Tompkins, Eleventh Cavalry, and Bamford, Twenty-eighth Infantry, and Lieutenant Cordier, Fifth Infantry, made captures of insurgent officers and documents, which captures proved to be exceptionally advantageous in subsequent operations.

Colonels Kline, Twenty-first Infantry, and Roberts, Second Infantry, performed valuable service at their respective stations, which did not happen to be situated in the center of greatest activity.

The brigade staff officers and those attached thereto were as follows:

Brigade staff.—Adjutant-general, Capt. M. F. Davis, First Cavalry; inspector-general, Maj. F. K. Ward, First Cavalry; judge-advocate, Lieut. Chas. W. Exton, Twentieth Infantry; Capt. J. A. Cole, Sixth Cavalry; chief and depot quartermaster, Capt. Wm. E. Horton, quartermaster's department; assistant to chief quartermaster, Lieut. C. C.

Allen, Thirtieth Infantry; chief commissary, Capt. Geo. H. Morgan, Third Cavalry; Capt. J. G. Galbraith, First Cavalry; chief surgeon, Maj. Wm. Stephenson, U. S. Army; engineer officer, Lieut. Geo. B. Pillsbury, Engineer Corps; assistant engineer officer, Lieut. W. G. Caples, Engineer Corps; chief ordnance officer, Lieut. Daniel VanVoorhis, Third Cavalry; provost-marshal of brigade, supervisor provost courts, acting commissary-general of prisoners, in charge civil affairs, Capt. D. H. Boughton, Third Cavalry; assistant to provost-marshal, Capt. H. A. White, Eleventh Cavalry; intelligence officer, Lieut. Daniel VanVoorhis, Third Cavalry; Capt. H. A. White, Eleventh Cavalry; brigade provost judges, Capt. Geo. H. Morgan, Third Cavalry; Capt. D. H. Boughton, Third Cavalry; Capt. C. D. Rhodes, Sixth Cavalry; Capt. H. A. White, Eleventh Cavalry; Capt. W. T. Johnston, Fifteenth Cavalry; Capt. J. F. Morrison, Twentieth Infantry; Capt. Chas. Crawford, Twentieth Infantry; Capt. Wm. S. Graves, Twentieth Infantry; Lieut. Daniel VanVoorhis, Third Cavalry.

Personal staff.—Aids-de-camp, Capt. Geo. H. Morgan, Third Cavalry; Lieut. Daniel VanVoorhis, Third Cavalry. Both of these officers accompanied me in the field during the campaign, and did other field service in command of districts and detachments.

Though all these staff officers performed their respective duties in an able manner entirely satisfactory to me, their opportunities varied, and I deem it no invidious distinction to state my conviction that without the exceptionally valuable assistance of Captains Boughton, Davis, and Johnston I could not possibly have accomplished the pacification of this brigade in so short a space of time. These three officers have had ample experience and were masters of their special lines of work. They labored (as did others) night and day, and their zeal, industry, energy, sound judgment, ability, and initiative could not have been surpassed. It is with a feeling of profound satisfaction and appreciation that I hereby acknowledge my obligations to them and to my other staff officers.

My thanks are also due and gratefully extended for the support given my every effort by the department and division commanders. Without their support I could have accomplished nothing. Additional troops were sent me without request, and all the additional transportation that could be had was freely supplied. No subordinate ever had more generous, abler, or stronger support.

In case it be desired other data, in detail, relating to the matter covered in this report will be found in the subreports of staff officers forwarded herewith.*

At the end of the campaign I published the following order:

"To the officers and men, Third Separate Brigade:

"With profound satisfaction the brigade commander announces that, so far as is known at these headquarters, every insurgent officer and band heretofore operating in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna has been captured, killed, or forced to surrender, and it is believed from the evidence of residents of these two provinces that conditions therein have never heretofore been more peaceful than they are at the present time.

"This condition has been brought about by a campaign lasting less than four months, and such signal success as has been achieved therein is attributed by the brigade commander to the zealous, loyal, and uncomplaining support which has been given by every officer and man in this brigade to plans and instructions which were formulated for the conduct of the campaign.

"The brigade commander, being fully aware of the difficulties which have been encountered and overcome, of the tireless energy and persistence displayed by all, and the fatigue and sickness which has resulted therefrom, only needs to add that his thanks and appreciation, gratefully extended to each individual officer and man, are in due proportion to the heavy burden of responsibility which has been lifted from his shoulders through the success achieved by their untiring efforts and loyal zeal."

This order clearly sets forth the feeling still entertained concerning the work of the entire command by the undersigned.

Very respectfully,

J. F. BELL,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

*Not printed.

ROSTER OF OFFICERS, THIRD SEPARATE BRIGADE, DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES, HEADQUARTERS THIRD SEPARATE BRIGADE, BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., JUNE 30, 1902.

Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, U. S. Army, commanding.

Personal staff.—First Lieut. Daniel Van Voorhis, Third Cavalry, aid-de-camp.

Brigade staff.—Adjutant-general, Capt. Milton F. Davis, First Cavalry; acting inspector-general, Maj. F. K. Ward, First Cavalry; judge-advocate, Capt. J. A. Cole, Sixth Cavalry; chief quartermaster, Capt. W. E. Horton, quartermaster, U. S. Army; chief commissary, Capt. J. G. Galbraith, First Cavalry; chief surgeon, Maj. William Stephenson, surgeon, U. S. Army; engineer officer, First Lieut. George B. Pillsbury, Engineer Corps; ordnance officer, First Lieut. D. Van Voorhis, Third Cavalry, aid-de-camp; superintendent of brigade provost courts, in charge of civil affairs, brigade provost marshal, acting commissary general of prisoners, Capt. Daniel H. Boughton, Third Cavalry; intelligence officer, brigade provost judge, Capt. H. A. White, Eleventh Cavalry.

Attached.—Capt. W. T. Johnston, Fifteenth Cavalry, brigade provost judge; Capt. Louis F. Garrard, jr., quartermaster, U. S. Army, depot quartermaster, Lucena, Tayabas Province, P. I.; Second Lieut. C. C. Allen, Thirtieth Infantry, assistant to chief quartermaster; Second Lieut. W. G. Caples, Engineer Corps, in charge of road work; First Lieut. W. B. Cowin, Third Cavalry, commanding gunboat *Cleveland*; Second Lieut. F. B. Hennessy, Artillery Corps, awaiting orders; Second Lieut. L. D. Gasser, Twenty-first Infantry, awaiting orders.

Strength of organizations.

	Officers.	Enlisted men.
First Cavalry	30	791
Sixth Cavalry	43	1,183
Ninth Cavalry	11	237
Second Infantry	36	942
Eighth Infantry	31	1,358
Twenty-sixth Infantry	2	104
Twenty-eighth Infantry	38	861
Thirtieth Infantry	17	596
Philippine Scouts	29	1,652
Total	287	7,724

Greatest effective strength of brigade from November 1, 1901, to June 30, 1902, 200 officers, 8,553 enlisted men. Greatest strength present in Philippines during same period, 328 officers, 9,787 men. Grand total in the brigade during this period, 485 officers, 14,070 men.

Diary of principal events—battles, engagements, etc.

August 27. Captain Hale, with detachment of Twentieth Infantry, attacked intrenched insurgents at San Bartolome, 5 miles northeast of Tanauan, Batangas. Enemy driven to mountains, 15 rifles captured, and Captain Castillo killed. Insurgents numbered about 300, mostly Gonzales's men. Malvar and Noriel present. Our loss 1 man wounded. Troops of adjoining stations ordered out to prevent escape of enemy. Eleven of the enemy killed and 9 captured. Eight white and colored deserters among enemy, who fought stubbornly.

August 29. Detachments of native scouts of Company F, Eighth Infantry, surprised party of about 20 insurgents in barrio of Magdalena, Laguna, killed 2, one being Lieutenant Paylan, and captured 7 Remington rifles. Near Magdalena, same time, Lieutenant Merchant, with detachment Eighth Infantry, encountered small party of enemy, wounding 2, one of whom died.

September 10. Lieutenant Faulkner, with detachment of Eighth Infantry, encountered detachment of the enemy near Nagcarlan, Laguna, barrio Cabuyao of Lilio. Enemy loss 3 killed and 7 wounded.

September 16. Eight miles east of Lopez, Tayabas, wire cut and 200 yards removed from poles in barrio Esperanza. Repair party of 5 men attacked and driven back by 30 insurgents. Loss, some tools and equipments.

September 18. Sergeant Russell, with detachment Company C, Twenty-first Infantry, acting in conjunction with constabulary, engaged enemy at barrio Quinatihan, 6 miles southwest of Candelaria, killed 1 insurgent, wounded 2, and captured 3.

Destroyed cuartel containing 25 tons of rice and 100 uniforms. Engagement lasted twenty minutes. No casualties.

September 30. Lieutenant Doster, Twenty-first Infantry, with 24 men, surprised command of Mariano Libres at barrio San Benito, near Lipa, killed 1 lieutenant and 4 men, captured 11 rifles—2 Mausers and 9 Remingtons—and about 70 rounds of ammunition per rifle. Captured 11 and burned two cuartels with rice.

October 7. Band of about 30 insurgents entered Calauag, Tayabas, and captured entire force of municipal police, numbering 11, all armed with bolos.

October 8. Town of Lopez, Tayabas, attacked by about 20 insurgents. The band was driven toward Guinayangan and dispersed. No casualties. Lieutenant Harrison, with detachment Twenty-first Infantry and Macabebe scouts from Lipa, encountered 300 entrenched insurgents near barrio Talisao, Mount Malaray. Second Lieut. Robert R. Bean, Philippine Scouts, killed, and 1 scout mortally wounded. Reinforcements coming up, enemy was driven from trenches into mountains. Other troops sent out from Lipa. Captain Hale, with about 150 men Twentieth Infantry, joined force from Lipa, consisting of 4 officers and 224 men, and conducted operations in Lipa Mountains.

October 9. Detachment M company, Eighth Infantry, under Sergeant Dennison, from Nagcarlan, Laguna, encountered party of 25 insurgents at barrio Baun of Lilio. Exchanged shots for about twenty minutes. No casualties. Cuartels and uniforms destroyed.

October 21. Malvar reported to have ordered all insurgents in Tayabas to join him in Batangas.

October 28. Lieutenant Parker, Sixth Cavalry, captured Gabino Rosario, adjutant to Anastacio Marasigan. Lieutenant Hilson, Twenty-first Infantry, Sariaya, struck insurgents at barrio Montesillo, 12 miles southwest of Sariaya, killing 1 corporal and capturing 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 sergeant, and 2 privates.

November 6. Captain Estes, Twentieth Infantry, captured Capt. Julio Rosario and 14 men collecting supplies for insurgents. One insurgent killed and 2,000 pounds rice burned. Lieutenant Connolly, Twenty-first Infantry, destroyed 2 cuartels near Mount Macolod and had skirmish with enemy. Garrison at Abra de Ilog, Mindoro, attacked while at supper by Leycos band. One American badly wounded, 5 insurgents killed, 5 guns and belts captured. Richter, deserter from Sixth Artillery, captured by Lieutenant Noyes.

November 12. Captain Hartman, First Cavalry, Bauan, with detachment, struck a body of insurgents 2 miles from Bauan. Twenty-two insurgents killed and 70 wounded 2; Americans wounded, not seriously. Major West, Sixth Cavalry, with troops from Taal, proceeded to Durangas in search of insurgent cuartels. Failed to find any. Heard the attack on Bauan and started for the insurgents; killed 3 and wounded 2; destroyed 3 new small cuartels on main trail leading up the east end of the mountain range between Taal and Bauan; 1 Remington rifle taken from the dead and wounded insurgents.

November 20. Colonel Wint, Sixth Cavalry, commanding expedition as follows: 250 men, Twenty-first Infantry, under command of Captain Morrow, Twenty-first Infantry, left Tiaong, 7 a. m., to strike into mountains north of Candelaria; 160 men, Twentieth Infantry, and 105 men Sixth Cavalry, under command of Captain Hale, Twentieth Infantry, and Captain Cabell, Sixth Cavalry, left San Pablo to operate in immediate vicinity of barrio of San Cristobal and Dolores. Sixty men of Eighth and Twenty-first Infantry, under command of First Lieut. E. T. Collins, Eighth Infantry, and Lieutenant Bach, Twenty-first Infantry, left San Pablo, 1 a. m., to round up barrio Santo Nifo and San Cristobal, for purpose of capturing guide; First Lieutenant Heintzelman, Sixth Cavalry, accompanied Lieutenants Collins and Bach. Thirty-five men of First Cavalry and pack train of 40 mules, First Lieutenant Gleeves, First Cavalry, in charge, left Tiaong 8 a. m. for Dolores for rations for period of November 22 to 26.

November 22. Lieutenant Bump, Eighth Infantry, with 11 men of Company G, Eighth Infantry, and 10 Macabebes, struck Caballes near Luisiana; 1 Macabebe wounded in ankle; several of the enemy were seen carried away. Captain Hale, Twentieth Infantry, of Wint's Banajao column, struck small band at Tres Tarques, capturing 1 man and 17 rifles.

November 23. Lian attacked by 250 ladrones with 105 guns at 6 a. m. Band led by Ciriaco. Captain Smith, Fourth Infantry, with Lieutenant Van Schaick and Dr. Mead, went from Nasugbu, and struck band 5 miles east of there. Killed 7, captured 2, and 3 rifles; recaptured much property taken from Lian. Lieutenant Van Schaick badly wounded, 1 enlisted man slightly wounded.

November 24. One squad Company B, Fourth Infantry, and native police of Indang encountered party of ladrones south of Indang; killed 6 and captured 5; also captured 1 Remington rifle and several bolos. Among killed was Juan Cabrera, ladrones' captain, of Maragondon; 1 native policeman slightly wounded.

November 26. Escort of 10 mounted men with 1 wagon, going from Majayjay to Magdalena, were attacked by large number of insurgents. Sergeant Peterson and Private Britton, Company I, of the Eighth Infantry, badly wounded; Privates Dunn and Freuing, Company I, Eighth Infantry, were captured by the insurgents, also 2 horses and equipments, 3 revolvers, 3 rifles, and 300 rounds of ammunition. Three mules of train badly wounded. Lieutenant Merchant and 32 men from Magdalena went in pursuit of the insurgents.

November 27. Lieutenant Greer, Fourth Infantry, with mounted detachment, found small body of ladrones in Amadeo; 1 ladrone killed, and 1 lieutenant and 3 men (ladrones) captured.

November 29. Detachment Fourth Infantry, with native police under scout interpreter, had an encounter with armed ladrones in vicinity of Cailliting, killing 3 and wounding several ladrones. Captured 1 rifle and 50 rounds ammunition from ladrones.

November 30. Gen. S. S. Sumner relinquished command of the Third Brigade and Gen. J. F. Bell assumed command.

December 3. Lieutenant Collins, Eighth Infantry, struck band of insurgents at Mount Calatajan, Lipa; captured 4 Mauser rifles, 1 Remington rifle, and 2 insurgents; destroyed 14 cuartels and some rice.

December 4. Mounted detachment, Fourth Infantry, and local police from Indang, under Scout Frank Barendt, struck band of ladrones near that place, killing 2, wounding several, and capturing 2 revolvers.

December 7. Tanauan attacked by insurgents at 5.30 a. m. One American wounded. Casualties to enemy not known. Lipa attacked; enemy driven from position. No casualties of Americans. Enemy lose 8. Insurgents numbering 400 men attacked Nagcarlan; 2 insurgents killed and 11 wounded. Loboo attacked; 1 American, 1 negro, 1 Filipino, killed on insurgent side, and 8 wounded. Casualties on American side, 1 sergeant and 1 private killed, and 1 native scout wounded.

December 9. Two engagements with insurgents in vicinity of fork of road to Tiaong Dolores. Private Charles A. Warnstaff, Company I, Twenty-first Infantry, wounded seriously through the body. Enemy some loss, not known. Insurgents came from direction barrio Santa Ana, and were in ambush for wagons going to Tiaong. Captain Morrow, with 150 men of Twenty-first Infantry, was in advance of wagons, and Lieutenant Hasson, Sixth Cavalry, with detachment Sixth Cavalry and 50 Ilocano Scouts at cut trail, Ambulan, fired on; no casualties. Cortez located between Santa Ana and Pila. Captain Miller, Eighth Infantry, struck him at close range and pursued him for about one hour toward Magdalena. Five insurgents known to be wounded. Their casualties not known. Three men of Company I, Eighth Infantry, wounded. Loboo attacked; 1 Macabebe killed.

December 10. Lieutenant Graham, First Cavalry, Troop A, in search of Capt. Alego Eleyes, found him in barrio Gagloc of Majayjay; wounded Alego and captured uniforms and important papers, and destroyed small quantity of rice and matches. Candelaria attacked at 7.30 a. m. Insurgents were repulsed. Two guns captured from insurgents. Sergeant Smith, Company C, Twenty-first Infantry, highly commended for gallant work.

December 11. Lieutenant Read, Sixth Cavalry, struck insurgents about 4 miles north of Calaca; had running fight for about 2 miles. No casualties. Lieutenant Hennessy, with 48 Ilocanos, Seventeenth Company Native Scouts, scouted northeast of Lipa; captured insurgent captain and 2 Mausers, 1 Remington, valuable papers, and 7 war bolos. Detachment Twenty-first Infantry, scouting near Calamba, struck insurgent outpost; wounded 1, captured 2 with 2 Mausers with 108 rounds ammunition. No casualties on American side. S. S. *Purísima Concepcion*, belonging to the Lopez family at Balayan, seized at Boac, and appropriated to use of United States in Third Brigade.

December 12. Lieutenant Fassett, scouting near Taysan, struck band of insurgents; had running fight for several hours. Corporal Beach, Company G, Twenty-first Infantry, killed; 1 scout, Fourth Company Macabebes, slightly wounded in foot. Lieutenant Hennessy, with 1 American scout and 6 men Seventeenth Company Native Scouts, surprised and captured, well up on the south end of Lipa Mountains, this morning at daybreak the force of Mariano Llapres, consisting of 42 men and 21 rifles, Mausers and Remingtons, with 40 rounds ammunition per gun; not a shot fired. Destroyed cuartel and burned immense supply of rice.

December 15. Lieutenant Hennessy, with detachment Seventeenth Company Ilocanos, surprised and captured at daybreak in barrio San Benito, Lipa, Lieut. Col. Eduardo Mayo and a mass of valuable correspondence. Capt. G. H. B. Smith, Fourth and Twenty-eighth Infantry, struck body of insurgents near Looc, killing 3; no casualties.

December 16. Lieutenant Moseley, First Cavalry, scouting southeast of Batangas with 30 men of Troop I, First Cavalry, struck a force of about 25 insurgents, including 30 riflemen, at barrio San Isidro, 4 miles from Batangas. After sharp skirmish the enemy fled, leaving 7 dead. They were seen to carry several dead or wounded. No casualties to detachment. First Lieutenant Fassett, with 30 men Company G, Twenty-first Infantry, struck about 75 bolomen and 15 riflemen at barrio Colod during the afternoon. The enemy soon fled, leaving 3 dead. Private Jos. Serva, Company G, received two severe bolo cuts on left arm, and one slight cut on head. Lieutenant Reese, Philippine Scouts, with 25 men Fourth Company Macabebes, started toward Loboo; had running fights with small bands; several were seen to fall, but were carried away. Burned 2 cuartels with gun racks for 20 rifles. Lieutenant Tilford, scouting east of Batangas during afternoon, struck small band of insurgents; killed 2 and no casualties to Americans.

December 17. Lieutenant Faulkner, Third Infantry, with Macabebe Scouts, struck about 20 insurgents near Sampa, barrio San Luis. Captured 1 Remington rifle; no casualties. Lieutenant Van Voorhis, Third Cavalry, 50 scouts, Second Company Macabebes, under Lieutenant Faulkner, Third Infantry, and 10 men of Twenty-first Infantry, returned from five days' scout in mountains east of Batangas. Enemy fired few shots at long range.

December 19. Lieutenant Tilford, First Cavalry, with 25 men Troop D, First Cavalry, found and surrounded an insurgent stronghold near the top of Loboo Mountains, 10 miles southeast of Batangas. Attacked at daybreak, killing 19 and capturing 2; also captured 16 rifles, 20 bolos, and 500 rounds ammunition, 2 haversacks, 1 Krag rifle, 1 belt, and 100 rounds of ammunition, and canteen and cup recently captured at Loboo. Colonel Wint reports escort of Sixth Cavalry and several Native Scouts of Sixteenth Company, with 2 wagons, going to Tiaong, attacked by 50 insurgents in barrio San Antonio, Sergeant Brown, Troop L, Sixth Cavalry, in command. Halted his wagons and drove insurgents from their position and proceeded to Tiaong. One scout slightly wounded; enemy casualties unknown. Reliable information that Lieutenant Collins's column killed 4 soldiers and wounded 1 lieutenant of Ramos's command in fight near Calatjan in the early part of the month. Captured their lieutenant.

December 20. Captain Parke, Twenty-first Infantry, destroyed tons of rice and 4 or 5 cuartels. The cuartels were used as quarters and storehouses by the 200 men reported there. He took 25 men of the Eighth and Twenty-first Infantry and followed the trail of one company of 70 men with 40 guns far up into the mountains and surprised them while getting ready to eat. Killed 2, one an officer, wounding 3 and capturing 2; also 12 uniforms of officers. Company rolls and records were captured. Captain Hartman, First Cavalry, from Bauan, located and destroyed 6 deserted cuartels near the south end of the peninsula opposite Point Pagalit. Two gun pits had been constructed commanding trails.

December 21. First Lieut. R. E. Brooks, Philippine Scouts, with 30 men Seventh Company Macabebes, and Company K, Twentieth Infantry, struck insurgents under Captain Barcelino 10 miles east of Tasyan. Killed 6 (1 officer), captured 1 insurgent, 1 Remington rifle, 50 rounds ammunition, and 17 bolos. Destroyed barracks and 3 tons of palay. No casualties on American side.

December 22. Capt. W. S. Graves, scouting with 2 companies of the Twentieth Infantry, from Ambulan and Tanauan, found enemy in large trench of recent construction on side of mountain; captured by Captains Graves and Estes and their commands. Only approach, narrow trail, intended as trap; information sent Captain Graves by insurgents, hoping he would start with small force. Had no difficulty in finding guides, an unusual occurrence. Attack had to be made in column of files; gallantly done. Private Cooper, Company A, Twentieth Infantry, first man in trench, seized an insurgent, threw him down and commenced firing on others. Captain Graves, with a few men, quickly followed by Captain Estes, reached trench. Insurgents retreated, leaving 7 killed within 50 yards. First volley fired within 200 yards. Ascent of mountain difficult and exhausting. Captain Estes's command had been on march since midnight. Captain Graves had been informed that much larger force is well entrenched about midway between Talisay and Taal, but he did not feel warranted in going farther without information, and having no confidence in Macabebes, and his wounded needing attention, returned to Ambulan. Captain Estes ordered to move to Suplan in support of Captain Krug's column, en route to Gonzales's supposed position. Private Cooper promoted to sergeant for exceptional bravery, and Captain Graves and Estes commended.

December 23. Company F, Twenty-first Infantry, had desperate hand to hand fight with bolomen in a deep gorge near Sorosoro, 8 miles south of San Jose, about 6 a. m. Twenty-two of the enemy killed, insurgent barracks destroyed, 7 heads

of cattle and several bolos captured. Casualties on American side: Lieutenant Conolly, ugly bolo cut on left cheek; Private Carney, 6 bolo cuts on neck and shoulders.

December 25. Lieutenant Hasson, Sixth Cavalry, with force of cavalry and scouts, located and destroyed 13 houses and cuartels of Luis Banaad; killed 4 bolomen who were in charge; captured papers implicating padre at San Pablo.

December 27. First Sergeant Courtney, with detachment Company M, Eighth Infantry, and 10 native police, struck force of enemy of 40 men near Lake Yambo. Engagement lasted twenty minutes, when enemy retreated in direction of San Pablo. No casualties on American side. Enemy's loss unknown. Destroyed 3 cuartels, a quantity of rice, blankets, and working utensils.

December 30. Companies L and M, Fifth Infantry, returned from expedition. Saw small bands of insurgents, but latter made no stand. Many cuartels destroyed during expedition. Lieutenant Widdisfield, Eighth Infantry, with Civilian Scout Drake and 30 native scouts of Tenth Company Macabebes, struck about 20 insurgents on Lake Taal, north of Mount Macolod, killing and wounding 5; captured 3 and a few bolos.

January 1. Colonel Dougherty, Eighth Infantry, with force of 5 officers and 200 men, destroyed all insurgent barrios and cuartels heretofore used for operations against Magdalena, Pila, Nagcarlan, Majayjay, and wagon trains. First Lieutenant Roach and 40 men struck enemy at daybreak. Enemy fled without firing a shot. Lieutenant Hickman, with Troop L, First Cavalry, made attack on barrio Mianet, of Luchan. F. W. Schwartz, saddler, and Trumpeter J. F. Pallasch were seriously wounded. Enemy scattered; loss unknown. Captain Boughton, Lieutenant Exton, Mr. Morris, of the Manila American, and Crispulo Patajo unexpectedly encountered about 20 insurgents in the mountains of Taysan. Charged at once with revolvers and defeated them, capturing 3 ponies and equipments. Lieutenant Fassett, with Company G, Twenty-first Infantry, landing near Loboo, had engagement with enemy. Privates Brown and Elmer Scott were slightly wounded. Enemy's loss unknown.

January 3. Corporal Shelly, Company H, Twenty-first Infantry, arrived at Lipa with 3 men of his company. Reports that on 2d instant Private James McGowan, of his company, was wounded through the thigh by a spear shot from a trap, and that he died in fifteen minutes from poison, but it was probably from a severed artery. Body sent to Taysan and buried there. Night of 2d, corporal and party leaving body were fired on by 20 or 30, but pushed on and left at least 1 dead insurgent pierced by two bullets. McGowan killed near Mount Niaga.

January 4. Scout Barendt and detachment returned from Magallanes; brought in Presidente, Juan Belle, and Francisco Espanilla. Information given by the presidente and guided by him, Barendt struck Guaquin's band of ladrones at daybreak; killed 1 and captured 5, with 1 rifle, 1 shotgun, and 2 war bolos, and burned barrio of Inal, Guaquin's headquarters. Captain Rhodes, Sixth Cavalry, and 2 enlisted men, Sixth Cavalry, struck 15 armed insurgents near San Nicolas, Cavite; captured 1 Remington, 1 Colt's revolver, and 100 rounds ammunition. No casualties. Lieutenant Nettles, with 30 men of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Infantry, struck Lott's cuartel, near Balite, at daybreak; killed 7 bolomen, burned cuartels and storehouses containing about 300 bushels of rice.

January 7. Major Villanueva, commanding flying column of Bauan; First Lieut. Honorato Oncaya, commanding company; 2 sergeants, 1 corporal, and 6 privates, with 1 Colt's revolver, No. 62276; 1 Krag carbine, United States model, with number eradicated; 3 Mausers, 4 Remingtons, and 1 Murata, all serviceable; 7 bolos and daggers, 471 rounds ammunition, and 1 serviceable revolver, all pertaining to above command, surrendered at Mount Maquilang. Surprised cuartel of 5 insurgents, wounding 1, destroying several small cuartels.

Loboo expedition.—A command, consisting of 3 companies Fifth Infantry, Captain Davison commanding, Troop M, Sixth Cavalry; Troop C and detachment of Troop D, First Cavalry; Companies E and L, Twenty-first Infantry; Fourteenth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, and Twenty-first Companies, Native Scouts, all under command of Colonel Wint, Sixth Cavalry, started in line of small columns of about 50 men per column, on the morning of January 1, from Taysan and San Juan de Bocboc road, south through the region between the road and the sea. The columns operated within supporting distance of each other and searched the country thoroughly. The country was full of insurgents, and the mountain region was a vast storehouse, containing accumulated supplies of palay, cattle, hogs, carabao, chickens, and corn sufficient, according to Colonel Wint's estimate, to last 20,000 men for six months. The Twenty-first Company Ilocanos, under Lieutenant Neff, had a sharp engagement with the enemy during the forenoon of January 3, but the latter fled from the trenches upon being flanked by Captain Cabell, with 40 men of the Sixth Cavalry, and Lieutenant King, with Sixteenth Company Ilocanos. Other troops had unimportant skirmishes, encountering many separate bodies of insurgents, most of which

made no stand. Impossible to ascertain enemy's casualties. None on American side. Colonel Wint had under his command 24 officers and 800 men. The line from Tayeao to Batangas was under Colonel Wells, First Cavalry, whose command consisted of Troop I, First Cavalry; Companies E, F, and G, Twenty-eighth Infantry, under Captain Bamford; Companies I and K, Twentieth Infantry, 3 companies Twenty-first Infantry, under Lieutenants Harrison, Minus, and Connolly, and the Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and Seventeenth Companies Native Scouts, in all about 1,000 men. They swept the whole western half of the Loboo Peninsula, and several engagements were had by Lieutenants Harrison, Minus, Price, Hennessy, Mullins, and Guthrie. They found and destroyed a number of cuartels, one immense intrenched position containing about 30 small barracks, fitted up with armracks and bunks and containing many tons of palay, horses, cattle, hogs, and 500 uniforms. Colonel Wells's column destroyed over 500 tons of insurgent palay, 3,000 bushels of corn, killed 9 insurgents, captured 8, with 2 rifles, 800 rounds ammunition, 650 uniforms, and much other insurgent property. Colonel Wint's command found and destroyed about 900 tons of palay cached in the heart of the Loboo Mountains.

January 8. Fifty bolomen surrendered at Bauan with their bolos and 1 serviceable Mauser. Lieutenant Bishop, Second Infantry, in small boat, with 10 or 12 men, landed at Mathog Island and ran into a party of 5 or 6 insurgent officers. Captured 1 and wounded 1. Captured commissions and correspondence, which indicates that rifles are hidden either in Mathog or Marinduque.

January 14. Force of Colonel Marasigan, consisting of 3 companies battalion of Garcia, 2 companies battalion of Payapa, 1 company battalion of Luyong, composed as follows: One colonel, 3 lieutenant-colonels, 1 major, 5 captains, 12 lieutenants, and 215 enlisted men, with 218 rifles, 10 revolvers, and about 5,000 rounds of ammunition, surrendered at Taal.

January 15. Capt. R. S. Offley and Lieut. J. G. Taylor, Thirtieth Infantry, with detachment of Company H, Thirtieth Infantry, encountered Corquera's band of ladrones in the hills back of Naujan. Ten ladrones killed and a rifle and ammunition secured from each. The ground was covered with trails of blood, indicating that many were wounded. Also captured carbine of Corquera. Ladrones badly demoralized.

January 16. Captain Davison and his command had a fight in the mountains with insurgents; killed 5 or 6, burned 2 large cuartels about 2 miles apart, with accommodations for about 150 men. Captain Barnhardt, Fifteenth Cavalry, and 300 men, Fifteenth Cavalry, operating in three columns on Mount Maquiling and surrounding knolls, found many shacks used as outposts and containing small quantities of rice. Many spring bamboo traps were found in the trails and destroyed. One column of 100 men under Captain Kirkpatrick and one under Captain Barnhardt, about a mile apart, struck the insurgents in trenches on the Laguna de Bay side of the mountain and drove them out. Enemy fell back and were struck by column under Captain Barnhardt at the base and were engaged at close range. Enemy escaped south and west, going toward San Pablo, being pursued by Captain Kirkpatrick as far as trails could be traced. Trenches new and well built, with camp just behind containing supplies. Enemy numbered about 60 guns. Private James Morgan, Troop L, killed, and Lieut. E. J. Ely, shot through left elbow, not serious. Enemy's casualties unknown.

January 25. Captain Norman, Eighth Infantry, with 3 officers and 80 men of Companies F, I, and M, Eighth Infantry, crossed Mount Banajao, and on Tayabas slope found and destroyed Caballes's central cuartel, with 10 tons of rice, \$3,000 worth of clothing, etc., 5 sewing machines, and a large quantity of salt. Captured 13 rifles, 1 pistol, and a large quantity of ammunition, which had to be destroyed on account of difficulty of carrying it. Also captured Caballes's papers.

January 26. Nagcarlan and Lilio attacked simultaneously at 9.30 p. m., and town fired at both places. At Lilio fire was quickly extinguished and enemy driven off. At Nagcarlan a strong wind quickly spread the fire, and north and west parts of town completely destroyed. About 5,000 people lost houses, property, and provisions. Now live in the church. Ten natives found firing the buildings were killed, and many reported killed in the engagement. No casualties among troops on American side. Lieutenant McLaughlin, Twenty-first Infantry, with detachment of 25 men of Company K, Twenty-first Infantry, left Calamba at 1 a. m. to scout foothills of Mount Maquiling. Six miles from there found outpost of 3 men. Killed 3 and captured 1 Mauser rifle, 1 Remington, and 1 Mauser carbine, with 30 rounds Remington ammunition.

February 3. Major Day struck camp of Luis Banaad. Had slight engagement with personal guard of Banaad; killed 1 insurgent and wounded 2. No casualties on American side. Lieutenant Leavitt, Twenty-eighth Infantry, with escort of 6 men of the Twenty-eighth Infantry, attacked between Indang and Maragondon by outpost of ladrones. Killed 2, wounded 3, and captured 6 and several guns.

February 5. Detachment from Pila had skirmish near barrio Laugan. Killed Lieut. Ciriaco Ortega. Several others known to be killed, but bodies not found. No casualties among troops. Lieutenant West and detachment attacked at Belete, Cantang, Cavayan, near Spanish fort, by bolomen. Four insurgents killed, 1 wounded, and 9 captured. No casualties on American side.

February 6. Comandante Antonio Mandigma surrendered at Lipa with 5 captains, 7 lieutenants, and 67 enlisted men, with 34 guns, 3 revolvers, and a lot of bolos. Column from Lipa found Burgos near Belete, but he escaped after a short fight. Five dead insurgents found on the field. Detachment of Companies F and M, Eighth Infantry, under Lieutenants Jones and Hunt, struck force of Col. Tomas Virey on east side of Mount Nagcarlan at 8.30 a. m. Killed 7 and mortally wounded 3 insurgents and captured 3 officers. Destroyed cuartels, uniforms, and 11,000 rounds of ammunition. Also captured Virey's family and papers.

February 9. Scouting party Fifteenth Cavalry, under Lieutenant Dean, struck outpost of 6 men in Lipa Mountains; killed 2, captured 4, 1 serviceable revolver and papers.

February 11. Lieutenant Nickerson, with First Company Macabebes, scouting headwaters of the Tanauan River, saw insurgents and exchanged shots without results. Followed them into Lipa Mountains and caught them on steep ground, where they made a stand. Killed 5 insurgents; 1 Macabee wounded slightly in right thigh.

February 14. Detachment from Talisay struck small band of insurgents near summit of Mount Gonzales at daybreak. Killed 1, captured 3, 1 revolver and 10 rounds of ammunition, 4 war bolos, 4 ponies and equipments, and 2 head of cattle.

February 18. Maj. Jacinto Amoranto, 2 captains, 5 lieutenants, and 98 enlisted men, with 5 serviceable revolvers, 63 serviceable and 3 unserviceable rifles, and 1,220 rounds of ammunition surrendered.

February 26. Battalion Sergeant-Major Lynch, Twenty-eighth Infantry, and detachment of 25 men struck insurgents at Looc, Batangas, under command of Julian Ramos, killing 2.

March 1. Lieutenant Guiney, Sixth Cavalry, struck cuartel of Blas Ygamen. About 60 insurgent guns engaged. Five insurgents killed and 1 Mauser captured. Lieutenant Guiney slightly wounded.

March 8. Civilian Scout Haywood, with 15 Macabebes of the Second Company, encountered a party of about 40 armed ladrones with rifles, near the barrio of Pinaghabahen, west of Naujan. Had a sharp fight lasting fifteen minutes; the enemy routed, leaving 7 dead on the field. They captured 1 Mauser and 150 rounds ammunition. One Macabee killed and 1 wounded. The ladrones captured the rifle of the Macabee killed, but did not get his ammunition.

March 9. Detachment of Company H, Thirtieth Infantry, struck cuartel of insurgents near Naujan; captured 6 rifles and considerable ammunition.

March 10. Captain Cabell, Sixth Cavalry, struck cuartel of Nicolas Dones, of Sebastian's command; killed 1 and captured 1 insurgent and 1 rifle.

March 14. Lieutenant Macnab, with 8 Macabebes, ambushed Carlos Caballes and 5 soldiers in barrio San Roque; killed 3 and wounded 3. Detachment from Talisay surprised small party short distance from Mount Gonzales; killed 3, captured 1, 4 war bolos, 1 short gun, 1 Mauser rifle, and 2 ponies carrying fresh meat and salt.

March 16. Lieutenant Doster, Twenty-first Infantry, with 40 men from Lipa, struck small party of insurgents in south end of Lipa Mountains, killing 5, wounding 1, and capturing 3 insurgents and 4 shotguns and 1 revolver. Lieutenant Gleaves, First Cavalry, and Lieutenant Cordier, Fifth Infantry, with detachment of 40 men, Troop B, First Cavalry, and Company I, Fifth Infantry, struck about 20 insurgents at Sainsang, Bataan, Mount Maquiling, at daylight, killing 4 and wounding 2 insurgents, and capturing 2; 4 rifles, 2 revolvers, and 125 rounds of ammunition were also captured.

March 18. Detachment Sixth Cavalry found an outpost and camp of insurgents near Santa Cruz. Captured camp and destroyed property. No casualties on American side. Enemy's loss unknown.

March 20. Detachment under Lieutenants Gleaves and Cordier struck insurgents on top of Mount Maquiling; killed 4 and wounded 1; captured 3 rifles and 4 bolos and 40 rounds of ammunition; destroyed 3 small cuartels and small amount of fresh beef and rice.

March 22. Captain Tompkins and detachment struck small outpost of San Pablo column, west of Tiaong, on San Pablo road, killing 4 bolomen and destroying large cuartel.

March 23. General Noriel and staff captured by Captain Bamford, Twenty-eighth Infantry, near Laiya, Batangas.

March 29. Three detachments of 8 men each of the Eleventh Company Macabebe Scouts encountered Captain Ramos's band of ladrones in the mountains of Calachaca; killed 1, captured 4, 3 shotguns, 4 khaki uniforms, 7 insurgent uniforms, and 3 cavans of palay, about 40 cavans in each, 6 women, wives of the ladrones. No casualties.

April 4. Capt. Faustino Villanueva, with 2 soldiers, 1 revolver and 2 bolos surrendered at Nagcarlan. Belonged to Malvar's command.

Lieutenants Gleaves and Cordier, with about 25 men each, left Santo Tomas to scout Mount Maquiling. Lieutenant Gleaves was to keep in the foothills and Lieutenant Cordier was to go to the top of Mount Maquiling, taking with him a guide and soldier who had reported the presence of Santo Tomas troops in that vicinity. On the evening of the 5th Lieutenant Cordier's detachment captured Col. Delmacio Hernandez and his adjutant, First Lieut. Juan Neer, near the site of Lapad, about the top of Mount Maquiling.

April 8. Lieutenant Cordier surprised the camp of Capt. Maximo Reno Laurel, Santo Tomas column, on the slope of Mount Bulalo, Mount Maquiling, killing Captain Laurel and 1 first lieutenant, unknown, and 4 soldiers, wounding 3; capturing 1 revolver and 25 rounds of ammunition.

April 9. Civil Scout McCoy, in charge of party of scouts, surprised 5 uniformed insurgents, killing 4 of them.

April 10. Comandante Emeterio Bunal, Capts. Fausto Villanueva, Martin Alvero, Pedro Alimango, Mamerto Guerra, Florencio Quijano, Lieuts. Cayetano Alinos, Bernardo Alimango, Francisco Colaya, and 24 soldiers with 16 rifles and 6 revolvers, surrendered at San Pablo, Laguna.

April 12. Colonel Caneo, with Lieut. Col. Jacinto Malixi, Lieut. Col. Marcial Alimario, Comandante Nicolas Donas, 6 staff officers, 2 captains, 5 lieutenants, and 139 soldiers, with 4 revolvers, 23 Remingtons, 8 Mausers, 3 Ambergs, 3 Krag, and 1 shotgun, surrendered at San Pablo, Laguna. Four hundred members of the Colorm sect came in at the same time.

April 13. Comandante Philapil, Capt. Cipriano Fazrosa, Junez Instructor, Capt. Pedro Hernandez, Second Lieut. Marciano Manto, Second Lieut. Gristin de Nosta, Partoleno Alayba, Candido Gavarra, with 23 soldiers of the Santo Tomas column, surrendered at Santo Tomas, bringing in 8 Remingtons and 5 Ambergs.

April 14. Civil scouts McCoy and Ralfton, with 7 scouts Thirtieth Company, and 15 men Company I, Fifth Infantry, and 21 Lipa volunteers, drove 60 insurgents, supposed to be Gonzales's soldiers, out of cuartel and they escaped to Talisay; captured over 1,000 cavans of rice, 6 sewing machines, 300 yards of insurgent uniform cloth, cigarette paper and tobacco, and burned 5 cuartels or shacks.

April 16. General Malvar surrendered to General Bell at Lipa.

April 17. Private Lease found 2 ladrones at Nasugbu, who fired at him. He returned their fire and killed 1 of them; brought in 14 rounds of ammunition.

April 19. General Gonzales surrendered at Tanauan with 24 officers, 120 men, and 110 guns.

April 20. Lieut. Col. Noberto Mayo, with 2 lieutenants and 33 soldiers, surrendered at Lipa, with 30 guns, 2 bolos, and 1,000 rounds of ammunition.

April 21. Colonel Hernandez (captured April 5) surrendered the Santo Thomas column, 29 officers and 144 soldiers, at Santo Thomas, to Capt. W. T. Johnston, Fifteenth Cavalry, brigade provost judge.

April 24. Surrendered at San Pablo: Capt. Celestino Gapayangao, with First Lieut. Narcoso Osorio, Second Lieuts. Sergio Aberton, Abdon Pasco, Pascual Urjina, Victorino Batulan, Teodoro Layog, and 23 soldiers, with 3 Remingtons, 1 Amberg, 1 Mauser; brought about by General Cailles. Surrendered at Lipa: Salustiano Brigat, Capt. Gregorio Luz, with 3 Remingtons, 1 revolver, 130 rounds of ammunition, belonging to Nordero Mayo's command. Also surrendered, Francisco Hernandez, first lieutenant, and Pedro Malabanan, second lieutenant, with 7 rifles, 1 bolo, 1 pistol, and 231 rounds of ammunition; belonged to company of Captain Brogas.

April 25. Col. Luis Banaad, Capt. Santiago Buni, with 4 of the escort of Banaad and family, surrendered at Lipa, bringing in 5 guns.

April 27. Col. Rosendo Banaad, Lieut. Col. Serapio Banaad, Capt. and Adj. Andres Alcos, Capts. Teodoro Cavino, Leoncio Aranoz, Raymundo Campos; First Lieuts. Segundo Brento, Francisco Alitagtag; Second Lieuts. Segundo Banayo and Jose Alimango, with 15 soldiers, 7 Remingtons, 1 Krag (No. 216793), 1 Mauser, 1 shotgun, 2 revolvers, and 174 rounds of ammunition, surrendered at San Pablo.

April 27. Lieut. Col. Maximo Limos with Capt. Maximiano Masaes, Lieut. Ramos Dison, 6 soldiers, 1 Remington carbine, 2 shotguns, 1 revolver, 2 bolos, and 12 rounds of ammunition, surrendered at San Pablo. First Lieutenants Valerio and Gamdo of the first and second companies of Taysan, surrendered at Taysan with 4 second lieutenants.

tenants and 25 soldiers, 1 Mauser, 5 Ambergs, and 15 Remingtons, 2 revolvers, 500 rounds of ammunition, and 8 bolos.

April 30. Briccio Casala, Evarristo Junio, Yrineo Bibal, and Faustino Magohos, Agatito Endaya, Simeon Estayala, and 33 soldiers with 31 guns, 1 revolver, and 3 bolos, surrendered at San Juan de Bocboc.

List of arms captured and surrendered.

CAPTURED.

Date.	Rifles and carbines.	Revolvers.	Shotguns.	Cannons.
1901.				
September	33	2		
October	47			
November	28	8		
December	185	8		
1902.				
January	178	49	116	
February	96	47	69	
March	201	29	41	
April	13	10	1	6
May	6			
June	1	1		
Total	737	144	227	6

SURRENDERED.

Date.	Rifles and carbines.	Revolvers.	Shotguns.	Cannons.
1901.				
September	26	8		
October	10			
November	7	6		
December	43	10		
1902.				
January	425	54	37	8
February	588	120	75	2
March	566	226	113	
April	507	98	46	3
May	34	12	19	
June	7	1		
Total	2,307	585	290	8

TOTAL ARMS CAPTURED AND SURRENDERED.

Rifles and carbines	3,044
Revolvers	679
Shotguns	517
Cannons	14

Number of insurgents and Americans killed and wounded.

Date.	Americans.		Insurgents.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
1901.				
September	2	3	8	5
October	1		3	10
November		4	5	90
December	2	3	63	35
1902.				
January	3	7	36	59
February		3	51	15
March	1	8	34	15
April		1	26	15
Total	9	29	226	244

Number of insurgent officers and men captured and surrendered.

Date.	Captured.		Surrendered.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
1901.				
July.....		13	54	553
August.....	9	48	27	91
September.....	7	40	3	6
October.....	6	27		
November.....	5	27		
December.....	5	96	6	41
1902.				
January.....	40	456	50	511
February.....	15	99	94	522
March.....	11	179	100	721
April.....	12	6	155	740
May.....	1		8	26
June.....	2		4	4
Total.....	113	989	499	3,214

Two civil officers and 400 of Colorum sect surrendered at San Pablo, Laguna, P. I. Not included.
Total captured and surrendered, 612 officers and 4,235 men.

TIAONG, PROVINCE OF TAYABAS, P. I., *March 10, 1902.*

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL THIRD SEPARATE BRIGADE,

DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES,

Batangas, P. I.

SIR: In accordance with verbal instructions from the brigade commander to proceed to the pueblo of Tiaong, province of Tayabas, and make a thorough investigation of the relations of the pueblo with the insurrecto forces, I have the honor to make the following report:

I arrived at Tiaong on February 19 and obtained a list of all the officials of the pueblo as then organized and of those who had been officials since the year 1900; also a list of the principales of the pueblo, and the cabezas of the barrios, with their assistants. As soon as this list was made, I directed that all be detained in the guardhouse pending my investigation. The presidente and several of the more important town officials were separately confined to prevent their talking with each other.

I then, in turn, called as many as I could get of the common "gente" of the barrio to my office and examined a great many of them separately and carefully. I did this with all the barrios in turn. By the time I had proceeded thus far with the investigation I was in possession of the names of the various insurgent collectors in the different barrios, and had also obtained much information showing that all of the officials and principales of the town were thoroughly compromised and had always been actively aiding the insurgent cause.

A number of these people were called up, in turn, and closely examined. I then knew, in a general way, the separate acts of the different principales of the pueblo, but had not yet gotten a complete story from any one of them.

The presidente, Pedro Cantos, was next called, and after a little sparring to see how much I knew, and becoming convinced from what I told him that there was very little left to hide, sat down in my office and made a more or less complete confession, under oath, of what had gone on in the town during the preceding year.

The secretary and treasurer of the town were then questioned in like manner, with the result that each in turn wrote his own confession and account of what had taken place in the town, within his knowledge, during the preceding year.

Leaving out names and dates, which can be found in the papers submitted with this report, the following is in brief what occurred in the pueblo:

In the month of May, 1901, a junta was held in one of the barrios of the town, the greater number of the principales of the town and the insurrecto chiefs of the vicinity being present. They decided to send a delegation to Colonel Gardener, who was expected soon at the neighboring village of Candelaria to organize that town, by putting in officers whom the people had previously selected in a junta which took place (in a barrio of Candelaria) between the insurrectos and the principales of that town. The native padre and five of the principales of Tiaong were selected to pre-

sent their petition to Governor Gardener at Candelaria. This was done, and they were instructed to return to Tiaong and prepare for the elections.

This committee reported back and another junta was held in a barrio of the pueblo of Tiaong (the same people in general participating), the object being to select the officers for the pueblo of Tiaong. The first man selected, Candido Umali (who had always been a collector for them), declined, saying that he did not have sufficient intelligence to serve them in that capacity and that he could do much more good in his old line, collecting. The second man selected was his son, who at the time was employed in the Tabaralera Company, in Lucena, and not wishing to give up his position there, also declined. After this Pedro Cantos was selected. The instructions were given to the cabezas of barrios and voters of the pueblo, and the slate as fixed up was elected and in due time took the oath of office and the several officials were installed in their respective places.

For the appointive officers of the pueblo such men were selected as had the complete confidence and approbation of the insurgent leaders. To the insurgent colonel, Masangcay, was allotted the organization of the police force; the man Alejo Lirag, selected as vice-presidente, was appointed fiscal of the church, collector for the town, and contractor for the necessary supplies for the American troops, one-half profits going out to insurgents.

After a knowledge of how this town was organized, no one need be surprised at what took place afterwards. These facts are substantiated in hundreds of sworn confessions and statements of the people who participated, principales of the pueblo, and insurgent officers who afterwards came in.

The principal and most important duty of the police force was to keep the insurgent forces properly informed as to the movements of the garrison of American troops. They themselves say that this was one of their duties, and give various times when they carried information to the insurgent forces of the movements of troops. The presidente and chief of police also give testimony to the same effect. In case they did not know the exact place to find the insurgents who were threatened, their instructions were to notify the cabezas of barrios in the general vicinity, it being then the duty of these cabezas to see that they were properly notified.

About the month of October, 1901, at the suggestion of the commanding officers, the council passed an act requiring all cabezas of barrios to immediately give notice to the commanding officer if they should happen to have news of any insurgent forces. The chief of police was sent out to notify them of their new duties, and the presidente says, and the chief of police also says, that what he did do was to visit all the insurrecto forces in the different barrios and incidentally carry out some contributions to them.

The police assisted in collecting from the tiendas of the town, also furnished valuable misinformation of the insurgent forces to the commanding officer, and at times acted as guides to the troops to show them where the insurgents were not.

Other juntas were celebrated between the principales of the pueblo and the insurgent chiefs, to treat of the contributions that should be exacted and to discuss the possibility of surprising the garrison of the town. In one of the juntas, Presidente Cantos requested that the insurgents let him have ten guns to surrender to the commanding officer so that he might acquire more influence with him.

At one time an insurgent detail came into the municipal building and impressed an escribiente of the presidencia, telling him he was a quintos in Captain so and so's company, and the man was taken out to the camp. This occurred in front of the town officials and a number of consejales about the month of September or October. Afterwards the escribiente spent about half of his time in the camp and the other half in town on various errands.

At another time the administrador militar of the insurgent forces, one Ciriaco Gonzales, resident of the town, assembled a number of the consejales in the presidencia and gave them a lecture in regard to their duties to General Malvar.

During all this time insurgent officers and soldiers were in and about the town whenever they chose to be. A detail of a sergeant and several men seemed to have always been in the town, and a number of people were arrested in the outskirts thereof, turned over to the insurgent forces in near-by barrio, and killed.

One principal case was that of two Macabebes sent to Tiaong by Colonel Wint, of San Pablo. One of them, while going from the town to a near-by barrio with his querida to see her mother, was captured by the forces of Lieut. Severo Reyes. The other Macabebe started to return to San Pablo, was captured, and both of them were taken to the same place and killed.

Another case was of a Filipino prisoner who was permitted to hang around the company kitchen of the Americans and was on somewhat friendly terms with the soldiers. On being suspected of telling something to the troops he was captured in the town by this detail of destroying angels, taken out to a near-by river, his hands

tied behind him, boloed, and his body thrown in the river in the presence of a number of people of a barrio.

Desiring to get in as many guns as possible, and knowing that an investigation of the murders committed would interfere with this work, I tried to not stir up this question, but the sergeant of police recounted to me at least eight people who had been murdered in that vicinity, leaving out some others whom I personally know to have been murdered there.

In the barrio of Buliran a native was captured (with an American pass in his pocket) by the forces of one Captain Hernandez, now a prisoner in Tiaong and, suspected of being an American spy, was killed.

In the year 1900 two American soldiers, stationed in San Pablo, while bathing in the outskirts of the town were captured and killed. This case was reported to me by a Spaniard by the name of Martinez, who is now in the Eighteenth Company of Native Scouts. I have not had time to find out whether two soldiers were lost from San Pablo, but Capt. Marcial Dia, now a prisoner at Tiaong, admits getting a revolver and gold watch and money belonging to two American soldiers, whom, he says, they frightened away from their clothes. I did not have enough data on this case to make any investigation; but when this captain was questioned about these two soldiers he became very sick and had to sit down. The case would bear further looking into. If these men were captured and killed there is enough data left in the hands of the commanding officer at Tiaong to investigate all the circumstances. Nothing could be more valuable to this criminal community than to have about 15 or 18 hangings in the plaza of the town.

A slight investigation of these matters would undoubtedly show 12 to 15 murders committed in this vicinity, and would surely lead to 15 or 18 hangings. For reasons previously given I touched very lightly on this subject.

COLLECTIONS.

Three pesos per couple a year were collected as poll tax by the cabezas of barrios and their assistants, and 10 per cent of the palay was exacted. In this town there are three harvests of palay each year; this collection should be a very large one. An extraordinary collection was made during the year, it being given out that a large quantity of arms were expected to be landed by the Germans about Batangas or San Juan. This collection was made according to the worth of the contributor, some giving 10, some 20, and some 30 or more pesos. I am told this collection reached in the neighborhood of 3,000 pesos. The arms were not obtained nor was the money refunded.

A native desiring to get married was required to pay 30 pesos, or as much of the 30 pesos as he could get together, with a promise to pay the rest at some future time.

Those eligible for military service, wishing to get out of it, were obliged to pay 30 pesos or as much of it as could be collected.

At the church they received a per cent of all ceremonial fees. This collection was included in the padre's charges, and was remitted by him through the vice-presidente, Alejo Lirag. In addition the padre at times sent out voluntary contributions.

There was a bridge over the stream of the pueblo. The insurgents put a set of collectors there, and all paid toll to cross the bridge.

The shopkeepers of the town paid regularly 1 to 2 reals per month. In addition to this they were expected to contribute at irregular intervals some of the supplies which they kept for sale.

The salary of the police force on one or two occasions was cut in two, one-half being sent out.

The band captured by the insurgents from the Spaniards was permitted to remain in the town, in charge of an insurgent manager, part of the time in charge of the padre, and at other times in charge of an insurgent doctor by the name of Samonte. One-half of the gross receipts were regularly sent out and the other half was used for the maintenance of the band, purchase and repair of instruments, etc.

The cockpit was run in their interest, a share of the proceeds being sent out regularly.

The police collected from those who gambled in private houses. This was sent out.

The Chinese and others, in addition to ordinary contributions, contributed raya-dilla, a blue striped cloth, of which uniforms were made by tailors in the town and sent out.

These seem to have been about the only collections they made. I know of nothing that went on in and about the town that escaped.

The insurgents, being afraid that the Government might confiscate their property, directed the town officials to cover it up, which was done, their land being taken up

in the names of their relatives or others, and false documents of property were regularly made out in the presidencia for these insurgents in the field. For full account of this matter see declaration of the secretary of the pueblo. He was permitted to use the books of the presidencia to get this information. The property of all of the insurgents out, by their orders, was thus covered up in such a way as to make it difficult to find.

On one occasion the American forces captured a black horse, the property of Colonel Masangcay, that he thought a great deal of. He at once sent word to the presidente to use every endeavor to get possession of the horse. The presidente immediately went to the commanding officer, told his lie, and got the horse.

The chief of police had taken the oath of allegiance only a short time before he was made chief of police.

After putting the vice-presidente, Alejo Lirag, in jail, one Isidoro Argao was named as vice-presidente. Argao's history is about as follows: Belonged to the forces of Col. Luis Banaad, of San Pablo; surrendered to the commanding officer at Tiaong in 1900; lived in town awhile; moved out to the barrio of Quipot; again joined the insurgents, accepting a captaincy, and was with Malvar for some two or three months; came in again and surrendered and took the oath of allegiance again in 1901, surrendering each time without arms. After he surrendered the second time, he contributed to the insurgents and furnished them with information of the movements of the American forces in the town of Tiaong, both by giving in person and sending this information by others.

He was acting in the town as a spy, pure and simple, on the American forces. In January, 1902, Argao and the chief of police accompanied the commanding officer and forces as guides looking for insurgents. Just as they were leaving the town Argao told the chief of police in effect that something was going to happen. They did not succeed in getting the troops to any insurgent camps, but in the absence of the greater part of the command the town was attacked. There are statements to the effect that Argao is still in command of insurgent troops and has been while living in the town, but I do not consider this evidence as conclusive. He is at present in jail at Tiaong.

The order of General Malvar, dated September, 1901, directing the insurgent chiefs to have one or more candidates for presidente in the different pueblos under American jurisdiction, also directing surrendering insurgents who have presented themselves to the American forces with a part of their guns only to carefully preserve the rest so that they may use them when a good time arrives for deceiving the Americans, is attached and attention invited to the same. Also two other orders of Malvar bearing on the same subject.

Tiaong is a town of about 6,000 or 7,000 inhabitants, and is of a very ordinary state of intelligence. It is situated between the Lipa Mountains on one side and San Cristobal and Banajao on the other. The order of intelligence is about that of the ordinary Filipino town of 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, no better and no worse. For a long time Malvar has lived in its vicinity, for a considerable part of the time in barrios of the town, and last year (1901) purchased some land there. The people are about the order of intelligence to suit Malvar, and he is a man of about the intelligence to fully satisfy their ideals. Tiaong I consider a rather typical and up-to-date Filipino town in this part of the country at present.

In the investigation of this town every form of perfidy, duplicity, and crookedness that could possibly exist anywhere was found.

The principales were on friendly and visiting terms with the garrison. The presidente, when arrested, was wearing the revolver of the commanding officer, for self-protection against insurgents. While investigating this town, naturally I came across evidence which gave me to understand that the neighboring town Candelaria had been organized on the same pattern, and that the same systems were in vogue there. Authority was obtained, and my assistant, Lieutenant Frisbie, of the Philippine Scouts, was sent to investigate this pueblo, and from his reports to me, and from my personal visit to the town, and the questioning of witnesses, I found that Candelaria and Tiaong were organized on the same method and plan.

The list of the organized forces pertaining to the pueblo of Tiaong accompanies this report, showing something like 227 guns in the hands of their forces. You might add to this 40 or 50 in the hands of private persons, without danger of making a mistake. I inclose copies of a number of the statements made by the principales of the pueblo of Tiaong to show the condition of the town. In addition to this some 200 or 300 other declarations were taken under oath.

In this investigation I was assisted by Lieutenant Frisbie, of the Philippine Scouts, whom I consider a very good officer for this class of work.

Respectfully submitted.

W. T. JOHNSTON,
Captain Fifteenth Cavalry, Brigade Provost Court.


BATANGAS, P. I., July 17, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Batangas, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

Pursuant to verbal instructions from the post commander, Col. A. B. Wells, First Cavalry, 60 men of G Company, Twenty-first Infantry, and 10 men of I Troop, First Cavalry, under the command of Lieut. E. T. Conley, Twenty-first Infantry, and myself, embarked on the launch *San Antonio* for the island Verde, for the purpose of capturing the insurgent captain, Eulalio Buenafe. It had been reported that he was at a town called San Aguipto, on the southwest coast of this island, with about 50 armed men.

We left Batangas about 11 o'clock p. m. on the 13th of July, and landed about 2:30 a. m. at Puting Buangin, marched overland from here through Sampolacan to San Aguipto. Each of these barrios was taken by surprise and carefully searched and



Route of expedition to Isla Verde and Mindoro, July 13-16, 1901.

all the men taken prisoners. No signs of insurgents were found, but by questioning the different natives we learned that Captain Buenafe had been there less than a week before with 30 men, but had left for the town of Calapan, on the coast of Mindoro. A guard of 10 men had been left on the launch with orders to move around the island and prevent any boats from leaving the island.

At about 5 p. m. we embarked again and moved around the island Verde toward the mainland at Loboo, where we waited around until 10 o'clock, when we started for Mindoro. Landing on the beach on the northeast coast, about halfway between Calapan and Naujan, we started for the former place. About 5 miles from Calapan, meeting an outpost, we captured 1 soldier, 2 rifles, and about 3,000 rounds of new Mauser ammunition. When we arrived near the town, I sent Lieutenant Conley with one platoon upon a hill south of the town, from which he extended around to the west

while I advanced with the other platoon from the east. The enemy made but little resistance, but began to run across a river west of the town, crossing on a footbridge. Lieutenant Conley, from his position on the hill, had a good view of them as they retreated and fired volleys into them, while my platoon from the town drove them toward him. Had the Filipino guide told us of this unfordable river, it would have been possible to completely surround the town and cut off their escape.

The Filipino force consisted of 150 riflemen, under command of Col. Ramon Atienza, the military governor of the island. Their losses were between 10 and 20 killed; wounded unknown. Captured all the military and civil records, 7 prisoners, 6 rifles, 3,000 rounds of ammunition, 1 officer's saber, and quantities of uniforms, cartridge boxes, etc.; also, 2 sailing *baucas* belonging to the governor, with a capacity of 60 men each. Two Americans, held prisoners by the insurgents, were taken. The cuartel and houses used as quarters by the troops were burned and stores destroyed.

Lieutenant Conley deserves the greatest credit for his energetic work throughout the expedition, as does also Mr. John W. Gray, an American civilian, who volunteered his services.

Very respectfully,

WILLIAM M. FASSETT,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-first Infantry.

[Indorsements.]

BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., July 18, 1901.

Respectfully referred to the adjutant-general, first district, Department of Southern Luzon.

I take pleasure in forwarding this interesting report of the expedition, consisting of detachments from Troop I, First Cavalry, and Company G, Twenty-first Infantry.

The manner in which it was conducted reflects credit upon all concerned, more especially its commanding officer, who was ably assisted by Lieutenant Conley, Twenty-first Infantry.

A. B. WELLS,
Colonel First Cavalry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
Manila, P. I., July 23, 1901.

Respectfully referred to the adjutant-general, Division of the Philippines.

I fully concur in the remarks of Colonel Wells, First Cavalry.

J. F. WADE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

BAUAN, BATANGAS, P. I., August 1, 1902.

THE ADJUTANT, *Bauan, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that I left this post at 5 a. m., July 30, 1901, with Second Lieut. A. M. Graham and 50 enlisted men of Troop K, First Cavalry, for Cuenca, which was reached at 7 a. m. The place was found to be occupied by First Lieut. P. A. Connolly and 50 men of Company F, Twenty-first Infantry, stationed at San Jose, who had been there since early the day before.

I therefore decided to return to Bauan via Dalipit, Dagatan, Balete, and Banaba.

While passing through Balete a man was seen to leap from a window and run into the woods. We captured him, as well as all the other men who had been with him in the house from which he attempted to escape. In this house there was found numbers of uniforms, among them being officers' uniforms, an officer's war bolo, and a letter of instructions from Lieut. Col. Briccio Casala, of Col. Ignacio Ybarra's regiment, generally operating in the mountains between Loboo and Ibaan and Taisan. Colonel Casala commands the zone of Batangas.

A great amount of corn was also found in this house, which I burned. I took 13 suspects with me to Bauan, and upon identification found that the one who attempted to escape was Juan Buenafe, who surrendered some time ago at Batangas, took the oath of allegiance, and later rejoined the insurgents, according to report.

I believe that at least 2 of the other prisoners captured are officers of the insurgent army because of their personal appearance, dress, and of the fact that they, with Juan Buenafe, were at the time examining Colonel Casala's letter of instructions.

The command returned to Bauan at 2 p. m. Distance marched, 21 miles.

Very respectfully,

J. D. L. HARTMAN,
Captain, First Cavalry, Commanding Troop K.

MAJAYJAY, LAGUNA, P. I., August 6, 1901.

ADJUTANT EIGHTH INFANTRY,

Santa Cruz, Laguna, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report relative to the movement upon Pedro Caballes's camp, August 3, 4, 5, 1901:

First Lieut. Charles P. Faulkner, with 43 enlisted men, Company M, Eighth Infantry, 1 private, Hospital Corps, and 3 native scouts, arrived in Majayjay from Nagcarlan at 8 p. m. August 2, 1901.

First Lieut. Bert H. Merchant, First Lieut. Leon L. Roach, Contract Surg. W. J. Condon, 44 enlisted men, Company H, Eighth Infantry, 49 enlisted men, Company L, Eighth Infantry, 1 acting hospital steward, 1 private, Hospital Corps, and 7 native scouts, arrived in Majayjay from Magdalena at 9 a. m. August 3, 1901.

Owing to the issue of rations to all the men and shoes to a few others, the movement was delayed until 1.30 p. m., when the column, consisting of 1 captain, 3 first lieutenants, 1 contract surgeon, 1 hospital steward, 1 acting hospital steward, 2 privates, Hospital Corps, 180 enlisted men, and 14 native scouts, moved toward Taytay, where Caballes was reported to be camped.

The column arrived in Panalabon at 6 p. m. and went into camp for the night. During this day three men were sent back to Majayjay, they being unable to accompany the column.

At 7 a. m. August 4, Lieutenant Roach, Contract Surgeon Condon, 1 acting hospital steward, 1 private, Hospital Corps, 86 enlisted men, Companies H and L, Lieutenant Merchant in command, with a guide from Panalabon, proceeded toward the cuartel, back of Taytay, arriving there about 9.30 a. m.

On their arrival they found that the cuartel had been very recently abandoned, probably owing to the movements of the American troops from Lucban, who were known to have been in Taytay August 3, 1901. Lieutenant Merchant burned the cuartel and all buildings in vicinity and returned to Panalabon, arriving there at 5 p. m. August 3, 1901.

At 7.30 a. m. August 4, Lieutenant Faulkner, 1 hospital steward, 1 private, Hospital Corps, 84 enlisted men of Companies I and M, Eighth Infantry, and 7 native scouts, Capt. Traber Norman, Eighth Infantry, in command, with a guide from Panalabon, proceeded on a different trail toward the same cuartel, back of Taytay, but, having proceeded about 1 mile, information was received that Caballes had moved his camp the night before farther up the mountains. Acting on this information, and not being able to send word to Lieutenant Merchant, we proceeded toward the new camp, which was situated about half way up the pass between Mount Banajao and Mount Banajao de Lucban.

The column arrived at the camp at 12 noon and succeeded in capturing an unarmed outpost. The camp was rushed but the enemy, about 75 men, had escaped. There was but a single trail leading into the camp, and as there was evidence of two other outposts in rear of the one captured, it is believed that our men were seen when the advanced outpost was captured.

On our arrival in camp it was found that the enemy had left so hurriedly that they abandoned their dinner, which was still cooking. They left all their records, provisions, such as rice, salt and dried fish, also some clothing and shoes and a bolt of a Mauser rifle. The different trails were searched for about two hours, but no trace of the enemy except a few rounds of ammunition—8 or 10—some dried fish, and cigarettes scattered along the trails could be found. The country is very mountainous and heavily wooded, which renders it easy for a scattered column to successfully avoid pursuit. There is a trail leading from the rear of the camp over the top of the pass—this trail was followed for a considerable distance.

The cuartel, a large quantity of rice, salt and dried fish, with mats and what clothing that was not taken away, were destroyed.

During this day and before arriving at the camp it was necessary to send 1 private, Hospital Corps, and 9 enlisted men back to Majayjay, as they were unable to proceed with the column.

At 3 p. m. the column moved on a different trail toward Taytay, arriving there at 6.30 p. m., and went into camp for the night. Taytay was completely deserted when the column arrived there.

On the morning of the 5th of August both columns moved into Majayjay, Lieutenant Merchant arriving there at 10 a. m. and Captain Norman at 10.30 a. m.

No houses were burnt by either of the columns, except the cuartels and the buildings found in their vicinity.

Among the records captured are important papers, commissions issued by Caballes, and dated August 2, 1901, some of which are signed and some unsigned; also a list of some of his officers and soldiers.

Very respectfully,


TRABER NORMAN,
Captain, Eighth Infantry.

BATANGAS, P. I., *August 8, 1901.*The ADJUTANT, *Batangas.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

Pursuant to verbal orders of the post commander, Col. A. B. Wells, First Cavalry, I embarked with 53 men of Company G, Twenty-first Infantry, on the launch *San Antonio* for Loboo.

We left Batangas about 5.30 p. m. August 6th and arrived in about two hours. We left the launch, and, taking 30 men from Company L, Twentieth Infantry, started overland about 11.30 p. m. for the barrio Batalan Bato, where Gen. Berixio Consola was reported to be with 200 men. The trail from Loboo to Batalan Bato is very rough and mountainous and we did not arrive at the latter place until 5.30 a. m. the next morning, but found the insurgents were not there. All of the natives in the barrio agreed in their statements that 200 insurgents had been there for two days, but had left on the afternoon of the 6th on account of lack of food, the country around being very poor, with little or no rice. They left going, it was reported, to



Sketch of route from Loboo to Batalan Bato, August 6-7, 1901.

some point near San Juan de Bocboc. After a halt of three hours we left for Loboo. On the trail we met 2 insurgent soldiers with Remingtons. They jumped into the bushes beside the road, but were both killed and their arms taken. Two natives, recognized as insurgent soldiers by our guide, were taken prisoners. Arriving at Loboo about 3.30 p. m. August 7, we left that evening for Batangas, arriving at about 10.30. If this trip had been made a day earlier it would have been possible to surprise them and probably kill a good many, because the barrio Batalan Bato is in a cup-shaped valley entirely surrounded by hills, and it would have been difficult for them to escape.

Very respectfully,

W. M. FASSETT,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-first Infantry.

LUCENA, PROVINCE OF TAYABAS, P. I., *August 20, 1901.*The ADJUTANT, *Lucena, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of my operations with Troop C, First Cavalry, while absent from this post from July 28 to August 15, inclusive, pursuant to telegraphic instructions from district headquarters, Batangas, P. I., July 27, 1901:

Left Lucena, P. I., in accordance therewith at 12 o'clock July 28 with 59 enlisted men, 2 native scouts, 3 packers, and pack train consisting of 9 mules and packs. Spent the night of the 28th at Sariaya, and arrived at Tiaong at 12 o'clock July 29. Having reported to Lipa my arrival, was ordered to temporary duty at Tiaong, where I remained July 30 and 31, when upon the latter date Capt. O. J. Brown, First Cavalry, came with orders from district commander attaching me to his command.

The following day, August 1, we proceeded to San Juan de Bocboc by an unknown trail and jungle, and arrived there at half past 3 o'clock in the afternoon without event of importance for the day.

August 2 we proceeded to Taysan by a circular route inclining north of regular trail between these points, and reached Taysan at 4 o'clock in the afternoon without event of importance.

August 3 we scouted southeast and south of Taisan along the foothills of the Loboo Mountains in quest of information concerning Malvar and the trails by which these mountains are accessible. Upon this day we received valuable information for our future campaign.

August 4 we remained at Taysan awaiting the return of pack train from Lipa with rations for troops.

Early in the morning of August 5 we began the march, going 6 miles due south of Taysan, then east for 4 or 5 miles, then over the mountain trail in a southerly course, going into camp at a barrio called Nanglobo at 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

It was reported that Malvar was at a barrio called Manoganan, 3 miles east of there, with a large force, and at 6 o'clock a. m. August 6 we began the march in this direction. Before we had been twenty minutes from camp the head of the column, of which my troop was leading, was fired into from the top of a foothill at a distance of 200 yards. The enemy fired three successive volleys from about a dozen guns, but without effect. By command of Captain Brown I dismounted my troops and took them immediately to the top of the hill from which we were attacked and formed a skirmish line upon its crest. We arrived there in time to get several volleys in at the enemy as they ascended the steep mountain at a range of 800 yards. Between this foothill and the mountain was a valley 500 yards wide, across which were ravines covered with shrubbery, under cover of which the enemy was enabled to reach the mountain. Only a portion of the trail by which the enemy ascended the mountain was plain to view, most of it being sheltered by trees. Thus they were 800 yards away before they came in sight. The trail led directly to some large nipa shacks a mile away. After these volleys were sent into them their bugle calls were heard far up in the mountain. When these facts were communicated to Captain Brown I was ordered to advance across the valley with my troop and his and take position under cover of a ravine leading down from the mountain and await orders. While waiting in this position I located the enemy moving about upon a hilltop far up in the mountain, and sent several volleys into them at a range of 1,500 yards. I can not say with what effect, but immediately afterwards two bugles sounded, 300 yards apart, from the mountain side, and shortly they began their volley firing. They used black powder and their bullets fell short. Later, when the enemy was fully located and our forces were disposed of to suit the lay of the field, my troop was in the center and advanced to where the trail began to ascend the mountain. We were under fire from trenches to the left front, right front, and immediate front, the latter direction being from a series of trenches up the trail, located from 200 to 300 yards apart. From this position my troop got in several volleys at them in view, running from one cover to another higher up the mountain. They were soon driven so high up in the mountain that there was no danger from their fire, and tactics were used to cause them to waste their ammunition. At one time they planted a large red flag above the uppermost trench, but after a few volleys from our forces they withdrew it. The enemy left the last trench at half past 10 o'clock, after firing volleys solely almost continuously for six hours. There were no casualties in my troop. The mountain upon which the engagement occurred is called Niaga, and we camped at a barrio adjoining it in the valley called Gibanga.

August 7 I took my troop as high up the mountain in the direction of the enemy's fortification as practicable without exhaustion, and fired three volleys into the group of shacks referred to before, but no evidence of life was seen. We then marched to Loboo and awaited a new supply of rations and ammunition from Batangas, P. I.

August 8 and 9 we marched to Nanglobo and camped for the night, leaving early the next morning, August 10, for barrio Managanan. We found the barrio deserted. We then set out for Lipa, going into camp at a barrio called San Isidro at 10 o'clock that night. Reached Lipa August 11 at 2 o'clock p. m. Remained at Lipa August 12 and 13, pursuant to telegraphic instructions dated August 12, proceeded to my station, Lucena, Tayabas Province, P. I., via Tiaong and Sariaya, arriving at my destination at 12 o'clock August 15.

The troop covered 180 miles, most of which was exceedingly rough country, and returned, after nineteen days of field service, with all men and horses in good condition, except one lamed horse sent to Batangas, P. I., with soldier in charge.

Very respectfully,

HORACE N. MUNRO,
Second Lieutenant, First Cavalry, Commanding Troop C.

COMPANY G, EIGHTH INFANTRY,
Cavinti, Laguna, P. I., August 29, 1901.

REGIMENTAL ADJUTANT, EIGHTH INFANTRY,
Santa Cruz, Laguna, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 27th I sent 4 of the Macabebes attached to Company G, Eighth Infantry, dressed as insurgents, on a scout in the country to the northeast and east of Cavinti. They returned at 12.30 p. m., bringing in 1 prisoner (Gregorio Mendez), an insurrecto soldier, who stated he belonged to Mariano Albus's command. The scouts had run across Albus and his men near barrio Paouin, and after firing a few shots caught the prisoner, who was unarmed, and came into Cavinti as fast as possible to give me the news. I left at 1.30 p. m. with 40 men, composed of 18 men of Company G, 4 of the scouts attached to Company G, and 18 men of Company E, Philippine Scouts, commanded by Lieutenant Macnab. My idea in taking this number was that I might be able to divide the force should more than one trail have to be covered.

We arrived at barrio Paouin about 3.30 p. m., and learned that the insurgents had left in the direction of Lupac, a barrio of San Antonio. At 5.30 p. m. cabeza of a subbarrio of Paouin, who said the insurgents had passed his place between 12 and 1 o'clock that afternoon. Halting here to prepare some supper and await the rising of the moon, we marched at 7 p. m. into the timber-covered hills for Lupac. The progress was slow, as the trail was difficult and the moonlight not very strong; but keeping on, we, at 3.30 a. m., reached the barrio Lupac, where we immediately arrested everybody we could find. In the first house were found three natives, two of whom proved to be insurrecto soldiers and whose guns were secured after daylight with a few rounds of ammunition. Both guns were Remingtons. In the morning I sent a detail to the cuartel, which was but a short distance above. Here nothing was found, but it showed signs of having been abandoned very recently. This cuartel was destroyed. While this detail was out the cabeza of the barrio Lupac, with the rest of the natives arrested, were being examined for information. Finally the cabeza, Joaquin Villanueva by name, said Albus's command had been there the afternoon previous and had given him his (Albus's) guns to take care of while his soldiers scattered, as they were looking for the Americans there the afternoon of the 27th or the forenoon of the 28th, and further, that he would show us where the guns were hidden. This he did, and we recovered from the river, between 6 a. m. and 7 a. m., 18 guns tied in bundles of 6 guns each; 17 were Remingtons and 1 a Mauser. Sergeant Peed, Corporal Fuller, and Private Humiller treaded the bottom of the river and dived for the guns, putting in nearly an hour's time in the water.

We could secure no information as to the whereabouts of Albus and his men other than "in the mountains," which was very probable, and through which search would be well-nigh fruitless. Resting until 9 a. m., we then set out on our return to Cavinti, where we arrived at 4.30 p. m. of the 28th, bringing in the following prisoners: Gregorio Mendez, the soldier who was captured by Company G scouts at Paouin, and who acted as guide; Lasiro Villamin, sergeant, and Valentin Valasa, soldier, both of whom were captured armed and belong to Albus's command. Also 2 suspects, Juan Ansay and Juan Villanueva, the son of the cabeza of barrio Lupac. I send these 5 natives to Santa Cruz, under guard for safe-keeping. We were absent twenty-seven hours from the post, twenty hours of which we were on the march.

Lieutenant Macnab, with whom I consulted, ably assisted me in carrying out my plans, and his Macabebes did fine work, especially so in getting information from the natives whom we captured while en route.

After returning to Cavinti I learned that Mariano Albus himself and 15 men with rifles had been seen near Cavinti in barrio Dubat at 1 p. m. the 27th. This information was brought in by a native, who said he saw Albus personally. First Sergeant Zimmerman immediately left the post with a detail to investigate the report, but nothing was seen of Albus or his soldiers. Am trying to locate this band now.

Estaban Reyas says this band was not commanded by Albus but by Bonifacio Pailon, a first lieutenant, who lives near Pagsanjan. I favor this opinion, as all at Lupac were very earnest in saying Albus himself was there the afternoon of the 27th, and he could not have been in the two places at the hours claimed, Lupac being seven hours from Dubat.

Very respectfully,

ARTHUR L. BUMP,
Second Lieutenant, Eighth Infantry, Commanding Company E.

TANAUAN, P. I., *September 3, 1901.*THE ADJUTANT, TWENTIETH INFANTRY,
Tanauan, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to render the following report of an engagement which took place August 27 between troops under my command and a force of insurgents reported to be commanded by Malvar, and subsequent movements of the command to include September 2, 1901.

In accordance with verbal instructions of the commanding officer, Col. W. S. McCaskey, Twentieth Infantry, a joint scout of Mount Maquiling was to be made August 27. Capt. J. G. Galbraith, First Cavalry, in command of a cavalry and an infantry detachment—the latter, 50 enlisted men of Company B, Twentieth Infantry, under First Lieut. G. M. Grimes, Twentieth Infantry—was to scout the mountain to the westward of a designated ravine, and Capt. H. C. Hale, Twentieth Infantry, in command of a battalion of 200 men, was to scout to the eastward of the ravine. Captain Galbraith's command was to start from Santo Tomas and Captain Hale's from Tanauan.

At 4 a. m. the Tanauan detachment started with the following strength and personnel, viz, Capt. H. C. Hale, Twentieth Infantry, commanding; First Lieutenant T. C. Lyster, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, and 3 enlisted men of the hospital corps; Capt. F. V. Krug, Twentieth Infantry, with 50 men of Company F; Capt. H. J. Hirsch, Twentieth Infantry, with 50 men of Company H; Capt. G. H. Estes, jr., Twentieth Infantry, with 50 men of Company G; First Lieut. A. M. Shipp, Twentieth Infantry, with 50 men of Company E; First Lieut. Hunter Kinzie, Twentieth Infantry, Company F; total, 7 officers, 203 enlisted men, 1 scout, and 1 interpreter.

At 7.30 a. m., firing was heard in the mountains and the objective of the command was changed in that direction. Guided by the firing, which soon became heavy and continuous and which came, apparently, entirely from the enemy, the column shortly encountered Lieutenant Grimes's detachment, which was reported to have been attacked and the advance guard driven back. At this time the command was under fire at long range and the concealed enemy was firing volleys of sufficient volume, rapidity, and precision to indicate the presence of considerable force, abundant ammunition, and a fair state of discipline.

After examining the situation it was decided to divide the force, now 25 men, and while engaging the enemy in his front with one part, to move the other up a spur of the mountain with a view of coming in on the right rear of the enemy, thus preventing his escape. Accordingly, Captain Hale, with E and F detachments, 100 men, started upon the flanking movement and began the ascent of a spur of Mount Maquiling, which apparently led to the desired position. It was soon found that a most difficult climb lay before the column. There was no trail, and no guide, and in many places the grass grew higher than the men's heads; the slope grew steeper and steeper, and at times became precipitous; underbrush and vines tripped and repeatedly threw the tired men to the ground; but using both hands and feet, and making progress inch by inch, nearly the entire command finally reached the top at 1 p. m.

Immediately moving to the ridge it was found that a detachment of our troops had gained their way well up the mountain into the former position of the enemy, and an advance toward them was made over the ridge and down the slope. An insignificant fire was opened upon the line as it advanced, that came from a clump of trees on our left, and which was the last scattering shots of the retreating enemy; it was soon silenced. On the slope now occupied by the column that had made the flanking movement a number of insurgents had taken refuge from the fire of the Americans who had gained high ground from the front and several of these were killed while attempting to escape and several surrendered. A number of rifles was also found on this slope; they had been discarded by fleeing insurgents.

The whole command was now in touch again, and about two hours were devoted to searching the vicinity for insurgents and rifles. The men, who had brought only a lunch with them, were very exhausted, and it was necessary to return to the post that day. Captain Galbraith, who after great effort had been able to get his cavalry detachment some distance up the mountain, was met; Lieutenant Grimes joined his command to which he belonged, and the Tanauan contingent united and marched to their station, where they arrived at 5.30 p. m.

The movements and action of the force left in the enemy's front are reported upon by the officers in command, and their reports are appended hereto. These reports will show that the engagement was principally fought by these detachments in the front and that the flanking party under Captain Hale did not reach its destination until the enemy had really been defeated. Had it been possible to make the flanking movement more quickly, more prisoners might have been taken, and perhaps

more decisive results attained; but, as it was, all indications pointed to a heavy punishment and disorganization of the enemy's forces, and this was mostly accomplished by the commands under Captains Hirsch and Estes and Lieutenant Grimes.

The firing was more or less continuous from about 7.30 until 11.30. Between the latter hour and 1 p. m., the end of the engagement, there was but little and desultory firing.

Casualties: Americans, 2 wounded, 1 seriously and 1 slightly; insurgents, killed 11, captured 8, of whom 3 were wounded. Rifles captured, 15. Many cuartels were burned and several ponies were killed. It is probable that many uncaptured insurgents were wounded, as officers report seeing several instances of wounded being carried from the field.

Prisoners report the enemy as numbering 250 rifles, and insist that Malvar, Gonzales, and Noriel were all present and had been occupying this position for several days. Attention is invited to the report of the prisoners that many insurgents carried two rifles, the frequency of desertions having left the insurgent commander with more guns than men.

In conclusion I would respectfully invite attention to the fact that it was Lieutenant Grimes, Twentieth Infantry, of Captain Galbraith's command, who first engaged the enemy, and that Captain Hale's command was guided to the fight only by the sound of the firing between Lieutenant Grimes and the enemy.

August 28.—With 50 men from each of Companies E, F, G, and H, Twentieth Infantry, departure was taken at 8 a. m., to continue the scout of Mount Maquiling and to search for the insurgents. Returning to the ground of the previous day's engagement the most thorough search was made in the vicinity, with the result of finding 1 wounded noncommissioned officer of the insurgents. He was brought in to Tanauan. The scouting was continued easterly, all ravines being reconnoitered and spurs ascended to within the timber line. Many cuartels were burned. The command returned at 5 p. m.

August 29.—With 250 men from the same companies as the day before, departure was taken at 8 a. m. for a three-day's scout. The command went into camp at a distance of about 6 miles from Tanauan, near the old burned barrio of Bitin.

In the afternoon of this day the force was divided and the country about a mountain to the northwest of Aliminos was examined by a detachment under Captain Krüg, while that about the detached mountain to the eastward of Maquiling was reconnoitered by a detachment under Captain Hale. Nothing was found by either party, and the detachments returned to the camp that evening.

August 30.—At 6 a. m. the command, leaving a retaining force of 50 men in camp, started for an examination of the site of the reported former defeat of the Spanish by the insurgents, where it was thought a body of the enemy might be found. Trails were abandoned and after a difficult climb the command came out on the mountain side well up on the slope. Moving farther upward, just below the timber line a trench was discovered 100 yards long, and this was taken to be the site of the Spanish defeat. Nothing of importance was found here, and the trench did not appear to have been lately occupied. On this day a rather large cuartel was discovered high up on one of the spurs of the mountain, and an approach was made upon it from above and in the rear. It was found to be empty, but with evidence of recent occupation. It was burned. The scout was continued along the mountain to the west until 4.40 p. m., when the command returned to camp after ten and one-half hours of almost continual climbing.

August 31.—Camp was broken this day, the pack train returned to Tanauan, and a force of 225 men was marched to the mountains and proceeded to continue the scouting from the point left off the day before, westerly to the point taken in on the 28th. Nothing of importance was discovered, and upon return that afternoon to Tanauan the command completed the examination of Mount Maquiling from the south westerly spur, opposite Tanauan, along the southern slope easterly to the pass to Bay.

September 2.—This day the country west of Tanauan to Lake Taal, north to Sulpoc and south to Balito River, was thoroughly scouted by eight detachments of 25 men each. The flank detachments started by daylight and the interior ones later. No evidence of insurgents could be found. Barrios were searched, and all travelers were examined. It was noticeable that many Filipino men were at home and working in the fields. Captain Hale, with 25 men, searched Lieut. Col. Mariano Lot's house, in the barrio of Luta, and found there, in a large quantity of corn, Filipino peas, salt, and tobacco. It was destroyed. A large kettle in the grounds of this place gave evidence of a meeting place for insurgents. The several detachments returned to Tanauan that evening.

Out of seven days the command has been in the field six. The country passed over has been unusually difficult, and the mud under foot has made infantry march-

ing exceptionally severe. At no time, however, has any part of the command shown an unwilling spirit. The officers and men have, as always, worked energetically and willingly. Discipline has been excellent at all times.

Very respectfully,

HARRY C. HALE,

Captain, Twentieth Infantry, Commanding Second Battalion.

SANTO TOMAS, BATANGAS, P. I., September 4, 1901.

Capt. HARRY C. HALE,

Twentieth Infantry, Tanauan, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by Company B, Twentieth Infantry, in the engagement at Mount Maquiling, August 27, 1901:

In compliance with verbal instructions from Captain Galbraith, First Cavalry, I left Santo Tomas at 3 a. m. with 5 noncommissioned officers and 50 privates, and proceeded to bridge over Cabaong River. I left bridge at daylight and scouted west of river in direction of Mount Maquiling. About 7.30 a. m. my advance reported some insurgent cuartels (shacks) on my right and front. These were examined carefully, and while there some unarmed natives were seen leaving another shack farther up the slope and going toward base of mountain. I moved forward, leaving 5 privates to guard rations. Arriving at shack, I sent Sergeant Stanton and 15 privates up trail taken by natives, which led directly to southwest base of and up Mount Maquiling. The detachment had just started up the mountain when they were fired on from thickly wooded part just above them—a few scattering shots, followed by several volleys and continuous firing. Detachment became separated and fell back, part by creek bed to right and part over trail used in going up. As soon as firing commenced I moved rapidly forward over same trail and met men falling back. They could not locate remainder of advance, and I continued forward movement until I found Private Belthea, wounded, at right of trail, about 70 or 80 yards from base of mountain, and had him carried to the rear. Up to this time I had not fired a shot, being afraid of hitting my own men (advance party). The insurgents were entirely hidden from view in the woods and were keeping up a very heavy fire. I had my entire command call out several times, "Sergeant Stanton, fall back!" and getting no reply, I opened fire, aiming at enemy's smoke. I considered it impracticable to move forward, and it having been reported that my advance was now in my rear, I decided to fall back out of the ravine to better cover.

At the first stand after movement commenced, enemy opened a strong flank fire while they kept moving along top of high ridge on my right. I fell back slowly, halting at every cover, and returning the fire, finally stopping at entrance of ravine by shack, about 300 yards from base of mountain, after about thirty minutes firing. I considered it a waste of ammunition to fire on an enemy I could not see, and who was not advancing, and I practically ceased firing, returning only the flank fire occasionally. When your command came up I reported to you, and shortly after you began movement on enemy's right flank; Captain Hirsch and H Company, myself and B Company, moved up on high ridge on our right, encountering a slight resistance in our front after getting on top of ridge. We moved forward well out on ridge and enemy opened fire from trenches on both flanks. In half an hour fire from both flanks had ceased. From top of ridge occupied by Companies B and H the enemy could be plainly seen coming from woods, from base of mountain where I first struck them, and scattering along face of ridge afterwards occupied by your troops. We forced many of them to seek cover, and they were afterwards struck by your command. Casualties in company: Killed, none; wounded, 2—Private Tristram B. Bethea, shot twice, compound fracture of left knee and perforation of left foot, and Private James R. Murrey, wound left arm, very slight. Enemy's loss, 4 killed (I personally counted 3). Wounded, none seen; there were evidences of wounded having been carried away. It was almost impossible to locate dead or wounded on ridge, owing to high grass on top and thick brush on sides. Enemy's loss in my front at base of mountain not known. Company captured 2 rifles (Remingtons) and destroyed 6 small cuartels. Company B's behavior throughout the whole engagement was very creditable, especially so in going into and coming out of ravine under a very trying fire, which fortunately was high. Company left for Santo Tomas at 4 p. m., arriving there at 5.30 p. m.

Very respectfully,

G. M. GRIMES,

First Lieutenant, Twentieth Infantry, Commanding Company B.

TANAUAN, BATANGAS, P. I., *September 2, 1901.*The ADJUTANT, SECOND BATTALION, *Twentieth Infantry.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of Company G, Twentieth Infantry, forming part of a battalion, in an engagement with Filipino insurgents in Mount Maquiling on August 27, 1901.

Having arrived in front of the position of the enemy I was ordered by the battalion commander to hold the enemy in the front while other companies moved to attack his right flank. Company B was assigned to my command.

I at once pushed my company to the front as far as possible, occupying the edge of the ravine, which separated us from the enemy by about 400 yards, and sent two squads under a sergeant to occupy a detached knoll about 150 yards in advance of my line.

As the enemy's line partly flanked my right, I directed Lieutenant Grimes, commanding Company B, to move around and attack the left flank of the enemy.

As the flank attack was pushed the enemy left his position and fled, a part going over the high hill immediately in my front, where they encountered the companies which had moved around to their right flank; other parts moved off over the ridge to the right of the high line.

Leaving a detachment to guard the exit from the ravine, which divided the main positions of the enemy, the remainder of the company advanced up the steep wooded hill which had been occupied by the enemy. In here 5 large and 14 small huts were burned. They had evidently been used as quarters.

The other companies having returned from the pursuit about 4 p. m., Company G joined the battalion and proceeded to the post.

No casualties. Under fire about three hours.

Very respectfully,

G. H. ESTES, Jr.,

Captain, Twentieth Infantry, Commanding Company G.

TANAUAN, BATANGAS PROVINCE, LUZON, *September 3, 1901.*The ADJUTANT, SECOND BATTALION, *Twentieth Infantry.*

SIR: I have the honor to report the following operations of Company H, Twentieth Infantry, in action against insurgents on August 27, 1901.

About 8 a. m., upon arriving upon open slope in front of enemy's position, I found the detachments of companies B and G, but did not know what had become of those of companies E and F. I had been previously instructed by the battalion commander that he would take companies E and G, and that I was to follow Captain Krug (F); finding, however, that F had gone on, and G left behind, I concluded it was the intention to have me join Company G.

I inquired of both Captain Estes and Lieutenant Grimes if any orders had been left for me, and they answered negatively.

It was evident that the enemy could be driven from his position only by an attack in flank, and, at the suggestion of Lieutenant Grimes, we joined the detachments of B and H, as 50 men was not considered a sufficient force to attempt the flank movement.

We then crossed the ravine and climbed the ridge on the left of the one from which the enemy was passing in a heavy fire. No trails were found and it was necessary to make way through a heavily wooded slope. Upon arriving about halfway up, and reaching the open, the enemy was encountered in front, intrenched, but quickly driven from it. The enemy on our left was now exposed, and a heavy fire opened and continued until the enemy's fire died out and he had disappeared.

In the meantime a fire was opened on us from higher up the slope we occupied, and also from the ridge to our right, but as we continued to advance up the ridge the enemy was driven off and his fire silenced.

After the main fire had ceased, individual insurgents were seen from time to time attempting to escape on the slope to our left, but fire was promptly opened on them and in this way a small detachment was held until Captain Hale's force appeared over the ridge and either killed or captured them.

Two Remington rifles and 1 Remington carbine and about 300 rounds of ammunition were captured; 4 ponies killed, and 14 cuartels burned, 1 of which was reported by prisoner to have been occupied for about two weeks by General Malvar. Four dead and 1 wounded were found; 2 other men were seen being carried away by the enemy.

The engagement lasted until about 1 p. m. Lieutenant Grimes, Twentieth Infantry, gave me his most cordial support throughout the engagement, and is entitled to share with me any credit there may be in the complete success of our combined movement.

The conduct of the enlisted men was very satisfactory and commendable.

Very respectfully,

H. J. HIRSCH,
Captain, Twentieth Infantry, Commanding Company H.

MAJAYJAY, LAGUNA, September 8, 1901.

ADJUTANT, EIGHTH INFANTRY, Santa Cruz, Laguna, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following relative to the movement upon Barol, September 7, 1901:

I left Majayjay, Laguna, P. I., at 4.30 a. m., September 7, with 42 men of Company I, Eighth Infantry, and proceeded to the barrio of Baquio, arriving there at 6.30 a. m. At Baquio 4 natives were captured and taken along.

From there proceeded to Barol, arriving in the latter place at 7.30 a. m. In this barrio 2 Remington rifles, 1 Mauser, and 1 shotgun, with 45 rounds of Remington ammunition and 33 rounds of Mauser ammunition, were captured; also a native named Silvestro Grueso, who is the chief of collectors of this part of the country, and 1 soldier, who had taken the oath of allegiance at Santa Cruz, Laguna, P. I., June 24, 1901, but in whose possession were found 1 rifle and 25 rounds of ammunition and the shotgun; also a large quantity of insurgent clothes and several flags. These were destroyed, as was the house in which they were found.

In this barrio was another storehouse, containing clothing and also used for loading purposes, as in it were found a reloading outfit, a large quantity of empty shells, and some lead and powder. The house and its contents were destroyed, after breaking up the reloading outfit.

The country around was thoroughly searched, but no further evidence of insurgents could be obtained.

From Barol proceeded to Banti, arriving there at 2.30 p. m., and, as nothing definite could be learned there, returned to Majayjay, arriving at 4 p. m. same date.

Silvestro Grueso is the native reported to have had in his possession 2 American mules, but I was unable to get any information from him or find any trace of said mules. In his possession were captured several papers signed by Caballes, dated August 27, 1901, to September 3, 1901. Other papers were also captured giving the names of the collectors, the persons from whom collected, and the sentinels of the barrio of Barol.

The soldier captured by me reports that Caballes, with 60 armed men, left Barol early the morning of the 7th and proceeded toward San Luis and thence to Lucban. This information I have been unable to verify.

In all I brought in 18 natives. Just at present I am unable to determine what connection, if any, they have with the insurgents. Would suggest that they be held until something definite can be learned of them.

Owing to the broken country and the houses being scattered it is difficult to operate with much success unless the insurgents should make a stand.

Very respectfully,

TRABER NORMAN,
Captain, Eighth Infantry.

NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, September 10—(Filed 10.15 a. m.).

ADJUTANT, EIGHTH INFANTRY, Santa Cruz, Laguna:

On information furnished me last night that a party of insurgents were in the barrio of Cabuyao of Lilio, I left here at 2 a. m. with 30 men, Company M, Eighth Infantry. Struck their outpost about 4.30 a. m., and a few minutes later their cuartel, which they left. While searching this for arms and ammunition the insurgents opened fire from a canal about 250 yards distant. The engagement lasted about three-quarters of an hour, owing to the difficulty of flanking them, which was, however, successfully accomplished. Enemies' casualties unknown, but believe they lost some in wounded. Our casualty was 1 enlisted man wounded, seriously, but not neces-

sarily fatal. Captured a quantity of ammunition, insurgent uniforms, and supplies, which I destroyed, as well as the cuartel.

Will send full report later. They retreated in the direction of Magdalena. Natives inform me they were troops under Pedro Cortez.

C. P. FAULKER, *First Lieutenant, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-FIRST INFANTRY,
Lipa, Province of Batangas, Luzon, P. I., October 19, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DISTRICT,
Department of Southern Luzon, Batangas Province, Luzon, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith the report of the expedition commanded by First Lieut. T. L. Brewer, Twenty-first Infantry, from September 15 to October 4, 1901, inclusive, also that of First Lieut. J. C. Minus, Twenty-first Infantry, on expedition from September 26 to October 4, 1901.

Very respectfully,

JACOB KLINE,
Colonel Twenty-first Infantry, Commanding.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
Batangas, Batangas, P. I., October 24, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Department of Southern Luzon.

This report is forwarded for information of department commander. Very few of the many expeditions sent out in this district met with any satisfactory or brilliant result, but the strain and hardship encountered are the same in every case.

The garrison at Lipa has been worked almost to the limit during the past four months, and has responded cheerfully and willingly to every demand made.

S. S. SUMNER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

LIPA, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., *October 5, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT, TWENTY-FIRST INFANTRY.

SIR: I respectfully submit the following report of an expedition under my command which left this post September 15, returning October 4, 1901:

A detachment of 100 men, 60 from Company B, Twenty-first Infantry, and 40 from Company D, Twenty-first Infantry, with Second Lieut. Allen T. Crockett, under command of First Lieut. T. L. Brewer.

Left Lipa September 15 at 11 a. m., proceeding direct to Alaminos, through barrio Santa Clara, arriving at Alaminos at 6 p. m. The following morning the detachment scouted country to the east and south of Alaminos and through barrios San Roque, Antipolo, and Santiago, joining a detachment of First Cavalry under command of Captain Galbraith at barrio San Gregorio; from this point scouting country in direction of Mount Jolomomug, returning to San Gregorio at 3.30 p. m., having encountered no insurgents. The cavalry detachment returned to San Pablo same afternoon.

From San Gregorio the detachment proceeded to barrios Palila and Macupon, where one insurgent soldier with enlistment paper was captured. The next morning, September 17, detachment scouted country east of Lipa Mountains through barrios Santa Rosaria and San Isidro, arriving at Tiaong about 6 p. m. Remained at Tiaong all day of September 18. On September 19 part of detachment, consisting of 4 noncommissioned officers and 27 privates, Company B, and 1 noncommissioned officer and 7 privates, Company D, Twenty-first Infantry, proceeded under command of Lieutenant Crockett to scout country between Tiaong and San Pablo, arriving at San Pablo in afternoon. At 10 p. m. detachment of 20 men under Lieutenant Crockett left San Pablo and marched through barrios San Ignacio and Santo Nifio, searching barrios for insurgents rumored to be hiding there, returning to San Pablo at 8 o'clock on morning of September 20.

From San Pablo the detachment proceeded at 2 p. m., scouting country to east of Tiaong-San Pablo road, arriving in neighborhood of barrios Bulanga and Bayang about 6 p. m., where Lieutenant Crockett with advance, consisting of 1 sergeant and 11 privates, Company B, and 1 corporal and 7 privates, Company D, Twenty-first Infantry, encountered force of about 30 armed insurgents quartered in 3 buildings. Insurgents dispersed at first fire, retreating toward Dolores, occasionally returning fire of Americans, who pursued them for two hours. Three insurgents killed and several wounded; 4 rifles and 1 revolver captured; also 56 insurgent uniforms, papers, stamps, and other equipment of cuartel, 200 rounds of Remington ammunition, stores of rice, and buildings were destroyed. Detachment returned to Tiaong at 11 p. m.

September 21 the detachment remained at Tiaong. On September 22 entire detachment, with addition of 10 men of Company C, Twenty-first Infantry, with First Lieutenant Tiffany and Second Lieutenant Crockett, Twenty-first Infantry, First Lieutenant Brewer, commanding, left Tiaong at 9 p. m., proceeding to a point about 1 mile west of barrio Quipot, where an insurgent cuartel and supply of rice was located and burned. Small guard of insurgents escaped in the darkness. One insurgent soldier killed.

The march was continued in the direction of San Juan de Bocboc, and at daylight the detachment arrived at barrio Lipayan, in the vicinity of which an insurgent cuartel was said to be located. Although scouting was continued during the day, September 23, no insurgents were found. The detachment arrived at Candelaria at 7 p. m.

Lieutenant Tiffany returned to Tiaong with mounted escort on morning of September 24. The detachment under my command, with Lieutenant Crockett, 106 enlisted men, left Candelaria at 11 a. m. September 24, proceeding to barrio of Bontoc, and from there toward Mount Masalacay, where, at 4 p. m., a force of 300 armed insurgents were located. After attempting to flank the enemy, which it was ascertained could not be accomplished, owing to an intervening canyon of great depth, a frontal attack was made. Lieutenant Crockett was killed early in the attack and three enlisted men (one of whom has since died) were wounded.

The fight was continued for about an hour and a half, when Captain Hearn, Twenty-first Infantry, with detachment of Company E, Twenty-first Infantry, and detachment of constabulary, Inspectors Taylor and Bruin, arrived, the firing having been heard near Mount Maybobo, in which vicinity Captain Hearn had been scouting. The attack continued till dark; insurgent cuartel of five buildings, containing about 30,000 pounds of rice and a quantity of ammunition, was destroyed. The insurgents withdrew under cover of the darkness, taking with them their dead and wounded.

The next morning the detachment followed in the direction in which the insurgents were supposed to have gone. All buildings occupied by insurgents and stores of corn and rice were destroyed.

The wounded men and the body of Lieutenant Crockett were sent in to Candelaria, to which place the detachment returned on afternoon of September 25. The wounded men were sent to the hospital at Sariaya, the detachment remaining at Candelaria, where Lieutenant Crockett's remains were buried with appropriate military honors.

The detachment returned to Tiaong, where it was reenforced by Lieutenant Minus with 100 men of Twenty-first Infantry.

The expedition, Captain Hearn commanding, scouted the country to the north of Candelaria, in the vicinity of Dolores, San Cristobal, Maybobo and Masalacay, but no insurgents were encountered.

The detachments from Companies H, I, B, and D, Lieutenant Minus in command, returned to Lipa, via Candelaria and Tiaong, arriving in Lipa October 4 at 11 o'clock p. m.

Owing to the bad condition of the roads and the difficulties of scouting through the mountains, it became necessary to refit the entire command twice with clothing.

The transportation was by native pack ponies, and was in every way satisfactory, the men carrying on their persons only canteens, one-half meat can, tin cup, rifle, and ammunition.

Respectfully submitted.

THOMAS L. BREWER,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-first Infantry.

LIPA, P. I., October 5, 1901.

ADJUTANT, TWENTY-FIRST INFANTRY, *Lipa, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of detachment commanded by me in recent expedition against insurgents:

Command of 2 officers and 100 men left Lipa September 26, 1901; marched to Tiaong, 18 miles, joined Captain Hearn September 27 at Tiaong. From Tiaong to Dolores September 28, 6 miles. Scouted in vicinity of Mount San Cristobal September 29, 20 miles; left Dolores September 30, marched to Masalacay, 10 miles. October 1 scouted country around Masalacay, 6 miles. October 2 marched to Candelaria, 8 miles. October 3 was detached from Captain Hearn's command and marched to Tiaong, 8 miles. October 4 returned to Lipa, 18 miles.

The last four days were very hard on the men on account of heavy rains, swollen rivers, and no dry clothing. An entire change of clothing was drawn at Tiaong on October 3. All information points to the fact that the insurgent troops engaged by Lieutenant Brewer September 24 dispersed during the night and went into the barrios in small bands. No traces of the body could be found. From various sources information was obtained that the insurgent troops referred to above is of late organization, probably within the last month. The leader is named Barnaldo Marquis, who entitles himself the reorganizer of the insurgent troops in Tayabas Province.

Particular attention is called to the large and well-cultivated fields of rice in the vicinity of Mount San Cristobal. It is now beginning to ripen, and the only gatherers of the crop seem to be women.

Very respectfully,

J. C. MINUS,

First Lieutenant, Twenty-first Infantry.

LIPA, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., October 21, 1901.

The ADJUTANT,

Lipa, Batangas Province, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to state that, in compliance with verbal orders of post commander, I left this post with 46 men of Company D, Twenty-first Infantry, and 80 Macabebe scouts, commanded by Lieutenant Aldrich and Lieutenant Bean, at 6 o'clock a. m., October 8, 1901, with instructions that General Malvar and from 200 to 300 men were supposed to be on Mount Baguimanoc near barrio of Talisay.

I proceeded to Talisay by way of barrio of Sapoc, arriving there about 9.30 o'clock a. m., and proceeded to try and get some definite information. The teniente of Talisay and all the people, when questioned, said they knew nothing at all of insurgents being near there. After about two hours' work though the teniente finally confessed that the insurgents had been there the day before and that he had given them rice, and that he knew where their cuartel was and that it was situated about half way up the mountain and offered to guide us to the place. We left Talisay about 12 o'clock with the teniente as our guide, and had proceeded about 2 miles southeast and were about 1,000 yards from the foot of the mountain when a native came up from the rear and told me there were trenches just at the foot of the mountain covering the trail. I then told Lieutenant Bean, who was in advance with 25 Macabebes, to continue along the trail very carefully and I took 10 Macabebes and went off on another trail leading to the rice fields (shown in sketch) and told Lieutenant Aldrich to hold the main body where he was until I could find out how the enemy were situated. After deploying my 10 men and proceeding to within about 300 yards of where the enemy were supposed to be, I halted and finally located one of their trenches. Not a shot had been fired, so I ordered my men to fire one volley to see if I could develop their strength. The insurgents then opened fire from both sides of the mountain. Lieutenant Bean's men and the 10 men with me returned the fire. I sent for Lieutenant Aldrich and his men and told him to take part of his men and see if he could, by any means, make a flank movement on the right. The rest of the men I deployed across the rice field. About fifteen minutes later I sent Corporal Whitman, Company D, Twenty-first Infantry, back and around to Lieutenant Bean to ask him if it was possible to make a flank movement over on the left. The corporal was gone about a half an hour and returned and said that Lieutenant Bean was killed and one Macabebe wounded.

A few minutes later Lieutenant Aldrich returned with his men and said it was impossible to make a flank movement on the right. I then told Lieutenant Aldrich to take command of the men there and I would go to where Lieutenant Bean was killed and see if a flank movement could not be made on the left.

Up to this time the enemy had been firing continuously and some of the volley firing was perfect, but about this time their firing became spasmodic. Our firing had been under perfect control, and very little firing had been done except by orders.

It took me about fifteen minutes to reach the place where Lieutenant Bean was killed, and after looking over the ground I found that a flank movement could not be made without going around and up over the mountains, which would take almost three hours. I ordered the men to carry Lieutenant Bean's body and the wounded man back and then ordered the men to fall back about 500 yards and sent for Lieutenant Aldrich. When he arrived he fell with an attack of the heat, utterly exhausted. I was nearly exhausted and the men were in the same condition. I decided it would be useless to charge the trenches, as even if we took them the sacrifice of lives would be too great for what we would gain, as the enemy could easily retreat up the mountains.

A few minutes later a man who was looking through Lieutenant Bean's glasses said that he saw a native going up the mountain, and, upon investigation, I found that the insurgents had all retreated. The underbrush was so thick that they had been able to retreat without our knowledge. As the men were too exhausted to follow up the mountains, I decided to go back about half a mile to where I had left the pack ponies and send Lieutenant Bean's body and the wounded man to Lipa.

The heat had been something awful and the men were utterly exhausted when we reached the pack train at 4 o'clock p. m. Lieutenant Aldrich had to be sent to Lipa as he was still suffering from his sunstroke. Lieutenant Minus, with 45 men of Company H, Twenty-first Infantry, and Lieutenant Kent, with 45 men of Troop M, First Cavalry, here joined me, but as we could get no information as to where the enemy had retreated we decided to go back to Talisay and see if we could get any information there. After working until 12 o'clock I finally found one man who said he could get us to them.

We started at daylight, leaving a detachment to guard the pack ponies. We went up the mountains just back of Talisay and scouted the whole mountain clear to the top and over to Mount Maraya, coming down the gulch in which the enemy had been intrenched, but we were unable to discover any signs of them. Just after crossing one of the bad gulches the native guide who was with the party tried to escape and was killed. We reached Talisay in the afternoon about 4 o'clock and found Captain Hale, Twentieth Infantry, there with his detachment and I reported.

From all I could learn and judge from the firing I should say that the enemy had about 150 guns and about 50 bolo men. I was told by the guide who was in the fight and who was killed that he had seen Malvar the morning of the fight up in the mountains, but that Malvar was not in the fight.

From all I can learn I think a great many who were in the fight buried their guns and went back to the barrios immediately. The others, I understand, left for the mountains near Candelaria.

In my opinion all the barrios at the foot of the mountains are nothing but cuartels, and Talisay is the worst of all.

I destroyed about 100,000 pounds of rice, burned a few houses up in the mountains, also a few houses near the scene of the fight.

In the death of Lieutenant Bean the service lost a brave and excellent officer.

We were out seven days longer, but I was under Captain Brown and Captain Hale during that time.

Very respectfully,

A. I. HARRISON,
First Lieutenant Twenty-first Infantry.

P. S.—It is reported that we killed 5 and wounded 5 in the fight October 8.


A. I. H.

[Second Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD SEPARATE BRIGADE,
DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
Batangas, P. I., November 1, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded for information of the department commander as per telegram from department headquarters dated 4.15 p. m., October 9, 1901. From this report and from map inclosed it would seem the insurgents had selected a strong position from which to fire on our troops. As Lieutenant Harrison was the officer in command and responsible, I am prepared to approve his action and the disposition of his command under the very trying conditions encountered. The overpowering heat, as well as the rough ground, plays an important part in all this mountain work, and the hard and trying work of officers and men is generally barren of result, because the enemy will not stand and defend any position. They simply inflict

what damage possible from a safe distance and then disappear on any movement to outflank or surround them. To move against any force placed as shown on inclosed sketch would probably result in severe loss and without any adequate result. An example is found in the attack by Captain Wilhelm last June under similar condi-



Scene of engagement on Mount Bagulmanoc, October 8, 1901.

mons. The difficulties of mountain warfare are so familiar to the department commander that it seems unnecessary to enlarge on the subject.

S. S. SUMNER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I.,

October 23, 1901.

The ADJUTANT, FIRST CAVALRY,
Batangas, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of a scout made in compliance with verbal orders of regimental commander:

I left Batangas, P. I., October 20, 1901, with 24 privates, 3 noncommissioned officers, Troop D, First Cavalry, and 5 privates, Troop I, First Cavalry, all mounted, with two days' field rations in saddle-bags. Arrived in Ibaan at 4.30 p. m. and left that post at 4 o'clock the following morning, proceeding in direction of mountains east of there. I found trails in very poor shape, and after six hours' traveling, with two horses badly lamed, decided to go to Taysan and make the trip from there by night. Left Taysan at 11.30 night of October 21, leaving 5 men and horses, sick and unable to travel, behind. At 4 o'clock in the morning the guide lost his way completely, and I was compelled to remain where I was until dawn, when upon getting again upon right trail I proceeded two miles further and struck cuartel of Capitan Baristo Castillo. I was able to partially surround the house, and from information received from two of the men captured learned that Baristo, riding a gray American horse, and with 12 men, armed, had left the day before for the mountains around Loboo, and that he had sent word to his brother, who had a small command of 22 men in the district between Tiaong and San Juan de Bocboc, to join him at once, and to tell all insurrectos in that portion of the country to go at once south to the mountains. I located and destroyed Capitan Baristo's storehouse, with 40 cabanes of palay, a number of insurgent uniforms and clothing, a few bolos and spears, and some official communications, copies of which are inclosed herewith. While engaged in burning the cuartel, was fired on by a small force of about 20 insurgents located on adjoining peak. The fire seemed to come from two points. Got my horses under shelter, and sent a flanking party of 6 men around to the right. I fired a few volleys, and upon arrival of flanking party insurgents had left. Thoroughly scouted surrounding country, but could find no traces of them, but upon returning home was fired upon seven or eight times by small forces of three or four men on neighboring peaks. I tried every imaginable means to get some of these men, forming a skirmish line and climbing adjoining peaks and leaving two or three men, dismounted on the trail, after troop moved off, but was unsuccessful. They fired at long range, between 800 and 1,000 yards, and their bullets seldom came near. I arrived in Taysan about 1 o'clock and in Batangas at 7 p. m., October 22, 1901, having traveled about 60 miles during the trip.

The cuartel destroyed was the finest stocked I have ever seen. The country around barrio Tulos, where the fight occurred, consists of small peaks, separated by very deep ravines. One can not operate there in the daytime with any chance of success, and night movements by cavalry in such a country are very difficult.

Very respectfully,

J. D. TILFORD,
First Lieutenant, First Cavalry.

[First indorsement.]

BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., October 24, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general first district, Department of Southern Luzon, Batangas, P. I.

Few expeditions in this province against the enemy have been attended with greater hardships than that of Lieutenant Tilford's.

The expedition was out in a drenching rain for two nights, the nights so dark as to render necessary the lighting of candles in order that the dim trail of the insurgents might be followed over the high peaks and across ravines and canyons, making it necessary to lower the animals down the sides of the mountains by lariats into the ravines below.

Considering the condition of the weather and the almost insurmountable obstacles overcome by him, this persevering young officer merits a favorable notice from superior headquarters.

A. B. WELLS,
Colonel First Cavalry, Commanding.

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
Batangas, Batangas Province, P. I., October 25, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general Department of Southern Luzon.
Attention invited to first indorsement, which is concurred in. Lieutenant Tilford certainly showed great energy and perseverance under very trying circumstances.

S. S. SUMNER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[Third indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
Manila, P. I., November 1, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general Division of the Philippines. The inclosures mentioned have not been received at these headquarters. Lieutenant Tilford has been commended by me in letter sent through headquarters of his district commander, copy inclosed.

J. F. WADE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
Manila, P. I., November 1, 1901.

First Lieut. J. D. TILFORD, First Cavalry,
(Through Commanding General, Third Brigade),
Batangas, Batangas.

SIR: I am directed by Brig. Gen. James F. Wade, U. S. Army, commanding Department of Southern Luzon, to express to you his appreciation and commendation of the energy, perseverance, and determination displayed by you on a scout from October 20 to 22, 1901, in the vicinity of Taysan. The qualities displayed by you on this occasion speak well for your future as a soldier and meet with the highest approbation of the department commander.

Very respectfully,

A. L. WAGNER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

LUCENA, TAYABAS PROVINCE, P. I., *October 31, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT, *Lucena, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that in compliance with order dated Lucena, P. I., October 25, 1901, directing that I proceed with 40 men of my troop to Pagbilao, Tayabas Province, P. I., and operate against insurgents reported to be in that vicinity, I left Lucena at 8.30 p. m. October 25, arriving at Pagbilao at 11 o'clock that night.

The next morning, acting upon information obtained by the sergeant in command at Pagbilao, I proceeded in the direction of Atimonan about 7 miles, returning at 4 o'clock p. m., without incident.

I then personally sought more accurate information as to the whereabouts of the insurgents and found that they had left the vicinity of Pagbilao and gone to or near the barrios Palali, Sevilla, and Mainit, pueblo of Tayabas, there to join other insurgents under Col. Bernardo Morguez. Some of the bolomen, while in the vicinity of Pagbilao, when asked what they expected to accomplish without rifles, replied that they would get rifles, probably at Mauban. Their strength was reported to be about 60 or 70 rifles and 100 or 150 bolomen, and it was thought that they had come up from the towns Atimonan, Gumaca, and Lopez. Their leader was known to people of Pagbilao only as Captain Pedro.

I therefore, on the morning of the 27th, left Pagbilao for the barrio of Palali, requesting that Lieutenant Hickman move in that direction from Tayabas and that the commanding officer at Lucban cover trails leading toward Palali and Mainit from Lucban. I met Lieutenant Hickman in Palali at 6 p. m., but without obtaining any information of the insurgents.


As the trails from Pagbilao and Tayabas to Palali had been covered by Lieutenant Hickman and me, and as Captain Wright had been directed to cover the trails from Lucban in the same direction, I thought that if the insurgents had really been in

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ROUTE SKETCH

RECONNAISSANCE OF
1st Lieut. H. R. Richmond, 1st Cav.

0 1 2 3 4 5 10 ms.



Palali they must have moved in the direction of Mauban, especially since the bolomen had remarked that they would get rifles there. Acting upon this supposition, I camped at Palali that night and the next morning at 6 o'clock followed the trail to Mauban. About 4 miles from Palali found unusual number barefooted tracks in the trail, and further on, near the barrios of Bali Balay and Mauban, while the rear guard was crossing small river, three men appeared on the bank behind them, two of whom had on belts with cartridge boxes and cross belts; the third man had on ordinary clothing and was captured, the other two making their escape. The prisoner proved to be the teniente of the barrio of Bali Balay, and stated that he had just met the other two men, that he did not know them, and that they were insurrectos, armed as stated above.

The trail being very difficult, I was compelled to halt at dark and spend the night in Bali Balay, arriving in Mauban the next day at 11 o'clock and finding everything there very quiet. I was informed by a native there, in whom I have great confidence, that the night before my arrival two hombres had arrived from the mountains above Atimonan by a trail entering the trail I had just come over near barrio Bali Balay, and that they had told him they had met in the mountains about 60 riflemen, not so many bolomen, and some were carrying bundles, marching toward Atimonan; that one of the latter who had fallen out of the column told them that the insurgents were going to a place in the mountains back of Atimonan.

If this be true, the insurgents may have been in front of me until they turned off back toward Atimonan near Bali Balay.

Being unable to obtain any information of armed insurgents near Mauban or Sampaloc, I left Mauban at 6 o'clock a. m., October 30, and passing through Sampaloc arrived at Lucban at 2.30 p. m. I remained at Lucban until 9.30 a. m. the next day, and then returned to Lucena, arriving at 1.45 p. m., without incident, horses and men in good condition.

I was informed at Mauban that there are a great many ladrones claiming to belong to the command of Comandante Apolinario Magpili, operating in the mountain country between Sampaloc and Cavinti, and that Magpili had in all about 150 guns, scattered in groups in the barrios, making it very difficult to capture them.

Very respectfully,

H. R. RICHMOND,

First Lieutenant, First Cavalry, Commanding Troop C.

[First indorsement.]

LUCENA, TAYABAS PROVINCE, LUZON, P. I., November 2, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Third Separate Brigade, Division of the Philippines, Batangas, P. I.

A tracing showing route of this scout is inclosed, prepared by Capt. H. H. Bandholtz, quartermaster Second Infantry, intelligence officer at this station.

C. S. ROBERTS,

Colonel Second Infantry, Commanding.

CATANAUAN, P. I., October 28, 1901.

THE ADJUTANT SECOND INFANTRY,

Lucena, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that at 7 o'clock p. m., October 25, 1901, I left this post for the barrio of Cogot Cogot, this town, with a detachment of 5 enlisted men of Company K, Second Infantry, and 5 native scouts of Company K, Second Infantry. We proceeded in bancas to Bayao, four hours up the Catanauan River, and thence by land to Cogot Cogot, which point we reached at 4 o'clock a. m., October 26, 1901.

Capt. Juan De la Rosas is in command of the insurrectos in this district. We reached this man's house in time to see him jump out of a window and escape in the bush. He left his cap with the insurrecto insignia of rank, also his sword and dagger sheath, behind him. Roman Batad, a private of voluntarios, was captured in the house. His certificate as a soldier, issued by Lieut. Col. Ruperto Rios, was here found. Several arrows and 1 bow were in the house as well. Hoping to capture De la Rosas, I ordered Sergeant Sturgill to take the detachment and proceed back on the trail until he should be just within hearing distance of a rifle report from this house. I secreted myself in the house with Private Bebout, Company K, Second Infantry, and 1 native scout, and I waited for Captain De la Rosas. The detachment had hardly been gone five minutes before I heard several shots fired. Just before I rejoined the detachment they fired a volley. On reaching them I found that Private John W. Gemmill, Company K, Second Infantry, and Private Iglani, native

scout, Company K, had been wounded by arrows. These were fired by men concealed on top of a hill over which the trail led. Gemmill was just grazed across the stomach. Iglani was hit in the chest, the arrow going half an inch. As the scouts told me that these arrows were poisoned, I immediately burnt out the wounds with matches. Lieutenant Bishop, Second Infantry, joined me in half an hour with 15 men. He should have come up sooner, but I had been wrongly informed as to what time the tide changed. His party had to work against the current all the way up the river, and was consequently delayed. I took 5 fresh men, and, retaining 3 of the scouts, instructed Lieutenant Bishop to proceed with the rest of the column to Catanauan. With the men I had I covered the trails around me. In an hour and a half 2 natives came within view, armed with bows and arrows. They came straight for where I was hidden with my party. Their dogs were ahead of them, saw us, and, turning around, went back. The natives evidently became suspicious, for they also turned back. We fired at them, and they both made for the bush and could not be found. I burned the house of De la Rosas and then started back for Catanauan. Reached here at 7 o'clock p. m., October 27, 1901. I found that both wounded men were well.

Very respectfully,

G. DE G. CATLIN,
First Lieutenant, Second Infantry, Commanding.

BAUAN, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., November 13, 1901.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, THIRD SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Batangas, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of an action between Troop K, First Cavalry, and insurgent forces, which took place just outside of Bauan, on November 12, 1901:

On November 10 Sebastian Brual, presidente, and Daniel Farol, chief of police, of Bauan, reported to me "(1) that a number of insurgents were then at Colvo, a barrio of this pueblo, located in the mountains, about 8 miles west of Bauan; (2) that cuartels were being constructed near Durangao, near the place where I had destroyed three cuartels on May 20, 1901; (3) that an ambuscade was to be prepared between Bauan and the barrio of Balayong, about 2 miles distant, on the Bauan-Taal road; and (4) that an insurgent command was seen at Banay-Banay, on land owned by Manuel Genato, just north of San Jose." I at once notified the commanding officer, San Jose, by wire, and at daylight the next morning sent a force, consisting of First Lieut. P. W. Arnold, First Cavalry, in command, Second Lieut. John S. McCleery, Twentieth Infantry, with 25 men of Company I, Twentieth Infantry, 12 men of Second Company Philippine Scouts, Macabebes, accompanied by 5 members of the municipal police, to Colvo. This party returned in the evening without having encountered any insurgents, but reported having noticed many suspicious things, and at one place a table set with 8 plates, mess outfits such as were formerly used by Spanish soldiers.

Shortly after dark the same day the chief of police came rushing into my quarters with the information that a runner had just come in from Gulibay, a barrio about 3 miles west of Bauan, who stated that 400 insurgents were then on their way to Bauan for the purpose of setting fire to Bauan, because the people of Bauan had taken measures to cut off the food supply from the insurgents, by ordering a concentration of all rice into the town on or before December 1. About the same time a telegram was received from Major West, Sixth Cavalry, commanding officer at Taal, which stated that the insurgents were concentrating on Bauan, which was to be attacked either on the 12th or 13th instant; also that cuartels were being built at Durangao, and that he would leave for Durangao the next morning. I learned later that he left for Durangao the same night.

I had the guards doubled and patrolled the streets and principal avenues of approach all night, and at 7 o'clock the next morning I took all available men of Troop K, First Cavalry, 52 in all, Second Lieut. Copley Enos, First Cavalry, 2 Macabebes scouts, and 1 member of the Hospital Corps, and set out for Durangao to cooperate with Major West, from Taal. Company I, Twentieth Infantry, and the detachment of Philippine scouts, Macabebes, were left in the post for its protection. The municipal police also worked constantly and faithfully during the fight as well as during the night preceding. On account of the rumor that an ambuscade was to be prepared on the hill just to the east of Balayong I left the main road about a mile from here (Bauan) and almost immediately my advance guard discovered and reported to me a large force of the enemy on the south side of the main road. We dismounted to fight on foot and immediately started advancing upon the enemy in extended order. He was then about

900 yards from us, with a company of about 75 bolomen in mass, on what then was his right flank, but which was intended for his rear support or reserve. The enemy fired on us almost immediately, and when about 800 yards from him a halt was made, and volley firing was kept up for several minutes, first at the line and then at the massed bolomen. The latter ran after they had received two volleys and disturbed us no more. Our line then advanced to about 600 yards, on the run, where we gained a small ridge from which we again resumed firing by volleys. In this advance Private William I. Rudd was wounded in left lower leg, the large bone being quite badly shattered. I then ordered another advance, and when this began the insurgents left their position and started on the retreat, taking up position after position along ridges which divided the fields. My command followed them from position to position, until finally they fled in disorder, splitting into small parties going in all directions excepting toward Bauan. Two larger bodies retreated one in a northerly direction toward Bologbog and the other west toward Durangao, from which direction I shortly afterwards heard some firing, which I judged was due to their having retreated into Major West's command. Later I learned that such was the case.

This caused many to change their direction so that they retreated due south and probably took refuge in the barrios San Andres, Bolo, and Munting Tubig on the coast. The action began at about 7.20 a. m., and the main action lasted about an hour, although we kept up firing volleys into groups retreating until 9.20 a. m., at which time Lieut. J. D. Tilford, with 25 men of Troop D, First Cavalry, came up from Batangas. I immediately dispatched him after the column that retreated north, sending with him Sergeant Hufeld as guide. He met with no resistance nor did he encounter any insurgents.

As my men had been constantly on the go, and as a great deal of the work was done at a double time or run in a hot sun, they were completely exhausted, and I gave them rest. After the horses had been brought up we took a skirmish formation and rode over the ground where the principal action had taken place, in order to try to find arms and see what damage was done to the enemy. I then counted 16 dead and 5 badly wounded on the field. A burial party of natives went out late yesterday afternoon and buried 22. Many wounded have been brought into Bauan since the engagement, and natives say that at least 50 were wounded. Personally I saw only 5, all of whom probably were mortally wounded, but many others have been brought into Bauan since. We picked up on the field 4 Mausers, 1 Murata, and 2 Remington rifles, and 2 Remington carbines, all serviceable, and 15 bolos. Two prisoners were captured. Besides Private Rudd, Corpl. William E. McNabney was twice wounded, once on the head by a bullet, which knocked him down and stunned him for a minute, but he went on with the rest, and shortly afterwards a boloman jumped up out of the tall grass and started running after my men, stabbing at whoever was near him. He inflicted a slight wound in the side of Corporal McNabney, but finally the boloman fell with 3 bullet holes. Corporal McNabney continued throughout the fight. I beg to especially mention for the favorable consideration of the Brigade and Department Commanders the following-named enlisted men who came under my especial notice during the engagement, viz, Q. M. Sergt. John Neimeier, Sergt. Frederick W. Hufeld, Corpl. William E. McNabney, and Private William Miller, all of Troop K, First Cavalry.

I dread to think what would have been the consequences had we continued on the main road, as at the place where they had arranged the ambushade and expected to attack us the road bed is about 15 feet lower than the surrounding country, with cut banks and a hedge on each side. Shelter trenches had been built parallel to the road on both sides of it at a distance of about 75 yards from the road.

According to native sources, 400 insurgents were in the engagement, about half with rifles and half with bolos. I believe that this estimate is not exaggerated. There were probably about 250 in our immediate front and about 150 on the north side of the road. The forces engaged were those of Lieut. Col. Jacinto Dimacalanagan, commanding zone of Bauan. Majs. Francisco Castillo and Geronimo Leynes were on the field. The latter is said to have been wounded in the arm, and Lieut. Salvador Belongpo is reported to have received a fracture of thigh bone. Lieut. Angel Aguila is reported among the killed.

The command returned to Bauan at 11 o'clock and at 12.45 left for Durangao to look for cuartels and to attempt to meet Major West's command. Nothing was developed in the afternoon, although the absence of men from all barrios was very noticeable. Returned to Bauan at 6.15 p. m. Total distance for day, 24 miles.

The telegraph wire was found cut at point where insurgents had chosen their position. I believe that a great many of the natives from Bauan went out and participated in the action and later returned and are now again posing as friendly natives. Two such have been arrested since the fight.

I am proud to say that the conduct of Second Lieut. Copley Enos, and of all the enlisted men of the command was all that could have been desired.

Respectfully submitted.

J. D. L. HARTMAN,
Commanding Troop K, and Post.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY,
Batangas, Batangas Province, P. I., November 15, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Third Separate Brigade, Batangas, P. I.

In forwarding this valuable and interesting report I desire to call the attention of the superior headquarters that this is not the first successful expedition against the enemy that this officer has made in the past six months.

The admirable disposition made by the commanding officer of his small force rendered a surprise impossible, but made it possible for a complete victory over the enemy.

It is doubtful if the enemy ever received a sounder thrashing than has just been given him by Captain Hartman and his troop.

The enlisted men mentioned in this report by Captain Hartman, I join in recommending them to the Secretary of War for such consideration as in his opinion their cases merit.

Captain Hartman, his officers, and troop who were in the engagement deserve the thanks and gratitude of their superior officers.

Information has just been received, since the receipt of this report, of the deaths of several of the wounded that were carried off the field by the enemy, which swells the number dead to nearly or quite 30 in all.

A. B. WELLS,
Colonel First Cavalry, Commanding.

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD SEPARATE BRIGADE,
DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
Batangas, P. I., November 16, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Department of Southern Luzon. Attention is invited to first indorsement, which is heartily approved.

S. S. SUMNER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[Third indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
Manila, P. I., November 23, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Division of the Philippines. I concur fully in the recommendation of Captain Hartman, by his regimental commander, as contained in the first indorsement. Subsequent reports, from apparently reliable native sources, indicate that the total casualties of the insurgents in this engagement were fully 100.

J. F. WADE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

NASUGBU, BATANGAS PROVINCE, LUZON, P. I.,
November 27, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

(Through military channels.)

SIR: Pursuant to paragraph 885, Army Regulations, I have the honor to submit the following report of engagement with insurgents (or ladrones having a recognized insurgent standing) in this province:

At 6.50 a. m., November 23, 1901, a mounted detachment from this station, consisting of First Lieut. Louis Joseph Van Schaick, Sixteenth Infantry, and 16 enlisted men of Company H, Fourth Infantry, accompanied by Asst. Surg. James E. Mead, myself in command, started in pursuit of a band of ladrones, which had just attacked the town of Lian, about 3 miles south of this station.

At about 8.15 a. m., the rear guard of the enemy, 50 strong, was encountered, deployed on the crest of a commanding hill, Pinquian, southeast of Nasugbu, and about 5½ miles from said town by the route taken through Lian. This hill is about 150 feet high. At its foot, about 350 yards from the crest, the detachment dismounted under cover of some trees which fringe a small stream at that point, and advanced on the position, driving the enemy from it. In this attack, 1 private of Company H was slightly wounded in finger of the right hand. The enemy left 1 dead and 1 wounded on the field.

The ladrone band was followed up on foot for about 2 miles, until the horses arrived, the pursuit then being continued mounted. During this part of the pursuit the enemy left 1 more dead and 1 more wounded on the field.

At about 10 a. m., upon emerging from a fringe of trees, a portion of the enemy's rear guard was suddenly encountered near the barrio of Abilo. This town is situated on the river Sumindac, at the foot of Monte Dumulag, in a northeasterly direction from Nasugbu, and about 13 miles from said town by the route traveled. The detachment at once charged along the trail, officers at the front, and there ensued a hand to hand fight between the few at the head of the column and the ladrones.

I here give in detail the action of First Lieut. Louis Joseph Van Schaick, Sixteenth Infantry, as being worthy of record. In the charge just mentioned the said Lieutenant Van Schaick killed 3 ladrones with his revolver, and in his attack upon a fourth found his cartridges exhausted. The ladrone snapped his piece at the lieutenant, and it was only a defective cartridge that saved the latter's life. The lieutenant then charged over his adversary, the force of the shock felling and disarming the latter, then dismounted to engage him on foot. In this personal encounter the lieutenant received two severe bolo cuts in the left arm, one to the bone near the elbow, the other nearly severing the wrist. Assistant Surgeon Mead closing in from the right, myself from the left, and First Sergeant Gothe, Company H, from the rear, shot the ladrone almost simultaneously. The assistant surgeon at once dressed the lieutenant's wound, a guard being left at the dressing station.

The remainder of the detachment under my command continued the pursuit, and, dismounting at the barrio, drove the enemy across the river.

In the engagement in this vicinity 6 dead ladrones were seen on the field, 4 of these being killed at close quarters by the officers. At the river 26 carabaoes and 5 native ponies were recaptured from the ladrone band. In the two engagements 2 Remington and 1 Mauser rifle, 1 Remington carbine, and 68 rounds of ammunition were captured; and 2 prisoners were taken, both wounded.

Owing to the serious wound of Lieutenant Van Schaick, the necessary depletion of the detachment, to furnish him with a guard, the almost exhausted condition of the horses after the prolonged and trying pursuit, and the fact that the main body of the enemy was well beyond the river, and the rear of it no longer encumbered by plunder, it was imperative that the pursuit be given up at this point.

After a suitable rest the detachment returned, reaching this station at about 6.30 p.m., after having marched a total distance of about 29 miles.

From the wounded prisoners, whose statements were subsequently corroborated, it was learned that the band of ladrones consisted of the united ladrone bands of Comandante Ciriaco, of Indang; Capt. Pedro Araro, of Alfonso; Lieutenant Lucio, of San Francisco de Malabon; Lieut. Pedro Parias, of Indang; and Lieut. Julian Ramos, of Alfonso, all under command of Comandante Ciriaco, who is reported to have a recognized standing with the insurgents. The united bands numbered between 200 and 300 strong, and were armed with between 100 and 125 Mauser and Remington rifles and carbines and 4 Krag-Jørgensen rifles, also with revolvers and many bolos.

On the third day after the fight an armed party of reliable natives was sent to the scene of the two engagements, by way of the route taken by the mounted detachment, and learned that Lieut. Pedro Ramos and 2 privates, identified by name, had been wounded, in addition to the 2 wounded prisoners, and that, in all, 16 ladrones had either been killed outright in the pursuit and the two engagements, or had died of their wounds in that space of time, this number being equal to the total enlisted strength of the opposing American force.

I desire here to express my appreciation of the hearty support and valuable assistance rendered by First Lieutenant Van Schaick, Sixteenth Infantry, throughout the pursuit and during the engagements with the enemy; also to commend him most highly on his prompt action on close encounter with the enemy, and on his undaunted spirit and marked personal bravery, which was a material factor in the successful culmination of the pursuit.

I desire also to commend the conduct of Assistant Surgeon Mead, who was always with the foremost, and, though not a line officer, he rendered material aid in the attack at close quarters upon the enemy.

SUMMARY.

Americans.—Mounted detachment, Company H, Fourth Infantry: Strength, 3 commissioned officers (including the assistant surgeon); 16 enlisted men. Arms, 16 rifles and 5 revolvers. Casualties, 1 officer, two severe bolo cuts, left arm; 1 private, slight flesh wound, right hand. Prisoners captured from the enemy, 2 (both wounded, and one subsequently having his leg amputated).

Arms, ammunition, and stolen property captured from the enemy: 2 Remington rifles, 1 Mauser rifle, 1 Remington carbine; total, 4 firearms, 68 rounds Remington and Mauser ammunition, 26 carabao, 5 ponies.

Many articles of household and store goods, such as sewing machine, bedding, clothing, cloth, etc.

Two native women captured by the *ladrones* to be held for ransom, and two of the *Lian* police, also prisoners, were turned loose by the *ladrones* on their being hard pressed by the Americans.

Enemy.—United *ladrone* bands under command of Comandante Ciriaco: Strength, between 200 and 300. Arms, between 100 and 125 rifles and carbines, 4 Krag-Jørgensen rifles, revolvers and many bolos. Casualties, 16 killed (numbering the same as the enlisted strength of the opposing American force), 5 wounded; loss in prisoners, 2 (these being two of the wounded above cited).

Very respectfully,

GUY H. B. SMITH,
Captain, Fourth Infantry, Commanding.

[First Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH INFANTRY,
Camp Wallace, Manila, P. I., December 22, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded, inviting attention to the recommendations of Capt. G. H. B. Smith, Fourth Infantry, inclosed herewith.

BUTLER D. PRICE,
Lieutenant-Colonel Fourth Infantry, Commanding.

LOBOO, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., *December 10, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT,
Batangas Province, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that about 7 o'clock on December 8, 1901, a detachment of 15 men of Fourth Company, native troops (Macabebes), under charge of Sergeant Jedlinskin, Company L, Twentieth Infantry, escorting Lieutenant Munro, First Cavalry, to the launch, was fired upon by insurgents when returning from the beach, from both sides of the road; no casualties to the detachment; 2 insurgents reported killed.

About 7:15 o'clock same night, December 8, 1901, the town of Loboo was attacked by insurgents from the east and north sides, and the west side was occupied, but no shots came from that direction; in all, I believe about 200 insurgents with rifles, but only about 60 rifles participated in the attack. Firing from a few rifles continued all night and ceased about 6.30 o'clock a. m., December 9; no casualties.

About 7.30 o'clock a. m., December 9, a reconnoissance of 7 men of the Fourth Company, native troops (Macabebes), under Lieutenant Leonard, Twentieth Infantry, were fired on from a house, killing Esteban Nabuag; no other casualties.

The insurgents withdrew shortly after this in the direction of Talampo and Talihib, as near as can be determined.

I am reliably informed that the following insurgent officers were present: Comandante Elesco Clandio, Cpts. Tomas Remariz and Felis Faral, Gabi.

Very respectfully,

W. A. CAVENAUGH,
First Lieutenant, Twentieth Infantry, Commanding.


BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., *December 15, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT, *Batangas, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

Pursuant to verbal orders of Col. A. B. Wells, First Cavalry, commanding Batangas, on December 9 I took 6 men of Company G, Twenty-first Infantry, and accompanied a pack train to Taysan. I had orders to obtain from Lieutenant Brooks, commanding a Macabebe company at this station, a sufficient number of his men, and search for

a band of insurgents who I heard were in the mountains near Taysan, in Senturis, a barrio of Rosario. I left Taysan at 8.30 p. m., December 10, having with me 22 Macabebes, accompanied by one civilianscout and 5 men of Company G, Twenty-first Infantry, my intention being to reach Senturis before daylight. I got as far as a barrio, San Isidro, when my guide declared he could not possibly follow the trail to Senturis by night, and the Macabebes appeared somewhat tired, so I waited there until morning, when we again started forward. In a barrio, Tolos, an insurgent outlook was found, in which one soldier was taken prisoner. Upon being questioned he said that about 50 armed insurgents had been at Senturis, but that a few days before they had gone to Loboo. This information was verified by three other prisoners



Sketch of scout from Taysan, Batangas, December 10-12, 1901.

captured near by. Knowing that the garrison at Loboo had been attacked, I judged this information to be correct, so I decided to move toward Loboo in the hope that they would be driven from there and would probably come back to their old position at Senturis, and that by luck I might meet them on the way. Carrying out this idea we had marched a little over an hour when, about a mile away, I saw them running out of two houses on a high hill. When we got about 800 yards from them they opened fire. I lined my men up and returned a few volleys. The Macabebes were armed with Springfield carbines and on account of their smoke, which not only made a target for the insurgents but also obscured our sight, and also because of their poor fire (most of them shooting into the air or into the ground), I had them stop alto-

gether, and during the rest of the fight the five American soldiers with me were the only ones who fired. From this point I moved up on the hill where they were stationed, trying to take it as much as possible in the flank. When we reached the top of the hill my corporal, one Macabebe, and I went around to the cuartel to see what was there. As we were about to enter the house the enemy fired a volley at us from a hill to which they had retreated, about 900 yards in the rear, killing the corporal instantly. We drove them out of their new position and they gradually retreated farther and farther away until they disappeared over a hill about 2,000 yards away. Just after dark that night I went to the hill over which they went in the hope of getting them, but could find no trace of them, and all the houses around were deserted. Wishing to bury my dead man as soon as possible, and having one wounded Macabebe who needed attention, I started for Taysan, where we arrived December 12. On the way in several prisoners were captured, one of whom claimed to be sort of a commissary for the insurgent column. When captured he had a pony loaded with rice and chickens. He said he had been in the fight and gave the information that the column was commanded by Maj. Fernando Garcia, alias "Gabe;" that under him were Capts. Geronimo Hornillo, Oranato Velasquez, Barcellino Luntoc, and Lieut. Pedro Casala. The latter, who is a son of Col. Briccio Casala, was wounded, together with several others; also that several were killed. If this is so, they took their killed and wounded with them, as the only evidence that I have that anyone was hit was that near the cuartel were several blotches of blood. The cuartel and all surrounding houses were destroyed. I estimate the insurgent force that I met to be about 50 strong, with about 25 rifles. The casualties on the American side were: Killed, Corpl. C. H. C. Beach, Company G, Twenty-first Infantry; wounded, one Macabebe, private, of Lieutenant Brooks's company, name unknown to me.

Very respectfully,

W. M. FASSETT,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-first Infantry.

FOURTH COMPANY NATIVE SCOUTS MACABEBES,
Batangas, Batangas Province., P. I., December 16, 1901.

ADJUTANT, *Batangas, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith report of operations of myself and 20 men Fourth Native Scouts Macabebes and Lieutenant Leonard and 30 men Company L, Twentieth Infantry, in vicinity of Loboo, P. I., from December 10 to 13, inclusive.

In compliance with verbal instructions from Col. A. B. Wells, First Cavalry, commanding forces in the field, left Loboo, P. I., December 10, with above-mentioned troops with a native who stated that he knew a trail to rear of position of insurgents on Mount Niaga. Proceeded by the way of barrios of Mabilnadunduc, Suang, and Malabrigo, arriving there at 4 a. m., December 11; followed the river bed from this point 6 miles north to a sitio of Malabrigo, where 1 insurgent was killed and 1 wounded.

A cuartel was found at this place and destroyed, with supplies, uniforms, etc. The guide proved to be of no further value here, and it was impossible to proceed farther in this direction; returned by same trail by way of Suang to Tayuman; proceeded north and east from here by way of Castila to Ulango. Insurgents had evacuated this barrio the night previous, leaving a large amount of supplies, which were destroyed. Followed same trail east to Jabanga, where a large amount of palay was destroyed.

Mount Niaga was scouted thoroughly from this place and no insurgents were found.

December 13 proceeded north and east to Nan-Lobo, where insurgents had abandoned a herd of cattle; it being impossible to capture these animals, they were killed to prevent them from again falling into their hands. Two insurgents were killed at this place and the barrio burned.

The majority of the men being without shoes, the condition of their feet rendered it necessary to return to Loboo. Returned by way of Bignay, which we burned, as it had been used as a rendezvous by the enemy. A large herd of cattle was left at this place by the insurgents, which were killed, as it was impossible to capture them. All streams very high and trails muddy in the country covered by the column.


Country was also deserted by all except a few insurgents.

Total distance scouted, 50 miles.

A sketch of the country traversed made by Lieutenant Leonard, Twentieth Infantry, inclosed herewith.

Very respectfully,


BOSS REESE,
First Lieutenant, Philippine Scouts, Commanding Column.



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
Mountainous.




Map of
4th Co. Macabes
DEC. 10th

SKETCH by Lt. Leona

abrigo L^t HOUSE





SKETCH SHOWING SAN ISIDRO AND BATANGAS, P. I.

[First indorsement.]

BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I.,
December 18, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general Third Separate Brigade, Batangas, P. I. The promptness and secrecy in which this scout as well as other expeditions have been made by both these young officers merits the commendation of their superiors.

A. B. WELLS,
Colonel First Cavalry, Commanding.

BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., December 17, 1901.

The ADJUTANT, *Batangas, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of an engagement which took place at the barrio of San Isidro between 30 men of Troop I, First Cavalry, and about 125 armed insurgents, of whom about 30 were riflemen.

Word was received from the presidente that there was a force of insurgents at the barrio of San Isidro, intimidating the people and preventing them from coming into Batangas.

At about 10 o'clock a. m. December 16 I was ordered to proceed with 30 men of my troop to the barrio of San Isidro, using as a guide a native policeman of Batangas.

I reached the barrio in about an hour's time, and the few natives who were seen in that vicinity stated that there were no insurgents in that locality. We proceeded farther on the trail, which at that point had a gully on each side, and beyond each gully was a long hill parallel to the trail and commanding it. We had advanced only a few yards farther when the insurgents opened upon us from these hills with two well-directed volleys at the head of the column. One horse was wounded.

Not being able to attack the insurgent position mounted, on account of the above-mentioned gullies, I dismounted the men, and after the horses were led a few yards to the rear, we advanced dismounted, the insurgents keeping up quite a steady fire. After doing a little firing from the trail we left it by the right flank, and in skirmish line we went down the gully and up the hill occupied by the enemy. In this advance the men were entirely in the open and the attack was up an almost bare hill.

It was hoped that the insurgents would stand, but they kept up a fire only until we started the ascent to their hill, when they broke and ran. We advanced as rapidly as possible, firing volleys at the fast-retreating natives. We followed them until they broke up into twos and threes and fled in different directions to the mountains.

In returning to the horses I counted seven dead insurgent soldiers on the field. On some of these cartridges were found, indicating that they were riflemen. The two trails leading farther into the mountains were bloody, and it is believed that many insurgents were wounded. None of the men of Troop I were hit. Several had narrow escapes, as the first fire of the insurgents was well directed.

After giving my men a little rest, I detailed 8 men to accompany Sergeant Green, whose horse had been wounded, to Batangas. I directed Sergeant Green to report the result of the fight and to state that we needed no reinforcements. I then proceeded ahead on the trail. No insurgents were seen. In a short time we heard firing off to our left, and it seems that some insurgents in retreating were fired on by the Macabebes, under Lieutenant Reese, who was about 2 miles farther north.

Just at this time Col. A. B. Wells, First Cavalry, rode up with First Lieut. R. S. Fitch, First Cavalry, and Dr. Coleman Nockolds, First Cavalry, and a detachment consisting of Troop D, First Cavalry, commanded by First Lieut. J. D. Tilford, First Cavalry.

After a moment's halt they advanced into the mountains and made a thorough scout of the vicinity.

I proceeded in the direction from which I had heard the firing of the Macabebes, but was unable to find any more insurgents. Lieutenant Reese informed me later, when I met him, that with his glasses he saw the insurgents cross the divide of the mountains on the Loboo trail.

I then returned to Batangas, arriving at 4.30 p. m. In the accompanying rough sketch the blue dash line represents the route taken by my detachment. The insurgents are represented in their position on the trail by red ink.

Respectfully submitted.

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
First Lieutenant, First Cavalry, Commanding Troop I.

[First indorsement.]

BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., *December 18, 1901.*


Respectfully forwarded [to the adjutant-general Third Separate Brigade, Batangas, P. I. The promptness in which this officer got to the enemy and the severe chastisement he gave him is most commendable.

A. B. WELLS,
Colonel First Cavalry, Commanding.

BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., *December 17, 1901.*The ADJUTANT, FIRST CAVALRY, *Batangas, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of a scout made in compliance with verbal orders regimental commander:

Left post at 2.30 a. m. morning of December 16 with 35 privates and 5 noncommissioned officers Troop D, First Cavalry, and proceeded to barrio Conde, where a large




Scout of Lieut. J. D. Tilford, First Cavalry, morning of December 16, 1901.

force of insurgents was said to be located. Surrounded the barrio at dawn, but found all the houses empty. While burning the houses was fired on by one or two men armed with Remingtons at a distance of about 800 yards. As a deep ravine intervened, I could not get to them directly. After firing two or three volleys at these men and driving them away I completely destroyed the houses in the vicinity and returned to Batangas, arriving at 8.30 a. m.

I found the country around barrio Conde completely deserted, and this fact, together with having one of my men severely wrench his knee, owing to a fall of his horse, caused my return to Batangas.

At 11.30 a. m., heavy firing having been heard in direction of barrio San Isidro, I was directed by Col. A. B. Wells, First Cavalry, post commander, to accompany him with 25 of my men, and we proceeded at once to the mountains east of here. After a trot of about 7 miles over a rough country we arrived on the scene of Troop I's fight with insurgents in time to pour a few volleys into the few small scattered bands of insurgents who were fleeing in every direction.

Accompanied by Colonel Wells, the troop thoroughly scouted the country within a radius of 3 or 4 miles of the fight, arriving in post at 5.20 p. m. During scout killed 2 insurgents and wounded 1.



Scout of Lieut. J. D. Tilford, First Cavalry, afternoon of December 16, 1901.

A few minutes after arrival I was called on for a detachment of 10 men to proceed to scene of Lieutenant Fassett's fight. Five of the 10 men who volunteered to go on this trip had been on the two preceding scouts of the day.

Very respectfully,

J. D. TILFORD,
First Lieutenant, First Cavalry, Commanding Troop D.

[First indorsement.]

BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., December 22, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general Third Separate Brigade, Batangas, P. I.

Lieutenant Tilford got out with great promptness.


A. B. WELLS,
Colonel First Cavalry, Commanding.

BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., December 18, 1901.

The ADJUTANT, Batangas, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report: On the afternoon of December 16, 1901, at about 2 o'clock, having heard that some bolomen were in the barrio Colod (a barrio of Batangas, about 2 miles from it), I took 30 men of Company G, Twenty-first Infantry, to find them. West of the barrio Colod, on a small hill, we saw drawn up in skirmish line about 15 men with rifles. I formed skirmish line, facing them at a distance of about 300 yards. Both sides fired a few volleys, and then I moved forward, keeping the same formation. Between the enemy and my line was a ravine, and during the difficulties in passing this my line was necessarily somewhat crumpled up. As soon as part of my men had passed the ravine I lined them up and we started again for the hill. Upon arriving there I found the enemy had fled, but looking back I saw a good many bolomen running around directly in rear of my men, who were still crossing the ravine. The part of the company on the hill fired several volleys at these bolomen and they withdrew, moving in the direction of the barrio. One of my men, who happened to be the last to cross the ravine, was attacked by several men and severely cut in the arm. When

I went to him he was just across the ravine and one of his assailants was lying dying near him. Two other dead Filipinos were seen in the ravine near by. This man's rifle could not be found, and he is unable to say whether he lost it in crossing the ravine or the insurgents got it. We crossed the ravine lower down, trying to get in rear of the barrio toward which the insurgents had retreated, but though we searched the country around for several hours, they could not be found. No special effort was made to look for the killed and wounded insurgents, and on account of the high grass and thick underbrush, it was easy for the wounded to conceal themselves, but judging from the number who fell when we fired at them at a distance of only 300 yards, and from the amount of blood in the different trails, I should estimate the number killed and wounded to be about 10. Their force is estimated at about 15 riflemen and 60 bolomen. Their casualties were—3 seen dead, and estimated about 7 more killed and wounded. Our casualties were—1 wounded, Private Joseph Serva,



Sketch of scout from Batangas, December 16, 1901.

Company G, Twenty-first Infantry, 2 bolo cuts left arm, severe, 1 bolo cut head, slight. The town presidente reports that 1 officer and 6 men were killed and several more wounded.

Very respectfully,

W. M. FASSETT,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-first Infantry, Commanding Company G.

[First indorsement.]

BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I.,
December 18, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Third Separate Brigade, Batangas, P. I.

Few officers of this command have done as much hard service in the field against the enemy as Lieutenant Fassett. Always willing, anxious, and ready, stamps him one of the best and most competent officers in the service.

His great promptness in moving out in twenty minutes after the receipt of the whereabouts of the enemy is most commendable. It is known that 1 lieutenant and 6 men were killed and a great many wounded.


A. B. WELLS,
Colonel First Cavalry, Commanding.

BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., *December 21, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT, FIRST CAVALRY, *Batangas, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of a scout made in compliance with verbal orders of Col. A. B. Wells, First Cavalry, commanding:

Left Batangas at 11 p. m., December 19, with 38 men, Troop D, First Cavalry, mounted, and arrived in barrio Siranglupa, about 6 miles east of this station, at 1 a. m., December 20. Left horses and 16 men and proceeded on foot with 22 men up the sides of Mount Bonoi. The trail was a very long and difficult one, the men in places going on their hands and knees. In about two hours and a half a cuartel was located on the pinnacle of the mountain, and having surrounded it on two sides, I ordered a few shots fired, and then had the native scout tell the insurgents in the cuartel that if they surrendered and came out at once without guns no harm would be done them. Instead of coming out it was seen that they were making for their guns and bolos. I then ordered a volley fired into the shack, and again ceased firing, calling to the men to come out and surrender. After a wait of a few minutes one man came out and surrendered, and immediately afterwards one or two men jumped out of the back of the houses and escaped down the mountain side.



Scout of Lieut. J. D. Tilford, First Cavalry, December 19-20, 1901.

One man with a bolo and gun got out the front door, and owing to the failure of my revolver to work and to the sergeant's carbine being jammed, he also got away. This man I believe was the lieutenant in command, Mariano Guita.

Seeing that the entire force would escape in this fashion, it being so dark my men could barely see them as they ran, I ordered another volley fired in the shack. A few shots were fired by them, I believe, in return, and when they ceased my fire also ceased.

Counting the dead in the shack, and those that had been killed in trying to escape, I found 17 killed, 1 wounded, and 2 captured. Captured 16 rifles, as follows: Twelve Remingtons, 2 Mausers, 1 German express, and 1 Krag-Jørgensen, No. 116971; 14 war bolos, 506 rounds of ammunition, including 1 Government belt with Krag cartridges, 2 haversacks, 1 canteen, 1 cup, all marked "L," of the Twentieth.

My casualties were, native guide slightly wounded in foot.

Started down the mountain at dawn, with native guide in litter, and reached post at 8.30 a. m., December 20.

Very respectfully,

J. D. TILFORD,
First Lieutenant, First Cavalry, Commanding Troop D.

[First indorsement.]

BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I., *December 22, 1901.*

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Third Separate Brigade, Batangas, P. I.

This is one of many successful expeditions that this young and energetic officer has made in the past year.


If there is any way of rewarding him for this service I hope that it may be done.

A. B. WELLS,
Colonel First Cavalry, Commanding.

TAYSAN, P. I., December 21, 1901.

POST ADJUTANT, Batangas, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of surprise on insurrecto camp 10 miles east of this station on the night of December 20, 1901.



Sketch of scout from Taysan, Batangas, December 20, 1901.

I left this station at 6 p. m. with 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 7 privates of Company K, Twentieth Infantry, and 3 civilian scouts; first sergeant, 2 sergeants, 3 corporals, and 24 privates Seventh Company Native Scouts.

At 9.45 p. m. enemy was located on small hill directly in our front. Skirmish line was formed and advanced on hill, taking insurrectos completely by surprise.

Their position was taken with a known loss to enemy of 6 killed and 1 captured, 1 of which I think was an officer, as he was trying to rally his men within a few feet of our line when he was killed. He also wore an officer's bolo and dagger.

American loss, none.

Captured 1 Remington rifle in good condition, 50 rounds ammunition, 10 war bolos, and 7 daggers; destroyed 3 quartels and about 3 tons of palay.

The captured prisoner says there were 20 riflemen and 15 bolomen of Captain Barcelino's company, commanded by Lieutenant Boleria and Lieutenant Arineo, at this camp; also that this detachment was an outpost for Major Gobby's command, which is located in quarters on Mount Loco Loco and consists of 5 companies with strength of 75 to the company.

For several different reasons I considered it impracticable to continue on, so, after burning the quarters, I started on the return, arriving in Taysan at 4.30 a. m.

I would respectfully request that this company be furnished with 30 magazine rifles, as the Springfield carbine, caliber .45, that they are equipped with at present put them at a great disadvantage.

If it is impossible to furnish the magazine rifles, I would suggest that a platoon or company be sent to cooperate with this company to make an expedition to Mount Loco Loco.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT E. BROOKS,
First Lieutenant, Philippine Scouts, Commanding Station.

[First indorsement.]

BATANGAS, BATANGAS PROVINCE, P. I.,
December 28, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to adjutant-general Third Separate Brigade, Batangas, P. I. There are no magazine rifles for issue here.

A. B. WELLS,
Colonel First Cavalry, Commanding.

[Fourth indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., January 15, 1902.

Respectfully returned to the adjutant-general Department of North Philippines.

It is not deemed advisable to have arms of two different calibers in the same organization.

F. D. WEBSTER,
Captain, Twentieth Infantry, Aid-de-camp, Acting Ordnance Officer.


AMBULAN, BATANGAS, P. I., *December 28, 1901.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL THIRD SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Batangas, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of engagement at Caloocan barrio at Talisay, Batangas Province, Luzon, P. I., Saturday, December 21, 1901:

About 8 o'clock p. m. December 20 I received word that insurgents had surrounded the barrio of Caloocan and the people could not come into Ambulan, as ordered by the brigade commander. I immediately telephoned this information to commanding officer, Tanauan, who sent Capt. G. H. Estes, Twentieth Infantry, with 25 men Company G, Twentieth Infantry, and 20 Philippine Scouts to Ambulan, and gave me instructions to take what men I could spare from my command at Ambulan and investigate this report. Captain Estes arrived about 4 o'clock a. m. December 21. As Captain Estes and most of his men had been up the greater part of the night, I did not leave Ambulan until 8.30 a. m. December 21, when I started for Caloocan with Captain Estes's command and 15 men from Company A, Twentieth Infantry, and 25 Philippine Scouts from Ambulan. When I arrived at Banga I learned from the natives that about 100 insurgents, armed with rifles, left there early that morning for Caloocan. I pushed on as rapidly as possible, stopping to question natives, from whom I soon secured the information that the insurgents were at Caloocan and occupied a fortified position and intended to fight, as they had told them (the natives) to tell the Americans they were at Caloocan. We passed through the barrio of Caloocan and I began to think they had gone, as the guide kept saying they were ahead. Without any warning, when the point had gotten within about 125 yards of their position, we received a volley. Most of the men were

in a swamp, but immediately secured what cover they could from a few trees, and I ordered those who could fire without endangering the lives of our own men to return the fire. I immediately saw they had an embankment extending from cliff to lake. As it was impossible to flank them from lake side, I began looking to get around on other flank and sent ahead a few of my own company to see if they could get on mountain, which seemed impossible. I soon saw this was at best a long operation, and as very few men could secure any protection I decided not to wait, but to charge the fortification, notwithstanding the fact I saw the place was so situated that the men must move up practically in single file, as a skirmish line could not be formed on account of the nearness of briars and brush to lake at a point about 125 yards from embankment. These briars and brush furnished no protection, as the insurgents were apparently firing without any aim, but absolutely prevented any rapid advance. Private Isaac I. Cooper, who was with point when first volley was fired, ran ahead and secured cover behind a tree, about 75 yards of the embankment, and began firing. I had, when I decided to charge, gotten with Captain Estes and some men to within about 50 yards of Private Cooper. I had no bugler with me, but gave the order to charge; started for the embankment. When I had gotten within 25 yards of Private Cooper, he left the tree and ran alone for the embankment. The insurgents kept up the fire until Private Cooper was at embankment and started to go over it, when they scattered and ran. He grabbed one and scuffled with him for



Sketch of engagement at Caloocan, Batangas, December 21, 1901.

nearly 50 yards, when he finally captured him. As we had to charge through thick mud and slush, there was necessarily some distance between files. The insurgents ran, getting as much protection as possible by stooping over, and had gotten in brush before an effective force arrived at embankment. The men immediately followed, and when they saw a man running would immediately shoot at him. We found 7 dead insurgents and got 4 rifles.

Private James Phillips, Company A, and Gabrera, Philippine scout, were wounded in left upper arm and right leg, respectively, at first volley; wounds not serious. Sergt. James Smith and Private Carry Durbin, Company G, were wounded during the advance in right leg and left arm, respectively. These were serious, but not fatal. I sent the men out and followed the insurgents, but they had apparently scattered and gone into mountains. On account of wounded and difficulty in transporting them, I returned to Ambulan that night. Too much credit can not be given Private Cooper for his action. Such an act does a great deal of harm to the enemy and is of great value to our men. Since engagement I have taken prisoner the teniente of Caloocan, who admits being with insurgents, and says Gen. Nicolas Gonzales was near where we met the insurgents, but Lieut. Col. Anecito Ornga was in command at embankment. He reports that Colonel Ornga was wounded in the knee. He says 13 were killed or died before he left the insurgents, and several more were wounded.

Route, sketch of road and position inclosed.

Very respectfully,

W. S. GRAVES,
Captain, Twentieth Infantry, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

BATANGAS, February 25—11.30 a. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Manila:

Following report in compliance with your telegram 24th instant:

"About 1 a. m. December 23, 1901, Lieut. P. A. Connolly, with 29 enlisted men Company F, Twenty-first Infantry, and native guides, started south from San Jose, Batangas, in search of a party of insurgent riflemen and bolomen said to be at Sorosoro, which was reached about 5 a. m. Detachment divided into two parties to surround riflemen, but the latter could not be found.

"Lieutenant Connolly, with 7 American soldiers and 2 natives, then climbed down the vertical sides of a deep canyon, climbing by the roots of trees, to fight the bolomen, who had shouted, 'Come on and fight,' in Tagalog. The remainder of the party was left above to prepare for a possible return of the riflemen and to prevent the escape of the bolomen. A few shots were fired at about 50 yards before coming to close quarters. The first insurgent was seen hiding behind a rock. Lieutenant Connolly called, 'Come here and surrender.' He rushed upon the lieutenant, who shot him twice, Musician Gilbert shooting him once. He kept on coming. Lieutenant Connolly, with empty revolver, then parried his blows for an instant and both men fell over a boulder into a stream of water, the boloman on top. The lieutenant grabbed the man's hair, held his head under water, and while drowning him pounded him insensible with butt of revolver. The soldiers did not shoot at this man on account of the danger of hitting the lieutenant. Lieutenant Connolly received one cut on left jaw and several scratches on fingers of right hand. The man being apparently dead, the lieutenant led his squad in search of more, who were found to the number of about 23. They kept darting at the soldiers from behind rocks, and kept the soldiers busy shooting and bayoneting them until all of the enemy were killed. Private Edward Carney received 7 bolo cuts. The enemy's supplies and habitation were burned, and the soldiers returned to San Jose, the lieutenant galloping back on a pony to have his wounds dressed and to order out the ambulance and surgeon for Private Carney. The final surrender of the San Jose insurgents was due to the relentless pursuit of them by Lieutenant Connolly, Twenty-first Infantry, commanding officer at San Jose, and to whom credit is due. He pursued them so persistently, so vigorously, and so successfully as to drive them to surrender as a last resort. Lieutenant Connolly will carry the bolo scar on his face for life."

DAVIS, Adjutant-General.

(In absence of brigade commander.)

TAYSAN, P. I., January 13, 1902.

The Post ADJUTANT, Batangas, P. I.

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report:

I left this station at 7.30 a. m., January 13, 1902, with Civilian Scout Fargerson and 40 men Seventh Company Macabebe Scouts, and proceeding in southerly direction for about 6 miles entered and ascended the mountains to the east of Mount Talampo. Encountered a band of 15 bolomen encamped on summit of divide, killing 2 men; followed remainder for some distance, but lost them in grass and underbrush on mountain side.

Returning to point near top of divide, burned two cuartels and a small quantity of palay. Destroyed a barrio of 10 houses in mountains and killed 5 ponies, 3 cows, and about 20 hogs.

Returned to station same day; distance traveled, about 20 miles.

I inclose herewith a sketch of route traveled.

Very respectfully,

W. H. BELL, Jr.,
Second Lieutenant, First Cavalry,
Squadron Quartermaster and Commissary.


EIGHTEENTH COMPANY NATIVE SCOUTS, "ILOCANOS,"

Tiaong, Tayabas, P. I., March 1, 1902.

The ADJUTANT.

Sir: I have the honor to make the following report of operations on the night of February 27 and morning of February 28, 1902, by verbal order of the commanding officer:

In command of a detachment consisting of Second Lieut. Floyd L. Frisbie, Philippine Scouts, 1 civilian scout, and 50 men from the Eighteenth Company Native



Scout from Taysan, Batangas, January 13, 1902.

Scouts, "Ilocanos," I left Tiaong at 10 p. m., February 27, arriving at barrio Payisa, about 6½ miles distant, at 11.30 p. m. We rested there 15 minutes, then resumed march to Caboy, 5 miles. Investigated houses in said barrio, finding nothing of any note. Resumed march toward Callejon to a sitio called Bungo, 1½ miles, where we had information that the insurgents were concentrated under a grove of mango trees. Upon reaching the vicinity of the grove, which was comparatively clear all around save for a rather dense growth of underbrush, the large trees having been cut down, I divided the command into two sections of 20 men each, leaving 10 men guarding houses. One section, under Lieutenant Frisbie, was to strike the enemy's left flank, and the other, which I commanded personally, commenced to make a frontal attack. Owing to the fact that the country on his side was clearer, Lieutenant Frisbie arrived first, and in trying to penetrate a thick hedge in his front alarmed the sentries on the opposite side, who immediately opened fire, which was promptly returned by Lieutenant Frisbie's party, which was separated from the enemy only by a hedge about 20 feet in breadth. This assault attracted their attention, and I was enabled to get very close to their front before they discovered my approach, thus making it almost a perfect surprise. I opened fire on approaching within 100 yards, and advanced firing. The enemy retreated in much disorder after firing a few volleys, leaving 1 lieutenant and 2 soldiers dead on the field.

Eight Remington rifles, 1 shotgun, 2 revolvers, 10 war bolos, and 475 rounds of ammunition were captured, with 12 ponies and 1 carabao. Lieutenant Frisbie's party also captured a corporal who was trying to effect his escape. Our casualties were: Private Tinoteo Alded, severe and painful wound in right leg; Corpl. Lino Ruiz, slight wound on right breast. From the prisoners we learned that the enemy was the command of Epitacio Martinez, consisting of himself, Capt. Marcos Magundayao and Policornio de Luna, 4 lieutenants, 1 of whom, Gregorio Sector, was killed, and between 50 and 60 men. The engagement lasted about one-half an hour. We camped here until morning. Broke camp at 6.50 a. m., February 28, and reached Tiaong at 10.15 a. m. same day. Marched in all about 25 miles.

The men stood well under fire, and I wish to commend Lieutenant Frisbie for the admirable manner in which he handled his section during the engagement.

Respectfully submitted.

ROWLAND WHITELY,
First Lieutenant, Philippine Scouts,
Commanding Eighteenth Company, Native Scouts.

[First Indorsement.]

TIAONG, TAYABAS, P. I., March 3, 1902.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general Third Separate Brigade, Batangas, P. I.

This engagement is the most important that has taken place in this pueblo for a long time, and the blow received by the insurgents will be severely felt by them. The loss to them of arms and ammunition means a great deal.

Attention is invited to Lieutenant Whitely's special reference to Second Lieut. Floyd L. Frisbie's conduct, which is concurred in. Lieutenant Whitely and his entire force deserve much credit for the successful outcome of this expedition.

J. D. L. HARTMAN,
Captain, First Cavalry, Commanding.

SANTO TOMAS, BATANGAS, LUZON, P. I., April 14, 1902.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, THIRD SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Batangas, Batangas, P. I.

(Through military channels.)

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of an expeditionary column under my command into Mount Maquiling, Philippine Islands, April 4-9, 1902.

Having obtained permission from the station commander, Tanauan, to scout the Maquiling Range of mountains, I left that station with 37 men Company I, Fifth Infantry, and 5 of the First Company Native Scouts (Macabebe) at 1.30 p. m. April 4, 1902.

Marched to the foothills, bivouacking on the Dipangla River.

April 5, left camp after breakfast at 4 a. m., proceeded up mountain to the basin of the Latag, arriving there at 8.10 a. m. Scouted with small party Monte Pallace. Returning left cargadores and guard in camp at La Tag, and with 25 men followed the

trail northeast. Struck a cuartel in a ravine, near a good spring of water; drove insurgents out, killing 3 bolomen; several reported wounded. Destroyed about 2 tons of palay (which it was impracticable to bring in), some rice, and vegetables. Our progress was for some time exceedingly difficult, owing to rank vegetation and to leaving the trail. Many men were bitten by leeches, which caused no little pain and delay. Whenever the column halted for a moment's rest the animals swarmed up the legs and worked their way through leggings and clothes to the skin. One soldier received such injury as to render him incapable of walking. Followed a dim trail marked by brush up side Pagitanang Talaoc, the topmost peak of the range. Trail became more distinct as we advanced. After a while the thick brush, etc., used to blind the trail below, was not in evidence, and no pains seemed to be taken at concealment. As we kept on the trail became more slippery and much steeper, until the men were forced to sling their rifles and crawl on hands and knees up the now almost perpendicular slope. So fatiguing was it that the troops could not advance far before they were obliged to halt, hanging to a vine or drooping branch of a tree, panting for breath. Men began to drop on the trail from sheer exhaustion, and it was necessary before reaching the summit to advance like a human ladder, hand over hand. Several men were unable to proceed to the top and were ordered back to camp.

The crest was finally gained, and three trails were visible. Scouted each. Out-post shacks were on one trail to the south. Behind a big cliff, well sheltered from the elements and obscured from human vision, were two large cuartels, and further down one of lesser extent, while several small cook shacks were scattered here and there. In one rice and squash were in pots on a stone fireplace, in which shavings and wood were placed ready for ignition. We searched the shelters thoroughly. All of the above were constructed on a narrow flat of ground and built against the cliff, of saplings and fern grass, blending with the vegetation surrounding, and overlooked the basin of La Tag, the valley below, and the country from Batangas to Bay. In the small cuartel referred to were many evidences of it being used as officer's quarters. A careful search was made of same. A poncho was suspended just under the roof and over a bed of rugs and woolen blankets. There were several mats, a small table, knife, fork, and spoon, an ordnance canteen and strap, tin cups, candles, and a good supply of clothes, together with pen and ink, shoes, slippers, and other articles of apparel. A small tin box attracted my attention. Upon opening, found it to contain three stamps, "The Headquarters Santo Tomas Column," "Dalmacio Hernandez y Garcia," and the stamp of "Juan Meer y Mano," adjutant of Hernandez. It dawned upon me that this was the cuartel of Dalmacio Hernandez. Everything suggested it. The luxury of the interior was rare in mountain retreats; the remoteness of the place and the almost inaccessible position occupied confirmed my belief. An order was immediately given for the troops to leave undisturbed everything surrounding the place. Eight men were picked from Company I and 2 Macabebes. Four men were placed in one cuartel and I took possession of the officer's quarters, with 6 men. Everything on the outside was rearranged. The matting over the doors was carefully drawn in place. The remainder of the detachment, as a ruse, in event of our having been seen to have entered the place, were ordered to march out from the vicinity of the buildings, return to camp, and on arrival there to fire several rounds, so as to give the impression of the withdrawal of the column from the mountain; all of which was carried out precisely as to time, place, etc.

The men in the shacks lay down in a row, the muzzles of their pieces barely protruding from the leafy wall and covering the trail. Just above each muzzle an eyehole was made to sight through. I sat on a sack of rice behind the mat-covered entrance. We lay in this position from noon until 6 p. m. Not a sound was made save the breathing of the men. Even coughing was suppressed. At about 5 p. m. a native came cautiously down the trail, apparently satisfied himself that everything was all right and then departed. About an hour later we heard tramping of feet and snapping of twigs. Somebody ran down the hill toward us, a gun was heard to click (it afterwards proved to be the loading from magazine to chamber by one of the men in the other cuartel), a form darkened the entrance, the mat was pushed aside, and Col. Dalmacio Hernandez looked into the barrel of my revolver. He threw up his hands, his complexion changed, and before he could be stopped uttered the most terror-stricken shriek. There was a patter patter of feet as if some one was escaping as the soldiers rushed from their concealment. On the trail in the opposite direction was heard some one approaching. The soldiers dropped in the bushes on the side of the trail, and the next instant sprang upon and captured First Lieut. Juan Meer y Mano, adjutant of Hernandez. The boys of Hernandez were taken shortly after, one with an excellent Mauser carbine and 18 rounds of rifle ball cartridges. Not a shot had been fired during this excitement. The men were cool, collected, and executed their orders without a flaw. It was a trying six hours of suspense, and when the climax came dusk had set in. The cuartels would accommodate 50 or more natives,

and in sequestering the detachment in the shacks there was a possibility of a counter ambushade. Colonel Hernandez and his adjutant and his two sons were placed under guard, all of the men being on post the remainder of the night. All approaches were guarded. No fires were lighted, as it was desired to remain hidden. Consequently the rice was not cooked, and as no rations were with the party they were without food until our return to camp at 10 a. m. the following day. I especially commend the detachment. Corporal Miller, Lance Corporal Adams, Privates Arthur, Clingan, Parker, Ludwig, Whitcomb, and Hyde, Company I, Fifth Infantry; Privates Pedro Yamba and Basilio Labaro, First Company Native Scouts (Macabebe), who withstood the fatigue of the march, carried out the spirit of all orders given, remained on guard all night, and were without food for over thirty hours, behaving in a manner typical of the American soldier.

April 6, returned to camp at 10 a. m. Scouted country to northeast. Totally destroyed large sweet-potato patch near La Tag. All ravines crossed were searched for insurgents and supplies. Returned to camp at 4 p. m.

April 7, upon questioning Hernandez, found that his forces were scattered here and there, and that he could furnish me with no information that could be of any value toward accomplishing anything in the vicinity. He promised that if he was sent to Santo Tomas he would exert all of his influence toward the pacification of the province; that he would send mandates to his officers to surrender their arms and forces, and would do all in his power toward terminating the insurrection. He informed me that he had been and was a warm friend of Generals Malvar and Gonzales; that Gonzales, and more than likely Malvar, would negotiate for surrender upon notification of his (Colonel Hernandez's) capture. Also learned that he was in command of the eastern zone of Batangas, the territory about and including Maquiling; that he had the largest column now in the field, and was third in rank among officers now out. (From events that have since transpired, his promises have been kept and his influence and importance demonstrated.) In consequence of the above I sent the prisoner in, under guard, to Santo Tomas.

Broke camp at 5 a. m., marched over summit of mountain, down east slope into Laguna Province. No trail after leaving crest. Destroyed several outpost shacks and two cuartels on ridge. Down precipitous slope of Maquiling, stumbling, sliding, and climbing over rocks, and through ravines thick with brush. Many sprains and bruises were received. About 2 p. m. struck a bubbling stream which streamed down to the valley. At about 4 p. m. a cuartel, large enough to hold about 40 insurgents, loomed up in front behind screens of brush. The firestones were cold and a small quantity of palay only was found. Camp was made on top of a spur to the right. The trail leading from the cuartel in the ravine to the hill was lined with set bamboo traps, the arrow of which, when the traps sprung, whizzed and fell with considerable force. After dark slipped back with 7 men and slept in cuartel.

April 8, sent out at daylight parties in both directions on the trail to reconnoiter. One party reported trail going south to be masked for over a mile, then very plain and much traveled. Decided to follow this one. Left camp at 6 a. m., marched up and down ravines, over foothills and up mountain. At about 8 a. m. heard indistinct voices on hill across ravine. Posted command along bluff covering all approaches. With about 10 men crept forward, crossed ravine, ascending opposite slope, emerged on mesa. Native sentinel seen to slide down vines of a tree. Running forward and making detour about point, opened fire on camp, disclosed to view among trees in front. Surprise was complete. A native, evidently sentry referred to, had just entered camp. Insurgents rushed madly down ravine. Firing was heard from that direction. We now had them between two bodies of troops and exposed to cross-fire. Corporal Holtry, Company I, Fifth Infantry, pursued for nearly half a mile Capt. Maximo Laurel. The latter, brought to bay, drew his revolver, but before he could use it a shot from the corporal's rifle blew the entire top of his head off and he sank lifeless to the ground. One revolver in good condition, with 25 rounds of cartridges, his papers and effects were secured. Casualties: Insurgents killed, 1 captain (Maximo Laurel), 1 lieutenant in uniform with insignia of rank (identity unknown), and 4 soldiers, all armed with bolos; wounded, 5, 100 per cent, there being 11 in this camp (near Bulalo, Laguna), commanded by Maximo Laurel at the time of the attack. Casualties among troops, none. Large supply of palay destroyed, about 300 pounds of rice taken, in addition to several suits of clothes, women's garments, vegetables, and salt. Destroyed rice-pounding apparatus and cuartel. Marched over saddle near Mabilog. Several insurgents sighted on Mount Bulalo. Opened fire on same. Result not known. On reaching trail many native footprints seen (it has since been ascertained from Capt. Pedro Hernandez, who surrendered recently, that it was his command). Near Bitin, at about 1 p. m., encountered a third party of insurgents. Fired into same. One lieutenant has since been reported as killed, and two soldiers wounded at this place by insurgents who have since

surrendered. At about 3 p. m. reached Mount Olila and joined forces with First Lieut. S. R. Gleaves, First Cavalry, encamping with same.

The command crossed from Batangas Province to Laguna Province, and from the latter to Batangas, recrossing the high range of mountains twice.

The trip was the most trying and fatiguing yet experienced. And it was only as the column debouched on the plain below, where the sun's rays struck it, that the hard strain of the preceding five days was noticeable.

Forty-two men was the strength of the command, which was now reduced to 29, 13 having been sent in as the result of sickness or other disability, or nearly one-third of the original number.

Chills and fever were prevalent, as well as dysentery.

The expedition was most successful, and it was due to the early and long marches, the excellent spirit shown, and the almost tireless energy of the men.

Very respectfully,

CONSTANT CORDIER,
Second Lieutenant, Fifth Infantry, Commanding.

[First indorsement.]

POST OF TANAUAN,
Tanauan, Batangas, P. I., April 20, 1902.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Third Separate Brigade, Batangas, Batangas, P. I., inviting attention to within report which, although long and in detail is interesting and deserves careful perusal, convincing the reader that no matter how difficult the work required of him, the American soldier will accomplish anything he is ordered to do.

Lieutenant Cordier and his men deserve great credit for the results accomplished, and I commend them to the brigade commander.

WM. H. C. BOWEN,
Major, Fifth Infantry, Commanding.

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD SEPARATE BRIGADE,
DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES,
Batangas, P. I., May 10, 1902.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Department of North Philippines. Lieutenant Cordier deserves the commendation of his superiors for the excellent work accomplished on this scout, as its effect was far-reaching in moral and result. There is no doubt that the capture of Hernandez was a strong factor in bringing about the surrender of Gonzales.

M. F. DAVIS,
Captain, First Cavalry, Adjutant-General.
(In absence of brigade commander.)

[Third indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., May 20, 1902.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Division of the Philippines, for the information of the division commander.

The action of Lieutenant Cordier and his command is commended.

LOYD WHEATON,
Major-General, Commanding.

CALAPAN, MINDORO, P. I., August 22, 1901.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of Southern Luzon.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Mindoro expedition. The Second Battalion, Thirtieth Infantry, and the Third Company, Macabebe Scouts, embarked on cascos at 11.30 a. m. July 26, at the Anda Monument. Company G, under Captain Erwin, which has been ordered to take station at Mangarin, and 24 Macabebe scouts, under Lieut. R. E. Brooks, were embarked on the *Sacramento* with three months' rations.

Battalion Headquarters, and Companies E and F, under Captains Bent and Shaw, respectively, were on the *Vizcaya*. Company H, under Captain Carey, and the Third Company Macabebe scouts, under Lieut. R. T. Hazzard, First Cavalry, were

on the *Liscum*. The troops were all on board before 3 p. m. The quartermaster and commissary stores did not come alongside until 5 p. m. I then found that there was not room on the ships for the stores that were alongside. I ordered the most necessary articles for immediate use to be loaded, leaving the remainder in the *cascos*, and reported my action to the adjutant-general.

I took this step because I knew the department commander wished the expedition to sail as soon as possible in order to cooperate with the *Annapolis* off Calapan. As soon as the loading was completed I put to sea, at 3 a. m. July 27. At 4 p. m. I was off the coast of Mindoro and about three hours' run from Calapan.

As I wished to attack that place so as to have daylight for making the landing, I ran into Puerto Galera and anchored. I landed a platoon of Company F, Thirtieth Infantry, and the company of Macabebes. As the troops approached the people all ran out of the town. Galera contains about 25 houses, with a small nipa church and convent. It would accommodate about 50 soldiers. Natives report that an insurgent major, a sergeant, and 6 men, all armed, constitute the garrison and that they fled to Abra de Ilog.

On the evening of the 27, while at anchor in the harbor of Galera, I issued the order for the attack on Calapan at 5.30 a. m. the next morning, a copy of which is appended, marked "A."

On the morning of the 28th Calapan was taken, in pursuance to this order, all the detachments arriving at the designated positions at the time specified. No resistance was encountered and no enemy was found in the town. Most of the inhabitants had fled, taking their property to the barrios.

I put Company F in the church and the Macabebes in the provincial government building, and worked all day unloading the stores for a two-company post.

When I entered the harbor of Calapan I found the gunboat *Annapolis* there at anchor. She had arrived on the morning of the 27th. Captain Rohrer, the commander, was of great assistance to me in landing my men and stores. He placed his steam launch at my disposition, through the use of which I finished the landing in two days.

On July 29 I appointed officers for a native civil government, with Señor Feliz Lopez as presidente. A copy of the order is appended, marked "B." At 12 noon there was an official flag raising in the plaza. The *Annapolis* fired the national salute and the order appointing the civil government was read and the municipal officials installed.

The temper of the people at Calapan impresses me as most favorable to American rule. They are heartily tired of the insurgent government, and seem to be pleased to see a permanent American occupation. The inhabitants of Calapan strike me as unusually intelligent and peacefully disposed. There were several thousand men present at the flag raising. I have been present at similar ceremonies in various parts of Luzon, but I never saw one at which the temper and spirit of the people seemed so good.

On July 29 the Macabebe scouts, with 30 men from Company F, Thirtieth Infantry, made a reconnaissance 6 miles to southwest of the town, a report of which is appended, marked "C."

On July 30 25 Macabebes and 25 men from Company F, Thirtieth Infantry, made a reconnaissance to Baco, a report of which is appended and marked "D."

On July 31 the supplies were all landed at Calapan. This town is now garrisoned by Companies F and M, Thirtieth Infantry, and the First Company Mindoro Scouts is being organized under Lieutenant Holtman.

On July 30 I left Calapan at 12 o'clock at night and arrived off Naujan, which was occupied without resistance at 5.30 a. m. July 31. A copy of the order for the movement is appended, marked "E."

Natives in Naujan reported that the insurgents, 200 armed men, under Atienza and Howard, had left there on the 18th, moving southwest through the lake country, and that they were probably in camp somewhere near Lake Naujan. The natives also reported that the trail was most difficult from Naujan to the camp, but that there was a good trail from Pola, leading over high ground. The Macabebes made scouts from the town. They found the country all mud and water and could get no definite information about the enemy.

Acting on this information, I determined to hold Naujan with a detachment of the Thirtieth and work against the camp with the Macabebes from Pola. On August 1 I put Captain Bent and 75 men of Company E, Thirtieth Infantry, into Naujan, and with Company H and the Macabebes I occupied Pola at 5.30 p. m. without resistance.

On August 2 I ordered Company H, under Captain Carey, to take station at Pola, and the Macabebes were put on shore, with orders to scout the country and try to reach the insurgent camp. The transport *Liscum*, having discharged the men and stores on board, was sent back to Manila from Pola. She left at 7 p. m.

On August 3 I left Pola at 7 a. m. in the *Vizcaya*, accompanied by the *Annapolis*, for the purpose of making an inspection of the coast towns to the south, while the detachments in Pola and Naujan scouted the country to obtain information of the enemy.

I went ashore at Pinamalayan, a town of about 1,000 inhabitants. It is the headquarters of the Mindoro lumber trade, and is a very clean and prosperous place. There is a shipyard there for building cascos and sailboats. I found a lumberman, who promptly took a contract to deliver a large order of telegraph poles for the Signal Corps, of a kind and dimension which, I am informed, can not be furnished in Luzon. I left Pinamalayan at 1 p. m. and steamed along the coast southward.

Anchored off Mangarin at 1 a. m. on August 4. I went ashore in the morning. We had considerable difficulty in landing in the surf. This is the only one of the stations now occupied which is exposed to the southwest monsoon. The old town of Mangarin is entirely destroyed. Some years ago the population was nearly wiped out by fever. The governor of the province ordered the town to be abandoned. I found Captain Erwin and Company G occupying the Recoleta Convent on the other side of the inlet from the old town. The convent is the only building in that vicinity. It is a large house, capable of accommodating the company, the hospital, and the officers. It is generally in good repair, except that the roof is practically gone. Padre Isidro, in charge of the Recoletos' cattle interest there, accompanied Captain Erwin. Padre Isidro had ordered the natives to roof the house. Though the company had been there only four days at that time, the roof was about done.

Padre Isidro has been of great assistance to Captain Erwin. He offered to give the company all the beef they needed, but I told him we preferred to buy our meat. Also through his influence 2 rifles, a shotgun, and several old pistols have been surrendered.

The natives about Mangarin are the poorest I have seen. They are generally ragged, naked, and hungry. There are no rice fields in that vicinity. They subsist chiefly on indian corn and fish. They are glad to work for their food. They were formerly employed by the cattle ranch and the coal mine, both of which have been out of business since the insurrection. I left Mangarin at 2 p. m., taking on board Lieutenant Brooks and the 25 Macabebes who had been stationed there. I think they can be used to better advantage in other parts of the island. I returned to Pola on the morning of August 5. There the Macabebes reported that they had scouted the country to Lake Naujan, had seen no enemy, and found no trails leading to the west side of the lake, where the insurgent camp was reported to be located. Seeing that I could do but little from Pola, I embarked the Macabebes on the *Vizcaya* and returned to Naujan, anchoring at the mouth of the river at 1 p. m. I put the Macabebes in Naujan with orders to scout the whole lake valley.

That night I returned to Calapan to get any orders that might have come in my absence. There I found that a steamer had brought all the quartermaster and commissary stores left in Manila. On August 6 I returned to Naujan and took Company E, Thirtieth Infantry, on board. On August 7 I went to Pinamalayan and put Company E, Thirtieth Infantry, ashore, and ordered it to take station there. The *Vizcaya* being out of water, we left at 11.30 a. m. and went to Romblon to fill her tanks. I left the *Annapolis* there. Captain Rohrer informed me that it was necessary for him to return to Cavite to repair his machinery. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation of the hearty and prompt cooperation given me by Captain Rohrer during the time the *Annapolis* accompanied the expedition.

On August 9 I returned to Calapan at 6 a. m. I found the cable in operation and reported to the department commander. On information given by Captain Sanz, native police, that there was a herd of cattle belonging to the insurgent government near here, Captain Shaw, with Company F, went out a few miles and brought in about 50 cattle. On investigation it developed that the cattle had been the property of the presidente, Feliz Lopez; that they had been seized by the insurgent government a few weeks before with the intention of shipping them to Luzon by banca for sale. Lopez stated that the cattle had been taken from him by force, and that he had not been paid by the government for them. His statement is probably true, as the cattle bear his mark, and the insurgents are not in the habit of paying for anything. A few days before Lopez had informed me that the town could not furnish beef for sale to troops because there was no cattle in this part of the island. I called his attention to the fact of the cattle being found in his possession and to his previous statement. I then told him I would take possession of the cattle and use them for beef, but if later it developed that his statement as to being forced to give up the cattle without pay was true, and if he showed himself a loyal and capable presidente and administered the town well, I would recommend that he be paid for those we used as beef. So far Lopez has been a model presidente. The herd is in my possession and an account has been kept of those used for beef.

On August 10 I ordered the quartermaster and commissary officers to prepare for shipment the stores sent from Manila, so that each station would receive rations up to November 1 and its share of quartermaster property. The work of sorting and invoicing the stores covered several days. August 11 Lieutenant Wills, Twelfth Infantry, and Lieutenant Holtman, with a detachment of Thirtieth Infantry, scouted the country about Dayap, between Calapan and Naujan, but found nothing.

On August 12 I visited Pola and found everything quiet, with no news of insurgents in that vicinity. August 13 I visited Naujan, where Lieut. R. T. Hazzard, commanding the Macabebe company, reported that on August 7, acting on information procured from the natives, he had burned an insurgent camp near the sitio Bancoro, about 12 miles southwest of Naujan. The camp was composed of 7 barracks built for soldiers and 6 large nipa houses. Thirty tons of rice found in the building was also burned. The same day Lieutenant Hazzard burned the house of Atienza, the governor of Mindoro, which was situated near the camp, and to which he had fled from Calapan about July 18, just after the attack on that town by the Twenty-first Infantry. Lieutenant Hazzard reports the valley back of Naujan as very rich, populous, and much ground under cultivation. The people are well supplied with rice, cattle, and other kinds of food. He states that he has never seen such fine rice grown in any other part of the Philippines. This valley is 50 miles long by from 20 to 30 miles wide. It is the main granary of the island, and should the insurgents settle down to an amiguo war it will probably be their stronghold, as it is full of food, is cut up by numerous rivers, lakes, and morasses, and will be difficult for troops to work in. August 15 Capt. William F. Creary, Twelfth Infantry, was ordered to proceed on the *Vizcaya* to southern stations and deliver rations and quartermaster supplies.

The troops of this command are now stationed as follows: Calapan, headquarters Second Battalion, Thirtieth Infantry; Company F, Thirtieth Infantry; Company M, Thirtieth Infantry; Mindoro scouts in process of organization. At present 1 officer and 20 men. Company F is quartered in the church, a fine building, in good repair, but too damp for permanent quarters. Company M, just organized, is quartered in the provincial capitol building and in 2 private houses. The Mindoro scouts are in a private house. The hospital is in a private house; is well located and equipped.

The quartermaster storehouse is in the convento, which is very small. The commissary and store house is in a private house well adapted for the purpose.

Calapan is situated on sandy soil, with good drainage into the sea in front and into a river in rear. I believe that this will prove a healthy station. The health of the men has greatly improved since coming here from the Laguna stations.

Naujan is garrisoned by the Third Company native scouts (Macabebes). It is a rich agricultural town; is situated on low, marshy ground, with bad water. In my opinion American troops should not be stationed there, as it has the reputation of being unhealthy even for the natives. I recommend that it be garrisoned by native scouts. From a military standpoint, it is the most important town to hold that I have yet visited. The attitude of the natives is less friendly there than in other towns. They appear to be under insurgent domination.

Pola is garrisoned by Company H, Thirtieth Infantry, and Company L, Thirtieth Infantry, now in process of organization. It is situated on sandy soil, with good drainage. The men are quartered in the church, convent, and one private house. There is a rich hemp district back of Pola. It will apparently be a healthy station.

Pinamalayan is garrisoned by Company E, Thirtieth Infantry. It is situated on a peninsula, between two rivers. The ground is high and sandy, with good drainage. The men are quartered in the church and convento. I believe it will be a healthy station. Pinamalayan is the headquarters of the lumber trade on the east coast, and is a clean, prosperous town, with an intelligent and industrious population.

Mangarin, at the southern end of the island, is garrisoned by Company G, Thirtieth Infantry. There is no town at this post—the convento occupied by the troops is the only house there. The ground is sandy and the location apparently healthy. It is believed to be an important point to occupy for the purpose of suppressing the insurgent cattle trade.

In none of the towns now occupied would it be practicable to increase the garrisons, on account of the lack of available houses to shelter troops.

Being convinced of the hostility and unreliability of Padre Miguel Catala, Cura of Naujan, I have ordered him to quit the limits of Mindoro, and not to return without permission from military authority. His absence will facilitate the pacification of Naujan.

The last information concerning the insurgents is a report from First Lieut. R. T. Hazzard that on August 4 the governor, Atienza, and the deserter, Howard, sick and carried on a litter, with from 200 to 300 armed men, were in the camp which Lieutenant Hazzard burned on August 7, and that they left the camp on August 4, moving to the southwest. Since this they have disappeared.

To-day a Spaniard, a resident of Calapan, informs me that he has been told by natives that Atienza and his band are in the mountains, five days' march southwest of Naujan, attempting to cut a road to the west coast. Howard is reported dying and the band very short of food.

The *Vizcaya* returned at 12 m. this morning, and is ordered to proceed to Manila this a. m.

Pursuant to instructions from your office, this report will be delivered by Capt. Robert McGregor, Corps of Engineers, the engineer officer, who has accompanied the expedition.

Very respectfully,

R. K. EVANS,
Major, Thirtieth Infantry, Commanding.

A.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BATTALION, THIRTIETH INFANTRY,
On board U. S. C. T. Vizcaya, July 27, 1901.

Order 103.

1. Calapan is reported to be occupied by about 100 insurgents and the deserter Howard.

2. Calapan will be attacked at daylight to-morrow morning.

3. Company F, Thirtieth Infantry, under Capt. F. B. Shaw, with Captain Sanz as guide, will disembark on the point south of Calapan. Captain Shaw will time his march so as to attack the town at 5.30 a. m. A surgeon and 3 Hospital Corps men will report to Captain Shaw.

4. The transport *Liscum* will land the Third Company of Macabebes under First Lieut. R. T. Hazzard, First Cavalry, in front of Calapan at 5.30 a. m., so as to support the attack of Captain Shaw on the left. A surgeon and 3 Hospital Corps men will report to Lieutenant Hazzard.

5. The *Vizcaya* will land Company E, Thirtieth Infantry, under Capt. C. L. Bent, on the left bank of the Calapan River at 5.30 a. m. Captain Bent will march in a northwesterly direction through the cocoanut grove and take up a position on the road so as to prevent the escape of the insurgents from the town. A surgeon and 3 Hospital Corps men will report to Captain Bent.

6. The men of the landing parties will be provided with 150 rounds of ammunition and one day's rations.

7. Commanders of the landing parties will see that peaceful natives are not molested.

8. Small boats will be returned to the steamers as soon as the men are landed.

9. All men while in small boats will have their belts and equipments free from the person.

10. The *Vizcaya* will leave the anchorage in Puerta Verdadera at 12 midnight and the *Liscum* at 3 a. m. to-morrow. Both ships will be in front of Calapan at 5 a. m.

By order of Major Evans:

EDWARD R. STONE,
First Lieutenant, Thirtieth Infantry, Adjutant.

B.

CALAPAN, MINDORO, P. I., July 29, 1901.

Order 1.

1. Until such time as an election may be ordered, the following civil officers of the pueblo of Calapan are hereby appointed: President, Señor Feliz Lopez; vice-president, Señor Teribio Gonzales; secretary, Señor Serilo Aryas; treasurer, Señor Graciano Luistro. They will be obeyed and respected accordingly.

2. The president will name cabezas for the barrios, who will be approved by the commanding officer.

3. The president will immediately have the cabezas make out and submit lists of all the inhabitants of their barrios, together with the number of carts, carabao, beef cattle, and horses.

4. The civil government will be administered according to the provisions of General Orders, No. 43, Division of the Philippines and Eighth Army Corps, 1899, and General Orders, No. 40, 1901, Division of the Philippines.

5. The council will meet every Sunday morning at 10 o'clock at the office of the commanding officer.

By order of Major Evans:

EDWARD R. STONE,
First Lieutenant, Thirtieth Infantry, Adjutant.

C.

CALAPAN, MINDORO PROVINCE, *July 29, 1901.*

THE ADJUTANT,
Mindoro Expeditionary Forces.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows:

Pursuant the verbal order of the commanding officer, upon information received concerning the presence of an insurgent force in the barrio of Cimaroon, I left this town at 7 o'clock a. m. this date, my force consisting of 50 men of my command and 25 men of Company F, Thirtieth Infantry, Lieutenant Weeks commanding, who reported pursuant to orders from your headquarters.

The column marched in southwest direction, arriving in barrio Ulo at 10 o'clock. A circuitous route was taken owing to an impassable river on direct route to Cimaroon. Repeated questionings during journey elicited no information concerning insurgents in vicinity at any recent date, but while command was resting at barrio Ulo a body of insurgents, armed, was seen passing to south. Party consisted of about 25 men, apparently all armed. As insurgents were at extreme rifle range, no shots were fired, but command was started at a run toward them. The insurgents had seen this command and were running rapidly for the woods, which they entered, going in direction of mountain trail to Naujan. Chase was abandoned as hopeless and command started on return march.

About one-half hour before entering Calapan, Lieutenant Weeks, in command of advance, sighted 3 insurgents running, and opened fire and chased them, but they escaped into jungle. Lieutenant Wilson (Philippine Scouts) was sent with 20 men to intercept if possible, but without success. Natives said the party consisted of a corporal and 2 men. Command returned at 4.30 p. m. this date. Distance marched (estimated) 14 miles; roads deep and muddy, and marching difficult. No casualties. Natives apparently friendly, but with decided disinclination to give direct information concerning insurgents. Much cultivation going on in the fields, and a most surprising number of the lower class of natives seem well educated and speak fluent Spanish.

Very respectfully,

R. T. HAZZARD,
First Lieutenant, First Cavalry,
Commanding Third Company Macabebe Scouts.

D.

CALAPAN, *July 30, 1901.*

TO ADJUTANT,
Mindoro Expeditionary Forces.

SIR: I have the honor to report that 25 Macabebes under Lieut. O. P. M. Hazzard, Third Cavalry, and 25 men Thirtieth Infantry, under Lieutenant Holtman, Philippine Scouts, formed party to scout toward Baco; left at daylight, found roads in fair condition, passed 2 barrios, people remaining, reached Baco at 10 o'clock. No resistance, no insurgents seen, no reports of any since July 15, 1901. Returned same trail, reached Calapan noon, marched 10 miles, road could be passed over by escort wagons and bull carts with ease. Ferry necessary at barrio 1½ miles south of Baco, and small bridge needs flooring three-fourths mile north of Calapan.

Very respectfully,

VAN LEER WILLS,
First Lieutenant, Twelfth Infantry.

E.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BATTALION, THIRTIETH INFANTRY,
On Board U. S. C. T. *Vizcaya*, August 1, 1901.

Order 106.

1. Naujan is reported to be occupied by 200 insurgents.
 2. Naujan will be attacked to-morrow at 5.30 a. m.
 3. Company H, under Captain Carey, on the *Liscum* will land at San Jose at 3 a. m. Captain Carey will remain at San Jose until 7 a. m., keeping his men hidden; he will then march to Naujan, arresting all able-bodied men and bringing them with him. After Company H is landed the *Liscum* will go to the anchorage in front of Naujan and wait orders.
 4. The *Vizcaya* will land the Third Company of Macabebe Scouts under First Lieut. R. T. Hazzard, First Cavalry, at the mouth of the old Naujan River at 2 a. m. Lieutenant Hazzard will leave 20 men in ambush at the intersection of the river and road, and with the remainder take up a position so as to cut the trail leading west of Naujan and intercept all hostile fugitives.
 5. The *Vizcaya* will land Company E, Thirtieth Infantry, under Capt. C. L. Bent, on the Naujan River at 4 a. m. Captain Bent will attack the town at 5.30 a. m.
 6. The commander of the gunboat *Annapolis* is requested to be in front of Naujan at 5.30 a. m., and to support the landing of Company E, should it be resisted.
 7. All small boats will be returned to the ships as soon as the men are landed.
- By order of Major Evans:

EDWARD R. STONE,
First Lieutenant, Thirtieth Infantry, Adjutant.

HEADQUARTERS MINDORO EXPEDITION,
Calapan, Mindoro, P. I., October 12, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations in Mindoro since August 25, the date on which I assumed command:

At that time the following towns were occupied by American troops: Calapan, Naujan, Pola, Pinamalayan, and Mangarin.

From reports of natives and information obtained by scouting parties I formed the opinion that the town of Naujan and its outlying barrios would be the center of the scene of action.

I consequently conducted the greater part of my operations in this territory, attaining the following results: The capture of Arthur Howard, the taking of the family of Ramon Atienza and the insurgent treasury, the destruction of the insurgents' arsenals, the capture and gain by surrender of 60 rifles and 500 rounds of ammunition, the demoralization of the insurgent force, and the capture of Atienza, colonel and insurgent governor, with his entire staff and 7 officers.

It has been evident from the first that the natives of Mindoro have had no sympathy with the insurrection in the island. The resistance to American authority has been almost wholly maintained by insurgent leaders from Luzon, who have forced the people of this island to a recognition of their authority and compelled them to contribute to their support.

This expedition being the first American troops permanently on the island, considerable difficulty was experienced in convincing the natives of our good intentions and winning their confidence. It has been done by degrees, however, and the existing condition of affairs in the island is, briefly, this:

The insurgent force, which I estimate to be about 150 men, is widely scattered in small bands; such of the soldiers as are residents of Mindoro are returning to their homes; those from Luzon and Marinduque are endeavoring to get away from this island. In this connection I desire to mention the work of the U. S. gunboats *Don Juan de Austria* and *Paragua*. These vessels have been of the greatest assistance in patrolling the coast and preventing expeditions from landing on or leaving this island.

The hearty cooperation and uniform courtesy of Commander Bowman, U. S. Navy, and his officers has in no small measure contributed to the successful carrying out of my plans.

The U. S. Army transport *Syracuse* has been of incalculable aid to me. Without her I would have been unable to accomplish the results attained in the time in which it has been done.

The people of Mindoro are apparently very heartily interested in and desirous of obtaining the complete pacification of the island, and show this desire by searching for hidden rifles and inducing acquaintances to surrender.

The act that would tend to the most complete and quickest termination of any remaining discontent on the part of the people is, in my opinion, the opening of the ports of the island to trade. I hope to be able to recommend this step in the present month. I now have garrisons at the towns previously mentioned and also at Puerto Galera and Abra de Ilog. These, with a contemplated post at Mamburao, on the northwest coast, will afford an opportunity to watch the results of the opening of the ports when it occurs.

The force of the northwest monsoons has been so great as to deter me from landing troops on the west coast of this island. In about ten days I shall establish a post at Mamburao, and after that will be prepared to indicate the points where it would be wise to retain garrisons, make any suggestions concerning the reduction of the military force, and prepare for the resumption of business and enterprises of all kinds on the island of Mindoro.

Most respectfully,

W. L. PITCHER,
Major, Eighth Infantry, Commanding.

APPENDIX D.

REPORTS OF OPERATIONS IN THE FOURTH SEPARATE BRIGADE.

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HEADQUARTERS FOURTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Nueva Caceres, Ambos Camarines, P. I., August 2, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT NORTH PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: The last report from these headquarters was made May 21, 1901, at which time this command was denominated the third district, Department of Southern Luzon, and comprised the provinces of Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Albay, and

Sorsogon, with their dependent islands and the islands of Burias, divided into sub-districts, as follows:

Subdistrict of Camarines Norte, the province of that name; headquarters at Daet; commanded by Maj. L. W. Cooke, Twenty-sixth Infantry, with the following stations and garrisons: Daet, Company C, Twenty-sixth Infantry; Indan, Company A, Twenty-sixth Infantry; two companies, aggregating 293 men.

Subdistrict of Iriga, that part of Camarines Sur bounded on the west by the Bicol River and on the north by the Pauili River; headquarters at Iriga; commanded by Lieut. Col. William Quinton, Twenty-seventh Infantry, with the following stations and garrisons: Iriga, Company D, Twenty-seventh Infantry, and detachment of Native Scouts; Buhi, Detachment B, Twenty-seventh Infantry; Baao, Company B, Twenty-seventh Infantry; Nabua, Company C, Twenty-seventh Infantry; Bato, detachment Company B, Twenty-seventh Infantry; three companies, aggregating 431 men.

Subdistrict of Lagonoy, the Partido of Lagonoy, province of Camarines Sur; headquarters San Jose de Lagonoy, commanded by Lieut. Col. William C. Forbush, Tenth Cavalry, with the following stations and garrisons: San Jose de Lagonoy, headquarters, field, staff and band and Troop C, Ninth Cavalry; Company I, Fifteenth Infantry; Goa, detachment Troop C, Ninth Cavalry; one troop and one company, aggregating 209 men.

Subdistrict of Nueva Caceres, all of the province of Camarines Sur not included in the subdistricts of Iriga and Lagonoy, and also the island of Burias; headquarters at Nueva Caceres, commanded by Lieut. Col. A. B. Wells, Ninth Cavalry, with the following stations and garrisons: Nueva Caceres, Troop D, Ninth Cavalry, and Company D, Fifteenth Infantry; also headquarters, field, staff and band Fifteenth Infantry; Ragay, Troop A, Ninth Cavalry; Libmanan, Troop B, Ninth Cavalry; Calabanga, detachment Company A, Twenty-seventh Infantry; Pasacao, Company B, Twenty-sixth Infantry; Pamplona, detachment B, Twenty-sixth Infantry; Minalabag, Company D, Twenty-sixth Infantry; San Fernando, detachment D, Twenty-sixth Infantry; Pili and Margarao, detachments A, Twenty-seventh Infantry; four companies and three troops, aggregating 809 men.

Subdistrict of Albay, the province of that name; headquarters at Guinobatan; commanded by Lieut. Col. W. C. Forbush, Tenth Cavalry, with the following stations and garrisons: Guinobatan, Troops F and H, Ninth Cavalry; Daraga, Troop E, Ninth Cavalry; Camalig, Wray's Scouts; Ligao, Troop G, Ninth Cavalry; Legaspi, six sections Fourteenth Battery, Field Artillery; Tobaco, Company B, Fifteenth Infantry; six sections of one battery, three troops, one company, and one company of scouts, aggregating 521 men.

Subdistrict of Sorsogon, the province of that name; headquarters at Sorsogon; commanded by Maj. G. A. Cornish, Fifteenth Infantry, with the following stations and garrisons: Sorsogon, Company K, Fifteenth Infantry; Gubat, detachment of Company L, Fifteenth Infantry; Mañog, detachment of Company L, Fifteenth Infantry; Donsol, detachment of Company M, Fifteenth Infantry; Bulan, detachment of Company M, Fifteenth Infantry; three companies, aggregating 371 men.

The island of Catanduanes was a separate command, headquarters at Birac, commanded by Capt. J. A. Maney, Fifteenth Infantry, with the following stations and garrisons: Birac, detachment of Company C, Fifteenth Infantry; Pandan, detachment of Company C, Fifteenth Infantry—one company aggregating 91 men.

RECAPITULATION.

Subdistrict of Camarines Norte, Companies A and C, Twenty-sixth Infantry.

Subdistrict of Iriga, Companies B, C, and D, Twenty-seventh Infantry.

Subdistrict of Lagonoy, headquarters, field, staff and band, Ninth Cavalry; Troop C, Ninth Cavalry, and Company I, Fifteenth Infantry.

Subdistrict of Nueva Caceres, headquarters, field, staff and band, Fifteenth Infantry; Troops A, B, and D, Ninth Cavalry; Companies B and D, Twenty-sixth Infantry; Company A, Twenty-seventh Infantry, and Company D, Fifteenth Infantry.

Subdistrict of Albay, Troops E, F, G, and H, Ninth Cavalry; 6 sections Fourteenth Battery, Field Artillery; Company B, Fifteenth Infantry, and Wray's Scouts.

Subdistrict of Sorsogon, Companies K, L, and M, Fifteenth Infantry.

Total troops in district May 21, 1901, 2,634.

On November 1, 1901, the Fourth Separate Brigade, Department of Southern Luzon, was created, with the following territorial limits:

"Province of Tayabas (east of a north and south line through Atimonan and including that town), provinces of Ambos Camarines, Albay, Sorsogon, islands of Masbate, Burias, Polillo, Catanduanes, Ticao, and all adjacent islands."

I was placed in command May 21, 1901, and at that time the following insurgent forces were in the field:

In Albay, Belarmino, with about 3,500 men and 400 rifles, was operating in that part of the province to the south of the Legaspi-Ligao-Nueva Caceres road, a very mountainous country, suitable only for infantry. In Camarines Sur, to the west of the Bicol River, Angeles was in the field, with about 250 men and 160 rifles; and in Camarines Norte Segovia was in command of about 200 insurgents, with about 100 rifles. There were no active insurgents in Sorsogon.

I directed Major Cooke to occupy Paracale and from there conduct a vigorous campaign in Camarines Norte.

For a campaign against Belarmino I ordered the following forces to assemble at Guinobatan: Company D, Fifteenth Infantry, Capt. E. Wittenmyer, from Nueva Caceres, 3 officers and 94 men; Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Capt. D. W. Kilburn, Twenty-sixth Infantry, from Iriga, 1 officer and 95 men; Company M, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Capt. L. M. Nuttman, Twenty-seventh Infantry, from Iriga, 1 officer and 99 men; Wray's Scouts, Lieut. G. M. Wray, from Camalig, 1 officer and 75 men. Aggregate, 5 officers and 363 men.

Capt. Edmund Wittenmyer, Fifteenth Infantry, was assigned to the command of this force, with instructions to occupy Jovellar and Putiao, and from those places to operate with large detachments, frequently relieved, against Belarmino, giving him no rest until he succumbed. He was to draw his supplies from the most convenient stations in Albay or Sorsogon, the commanders of those subdistricts having been directed to afford him such aid as he might require in the way of supplies or troops.

To confine Belarmino to the chosen field and prevent his escape, the troops along the Legaspi-Ligao road were ordered to patrol that road and drive him back if he attempted to cross; and Lieut. Charles Abel, Eighteenth Infantry, with 80 mounted men, Twenty-sixth Infantry, was sent from Iriga to Talisay, in Albay, to guard that exit. The commanding officer of the subdistrict of Sorsogon was directed to occupy the two towns called Panganiran, on the south coast, to prevent the escape of the insurgents by sea, the garrison at Donsol being kept intact for the same purpose. To cut off supplies in money, regulations were established to stop the trade in hemp which had contributed any tax to the insurgents or that was likely to do so if sold.

Captain Wittenmyer began his march from Nueva Caceres May 27, 1901, and on the 29th I received information that Belarmino had attacked Donsol on the 26th with 500 riflemen and 2,000 bolomen. This town was garrisoned by a platoon of Company M, Fifteenth Infantry, Capt. John Cotter commanding.

The attack was vigorously made and stoutly received by our small force, which repulsed the insurgents in their repeated attacks. The insurgents finally abandoned the attempt and withdrew with considerable loss; our loss was trifling.

Captain Wittenmyer's command took the field in two columns from Guinobatan and Camalig, and the plan of campaign was carried out with such energy that insurgents began immediately to come into the garrisoned towns to surrender and take the oath of allegiance. At first they came singly, then by twos and threes, and finally by scores, winding up with the surrender of Belarmino July 4, with 1,878 men and 69 officers and 378 rifles. The department commander sent two companies of the Second Infantry to Donsol June 1, and one squadron of the Sixth Cavalry to Legaspi during the campaign, and the moral effect of their presence and a few scouting parties they sent out contributed to the outcome.

To Captain Wittenmyer, his officers and men, however, the main credit belongs for the energetic and resolute prosecution of the campaign.

Campaign in Camarines Norte.—The campaign in Camarines Norte against insurgents, under the command of Angeles, Martinez, and Segovia, insurgent leaders in that province, was made by Maj. L. W. Cooke, Twenty-sixth Infantry, who was directed to commence a vigorous campaign in the Camarines Norte against all insurgents and to prosecute it until all armed resistance had ceased. Major Cooke had at his disposal the following troops: Companies A, C, F, and I, Twenty-sixth Infantry.

On July 5 Major Cooke, with First Lieutenant Sanford, battalion adjutant, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and Company F, Twenty-sixth Infantry, commanded by Capt. J. F. Preston, Twenty-sixth Infantry, proceeded to Paracale, P. I. Company F was temporarily stationed at Paracale; Company A, at Paracale with a detachment at Mambulao; Company F, at Capalonga; Company C, at Daet with a detachment at Indan. About July 7, 1901, Major Cooke, with Lieutenants Sanford and Chamberlain and Company A, Twenty-sixth Infantry, commanded by Capt. George H. McMaster, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and a detachment of Company F, Twenty-sixth Infantry, left on the launch *Serantes* for Capalonga; disembarked command at Capalonga and divided it into three columns under Captain McMaster, Twenty-sixth Infantry; Lieutenant Sanford, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and Lieutenant Chamberlain, Second Infantry, who proceeded by different routes to camp of insurgents. The

camp was located that night, surrounded, and attacked. Several prisoners and rifles were captured, together with valuable information and stores of rice. Two prisoners, in the hands of the insurgents, who were to have been killed the following day, were liberated. The command returned to Paracale about July 12, and the following disposition of troops was made: Company A, stationed at Paracale; Company C, at Indan; Company F, at Daet, and later Company I, at Capalonga.

A very arduous and difficult scout was made by detachments of Companies A and C, commanded respectively by Capts. G. H. McMaster and L. F. Kilbourne, the latter part of July, through the entire northern part of the province and into the mountains northwest of Paracale and Capalonga.

A detachment of Company C was later stationed on the trail in the Mount Labo district to prevent insurgents from going into the province of Camarines Sur.

During the months of July and August scouting was continued by large detachments from all companies in the province, and it was due to the incessant field work of Major Cooke's command that Martinez with his soldiers surrendered to Captain Tupes, First Infantry, at Daet, September 21, 1901.

Great credit is due to Major Cooke and the officers and men under his command for bringing to a close all armed resistance to American control in the province of Camarines Norte.

The following officers were actively engaged in these operations: Capts. L. F. Kilbourne, J. F. Preston, jr., Twenty-sixth Infantry; Capt. G. H. McMaster, Twenty-sixth Infantry; Capt. H. Tupes, First Infantry; Lieut. J. B. Sanford, Twenty-sixth Infantry; Lieut. Fred Van S. Chamberlain, Second Infantry; Lieut. A. McC. Wilson, Twentieth Infantry; Lieut. L. M. Purcell, Twenty-sixth Infantry; Lieut. H. S. Malone, Twenty-sixth Infantry.

Campaign in Camarines Sur.—Maj. A. Williams, Twenty-sixth Infantry, was directed, August 18, 1901, to utilize all troops under his command to cause the surrender or effect the capture of all insurgents actively engaged in the province of Camarines Sur, especially the force under the command of Elias Angeles. There were in the province about 400 insurgents with about 150 rifles.

The following troops were placed under the command of Major Williams: Troops A, B, and D, Ninth Cavalry; Companies B, D, E, and G, Twenty-sixth Infantry; Wray's Company of Philippine Scouts; Iriga Scouts.

The presidente of Magarao, who was distinguished among the natives as being friendly to the Americans, volunteered the services of 50 organized municipal police, under Captain Lorenzo, for any military service that would secure peaceful conditions. These men were fairly well drilled and uniformed and had given former proof of loyalty. Their services were accepted for one month and they were loaned carbines to replace the shotguns with which they had been armed.

The operations of the insurgents were mostly confined to the mountainous regions north of the line from Pasacao and Ragay and to Lupi and Libmanan.

Troops were stationed at Ragay, Lupi, Pasacao, Libmanan, and Nueva Caceres and operated from these stations.

Numerous scouts were made and several fights took place. The result of these continued scouts was the surrender of Elias Angeles and his forces to Capt. O. B. Rosenbaum, Twenty-sixth Infantry, at Libmanan, September 1, 1901.

The operations in Camarines Norte, under Maj. L. W. Cooke, Twenty-sixth Infantry, had a material effect in forcing Angeles and his forces to surrender.

The officers and men on this campaign performed most arduous work—fatiguing, painful marches, marching in heat and rain, most of the time amid a tropical tangle which shut out the view of a man a few feet away.

The officers who were actively engaged in these operations were Major Williams, Twenty-sixth Infantry; Capts. G. E. Houle, O. B. Rosenbaum, F. S. Hutton, Twenty-sixth Infantry; Lieuts. W. J. Schmidt, C. E. Delaplaine, Deas Archer, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and Lieuts. H. A. Ripley, Twenty-second Infantry, M. L. Crimmins, Sixth Infantry, and Albert R. Dillingham, Eighteenth Infantry; Lieutenants Wray and Cutts, Philippine Scouts.

All the officers and men deserve great credit for the hard work done and the results accomplished.

The Magarao volunteers are especially commended for their loyalty and good services.

Captain Wittenmyer reported to me about September 12, 1901, that two scouts carrying mail from Bulan to Matnog had been killed by a party of insurgents, and that he had received information that there were about 600 insurgents in the mountains in the vicinity of Irocin. This band of insurgents was led by a native who had come over from Samar to organize them. He had a large number of "anting-anting," of which he furnished one to each member of the band to make the men invulnerable.

Campaign in Sorsogon.—I then placed Capt. E. Wittenmyer, Fifteenth Infantry, in command of the following troops: Company D, Fifteenth Infantry, 100 men; Company L, Fifteenth Infantry, 83 men; Company I, Fifteenth Infantry, 50 men; Company C, Fifteenth Infantry, 50 men—total, 285 enlisted men—and ordered him to put an end to all armed resistance to American control in the province of Sorsogon.

Captain Wittenmyer made the following disposition of his troops: Seventy-five men at Irocin, 50 men at Bulusan, 100 men at Matnog, and 60 men at Bulan; and later 50 additional men were ordered from Sorsogon and stationed at Casiguran to cooperate with Captain Wittenmyer.

Continued scouting was done from all these stations during the latter part of September and the month of October, and numerous fights occurred, in which 18 insurgents were killed, a large number wounded, and 175 insurgents captured. The killed included the leader of all these insurgents in this province, Comandante de la Cruz. On October 31 Captain Wittenmyer reported the situation in fine shape and recommended the gradual withdrawal of the troops in the field.

Great credit is due to Captain Wittenmyer and the officers and men under his command for the results accomplished.

Campaign in Tayabas Province.—The campaign in the province of Tayabas was conducted under the personal supervision of Brig. Gen. F. D. Grant, U. S. Army.

The insurgent forces operating in this district, estimated at about 900, were under Caballes and Marques. The following disposition of troops was made:

At Guinayangan, Company B, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and Company G, Second Infantry; at Pitogo, Company L, Second Infantry; at Atimonan, Thirty-second Company Native Scouts, and Companies E and M, Second Infantry; at Catanaun, Company K, Second Infantry.

Operations were vigorously pushed throughout the entire territory during the months of December, 1901, and January and February, 1902. The insurgent forces scattered into small bands and were encountered at various times by scouting parties, kept continually on the move.

Vigorous measures were taken by all station commanders to stamp out this insurrection.

The inhabitants were concentrated and shipment of supplies regulated by the military, and by this means, together with continuous activity on the part of the troops in the field, the insurgents were forced to either leave the province or surrender, and by the end of April the insurrection was at an end.

Anting-antings.—During the month of April, 1901, a band of malcontents numbering about 300 natives, calling themselves "anting-anting," operated to the disquiet of the people in the province of Sorsogon, near Mount Bulusan.

The constabulary, under their inspectors, and a large number of volunteers, called out by the governor and commanded by the presidente of Bulan, took the field against these malcontents. Frequent clashes occurred, with losses on both sides in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

The "anting-anting" trouble in the province was subdued in the early part of May by the capture of the ringleader, Colache, and about 250 of his followers.

The constabulary handled this uprising without assistance from the troops.

Cholera.—An outbreak of Asiatic cholera occurred in the brigade April 1, 1902, and strenuous methods were adopted to prevent its appearance among the troops, the military and civil authorities uniting in this work.

In spite of all the precautions that were taken, 33 soldiers were attacked by this disease, 14 of whom died. The last case of cholera among troops of the brigade developed June 4, 1902, and the last death from the same cause occurred June 6, 1902.

A special report on cholera, by Maj. Henry D. Thomason, surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, was forwarded to your office from these headquarters July 21, 1902.

Surra.—Surra made its appearance among the horses and mules in the brigade last October, and every precaution was taken to prevent its spread. Notwithstanding all these precautions, many animals died of this disease.

Civil government.—Civil government was inaugurated July 4, 1901, in Ambos Camarines, Albay, and Sorsogon provinces.

Report of operations.—The following is a statement of the many scouting affairs and combats reported from May, 1901, to May, 1902:

May 23: Captain Armstrong, Ninth Cavalry, and Troop A, Ninth Cavalry, in encounter with insurgents west of Ragay, captured 1 comandante and 1 lieutenant, 3 rifles and 1 revolver; no casualties. Lieutenant Miller and Detachment B, Ninth Cavalry, surprised party of insurgents at barrio of Binog; killed 2 and captured 4; no casualties. Lieutenant Wray, commanding scouts, had an engagement with insurgents above Jovellar, killed 4; no casualties. Detachment G, Ninth Cavalry, had engagement with insurgents at Olit, below Guinobatan; killed 3, captured 1; no casualties. Detachment F, Ninth Cavalry, in scout about Maurora and Baulolo, captured 3 ponies belonging to Col. Simon Ola and burned his house. Lieutenant Stodter, Ninth Cav-

alry, Lieutenant Cutts, Eleventh Cavalry, scouting with Troop H, Ninth Cavalry, encountered force of insurgents and scattered them; Private Custer, Troop H, Ninth Cavalry, wounded.

May 25: Sergt. Frank Pratt, Company K, Fifteenth Infantry, with a small detachment, captured, near Bacon, 5 insurgents.

May 26: Donsol attacked by 300 armed insurgents in three columns; Captain Cotter, Fifteenth Infantry, in command of Donsol at the time with a platoon Company M, Fifteenth Infantry; no casualties; 12 insurgents killed, 30 wounded; engagement lasted two hours. Sergt. Frank Pratt, Company K, Fifteenth Infantry, destroyed cuartel and large quantity of rice near Caiyan, and afterwards captured the presidente of Manito, 8 insurgents, a number of bolos and daggers, and destroyed an outpost 3 miles south of Manito, with about 1,100 pounds of rice.

May 30: Lieutenant Wray, in command of Philippine Scouts, and H, Ninth Cavalry, Lieutenant Stodter commanding, had engagement with insurgents between Donsol and Jovellar; killed 5 insurgents; no casualties.

June 1: Captain Houle, Twenty-sixth Infantry, with detachment Company B, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and Captain Armstrong, Ninth Cavalry, with Troop A, Ninth Cavalry, made a combined movement to the mouth of the Ragay River; killed 2 insurgents; captured 2 rifles, 1 revolver; no casualties. Four columns left Donsol for the purpose of surrounding Estrella, the reported headquarters of Belarmino. The column consisted of Lieutenant Wray, with Lieutenant Stodter, Ninth Cavalry, 59 men Ninth Cavalry, 24 men Wray's Scouts; Second Lieutenant McCook, Second Infantry, with Lieutenant Cullison, Second Infantry, 70 men; Company G, Second Infantry; 10 men Wray's Scouts.

June 3: Captain Benham, Second Infantry, with Lieutenant Martin, Second Infantry, and 80 men Company A, Second Infantry.

June 4: Insurgents fired on town of Jovellar; insurgents driven into hills; town of Pasong burnt and 20 houses in mountain destroyed; 3 prisoners captured; no casualties. Lieutenant Parrott, Fifteenth Infantry, with Lieutenant Catlin, Second Infantry, 80 men Fifteenth and Second Infantry. Upon approach of these troops the insurgents scattered, took to the mountains; several small skirmishes took place. Estrella was destroyed and Lieutenant Wray destroyed camp of Ramon Santos; no casualties. Lieutenant Cowan, Fifteenth Infantry, with 40 men, encountered force of insurgents near Sulong; killed 5 insurgents and captured 1 United States carbine; no casualties.

June 5: A party of kidnapers were encountered and killed by detachment H, Ninth Cavalry, under Sergeant Clark; 1 scout wounded.

June 7: Captain Wittenmyer, Fifteenth Infantry, with detachment, met small band of insurgents about 7 miles from Jovellar; drove them out of their position and wounded 1 insurgent; no casualties.

June 10: Captain Kilburn, Twenty-sixth Infantry, in command of Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, attacked force of insurgents about 5 miles north of Jovellar; killed 6 insurgents and captured 2 insurgents and 1 carbine, 3 Mausers, and 20 rounds of ammunition; no casualties.

June 11: Corporal Johnson, with 12 men G, Ninth Cavalry, coming down from Ligao with hemp train, were attacked by 5 insurgents; 2 insurgents killed and 1 wounded; no casualties.

June 12: Capt. E. Wittenmyer, Fifteenth Infantry, and Lieutenant Wray, Eleventh Cavalry, with detachments, had fight with insurgents near Estrella; killed 7; no casualties; cook of insurgent chief Belarmino captured; camp of Santos destroyed.

June 13: Lieutenant Miller, with detachment B, Ninth Cavalry, on scout on night of 13th, captured presidente of Cordones and 4 insurgent lieutenants about 8 miles west of Libmanan. Detachment G, Ninth Cavalry, on scout from Ligao, encountered band of armed insurgents and killed 6.

June 19: Lieutenant Corbusier, Ninth Cavalry, and Lieutenant Buchan, Sixth Cavalry, with detachment, were returning from Camalig when they met small band of insurgents; killed insurgent vice-presidente of Camalig and 12 bolomen.

June 20: Lieutenant Moore, Fifteenth Infantry, with detachment, had fight with insurgents at Bulan, killed 8 insurgents and wounded 1; no casualties.

June 23: Commandantes Policarpo Pelgoni, Tomas Beso, secretary of war for Belarmino; Lieuts. Enrilaro Annero and Ygnacio Bonito surrendered at Legaspi to Colonel Wint, Sixth Cavalry.

June 26: Detachment of 10 men, Ninth Cavalry, scouting from Ligao to Guinobatan, along the coast near Donsol and Panganiran, killed 10 insurgents, including 2 captains, captured 1 captain in uniform and 102 men; no casualties. Two captains and 196 bolomen surrendered at Guinobatan.

June 27: One major, several minor officers, and 157 bolomen surrendered at Guinobatan.

June 29: Lieutenant of police at Buhi captured 3 insurgents.

July 4: The insurgent General Belarmino surrendered to Colonel Wint, Sixth Cavalry, at Legaspi with 5 staff officers, 27 company officers, and 218 men, 214 rifles, and 3,000 rounds of ammunition.

July 5: Comandantes Simon Ola, Nicolas Espada, and Juan Salagar, with 12 officers and 37 men, 33 rifles, 3 revolvers, and 1,000 rounds of ammunition, surrendered.

July 11: Col. Ramon Santos, Lieut. Col. Rufino Rives, Lieuts. Ramon Remasante, Francisco Pena, and Frances Rosca, with 34 men, 32 rifles, 1 shotgun, and 181 rounds of ammunition, surrendered to Colonel Wint, Sixth Cavalry, at Legaspi.

July 12: General Gibarra, Comandante José Virclus, 8 officers, and 45 men, with 5 rifles, surrendered to Colonel Wint, Sixth Cavalry, at Legaspi. Captain Honuto Sabese and 16 insurgents surrendered at Polangui.

July 13: Col. Jugracio Ovence, Comandante Isabello Maders, 3 officers, and 23 men, with 21 rifles, surrendered to Colonel Wint at Legaspi.

July 21: Eight men and 9 rifles, Tolidos command, surrendered at Legaspi.

August 14: Detachment Company B, Twenty-sixth Infantry, while scouting through Topas Mountains, 8 miles west of Pamplona, struck insurgents and killed 1 lieutenant and 5 soldiers; captured 1 comandante and 2 captains, 3 Remingtons, and 3 Krag carbines, 133 rounds of ammunition; destroyed cuarteles near where fight took place.

September 1-6: Colonel Angeles, with 21 officers and 60 men, with 16 rifles and 10 revolvers and bolos, surrendered to Captain Rosenbaum, Twenty-sixth Infantry, at Libmanan.

September 10: Detachment at Gate had fight with insurgents; killed 10 and captured 1; no casualties.

September 28: More than 100 insurgents attacked detachment at night at Gate; 8 insurgents killed; no casualties.

October 26: Six insurgents captured by Lieutenant Stodter, Ninth Cavalry, and detachment in scout near Polangui band of ladrones under Col. Augustin Saria.

November 26: Lieutenant Wray, with company of scouts, attacked ladrones near Polangui; killed 1 ladrone and destroyed 100 sacks of rice.

December 21: Lieutenant Wray, with company of scouts, captured 9 insurgents on scout in mountains near Gumaca.

December 22: Lieutenant Trotter, Artillery Corps, with detachment, Second Infantry, had fight with 20 insurgents of Reos's forces near Gumaca; captured Lieut. Beraulio Maraligan.

January 5: Lieutenant Bishop, Second Infantry, in command of 10 men, Second Infantry, surprised Col. Ruperto Rios and 9 insurgent officers on island of Munkun; captured 6 officers and important papers; Colonel Rios escaped, but was wounded.

January 6: Detachment Second Infantry, under Sergeant Penny, Company G, Second Infantry, encountered insurgents west of Guinayangan; killed 1 lieutenant and 4 soldiers of insurgents; captured 10 bolos and valuable information, and burned 1,500 bushels of rice and all buildings at Bat-Bat.

January 13: Constabulary encountered band of ladrones at Tivi and captured 11 bolomen near Legaspi.

January 14: Captain Houle, Twenty-sixth Infantry, commanding detachment Company B, Twenty-sixth Infantry, on a scout found insurgent camp in mountains of barrio La Laguna; killed Capt. Guillouno Paouganadain and 3 soldiers, and destroyed camp.

January 15: Lieutenant Butler, Second Infantry, in command of a detachment, struck insurgents near Puigosa; killed 2 insurgents, captured 2 rifles; 1 scout of Lieutenant Butler's detachment seriously wounded; Sergeants Adams and Scott and Private Bordon, Company L, Second Infantry, wounded.

January 24: Lieutenant Wray, in command of company of scouts, encountered insurgents at Calaug; killed 13 insurgents and captured 5 insurgents and 5 rifles.

January 28: Civilian Scout Morris, in command of a detachment of 32 company scouts, struck insurgent camp in mountains near Calaug; killed 1 major, 2 captains, 2 lieutenants, 5 insurgent soldiers; captured 1 Krag rifle and all of Colonel Reos's papers.

February 2: Police of San Narciso captured 1 major and 1 captain (Rios's band).

February 3: One Mauser rifle captured in scout near barrio Santa Rosa, Gumaca.

February 4: Captain Marquart, Second Infantry, reports the surrender to Captain Houle, Twenty-sixth Infantry, of 17 Tulasanes and 4 rifles on island of Alabat. Captain Hutton, Twenty-sixth Infantry, reports engagement with Captain Valerio, of Arbelas's band, in mountains near Ragay; no casualties.

February 10: Town of San Narciso attacked by band of insurgents with about 15 rifles; Sergeant Penny, Second Infantry, wounded; 1 insurgent killed and several wounded.

March 3: Lieutenant Wray captured Capt. Hostimano Paulolo, who later was killed while trying to escape and during scout in Tayabas Province.

March 4: Detachment Wray's scouts had fight at night with band of bolomen near Lopez; killed 4; no casualties.

April 4: Detachment of 5 men of the constabulary were attacked near Bulusan by band of outlaws; 2 of the constabulary escaped and other 3 were captured and cut to pieces. Outlaws captured two rifles, 2 shotguns, 2 revolvers.

May 13: Detachment of Wray's scouts returned from scout in vicinity of Pitogo; captured 1 insurgent lieutenant and valuable information.

Report for the period May 21, 1901, to June 30, 1902, of killed, wounded, and captured in the district and brigade: Americans—killed, 4; killed, constabulary, 3; wounded, Americans, 8. Insurgents—killed, 136; wounded, unknown; captured, 436.

Following are captures made of arms and ammunition: Rifles captured, 33; revolvers captured, 8; ammunition, rounds, 300.

Following surrenders were received: Men, 1,830; rifles, 404; revolvers, 18; ammunition, rounds, 4,779.

Total captures and surrenders: Men, 2,266; rifles, 437; revolvers, 26; ammunition, rounds, 5,079.

Respectfully submitted.

CONSTANT WILLIAMS,
Colonel Twenty-sixth U. S. Infantry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT CAMARINES NORTE,
Dact, P. I., July 28, 1901.

ACTING ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
*Third District, Department Southern Luzon,
Nueva Caceres, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith reports from Captain McMaster dated the 15th and 19th instant. Luis Basa is the man reported to have been made to dig his grave and then shot by order of Compluma (see my report dated Paracale, July 2). Basa states he was sentenced to death, but escaped from the cuartel at Binanangan when attacked by Captain McMaster, July 6.

The large boat referred to will be used along the coast when the weather permits. The great need of a steam launch or other seagoing vessel is daily more apparent.

When another officer reports, I shall occupy the Labo country with 50 men, and then if the seacoast could be patrolled from Basi to the boundary of this province and Tayabas, and with coast towns occupied as at present, it would, no doubt, result in the speedy disintegration of the enemy. The expedition to the Straits of Apat was abandoned owing to heavy weather.

Very respectfully,

L. W. COOKE,
Major, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding Subdistrict.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
Nueva Caceres, P. I., August 2, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Department of Southern Luzon. I shall send "Serantes" to Major Cooke as soon as the paymaster is through with his payments.

Captain McMaster is doing good work.

CONSTANT WILLIAMS,
Colonel Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding.

CAPALONGA, P. I., *July 15, 1901—5.30 p. m.*

The ADJUTANT, *Subdistrict North Camarines.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that yesterday at noon two squads, under Corporal Miller, Company A, Twenty-sixth Infantry, were directed to proceed by boat to northwest to capture a prominent native, Señor Lapac, who is held for friendliness to Americans.

At 4.30 p. m. some 25 (with possibly less than 10 guns) while watching the boats were fired at by the party on land, about 500 yards distance. One insurrecto was wounded, as learned from a native who had acted as guide for 3 men going from Barud to Bunagun. The party broke, firing in all 3 shots (soldiers about 100), part

taking to woods and part attempting to escape by boat. This boat (good for 12 men) was taken. This was near Calabaca, 2 miles toward Capalonga from Binanangan, where enemy was struck July 6 on expedition accompanied by the district and sub-district commanders.

One other boat (30 men capacity) was taken near by, coming to the house of one Juan Gonzales, loaded with hemp. This hemp was, from confession of Gonzales and his brother-in-law, Soltero Eberno, to be exchanged for rice.

The large boat near at hand (description inclosed and permit to trade in Tayabas) would probably have been used to transport such contraband to Tayabas.

This morning, as this expedition had not returned, I proceeded up the coast with three days' supplies and found the detachment some 5 miles away.

I returned here a few minutes ago and will take the surgeon (Dr. Chapman) and in all three squads. Object is to thoroughly clear out the country and press up the trail from Binanangan toward Labo, a two or three days' trip, leaving Dr. Chapman, with greater part of command (on account of difficulty of transporting food), at or near Binanangan, which is expected will be reached about midnight.

The insurgents, from reports, are supposed to have a retreat at a place called Bunagun, one day's march from Labo. This is probably the same place that the subdistrict commander formerly directed me to clear out, and it is possible where the detachment from Paracale (on 12th) struck the ladrones.

Binanangan and Labo are the exits from here, and it is thought that the few scattering ladrones will take this trail after yesterday's encounter, and I purpose, as before mentioned, pressing them from this end. This trail is toward Nueva Caceres. The large boat was not brought by the detachment, but it will be secured and probably sent to Daet with prisoners when detachment returns.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. McMASTER,
Captain, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding Substation, Capalonga.

IN THE FIELD, CAPALONGA, P. I.,
July 19, 1901, 3 p. m.

THE ADJUTANT, SUBDISTRICT NORTH CAMARINES,
Daet, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report as to operations of detachment under my command since July 18, in continuation of report submitted that date.

At 6 p. m., July 15, my detachment (Dr. Chapman, 11 enlisted men, and 1 scout) left in two boats for Binanangan, 15 miles. Failing to find Corporal Peairs's detachment, left to guard a boat, detachment at daybreak approached fire, which was supposed to be an outpost. This was found to be the hut of Señor Luis N. Basa, of Basaid, an intelligent Spaniard who was sent out in the latter part of May by Federal party in Manila to form committees in Basaid, Capalonga, Mambulao, and Paracale, with consent of department commander. He was seized about June 15 by presidente of Basaid and sent under presidente of Capalonga and delivered into hands of Compluma's band. When expedition accompanied by district and sub-district commanders struck insurgents' camp on July 6, he was taken toward Basaid and escaped next day. He will be of great aid in clearing this section of spies (Mambulao and other places, he says, contain them), as he has been in a position to know the ladrones' secrets and is enthusiastic in his desire to run these ladrones to earth.

This man will be applied for as an interpreter, serving as guide as well. This position he will accept for the time being while the neighborhood is being cleared out.

Corporal Peairs's detachment not reporting, a boat with 4 enlisted men (Corporal Miller in charge) left to search for them, 11 a. m. The remaining boat, with the surgeon, family of Basa, and 2 enlisted men, left at 3 p. m. on similar errand, 1 remaining with 5 soldiers, 1 scout, and Mr. Basa, in order to ambush the trail, 2 shots having been heard at noon. At 10 p. m. all detachments joined save Corporal Miller's.

The details are mentioned as showing the difficulties encountered by using small boats, or else letting good opportunities go by. Corporal Peairs's detachment in searching for mine picked up Capt. Roberto Lapac, the prominent man from Capalonga, kidnaped by the insurgents, he escaping from his captors on preceding day, when, he reports, that 1 insurgent was wounded and 2 killed, they being soldiers of one Lieutenant Glicerio, en route to see about the quartermaster who was bringing ransom money for presidente of Vicente. This Captain Lapac informed Señor Basa that he had seen a letter directing a lieutenant to gather supplies at Bosegon, toward

Labo, directing Compluma to collect his 25 men to bring there, they being supposed to be above Basaid. Consequently at 11 p. m., with 12 enlisted men and Señor Basa and Captain Lapac, I left for Basaid (25 miles up the coast) using the Chinaman's boat sent here by the subdistrict commander. Here again the boat question had to be solved, so the surgeon remained with one of the boats captured on the preceding day, awaiting Corporal Miller's boat, who did not join until 4 a. m., the 17th. My boat reached Basaid at 9.30 a. m., the 17th, the surgeon's boat at 2.30 p. m. Spies were sent out and Compluma's band, about 25 rifles, going slowly with their women, were reported as nearing the straits of Apat, six hours distant at noon on 16th, from where is said to be two trails toward Labo. This news was received at 7 p. m., July 18, so not having sufficient rations to pursue, considering what might happen in case of a storm with the boats at hand, I returned at 8.40 p. m. to Capalonga (40 miles), reaching latter place at 8.45 a. m., 19th. The boat with the surgeon aboard and a smaller one were dropped at Calabaca to secure the *Constancia*, the vessel reported about the 15th. This vessel, Mr. Basa says, has been carrying insurgent soldiers and supplies. He is satisfied that many boats leave Lopez, Mauban, and similar ports, presumably for Tayabas ports, but they pass down the coast and give aid to insurgents. Del Mundo himself, with the presidentes of Mambulao and Capalonga, was supposed at this time to be in Mauban, and it is not unlikely that the swift boat passing Binanangan shortly after daybreak July 17, and which was chased and fired at, contained him and party.

If a small launch could cut this line of communications from Tayabas and the other end could be cut off at Labo, affairs would be soon settled up.

From what I saw of the country up as far as Basaid (40 miles) I would not recommend any station above this one—Capalonga.

A small launch (for 25 men) moving from place to place would soon settle affairs, as well as supply the 3 substations under my command—Capalonga, Mambulao, and Paracale—already covering 40 miles. Unless some such energetic step is taken Mr. Basa thinks the insurgents will continue here for six months, as they have their supplies and sympathizers in towns garrisoned by our troops.

This man it was intended to send at first opportunity to report to the subdistrict commander, but will use him first in an expedition planned to follow up Compluma, which must go slowly, taking his trail at the Straits of Apat, following with 25 men, leaving 5 with a large boat picked up here to-day, expecting to leave here at 6 p. m.

Two weeks' supplies will be carried, burden bearers used.

This will be a very difficult trip and will leave one squad at Capalonga, but with the assistance of these two recent captives I deem that the opportunity should not be allowed to pass. It will be too late to await instructions from subdistrict headquarters, but will leave details of trip with Surgeon Chapman, whose good assistance in the forthcoming trip must be foregone.

This report is extended, but it should show that without a launch the necessary work here is arduous and dangerous.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. McMASTER,
Captain, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding Substation.

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT OF ALBAY,
Legaspi, Albay, P. I., August 13, 1901.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
Manila, P. I.

(Through headquarters third district, Department of Southern Luzon, Nueva Caceres, P. I.)

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations against the insurgent forces in the subdistrict, which ended in the surrender of the insurgent, General Belarmino, and all of his forces and arms except a small force composed of Lieut. Augustin Sariaya and 7 men, which has in its possession 9 rifles. This force belonged to Comandante Toledo's band and refused to surrender, and when last heard of was supposed to be attempting to escape to the north, with a view to joining some force still in the field:

On June 12 I arrived at this place with the headquarters and Third Squadron, Sixth Cavalry, and took station and assumed command of the subdistrict. At this time I found that field operations were in progress under Capt. E. Wittenmyer, Fifteenth Infantry, who had a force consisting of Company D, Fifteenth Infantry;

Companies K and M, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and Wray's Scouts, a total of 5 officers and 269 men, and who was operating in the vicinity of Jovellar.

On June 16 the horses of the Third Squadron arrived at this post and were unloaded.

On the evening of the day Second Lieut. P. W. Guiney, Sixth Cavalry, with a detachment of 40 men, and on the morning of the 17th Capt. J. W. Furlong, Sixth Cavalry, with one troop took the field, and from this time on every effort was made to push field operations and make an end to all armed opposition. With this end in view the following dispositions were made:

First. The Ninth Cavalry (Second Squadron) was directed to cover the country along the Legaspi-Ligao-Nueva Caceres wagon road and to escort supplies to Captain Wittenmyer's command.

Second. Lieutenant Abel with 70 mounted men at Talisay was ordered to cooperate with Captain Wittenmyer and receive orders from him.

Third. The Sixth Cavalry (Third Squadron) was directed to cover thoroughly the country east of Jovellar and south of the wagon road (Legaspi-Ligao-Nueva Caceres) to Putiao.

Fourth. The commanding officer, Sorsogon, was directed to guard the rivers between Castilla and Donsol and to cover the country between these towns and Putiao.

It having been discovered from captured papers that the insurgents were deriving part if not all of their revenues from tax on hemp cut and marketed in this region, I directed on June 19 that for the present no hemp be allowed to be cut, handled, or marketed, except in territory that is fully under our control and supervision. These restrictions were removed on July 19, pursuant to telegraphic instructions from district headquarters, after the object of their issuance had been fully attained.

Under date of June 27 I received from Belarmino the letter attached hereto and marked "A," to which the reply, attached hereto marked "B," was sent, and under date of June 29 I received the letter attached hereto marked "C," to which the reply attached hereto marked "D" was sent.

On July 4 Belarmino, with 32 officers, 218 men, and 214 rifles, presented himself at Albay and, having been escorted to Legaspi, surrendered. From time to time within the next few days Simeon Ola, Espada, Toledo, and others surrendered at this place with armed men, and on July 10 Ramon Santos, with 4 officers, 34 men 33 rifles, and 1 shotgun, surrendered at Ligao.

These surrenders, with that of 5 officers, 9 men, 9 rifles, and 2 revolvers made at Donsol on July 1, make a total of 81 officers, 429 men, 372 rifles, 11 revolvers, and 11 shotguns and 18 civil officers surrendered in this subdistrict. These surrenders from the best information that can be obtained include all the insurgents and arms in this subdistrict, except the officer, 7 men, and 9 rifles previously mentioned. Ramon Santos is still trying to locate this small band, but up to the present time has been unable to do so.

Prior to his surrender General Belarmino promised to use his best efforts to bring in and surrender every man and gun belonging to his force. He has worked faithfully at this task with the result stated above. In order to accomplish this it was necessary for him to keep messengers in the mountains hunting for small parties that were skulking there and who were not disposed to surrender. I am satisfied that he has acted in good faith in this matter, and that it is through no fault of his that the small party that is still out has not surrendered.

On July 7 William Victor and Fred Hunter, deserters from Troop G, Ninth Cavalry, and on July 8 Garth Shores, a deserter from Troop H, Ninth Cavalry, were delivered by General Belarmino, who requested, as a favor to him, that they be treated as leniently as possible.

Two negro deserters, Dubose and Russell, Troop E, Ninth Cavalry, surrendered on June 24 to the commanding officer, Camalig, with their carbines and belts, with ammunition.

General Belarmino also returned 3 mules, all that were left of a lot of mules captured in June, 1900, near Ligao.

In my opinion there should be no further trouble within the limits of this subdistrict, as, in addition to the officers and soldiers who have surrendered, over 4,000 bolomen and reserves have taken the oath of allegiance to the United States.

Reports of officers of field operations inclosed herewith.

In closing this report I desire to express my satisfaction with and appreciation of the intelligent and thorough manner in which the officers and men of this command have performed their duties during these operations. Captain Wittenmyer deserves great credit for his energy and persistence in his work. Major Wright responded promptly to every call made on his command, and the work of his officers was well done.

Of the Sixth Cavalry, Captain Cabell and Lieutenants Guiney, Karnes, and Buchan did good and effective work.

I desire to especially thank Lieutenant Wray, Native Scouts, not only for good and effective work, but also for much valuable information furnished me regarding the country operated in and the conditions existing therein, in regard to which he was thoroughly posted.

Reports were called for from all officers engaged in these field operations in General Orders, No. 3, current series, these headquarters, but some have not been received for different causes. This report is therefore rendered without them on account of my being under orders to relinquish command of the subdistrict.

Very respectfully,

THEO. J. WINT,
Colonel Sixth Cavalry, Commanding.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
Nueva Caceres, October 3, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Department of Southern Luzon.

Colonel Wint says: "On the evening of this day (June 16) Lieut. P. W. Guiney, with 40 men, and on the morning of the 17th Capt. J. W. Furlong, with one troop, took the field and from this time on every effort was made to push the field operations and make an end to all armed opposition."

It will be seen from the report of Lieutenant Guiney that under his instructions from Colonel Wint he made a scout in the vicinity of Libog and returned to Legaspi on the next day. It will also be seen in Captain Furlong's report that he scouted in the vicinity of Libog and Tabaco, remaining out two, possibly three, days, and then returned to Legaspi. As neither of these parties encountered the insurgents, which is not surprising since the field of action was in the opposite direction from Legaspi, and as they returned so quickly to Legaspi, the statement that they "took the field" is hardly warranted according to my understanding of the meaning of the expression.

"From this time on," says Colonel Wint, "every effort was made to push field operations, etc." It appears from the reports that Colonel Wint sent two more scouting parties, one of 50 men with four days' rations and one of 60 men with five days' rations. These two parties were sent in the right direction and performed their duty well in the limited time allotted, but they were not sent out to stay. As Colonel Wint had four troops of his regiment at Legaspi and Daraga he can not claim that every effort was made by him to push field operations, etc.

Colonel Wint goes on to say: "With this end in view, the following dispositions were made:

"First. The Ninth Cavalry (Squadron) was directed to cover country along the Legaspi-Ligao-Nueva Caceres wagon road and to escort Captain Wittenmyer's command.

"Second. Lieutenant Abel, with 70 mounted men at Talisay, was ordered to cooperate with Captain Wittenmyer and receive orders from him.

"Third. The Sixth Cavalry (Third Squadron) was directed to cover thoroughly the country east of Jovellar and south of the wagon road (Legaspi-Ligao-Nueva Caceres) to Putiao.

"Fourth. The commanding officer, Sorsogon, was directed to guard the rivers between Castilla and Donsol and to cover the country between these towns and Putiao."

He leaves it to be inferred that these dispositions were made by himself. Now the truth is that before Captain Wittenmyer entered upon his campaign the commanding officers of the subdistricts of Albay and Sorsogon were informed by the district commander of the intended campaign, and were directed to cooperate with Captain Wittenmyer and furnish him with all the assistance he might need. The campaign had actually been commenced some two weeks before the arrival of Colonel Wint in the district, and on June 14 Colonel Wint was given the inclosed memorandum showing location and disposition of troops in the subdistrict. (Inclosed, marked "E.")

Lieutenant Abel was sent to Talisay by the district commander before Colonel Wint arrived at Legaspi.

As to the first and second items there is absolutely nothing on record to indicate that Colonel Wint gave any orders whatever relative to these dispositions. With regard to the third item, there is nothing more than Colonel Wint's orders for the two scouting parties to indicate even the intention to thoroughly cover the country mentioned. As to the fourth item, Colonel Wint did, on June 26, send the instructions stated to the commanding officer, Sorsogon, but they were not received until after Belarmino's surrender.

General Orders, No. 15, from district headquarters (copy inclosed, marked "G"), was issued on May 29, 1901, as a part of the plan of operations against the insurgents, and nothing further in that line was needed.

Colonel Wint's order applied to all trade in hemp, without discrimination, yet, as I supposed that he was personally directing an active campaign, I approved it because I did not wish to embarrass him. With regard to his statement that his order was revoked in compliance with telegraphic instructions from district headquarters, I refer to the telegram mentioned by him (copy inclosed, marked "F"), from which it will be seen it simply removes the restrictions of District General Orders, No. 15 (inclosed, marked "G"), in part of this district. As a matter of fact Colonel Wint's order was disapproved by the division commander, who ordered it to be revoked.

It appears to me, from Colonel Wint's report, that he desires to appropriate to himself all the credit for the work done in Albay. I have therefore deemed it necessary to show upon what slight foundations his claim rests, in order that the credit for the field operations may go where it properly belongs—that is to say, to Capt. Edmund Wittenmyer, Fifteenth Infantry, and his brave associates in the field, who deserve something more than the few patronizing remarks made by Colonel Wint. These men, under orders from these headquarters, took the field two weeks before Colonel Wint's arrival in the district; they hunted down Belarmino, destroyed his supplies and shelters, and so embarrassed him that finally, worn out, weakened by losses in action, and wholesale desertions, and with no refuge available, he surrendered to the subdistrict commander, who happened to be Colonel Wint. As Captain Wittenmyer was acting under orders from the district commander, his report, properly addressed to the adjutant-general, third district, has been withdrawn from Colonel Wint's report, and is forwarded as a separate paper.

CONSTANT WILLIAMS,
Colonel Twenty-Sixth U. S. Infantry, Commanding.

A.

[Translation.]

MILITARY HEADQUARTERS OF ALBAY, *June 26, 1901.*

THE COLONEL COMMANDING THE UNITED STATES FORCES,
Province of Albay.

MY DEAR SIR: Having received yesterday at my headquarters in the field a letter from my immediate military superior, Señor Mariano Trias, which treats of negotiations on my part in behalf of the Filipinos, especially of this province, and considering that this affair is highly political, and in consequence very delicate, I have believed it advisable, to enable us to arrive at better understanding, that hostilities on the part of both combatants be suspended, and that you will be pleased to send to these headquarters, with your formal authorization, the commissioners, Señores Aniceto Medel, and Mariano Serrano.

Respectfully, etc.,

V. BELARMINO,
Major-General of the Philippine Forces, Commanding in the Province of Albay.

B.

[Translation.]

LEGASPI, ALBAY, *P. I., June 27, 1901.*

Gen. V. BELARMINO.

SIR: The policy of the United States and the conditions for submission to its authority have been published so repeatedly that it is believed that you, as well as the other prominent Philippine officers, have a full knowledge of the same, and at this late hour it is not considered necessary to enter into special correspondence over the terms and conditions of your surrender, except to assure you that you shall receive the same just and considerate treatment that has been accorded to other important officers. None of my troops will be withdrawn and operations shall be continued with activity while there exists armed insurgents in this province.

The officer bearing this letter has authority to pass through the troops of my command.

Very respectfully,

THEO. J. WINT,
Colonel Sixth Cavalry, Commanding Subdistrict of Albay.

C.

[Translation.]

IN THE MOUNTAINS OF ALBAY, *June 29, 1901.*

THE COLONEL COMMANDING THE AMERICAN FORCES,
Province of Albay.

SIR: I have received with genuine satisfaction your answer to my letter, and it gives me extreme pleasure to inform you that seeing the urgent necessity of pacifying this province, which has for so long a time been given up to a sanguinary warfare, I shall surrender at once, presenting myself to you in the pueblo of Albay, on the afternoon of Thursday, the 4th day of July, with the troops that I have collected. Owing to the great distances covered by my command it is not possible for me to concentrate it all in such a short space of time, notwithstanding which, once in the pueblo, I shall direct that all of them shall surrender.

I believe it superfluous to signify to you that I am confident of the unfailing goodness and benevolence of the Government of the United States, that I and all my subordinates will be well treated, as have always been the others, and that there will be conceded to me, through your powerful influence, some of the advantages accorded to the Philippine people by the Government of your nation which have been received by other Philippine generals.

In order that the progress of the concentration of my troops will not be interfered with, I beg that you will have the goodness to order that your troops will not go up into the mountains during the truce, in order that there may be realized the good results which are desired.

Very respectfully, etc.,

V. BELARMINO.

D.

[Translation.]

LEGASPI, ALBAY, P. I., *July 1, 1901.*

Gen. V. BELARMINO.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo, delivered to me by your adjutant-general, Señor Medina, informing me that you have decided to surrender on the 4th day of this month with the forces that you have collected and afterwards to assist in terminating the present state of affairs in this province.

To-day I shall order my troops in the field to withdraw and to suspend operations until the 5th day of this month, or until such other date that shall be deemed convenient between us. The detachment now in Jovellar will be withdrawn.

I do not deem it necessary to assure you that yourself as well as the troops under your command shall receive the same kind treatment as has been accorded those who have previously surrendered.

Very respectfully,

THEO. J. WINT,
Colonel Sixth Cavalry, Commanding Subdistrict of Albay.

E.

[Memorandum for Colonel Wint.]

JUNE 14, 1901.

There is now only one practicable wagon road in Albay Province. It runs from Legaspi—through Daraga, Camalig, Guinobatan, Ligao, Oas, and Polangui—to Nueva Caceres, in Ambos Camarines Province. There is a branch from Oas to Libong.

One squadron of the Ninth Cavalry holds this road from Legaspi to Ligao. A detachment of the Twenty-sixth Infantry from the subdistrict of Iriga is at Polangui. These troops scour the country near their posts and furnish escorts and patrols. There is one company of the Fifteenth Infantry at Tabaco; that district is quiet. Three companies of the Fifteenth Infantry and a detachment of the Fourteenth Field Battery garrison the following posts in Sorsogon Province: Sorsogon, Bacon, Gubat, Matnog, Bulan, and Donsol. There are also temporarily serving in this province one company of the Fifteenth Infantry, now at Castilla, and two companies of the Second Infantry, now at Donsol. Major Cornish is now in command, but the lieutenant-colonel (Matile) and headquarters Fifteenth Infantry will be at Sorsogon in a few days. Belarmino has not to exceed 300 rifles, is very short of ammu-

dition and what he has is very inferior; his men are poor shots. He has been operating between the road and Sorsogon Bay from north to south, and the Archipelago and Bay of Albay from east to west. Captain Wittenmyer is operating against him, in about the middle of this country, with Wray's native scouts, 40 in number, belonging to the subdistrict of Albay, his own company of the Fifteenth Infantry, from the Camarines, and two companies of the Twenty-sixth Infantry, from the subdistrict of Iriga. Belarmino's forces are now scattered and our troops are hunting them. There is also a force of 80 mounted infantry under Lieutenant Abel at Talisay, borrowed from subdistrict of Iriga. Matnog is the nearest point to Samar and the small garrison there must not be reduced; it must be increased with advantage, so as to prevent the crossing of insurrectos from one island to the other. Panganiran Point is the nearest part of Luzon to the island of Burias and it will be well to watch that vicinity closely to keep the insurrectos from crossing over. Lieutenant Abel's command at Talisay is observing that district. I have suggested to Major Cornish that he place one company of the Second Infantry at each of the places called Panganiran on the southwest coast, with instructions to operate toward the north and cover the country. There is a trail from one to Guinobatan and from the other to Ligao.

CONSTANT WILLIAMS,
Colonel Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding Third District.

F.

[Telegram.]

NUEVA CACERES, P. I., July 18, 1901.

COMMANDING OFFICER, SUBDISTRICT ALBAY,

Legaspi.

The restrictions upon traffic in hemp imposed by General Orders, No. 15, current series, from these headquarters, are hereby removed excepting in that portion of the Camarines lying west of Bicol River and Lake Bato.

By order of Colonel Williams.

ELY,
Assistant Acting Adjutant-General.

(Also to Commanding Officer, Subdistrict of Iriga, Iriga.)

G.

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. THIRD DISTRICT DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
No. 15. } *Nueva Caceres, P. I., May 29, 1901.*

All commanding officers in this district are directed to exercise the greatest vigilance in suppressing illicit traffic in hemp.

All hemp is contraband which has been cultivated or prepared, wholly or in part, by persons inimical to the United States, or which is owned by such persons, or which has been acquired from such persons, or upon which any tax or contributions of any kind has been paid or promised to such persons.

Contraband hemp will be seized wherever found and stored at the nearest military station; if it be impracticable to take it to a military station it will be destroyed. All persons in whose custody such hemp may be found will be arrested. A full report in each case will be made to these headquarters promptly.

Owners of noncontraband hemp will be allowed to move it to the nearest convenient seaport, but written permits must first be obtained from the local military commander. The permits will state the name of the owner, the name of the consignee and place of destination, the quantity to be transported, the name of the person to be in charge en route, and the date of departure. The person in charge of the hemp en route will carry this permit with him and will show it to all officers who may require it. Upon his arrival at his destination and before he turns over the hemp to the consignee he must turn over the permit to the military commander, who will see that the quantity brought in corresponds with that stated in the permit. The hemp may then be delivered to the consignee and the permit be filed at post headquarters.

Until further orders, buyers of hemp will not be permitted to go outside of the towns occupied by our troops; all trade in hemp will be conducted under the supervision of the local military commander, who will make such regulations for its control as may be necessary to prevent the buying of contraband hemp, and he will not permit any hemp to be sold unless its noncontraband character may be clearly established. Whenever doubt exists, the hemp will be seized and a searching investigation made.

By order of Colonel Williams.

W. T. MAY,
Captain and Adjutant, Fifteenth Infantry.

GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVINCE OF ALBAY,
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
Albay, P. I., August 20, 1901.

Col. THEODORE J. WINT,
Commanding Subdistrict of Albay, Legaspi, P. I.

SIR: Permit me to express to you the sincere thanks of the people of this province and myself for the wonderful services rendered in bringing about peace in this territory. Universal regret is expressed on all sides by the people at the departure of yourself, your officers, and your troops, whom the people have learned to respect owing to the justice of your officers and the gentlemanly conduct of your men.

Wishing you every success in your new field of operations and assuring you of the entire friendship of the people of this province, I have the honor to remain, sir,

Very truly, yours,

A. U. BETTS, *Governor.*

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CAVALRY,
Pasay Cavalry Barracks, August 29, 1901.

A true copy respectfully furnished the adjutant-general, Department Southern Luzon, with request that this be filed with report of field operations in subdistrict of Albay, rendered by me at Legaspi, August 13, as commanding officer subdistrict of Albay, and which was forwarded through the headquarters Third District Department of Southern Luzon.

THEO. J. WINT,
Colonel Sixth Cavalry, Commanding.

DARAGA, P. I., *June 19, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT,
Subdistrict of Sorsogon and Albay.

(Through adjutant, Third Squadron, Sixth Cavalry.)

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report, in compliance with paragraph 6, Special Orders, No. 1, current series, headquarters subdistrict of Sorsogon and Albay: Second Lieut. P. W. Guiney, Sixth Cavalry, with a detachment of 40 enlisted men of Troop L, Sixth Cavalry, mounted, left Legaspi about 6 p. m. June 15, 1901, and marched to Libog, reaching there about 10 p. m. the same day. The presidente of that town informed me that the insurgents were expected to attack Misericordia and San Fernando during the night. I proceeded to those towns with 30 men, dismounted, reaching San Fernando about 4 a. m. At neither of these towns could I or the native police sent with me by the presidente of Libog discover anything about the insurgents, the inhabitants claiming there were none in the vicinity. I then returned to Libog and was told by the presidente that there were insurgents in the neighborhood of Macapagal, near the road from Legaspi to Libog. About 3 p. m. left Libog and went to the vicinity of Macapagal, but could find no trace of insurgents. I continued along the main road until I met Captain Furlong, and then proceeded to Legaspi.

Very respectfully,

P. W. GUINEY,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Cavalry.

LEGASPI, ALBAY, P. I., June 20, 1901.

ADJUTANT, SUBDISTRICT ALBAY, *Legaspi, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that, pursuant to Special Orders, No. 2, headquarters subdistrict Albay, Legaspi, P. I., June 16, I proceeded with 60 men of Troop K, Sixth Cavalry, to the vicinity of San Fernando, a barrio of Libog, where I scouted the country thoroughly, but could find no evidence of armed insurrectos. The people were somewhat stirred up, however, over a cutting affray which had taken place somewhat recently between two natives. I proceeded to Tabaco, where I learned that the Ligao-Tabaco trail was guarded by a detachment from Tabaco, stationed about 8 miles out in the hills, and that the Ninth Cavalry from Ligao was patrolling the country from Ligao to this detachment.

I returned to Libog, again scouting side trails, but saw nothing; everything very peaceable and natives friendly.

I then returned to Legaspi, reporting verbally the above to the subdistrict commander.

Very respectfully,

JOHN W. FURLONG,
Captain, Sixth Cavalry.

DARAGA, ALBAY, P. I., June 22, 1901.

The ADJUTANT, *Subdistrict of Albay.*

(Through adjutant, Legaspi, P. I.)

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in compliance with telegraphic instructions from your office, I left this post at 5.30 p.m., June 17, with 20 mounted men Troop M, Sixth Cavalry, and proceeded to Camalig for the purpose of cooperating with Lieutenant Corbusier, Ninth Cavalry, in a "hike" after Comandante Matias, arriving at the latter place about 7 p.m. in a heavy rainstorm.

Left Camalig at 7.30 a. m., June 18, with my detachment, Lieutenant Corbusier, 1 noncommissioned officer and 2 men Troop E, Ninth Cavalry, and native scouts (mounted) scouting the country around Tacaytay, Baligan, and Mauraro. Found the country almost deserted, save for women and children. From Mauraro proceeded over mountain trail to Guinobatan, thence by the road back to Camalig, arriving about 3 p. m.

Having received information that a wedding celebration, at which Matias's command was expected to be present, was to be held at a place called Aogoto, I left Camalig at 7.30 p. m., June 18, with 17 dismounted men, Sixth Cavalry, Lieutenant Corbusier and 18 dismounted men, Ninth Cavalry, native scouts and guides, and marched until 2.30 a. m., June 19, over blind trails and through the hemp on the sides of the mountains. At 2 o'clock struck 2 bolomen (outposts), and one of the scouts, in spite of strict orders to the contrary, discharged his piece, thus alarming the whole country about. When we arrived at the house sought, some thirty minutes later, all insurrectos had fled. Upon information obtained from women found at Aogoto, proceeded a distance in the vicinity of Solong, when a small band was surprised in a house and the insurrecto vice-presidente of Camalig was killed and 3 bolomen captured.


Having found no signs of Matias's command, and the presence of my command being undoubtedly known, I concluded to return to Camalig. I reached the latter place at 9.30 a. m. June 19, and after breakfast saddled and returned to Daraga.

The trail from Camalig, through Tacaytay, Baligan, and Mauraro to Guinobatan is practicable for cavalry, though difficult in places.

Of the trip of the night of the 18th instant, I am unable to submit a sketch of all trails followed, as a greater part of the distance there is no defined trail. It would be impossible to take cavalry over this section of the country.

Very respectfully,

F. E. BUCHAN,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Cavalry.



Sketch of scout from Daraga June 17-19, 1901.

DARAGA, ALBAY, P. I., June 23, 1901.

ADJUTANT SUBDISTRICT ALBAY, *Legaspi, P. I.*
(Through Adjutant, Legaspi.)

SIR: I have the honor to report that in compliance with instructions of the sub-district commander I left this place at 5 a. m. June 19, 1901, with 6 guides (native scouts) and 50 men Troop M, Sixth Cavalry, to go to Putiao and to scout country west of there. I camped at Anislag same night. At Tabontabon, 2 miles out, saw small party insurgents, but could not come up with them. June 20, with 30 dismounted men, went 6 miles to house of Chino Juan Imperial; found it deserted and partially destroyed by fire. I returned to Anislag at 8 a. m. and marched to Putiao, 6 miles. June 21, with 25 dismounted men, I visited Bayason and Biaos, leaving camp at 1 a. m. and returning at 5 p. m., 26 miles. Saw party insurrectos, about 8 or 10, near Biaos. June 22, returned to Anislag. June 23, at 2.30 a. m., with 4 scouts and 11 men, left Anislag for Basquirran; located insurrecto outpost at 4 a. m., band of Captain Querobin, about 20 rifles. In the fight killed 2 insurgents and captured 1 Remington rifle and 20 cartridges. Returned to Daraga at 9 a. m.

The trail to Putiao is fair for horses as far as Anislag, then poor to Putiao.

All other trails followed are footpaths and could not be traversed by horses.

All horses going in the hills should be shod all around.

On all trails there are houses occupied by natives, who evidently give the alarm to insurgents when our troops approach. These natives also serve as carriers from the towns.

I recommend that orders be given to burn all those houses and bring in their occupants. They would doubtless have to be fed in the towns.

As little can be accomplished in these hills until the country is known, I recommend that the same officers and troops with the same scouts be used as far as possible in one section of the country.

Distance marched June 19 to 23: Mounted, 32 miles; dismounted, 40 miles.

Very respectfully,

DE R. C. CABELL,
Captain, Sixth Cavalry, Commanding Troop M.

DARAGA, ALBAY, P. I., June 28, 1901.

ADJUTANT SUBDISTRICT ALBAY.
(Through Adjutant, Legaspi, P. I.)

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in compliance with following communication from your office, viz:

"HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT OF ALBAY,
Legaspi, June 24, 1901.

"COMMANDING OFFICER LEGASPI,
Albay, P.I.

SIR: "You will send, from Sixth Cavalry troops under your command at this station and at the substation of Daraga, a detachment consisting of 2 officers and 60 enlisted men, to scout the country from Daraga to Anislag and Putiao and vicinity. The detachment will be mounted and fully equipped for field service, and will march from Daraga at 5 a. m. to-morrow, the 25th instant. Five days' rations and as much grain as practicable will be carried. Six scouts have been ordered to report to commanding officer, Daraga, this evening to accompany this detachment.

"You will instruct the officer to command the detachment to report to the subdistrict commander this p. m.


"You will provide pack transportation for the detachment.

"By order of Colonel Wint:

"J. T. NANCE,
Captain, Ninth Cavalry, Adjutant."

"Official copy forwarded to Lieutenant Buchan, Sixth Cavalry, who is designated to command above detachment, which will consist of 30 men from Troop K and Lieutenant Karnes and 30 men from Troop I. Four packers and 14 mules will be reported to Lieutenant Buchan this p. m., June 24, 1901. Five days' rations will include emergency rations for one day.

"WM. W. FORSYTH,
Captain, Sixth Cavalry, Commanding."



Sketch map of trails from Daraga to Bayason

I left Daraga at 5 a. m., June 25, with a detachment of 30 men from Troop K and Lieutenant Karnes and 30 men Troop I, 5 native scouts, and pack train, and proceeded to a point midway between Anislag and Putiao (indicated on inclosed map), where I arrived at 2.30 p. m. and established camp.

At a point halfway between Basquirran and Anislag (indicated on map) advance guard struck a small band of insurrectos, probably about half a dozen rifles. They fired four or five scattering shots and fled to the hills. I dismounted half a platoon and pursued them as far as practicable. None were captured and, so far as known, none hit.

On June 26, at 3 o'clock a. m., I sent out 2 detachments of 15 men, the first, under Lieutenant Karnes, to scout country in and about Anislag and Basquirran, and to strike, if possible, insurrecto band encountered the day before. Lieutenant Karnes returned to camp at 9.30 a. m., having discovered no trace of insurrectos.

The second detachment, under Sergt. Peter J. Peterson, Troop K, scouted through Putiao in the direction of Cogbacon, returning to camp by way of Bayabon. Nothing indicating presence of insurrectos discovered.

June 27 left camp at 6 a. m. with entire command, scouting country through Anislag, Lingting, Panoypay, Florista, Tuloto, and Sulong, arriving at Camalig at 6 p. m.

Between Panoypay discovered telegraph line apparently connecting latter place with Basquirran. This I cut, and destroyed several of the insulators. Nothing else indicating presence of insurrectos discovered.

June 28 left Camalig at 7.30 a. m., arriving at Daraga at 9 a. m.

All hombres captured and found in country claim there are no insurrectos in the seaports excepting the small band of Captain Quirobin, in the vicinity of Basquirran. All others, including Belarmino's command, have moved west and south of line from Guinobatan to Jovellar.

Blue lead pencil line on inclosed map indicates route of column and detachments. The trail from Panoypay to Tuloto by way of Florista is exceedingly rough and difficult for cavalry.

Captured 5 hombres near Basquirran who had been carrying rice to insurrectos. These I brought in to Daraga; I have heretofore telegraphed for instructions regarding these prisoners.

Very respectfully,

F. E. BUCHAN,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Cavalry.

DARAGA, P. I., July 2, 1901.

COMMANDING OFFICER TROOP M, SIXTH CAVALRY:

SIR: I have the honor to report the movements of my detachment since leaving Lieut. P. W. Guiney, Sixth Cavalry, at Anislag.

I left Anislag July 1, 1901, traveling north for about 8 miles, finding only 1 house showing signs of recent habitation, this containing vegetables, which I destroyed. From there I went west, passing a house with 4 Filipinos; 3 of those were pointed out to me as insurrectos, and I took the 4 Filipinos as prisoners. After going about 1 mile farther I made a halt. During the halt we saw 3 Filipinos; 2 were carrying rice, and I had two baskets of fish; they had more than they were allowed to carry, so I took them as prisoners also. After resting about twenty minutes we started southwest, and after marching about 1 mile I found a house with a lot of hemp, which I destroyed. From here I went to Albay, arriving there about 8 p. m., July 1, 1901. We camped at Albay over night, and left there about 6 a. m., July 2, 1901, arriving at Daraga about 7 a. m. the same date.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SIMON WINGENDER,
Sergeant, Troop M, Sixth Cavalry.

DARAGA, P. I., July 2, 1901.


COMMANDING OFFICER TROOP K, SIXTH CAVALRY:

Sergeant Reynolds and 19 men, Troop K, Sixth Cavalry, left Daraga at 6 a. m., June 30, 1901, for Basquirran, arriving at about 10.30 a. m., July 1. Marched at 7.30 a. m., and proceeded by rail north toward Albay, went into camp at 11 a. m., 2 miles from Albay. July 2 marched on rail to Albay, searched a native house for insurgents, found about 200 pounds of hemp, which we destroyed. Distance from to Albay $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles. About 3 miles from Albay arrested 3 natives carrying 200 pounds of rice to insurgents; destroyed rice. Arrested native merchant who sold above rice and turned the 4 prisoners over to the guard upon arrival at Daraga at 11 a. m.

Respectfully,

ISAAC REYNOLDS,
Sergeant, Troop K, Sixth Cavalry.

Route of Scouting Party from Daraga to Putiao and Vicinity June 25-28, 1901



SORSOGON, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, P. I., *July 5, 1901.*

The COMMANDING OFFICER SUBDISTRICT OF ALBAY, *Legaspi.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that I sent across to Magallanes a detachment to patrol the coast and to prevent the coming of contraband hemp and the shipment of rice to insurgent districts.

I inclose report of operations of Lieut. Dan T. Moore, Fifteenth Infantry, at Bulan.

Very respectfully,

L. A. MATILE,
Lieutenant-Colonel Fifteenth Infantry, Commanding.

[Inclosure.]

SORSOGON, P. I., *July 2, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT FIFTEENTH INFANTRY, *Sorsogon.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 20th instant, having obtained information that 4 men from Masbate were organizing a company of insurgents at Mariat, barrio of Bulan, I proceeded there by banca with a detachment of 5 men from Company M, Fifteenth Infantry, and 1 native scout.

I landed south of the town and proceeded overland, arriving at the camp at 5 a. m. Failed to surprise the insurgents owing to 1 prisoner trying to escape. Burnt down houses in camp and was preparing to leave when we were attacked from all sides by bolomen. Insurgents killed, 8; wounded, 1. No arms captured.

Very respectfully,

DAN T. MOORE,
Second Lieutenant, Artillery Corps.

CAMALIG, PROVINCE OF ALBAY, P. I., *July 19, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT SUBDISTRICT OF ALBAY, *Legaspi, P. I.*

(Through military channels.)

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report on field operations of Wray's Scouts, First Lieut. George M. Wray, Eleventh Cavalry, U. S. Volunteers, commanding, for the month of June, 1901.

On June 1 Lieutenant Wray left Donsol at 5 a. m. with a command consisting of First Lieut. Charles E. Stodter, 59 enlisted men, Ninth Cavalry, and 24 native scouts, proceeding to Estrella, reported as being the headquarters of the insurgent chief Belarmino, en route encountering an insurgent outpost, killing 1 and wounding 2 of the enemy, capturing 1 Remington rifle and 36 rounds of ammunition. He remained in Estrella, scouting in vicinity, capturing and destroying 30 sacks of rice, a large quantity of unmade insurgent clothing, and other supplies, and burning all buildings used by the insurgents as quarters and storehouses, until the 4th of June, on which date he returned to Donsol, and Lieutenant Stodter, with detachment from Ninth Cavalry, returned to Guinobatan.

June 5 he left Donsol at 11 a. m. with 25 native scouts, in company with Capt. E. Wittenmyer, Fifteenth Infantry, and proceeded to Bonanguran, arriving at 5 a. m., June 6, without having encountered any resistance.

I joined Lieutenant Wray here, having been with Captain Wittenmyer's command with a detachment of scouts since his leaving Camalig, on May 31. The scouts remained in Bananguran, scouting in vicinity, until the 7th of June, when Lieutenant Wray, with a detachment of 10 native scouts, in company with Captain Wittenmyer, scouted to the barrios of Panala and Tiguis, engaging a force of about 20 insurgents at the latter place, killing 1. On the morning of the 8th he proceeded from Tiguis to Jovellar.

I scouted the country in vicinity of Bananguran and San Vincente from June 5 to 8, on which date, pursuant to orders from Captain Wittenmyer, I proceeded from Bonanguran to Jovellar with remainder of the scouts, company D, Fifteenth Infantry, and pack train, meeting with no resistance en route, but destroying a large amount of rice and burning several buildings which showed recent occupancy by insurgents. I remained in Jovellar until the morning of the 10th, when, pursuant to orders from Lieutenant Wray, I proceeded to Guinobatan with Captain Wittenmyer, and from thence to Camalig.

Lieutenant Wray remained in Jovellar scouting the immediate vicinity until the morning of the 11th instant, when he scouted to the barrio of Buya in company with Captain Wittenmyer, engaging the insurgents and capturing a large quantity of supplies and several horses, which were saddled and evidently belonged to officers;

from this point he proceeded to the barrios of Malubago and Estrella, remaining in the latter place, scouting in vicinity, until the morning of the 18th instant, when he returned to Camalig, leaving the scouts with Captain Wittenmyer.

On the 22d Lieutenant Wray returned to Jovellar. On the 23d he scouted north to the barrio of Tiguis, without result. On the 26th he scouted south to the barrio of Tualum, having an engagement at that point and capturing one Mauser rifle.

June 26 he scouted to the barrio of Malubago, camping overnight in mountains, and returning to Camalig on the morning of the 27th. In conclusion, I have the honor to state that I had nothing but a few notes from which to write this report, and as I was only with Lieutenant Wray a short space of time I am unable to give any definite information regarding distances, character of country, etc., traversed by him.

Very respectfully,

LEO M. CUTTS,
First Lieutenant, Philippine Scouts, Temporarily Commanding.

SORSOGON, July 10, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Nueva Caceres, P. I.

(Through commanding officer, Subdistrict of Albay.)

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations in the field which were directed by you in verbal orders:

I left Nueva Caceres, May 27, at 4 a. m., with Company D, Fifteenth Infantry, 79 men, and 3 officers.

The officers were Capt. E. Wittenmyer, Fifteenth Infantry; Capt. Thomas G. Carson, Tenth Cavalry, and Lieut. A. S. Cowan, Fifteenth Infantry.

Captain Carson requested permission to accompany us, which was granted by the district commander.

At Baao, Capt. D. W. Kilburn, with Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, joined me on 28th instant (90 men). At Polangui, Capt. L. M. Nuttman and Company M, Twenty-sixth Infantry, joined me (100 men), making 269 men and 5 officers. We arrived at Ligao on 30th, and 31st went from Ligao to Guinobatan, when I left Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and Captain Kilburn.

I had previously been over most of the country to be operated over and had a good personal knowledge of the terrain. I also received a copy of Captain Cotter's report of the attack made on Donsol, and learned that Lieutenant Wray, Eleventh Cavalry, 40 scouts, and Lieutenant Stodter, with 40 men, Ninth Cavalry, had left with orders to get to Donsol as soon as possible. I also learned that Captain Benham, with two companies, same regiment, were ordered to Donsol to relieve the situation.

The country around Jovellar and Florista, and on down to Catamlagnan, is very rough, and the only trails where the ordinary rate of march can be made are from Albay and Daraga to Anislag and Putiao, and from Camalig to Taloto and Jovellar, and from Guinobatan to Jovellar. All other trails in this section can be passed over by pack mules in good weather only, and some of them then with the greatest difficulty, not taking into consideration the difficulty of guarding them.

We knew that General Belarmino's forces comprised between 350 and 400 rifles and every "hombre" in the country was a boloman or vigilante.

Among the rifles were 24 American guns, and among his forces were six deserters from the Ninth Cavalry.

I selected Jovellar and Putiao as places to put a company each and with the other company I intended to operate against them, exchanging men whenever they began to give out.

I ordered Captain Kilburn to proceed from Guinobatan to Jovellar on June 1 and to get all the relations there that he could. The distance from Guinobatan to Jovellar is about 12 miles, trail good for packs. I also ordered him to send a patrol consisting of 25 men, daily, at least 5 miles south of Jovellar, to remain out for twenty-four hours.

I left on May 31 at 4 p. m., with Company D, Fifteenth Infantry, and Company M, Twenty-sixth Infantry, for Camalig, 179 men and 4 officers.

We left Camalig at midnight for Taloto. Left in four columns, each consisting of five sets of fours. Lieutenant Cutts, Eleventh Cavalry, went with us from Camalig, with a few scouts (Wray's) and three native policeman from Camalig. The columns arrived at Taloto on June 1 between 7 and 9 a. m.

Lieutenant Cowan's was the last column to leave Camalig, and he arrived last. He killed 5 insurgents in a house near Sulong, and captured a U. S. magazine carbine, afterwards found to belong to Ninth Cavalry deserter. He also wounded Garth Shores, the deserter whose carbine he captured. Shores was hit in the shoulder and the bullet came out in the middle of his back.

That same afternoon we all moved to Florista. Next morning, June 2, at 5 p. m., we left in four columns for the Vicente, near Putiao. Lieutenant Cowan's was the only column to get there, as Carson's and Nuttman's guides soon said they did not know the trails and consequently they followed me, and my guide took me to San Vicente. I knew this was not the right place and moved on till we came to Bananguran, where we found Captain Benham with two companies Second Infantry.

As the pack train was with us it was necessary to get rations to Cowan, so I sent Captain Carson with 4 mules to Cowan. The men had marched all day and I selected 25 men to go as guard. They left Bananguran at 7 p. m. and arrived at San Vicente, where Cowan was, at daylight June 3.

I told Captain Cowan before he left, if I did not reach him before his rations were out, to go to Legaspi with his and Cowan's detachments for rations.

Captain Benham gave me an account of his movements from Donsol. He had left Donsol on morning of June 1 in 4 columns to go to Estrella, each column 80 strong. The position on June 3 was as follows: Kilburn's Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, at Jovellar, with 25 men; 5 miles south, near Tugis, Lieutenant Cowan and Captain Carson, with 85 men near San Vicente de Putiao, and Captain Nuttman and myself at Bananguran with 84 men; Captain Benham, Second Infantry, with 3 of his columns of 80 men each at Bananguran. Lieutenants Wray and Stodter had been ordered to Estrella, but Captain Benham did not know whether he had reached that point. Benham had expected to have his 4 columns meet at Estrella at noon on June 2, but 3 of them were 12 miles from there. Captain Benham only had one day's rations left and decided to return on 3d to Donsol.

I remained in camp at Bananguran on 3d and 4th, sending out patrols, and on the 5th went to Donsol with Captain Nuttman and 25 men with pack train to get rations. Arrived at Donsol at 5 p. m., about 13 miles; trail bad in places. Lieutenant Wray arrived at Donsol a few minutes after I did, coming from Estrella. Lieut. Stodter went from Estrella to Guinobatan. Wray reported that Ramon Santos had been in Estrella but had left. I informed Wray that I had orders for him to report to me and we left together for Bananguran at 11 a. m. June 6. We arrived at Bananguran at 4 a. m. June 7, having to lay up, it being too dark until midnight, when the moon rose. I found that the camp had been fired into by about 5 riflemen while I was gone, and several prisoners captured gave us the information that Belarmino's forces had scattered or disbanded and General Belarmino had gone to Panala.

On morning of 8th Wray and I, with 12 scouts and 12 men, Company D, went to Panala, through hemp, across country. We found no one had been there for some time, at least two days, as no one had been there since recent rains. We then started to move across country to Tugis. Here we saw some insurgents, about 15, but it was nearly dark and they were across the river and on a high hill. I fired a volley at them from the nearest point I could reach. They then fired on 5 men I had sent to try to get around them. Our first volley (6 men firing) killed 1. The firing kept up probably five minutes when they retreated and escaped. We went on toward Jovellar till dark, when we camped in a shack. Next morning we started before daylight and at 5 a. m. ran on to Captain Kilburn's patrol down the river in their camp.

We arrived at Jovellar about 11 a. m., and Lieutenant Cutts, Eleventh Cavalry, arrived with the men belonging to my company scouts with pack train at 12 noon, from Bananguran. I had given orders for him to bring these men to Jovellar with pack train leaving Nuttman with all rations at Bananguran.

I went to Guinobatan afternoon of 9th instant, and returned to Jovellar on morning of 10th. Sent Wray on morning of 10th, or rather night of 9th, to Tugis to find out if supplies of insurgents were there as reported by prisoners. Wray reported on 10th that he was unable to find supplies but he believed there were some there and he was satisfied a small band of insurgents were in the vicinity of Tugis. I then ordered Captain Kilburn to send his patrol farther down the river and try to capture these insurgents. A few days later his patrol killed 6 insurgents, captured 3 rifles, and destroyed their supplies, which they found in a cave.

Lieutenant Cowan joined me at Guinobatan on June 9 with men under him and Captain Carson. Captain Carson had reported to district commander and left under orders to join his regiment. The following is report sent to adjutant subdistrict of Albay on June 16 and covers operations from June 10 to 16:

Left Guinobatan June 10; arrived at Jovellar same day. June 11 sent Lieutenant Cowan, with about 35 men Company M, Twenty-sixth Infantry, to report to Captain Nuttman, Twenty-seventh Infantry, at Bananguran. Captain Nuttman and Lieutenant Cowan to leave Bananguran in two columns on 12th for Estrella. June 11 I went with Lieutenant Wray, Eleventh Cavalry, and 16 scouts, 16 men Company D, Fifteenth Infantry, to neighborhood of Malaboga; 12th went to Estrella. About 4.30 p. m., after being fired upon by vigilantes for a distance of 3 miles, we came upon and captured 6 horses, 4 of them saddled and bridled; the other 2 had native saddles on them. Killed the man holding 4 of them. Found the supper and provisions of the

party. Got a hat belonging to Capt. Pedro Ricato, who was with Ramon Santos. When we arrived at Estrella Captain Nuttman and Lieutenant Cowan were both in. We learned from prisoners that General Belarmino, Colonel Maronilla, Ramon Santos, and other officers were holding a conference.

The next day, 13th, we sent out small parties to try and find out where these parties had gone. The 14th we also scouted immediate vicinity and I sent Lieutenant Cowan with 8 men Company D, Fifteenth Infantry; 1 man Company M, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and 10 scouts to investigate information gained about supplies at place I had captured cook of Ramon Santos on 12th. Lieutenant Cowan got several sacks of rice, all Ramon Santos's records of insurgents, both as instructor-general, commissary-general, and director of operations. The records will be sent in and I request that no one except officers of the United States be allowed to see them, as there is information that may incriminate certain firms now doing business in this province.

On 15th Lieutenant Wray and I went with 13 soldiers and 16 scouts to Magogong, and from there to Sapud, to try to catch Ramon Santos. Ramon Santos had been to Sapud and had gone toward Ligao with Capt. Felix Ricardo and 10 riflemen. On 16th we returned to Estrella. Lieutenant Wray left me at Buyo to try to get Colonel Ovens. Got some of his relatives, his supplies, including vino and beer.

Captain Nuttman and Lieutenant Cowan went, on 15th, to capture arsenal about 6 miles from here (Estrella).

Found a few cartridges, tin, lead, and copper. Destroyed all houses connected with it (arsenal). Sixteenth Lieutenant Cowan captured 1,000 pounds palay. Destroyed insurgent supplies. Found all this stuff in a cache.

Lieutenant Wray will leave for Jovellar to-morrow with 40 prisoners. Will arrive at Guinobatan next day. Would like to have mules shod and returned with but one day in Guinobatan. Best information says Belarmino is between us and the sea, with Simion Ola commanding guard. Maronilla is with him. Lieutenant Wray can tell you all I know. I urge that you have all towns from Guinobatan to Legaspi entirely closed against hemp. We have information which shows, beyond doubt, that the insurgents collect from everybody who sells hemp outside of town limits—I mean all hemp raised outside of town limits. I also have information from prisoners that at Mauraro there are always vigilantes. Malaboga is always bad. If possible, stir up both of these places and send some one back of Ligao for Ramon Santos.

On 17th, Lieutenant Wray left Estrella with pack train for Jovellar. Sent three scouting parties out. One beyond Buyo, one down the river, and one southwest. June 18 sent Captain Nuttman southwest beyond Tula. He went to Buena Vista and along coast to Marigondon, where he camped. He returned on 19th and reported having seen a detachment of Ninth Cavalry, from Ligao, under a sergeant, consisting of 10 men, at Marigondon. He also reported many houses in direction of Mamlad.

On 20th, Lieutenant Cowan and I went to Mamlad and thoroughly scouted the entire country. We learned from prisoners that no armed insurgents remained in that vicinity, but that they had all gone toward Ligao. On 21st took my company and Nuttman's company, Twenty-sixth Infantry, to Jovellar. On 22d sent Kilburn's company to Malaboga to remain in vicinity for three days, then go to Guinobatan, where I would send him orders. Same day I went to Guinobatan, and from there to Legaspi. I went in with a guard of five of Wray's scouts. On 23d, on account of hard rain, remained in Legaspi. On 24th left Legaspi, and shortly after arriving at Camalig two deserters from Ninth Cavalry (Russell and Dubose) surrendered to Lieutenant Pritchard, commanding officer at Camalig. I learned from them where Toledo was, and asked Pritchard to take Dubose as a guide and go after Toledo that night. I took Russell with me and went to Guinobatan and then to Jovellar, where I arrived at 10 o'clock. I sent Lieutenant Cowan at 12 o'clock that same night with 25 men to try to get Toledo. I had told Pritchard Cowan would come from Jovellar. Sent Wray at midnight same night with scouts to Apud, where Toledo was expected to go from Miti, his present position. Next morning I went to Parian, one of Toledo's haunts. I found Pritchard there, and Cowan arrived in the afternoon. Both of these parties had failed to reach Toledo on account of darkness, the guides not being able to follow the trails. I had received word from Major Wright that more than a hundred bolomen had surrendered with five or six officers. Wray surprised an outpost at Apud and got a rifle. Lieutenant Corbusier, Ninth Cavalry, from Guinobatan, sent out by Major Wright, Ninth Cavalry, captured another rifle. All reports indicated that the insurgents were rapidly disintegrating. No vigilantes or bolomen could be found. I ordered Kilburn to Parian and directed him to keep a patrol between him and Taloto, Sulong, and Camalig all the time. Wray went to Malaboga, Cowan and I to Florista. Nuttman patrolled south from Jovellar. Reports kept coming in of more surrenders, and our country was kept well patrolled. On June 30, I wrote the following telegram to Colonel Wint, commanding at Legaspi:

"I send in 24 men of Captain Nuttman's Company M, Twenty-sixth Infantry, mostly dysentery, and 2 men from Captain Kilburn's Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry. Captain Nuttman had sent previous to this 17, including his first sergeant. Captain Kilburn had sent 16 in. This leaves of Company M 57 and of Company K 75. Both of these companies have a number of men, 10 or 12, in camp with malaria.

"I had absent sick in Company D, Fifteenth Infantry, 24 men when I came out and have now but 43 men out of 79 I came out with. Seven of these 43 are sick.

"I shall leave to-morrow, July 1, for Donsol, with my company and will take all my men to Sorsogon first opportunity.

"I request that both Companies K and M, Twenty-sixth Infantry, be sent to their stations at once.

"I recommend that troop of cavalry, or large detachment, be ordered to Jovellar to remain until all insurrectos are in. This troop ought to be relieved every fifteen days.

"I also recommend that a company of infantry be sent to some point in the vicinity of Bananguran, to remain until all insurgents are in. This company ought to be relieved every fifteen days.

"Captain Gilbert, medical department, and the Hospital Corps men with the companies here should be relieved also.

"I request that this telegram be sent to this district headquarters. These companies have been in the field now for more than a month and I am afraid there will be a total collapse. A number of men are doing duty who ought to be on sick report."

On July 1, I left for Donsol with two columns. Lieutenant Cowan and part of the men went down the river with two boats holding the rations and sick, while I went over the mountains by trail. We met at the junction of the two rivers at 7 p. m., just below Panala, and at 9 p. m. arrived at Bananguran and went into camp.

I had given orders for Lieutenant Cowan to bring all boats possible with him and he had 8 good ones on arrival at Bananguran. Next day, July 2, I went overland, with 19 men, to Donsol, and Lieutenant Cowan, with 25 and the prisoners, by water. I arrived at Donsol at 7 p. m. July 2, I learned from the commanding officer, Captain Cotter, Fifteenth Infantry, that 3 officers and 9 soldiers had surrendered with arms and ammunition on July 1. July 3 a launch arrived from Sorsogon with telegram from Colonel Wint, commanding officer at Legaspi, for me to report to him for consultation. I took my company to Sorsogon on the launch and got to Legaspi on July 6.

I reported to the commanding officer and was informed by him that before he had received my telegram he had agreed to withdraw the troops in the field so that General Belarmino could assemble his forces and surrender. General Belarmino had agreed to surrender all his officers, men, arms, and ammunition provided Colonel Wint would withdraw the troops in the field and let him assemble the insurgents.

I remained in Legaspi for four days and when I returned to Sorsogon all of the leaders except Ramon Santos had surrendered. About 300 rifles were in. Assurances were given that both Toledo and Ramon Santos would be in very shortly.

In closing this report I desire to state that every officer within reach of me did everything possible to help me. Major Wright, Ninth Cavalry, did more. He went out of his way to help me and my men, both in their work and in supplying them.

Colonel Wint wired me to let him know if he could do anything and sent and kept a detachment in the vicinity of Anislac and Putiao at my suggestion. He also kept troops west of us under Lieutenant Abel, in the vicinity of Talisay.

I learned afterwards, though I did not know it at the time, that Captain Benham, Second Infantry, had sent detachments out from Donsol, in the vicinity of Pilar, and one detachment out west of the Bananguran River. The commanding officer at Sorsogon had sent a detachment from Castilla toward Putiao. All of these detachments materially assisted us, as it kept the insurgents on the run and they could not find a place where our troops were not after them.

Captain Kilburn, Captain Nuttman, Lieutenant Wray, Eleventh Cavalry, and Lieutenant Cowan, Fifteenth Infantry, worked cheerfully and relentlessly. They all deserve great credit. Wray's scouts did excellent work, and his chief scout, Bensi, deserves some position where he can get more pay. He was invaluable.

The main credit for the work done rests with the enlisted men of the three companies. My men had been tried before and knew just how to act. They required no attention.

Kilburn's and Nuttman's men were practically recruits, and they are now soldiers. These men took every hardship without a growl, and sometimes it was very hard.

The distances marched, the prisoners taken, the killed and wounded, can not be given, as they are unknown. But we were out from May 26 to July 3, and every man who was able, and sometimes those who were not able, were on duty every day and many nights. They slept on the ground, marched in the rain, in rivers, day

and night had straight rations and sometimes a little short of that, yet every man did his duty and did it cheerfully.

Captain Gilbert, assistant surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, and the Hospital Corps men with the companies did good work, and cheerfully attended all the sick.

Sketch map inclosed.

Very respectfully,

E. WITTENMYER,
Captain, Fifteenth Infantry.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT OF ALBAY,
Legaspi, Albay, P. I., August 13, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, third district, Department of Southern Luzon, as an inclosure.

Attention invited to the following irregularity in Captain Wittenmyer's report:

This report should have been rendered to the adjutant, subdistrict of Albay, pursuant to General Orders, No. 3, headquarters subdistrict of Albay, Legaspi, P. I., June 20, 1901, copy of which was forwarded all post commanders, that officers should submit reports of field operations to these headquarters, accompanied by sketch map. Captain Wittenmyer also fails to state in his report that he reported in person to the subdistrict commander at Legaspi, on June 23, 1901, for orders, at which time he received orders and instructions.

T. J. WINT,
Colonel Sixth Cavalry.

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
October 4, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Department of Southern Luzon.

This being the report of a campaign conducted by Captain Wittenmyer, under direct orders from the district commander, it is properly addressed to the adjutant-general of the district, and is therefore withdrawn from the report of the subdistrict commander.

Too much praise can not be awarded to Captain Wittenmyer and the members of his command for the complete accomplishment of the object of the campaign, viz, the capture or destruction of the insurgent forces in Albay.

To relentlessly follow up, day after day, for four weeks, a native force at home in the country; to contend with all the obstacles of a thick tropical jungle, where the air is motionless and deadly; to suffer from malaria and the maddening stings of venomous insects; to toil over steep mountain trails especially favorable for ambush, and to overcome everything in the way, wearing out in the end an enemy natural to the climate, and compelling him to surrender in order to obtain relief from an unendurable situation, is an achievement of which Captain Wittenmyer's command may well be proud. It is another proof that the American soldier is equal to any demand which may be made upon him.

CONSTANT WILLIAMS,
Colonel Twenty-sixth U. S. Infantry, Commanding.


HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT AND
POST OF NUEVA CACERES, P. I.,
October 10, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, THIRD DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON, *Nueva Caceres, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of recent military operations in this subdistrict:

On assuming command of the subdistrict, in June last, the information was communicated to me by the district commander that such insurgents as were within the territory assigned to me were in the mountains north of a line, Pasacao-Pamplona.

After the organization of the second and third battalions of the Twenty-sixth Infantry, the following troops were placed under my command: Troops A, B, and D, Ninth Cavalry; Companies B, D, E, and G, Twenty-sixth Infantry; Wray's Philippine Scouts, and, temporarily, Company L, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and the Iriga Scouts.



The president of Magarao, who has been distinguished among the natives as being friendly to the Americans, volunteered the services of 50 organized municipal police, under "Capitan" Lorenzo, for any military service that would secure peaceful conditions.

These men were fairly drilled and uniformed and had given former proof of loyalty. With the approval of the district commander their services were accepted for one month and they were loaned carbines to replace the shotguns with which they had been armed.

In accordance with the views of the district commander new stations were established at Ragay and Lupi on sites of towns destroyed by the Forty-fifth U. S. Volunteers, Company D, Twenty-sixth Infantry, garrisoning Ragay and Pascolaga, on the coast to northwest of Ragay, and Company E, same regiment, occupying Lupi.

The commanders of these new stations were instructed to endeavor to restore confidence among the natives, induce the restoration of the towns, and to use every endeavor to clear the country of insurgents and establish peaceful conditions.

The region in which the insurgents were lurking and from which they operated while levying contributions, kidnaping, making prisoners of and sometimes murdering those friendly to the Americans, and occasionally firing upon small parties of soldiers, is made up of rugged, rocky mountains, densely covered with tropical forest growth, trees, vines, coarse grasses, and tangled brush, in which trails are lost.

The insurgents had a very complete system of cordones, spies, and sentinels, who from points of vantage watched the movements of our troops so thoroughly as to render contact or surprise almost impossible. Under these conditions it was decided to locate, if possible, the rendezvous of the principal band, then to hold them, if possible, in the limited area, cut off all supplies of fish, rice, etc., from outside, and to traverse the guarded area, so as to force the insurgents to fight or to dodge the troops. Without outside supplies the insurgents can not live in the mountains if kept on the move.

My plan of actions, as set forth in field orders, dated August 8, 1901 (Exhibit A), met the hearty approval and support of the district commander, and, as developed, was carried out by my subordinates with most gratifying loyalty and zeal. See also Exhibits B, C, and D.

On August 14 Corporal Mohler, of Company B, Twenty-sixth Infantry, with 8 men of his company and 8 native scouts, encountered a party of 11 insurgents under Lieut. Nicolas Penaflor near Pamplona and killed 1 lieutenant, 1 sergeant, and 5 privates, captured 6 guns, 212 rounds of ammunition, and also captured 1 major, 2 captains, and 9 cordones (or sentinel spies). The lieutenant killed was Sebastian Angeles, brother of the leader (Elias).

With this exception the fighting was limited to our men firing on insurgents encountered in mountains, who as a rule withdrew hurriedly at the first fire. We had no casualties.

The reports of the several commanders are inclosed, and for details I beg to refer to them. They are marked D, E, F, G, H, I, K, and L.

I am obliged, on account of being hurriedly ordered out of the department, to make this report without being able to do more than to summarize the results in brief. (See Inclosure M.)

The officers and men of this little campaign performed for a few days most arduous work, fatiguing, painful marching in heat and rain, most of the time amid a tropical tangle which shut out the view of a man a few feet distant. Clothing was torn and shoes worn out, and insects were terrific, and the enemy was elusive. The results, however, are shown in the surrender of Angeles and of his principal lieutenant, Martinez, who, finding this section untenable, managed to get away, but, finding our troops in the North Camarines looking for him, surrendered at Daet. But one band, that of Vallerio Abili, who is now located north of Ragay, remains of Angeles' command. Abili has probably not over 15 or 20 guns and but little ammunition. He is being harassed and chased, and the troops at Guinayangan, Tayabas Province, are working in cooperation with those at Ragay. It is most probable that in a short time he will be killed or captured.

The officers who were actively engaged in these operations were Captains Houle, Hutton, Roenbaum; Lieutenants Schmidt, Delaplane, and Archer, Twenty-sixth Infantry; Lieutenant Ripley, Twenty-second Infantry; Lieutenant Crimmins, Sixth Infantry; Lieutenant Dillingham, Eighteenth Infantry; Lieutenants Wray and Cutts, Philippine Scouts.

All of the officers and men deserve great credit for the hard work done, and this can only be appreciated by those who have campaigned in the mountains of southern Luzon.

I believe Corporal Mohler should be especially complimented. Wray's Scouts did good work, and the Magarao Volunteers are to be commended for their loyalty as well as good services. As to the Iriga Scouts, and all of the officers and men of the Twenty-sixth Infantry, and the officers serving with that regiment, I simply say that I am proud to have them under my command.

Very respectfully,

A. WILLIAMS,

Major Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding Post.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
Nueva Caceres, P. I., October 13, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Department of Southern Luzon.

Major Williams, Twenty-sixth Infantry, who planned and executed the within plan, deserves great credit for the good work accomplished. The energy and zeal shown by the officers and men, and the hardships undergone by them in their efforts to suppress all insurrection in the subdistrict, are commended and recommended to the consideration of higher authority.

F. D. GRANT,

Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

A.

FIELD ORDERS.]

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT AND POST,
Nueva Caceres, P. I., August 8, 1901.

It appears certain that some insurgents, presumably under the immediate command of Angeles, are in the district included between the sea and the line Ragay-Lupi-Libmanan-Pamplona-Pasacao.

Angeles is understood to be in the vicinity of a mountain numbered 196 on the "Plano Topografico" (Colosisi), although he may be westward on mountain 206 (Talamud).

The object of the present operations is to capture or kill the insurgent outlaws.

Company L of the Twenty-sixth Infantry and the Iriga Scouts proceed to Lupi and joins Company E, Twenty-sixth Infantry, now there, as speedily as possible.

Company L and scouts, after moving for some distance toward Binahian, will, if possible, gain a trail leading to mountain 196 in the area between Lupi and the coast. This movement will be cooperated in by Company E, which should approach mountain 196 from the north as directly as possible.

The commanding officer of Libmanan will place a force at Sipocot and watch the trail from Libmanan to Lupi along line of Libmanan River.

Wray's Scouts will move, covering as much country as possible, from Pamplona to mountain 196.

The commanding officer, Pasacao, will cover the country to the north and east of that station, so as to allow no refuge or escape of the insurgents in that direction.

The commanding officer at Ragay will send a detachment to Binahian and operate toward mountain 196.

Any developments calling for a change of these dispositions will be promptly communicated.

In approaching the presumed location of the insurgents it is advised that organizations be held together as long as possible.

On closing in, squads can be detached when opportunity affords to watch trails, cover ground, etc. Men should be cautioned not to lose touch with their squads. As much of the country as possible will be investigated, but the general object of the movement be continually in view.

All natives found within the area above designated are presumably insurgents and will be dealt with accordingly—captured or killed; but no violation of the laws of war will be tolerated.

Care must be taken not to mistake or fire upon our own men. The word "attention" will be used in recognition and also the "attention" on the bugle.

Each organization after starting will proceed until Mt. Colosisi (196) is reached, or until it is learned that other forces have been there, after which, unless the insurgents are within reach, it will proceed to Lupi, Libmanan, or Pamplona, as may be most accessible, reporting to the subdistrict headquarters without delay.

The time of starting out will be ordered by the subdistrict commander.

By command of Major Williams:

JAMES T. WATSON,

First Lieutenant and Battalion Adjutant, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Adjutant.

B.

FIELD ORDERS.]

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT AND POST OF NUEVA CACERES, P. I.,
Libmanan, August 18, 1901.

The following movements will be made in the area between the Libmanan River and the sea to the eastward with a view to killing or capturing any insurgents in that section of the country:

The commanding officer, Lupi, with the Iriga Scouts and as many men of Company E, Twenty-sixth Infantry, as can be spared for field service, will proceed to Calabanga, thence southward to Cabusao and Libmanan, covering as much territory as possible by such distribution of his command as may be deemed most advisable.

The commanding officer, Libmanan, will send a force from Companies G and L, Twenty-sixth Infantry, via Barcelonita northward to Lupi, covering as much territory as possible and distributing his command as may be considered advantageous.

Wray's Scouts and the Magarao Volunteer Scouts will cooperate in the movements via Sipocot.

The time of starting will be arranged by mutual understanding between the commanding officers at Libmanan and Lupi so that the several commands may start out as simultaneously as possible.

The instruction in regard to the treatment of natives herein given will govern. No buildings or other property will be destroyed, or unless, from well-grounded suspicion or actual observation, such buildings or other property are in military use or are intended for military use by the insurgents.

By order of Major Williams:

JAMES T. WATSON,

First Lieutenant and Battalion Adjutant, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Adjutant.

C.

NUEVA CACERES, P. I., *August 10, 1901.*

To the Troops Operating North of Pamplona-Pasacao:

Should the movement now undertaken fail to bring contact with insurgents, and the latter are likely to be found to the westward, it is desired by the subdistrict commander that troops from north and south, on meeting, proceed to the west coast and endeavor to reach the insurgents.

A. WILLIAMS,

Major, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding Post.

(Placed in the hands of C. O. Wray's Scouts.)

D.

FIELD ORDERS.]

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT AND POST OF NUEVA CACERES,
Libmanan, P. I., August 18, 1901.

First Lieut. Leo M. Cutts, Philippine Scouts, with 20 selected men from Wray's Scouts, and a hospital corps soldier, will proceed without delay, via Pamplona and Pasacao, to Binahian.

At Pasacao he will be furnished such rations as he may require and be furnished transportation to enable him to reach Binahian. He will be accompanied by one Brooks, a surrendered deserter from the Forty-fifth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, now at Libmanan, and the commanding officer, Pasacao, will turn over to him Antonio Lopez, a prisoner, now at that station.

On reaching Binahian, Lieutenant Cutts will carry out special instructions communicated to him by the subdistrict commander.

By order of Major Williams:

JAMES T. WATSON,

First Lieutenant and Battalion Adjutant, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Adjutant.

E.

PASACAO, CAMARINES SUR, LUZON, *September 7, 1901.*The ADJUTANT SUBDISTRICT NUEVA CACERES, *Luzon.*

SIR: In compliance with telegram from your office dated September 5, 1901, I have the honor to make the following report of operations during the month of August:

Detachment of Corporal Mohler, 8 privates, Company B, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and 8 native scouts, departed at 1 p. m. August 14, pursuant to verbal orders and returned at 8 p. m. August 15, scouting in the mountains west of Pamplona, and having one engagement about 7 miles west of that place, killing 7 of the enemy and capturing 3 carbines, 3 Remington rifles, 133 rounds of ammunition, and 16 natives.

Myself with 20 men, Company B, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and 8 native scouts, departed at 8.30 a. m. August 17, and with 15 men, Company B, I returned at 3, August 20, by launch *Nashville*, the remaining 5 men Company B and 8 scouts returning at 10 a. m. August 21, by way of Pamplona, the entire detachment having operated in the vicinity of Tinalmod without result.

First Sergeant Fisher and 7 privates, Company B, Twenty-sixth Infantry, departed at 12 m. August 17, per verbal order commanding officer, returning at 12 m. August 18, having scouted in the region between Pasacao, Pamplona, and San Fernando. No result.

Lieutenant Crimmins, Sixth Infantry, in command of 5 men, Company B, departed at 10 a. m., and having operated in the region southwest of Pamplona, returned at 3 p. m. August 18, without result.

Eight native scouts departed at 8 a. m. August 25, pursuant to verbal orders, and returned August 26, having operated in mountains west of Pamplona. Captured 1 revolver.

One Winchester was surrendered by Anadelo Marques, native, to me at Pasacao, P. I., August 13, 1901.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE E. HOULE,

Captain, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding.

F.

LIBMANAN, CAMARINES SUR, P. I., *September 7, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT SUBDISTRICT NUEVA CACERES, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of troops of this command pursuant to orders from the subdistrict commander, Nueva Caceres, P. I.:

The command comprised Companies G and L, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Native Scouts, and the Magarao Volunteers, and the operations were for the purpose of capturing or killing (see Field Orders of August 8 herewith, marked "A") the insurgents under the notorious leader Angeles, who has been eluding the vigilance of the American troops for nearly two years, and resulted in the surrender of the above leader at this place on September 1, 1901, with 21 officers, 50 soldiers, 8 rifles, 10 revolvers, and a number of bolos, and in the surrender, September 12, 1901, of a lieutenant, with 10 men and 11 rifles, and no doubt will be instrumental in the surrender of other similar bands still bearing arms.

Field Orders of August 8, 1901, were carried out as ordered, the commands leaving their various stations August 13, 1901, and while no large captures were made, still the moral effect was evident.

A patrol was placed on the river here preventing a quantity of rice and fish from leaving the town. Numerous scouting parties were sent out, and the Magarao Volunteers used to patrol trails from Libmanan to Lupi. In this way about 25 Cordones were captured, and from these it was learned the insurgents were terrified, rapidly moving from place to place, and were having great difficulty in procuring sufficient food for their large band.

The troops returned to this station August 16, 1901, Company G having scouted the country from Lupi to Binahian, and thence to this place, to the distance about 45 miles, and as the trails were extremely difficult and the country almost inaccessible, this company was much in need of rest and clothing, which were given.

On August 22, 1901, another expedition was started pursuant to Field Orders, August 18, 1901 (within, marked "B"), and was carried out successfully. However, the night of August 22, 1901, two emissaries from Angeles presented themselves with

a letter for the commanding officer, United States troops, and was sent to Nueva Caceres the next day.

This resulted in terms being given which were accepted and a proposition to surrender as per letter marked "C," which was carried out as proposed.

In all, 23 officers, 60 soldiers, 19 rifles, 11 revolvers, and a few bolos have been surrendered at this station, and 4 officers, 21 soldiers, some uniforms, and a few bolos captured by the troops of this command.

Very respectfully,

O. B. ROSENBAUM,

Captain, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding Post, Libmanan.

G.

COMPANY D, TWENTY-SIXTH INFANTRY,
Ragay, August 31, 1901.

The ADJUTANT SUBDISTRICT, *Nueva Caceres, P. I.*

SIR : I have the honor to report the following operations of importance of Company D, Twenty-sixth Infantry, during the month of August, 1901.

On August 3, 1901, detachment under my command scouted coast east of Ragay Bay, and in the evening boarded a steam vessel that had entered the bay. Found on board Señor Calvo, who formerly had large interests in the district and who had returned here to see if it was possible to reestablish his business. He accompanied scouting parties on August 5 from Malinao up Pascalog and Binahian rivers and up the Ragay River to Ragay. Distance covered, about 20 miles. The result of this visit will be the reestablishment of his shipbuilding and lumber interests at Pascalog, which will aid greatly in the pacification of this territory.

On August 11 received the orders of the subdistrict commanders to join in an expedition at Binahian for operating against Angeles. Information had previously been sent me from Señor Lopez at Binahian of the presence of insurrectos and two Americans in the country between Binahian, Lupi, Libmanan, and Pasacao. On August 12 a detachment of 7 men left Malinao, reaching Ragay in the evening; here they were joined by 15 more men and one H. C. private, and scouted to Binahian August 13, which place they reached at 5 p. m. I reached Binahian also by boat on same date accompanied by Surgeon Reddy, and detachment of 8 men. Distance covered by detachment August 12 and 13 about 30 miles. I immediately placed Señor Lopez under arrest in accordance with my instructions. At 12 o'clock midnight August 13 Company L, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and native scouts reached Binahian from Lupi, which, in connection with the movement my detachment had made the same day, thoroughly covered the territory east of Ragay to a north and south line through Binahian and Lupi. Upon the arrival of Company L, Twenty-sixth Infantry, the commanding officer said he intended to burn and destroy everything in the whole town, at which notification I gave orders that no burning in the town would be permitted except by my orders. Although I had recognized the fact that without a doubt certain supplies were received by the insurrectos through Binahian, and I had verbally recommended that a detachment be stationed there, I did not think the circumstances warranted the entire destruction of the town when I was practically assured that if the people were given the protection they desired, that they would at once refuse to furnish further supplies to insurrectos. August 14 I sent part of my detachment by trail to Lupi and from there they returned to Ragay the following day. Distance covered by detachment about 30 miles. On August 15 left with remainder of my detachment, Company L, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and native scouts, by a trail leading to Libmanan and directly into district I believed to be occupied by Angeles. Company L, Twenty-sixth Infantry, was encumbered by a pack train, and marched so slow that after proceeding about 8 miles I cut loose with my detachment and by night had reached Mount Pantic, and, developing a trail leading into the Tinalmod Mountains, camped for the night. I could not follow the trail farther, and was compelled to return to Binahian on August 16 to prevent completely exhausting my men.

From August 12 to 15 my company were out of rations, and nearly all who were available for scouting duty had been continually on the move for over a month.

Paymaster reached Binahian August 17, and it became necessary for me to return to Ragay to witness payment. A detachment of 8 men was left in Binahian, where they have been kept up to the present time. August 22 a detail scouted to Lupi, returning August 23. Distance covered by detachment about 30 miles. August 25 a scouting party of 20 men left Pascalog for Quilbay and scouted the district thor-

oughly, returning to camp August 29, 1901. Distance covered, about 50 miles. Also, on August 25 a scouting party left Ragay, operating to the north of first party; this detachment returned to Ragay; August 27 a scouting party under charge of Sergeant Fetterly, Company D, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and operating from Binahian, captured Comandante Alsona. * * *

Very respectfully,

F. S. HUTTON,

Captain, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding.

H.

PAMPLONA, P. I., *August 31, 1901.*

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN LUZON,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report:

Upon my return from Manila to Albay, August 8, 1901, I found that my scouts had proceeded overland to Nueva Caceres to report to the commanding officer, subdistrict Nueva Caceres, P. I.

Later I received an order to at once join my command. On my arrival in Nueva Caceres, I found my scouts in line and ready to take the field under the command of Lieutenant Cutts.

I received an order from the subdistrict commander to proceed to Libmanan, P. I., and take temporary command of a company of volunteer native scouts from the pueblo of Magarao.

On my arrival at Libmanan, August 11, I found the natives that I was to take command of doing duty as cossack posts between Libmanan and Lupi, a distance of 22 miles. Their duty was to prevent the insurgents from crossing their line, as the insurgents were all supposed to be in the mountains west of Libmanan and Lupi, where my scouts, under the command of Lieutenant Cutts and 4 companies of the Twenty-sixth Infantry were operating.

The following morning, while en route to Sipocot (where I was to be temporarily stationed), I inspected the posts, which were found to be composed of 5 natives each, and 2 miles apart. In all, 5 posts between Libmanan and Sipocot.

Except in two instances, 1 soldier could have captured the posts, as there was no sentinel on the alert. On inquiry, I was informed that they had been instructed to be on the alert and patrol between posts, but there was no one but a native corporal to see that this was done, and it was neglected. On my arrival in Sipocot I found a native volunteer captain of this company in charge. From him I obtained information that there was about 40 armed insurgents in the mountains and vicinity.

Taking this and attending circumstances into consideration, I at once relieved the cossack posts and had patrols made instead.

The following day I inspected the company and found in their possession 43 U. S. carbines, model 1895-96; 5 Remington shotguns, and 1 Colt's U. S. revolver, caliber 0.38. The men with carbines had 35 rounds of ammunition each, and the men with the shotguns 10 rounds of buckshot ammunition each. The company presented a very soldierly appearance, though devoid of any knowledge or instruction pertaining to the proper use of their arms. I at once gave them instruction in the loading and firing, and they soon gained a fair knowledge of the use of their arms.

In the performance of their duties, both patrolling and guard, I always found them willing, though at times the trails were very difficult, especially so at night.

I remained here in charge until August 18, when I proceeded to Libmanan to report to the subdistrict commander. Arriving there, I found my company of scouts, and was directed to take command of them, turning over a detail of 20 picked men to Lieutenant Cutts. The 30 remaining returned to Sipocot with me, where I remained until August 22, when, pursuant to a telegram dated August 21, headquarters subdistrict Nueva Caceres, P. I., regarding the whereabouts of the insurgents, I left Sipocot with 12 of my own and 10 Magarao scouts, proceeding down the river to Bical, where I left the river, going on trail in a westerly direction through mountains, passing the sitio of Ragay and going into camp for the night at 5 p. m. The next day I proceeded on my way across the mountains to the barrio of Tinalmod (in the vicinity of which the insurgents were supposed to be located, according to the information furnished by Captain Houle, Twenty-sixth Infantry).

Here I obtained information that the insurgents were in the mountains north of Binahian, in the vicinity of mountain No. 199.

From Tinalmod I proceeded to Binahian. Upon my arrival there, I found Lieutenant Cutts and party, who informed me that he had arrived there on the 21st

instant. On the 24th instant I sent a party of scouts to look for a lieutenant of insurgents that had lived in this place and had kept the enemy informed as to the movements of our troops, also acting as a commissary officer for them, but being warned by amigos that we were after him he made his escape. On the 25th instant, acting on information regarding the whereabouts of Colonel Angeles, I went on a scout to mountain No. 199, where Deserter Brooks told me Angeles's camp was located, which I found upon my arrival to have been destroyed and deserted some hours previous. I was unable to determine which way the insurgents had gone, so I returned to Binahian. The following day, acting on information regarding the possible whereabouts of Angeles, and also where two rifles were concealed, I sent a party out to look for them and to gain information concerning the insurgents. Upon their return they reported that they had found the place about six hours distant from Binahian, but that the rifles had been taken away. They brought in with them four native prisoners that they had captured in the vicinity, one of whom was recognized by my guide as being an insurgent. The native admitted that he had taken the rifle to Colonel Angeles, who the day before was at a barrio of Ragay, named Dao, about twelve hours distant, in company with Colonel Martinez and 40 rifles. The next day, August 26, Lieutenant Cutts returned to Nueva Caceres.

I was preparing to follow up information regarding the whereabouts of the insurgents, when I received a telegram informing me that for the present and until after the 1st of September all hostile operations against the insurgents were to be suspended.

Acting upon this advice I returned to Sipocot, August 27. The next day I received a telegram ordering me to concentrate my scouts at Pamplona, at which place I arrived the evening of the 29th instant, taking temporary station there, where I found the remainder of my command, Lieutenant Cutts having returned from Nueva Caceres the same day.

Very respectfully,

G. M. WRAY,
First Lieutenant, Philippine Scouts.

I.

• BAAO, CAMARINES SUR, P. I., October 5, 1901.

THE ADJUTANT, SUBDISTRICT OF NUEVA CACERES,
Nueva Caceres, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of field operations by Wray's Scouts during the period I was in command in the month of August, 1901:

On August 6 I left Camalig at 7.30 a. m. for Nueva Caceres, pursuant to telegraphic orders from headquarters Third district, Department of Southern Luzon, through commanding officer Guinobatan, P. I., and arrived in Nueva Caceres at 9.30 p. m., August 8, reporting pursuant to instructions to the subdistrict commander. My command consisted of Contract Surg. A. M. Chase, U. S. Army, and 50 Philippine Scouts.

The command rested until the 12th, when, pursuant to field orders, dated Nueva Caceres, P. I., August 8, 1901, I left Nueva Caceres at 2 p. m. for Pamplona in bancas, arriving at 6 p. m., and camping for the night.

Pursuant to orders from the subdistrict commander, I left Pamplona at 7 a. m. and proceeded northwest in the direction of mountain 196 (Colasisi), camping for the night about 15 miles from starting point. The next day, finding it impossible to continue on in direction indicated in my orders owing to the terrible condition of the trails and sickness among my men, I marched to Libmanan, arriving at noon. Here I learned from the commanding officer that a column had reached the objective point from Lupi, and as nothing had been developed, and my orders did not require me to proceed, I decided to rest my men. During the day some of Captain Rosenbaum's scouts brought in a prisoner who they had taken near Bicol, and who, upon being questioned, said that he was Maj. Pedro Leis, in charge of communications (comandante de comunicaciones). I questioned him very closely, but he would give me no information. Later he told me that he could lead me to a house in the mountains near Bicol where Angeles with two riflemen were hiding. I immediately secured permission from Captain Rosenbaum to take him along as a guide, and on the morning of the 15th left Libmanan in the direction he indicated. After marching all day we arrived at the barrio of Pangasuan, and I camped for the night. Upon starting the prisoner had told us it was five hours to the place in question, but I lost confidence in him and gave up hope of finding anything. The next morning, the 16th of August, however, upon his protesting that he could still lead me to

Angeles, I continued on in direction he indicated. About 12 o'clock the man attempted to escape and was killed by Corpl. Valentin Gambua, although he was twice halted. This occurred at the sitio of Mangana.

Learning from other prisoners that we were nearer Libmanan than Bicol, and that we had been marching in a circle, I returned to the former place and reported by wire to the subdistrict commander the result of the trip.

The next day, the 17th of August, I proceeded to Nueva Caceres and reported to the subdistrict commander in person, returning with him to Libmanan on the 18th, where a conference was held between Major Williams, Lieutenant Wray, and myself, the result being that I was placed in command of 20 selected men from Wray's Scouts with orders from Major Williams, the subdistrict commander, to take Brooks, the surrendered deserter, and proceed via Pamplona to Pasacao, where I was also to have turned over to me a Spaniard, Angel Lopez, under arrest charged with aiding the insurgents. From Pasacao I was to proceed up the coast to Binahian and from thence, if possible, to Angeles's camp, which was reported to be not far from that point in the mountains. Pursuant to these orders, I left Libmanan at 4 p. m., and proceeded to Pamplona in bancas, arriving about 7 p. m., and camping for the night.

On the 19th I marched to Pasacao, finding upon my arrival there a launch which had been ordered to take me to Binahian. I drew three days' rations here, but was forced to stay overnight, as the launch went to Burias with rations and did not get back until the following morning.

I left Pasacao the morning of the 20th instant, with 20 scouts and 6 prisoners, including Brooks and Lopez. On the arrival of the launch at Binahian, I landed six men, with orders to catch, at all hazards, a native named Santiago, who lived in the town, and who, Brooks informed me, was one of Angeles's spies, and the medium by which communication was carried on between Angeles and Lopez, the Spaniard. I afterwards landed with the balance of my force. Angel Lopez was the representative of the Philippine Lumber Company and lived in a large house owned by the company in Binahian. Upon my arrival there, I found a small detachment of Company D, Twenty-sixth Infantry, under the command of a sergeant, occupying the lower part of the building, and as there was no other suitable place to put my men, I had them camp in the same quarters, using a room myself upstairs, and allowing Lopez to occupy another room with his family. After landing myself, the detachment that I had sent out to capture the native Santiago returned and reported that he had escaped upon the arrival in the bay of the launch. This was later borne out by Angeles himself after his surrender, when he told me that he knew two hours after our arrival at Binahian that we were there. Lopez had been accused by Brooks when he surrendered of visiting Angeles's camp and supplying him with rations and other necessities, but the charges had never been pressed until I myself took the matter up. He had managed to make friends of some five or six officers who had been in Binahian before me, and from one he had received a letter which ordinarily would have convinced any man that the charges were false. I made a careful investigation, however, and believed that Brooks was telling the truth. The afternoon of my arrival in Binahian, I talked with Lopez, and in fifteen minutes he had confessed to me the whole thing. He said: "I did go to Angeles's camp and carried whisky and wine there, also giving him rice, but I was forced to do so—living here unprotected as I was for a period of seven months, in a territory under insurgent control, I had to either comply with their demands, which were made once at the point of a rifle, or die." Upon my asking him why he had not appealed to the American authorities, he replied, "I tried to do so at Delapon, but the company stopped me."

Lopez told me that the native Santiago was a spy and offered to assist me in his capture. I acted on his information and posted outposts on each trail leading out of town with orders to allow no one to pass, and to arrest all persons who tried to enter. We then made a systematic search of the town, but without result. I sent out two scouting parties that night, but no results were obtained outside of the capture of a few men who were declared to be dangerous by the Spaniard, and were held as prisoners by me awaiting investigation.

On August 21, hearing that some insurgents were on the coast northwest of Binahian, I proceeded in a small boat with six scouts and the Spaniard, all disguised as natives, to the point, but found that no one had been there for some time. I then returned to Binahian, remaining there the balance of the day.

At 4 o'clock a. m., August 22, I proceeded in the direction of Angeles's camp as near as I could judge from Brooks's, Lopez's, and other prisoners' statements, but after marching for several hours discovered that none of them either knew no more about its location than I did, or else did not care to tell; so after scouting thoroughly in the mountains in the vicinity of the sitio of Cabugao, I returned to Binahian,

arriving about noon. I searched Lopez's room and found an English Manchester rifle and a double-barreled shotgun. He later came to me and surrendered a caliber .44 revolver, Spanish make, all of which I confiscated August 23. In the afternoon one of the natives I had captured in town came to me crying and said that he was afraid he was going to be imprisoned and killed, and that he wanted to save himself. I told him he need have no fear, but that I wanted him to tell me all he knew. He then said that when he was captured he had just returned from the sitio of Magdua, on the coast, about six hours' march from Binahian, and that Maj. Toedorico Alzona and two insurgents arrived, with two rifles and a revolver, and were in hiding there. I asked him if he could lead us to the place, and he said he could. I then promised him his liberty and good treatment if he assisted in their capture, and he replied that I could depend on him. That night I sent a detachment of a sergeant and six men in a small boat to the place designated by the prisoner. He acted as guide, and they returned the following day, the 24th, bringing with them Major Alzona, four other prisoners, one small .32 caliber revolver, captured under Alzona's head while asleep, and six rounds of ammunition. The two rifles mentioned could not be found. I released the guide.

Hearing from Lopez the Spaniard and several other natives that Alzona was a notorious outlaw, and for the purpose of securing him so as to prevent escape, I had him tied to a tree in rear of the house, and posted over him an American soldier, with orders to see that no one came near him or communicated with him in any way. Then, suspicious of the natives in the house, and fearing that he would by using the native tongue communicate with them, I placed a scout over him with the same orders and turned to walk away, when I was startled by a shot. Turning, I saw the scout looking at his carbine in a dazed way and Alzona shot through the head. He died almost instantly. The scout could give no explanation except that he placed a shell in the chamber of his piece and it went off. I immediately placed the scout (Nasario Nicio) in arrest and had Alzona buried. From the appearance of the scout, which was about all the evidence I had to work on, I believe the shooting to have been accidental.

Lieutenant Wray reached Binahian shortly after this occurrence and I reported it to him.

On August 25, having run out of rations and being unable to accomplish anything further, I turned over to Lieutenant Wray all of my well men in exchange for his sick and ten of the Magarao volunteers who he had with him, also all but my important prisoners, and boarded one of the Philippine Lumber Company's steamers lying in the bay and started for Pasacao. We were forced to return, however, owing to heavy weather, and did not leave Binahian until the 27th, when we reached Pasacao without incident. I reported to the subdistrict commander from Pasacao by wire, and was ordered to proceed to Pamplona and leave my men there, taking Brooks and Lopez to Nueva Caceres, which I did. I returned to Pamplona on the 28th and reported for duty to Lieutenant Wray.

Very respectfully,

LEO M. CUTTS,
First Lieutenant, Philippine Scouts.

K.

LUPI, CAMARINES SUR, P. I., *August 31, 1901.*

ADJUTANT SUBDISTRICT AND POST,
Nueva Caceres, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of scouts for the week ending August 31, 1901:

August 22 Lieutenant Schmidt, with 37 men, left Lupi in compliance with field orders from headquarters, subdistrict and post of Nueva Caceres, P. I., dated August 18, 1901, and arrived at Calabanga about noon. Scouted vicinity and up Polantuna trail 3 miles, then returned to Calabanga and camped for the night. Next morning left for Barcelonita, arriving there about noon. On the way passed a detachment of Company L, Twenty-sixth Infantry Regiment. Left after a short rest and proceeded to Cabussao; camped for the night. Next morning left by the way of the rice paddies for Libmanan, but, after going a mile, returned on account of not finding a trail, and went to Barcelonita and scouted vicinity. Camped for the night. August 25 reached Libmanan, where they stayed until next morning, when they proceeded to Sipocot, where part of the detachment, under Sergeant Lucas, remained to

escort pack train to Lupi next day, while 8 men, under Lieutenant Schmidt, proceeded to Lupi, on the way capturing a boatload of hemp.

August 26 Lieutenant Archer, with 8 men, left Lupi in boats and went down the Libmanan River 1 mile. Here they searched a house, but finding nothing suspicious went up the river 5 miles. Left the boats and scouted 3 miles to the westward, passing many native houses, all of which they searched; captured 2 insurgents. Returned to boats by a circuitous route, and camped at the boat landing for the night. Returned to Lupi next day.

August 28 Lieutenants Schmidt and Archer, with 45 men, left Lupi on a trail leading northwest. Followed trail 6 miles, finding 7 occupied shacks. Returned to Lupi by same trail. Distance covered, 12 miles.

Very respectfully,

WM. J. SCHMIDT,
Second Lieutenant, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding.

LUPI, CAMARINES SUR, P. I., September 7, 1901.

ADJUTANT SUBDISTRICT AND POST,

Nueva Caceres, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of scouts for the week ending September 7, 1901:

August 30 Lieutenant Archer left Lupi and scouted to Ragay.

August 31 left Ragay and went in a northwesterly direction. Met with small band of insurgents and fired on them. Searched many shacks, finding in one a sling shot, a Mauser shell, some melted lead and a set of tools that looked like loading tools. Camped for the night on Ragay River. Next day scouted the country north of Lupi. Arrived at Lupi September 1, 1901; distance, 45 miles.

September 7 Sergeant Lucas, with 9 men, left Lupi and scouted country northeast 5 miles. Found nothing of importance. Returned to camp by different trail. Distance covered, 11 miles.

Very respectfully,

W. J. SCHMIDT,
Second Lieutenant, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding Company E.

L.

LUPI, CAMARINES SUR, P. I., August 24, 1901.

ADJUTANT SUBDISTRICT AND POST,

Nueva Caceres, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of scouts for the week ending August 24, 1901.

August 18 Lieutenant Schmidt, with 5 men, left Lupi and went down the Libmanan River 1 mile; left river, took trail leading north, 1½ miles; found nothing; returned to camp by same trail.

August 19 Sergeants Lucas and Helms, with 4 men, left Lupi and scouted southeast 3½ miles, finding 2 insurgent outposts that had been recently abandoned and 11 shacks occupied by women and children, who claimed that the men had gone to Lupi and Libmanan to take the oath of allegiance. Found trail leading northwest through cultivated country. Returned to camp by different trail. Distance covered, 8 miles.

August 21 Lieutenant Archer, with 10 men, left Lupi for Libmanan by boat; returned to Lupi next day by trail, finding an abandoned outpost to right of trail on hill. Sergeant Heller, with 2 men, came up from Sipocot by boat.

August 22 Sergeants Helms and Trainor scouted northwest 2½ miles, following trail along river. On way out found 9 shacks, one apparently having been used as a cuartel. Found large hemp field. Returned by circuitous route. Distance covered, 5 miles.

August 22 Lieutenant Schmidt, with 37 men, left Lupi, in compliance with field orders from headquarters subdistrict of Nueva Caceres, P. I., dated August 18, 1901.

DEAS ARCHER,
Second Lieutenant, Twenty-sixth Infantry.
(In the absence of Lieutenant Schmidt, Twenty-sixth Infantry).

M.

Synopsis of scouting operations, August 8 to September 2, 1901.

Date.	Place.	Officers, soldiers, etc., captured and surrendered.	Arms, ammunition, etc., surrendered.	To whom surrendered.
1901.				
Aug. 13	Pasacao ...	Insurgent deserter	1 Winchester, 9 cartridges.	Captain Houle.
14	Libmanan ...	7 bolomen	Lieutenant Cutts.
.....dodo	Major	Captain Rosenbaum.
15	Pasacao ...	Lieut. Sebastian Angeles (killed); 1 major, 2 captains, 6 men (cordones).	3 Remingtons, 8 Krag carbines, 133 rounds of Krag, 7 rounds Remington, 11 rounds revolver.	Captain Houle.
16	Lupi	Major Baldermo	2 carbines	Second Lieutenant Schmidt.
17do	Captain Domingo Derlaro, Lieut. Amagtar Camot, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, and 10 privates.	2 bolos, 3 daggers, 12 working bolos.	Do.
19	Pasacao ...	Lieut. Ynocencio Pereda	Lieutenant Crimmins.
25	Libmanan.	Lieut. Francisco Netomes	1 revolver, 1 round revolver.	Captain Rosenbaum.
26	Pasacao ...	Major Alzona (killed)	2 guns, 2 revolvers	Lieutenant Cutts.
30	Lupi	2 insurgents	Second Lieutenant Schmidt.
Sept. 1	Libmanan.	21 officers (including Maj. Elias Angeles), 50 soldiers (insurgents).	8 rifles, 10 revolvers, bolos, 500 rounds ammunition, uniforms, insignia, etc.	Captain Rosenbaum.
12do	Roman Palo (Lieutenant), 10 soldiers (insurgents).	11 rifles	Do.
12do	25 cordones	Uniforms, insignia, etc.	Magarao Volunteers.

A. WILLIAMS, Major, Twenty-sixth Infantry.

SOROGON, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, P. I.,
October 1, 1901.THE ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, THIRD DISTRICT,
Department Southern Luzon, Nueva Caceres, Camarines Sur, Luzon, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the recent outbreak in the southern portion of this province:

On September 12th ultimo, Capt. Edmund Wittenmyer, Fifteenth Infantry, commanding Bulan, reported to me that on September 12 he had received information that workmen near Irocin were taking refuge in the town owing to the activity of ladrones without, and that he had immediately sent a detachment of Company D, Fifteenth Infantry, to report to the presidente, Irocin, to verify the cause of alarm and to assist in making arrests. Further investigation on the part of this officer developed the existence of a fanatical craze among certain class of natives about Irocin and called "Anting-Anting," the belief prevailing among the victims of this excitement that the wearing on the forehead and in the mouth of small pieces of paper bearing certain signs and crosses rendered them immune to American bullets. Captain Wittenmyer's detachment had several encounters with parties of these fanatics armed with bolos and daggers, with the result that nine or more of them were killed without casualty to the troops. In his first report he says: "When I arrived at Gate I found my men, but the town was deserted and the sergeant pointed out to me the dead. He had killed 8 and wounded 2, one of whom died afterwards. He had not molested a body and each held in his left hand a dagger and in his right a bolo, while around his head was a handkerchief with 'Anting-Anting' inside and some had a charmed piece of writing in the mouth."

I had heard incidentally from other sources that a native styling himself "Jesus Christ," accompanied by a woman impersonating the "Virgin Mary," were the originators of this fanaticism, and that these charmed papers were sold by them to the natives at 2 pesos each.

For full details of Captain Wittenmyer's operations I respectfully refer you to his reports hereto appended and marked "A," "B," "C," "D," and "E," respectively. No report was received by him dated September 7.

I would state here that on September 12 I received notification from headquarters

third district, telegram dated September 10, that I was in command of the subdistrict of Albay. The telegram to this effect, which had been sent from said headquarters September 4, did not reach me until September 14, it having been put in the mail at Legaspi and forwarded via Manila.

Upon receipt of Captain Wittenmyer's report of the disturbance I immediately sent a detachment of 34 men of Company K, under Second Lieut. W. B. Graham, Fifteenth Infantry, to Juban with instructions to work over the country toward Irocin, and to communicate with and to cooperate with Captain Wittenmyer. The latter was notified of this by letter, copy appended and marked "F." Attention also invited to letter, copy appended and marked "L," requesting report of Captain Wittenmyer upon my assuming command of the subdistrict.

Lieutenant Graham's reports are attached and marked "G" and "H," respectively. A special messenger was sent to Capt. H. A. Smith, Fifteenth Infantry, commanding Gubat, informing him of the condition of affairs and directing him to send out detachments to the south and west of Gubat to scout the country. This order was promptly obeyed. (See reports "K" and "L.")

On September 6 two native scouts, carrying the mail from Bulan to Matnog, were captured and subsequently killed near the barrio of Gate, Bulan, by ladrones. They secured 5 sacks of mail, 2 shotguns, and 1 revolver. Upon receiving information of this September 9, Lieutenant Parrott, Fifteenth Infantry, commanding Matnog, went out at 3 a. m. with detachment of Company L, Fifteenth Infantry, and captured 3 ladrones in red uniforms and armed with bolos, near Bauban, which latter he burned. He also found body of one of the scouts killed. Captain Wittenmyer reports that subsequently Parrott arrested one "Bonifacio," native, supposed to be a brother of Luis Briones, the leader of the outbreak, and who was present at the killing of the scouts. Lieutenant Parrott's report marked "M." September 14, I sent message by wire to the district commander, copy marked "N."

Captain Wittenmyer reported September 18 that he expected to recover the captured mail and arrest murderers of the scouts and many other participants. For some time after this last-mentioned report nothing further was heard from Captain Wittenmyer until, upon my request, September 29, he reported operations of his command, from which it appears that another serious encounter was had with ladrones, or insurgents, near Gate, and in which eight more of them were killed, the enemy having attacked the quarters of the detachment about 11 o'clock p. m., September 28, near Gate. One of the killed is said to be Pedro de la Cruz, an insurgent comandante. No casualties among the troops. In this action a woman was accidentally killed at some distance from the scene of action.

Judging from reports the presidente of Bulan has offered every assistance to our forces.

Captain Wittenmyer now holds in custody four natives who acknowledge to have been present when the scouts were killed. He has also the names of all save two or three of the participants, of which there were about 23, and expects to catch them all. Lieutenant Parrott has two at Matnog, while Lieutenant Graham captured three others.

It is believed that there are several hundred "Anting-Anting" between Matnog and Bulusan. Irocin seemed to be the headquarters of these fanatics, who are in heart ladrones.

The teniente of Gate gave Lieutenant Graham two guides, who escaped in the mountains, and one of whom was afterwards killed in the attack of the night of September 28. Captain Wittenmyer has ordered the arrest of this teniente, who had made good his escape before the attack.

On September 28 I received a copy of General Orders, No. 118, Department of Southern Luzon, current series, discontinuing the subdistrict of Albay.

As indicated in my dispatch to you of this date, it appears to me that more troops should be kept in the immediate vicinity of this outbreak, and I respectfully suggest that a platoon with a commissioned officer be stationed at Bulusan, to cover the territory between that place and Irocin, cooperating with troops of Matnog and Bulan until the ladrones be hunted down and this religious fanaticism stamped out. Company C, soon to garrison Gubat, could furnish force for Bulusan, which, with Company L at Matnog, Company D at Bulan, and reinforcements from Sorsogon, could cover the disaffected neighborhood effectually.

There is no doubt that more or less smuggling is kept up between the southern and eastern coast of Sorsogon and the island of Samar. I have no information from Captain Wittenmyer since September 29, 1901.

Very respectfully,

L. A. MATILE,

Lieutenant-Colonel Fifteenth Infantry, Commanding Sorsogon.

[Inclosures referred to not received.]

BULAN, P. I., *September 12, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT SUBDISTRICT OF ALBAY,

Sorsogon, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that on September 7, 1901, a native came into this post and informed me that the two scouts (native) sent from here to Matnog on the 6th instant with United States mail had been captured. These two scouts had shotguns and one had a revolver, the property of the Government of the United States.

I immediately sent First Sergt. William Buerkle, Company D, Fifteenth Infantry, with fifteen men with orders to go to the place of capture, search thoroughly for the scouts and mail, and, if possible, recover them; if not able to recover them, to push on to Matnog and inform Lieutenant Parrott, Fifteenth Infantry, commanding at Matnog, and to whose post the scouts belonged; after having reported to Lieutenant Parrott to go to Irocin, where I would meet him.

On the afternoon of September 9, at 3 p. m., I got a note from Lieutenant Parrott, at Gate, asking permission to burn the place provided the presidente did not furnish guides to pursue the party that captured the scouts. I sent an answer by the same man within five minutes stating that I would be in Gate early the next morning and asking Lieutenant Parrott to wait for me.

I had already sent a corporal and eight men to Gate so that they would be fresh next morning (10th) to escort me to Irocin.

I left here at 5 a. m. (10th) with two natives, but owing to heavy rains we could not cross the river near this place till 9 a. m.

I arrived at Gate at 11 a. m. The corporal in charge of my escort had a letter from Lieutenant Parrott for me stating that as he had not heard from me he would return to Matnog.

I could not understand why he did not get my note, and upon questioning the teniente of the barrio found that he had not received a note sent by same man by the presidente of Bulan. I went on at once to Irocin, but informed the teniente of the barrio of Gate that he must send out men to find out what became of the scouts and the mail, and that I would return on Thursday, the 12th, and expect the information.

When I arrived at Irocin at 1 p. m., I found First Sergeant Buerkle had gone to Bulusan, he having left a note for me telling all he had done and that he would be back that evening.

He returned about 5 p. m., and reported that he had struck 8 insurgents in a bunch and had killed one. This man had on him a dagger and a paper showing he belonged to the Anting-Anting.

He had seen about 15 of these same people about a mile from Gate, toward Irocin, and had got three of their hats and a small bundle of rice. I directed Sergeant Buerkle to leave Irocin early on the morning of the 11th, and to go within a mile or a mile and a half of Gate, to leave half his party hidden in the hemp along the road and sneak over to the road leading from Gate to Bamban with the others, secrete themselves, and watch for parties there. I told him I would leave Irocin with 8 men and camp with him at Gate that night.

When I arrived at Gate there were no people in any of the houses, and my first sergeant reported that he had come in from the road leading to Bamban, and that they saw a lot of people in the tribunal but had not expected anything wrong, when all these people ran into the brush.

Not a shot was fired at them. He stopped at the church, and while he and one man went to look into some houses, this detachment was charged by a great many bolomen.

There were seven dead on the road, and two were wounded, one of whom died before morning. Every one had a dagger in his left hand and a bolo in his right, and the Anting-Anting in a handkerchief tied around his head.

I, myself, examined every handkerchief and collected the daggers and bolos, and one man even had a piece of holy paper in his teeth. I had the dead buried that night, there being 8 killed. I am satisfied that many more were wounded.

The wounded man, living, informed me that there were 110 bolomen, commanded by Capt. Luis Briones, that charged this little party, and that all had the Anting-Anting on their heads, believing that no bullet could enter their body while they had that.

I wish to call especial attention to the fact that these 7 men deserve very great credit for their conduct. They were charged by over 100 bolomen all within 50 yards of them. They killed 8 and captured 1 wounded and not a man of them wavered in the least. I have been in the field with these men a great deal and I feel that such conduct, though not unusual in the company, deserves commendation in orders.

On the 12th I sent First Sergeant Buerkle with 15 men to vicinity of Marinab and I returned to Bulan, leaving 8 men in Gate as guard.

The captured wounded man reported both scouts killed, the mail bags buried, and the revolver and shotguns taken by the leaders of the ladrones.

This is no doubt true, as Lieutenant Parrott informed me he had found the body of one of the scouts.

I have a list of 20 names of men, with Capt. Luis Briones, whom I am now trying to capture, and I expect to get other information from them when captured.

Everything is apparently quiet now.

Very respectfully,

E. WITTENMEYER,
Captain, Fifteenth Infantry, Commanding.

SEPTEMBER 18.

Just returned from Irocin. Everything is quiet there and at Gate, both of which places have a guard of 15 men from my company. Two more dead bodies were found in the brush near Gate. I am satisfied many were wounded. Everybody reports that the people no longer believe in Anting-Anting. Lieutenant Graham, with 30 men from Sorsogon, will remain in mountains near place of capture for some time. I think the mail will be recovered and many of these people captured. The civil authorities (native) are assisting, but they are very much afraid, as they have no arms.

I received your telegram of the 14th to-day and informed the presidente of Irocin that a guard would be left in his town as long as necessary.

Very respectfully,

E. WITTENMEYER,
Captain, Fifteenth Infantry, Commanding.

BULAN, October 4, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, THIRD DISTRICT,
Department Southern Luzon, Nueva Caceres, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the following parties were sent out from this post during the month of September:

One sergeant, 1 corporal, and 13 privates went to Irocin on 2d and relieved on 4th.

Captain Wittenmeyer, Fifteenth Infantry, with 39 enlisted men, went to Gate on September 3, and returned on 4th.

One sergeant, 2 corporals, and 13 privates went to Irocin on 4th and returned on 15th.

One corporal and 4 privates went to Irocin on September 7 and returned on 9th.

One first sergeant, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 13 privates left post on 7th, went to Gate, Bamban, Matnog, Irocin and Bulusan and back to Irocin, Irocin to Gate. From Gate scouted south and returned to Bulan on 14th.

I went personally on 11th to Irocin with corporal and 6 men, back to Gate on 12th, and returned here on 13th.

On 13th sent 2 sergeants, 1 corporal, and 20 privates to Gate and Irocin. These men remained in field until 26th.

On 16th sent 1 sergeant and 6 men to Gate. Returned on 26th.

On 20th 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 11 privates went to Batag. Returned on 22d.

On 23d sent 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 13 privates to Irocin. Still there.

On 28th sent 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 14 privates to Gate. That night at 11 o'clock sent 4 privates with 3 natives with letter to Gate and they are still there.

Second Lieut. W. B. Graham, Fifteenth Infantry, with 30 men, Company K, Fifteenth Infantry, have been for about two weeks in the field between Irocin, Gate, and Matnog. His report was sent to adjutant subdistrict of Albay.

I have the honor to report that on (here date is left out, but other reports indicate it should be September 11), about 11 o'clock a. m., First Sergt. William Buerkle, Corpl. Perry W. Hoig, Privates Napoleon Tatro, James J. Foley, Frank Pratt, Fred Kellar, Company D, Fifteenth Infantry, and Albert A. Hoffman, Hospital Corps, were attacked by 110 insurgents—ladrones and fanatics, Anting-Anting men—all armed with bolos and daggers. This small party had arrived in Gate but a moment before and were charged from cover about 50 yards away by this whole force of over 100 bolo men. I arrived at Gate at 4.30 p. m. and the dead had not been touched.

There were 8 dead and 2 were afterwards found in the bush and also one badly wounded was found who is now in the hospital at this post.

Having seen the entire situation—the position of the dead and the bolos and dirks with which they were armed—I know that these men had a very hard proposition and one in which the slightest amount of bad judgment, bad work, or poor shooting had occurred it could not have failed to have ended disastrously for my men. I

therefore desire to testify to my own knowledge of the situation and recommend that the following named men: First Sergt. William Buerkle, Corpl. Perry W. Hoig, Privates Napoleon Tatso, James J. Foley, Frank Pratt, Fred Kellar, Company D, Fifteenth Infantry, Albert A. Hoffman, Hospital Corps, be mentioned in orders for having displayed coolness, good judgment, and splendid courage in having successfully withstood a bolo charge at close range when outnumbered 15 to 1.

This at Gate, pueblo of Bulan, Sorsogon, P. I., on September 10, 1901.

On the night of September 28, 1901, the detachment at Gate was attacked by fully 200 armed men at 11.30 o'clock p. m. Only the coolest and best work on the part of the men of the detachment saved them from all being killed. Any little break by a single man might have caused the loss of the entire party.

I inclose Sergeant Biesecker's report. I personally visited the scene of this fight and recommend that every man in the party be commended for excellent behavior under the most trying circumstances of a night attack by bolo men where they were outnumbered by more than 10 to 1, and that Sergt. Friend C. Biesecker, Company D, Fifteenth Infantry, be commended in the highest terms for his presence of mind, good judgment, and sterling worth as a soldier. Only a man who had the absolute confidence of every man present could have been obeyed as Sergeant Biesecker was by all of this detachment.

Very respectfully,


E. WITTENMYER,
Captain, Fifteenth Infantry, Commanding.

BULAN, P. I., October 4, 1901.

The COMMANDING OFFICER COMPANY D, FIFTEENTH INFANTRY.

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of an attack of insurgents on the party of troops at barrio de Gate on the night of September 28, 1901:

I arrived at Gate about 6 p. m., September 28, with my detachment, consisting of myself, Corporals Hoy and Hart, and 14 privates of Company D, Fifteenth Infantry,



Scene of fight at Gate, Sorsogon, September 28, 1901.

and took quarters in the church, as directed by you before leaving Bulan. The position of the church is about as shown in this sketch.

My men all went to bed early, as they were tired. I decided not to put out a guard, as about 30 of Company K were in the Tribunal Building, about 50 yards away, and in another house, marked on the sketch, and they had a guard.

I lay down on my bunk between 8 and 9 o'clock to go to sleep, but in a few minutes I concluded it would not do to go to sleep without a guard, so I told Corporals Hoy and Hart that we must have a guard, and as the privates had had a very hard time, we, the noncommissioned officers, would do the guard duty that night, so Corporal Hoy and I sat down in the two chairs in front of the church. Our guns were just inside of the door on our bunks. At 20 minutes to 11 we heard a noise in the river, and I asked Corporal Hoy what that was, and he said it must have been some ducks, as there was always a lot of them in the river at night.

Just at 11 o'clock I looked at my watch, and while doing so a dog barked behind the church. Corporal Hoy said, "Let's get some rocks and drive that dog away, for he will keep the men awake all night." Corporal Hoy went down the left-hand side of the church and I the right to stone this dog. When about halfway down the

side of the church Corporal Hoy yelled, "Turn out the guard!" I ran with all my might for my gun, as did Corporal Hoy. I just grabbed my belt, and hooked one hook, and turned with my carbine to the door, and shot from my hip at a man only a few feet in front of me. I took two long steps from the door and faced to the left, putting myself right in front of the enemy, and Corporal Hoy was by my side, Corporal Hart by him, and then Privates Matthews, Wadlinger, and Myres. This filled up all the space between me and the church door, and I ordered the other men to remain near the door on the inside, as I saw by this time we could check the rush. I looked over to the Tribunal Building and saw Company K detachment forming outside in the road, and I yelled to them not to shoot, as they would hit us. All this time we were firing as fast as we could at a body of men 10 feet in front of us. I fired 21 shots without moving a foot; Corporal Hoy fired 13; Corporal Hart, Privates Wadlinger and Matthews about the same. As the rush stopped, one man rushed at Private Myres and was in the act of striking him with a large bolo when I fired a shot in his breast, and as he did not fall, I dropped on my knee and fired at him, when he fell. This was the last man killed. They started to escape, and we ran to the corner of the church, about 15 feet, and fired a few shots before they vanished from sight. The sergeant of Company K then asked me to let him follow them, which I did; but I ordered every man to be careful to shoot only at an insurgent, and told them that there were women sleeping in some of those shacks, and I wanted them particularly not to shoot at a woman, as I did not want any of our men accused of killing women.

Company K detachment went as line of skirmishers closely deployed for a distance of 100 yards or more, and fired while going 10 or 15 shots.

The back doors of the church and the side doors had been made fast by the men before going to bed. At one of these doors these insurgents tried to cut their way through, but Private Geltz, Company D, shot two or three shots through the door, and they ran from it. Privates Schaefer and Dailey, inside the church, sat down on their bunks and shot through above the sill as they would see shadows pass outside.

These people advanced to the church, driving in front of them about twenty horses; and I know there were at least 200 of the insurgents. A man we captured next morning says there were 240. We found next morning three hats and three or four bloody handkerchiefs some 150 yards from the church, while the trails to Irocin and Matnog both showed blood stains.

The men all behaved first class, and all the men except one in my detachment, including those in the church, got to fire at them as they scattered.

There were 2 dead in front of the church less than 10 feet from the door, and 6 in a pile at the corner of the church about 10 feet from the door. I am sure many were wounded.

Every man had a bolo in his right hand and a dagger in his left and an anting-anting inside of the handkerchief tied around his forehead.

The last man killed was said to be Pedro de la Cruz, a comandante recently arrived from Samar.

Respectfully submitted.

FRIEND C. BIESECKER,
Sergeant, Company D, Fifteenth Infantry.

[Extract from report of operations submitted by Lieut. William B. Graham, second lieutenant, Fifteenth Infantry, dated Bulan, October 4, 1901.]

* * * Stayed in Irocin over night. Sergeant in charge of detachment Company D there received information that enemy was congregating at Lolos, so, at 10.30 p. m., I took 10 men of Company D and went out, but found nothing and returned at 3 a. m. September 29. At 4 a. m. Corporal Harris and 14 men from detachment Company K at Gate came and reported to me that the enemy had attacked Gate about 11 p. m. night before. That 8 of enemy had been killed and no casualties on our side. At 6 a. m. 29th instant left Irocin and returned to Gate, arriving at 8 a. m. The enemy's dead were lying as they fell; had not been disturbed at all. Each man held a bolo in one hand and a dagger in the other and all wore the anting-anting emblems. One unwounded man was found next wandering about barrio apparently dazed, wearing anting-anting emblem. I had the dead men buried, and under instructions dated September 28 I left Gate and marched to Bulan. * * *

No other action referred to in balance of Lieutenant Graham's report.

GUMACA, TAYABAS PROVINCE, P. I., January 1, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FOURTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,

Nueva Caceres, Camarines Sur, P. I.

(Through military channels.)

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of field operations of my command from the time of my arrival at Gumaca, December 18, until December 31, 1901.

December 20 and 21, with 20 native scouts and Civilian Scout Morris, I scouted to the barrios of Banot, Idea, San Pablo, and San Isidro. At the barrio of Idea, where I stayed over night, I took 9 native prisoners that had passes in their possession signed by insurgent officers; I also brought in 2 head of cattle that were at the house of one of the natives that had an insurgent pass. I saw no indications of armed insurgents, although one of the prisoners told me there had been a party of 250 through there a week before.

December 23, pursuant to instructions, I proceeded with 35 native scouts and Civilian Scout Morris and Von Minden to Atimonan, reporting upon my arrival to Captain Miller. The following morning, the 24th instant, pursuant to instructions received from Captain Miller, I scouted to the pueblo of Unisan via barrios of Montes and Cabayo; I camped at night at the barrio of Santa Cruz, during the day having passed through the barrios of Montes, Cabayo, and San Pedro, seeing nothing of insurgents en route. The following morning I proceeded on to Unisan, arriving there at 9 a. m. I was well received by the local presidente, who gave all my men a good dinner, and offered to furnish me with guides to any place I wanted to go. The following day, the 26th instant, I returned to Gumaca, arriving here at 3.30 p. m., passing through the barrio of Almasin and Pocol, seeing no signs of insurgents en route.

December 22, Civilian Scout Hall and 11 men scouted the barrios of San Isidro and Idea; returned the 23d. No results.

December 25, Civilian Scout Hall and 25 scouts, pursuant to orders received from Captain Miller, scouted to the barrios of Mabunga, Tubas, Lagalag, Cublian, and Insangat; returned the 26th. Nothing seen of insurgents.

December 30, Civilian Scout Hall and 11 men scouted to Unisan and returned over the same trail; captured three head of cattle en route; insurgents' pass found in house where cattle were taken. No sign of insurgents.

December 31, Civilian Scout Morris and 13 men on scout to pueblo of Pitogo.

Summary of report: Number of expeditions after insurgents, 6; number of enemy captured, 9; amount of supplies captured, 5 head of cattle; approximate number of miles traveled, 185.

Very respectfully,

G. M. WRAY,

*First Lieutenant Philippine Scouts,
Commanding Thirty-second Company Native Scouts.*

[First Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES,
Nueva Caceres, P. I., January 27, 1902.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Department of North Philippines, for the information of the department.

The active work of troops in this section will be kept up until the entire province is cleared of insurgents.

F. D. GRANT,

Brigadier-General, United States Army, Commanding.

PITOGO, P. I., November 27, 1901.

Capt. ABNER PICKERING,
Commanding District Guinayangan.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on November 21, 1901, at daybreak, I met at Manbug, a barrio of Macalelon, a party of insurgents, said to be 150, with 70 rifles, under command of Capt. Protasio Sylva, of Lieut. Col. Roberto Rios' forces. A paper with Reos' stamp was found in one of the quarters.

I drove them from several positions in the hills, until finally, after an hour's marching, fire was opened on me again from a hill from which I failed to drive them.

Again, on November 25, in company with Lieutenant Harris, with a detachment of Company I and with a detachment of my own company, I returned to the place by a difficult route. We found the insurgents gone.

The last hill they had occupied was conical and very steep. The advance from the side I originally attacked was by a narrow trail up the backbone, and so steep that we found side lines in place for assistance of the natives in climbing. It was fortified at the apex with logs, and had apparently been a rendezvous for some time.

The enemy had a small cannon, Mauser and Remington rifles, judged by the sound of the bullets. They were evidently well supplied with ammunition, their fire being perhaps a third as heavy as mine, and I expended 2,000 rounds; and I wish to remark here that the ammunition not packed in the newest damp-proof boxes is ineffective. Several men reported as many as 10 cartridges out of 50 missing fire.

The men were very much exposed on several occasions of fire, and behaved well under it.

On the two expeditions about a dozen buildings were destroyed, and about 200 cavares of rice.

The party is variously reported as having broken up and as having moved toward Lopez.

I took command of this station November 14, 1901.

There has not previously been an officer here, and I understand in a general way that I report to you. Will you kindly direct me to whom to report in future and forward this in the manner you see fit?

Very respectfully,

LAWRENCE P. BUTLER,
*First Lieutenant, Second Infantry,
Commanding Pitogo, Macalelon, and Unisan.*

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES,
Nueva Caceres, P. I., January 25, 1902.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Department of North Philippines. There seems to be a number of insurgents in the Tayabas peninsula and also in vicinity of Lopez and Calaoag. Vigorous measures are being made against them.

The two companies recently taken from my command in that section has interfered partly with the campaign planned and which I went to superintend in person.

If two companies of native scouts with good officers, which I asked for recently in place of cavalry, could be loaned me, and also a launch, the peninsula of Tayabas could be effectively cleared up in a short time. Calnay section has been cleared up. Copy of telegram relating thereto inclosed.

F. D. GRANT,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[Third indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTH PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., February 7, 1902.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Division of the Philippines.

At the present time it is not practicable to furnish the native troops asked for in the indorsement hereon.

LOYD WHEATON,
Major-General, Commanding.

TAYABAS, 10 Septiembre, 1901.

Señor Ruperto Rios y Talarani, teniente coronel, jefe politico-militar de la provincia de Tayabas, certifico en forma legal que el ciudadano Severo Manzano es cabo segundo de voluntarios del batallon provisional Tayabas.

Por tanto ordeno a todas las autoridades asi civiles como militares le reconozcan como tal cabo segundo de dichos voluntarios.

[SEAL.]

ROBERTO RIOS,
El Teniente Coronel.

Esta jefatura politico-militar se expedio un nombramiento provisional de segundo cabo al Severo Manzano.

[Translation.]

TAYABAS, September 10, 1901.

Señor Ruperto Rios y Talarani, lieutenant-colonel, politico-military chief of the province of Tayabas, certifies in legal form that the citizen Severo Manzano is second corporal of volunteers of the provisional battalion of Tayabas.

I therefore direct all authorities, both civil and military, to recognize him as such second corporal of volunteers.

ROBERTO RIOS,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

PITOGO, P. I., December 16, 1901.

Capt. CHARLES MILLER, *Second Infantry,*
Commanding Troops at Gumaca, Lopez, and Pitogo, Atimonan, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 13, 1901, of instructions, and inclosing instructions to the presidente of Pitogo, and "instructions to officers" relative to insurgent property. In obedience to these instructions I report that on December 11, 1901, on receipt of your letter dated December 9, 1901, I left at midnight for the barrio Banot, reported by guides to be four miles distant from Pitogo, thus expecting to arrive well before daylight. The trails were found to be very wet, and the Pitogo River, whose bed was followed for nearly half the distance, in point of time, and crossed eight times, was swollen by the rains, which have been heavy in this neighborhood, and was hip deep. I therefore did not arrive at Banot until 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 12th. The barrio was found perfectly devoid of people, though the presence of their chickens, hogs, and dogs pointed to an expected return, and an American flag from the window of the lieutenant of the barrio's house, to a knowledge of the advance of troops. The barrio was therefore burned, including over 100 bushels of rice.

San Antonio, Jan Juan, and San Pedro, barrio of Pitogo, passed through, contained inhabitants in the houses and at work in the fields, and were not molested.

I have this day interviewed reliable persons of Macalelon, and obtained the names of persons whose capture, the informants claim, would end disturbances in the neighborhood. The names follow. The residences given are those of their families.

Portasio Silvalo, captain, 30 years of age, San Nicolas, barrio of Macalelon (father and mother, wife, and children.)

Francisco Colorettes, captain, alias Hutalea, about 30 years of age, San Nicolas, barrio of Macalelon (mother, wife, and two children.)

Fernando Lorsua, alias Putal, captain, about 30 years of age. Lopez (family), fingers of right hand missing.

Basilio Avila, alias Cubao, about 40 years of age (family), San Isidro, barrio of Macalelon, presidente of insurrectos, medium height, lean.

One of the informants is Victor Cataroja, who was a prisoner of Capt. Portasio Silvala, and given his liberty after my attack on the captain's forces in Mambug, November 21, 1901. He was presidente of Macalelon in Spanish times.

The names of insurgent officers, which you perhaps already have, and whose families belong in Macalelon, I report, in case you have not the names on file:

Capt. Ellerno Lorena, First Lieut. Francisco Sardanias, Lieut. Col. Roberto Rios (comandant in the field, family lives in Atimonan), Captain Verdadero (in company with Rios in the field).

Macalelon was practically deserted when I visited it two days after removing the detachment. The people have since returned in part, many living in the barrios.

The Unisan detachment was withdrawn December 11. At the time of the withdrawal the town was apparently pacific and busy. Boat building was being carried on quite extensively for a place of its size.

Very respectfully,

LAWRENCE P. BUTLER,
First Lieutenant, Second Infantry, Commanding Pitogo.

PITOGO, December 20, 1901.

Capt. CHARLES MILLER,
Second Infantry, Commanding, Atimonan, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on information from Unisan that a band described as "many" armed men passed through Sontol, a barrio of Unisan, en route to Unisan, I left for that place on the evening of December 16, with Dr. Springwater and company. Arrived opposite Unisan, a storm ripped the sails of the barcada on which I had embarked, making it unable to beat into the harbor. A landing was

finally effected at 3 p. m. at Polo Grande, beyond Laguimanoc. Lieutenant Harris sent a party with barcadas to relief, and I reached Unisan by launch at 5 p. m. December 18. A detachment of native troops—15 men under a native sergeant—arrived in Unisan that night and took station. The information could not be confirmed, and could obtain none of location of insurgents. Have no orders with respect to native troops, but told the sergeant to give me notice of anything of importance.

Arrived here, I find word of a band of over 300, armed with a few rifles, with bows and arrows, and with clubs, probably mainly recent recruits, east of here. Am collecting information and will move on them when located.

In the meantime there is undoubtedly work to be done in this town: With five marches in as many weeks, the total time I have been at this station, it may not be surprising to you to learn from another source that 100 recruits have been taken from this town itself. The information was given to me on my return from last three-day expedition, and is being investigated. If this be true, the recruits were taken from distant barrios.

As I inferred, there is a good deal to be learned of the status of inhabitants of this town. Pitogo, Macalelon, and Unisan were formerly occupied by detachments, which, because of their limited size apparently occupied the towns and nothing else. There was but little information turned over to me as to the inhabitants, and none whatever of the surrounding country. I have discovered but one reliable guide, whom the doctor is now trying to put in condition for the next march. Do you think it is possible for me to employ him regularly as interpreter or similar status? And will you please advise me if authority is necessary, and the procedure to be followed.

I submit list of names which the presidente has informed me he sent to you in reply to your letter of December 13, 1901: (1) Barrio Cabulilian, Florentino Arvilria; (2) Lorenzo Mende; (3) barrio Casasahan, Gregorio Estela; (4) barrio Saguinman, Regino Baras; (5) barrio Adia, Diego Fuerte; (6) barrio Biga, Daniel Forea; (7) barrio Lagahim, Regino Forbes; (8) Roque Forbes; (9) barrio Ylaya Soliyao, Damian Ondoy; (10) Mariano Banora.

No. 1 is a captain, Nos. 2 and 4 are lieutenants. All surrendered with the late insurgent troops at Tayabas. No. 3, Gregorio Estela, is reported with band by force and not voluntarily. The rest are all described as "bad."

No. 5, Diego Fuerte, is described as a boy, but of considerable importance.

In conformity with your letter to the presidente, stores have been carried into the town since receipt of your letter.

I would prefer to report things accomplished, but it is in obedience to your instructions to report anyway that I write at this length.

Very respectfully,

LAWRENCE P. BUTLER,

First Lieutenant, Second Infantry, Commanding Pitogo.

PITOGO, P. I., December 28, 1901.

Capt. CHARLES MILLER,
Commanding District, Atimonan, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on receipt of your letter of December 24, giving Lieutenant Wray's movements, and also on information from Macalelon that a force of 100 or more were expected to arrive at Banilad, a barrio of Macalelon, from the north, which appeared to tally with your information, I left December 25 for Banilad.

From there I went on to Lagin, where I missed capturing or killing, through a cartridge missing fire, a man who escaped from the house of Nicolas Acu, probably Nicolas himself, who is an agent for collecting supplies for insurgents. Under cover of darkness I went on to the house of one known as Captain Victor, who is reported as chief commissary for Roberto Rios, lieutenant-colonel under Cailles, but found his house empty, with fire still burning. From there proceeded to Tabacin, and at the end of that barrio, on the top of a commanding hill, found a deserted post, which I occupied for the remainder of the night of the 26th. It is understood that the information given me was correct, but that information went ahead of me to the insurgents while I followed them through three barrios. Beyond the last barrio the nearest was Bantad, of Gumaca.

I destroyed the three barrios passed through, and about 1,000 bushels of rice.

Lieutenant Wray arrived at Macalelon at the same time I arrived at Pitogo on my return last night.

I will forward papers found in the houses visited, many bearing Rios's signature, by mail.

Very respectfully,

LAWRENCE P. BUTLER,

First Lieutenant, Second Infantry, Commanding Pitogo.

REPORT OF A RECONNAISSANCE MADE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF CAPT. CHARLES MILLER, SECOND INFANTRY, AT ATIMONAN, TAYABAS PROVINCE, LUZON, P. I., ON DECEMBER 19 TO 22, 1901, BY FIRST LIEUT. ALDEN TROTTER, ARTILLERY CORPS.

I left Atimonan at 7.30 o'clock a. m. December 19 with a detachment of 17 enlisted men of Company M, Second Infantry, and 2 native scouts, with orders to march in direction of Gumaca and to find, if possible, an insurgent camp said to be located in the mountains near the barrio of Malusac; to use all possible endeavor to secure information about the insurgents; to make diligent inquiry and if possible obtain evidence of contributions having been made to insurgents by natives; to destroy all insurgent property and property upon which contributions had been levied by the insurgents, if not practicable to bring said property into a military station.

On December 19 I visited nearly all of the houses in the barrios of Dujat, Malusac, and Yualig, examining all papers in the possession of inhabitants, and used every effort to secure information, but without success.

On December 20 I left Yualig with a guide secured at that place; marched due east in the direction of Gumaca over a very rough mountain trail. Two hours out from Yualig we came upon a group of buildings in a cleared space in the mountains. When within 600 or 700 yards of these houses quite a number of men wearing red trousers were seen to be running for the woods. The point of the advance party fired upon them, but they all escaped into the forest. We searched the houses, 7 in number, and found 11 spears about 5 feet long with bamboo handles and iron points, 7 bolos, and several bows and arrows with barbed iron points. In one of the houses we found a commission which had been issued by Ruperto Rios, calling himself lieutenant-colonel of volunteers, to Ruman Par, appointing him a second lieutenant of volunteers. This commission bore date of December 12, 1901. A list of names of the men under command of Par, 22 in number, was found. The wives and families of the lieutenant and two other of his men were captured. A large quantity of rice was found in all the houses. After burning the 7 houses we marched to Gumaca, where the women prisoners were turned over to the local police.

On December 21 I started back over the mountains for Yualig by a different trail, which led into the same trail over which I had passed the day before when about 3 miles out of Gumaca. We camped for the night at the place where the houses had been burned the day before. On the morning of December 22 I explored a trail which led out in a southerly direction toward Unisan, and over which I had been informed that most of the band had escaped the day before. This trail became almost impassable after marching about two hours. On returning through the locality where the houses had been burned the day before another house was found hidden by trees and undergrowth, and which bore evidence of recent occupation by insurgents. This house was burned.

I then returned to the barrio of Yualig, where two men were found in the house of the lieutenant of the barrio, whose names were on the list which had been captured in the mountains. Two other men named on this list were sent for. All of these men, together with one which had been captured the day before near Gumaca, and whose name was also on this list, were brought to Atimonan and turned over to the commanding officer.

Distance marched, about 60 miles.

Very respectfully,

ALDEN TROTTER,
First Lieutenant, Artillery Corps.

REPORT OF A RECONNAISSANCE MADE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF CAPT. CHARLES MILLER, SECOND INFANTRY, AT ATIMONAN, TAYABAS, P. I., DECEMBER 26-30, 1901, BY FIRST LIEUT. ALDEN TROTTER, ARTILLERY CORPS.

I left Atimonan, Tayabas, P. I., on December 26, 1901, with a detachment of 17 enlisted men of Company M, Second Infantry, and 2 native scouts, with orders to scout in the vicinity of the barrio of Malusac and if possible find the camp of one Ruperto Reos, a lieutenant-colonel of insurgents, said to be located in that vicinity; to find 2 houses also located in that vicinity, and which were formerly occupied by insurgents, and to burn them; to then scout in a westerly direction, striking the road to Laguanoc and Pagbilao, in which section the insurgent leader Marquez was reported to be located.

The above orders were carried out by me as far as possible to do so. I found the 2 houses referred to and burned them. I failed to find the camp of Ruperto Rios. I found a trail leading to the mountains when about half the distance to Laguanoc, which when followed up led me into the barrio of Montes. I then returned to

Atimonan with intention to go out the next morning and look for another trail into the section referred to. This on December 27, 1901.

On December 28 I left Atimonan with a detachment of 17 enlisted men of Company E, Second Infantry, and 2 native scouts, with orders to scout the country to Santa Catalina, there to secure a guide and find a trail leading to the coast passing west of Mount Pituan, and after striking the coast to return to Atimonan, unless information secured led me elsewhere.

The detachment marched as directed, spending the night of December 28 in the barrio of Santa Catalina, where a guide was secured who knew a trail through the mountains to the coast through the territory indicated above. On the morning of December 29 the detachment followed the Maling River to its mountain source; thence across the mountain range until the source of the Biaan River was found; thence down the bed of this stream, west of Mount Pituan, to the coast, arriving at Biaan, a barrio of Mauban, on the same evening; thence on the morning of December 30 to Atimonan by a trail along the coast.

No insurgents were encountered on either of the above reconnaissances, and I was unable to secure any information as to the whereabouts of insurgents or insurgent sympathizers.

The country between Santa Catalina and Biaan is mountainous and difficult, and is absolutely without inhabitants.

Distance marched, about 60 miles.

Respectfully submitted.

ALDEN TROTTER,
First Lieutenant, Artillery Corps.

ATIMONAN, TAYABAS, P. I., *December 22, 1901.*

ADJUTANT:

I have the honor to state that, in compliance with verbal instructions of post commander, with 17 men of Company I, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and 2 scouts, I left this place at 7 a. m. the 19th instant to scout the country northwest of Atimonan, and to discover, if possible, the trails leading from the barrio of Santa Catalina to the towns of Tayabas, sampaloc, and Mauban. I was not able to locate the trails definitely, but have no doubt of their existence. Leaving the barrio of Santa Catalina I crossed two mountain ranges to the coast northwest of Atimonan, and came into the post at 5 p. m. December 21.

The country between here and the barrio of Santa Catalina is heavily wooded, and no signs of houses or fields, with the exception of the barrio of Taloloon, where there are a few abaca and rice fields. Saw no insurgents and could get no information.

Distance marched, about 45 miles.

Very respectfully,

MACK RICHARDSON,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-sixth Infantry.

ATIMONAN, TAYABAS PROVINCE, P. I.,
December 31, 1901.

THE ADJUTANT.

SIR: I have the honor to state that in obedience to orders from the commanding officer I left the post at 5.30 a. m., 26th instant, with 19 men and four days' rations to scout the country southwest and west of Atimonan. I inspected the barrios of Sucol, Molinao, Santa Catalina, Taloloon, San Vicente, Santa Ana, and Molicon. Nothing was seen of insurgents. I marched west from Atimonan to Santa Catalina, thence southwest along the crest of mountain to the Pagbilao trail, striking the latter about three hours from Pagbilao. The trail is practicable for ponies throughout the entire distance. Distance marched, about 50 miles.

Returned at noon December 29.

Very respectfully,

MACK RICHARDSON,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-sixth Infantry.

ATIMONAN, TAYABAS, P. I., *December 22, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT, *Atimonan, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to render the following report:

I left Atimonan on morning of December 19 with a detachment of 17 men of Company E, Second Infantry, and 2 scouts, under verbal orders of post commander, to thoroughly scout country northwest of Atimonan. Just outside barrio of Villa captured Second Lieut. Braulio Maracigan, of Atimonan Column, with commission and other papers, among which was list of his soldiers in barrio of Villa. Proceeded to barrio of Pitisan, captured some papers and lead, and burned cuartel.

On morning of December 20 discovered cuartel in mountain near Rosario barrio, with 4 men. Captured 1 man and destroyed cuartel, with papers and about 500 pounds of rice. Returned to barrio of Villa December 21, destroyed 5 cuartels, and confiscated and burned 6 houses belonging to persons who had paid contributions to the captured lieutenant. Arrived at post of Atimonan about 7 p. m., December 21.

Distance marched, about 35 miles.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE A. WIECZOREK,
Second Lieutenant, Second Infantry.

ATIMONAN, TAYABAS, P. I., *December 30, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT, *Atimonan, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to render the following report:

I left Atimonan, P. I., December 26, at 6 a. m., with a detachment of 19 men of Company E, Second Infantry, under verbal orders of post commander to scout country southwest of Atimonan, P. I. After scouting through barrios of Monte, Maibit, Sapagan, Pimili, and Bolang Bolangan, I turned north, passing through barrios of Santa Catalina and Molinao, and then crossed the mountains and scouted barrios of Malocboi, arriving at Pagbilao at 8.30 p. m., December 27. According to instructions by wire from post commander at Atimonan, P. I., I left Pagbilao at 2 p. m., December 28, for Laguimanoc, P. I., and returned to post of Atimonan at 3 p. m., December 30.

No insurgents or tulisanes were met with on the way.

Distance traveled, about 50 miles.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE A. WIECZOREK,
Second Lieutenant, Second Infantry.

LOPEZ, P. I., *December 31, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT, *Atimonan, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the following expeditions were made from here:

December 23-24. Sergeant Miller and 12 men to San Francisco and vicinity. No results.

December 23-24. Sergeant Peyton and 16 men along telegraph line. No results.

December 26-28. Sergeant Mohler and 16 men to La Villa Espafia and vicinity. No results.

December 26-28. Sergeant Kahl and 16 men to Hongo, Bolotong, and Benitad. No results.

December 26-28. Sergeant Peyton and 16 men to Tambo, Rosario, and vicinity. No results.

December 29-30. Sergeant Mohler and 32 men to Santa Rosa and vicinity. No results.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE E. HOULE,
Captain, Second Infantry, Commanding Lopez.

EXHIBIT 2.

REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. JAMES F. WADE, U. S. ARMY, COMMAND-
ING THE DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH PHILIPPINES.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH PHILIPPINES,
Cebu, P. I., August 8, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Division of the Philippines.

SIR: In compliance with telegraphic instructions of the division commander I have the honor to submit the following annual report:

November 9, 1901, the President directed—General Orders, No. 148, Adjutant-General's Office—certain changes in the organization of the Division of the Philippines, to go into effect November 30. In part these changes consisted of the discontinuance of the departments of the Visayas and of Mindanao and Jolo and the establishment of the Department of South Philippines. The geographical limits of the new department being the same as formerly included in the two departments discontinued. The order establishing the new department assigned me to the command with headquarters at Cebu, island of Cebu. On the date fixed I relinquished the command of the Department of Southern Luzon—also discontinued—assumed command of the new department and proceeding to this city, arrived here and established headquarters on December 6, 1901. On October 31, 1901 (General Orders, No. 311, Division of the Philippines), a system of Separate Brigades had been established; three of these brigades are within the limits of this Department, as follows: Fifth Separate Brigade—Headquarters at Iloilo, Panay. Troops serving in the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, and all adjacent islands. Sixth Separate Brigade—Headquarters at Tacloban, Leyte. Troops serving in the islands of Leyte, Samar, and all adjacent islands. Seventh Separate Brigade—Headquarters at Zamboanga, Mindanao. Troops serving in the islands of Mindanao, Jolo group, Paragua, Calamianes group, and all adjacent islands. Since the department was established, the troops serving in Paragua, the Calamianes group and adjacent islands, have been transferred from the Seventh to the Fifth Separate Brigade.

On November, 16, 1901, the division commander directed (General Orders, No. 354, Par. 2) that upon the discontinuance of the departments of the Visayas and of Mindanao and Jolo the records pertaining to these departments will be turned over to the commanding generals of the Fifth and Seventh Separate brigades, respectively. Therefore the records of this department begin with its organization, November 30, 1901, and there is nothing on file at these headquarters regarding operations in the territory embraced within the department limits prior to the date mentioned. The reports of the brigade commanders should treat in detail of all operations within their respective territory.

For this reason and to avoid duplication without additional information the usual "Summary of Military Operations" does not accompany this report.

When this department was established the provinces of Cebu, Bohol, and Samar were under military control. In Cebu the insurgents had surrendered to General Hughes in October, and on January 1, 1902, the province was restored to the civil authorities. In Bohol the insurgents surrendered during December, 1901, and January, 1902, and the civil authorities took charge of the province on April 1, 1902.

In Samar the situation was a much more serious condition of affairs, which may be accounted for as follows: The wild and savage nature of the people, who had quite generally abandoned their towns, burned many of them, and fled to the hills. The very difficult character of the country, regarding which practically nothing was known; the almost total absence of roads and trails and the consequent difficulty in moving, supplying, or communicating with troops; and, not the least, to the fact that until January, 1902, there had not been sufficient troops available to properly garrison and scout the country. The brigade commander was necessarily given great latitude in conducting his campaign, but his orders and circulars were carefully scrutinized, the location and movements of his troops followed, and the operations kept as much in hand as the distance and means of communication would admit. About the middle of January it appeared to me that there were enough troops in Samar to put an end to the insurrection within a reasonable time. I went to Samar, met the brigade commander at Calbayog on January 21, and went over the whole situation with him. The troops were well located, and, so far as appeared, were acting under proper instructions. While at Calbayog, the brigade commander, General Smith, was informed that the division commander had arrived at Tacloban and desired to see him. A few days later the division commander came here, and I was informed of his discovery, while at Tacloban, of the unfortunate affair at Basey of January 20, which resulted in the trial of two officers of the Marine Corps, and later of General Smith. On February 18, by a combination of energy, good judgment, and good luck, Lieutenant Strebler, of the native scouts, captured Lucban, the commanding general of the insurgent forces and the head of the insurrection in Samar. The loss of their leader, the greater number of troops operating against them, the efficient naval patrol which cut off their supplies from the other islands, and the efficient work of a number of friendly natives greatly discouraged the insurgents. March 27 General Smith announced that General Gueverra, who had nominally succeeded Lucban, had agreed to surrender with all his forces on April 15, and that military operations had been suspended. General Smith left Samar April 6, having been relieved from command. Colonel De Russy assumed temporary command, and April 15 informed me that the date fixed for Gueverra's surrender had been changed to the 20th. Not being able to get any satisfactory information regarding affairs in Samar, and Colonel De Russy having been promoted and retired, I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Myer, Eleventh Infantry, to assume command of the brigade and meet me at Calbayog April 18. At Catbalogan I ascertained that there was no written agreement between General Smith and Gueverra, and that the latter demanded an extension of time and certain terms that could not be entertained. I sent Colonel Myer and Captain Traub,

Fifth Cavalry, to the insurgent camp with instructions to insist upon Gueverra's unconditional surrender at the earliest date the insurgent forces could be assembled. Brigadier-General Grant, who had been assigned to the command of the brigade, joined Colonel Myer and Captain Traub at the camp. Gueverra agreed to surrender at Catbalogan on April 27 with all his men, arms, and munitions of war. This agreement was put in writing, signed, and carried out in good faith by all concerned. June 16 civil government was established in the province of Samar, and the island transferred to the civil authorities.

The civil commission has recently established a new province, called the province of Paragua, which includes that portion of Paragua and adjacent islands north of the tenth parallel of north latitude, the Calamianes group, and the Cuyo group.

Early in the year a few Moros from the Lake Lanao region began to show an opposition to any occupation of their country by United States soldiers. Two or three soldiers were killed while some distance from their commands. This, however, seemed individual acts, and no serious trouble occurred until February 15, when the attack was made upon Lieutenant Forsyth's detachment. This attack showed that while the great majority of Moros may be friendly or at least indifferent to our occupation of their country, there is also a rather large hostile element among them. These people are densely ignorant, they know nothing about our Government or people, except as they are able to judge from the few soldiers seen on the border of their country. There is only one thing that they respect—that is force. It was immediately seen that if we are to get and retain control of the Moro country the people of the lake region must be given a lesson. Malabang was selected as a base, and the assembling of troops and supplies for an expedition to the lake was begun. Early in April the division commander visited Malabang and took immediate charge of operations in the Moro country. It is unnecessary for me to refer further to this subject as I have no information not already in his possession.

The troops now in the department, except those in Mindanao, are quartered in the larger towns, generally in rented buildings and fairly comfortable and well supplied, except in the matter of fresh beef. This has not at any time been satisfactory. There are few cattle in the islands and very little native beef to be had. Lack of means of proper transportation has rendered it impossible to furnish Australian beef to more than a few of the stations, and this only at infrequent and irregular times. The chartered transports used between Manila and posts in this department do not have cold-storage facilities, nor do they always carry ice boxes. The troops have made very little complaint. The troops are generally in good condition and well disciplined. There have been practically no complaints from civil authorities or individuals. It is cause for sincere congratulations that from a state of war and military rule the troops have, almost at a day's notice, given up all authority and settled down with so little friction under civil rule among people of an alien and inferior race.

Attention is invited to the accompanying synopsis of reports of the chiefs of the various staff departments and other papers herewith. None of the reports of the brigade commanders yet received.

Respectfully submitted.

J. F. WADE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The duties of adjutant-general of the department were performed by Capt. Peter E. Traub, Fifth Cavalry, until February 9, 1902, when Maj. C. J. Crane, U. S. Infantry, assistant adjutant-general, reported for duty.

From February 9, 1902, to the present time Captain Traub has been assistant to the adjutant-general of the department, Major Crane.

The work of the office has been the usual administrative duties connected with the adjutant-general's department.

The duty of organizing and beginning the department and putting everything in good running order was well and satisfactorily performed by Captain Traub and the chief clerk, Mr. H. C. Bock.

Mr. Bock's services as chief clerk were especially valuable under the conditions affecting the office help—the frequent changing of clerks, instruction of new clerks, etc.

The office force consisted of two \$1,200 per annum civil-service clerks, and two "emergency" clerks at \$1,600 and \$1,000 per annum, respectively, with two "emergency" messengers at \$720 per annum and a ration. These messengers have been doing important clerical work. One, the office stenographer and typewriter, and the other in charge of the returns division of the department. The balance of the force being supplied by detail of enlisted men, the work of the office has been much hampered. The lack of regular clerks, the enlisted force constantly changing by expiration of term of service and regiments returning to the United States, has rendered it extremely difficult to properly keep up the work of the office, and entailed extra and hard work on the few civilian clerks, who were required to constantly supervise work of each new detail in the office in addition to their regular duties.

INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The duties of the department inspector-general were performed during the entire period covered by this annual report by Maj. Fred A. Smith, U. S. Infantry, acting inspector-general, who reported for such duty at Cebu, P. I., December 10, 1901.

The following extracts from his report are here reproduced, and are deserving of careful consideration as embodying the results of his experience as a line officer and as an inspector:

"This department being subdivided into three separate brigades, to which an inspector was assigned, as follows:

"Fifth Separate Brigade: Maj. F. West, U. S. Cavalry, inspector-general, who assumed charge of the office December 20, 1901, relieving Capt. Omar Bundy, Sixth Infantry, who was temporarily in charge during the interval between my departure from and the arrival of Major West at Iloilo, P. I.

"Sixth Separate Brigade: Maj. C. H. Watts, Fifth Cavalry, acting inspector-general since November 3, 1901.

"Seventh Separate Brigade: Maj. James S. Pettit, U. S. Infantry, inspector-general.

"During the month of December, 1901, there were 166 stations and substations maintained in this department, which were distributed as follows: Fifth Separate Brigade, 75; Sixth Separate Brigade, 67; Seventh Separate Brigade, 24.

"This number had been reduced on June 30, 1902, just 50 per cent, as follows: Fifth Separate Brigade, 25; Sixth Separate Brigade, 29; Seventh Separate Brigade, 29.

"To inspect such a number of stations has necessitated a large amount of work upon the brigade inspectors, when it is considered that each and every one can be reached only by water transportation and then have to take advantage of some chance opportunity, such as a small steamer delivering supplies at intermediate points from the larger centers of distribution, and as these stops are often very brief or contingent upon the weather and anchorage, the inspections must necessarily be hurried, incomplete, and unsatisfactory, and much of that time consumed in the inspection of money accounts and the condemnation of property awaiting the arrival of the inspector, without being able to devote sufficient time to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of officers and troops to be able to make a comprehensive report.

"*Quartermaster's Department.*—My observation and experience has firmly convinced me that what is and has been needed for the best interests of the service is a number of boats in the Government service of about 200 tons capacity, of good speed and light draft (not to exceed 10 feet), fitted with cold storage or ice boxes, to carry only light freight and mail, and with a few passenger accommodations; these boats to leave either Manila, Iloilo, or Cebu, and make a bimonthly trip to each of the stations in these islands, so that the arrival of the mail about twice a month could be a looked-for event; the delivery of fresh beef, vegetables, and ice could be assured, and that a system of intercommunication could be kept up, carrying officers and men to and from

as occasion demands, or, in other words, in the nature of mail and express steamers. Those now owned or chartered by the Government being too large or of too deep draft to touch at stations other than the few principal ports of the islands, there being no harbors and many dangerous shoals and reefs in front of these stations, necessitates anchoring at a long distance out, and the unloading is slow, tedious, expensive in the delay, and, owing to the lack of sufficient and proper kinds of boats for discharging, results in damage to stores of all kinds from getting wet.

"Each station should be provided with small boats of the scow or flat-bottomed order, with high sides and strong-ribbed bottoms, the damage to the ordinary ship's boats being very great when used for heavy freight. I have personal knowledge of one boat such as I have described as being best adapted, which was in use from Tacloban, Leyte, with good results in any sea. It was towed behind the launch without much retarding effect, it being flat-bottomed or nearly so, and could be taken to within a short distance of the beach.

"The campaign hat has stood the test of the hardest kind of field service in tropical climates during the past year, but it becomes unshapely and not of uniform appearance, depending upon the habits of the wearer. During hard rains the crease in the top becomes a receptacle for water and leaks through on the head.

"The clothing issued is in general well adapted for tropical service. The dark blue flannel shirt has proved its excellence and a flannel shirt is an absolute necessity as a health preservative; it prevents the chilling of the body when resting after profuse perspiration or being wet with rain and protects from change of temperature at night. Objection has been raised to its color as being too conspicuous and a khaki colored shirt of similar or lighter material has been suggested, but great care will have to be exercised to secure material which will retain its color as well as the dark blue shirt has done. Service in Cuba and the Philippines has proven that the khaki blouse is an incumbrance and quite unnecessary in the field for such rough service as troops have experienced, and worn over an undershirt and the blue flannel shirt is too much covering for the body. In garrison it is not necessary to wear the blue flannel shirt when the blouse can be worn. The canvas legging does not retain its color after the repeated washings or poundings it gets and the leather strap and fastening which go under the instep are of a too light quality of leather and universally break or give way, making it difficult to keep the legging in place. The leggings are of useful service for many reasons, but should be worn with breeches made to fit close and button above the ankle and around the calf of the leg.

"Many complaints are made of the quality of the tan shoes; they do not stand rough service and the saturation of mud and water necessary for them to undergo, they go to pieces completely, the sole parting from the upper and will seldom stand more than one or two hard 'hikes' and frequently they go to pieces in a day, whereas a commercial shoe will last for months. The shoe should be the best, but I believe it to be one of the worst articles, for the service required of it, issued to troops. A light-weight, high grade, woolen sock is quite essential to be worn on long marches for the proper protection of the feet.

"The tan polish furnished by the quartermaster's department is very poor, indeed, while that sold by the subsistence department is very good.

"The khaki blouse has been issued with standing collars varying in height from 1 to 2 inches, some with turn-down collars, some with brass buttons, some with pockets, some without, some with a support for the cartridge belt, and generally not of good fit, so that at an inspection of an organization a very ununiform appearance is presented. In my opinion the appearance of the blouse would be improved by having it made with a standing collar, the same as that for commissioned officers.

"*Subsistence Department.*—This department is justly entitled to praise for the demands made upon it and the manner in which it has met them, using every endeavor to promote the comfort and welfare of men and officers at remote and lonely stations and in the field.

"The full ration has at all times been available, except fresh meat and vegetables, which have been supplied as far as limited and irregular transportation and distance from the supply depots have permitted. Where there is no means of preserving the same at the stations the supply is limited to what can be utilized within twenty-four hours.

"Disease (rinderpest) and a lack of any systematic attempt to breed cattle has depleted the islands of native cattle so that the supply is quite wholly dependent upon imported refrigerated meat.

"Fresh potatoes and onions spoil very rapidly in this climate, and the loss to the Government has been considerable on these articles alone. The ration as now constituted seems to be satisfactory and suited to the climatic conditions, and the list of sale stores sufficiently varied and complete to meet the general demand.

"These islands furnish nothing that can be substituted for the improvement of the regular ration, not even fruit, except it might be the banana.

"Ants, weevils, and repeated handling in transportation injure subsistence stores, and the size of the package should be regulated to facilitate easy handling.

"To prevent deterioration subsistence stores should not be accumulated in depots in large quantities, and should be supplied to station for reasonably short periods, so as not to be injured by long storage, getting wet, mildewed, etc., as the facilities for storage at stations are generally limited and conducive to deterioration by dampness, from which cans rust and contents spoil.

"The greatest loss appears in canned pineapples, soups, peaches, packed in sawdust, as if one can bursts or the sawdust gets wet the moisture is retained, rusting the cans.

"Sliced ham is another article which deteriorates, the same appearing good on the exterior.

"As an evidence of an extreme, although not altogether an exceptional case, I quote from a report concerning receipt of fresh meat and vegetables at Oras, Samar, P. I.: 'Fresh meat has been received at this post twice in the last six months in quantity enough to last the troops one day. Fresh vegetables have been received about once a month on the average, but never in quantities to last through the month. There is no means of preserving fresh meat at this post. It is hung up and issued promptly.'

"Sauerkraut is an article much desired by the companies.

"*Medical Department.*—The hospitals, wherever inspected, have been found to be in excellent condition, as far as the facilities of the building occupied would permit them to be made so. At most stations there are only nipa houses rented for the purpose.

"The hospitals at Cebu, island of Cebu; Iloilo, island of Panay; Tacloban, island of Leyte, are designated as 'base hospitals,' to which places the more serious cases are ordered for treatment upon the recommendation of the chief surgeon of the Separate Brigade.

"The inspection of the enlisted men at stations for evidence of venereal infection required by General Orders, No. 101, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, May 21, 1901, has been made with good results in controlling and preventing the spread of the disease.

"The officer in charge of the ice plant at Cebu has recommended that the price (of ice) be reduced to 65 cents per 100 pounds and 75 cents to government employees and civilians.

"I recommend that a distilling plant for drinking water be operated in connection with all ice plants; the same steam power could be used with but little, if any, additional expense. There are several distilling plants now in operation in this department under charge of the quartermaster's department.

"If the medical department is to have charge of the ice plants, no good reason is known to exist why it should not also have charge of the water supply, particularly in these tropical climates, the health of the troops being largely dependent upon water being sterilized.

"*Ordnance Department.*—The present service rifle has stood the test of the hardest and roughest kind of service and has proved itself an arm well suited to the use of the service.

"The officer's sword was found to be an impediment rather than a benefit; it interfered with his marching on foot and was an encumbrance to the mounted officer, and was generally discarded and only the revolver worn on the belt.

"*Signal Corps, U. S. Army.*—The work of the signal corps has been an important factor in the military operations of this department during the year and reflects great credit upon its members.

"The change from a state of active warfare to one of more general peaceful conditions renders the question of providing quarters for the troops and selecting sites for such permanent stations as may be necessary to be maintained one of much importance.

* * * * *

"The prestige of the Army is much injured by the discharged soldier who, rejoicing in his freedom from military restraint, goes about wearing part of his uniform, the other part being civilian clothing and hat and makes himself a conspicuous object by his manners and conduct which the layman credits to the U. S. Army. Such men are sent to the large centers where they wait sometimes for weeks for transportation to Manila and thence to the United States, making the same trail of disrepute until they reach their ultimate destination. This might be obviated by the Government changing the present system of a money clothing allowance, retaining the pro-

prietorship of the clothing and upon discharge either issuing a suit of civilian clothing or giving a stated money allowance for the purchase of the same. This would prevent the wearing of any part of the uniform by those not in the military service, which is a very common practice. All Government employees should be required to wear a distinctive uniform adapted to the line of their particular duties. It is particularly noticeable in these islands that school-teachers, ex-volunteer officers and many others employed in a civil capacity assume to themselves the khaki colored cloth for their clothes and in these and their white clothes have them made as nearly approaching the officers' uniform as possible, the only distinguishing difference being the insignia of rank and service accorded the officer.

"It is reported that recruits received from the United States are not well drilled, set-up, or instructed; this was my observation during my inspections and at a time when the troops were engaged in active field duty, and time could not be spared nor was their location suitable to impart the necessary instruction. To relieve the stress upon the organizations, and their services being absolutely necessary in the field, it was often necessary to take them out without their ever having received any instruction in target practice and with but little knowledge of the general duties of a soldier. During active operations recruits should not be forwarded from the United States without having received at least three months' instruction at some depot or camp of instruction."

JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Lieut. Col. Jasper N. Morrison, Judge-Advocate-General's Department, was judge-advocate of the Department of South Philippines from January 8, 1902, till May 10, 1902. Maj. Frank L. Dodds, Judge-Advocate-General's Department, joined June 8, 1902, and since that date has performed the duties of the office.

The department inspector, Maj. Fred A. Smith, had charge of the office during the period when it was deprived of the services of its proper incumbent.

Major Dodds submitted the annual report, from which the following information is obtained with reference to the operations of his department.

No statistics as to the inferior courts is furnished, such not being required this year.

Three officers, including one of Philippine Scouts, were tried by general court-martial. Enlisted men tried by such court were 196; acquittals, 19; dishonorable discharges, 92; cases disapproved, 5.

Average enlisted strength present in department about 13,000.

The following table shows the number of violations of specific articles of war: Seventeenth, 18; Twentieth, 7; Twenty-first, 22; Thirty-second, 18; Thirty-third, 12; Thirty-eighth, 29; Thirty-ninth, 30; Fortieth, 10; Forty-seventh, 9; Fifty-eighth, 10; Sixtieth, 6; Sixty-second, 126.

Native scouts tried, 9; tried by military commissions, natives, 14; ex-soldier, 1; death sentences, 4.

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

Lieut. Col. C. A. H. McCauley, Quartermaster's Department, has been chief quartermaster of the department since its organization. The lack of sufficient water transportation has, on a number of occasions, hampered the proper shipment of supplies. Small launches like the *Troy* and *Philadelphia* are not suitable for the general use required of our water transportation, being too small to be trusted in open sea, except in good weather, and their carrying capacity being so limited as to cause too great a frequency of trips around these islands. Boats about the size of those recommended by the department inspector-general would be much preferable.

The ports where even our small launches of 7 or 8 feet draft can pull up against the wharf are very few in number, this fact necessitating the employment of various kinds of small rowboats. Attention here is invited to the recommendation of the department inspector-general with reference to small boats for this kind of work. The sampans owned by the Chinese at Calbayog, Samar, have been of invaluable service to us because of their light draft and carrying capacity.

The army mule and broad-tire escort wagon still stand the test of use in the Philippines. Of course they do not last as long as in the United States, but nothing can replace them where the roads are practicable for wheeled transportation. In Samar, native bearers of burdens have been used to good advantage during the past year, noticeably on the expedition which resulted in the capture of Lucban by Lieutenant Strebler, Philippine Scouts. Pack service in Samar is exceedingly hard on our mules, being impracticable over much of the island, and sometimes rendered absolutely necessary for the use of the native bearer.

The khaki clothing issued here in the Philippines preserves its color very well,

while that in the United States quickly fades where wet with perspiration. The new khaki woolen shirt would be a very acceptable change from the blue woolen shirt which our soldiers naturally and properly have preferred to any other outer covering for the body in spite of the fine target offered by that garment. It would seem that here in the Philippines the change should be immediate, on account of the uncertainty of peace. The surplus blue shirts can be used without detriment in the United States.

The tan shoe has its advocates and its critics. There seems to be no doubt that the shoe is frequently disabled by poor workmanship or poor thread, the result being to compel the wearer to discard his shoes and trust to his ingenuity to protect his feet. A marching shoe should not have such high heels.

The increase to the clothing allowance of the Philippine Scouts is most welcome and universally required.

The forage for our American horses and mules must be that to which they are accustomed in order to obtain the proper result. For a short time palay and grass will keep them on their feet, but the result is always to render them useless if fed for a long time on native provender. The native pony is fast disappearing from our corrals as peace conditions become more settled.

Lieutenant-Colonel McCauley's report contains a very interesting discussion on the dread disease—glanders.

The Japanese coal is not good. Coal has been found on the island of Cebu, not far from Danao, and its quality is said to be good.

The chief quartermaster recommends that all vessels visiting these waters be provided with rope nets for use in discharging boxes, sacks, etc. Also that all packages should be limited in weight to from 50 to 100 pounds, in order to improve the ease of handling. These small packages should be securely strapped to prevent their falling to pieces with the rough handling unavoidably received in transit. Boxes containing clothing and shoes should be lined with petroleum paper to keep out the ants, which are very destructive.

Our troops are still quartered almost entirely in native buildings, which are convents and private dwellings. When permanent quarters are built they should be combined of stone and wood, like the better dwellings in all large towns here.

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

The affairs of this department have been under the charge of Lieut. Col. Henry B. Osgood, Subsistence Department.

The following extracts from his report present clearly the workings of his department:

"Within the limits of the department were about 180 stations and substations of troops, and steps were at once taken to ascertain their condition and needs.

"A large surplus of stores had been accumulated in the Iloilo depot of the Fifth Brigade. This was at once disposed of by transfer to where most needed—largely to Samar, and to a less extent Cebu and Zamboanga.

"It was found that many stations had no commissary and consequently were deprived of commissary privileges.

"Attention was called to the condition of subsistence affairs and the commanding general issued order that a commissary be detailed at all stations where there was a commissioned officer. A variety of sales stores were sent at once to these stations. The advantage of this action became at once apparent by the large sales of stores at these stations and manifested the deprivations that these troops, isolated as they were, had been subjected to. It became evident soon after the department was established here that this (Cebu) is the natural supply point of many stations that were at the time being supplied from their brigade headquarters. The channels of trade center here very largely, and steamers frequently and quite regularly ply between these stations and Cebu. The harbor here is an excellent one, and if a wharf, that could easily and cheaply be built, were built, great saving would ensue.

"The department commander authorized their being supplied from here, and this has been done for the stations on the east side of Negros, in the Fifth Brigade; the west side of Leyte, in the Sixth Brigade, and the north side of Mindanao, in the Seventh Brigade, until very recently, when the supply of the latter stations was by the division commander ordered made from Manila.

"The disadvantages here are that stores have to be scattered about in various rooms.

"The water transportation for the distribution of supplies here is very inadequate. The result is that the distribution to stations is much hampered.

"These boats are really not in the least adapted to the necessities here. They

have absolutely no facilities for carrying fresh beef and ice, not being large enough to take on an ice box with a capacity for a quarter of beef for the stations on this island alone. The fresh beef problem is one that constantly obtrudes itself, demanding solution.

"The only solution of the problem that I can give is refrigerated beef, and that should be given very soon. There are troops stationed in this department that have scarcely tasted fresh beef for a year, and it does not look now as if they would get any in another.

"Boards of survey all tell the same story, and that one is 'wet and rust,' all charged to 'climatic influences.'

"The quartermaster's department builds boats at Manila that are just what all these stations need and should have.

"For the distribution of fresh beef, ice, and other stores, we need a good sea boat—not little harbor launches. This boat should have a cold storage capacity of at least 14,000 pounds and freight room for 200 tons at least. She should be light draft, so that she can get near stations.

"As shown by proceedings of boards of survey the principal losses to subsistence stores have occurred to canned goods, issue bacon and fresh vegetables; due to 'climatic influences.'"

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

Capt. Henry A. Shaw, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, submits the annual report of the chief surgeon of the department. He performed the duties of the office from the date of the departure of Lieutenant-Colonel Harvey to date of arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Adair; also from the departure of the latter to the present time, in addition to his duties as commanding officer of the base hospital at Cebu.

The following extracts from Captain Shaw's report explain clearly and succinctly the operations of his department:

"The office of chief surgeon of his department was held by Lieut. Col. P. F. Harvey from the establishment of the department until March 8, 1902, on which date he was relieved to assume similar duties in the Department of North Philippines. His place was taken by Lieut. Col. G. W. Adair, who was in turn relieved, June 10, 1902, to assume duty as division chief surgeon. Major Banister, the present chief surgeon, has not yet joined.

"A 'base hospital,' established at Cebu prior to January 10, occupying the convent building fronting on 'Plaza Recoleta' and subsequently occupying the building corner of Calles Teatro and Alfonso XIII, is a sixty-bed hospital and, under the immediate supervision of the department chief surgeon, receiving sick from the entire command. Brigade hospitals are as follows, viz: Iloilo, a sixty-bed hospital; Tacloban, a forty-bed hospital, and Zamboanga, a thirty-bed hospital, are under the immediate supervision of the brigade chief surgeon, receiving the sick of the respective brigade commands, pursuant to brigade orders issued on the recommendation of the brigade chief surgeons.

"Medical officers are so distributed that no station is at present without a surgeon, nor have there been during the period covered by this report. Post hospitals of sufficient capacity and equipment for the need of each station are in operation, and excepting those at a few isolated garrisons have been inspected by the brigade chief surgeons at least once during the present year. Reports of these inspections have, in general, shown very satisfactory conditions existing.

"A 'dental base station' has been established at Cebu, in charge of Contract Dental Surgeon G. L. Mason, to which patients requiring dental treatment not possible with dental field equipments are transferred. There are also seven other dental surgeons on duty in the department, visiting such stations as may be necessary and under the immediate charge of the brigade chief surgeon.

"Medical subsupply depots are located in Cebu, Iloilo, Tacloban, and Zamboanga, and under present condition but little trouble is experienced in filling all approved requisitions.

"There are eight ice machines in operation in the department, viz: Iloilo, Tacloban, Catbalogan, Cebu, Iligan (formerly at Cagayan), Zamboanga, Paran-paran and Jolo. All of these plants are self-supporting and in successful operation.

"During this period there have occurred 129 deaths from all causes, a death rate of about 9 per 1,000. It is believed that with the present reduced forces with the more regular and less arduous duties than were heretofore required will result in even a more satisfactory report for the ensuing year."

PAY DEPARTMENT.

Maj. Jerome A. Watrous, paymaster, U. S. Army, was chief paymaster of the department during the greater part of the period covered by this report. Maj.

George R. Smith, paymaster, U. S. Army, arrived at Cebu, P. I., June 30, 1902, and was immediately announced as chief paymaster of the department.

The following statistics are furnished by Major Smith:

Amount on hand November 30, 1901.....	\$408, 923. 83
Amount received from paymasters	2, 678, 084. 50
Amount of soldiers' deposits.....	308, 706. 52
Amount of paymasters' collections	72, 477. 47
Total to be accounted for	3, 468, 192. 32
Amount disbursed	1, 901, 667. 68
Amount transferred to paymasters.....	802, 302. 07
Amount of paymasters' collections deposited.....	72, 766. 67
Balance on hand June 30, 1902.....	691, 455. 90
Total accounted for.....	3, 468, 192. 32

The troops have as a rule been paid every two months. Sometimes it has been possible to pay some organizations oftener, and it is has also been the fact that some other organizations were not paid regularly every two months.

The paymaster paying the troops of Samar and Eastern Leyte has always had an arduous undertaking, a tiresome, tedious, and a long journey which was sometimes enlivened by danger, either from the insurrectos on land or from the rough waters around the coasts of Samar. For that reason it was considered best to regularly change the routes to be traveled by the different paymasters, this giving each of them a chance at Samar, even using the paymaster stationed at Zamboanga for that purpose.

The question of available and suitable transportation for the paymaster has seriously affected the payment of troops, frequently delaying his pay trip.

ENGINEER CORPS.

Capt. Robert McGregor, Corps of Engineers, was chief engineer officer of the department and acted as such until his departure, May 23, 1902, for Manila, for sanitary work in that city.

Since May 23, 1902, First Lieut. James D. Reams, Twenty-ninth Infantry, assistant to the chief engineer officer of the department, has been performing the duties of his chief, and submits the annual report of operations of his department.

Island of Panay.—Much road, culvert, and bridge work has been done in the province of Iloilo, and to a less extent in the other provinces.

The work contemplated in this island is far from completion. However, the principal routes are in a fairly good condition. Since the removal of the engineer troops from this island very little work has been done.

Iloilo Harbor.—A survey of this harbor has been completed with the view to its permanent improvement by dredging and the removal of the wrecks sunk in the harbor by the insurgents.

Negros.—The work on this island has been confined to surveying, including transit triangulations and reconnaissance, on the west coast from Bacolod to Bago. This work was begun in September, 1901, but progressed slowly, owing to the lack of transportation and excessive rains. It was suspended about May 1, 1902, owing to the withdrawal of the engineer troops. No plotting of the field notes has yet been done.

Cebu.—A section of this island between Danao and Carcar on the east coast and Aloguinsan and Point Bagacaua on the west coast has been surveyed and plotted to a scale of 1:60,000 and complete topographical tracing sent to Manila for blue printing. A reconnaissance map of the city of Cebu has also been made.

Plans for the preliminary improvement of the harbor of Cebu were submitted March 28, 1902. No appropriation has yet been made.

Leyte.—Very little work has been done on this island. Work on the Jaro-Carigara road was begun, but was suspended about the middle of May when the detachment was ordered to Mindanao.

Samar.—The work on this island has consisted of reconnaissance and building trails. A trail of 15 miles has been built from Blanca Aurora to San Jose, making the distance between these two towns much shorter. Also a hydrographic survey has been made of the harbor of Calbayog, under the direct supervision of the engineer officer of the department, with the view of submitting plans and estimates for a pier in that harbor.

Mindanao.—The engineer work in the country occupied by the Seventh Separate

Brigade is under the direct supervision of Capt. Jay J. Morrow, Corps of Engineers, engineer officer, Seventh Separate Brigade.

Up to the time of the Lake Lanao trouble the engineer work of the island had consisted of road and bridge building and reconnoissance and building a wharf at Zamboanga.

A road from Paran-paran to Cotabato, including a bridge across the Paran-paran River, is being constructed.

The wharf at Zamboanga is nearing completion and will be large enough to accommodate the largest interisland steamers.

About the middle of May, Captain Morrow, with Lieutenant Brown and Lieutenant Dent and 107 men of Companies F and G, Second Battalion of Engineers, were ordered to Malabang for road work, in connection with the Lake Lanao expedition.

Paragua and adjacent islands.—The work on these islands has consisted mainly in reconnoissance, locating, and building trails.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

The duties of the acting ordnance officer were performed by Capt. Joseph P. Tracy, Artillery Corps, aid-de-camp, till his departure for home station in April, 1902, after which date, by Capt. Peter E. Traub, Fifth Cavalry, assistant to the adjutant-general of the department.

The office was not one of supply, all requisitions being forwarded to the ordnance office of the division at Manila, P. I., after check and approval by the department commander.

The clerical work was performed by clerks in the office of the adjutant-general, except for a short period, when an ordnance sergeant was on such duty.

SIGNAL CORPS.

Capt. L. D. Wildman, Signal Corps, U. S. Army, was the chief signal officer of the department from its organization on December 1, 1901, to March 15, 1902, on which date he was relieved by First Lieut. Charles S. Wallace, Signal Corps, U. S. Army, having been ordered to the United States for duty. Lieutenant Wallace continued in office during the remainder of the fiscal year and submitted the interesting report from which the following information has been extracted almost verbatim:

Total number of miles of telegraph line built in the department since December 1, 1901, 325. All cables now in use were laid prior to December 1, 1901.

Number of miles of telegraph line temporarily abandoned since December 1, 1901, and not yet reoccupied, 10, and 154 miles more of old line not yet resumed use of, but will again be occupied when needed.

Aggregate length of telegraph line now in use, 1,058 miles; of cable, 1,043 miles; and of telephone lines, 476 miles.

To use and manage these lines there are 50 telegraph and cable offices and 31 telephone offices, which maintained, in all, 136 instruments. In Cebu, Cebu, is located a telephone-repair plant.

The department is now handling daily over 3,000 messages, or 105,000 words. Since December there has been a daily bulletin service, at present controlled by the adjutant-general of the division.

The receipts for messages sent greatly exceed all expenses of keeping up the telegraph lines, if we leave out of consideration the pay, clothing, etc., of the enlisted men.

To the usual difficulties in keeping the lines in working condition offered by the natives, both in the districts pacified and in those where war was being waged, nature itself added others. Earthquakes and other upheavals have on several occasions put out of condition the cable lines around Mindanao Island, on one occasion covering up 2 miles of cable.

The cables have suffered also from the carelessness of ships' captains dropping anchor on the line of the cable at the entrance to the harbors. Every effort to prevent accident has been made by placing buoys over the cables and signs on shore, but at night, when most of these accidents have occurred, there has been no way of assuring their protection.

Frequent cutting of the wire by natives has of course resulted, especially in Leyte and in Mindanao between Malabang and Camp Vicars. The Moros were content to cut the wire, but in Leyte great gaps in the line were made by the removal of the wire.

From January 1 to March 28 the Leyte lines were cut on twenty-three different

occasions, and in all 20 miles and 160 yards of wire was carried away. Yet Leyte had been for many months under civil control.

Materials for poles.—The woods which grow in the bottom lands through which most of the lines run through the department are all soft and unsuitable for poles. Some varieties grow when planted and do very well. The hard woods grow only in the mountains. They are very heavy and difficult of access and transportation when cut into poles and are expensive. They will probably last three years. It would be much cheaper in the end to equip all permanent lines with iron poles, which could be laid down in any port of entry in the archipelago for about \$4 per pole.

Native labor.—Natives are employed as laborers and drivers for native transportation on the construction of new lines and as messengers, linemen, janitors, etc., in the maintenance of existing lines. They are put on construction duty at 50 cents Mexican per day and rations. As messengers and linemen they are paid from \$15 to \$20 Mexican per month and rations and are scarcely worth even this low rate of wages.

On construction work in the interior, when it is desired to employ a number of them at a time it can be done only through the president of the town ordering them to work. As messengers and linemen they are careless and unreliable, from the natural antipathy of the native to any form of steady labor.

The Eastern Extension Company uses natives in its offices as operators and for clerical work, but the company's manner of handling telegrams is very different from ours, and Lieutenant Wallace doubts if the native is yet born who, in a reasonable time, could be educated to handle the large amount of business handled daily by the American operator.

Abandoned stations.—American troops at many stations have been withdrawn and the stations are now occupied by Philippine scouts or the constabulary. In such places telephones have been substituted where practicable, and where it is not operators have been kept on duty when application has been made by the civil governor or by the constabulary.

Extensions recommended.—A short cable connecting Iloilo, Panay, and Bacolod, Negros. The distance is 10 or 12 miles, and now telegraphic communication between those two points is had over combined cable telegraph lines aggregating more than 1,000 miles. Similarly a short cable from Capiz to Calivo would be a good substitute for a telegraph line which practically travels all around Panay. A cable of 60 miles, from Siassi to Sandakan, Borneo, would give us a second connection with the outer world.

But the one thing most needed to improve the existing service in this department of South Philippines is a short cable between Masbate and the town of Boac, Marinduque. This, with the short cable from Iloilo to Bacolod, which is needed also for local business, would give two direct lines between Cebu and Manila, both touching at Masbate.

* * * * *

The record of the Signal Corps and its high grade of efficiency have at least kept pace with past traditions.

On November 30, 1901, the following troops were stationed in this department: Engineers, Companies F and G; Signal Corps, Company H; Sixth Cavalry, Troop D; Tenth Cavalry, Troops E, F, G, and H; Fifteenth Cavalry, Troops A, B, C, D, and G; First Infantry, entire regiment; Sixth Infantry, entire regiment; Seventh Infantry, Companies C, D, H, and M; Ninth Infantry, entire regiment except Company B; Tenth Infantry, First and Third Battalions; Eleventh Infantry, headquarters, First and Third Battalions; Twelfth Infantry, Companies A, B, C, and D; Seventeenth Infantry, entire regiment; Nineteenth Infantry, entire regiment; Twenty-sixth Infantry, Companies H, K, L, and M; Marine Corps, Companies C, D, and H, First Regiment; Marine Corps, Company F, First Regiment; native scouts, Companies Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth, Ilocanos; native scouts, Companies Thirty-fifth to Fiftieth inclusive, Visayans.

The following are the changes between November 30, 1901, and June 30, 1902:

January 18, 1902: Headquarters and Troop E, Fifteenth Cavalry, arrived in department.

February 16, 1902: Headquarters, First and Third Battalions, Twenty-seventh Infantry, arrived in department.

February 21, 1902: Troops A, B, C, and D, Eleventh Cavalry, arrived in department.

February 22, 1902: Headquarters and Companies B, E, F, G, H, I, K, and M, Seventeenth Infantry, left department.

February 27, 1902: Battalion U. S. Marine Corps left department.

March 10, 1902: Companies A, B, C, and D, Fifteenth Infantry, arrived in department.

March 14, 1902: Companies A, B, C, and D, Twelfth Infantry, left department.
March 20, 1902: Second Battalion, Twenty-seventh Infantry, arrived in department.
April 6, 1902: Second Battalion, Fifteenth Infantry, arrived in department.
April 8, 1902: Headquarters and 7 companies Ninth Infantry left department.
April 12, 1902: Twenty-fifth Field Battery, Troops F and H, Fifteenth Cavalry, arrived in department.
April 26, 1902: Headquarters and Second Battalion, Tenth Infantry, arrived in department.
May 3, 1902: Headquarters and 12 companies Twenty-ninth Infantry arrived in department.
May 12, 1902: Remaining 4 companies Ninth Infantry left department.
May 19, 1902: Sixth and Nineteenth regiments infantry left department.
May 29, 1902: Third Squadron, Fifteenth Cavalry, arrived in department.
June 2, 1902: Companies C, D, H, and M, Seventh Infantry, left department.
June 3, 1902: Headquarters and Third Squadron Ninth Cavalry arrived in department.
June 4, 1902: Troops A, B, C, and D, Eleventh Cavalry, left department.
June 7, 1902: Troops E, F, G, and H, Tenth Cavalry, left department.
June 14, 1902: Troop D, Sixth Cavalry, and Companies A, C, D, and L, Seventeenth Infantry, left department.
June 20, 1902: Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, left department.
On June 30, 1902, the following troops were stationed in the department: Engineers, Companies F and G; Signal Corps, Company H; Ninth Cavalry, headquarters and Third Squadron; Fifteenth Cavalry, entire regiment; artillery, Twenty-fifth Field Battery; First Infantry, entire regiment; Tenth Infantry, entire regiment; Eleventh Infantry, headquarters, First and Third Battalions; Fifteenth Infantry, First and Second Battalions; Twenty-sixth Infantry, Companies H, L, and M; Twenty-seventh Infantry, entire regiment; Twenty-ninth Infantry, entire regiment; native scouts, Companies Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth, Ilocanos; native scouts, Companies Thirty-fifth to Fiftieth, including Visayans.

APPENDIX E.

REPORTS OF OPERATIONS IN THE FIFTH SEPARATE BRIGADE.

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Iloilo, Panay, P. I., June 30, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

(Through military channels.)

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the Fifth Separate Brigade for the year ending June 30, 1902:

The Fifth Separate Brigade was established by General Orders, No. 311, headquarters Division of the Philippines, series 1901, to take effect November 1, 1901, the territorial limits then given being the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, and all the adjacent islands. Brig. Gen. R. P. Hughes, U. S. Army, was assigned to the command with headquarters at Iloilo, Panay, P. I. He relinquished command December 12, 1901, and was succeeded by Col. Simon Snyder, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry, on the same date. Colonel Snyder was relieved May 6, 1902, and succeeded by Brig. Gen. J. F. Wade, U. S. Army, then commanding Department of South Philippines. Col. E. S. Godfrey, Ninth U. S. Cavalry, was assigned to the command by paragraph 3, General Orders, No. 109, headquarters Division of the Philippines, May 3, 1902.

The island of Paragua (Palawan on some maps) and its adjacent islands, the Cuyos and Calamianes groups of islands, were transferred to this brigade March 1, 1902.

At the date of organization of the brigade, November 1, 1901, the troops garrisoning the brigade were one troop Sixth U. S. Cavalry, Second Squadron Tenth Cavalry, Sixth Infantry, Nineteenth Infantry, and eight companies of Philippine Scouts, occupying 144 stations. Two companies of the Tenth Infantry were added upon the transfer to the brigade of the island of Paragua and the Cuyos and the Calamianes groups occupying Puerto Princesa, Paragua, and Coron in the Calamianes. All the above troops were relieved by transfer to the United States and other commands except the Philippine Scouts and the two companies of the Tenth Infantry; the latter have been notified that they will be transferred to the Seventh Separate Brigade upon arrival of two companies of the Twenty-ninth Infantry to relieve them.

The brigade is now garrisoned by the Third Squadron Ninth Cavalry, two companies Tenth Infantry, Twenty-ninth Infantry, and eight companies Philippine Scouts, occupying 22 stations, not including telegraph stations.

At the close of General Hughes's report, to include November 30, 1901, when the Department of the Visayas ceased, the insurgents, under Samson, on the island of Bohol, were about to surrender. This surrender took place December 23, 1901, at Tagbilaran, Bohol, to Maj. T. C. Woodbury, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry. Samson surrendered 56 officers, 127 men, 45 guns, and 28 cannon; the total surrenders for December being 56 officers, 135 men, 48 guns, 28 cannon, and 1 revolver. The surrenders for January, 1902, were 524 men. This closed the insurrection in Bohol. Nine guns and some ammunition were captured on island of Cebu during March;

202 men, 12 guns, some bolos, spears, etc., were surrendered on the island of Negros during the month of April. These men, under Rufo and Tuvo, belonged to Papa Isio's band of ladrones. Papa Isio is still in the mountains. No other operations of any note are recorded. While there is now a general peace, still there are persistent rumors of the depredations of the ladrone element in the various provinces.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The "Card System of Records and Indices" which was inaugurated by the Adjutant-General, Department of the Visayas, has proven satisfactory and superior to the book system. All the old records have been recorded and indexed and contain much important data concerning confiscated property, claims, etc.

In this office the system of "Descriptive Cards of Inhabitants" has been in vogue since December of 1900 and there are records of 2,079 prominent natives.

Copies of the most important captured insurgent documents have been recorded in Spanish by the official interpreter, Mr. F. R. Fabie. In addition, much other material has been gathered from loan of documents by the late insurgent leaders throughout the brigade. These documents, it is believed, will be of great help to the public in showing the trend of Filipino minds, methods, conditions, etc., as respects dealings among themselves, with the United States, as to warfare, government, etc. This important and valuable work was begun by Capt. R. H. Noble, Third Infantry, adjutant-general, December 27, 1900.

During the year 37,417 oaths of allegiance have been received and recorded.

JUDGE-ADVOCATE'S DEPARTMENT.

Since the establishment of the brigade there have been 80 trials by general court-martial, resulting in 10 acquittals, 8 disapprovals, 41 approvals involving forfeitures of \$1,477.20, and 21 approvals involving dishonorable discharge with the forfeiture of all pay and allowances.

It appears that no record has been kept of the summary courts by the brigade judge-advocate; this omission will be rectified in future.

MILITARY PRISON, ILOILO.

The old Spanish fort, Fort San Pedro 22, was designated as the military prison for the Department of South Philippines, per General Orders, No. 25, Division of the Philippines, February 5, 1902. It had been the military prison for the former Department of the Visayas and the Fifth Separate Brigade. The following shows the prison record since November 30, 1901:

	Ameri- cans.	Natives.
On hand Dec. 1	11	118
Confined	40	5
Recaptured	2
Transferred	10	21
Discharged	6	5
Released	9	44
Died	32
Hanged	3
Escaped	4
On hand June 30	24	18

Sixteen natives are serving sentences imposed by provost courts. There has not yet been devised a system of hard labor.

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

The reduction of troops has left large surpluses of different classes of quartermaster stores and clothing—camp and garrison equipage. This will result in great losses through climate and insects. It is recommended that the excesses be reshipped to the United States, or that they be drawn upon for troops stationed beyond the brigade until reduced to within safe limits.

Clothing.—In general, the quality of the clothing has improved. The dye of the khaki has given better satisfaction. There are still complaints, however, that the khaki received from the United States is not as permanent in color or good in quality as that of foreign manufacture.

It is recommended that the use of the buckskin gauntlet be discontinued in the Tropics. They soon become soaked with perspiration and they rot; they are of no useful service in the Tropics, and an unreasonable expense to the Government and to the soldier.

Ranges.—Among the quartermaster stores condemned are many ranges which to all outward appearances are in good condition; examination, however, discloses that they are unserviceable because the fireboxes are burned out. It is believed this great expense could be remedied by the inventors if they would so make them that spare parts could be supplied, and which could be replaced by the ordinary mechanic.

Sterilizers.—It is also recommended that spare parts be supplied with the water sterilizer, and that they be shipped with the original package. A sterilizer gets out of order, requisition is put in, and maybe will have to be furnished from one of the general depots. This requires time, during which the apparatus is idle.

Barracks and quarters.—It is very desirable that the sites for posts and sizes of local garrisons should be quickly determined and that permanent quarters be built for officers and men.

The native lumber is very expensive; indeed it is almost impracticable to obtain it at all; because of the slow and crude methods of manufacturing it, and its inaccessibility from lack of roads to transport the logs to the ports, renders its use almost prohibitory at present.

It is believed that the Pacific pine lumber and the redwood could be used with economy; that if the pine lumber were planed and painted with thin coal tar it could be protected from the ravages of the ants. It is recommended that crude petroleum be furnished by the quartermaster's department for mopping floors, etc., to keep ants from the buildings and stores as they are a pest dreaded by all. They not only destroy stores but get on the person and their bites cause ulcers that are very uncomfortable.

Public animals.—There are in the brigade 456 public animals, of which 196 are riding or cavalry horses, 136 draft horses, and 126 mules. The losses during the year have been very great. Four hundred and thirty-seven cavalry horses, 78 draft horses and 187 mules have died or been killed to prevent suffering and spread of disease; 6 draft horses and 3 mules were condemned and sold. The great losses are due to glanders, farcy, and surra. Investigations are now going on with the view of finding some remedy and preventive for surra, with somewhat encouraging results. Wherever the native grasses are fed it seems that this disease spreads—just why has not yet been determined. There is general complaint that the native grasses are unsatisfactory; that they lack nutrition and cause scouring, and hence weakening of the animals.

It is recommended that a board of officers of cavalry, medical department and veterinarians be appointed to consider the questions of tropical diseases of animals and of native forage; or that the Agricultural Department of the United States be requested to take up these subjects for investigation.

CONDEMNED SUPPLIES.

Quartermaster supplies to the value of \$45,592.55 were condemned during the year. This includes the former Department of Visayas.

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

The troops have been well supplied with rations, except fresh beef and vegetables. The rinderpest has destroyed most of the beef cattle in the islands. Some posts are very meagerly supplied. The beef from the native cattle is high priced, tough, badly butchered, and of poor quality. Fresh vegetables are not obtainable in this country.

Through the well-directed energies of the chief surgeon, Maj. A. S. Polhémus, surgeon U. S. Army, a small cold storage room is being put in condition in connection with the ice plant that will hold perhaps two or three weeks' beef supply for the station of Iloilo. It may be that sufficient quantities may be taken care of to supply the near-by posts.

It is recommended that the tin plating of the cans be made heavier and greater care be given to the soldering; also suggested that the cans be lacquered or painted. It is said that "tinned" goods purchased from English firms are lacquered and do not show the signs of deterioration shown on canned goods in the subsistence department. It frequently happens that while transporting the stores from vessels to shore the cases get wet with salt water. The cans then rust rapidly.

The inspector-general reports that many of the stations are overstocked with subsistence supplies. This, quite likely, is due to the abandonment of posts and the consolidation of the supplies at the nearest available stations.

The cost value of subsistence stores condemned during the past fiscal year in this brigade was \$33,943.64, the greatest losses being in tobacco, cranberry sauce, milk, flour, potatoes, onions, tomatoes, soups, bacon, ginger ale, and shasta water.

The present policy of the subsistence department of forcing the troops to take the stores furnished, when not of standard quality, is a just cause for dissatisfaction.

Great quantities of stores were shipped to and distributed over the islands to supply the many stations for the large army then occupying the islands. The large reduction of the forces and the abandonment of stations caused a concentration of supplies. The troops are now using up those supplies, some a year old and over. Of course, they have deteriorated in quality—it is an unfortunate necessity. It is claimed that the bacon kept in the Tropics for a considerable period will not fry crisp, but becomes mushy or flabby. Complaint is made that troops are not supplied with good smoking tobacco, that the soldier has no choice but must take what is furnished, and that of poor quality.

Complaint is made that russet shoe polish is no longer furnished by the department. This most certainly should be remedied. Every encouragement should be given the soldier to keep himself neat and presentable. Such a small article as this one necessity is not furnished for sale by any department of the Government and can not be obtained from local dealers.

It is suggested that green coffee be furnished to troops, now that they are held in garrison.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

The chief surgeon reports that the health of the troops of the brigade has been good and generally free from epidemics, except dengue, amœbic dysentery, and venereal diseases. A few cases of Asiatic cholera have appeared among the troops at Cebu and on the island of Bohol. Considerable research has been made in the treatment of tropical diseases in the brigade hospital, especially investigations made in the chemical and bacteriological laboratory.

The medical officers have proved efficient, capable, and energetic. While nearly all of them are volunteer and contract surgeons, they have held up the high standard of efficiency established by the medical department of the Army.

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS.

Internal improvements, under the direction of the engineer officers or acting engineer officer of the brigade, have made considerable progress. The road from Jaro to Pototan was put in good condition and all of it metaled and graveled. Owing to lack of funds the entire distance could not be metaled, but the civil government has promised to complete the work. All road work by the Army was stopped May 16, when nearly all the road tools were taken to Mindanao to assist in the military operations against the Moros. Seventeen bridges have been constructed or are nearing completion on the island of Panay, one of which is a three-span bridge 290 feet long. A complete triangulation system has been made of the harbor of Iloilo. Three tide gauges have been established at each of which observations are made every half hour. Soundings were taken and borings made to determine the depth of water and character of bottom on which to base calculations for dredging the harbor. There are 5 wrecks in the channel that obstruct navigation; estimates of cost of removal have been submitted, but as yet no appropriation has been made.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

Some stores are still kept on hand by the brigade ordnance officer. As these supplies require great care to keep from deterioration, it is recommended that the brigade ordnance depot be broken up and the stores concentrated at the Manila Arsenal.

The ordnance stores condemned during this year amounted to \$14,600.31.

SIGNAL CORPS.

Considering the many difficulties encountered by the Signal Corps in the construction and maintenance of the cable, telegraph and telephone lines, the regularity and success of this department in keeping up communications has been remarkable and is deserving of the highest commendation. I think I but reflect the general opinion of the Army that the Signal Corps has given the most general satisfaction of any department in the Army since the commencement of hostilities in 1898. That it seemed to be ready for war, and has been "up to date" in all its operations.

There are in this brigade 313 miles of cable, 753 miles of telegraph and 260 miles of telephone lines, making a total mileage of 1,326.

There are 28 telegraph and 21 telephone stations. There are telephone exchanges at Cebu, Bacolod, and Iloilo operating 107 telephones.

A cable from Iloilo to Bacolod is much needed. This would give an alternate line from the south and from Cebu to communicate with Manila.

On each island on which there are lines there is an acting signal officer detailed who has general charge of the lines, supplies, officers, and operators of that island. One man from each organization is detailed for instruction in telegraphy.

NATIVE TROOPS.

The Philippine Scouts, or native troops, have given general satisfaction as to discipline and efficiency. The officers are reported as zealous and efficient.

I recommend that a few enlistments of, say, about 8 native Filipinos be authorized in each troop and company stationed in these islands; that they be allowed to go to the United States when regiments are transferred, if they so desire. I believe that in no better way can the adult Filipino be educated to know Americans and American institutions, and the wonderful development of our country.

I also recommend that the enlistment of a few Americans be authorized in the companies of the native scouts. It is desirable that these Americans be qualified to teach the three "R's." By these enlistments the American and Filipino will come to know each other; we will be better able to judge them, and they will be better able to judge Americans and themselves. It would greatly broaden mutual understanding.

Some complaints are made that the clothing allowances for native scouts are insufficient, also that the meat, bread, and soap allowances are too meager. It would seem that they certainly should have as much as other enlisted men. It is claimed that when the army ration was given and they were required to cook and serve it as did the American companies, the native scouts showed wonderful physical development. The officers of the scouts claim that the endurance and bearing of the men generally was much better with the army ration than since they have had a separate ration.

INHABITANTS AND POLITICAL RELATIONS.

The commanding officers of stations report that the inhabitants, are in general, contented and prosperous, and in nearly all cases that the people desire that the garrisons be retained not only for the protection from *ladrones* (the scourge of the whole country), or the financial benefits because of the army disbursements, but because of the general feeling of security in their presence. Cordial relations exist between the people and the garrisons and between the civil officials and the military. Very few cases of abuse of natives by soldiers have come to notice. Such infractions are always punished when reported. Such commanding officers as have reported on the subject, state that there has been an apparent falling off of attendance at the public schools and that this falling off comes from the better classes, or the well-to-do.

In the efforts to prevent the introduction of cholera there has been cordial cooperation between the military, provincial, and municipal boards of health except at Capiz, where there seems to be some friction on the part of the local authorities and laxity in enforcing the necessary sanitary requirements.

THE MOROS.

The island of Paragua, south of the tenth degree of latitude, and the Balabac Group, is inhabited by Moros and wild tribes of natives. The Moros are estimated at 8,000, located chiefly along the seacoast. They are reported as friendly and contented, except perhaps the Malay Moros, who have heretofore raided the wild tribes for tribute and the capture of people to sell into slavery in Borneo, Jolo, and elsewhere. They have been informed that they would be allowed to manage their own people in accord with their customs and religion, but were ordered not to interfere with the inhabitants who were not converts to their religion. Major Brown, Tenth Infantry, the commanding officer, reports that no complaints have been made of violation of these orders.

THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLE.

The population of the wild tribes, or "mountain people," is estimated at about 30,000, and are located chiefly in the interior. These people are reported as timid race, living in rude shelters and without permanent abode. They have chiefs, or headmen, who have been recognized by the local commanding officers, who have required reports from them, thus bringing them under partial control. In the few cases where they have fully acquiesced they appear to recognize the benefits of pro-

tection given them. It appears, though, that the problems presented are closely related to the old problem of the civilization of the red Indian.

In general, it is reported that the condition of these people has improved during the past year.

INSTRUCTION OF RECRUITS.

It is recommended that all recruits intended for regiments stationed in the Tropics be well drilled before being sent from the United States. More or less care is required in pushing men when they first arrive in the Tropics, lest they run down. This discriminating care is not always given, chiefly because the recruit does not complain, and in consequence the man is languid and finally goes on the sick report. He thus loses touch with his squad and is put into another, and it is not long till all classification is lost and the noncommissioned officer becomes discouraged.

PERIODS OF ENLISTMENTS.

The opinion seems to be pretty general among officers, especially those who served during the five-year enlistment period, that there has been a deterioration of the general average of the enlisted men since the doing away with the five-year enlistments; that the three-year enlistment does not fix a man in the military ideas; that a three year induces a feeling of unrest. It takes about all the three years to get a cavalry soldier "into shape." The soldier is then discharged and the organization takes on a new man. By reason of the discharges for expiration of term of service, and for other cause, the annual loss is reckoned at about 40 to 45 per cent; the expenses are greatly increased, unless the man reenlists, by reason of the expense of transportation on final statements and the "first year" clothing allowance.

POSTS.

It is desirable in locating posts that the garrisons be large and located outside the towns or cities, so that the men may be better held in hand, the greater variety may be given the duties and more varied the instructions; that libraries be established and amusement halls be provided. The men need more diversion among themselves. With some men the tendency is toward degeneracy and with present surroundings and circumstances it is almost impossible to get good results.

POST EXCHANGES.

There have been no reports of post exchanges having been established in the brigade during the past year.

It is recommended that regiments coming to the Philippines bring with them all necessary articles for the establishment of post exchanges, such articles as the subsistence department does not furnish, that are necessary for the soldiers' comfort and convenience and for athletics. Some of these may be purchased at Manila; but at a greatly enhanced cost; however, this market can not be relied upon.

LAUNDRY WORK.

It is recommended that the subsistence department be required to keep on hand supplies of washtubs, washboards, flatirons, etc., in fact, all kinds of laundry material, for sale to organizations. Having made these necessities procurable, organizations should be required to establish laundries. A noncommissioned officer and one man should manage the laundry, etc., and the natives should be hired for the labor. In this way probably many of the skin diseases could be avoided. As it is now, undoubtedly many of the men contract skin diseases through the laundrying by the natives. They do not boil the clothes and they pound them to pieces. When the posts are built in the Tropics provision should be made for establishing post laundries, and it should be a regulation that all men should have their laundry done at the established laundries except when otherwise permitted by the commanding officer. Some such regulation would be necessary because of the proneness of the men to claim the right to have their laundry work done as they may wish, and the commanding officers of organizations not infrequently sustain the plea.

Attention is invited to the detailed reports of the various staff departments which are hereto appended, marked "Appendix A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J."*

Respectfully submitted.

E. S. GODFREY,
Colonel Ninth Cavalry, Commanding.

* Not printed.

STATION OF VALLADOLID,
Valladolid, Negros, P. I.; December 2, 1901.

The ADJUTANT, *Bacolod*.

SIR: In a report previously submitted to your office I mentioned the attack made upon my party while engaged in collecting topographical data in the vicinity of La Castellana. On my return to Bacolod, the district commander directed me to proceed to La Castellana, and, under telegraphic instructions of the division commander, to arrest all persons concerned in the attack of September 6 upon that place.

I have now the honor to submit the following report under said instructions:

At about 4 o'clock a. m., September 10, in company with Lieutenant Maxey and 20 men, I left Bacolod in the launch *Lee Fat* for Pontevedra. We disembarked at 4 p. m. and proceeded to Hacienda Carmen, having procured native carriers to transport supplies.

On the 11th the march was continued to La Castellana, where I reported by telegraph to Major Byrne, Thirteenth Infantry, commanding the La Carlota subdistrict. The limits of my command, as determined by him, included only the township of La Castellana and vicinity of La Granja. There were 15 men at the latter place and 83 at the former.

To secure concerted action by the small detachments a telegraph line was constructed between La Carlota and La Granja, and preliminary investigations begun to ascertain conditions, to determine the identity of the parties whom we were to arrest, and to obtain such knowledge of the topography as would enable operations to be conducted to best advantage.

It was found that a band of armed men infested the slopes of the Canlaon Volcano and the mountains to the east and southeast of Isabela, under the leadership of a man commonly known as "Papa Isio," or, as he signs himself, "Dionisio, Papa," or "Dionysius the Pope."

The band, including all its members, male and female, numbered about 1,500 souls, of whom perhaps 400 men were considered as soldiers and were armed, a few with rifles, the remainder with spears and talibones. Isio has been for years a fugitive from justice, hiding on the slopes of the volcano. He pretends to supernatural powers; he sells charms to his followers which he affirms and they believe will protect their wearers from death by American bullets; he retains his credit when any are killed by saying that they did not fulfill the conditions imposed that no word must be uttered during a fight. He marries and performs all other ceremonies of the church. He is the religious head of his party, and appears to command their implicit faith and obedience. He is opposed to all foreigners, especially to all Americans, since they are in control of the island. He assumes the title of political and military governor of western Negros, and in some documents of the entire island. He collects taxes and prohibits natives from working in the mountains for themselves or for others without the payment of tribute. He levies tribute on all who are in reach of his forces. His documents are stamped "Katipunan" across the face. He confesses to no other allegiance than to the Philippine Republic and Emilio Aguinaldo, and is a declared enemy of the United States and to the existing government in the Philippine Islands. He is the commander in chief of military operations in the island of Negros. He disclaims the idea that peace prevails, and maintains that war exists and will continue to exist until the Americans deliver their arms to him. Under his command are about 15 "generals," each having his own following. These are uniformed in grayish blue with stripes of red and blue, ending in a triangle of white, in imitation of the insurgent flag. The soldiers wear straw hats with red band. Officers wear a blue chasseur cap with red band.

These so-called generals are principally noted criminals. The rank and file are of the most ignorant and lowest classes of the island, and are considered by the natives generally as savages.

The creed taught by Isio is termed "Babalyanism" and its followers "Babalyanes." Early in September Isio notified the presidentes of La Castellana, La Carlota, and San Enrique that they had incurred his displeasure and that he would attack their towns. Accordingly at about 2 a. m. on September 6 a band under Francisco Abilo, Anselmo Cinco, and Siriaco attacked the quarters of the native scouts in La Castellana; another under "Tanó" took possession of San Miguel, a barrio of La Carlota, and another portion attacked the hacienda Canlaon. It was this latter party which fired upon my party near the hacienda Haguinit.

As these several operations have not heretofore been reported, except in brief telegraphic dispatches, it is deemed proper to give them here a somewhat more detailed description.

Descent upon San Miguel.—At daybreak, September 6, a considerable number of men armed with spears, bolos, and a few rifles entered San Miguel, and placing out-

posts at the entrances of the barrio, and sentinels at intervals, the remainder proceeded from house to house, taking therefrom whatever articles had value in their eyes. About a dozen men were bound and carried off as prisoners in the direction of Haguimit.

Affair at Canlaon.—At daybreak, September 6, the hacienda Canlaon was entered by an armed party and the native overseer and one other person murdered with bolos. Several others were bound and carried away as prisoners.

Affair at Haguimit.—The two parties from San Miguel and Canlaon had apparently united at Haguimit when, at about 7.30 a. m., as I was passing along the public road in front of this hacienda, they opened fire upon us.

Accompanying me were 5 soldiers of the Sixth Infantry, 1 of the Signal Corps, and a Spaniard, making a force of 8, armed with 4 Krag, 1 Winchester, and 3 revolvers.

A native woman reported the force at Haguimit as numbering 80. When fired upon it was at once resolved to attack. Leaving 2 men, 1 with a Krag, the other with a revolver, in the road, and accompanied by the Spaniard and 4 soldiers, I made a detour through a cane field and reached a point on the left and rear of the enemy and advanced at once, firing upon such of them as were visible. The surprise was complete and the enemy scattered and ran for the mountains through the cane fields, escaping in this manner. They had been disposed in the houses and in the cane on either side of the road where they expected us to advance, and were demoralized by the attack from the rear, our entrance into and passage through the cane field having been unobserved. A considerable number in uniform attempted to oppose our advance, and a brisk little encounter was had with these, but in a couple of minutes they broke and ran, leaving 1 dead, and 1 Remington rifle and ammunition on the field, 2 more dead were subsequently found in the cane, through which, after being wounded, they attempted to escape.

The Spaniard, Mr. Cadenas, was of great assistance as guide and participated gallantly in the fight.

A sketch showing the character of the ground and the details of the action is appended hereto.

The effect of this small affair was to release all of the prisoners from Canlaon, and San Miguel and prevent the attack which, it was subsequently learned, had been planned against La Carlota and haciendas in the vicinity.


Affair at La Castellana.—At La Castellana were stationed a soldier of the Signal Corps, as telegraph operator, Sergeant Maddux, of Company H, Sixth Infantry, and 15 native scouts. The white soldiers occupied the Casa Popular in the plaza; the scouts occupied a building in the corner of the plaza. Being casually in La Castellana and having learned that an attack was threatened, I reported the situation on the 5th and in accordance with the request of Major Byrne, commanding the sub-district, left 5 of my escort of 6 at La Castellana, and proceeded to La Granja under my orders.

In the early hours of the night a force of Babalyanes numbering about 150, and armed mainly with spears and bolos, gathered on the slopes of a low hill near the town, and at about 2 a. m. moved quietly into the streets of the latter. Hiding in the tall grass they crawled close to the building in which the scouts were sleeping, and suddenly swarmed around it, striking down the sentinels and rushing up the steps into the room occupied by the scouts. The latter were awakened to find the enemy among them; utterly demoralized, they sought to escape by jumping from the windows; resistance was impossible, and those who attempted it were done to death with wounds from lance and bolo; 3 were killed outright; 3 others were so badly wounded that they have since died. They were literally cut to pieces. One man received 36 distinct wounds, and others as nearly as many. The attack lasted but a moment. The white soldier on duty as sentinel at the Casa Popular gave instant alarm, and Sergeant Maddux quickly formed a skirmish line of the 6 soldiers and a few native civilians who had taken refuge in the quarters, and advanced, firing upon the enemy, who fled at once, leaving 1 man killed. They were followed to a point without the town, where they scattered in the darkness.

Returning to the quarters, it was found that 7 Springfield rifles and about 150 rounds of ammunition had been captured by the Babalyanes.

A detachment of soldiers ordered by night march from Valladolid to La Castellana by Major Byrne arrived about five hours later.

Without doubt, but for the 5 white soldiers left at La Castellana on the previous day the entire detachment of native troops and the 2 American soldiers would have been slaughtered, and all their arms and ammunition captured. The American sympathizers and the proprietors of the vicinity would have been killed and their property burned in accordance with the customs of this band, which had previously



Approximate Scale
0 100 200 yds.

LEGEND

A- Position of Americans, when fired on, and of Reserve.

B- Position of Babalyanes when opening fire.

C- Last position Babalyanes.

D- Last " Americans.


----- American Advance.

----- Babalyanes' retreat.

—— " position.

Sketch of Hacienda Haguimut to illus.
Fate Affair of September 6th 1901

J. V. K. K. K.
Captain 6th Infy.



Sketch of Position of La Castellana
 Showing Lines of Advance and Attack of Babalyan
 on Native Scouts, September 6, 1901.
 J. H. Stenhouse
 Captain 6th Infy.

laid waste that section of Negros, murdering people and burning their haciendas with an impartial disregard of age, sex, or nationality.

In the foregoing encounter no American soldier was injured.

It is to be noted that the uniforms of the 2 Babalyanes killed at Haguimit and at La Castellana were identical, both having insurgent and Katipunan insignia.

A sketch of the ground where the affair took place is hereto attached.

Events at Isabela.—On the 7th of September an armed band appeared at the Hacienda Antolanga, near Isabela, and secured as prisoners several people, wounding Mr. Emilio Vidal, a Spaniard, with some bolo cuts in the face and shoulder. The fortunate approach of Antonio Igoa and other Spaniards, armed with Winchesters, with which they opened fire, drove the party away, forcing them to abandon their prisoners. Another hacienda was visited on the following day, when one man, Santiago Paguntalan, was murdered.

It is believed the attacks near Isabela were not a part of the general plan of the man Isio, but were a simple lawless outbreak of some of the people of the town, encouraged thereto by the success of the Babalyanes at La Castellana, and probably inspired by revenge or hatred on the part of personal enemies, who hired a force to make the attack.

Further events.—As stated above, I arrived at La Castellana on the 11th of September.

People and planters were completely demoralized. Terror of the Babalyanes reigned everywhere. It was difficult to get information, spies, or guides. The ground was thoroughly studied. It was found that the strongholds of the Babalyanes were on the slopes of the Volcano Canlaon, and simultaneous movements were planned with a view of reaching as many points as possible and at the same time of cutting off the line of escape.

The parties from La Castellana started at 11 p. m., September 17. One under Lieutenant Bennett went to Gitaas, Mansalano, and Sagang, with orders to follow the trail westward to Cabungbungan. Another, under Lieutenant Maxey, proceeded by way of San Jose to Cabungbungan. A third, under my personal command, took the direct trail to the same place. A fourth party, from La Granja, under Sergeant Kuleza, Company H, Sixth Infantry, was directed upon Bais with orders to surprise the place at daybreak and wait there during the following day until noon.

This operation was carried out and Cabungbungan, the headquarters of Isio's band, was destroyed. It was followed immediately by a continued series of marches directed upon other resorts of these outlaws, and covering the slopes of the volcano from Tinanauan to the headwaters of the Masulug.

This service was particularly trying to the troops, as all the marches were made at night and all attacks at daybreak. The season was rainy and mud was everywhere, making the narrow mountain trails both slippery and dangerous, as well as excessively fatiguing to the men. Within two weeks a total number of 14 expeditions were carried out within the district of La Castellana and La Granja, and the country within those limits thoroughly cleaned. It is regretted that no firearms were captured from the Babalyanes. In the various expeditions 47 were killed, including General Siriaco, and some prisoners taken, who were turned over to the civil authorities. No loss was suffered by the American forces.

At the end of September a verbal report of these results was made to the district commander, and he was informed that everything possible had been done to carry out the orders of the division commander, but that a literal compliance with the order to arrest the outlaws who were concerned in the attack on La Castellana was impracticable.

The attack was made against the armed forces of the United States; it was made in force by a large band of armed and organized insurgents, which was a detachment merely of a larger organization, having its headquarters and strongholds in almost inaccessible fastnesses of the rugged and broken mountain country to the north and east of La Castellana. The only way to arrest them was to go into the mountains after them, and when they were found it meant a fight, from which the survivors could escape readily in the tangled brush which covers the mountains. They exist in strong bands, uniformed, armed, and organized for war. A belief in their anting-anting and their supposed invulnerability induces them to fanatically fight to the death, and ordinarily arrest can be made only of a dead body or of a man wounded beyond recovery.

Within the district, comprising more than 1,500 square miles, which is subject to the incursions of these outlaws, a state of actual war exists, and the ordinary peaceful measures of serving civil process are entirely ineffective and, in fact, totally useless. In my opinion the Babalyanes may be reached and peaceful conditions restored only by a resort to military force and the adoption of measures of war applied in all their vigor. Unless speedily suppressed, this murderous band, which, through the

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BATTALION SIXTH INFANTRY.

*Iloilo, Panay, P. I., May 16, 1902.*THE ADJUTANT, SIXTH U. S. INFANTRY, *Bacolod, Negros, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of myself and command from the first day of January, 1902, to the end of April, 1902.

Report has already been submitted covering operations up to the former date. The new found the several detachments busy in chasing down the small bands of insurgents into which Isio's and Rufo's forces were divided. They had been driven out of the jurisdiction of La Castellana, and from the slopes of the Canlaon Volcano. In the south the bands of Rufo operated as far as Isiu, but the main theater of operations was in the vicinity of Isabela and Payao. There the insurgents were very active, although their operations were principally confined to robbing, burning of haciendas, crops of sugar cane, and unprotected barrios. Jimamaylan was threatened. As there were but a few of the native constabulary there, Lieutenant Roeder was sent out with a detachment of native soldiers from Cabancalan to prevent any disaster to them, and to follow up the enemy, should any appear. At the same time Captain Atkinson was directed to scout in the same direction. It was subsequently ascertained that his column passed the insurgent forces which were en route to Jimamaylan, but who were hidden in the tall grass, having received word of his approach. The insurgent forces immediately returned, and on January 7 robbed two haciendas near Payao and burned a portion of the town, which they left hastily, fearing the return of Captain Atkinson and his command.

All troops available were put in action scouring the country in every direction. Lieutenant Burbank, with a detachment from Valladolid, was sent to Payao, from which point he operated up the south fort of the Guinjuuban River.

Captain Atkinson returned to Isabela on the 10th. About midnight he received a report that the insurgents had visited the hacienda Alicante, burning and robbing. He and his men were now worn with constant marching, but assembling a number of native horses loaned by the residents of Isabela, he started at 2 a. m. in pursuit. The band was followed and struck at about 2 p. m. on the 11th, a brief but brisk engagement ensuing near the Burognac River, on the slopes of Canlaon. The enemy were climbing a hill when struck and were charged and scattered, leaving their plunder. None of our men were injured. One Springfield rifle captured September 6 at Castellana was recaptured. A bullet struck and cut the telegraph line which passes near the scene of the fight. Captain Atkinson's report is appended, marked "I."

The command then marched to La Castellana. Sergeant Maddux, with a detachment, was sent out to scour the locality, burning a camp and again scattering the band, killing one.

At this juncture orders were received suspending all operations against the enemy unless actually attacked, as the suppression of outlawry was the function of the civil government.

There were at that time five constabulary at Payao, but none other in the district in which these depredations were occurring. The robberies continued during the month. A list of these outrages committed near Isabela in January is hereto appended, marked "II." On January 21 instructions were received from the post commander to secure the surrender of all parties in arms against United States authority, especially of Papa Isio and Rufo (instructions appended, marked "III"). The people of Negros generally were anxious to aid in this enterprise, and letters were received from several prominent natives who were known to Isio and in whom it was believed he had some confidence. I left Valladolid for La Castellana on January 25 and communicated with Papa Isio through Mr. Hermann Grupi, of the latter town, inviting him to a conference with a view of surrendering himself and forces. The exact location of Papa Isio was unknown, but on February 10 a vague letter was received by Mr. Grupi from him which indicated great suspicion of any overtures and requested arms, ammunition, and money. A reply was immediately sent by Mr. Grupi and myself, renewing the request for a conference.

A fortnight passed before an answer was received. When it came it seemed favorable and strong hopes were indulged that he might surrender with his entire band. He requested until the end of the month to get his men together. It was granted, as well as his request that his men be allowed to march unmolested over the main roads in order to save time. His order to his officers to assemble for presentation was dated March 29, and the date fixed in it for the concentration of his troops was April 15, and possibly interpreting the delay of one month to mean from the date on which he received notice of its grant, he announced in a letter to his subordinates and others an armistice until April 25.

As it would certainly take his scattered troops until the date mentioned to reach Isabela, this was tacitly accepted.

He requested a personal interview with Mr. Grupi, unaccompanied by Americans. He left Macabong and took up a station near the hacienda Bonifacio, in the jurisdiction of Isabela. There he received Mr. Grupi in state on the 11th of April, seated on a sort of throne which was placed on a large rock. Arrayed in purple robes and with a miter on his head, he posed as the successor of St. Peter, and Mr. Grupi was compelled to kiss his hand and occupy a lowly seat during the interview. Dionisio asked many questions, and finally dismissed Mr. Grupi, whose impressions of the visit and of Papa Isio's designs were not favorable.

Every means that could be thought of was employed to influence Isio and his followers to surrender. "General" Hilario and a number of his men in worn and ragged condition presented themselves soon after Sergeant Maddux's expedition which had destroyed this general's camp. These men and others were fed, clothed, treated well, and sent out to influence those still out. Many scattered members were so brought in, but Hilario was afraid to go near Papa Isio, believing that the latter would kill him for his treachery in surrendering. By various means the common people were influenced to believe more in American power and kindness, and less in the supposed supernatural powers of Papa Isio.

It became easier to get information and more difficult for him to get supplies. He wrote many letters asking for money and rice. Haciendas were called upon to deliver to his men as much as 100 cabans of palay. By my direction he was refused money and rice, and as necessity of feeding his men was evident, the town made small contributions of rice, which enabled them to subsist during the negotiations.

On April 1 the "Colonel" Marcelo and "Lieutenant" Manuel came into Isabela under a flag of truce, with Isio's orders to Rufo and the troops in the south to unite with him in surrendering at Isabela. They stated that if Rufo refused to surrender Papa Isio would come in anyway.

Lieutenant Young and four mounted men were sent as escort for Marcelo and Manuel as far as Isio, where he was to await their return from the south coast.

Papa Isio meanwhile had moved his headquarters to Banogbanog, a place well up in the mountains. From here he sent several of his officers into Isabela for conference, and finally his secretary, with most of his generals. They were well treated and seemed satisfied with the terms offered by the Government, which were explained to them by Mr. Juan Araneta, Mr. Grupi, Agripina Lacerna, and influential residents of Isabela. The now quite frequent communications from Papa Isio seemed to indicate confidence in us, but I am sure he could not understand why the Government should be so liberal with him, a known criminal and murderer, and an outlaw in every successive government—Spanish, insurgent, and American. In some way he got the idea that war was to take place between the Americans and Japanese, and we wanted him to help us. He was told that this was not so, but that the peace and tranquility of the Philippine people was what we desired. As the end of the armistice drew near, word was received from various sources that Papa Isio would not surrender and that he was endeavoring to prolong negotiations until the rainy season began, when operations in the mountains would become difficult, or, as he believed, impossible for Americans. Notice was sent him that the Government would grant no further extension of time, and a proclamation was issued and published to all people living in the mountains that if Papa Isio did not surrender by the 25th he and his people would be considered bandits and enemies of mankind. A final letter from Isio stated that he agreed to accept the supremacy of the United States; that he wished to live in the mountains; that he could not surrender without authority from his superiors in Paris and Luzon, and asked for a month's time to communicate with these places. On sending this, he moved back into the mountains with such of his command as remained with him, and with their weapons.

On receiving instructions to secure the surrender of Papa Isio and Rufo orders were sent to Lieutenant Roeder, at Cabancalan, to seek some means of getting into communication with Rufo, a somewhat delicate matter, since heretofore, according to reports, Rufo's custom was to murder all messengers who brought him letters of this character. Roeder was directed to search for some relative of Rufo's, and on February 11 he reported that two sisters lived near Cabancalan, and he was directed to send them, escorting them as far as Isio. On the 21st they returned, stating they had not seen Rufo and that they had been fired on by four rifles at Bulala. They said Rufo had separated from Papa Isio, and believed he would surrender if assured of pardon for criminal acts committed in the past. Assurances of pardon were received from both military and civil authorities in Bacolod, and another party started from Cabancalan to meet Rufo. On March 8 the messengers returned, bringing a message from him stating he was willing to surrender, and requested orders as to what he should do. The messengers, however, could not quite overcome his sus-

picians, and his sisters were sent again, on March 20, with a letter explaining in detail the terms of the Government.

Lieutenant Young and party, including Marcelo and Manuel, reached Isio April 3. The two latter immediately started south, and on April 14 Marcelo returned, bringing with him 62 officers and men, who surrendered to Lieutenant Young, with 1 Mauser rifle, 27 rounds of ammunition, about 60 bolos, and 7 lances. These were part of Papa Isio's band, under Guistoy (who, however, did not appear), and on the arrival, April 14, of Lieutenant Roeder, an hour after the above surrender, 10 of Rufo's men surrendered to him, and at 3 p. m. the following day, April 15, Rufo and 73 of his forces surrendered with 5 rifles, 4 shotguns, and about 60 bolos.

Marcelo and Manuel, with the unarmed forces of Guistoy, escorted by Lieutenant Young and party, proceeded to Isabela and thence to Banogbanog to report to Papa Isio, who received them badly. As a consequence, all of Guistoy's men took the oath of allegiance and returned to the south. Marcelo and Manuel, who had worked well and in good faith, also took the oath, turned in their arms, and offered their services to the American cause.

In the meantime minor surrenders of small bands and individuals had been made, notably to Sergeant Kuleza, Company H, Sixth Infantry, at Haguimit, where 38 men presented themselves, and at Isio, where nearly 200 in small parties surrendered.

As a result of the negotiations, therefore, Rufo, Marcelo, and Manuel, the three most intelligent, active, and influential members of the insurgent party, and about 400 officers and soldiers, surrendered to the several detachments of my command. The whole south coast is opened up and the hostile element limited to a small band of ignorant, superstitious, fanatic followers of Papa Isio, of whom the constabulary should give a good account.

Papa Isio seems to be a grossly ignorant man of low birth, possibly a sincere fanatic, but superstitious and cunning. He deceives his followers by a few tricks of legerdemain, which they regard as a miracle, and he has great influence over the ignorant masses, who fear his vengeance and are superstitiously inclined to believe in his sacred character and supernatural powers. Rufo is another sort of a man—tall, slender, and but 27 years of age. He has been a fugitive from justice for seven years, as he had killed one or two people in passion during the Spanish régime. He married about two years ago and is tired of being an outlaw and wishes to build a home at Sipalay under American protection. I believe him to be sincere, and he may be of use in establishing peaceful conditions in the south of Negros.

Papa Isio, I believe, is a hopeless case. He should be exterminated.

The 25th of April was the end of the armistice. Captain Atkinson, Lieutenant Young, with troops, and Mr. White, the latter with a force of constabulary, were sent out on that date to follow Papa Isio to his lair, over all the trails known to lead to Macabong, supposed to be a three days' march into the heart of the mountains. The parties met with little or no resistance, the enemy scattering in all directions, and endeavoring to keep well out of range of our bullets. Two killed and four wounded were reported. The camp at Macabong and a large amount of supplies were destroyed. These operations were aided greatly, indeed, were rendered possible only, by the aid of Marcelo and Manuel, who volunteered their services as guides and displayed great energy and activity against their former chief.

Aside from the officers of my command, who all rendered zealous and efficient support, Mr. Juan Araneta, Mr. Hermann Grupi, and Agripino Lacerna all rendered great assistance, for which my thanks are due.

I inclose the communications addressed to myself and others from Papa Isio, or as his real name is understood to be, Dionisio Segobela. Also letters from Rufo. Under agreement with the latter a number of documents were forwarded to me by him after his return to Sipalay. These were turned over to the adjutant-general of the Fifth Separate Brigade on this date.

I inclose copies of a petition presented me by residents of Isabela, praying for protection from Papa Isio for their property, and the affidavit of a resident of Payao of his sequestration and release on promise of payment of ransom; also the original order of concentration of Papa Isio to his subordinates.

Very respectfully,

L. W. V. KENNON,
Captain, Sixth Infantry, Commanding Second Battalion, Sixth Infantry.

I.

ISABELA, NEGROS, P. I., *January 21, 1902.*

Capt. L. W. V. KENNON,

Commanding Second Battalion, Sixth Infantry, Valladolid, Negros.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement I had with a band of ladrones on the 11th instant:

I was awakened at about 12 o'clock a. m. that date by the presidente of this town, who told me there was a large fire in the direction of the hacienda Alicante, about two hours from here. While looking out of the window, the owner of said hacienda rode in and reported that a band of ladrones had come to the place at about 11.30 and set fire to the place after he had fired several shots at them. I at once asked the presidente to get me as many ponies as possible, and at about 2.30 he had succeeded in getting 8. On these I mounted 4 American soldiers, members of my company, H, and 4 native scouts, members of Forty-second Company. The presidente and Contract Surg. M. J. Hansen volunteered their services, so that with myself there were 11 rifles. Thinking that the band might try to pass back into the mountains to the east after their work was done, I took up the trail leading northeast of here, so as to get between the band and the mountains to the east. Arriving at the hacienda Bonifacio at daylight, I found that the band had not passed there, so cut directly northwest over the field and came out on the road leading toward Magallon at the hacienda Antolanga. I learned that the band had made a visit there as it passed on its way toward Magallon. I stopped long enough to get something for the men to eat, and pushed on. On arrival at Magallon found the band about three hours ahead, going directly toward the volcano Canlaon. Pushed on with all speed, following the trail up hill and down, over rivers and streams, till 1.30, when the ponies were about ready to fall from exhaustion. I rested them for thirty minutes, and on again. At about 2.30 p. m. I came out of the tall grass at the foot of a hill and discovered the band just going up the hill on the opposite side of a small stream called the Boroguane, and about 3 or 4 miles (I should say) from the foot of the volcano Canlaon.

I dismounted and opened fire at once. The fire was returned and kept up by the ladrones for about ten minutes, but our fire was so hot they began to crawl from behind the large stones, where they had taken shelter, and to make off into the ravines and over the hill. Their fire was quite steady for a few moments, particularly that coming from one or two small caliber rifles. The hind men bethese guns were trained to handle them; this I am sure of. I pushed over the stream and up the hill, when the band fled in all directions, leaving their plunder (or much of it) on the hillside. The men scouted over the hill and to the ravines on the other side, but no trace could be found of the broken-up party. I then returned back over the trail, gathering up the plunder dropped. One dead ladrone was found; also his rifle, which from later investigation proved to be one of the Springfield ones taken in the attack on La Castellana last September. From the description I gave of the dead man on my arrival at La Castellana, I am convinced that he was one of the men of that town engaged in the uprising. The trails of blood and the number of men that fell at the first volley from my detachment led me to believe that a number were either badly wounded or died after crawling into the near-by ravines. Later visit to this place next day by Sergeant Maddux, Company H, with a detachment from La Castellana, convinces me that my surmise was correct, as he found two graves and much blood. I have learned that these people bury several in one grave in order to cover up the loss as much as possible. As I had no rations with me and no shelter of any kind I decided it was impracticable to follow the band, so pushed on to La Castellana, reaching there about 7.30 that night, after being almost sixteen hours in the saddle and on the march. Next day, by orders from you, I returned to this station.

I should judge that there were about 25 in the band, and it had at least five rifles. From the shells found they were Springfield, Remington, and Mauser. In addition to the rifle mentioned above there were captured 1 bolo, 1 dagger, 3 spears, 1 pony, and equipments, and a large amount of plunder taken from the haciendas "Alicante" and "Antolanga." This plunder consisted of all sorts of personal goods, ranging from clothing, male and female, to razors, combs and brushes, bed clothing, mackintoshes, shoes, etc. These articles have been identified since my return, and by your direction (on positive proof) turned over to the proper owners; likewise the pony. The taken arms will be turned in as per orders governing disposition of same. From the dead body of the ladrone killed was taken \$1.10 Mexican currency. In the absence of proper heirs I will use this money for the benefit of the men of the command.

While all the men under me acted well and stood the hard trip without complaint,

I wish to add a word in praise of Contract Surg. M. J. Hansen. Since my station here Dr. Hansen has volunteered for several hard scouts. On this one he was as cool as an old soldier; under fire his presence with me was of much assistance. I think that the long services of Dr. Hansen in the Philippine Islands, both as an enlisted man and as a contract surgeon, and his work with me as a volunteer when rifles were in need on account of the small number of men at hand entitle him to some recognition from the Government. I would be most pleased to see him appointed a captain and assistant surgeon of volunteers. I feel that he has earned that rank.

Very respectfully,

B. W. ATKINSON,
Captain, Sixth Infantry.

II.

ISABELA, NEGROS, P. I., *February 2, 1902.*

Capt. L. W. V. KENNON,
*Sixth Infantry, Commanding Second Battalion Sixth Infantry,
La Castellana, Negros, P. I.*

SIR: In compliance with verbal instructions from you, this date, I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of ladrones in this vicinity during the month of January, 1902:

On the 7th of January a band visited the pueblo of Payao, burning eight houses and carrying away a large amount of plunder and quite a good-sized amount of money. The same day en route to the mountains the same band visited two haciendas near Payao, robbing same of provisions, money, and household and personal property. At these two haciendas the two men in charge, named Apolonio Hortinela and Vincente de Leon, were captured and released after signing papers agreeing to pay to the band on its next visit the sum of \$1,000 Mexican each.

On January 11 a band visited the hacienda Alicante; burnt four houses and set fire to others which were not burnt, the fires being extinguished. A large amount of plunder was carried away from this hacienda. After leaving this hacienda a visit was made to the hacienda Antolanga, where the same kind of robbery was committed.

January 20 the hacienda Salapid was visited and clothing and provisions taken.

The hacienda Camansi was visited by a band on January 24 and a small amount of clothing and provisions taken. This same hacienda had been visited on December 12, at which time the man in charge was compelled to give the band the sum of \$20 Mexican.

January 30 the hacienda Nalipay was visited. Nothing was taken from the houses, but the cane was set on fire and quite a large amount destroyed. This same thing was repeated on the night of January 31, but a smaller amount of cane was destroyed.

A small barrio at this hacienda, San Bonifacio, was visited on the night of January 31 and about 20 small houses destroyed. This same band then visited a small barrio called Mampahabug on its way to the mountains and destroyed it by fire, about 25 houses

Respectfully,

B. W. ATKINSON,
Captain, Sixth Infantry, Commanding Station.

III.

[Telegram.]

BACOLOD, NEGROS, P. I., *January 21, 1902.*

Captain KENNON, *Valladolid.*

Yesterday post commander had consultation with division commander, who gave him the following verbal instructions:

First. To secure the surrender of all parties in arms against United States authority, promising immunity from punishment except for crimes against the United States, provided that offenses against provincial and other local laws may be punished by provincial or local courts. Firearms in good condition to be paid for at usual rate.

Second. To concentrate forces as soon as possible, so that not less than a company be stationed at any one point.

Third. Not to operate against ladrones or offenders against public peace and order; but only against armed parties in open violation of the United States laws.

These instructions are furnished for your information and guidance. You are instructed to use every effort to secure the surrender of bands of Papa Isio and Rufo, and the post commander suggests that Herman Grupe be made the mediator to secure one or both.

POORE, *Adjutant.*

NAGA, CEBU, P. I., June 30, 1902.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY, *Washington, D. C.*

(Through military channels.)

SIR: I have the honor to submit my annual report from January 1, 1902, to June 30, 1902.

All post buildings in very good condition, comparatively. Supplies very good, except fresh vegetables and fresh beef, the allowance of which is too small for the native troops. Also the receipt of vegetables is very irregular.

As to political conditions, a new presidente has been installed in office and everything is very quiet.

The relations existing between the military and the civil authorities quite amicable, as are the relations between the military and the people.

As to the general condition of the people, they are greatly impoverished, the principal industries being the raising of tobacco, corn, and chickens. Their resources are sufficiently extensive, but they lack knowledge and industry to develop them. Their supplies are very meager. Commerce is limited principally to city of Cebu, Cebu Island. The educated class is but a very small percentage of the population, though they evince a most commendable desire to be taught. The wealth of the district is in the hands of two or three families. All are more or less intimidated by the bands of "ladrones" who infest the mountainous regions.

I would recommend an increase for native troops of the following articles: Beef, fresh; coffee, sugar, and vegetables, fresh; also an increase in their clothing allowance.

Yours respectfully,

T. M. KITE,

First Lieutenant, Philippine Scouts, Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, July 1, 1902.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH PHILIPPINES,

Cebu, Cebu.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the Sixth Separate Brigade, Division of the Philippines, for the year ending June 30, 1902:

This brigade was created by General Orders, No. 311, Division Headquarters, October 8, 1901, and embraces the territory included in the islands of Leyte and Samar and the adjacent smaller islands. Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Smith, U. S. Army, was first assigned to the command.

At the formation of the brigade the insurgents of this section had never been brought completely to terms; and, though in Leyte civil government had been inaugurated, Samar still remained under military rule. During September, 1901, Company C, Ninth Infantry, Capt. Thomas W. Connell commanding, stationed at Balangiga, Samar, was, through the negligence of over-confidence in the friendliness of the natives, surprised, and almost the entire garrison massacred.

Their bloody success at Balangiga encouraged the insurgents into increased activity throughout Samar, an activity ably supported by the supplies and encouragement received from the treacherous native officials of Leyte. General Smith commenced an active campaign at once, and troops were drawn from various points of the division and sent to Samar. It is not practicable for me to give the details of the movements of these troops or a full statement of results occurring before April 19, 1902, when I assumed command, because the records found at brigade headquarters are not complete enough, nor in condition which affords sufficient information for the purpose; but from General Smith's adjutant-general I understand that the dates and details of all operations in the brigade were in the possession of General Smith, who intended to make a personal report of the campaign to headquarters. The conduct of the campaign in Samar has been the subject of so much criticism, particularly of a personal nature, that I have felt the right to give the history of its details was due General Smith, and I have not, therefore, attempted to secure the data I understand to be in his possession. But in connection with the criticism referred to, it seems

proper for me to remark here that after making a complete tour of Samar I find that while the insurgents destroyed many of the principal pueblos and barrios of the island to prevent the Americans finding shelter therein, our troops destroyed very little, and this destruction was generally confined to isolated shacks which sheltered the enemy in the hills, though in a few cases the American troops did destroy towns. Many of the rumors and statements that have passed into circulation, so far as I have been able to ascertain the truth, greatly exaggerate the facts.

On April 3, 1902, the command of the brigade was turned over by General Smith to Col. (later Brig. Gen., retired) I. D. De Russey, Eleventh Infantry, who held it until his retirement and relief by Lieut. Col. A. L. Myer, Eleventh Infantry, whom I relieved on my arrival at Calbayog, Samar, April 19, 1902, in compliance with General Orders, No. 65, Division Headquarters, dated March 24, 1902.

The following conditions then obtained: Leyte was under civil government, inaugurated nearly a year before, but there was still a body of so-called insurgents, or *ladrones*, in the hills, who committed constant depredations in various parts of the island. Against these, however, in accordance with directions from division headquarters, the military had undertaken no offensive operations for several months.

In Samar General Smith's active campaign had resulted in (1) a small surrender at Calbayog, January 21, 1902, of a captain of insurgents, and a few men and arms, important only as the first break in the insurgent forces of this island; (2) the capture of Lucban, the insurgent leader, on February 18, by Lieut. Alphonse Streblor, Philippine Scouts; and (3) following Lucban's capture, the surrender at Laguan of 2 officers of insurgents, about 20 rifles and 100 bolomen. Lucban, after his capture, wrote letters to Guevarra, who succeeded to command of the Samar insurgents, advising general surrender, and an armistice resulted, commencing March 18, 1902, following which Guevarra agreed to assemble his forces on the Gandara River and surrender with all the troops under his command on April 15. Communication was kept up with him until General Smith was relieved, and then by Colonel De Russey, but for various reasons the surrender was postponed, and upon my arrival at Calbayog I found Lieut. S. T. Ansell, Eleventh Infantry, who had been keeping in touch with the insurgent leader as the representative of the brigade commander, with a note from Guevarra to Colonel De Russey complaining that the armistice had not been observed, and giving me the impression that the insurgents were getting ready either to take to the mountains again or to try and force us to agree to terms most favorable to them. In any event, the situation appeared critical, and I took the army gunboat *Florida* at once and started up the Gandara, arriving at the post of Erenas about midnight. I lay there until morning and then proceeded on the quartermaster's launch *Hercules* to the insurgent camp, which I reached about 9 o'clock a. m., April 20. At Erenas I met Capt. Peter E. Traub, Fifth Cavalry, the representative of the department commander, on a mission to the insurgents, and he accompanied me on the *Hercules*. Captain Traub, an excellent Spanish scholar, offered his services as interpreter, and served ably as such during the negotiations which followed.

The insurgent camp was located several miles above Erenas on the same fork of the Gandara. On arrival there we were received with proper honors by the insurgents, albeit with surly looks. An interview with Guevarra followed at once, which continued several hours. Guevarra stated that the armistice had not been observed by the Americans, and that a company of his troops in northeastern Samar, on their way to join him on the Gandara, had been fired upon by native police and soldiers from Laguan or Catubig, and several of them killed.^a This, he affirmed, caused a restlessness among his people and, inasmuch as many of them were not in favor of surrendering, rendered their control difficult. I assured him in reply to this that the complaint should be fully investigated at once, and if anyone had violated the armistice he should be punished, and I explained that suspicion on both sides was a natural consequence of a long armistice. Guevarra intimated then that his subordinates were more or less opposed to surrender except under terms giving them political guarantees and the return of money captured or derived from the sale of captured hemp, and various other conditions. After much talk I informed Guevarra that I would give no terms whatever; that his surrender must be unconditional, and that he must fix the date, and an early one, at this meeting on which his troops or those he could control would surrender, and that on that date hostilities would recommence against all who did not then come in.

Matters were brought thus to a definite issue, and Guevarra begged for some appearance of terms to submit to those he termed his "*jefes*." I told him then I

^aSubsequent investigation of this complaint showed that while a party of native carabao thieves had encountered and exchanged shots with a United States detachment the fault lay wholly with the insurgent band.—F. D. G.

would release all prisoners of war not convicted of crimes, and that I would release those who might have crimes charged against them wherever we could not secure sufficient evidence to convict. This he submitted to the assembled "jefes," and after a short discussion the terms were accepted, and April 27 and Catbalogan fixed as the date and place of the formal ceremonies of surrender. Three sets of these terms in Spanish were signed, and one given to Guevarra, one held by Captain Traub for the department commander, and the original draft retained by me. Unfortunately this copy has been mislaid, and I am unable to attach it to this report.

Government transportation was furnished and Guevarra and his troops moved to Catbalogan on April 26. On my arrival there, I learned that Daza, the leader of insurgents in southern Samar, was at Calbiga, to which point I dispatched small launches and brought him and his men to Catbalogan. I had tents erected and rations issued for the insurgents and the formal surrender was received about 3.30 p. m. April 27, 1902. The photographs herewith (Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E^a) may afford a better idea of this surrender than further description.

With few exceptions, to be noted hereafter, this surrender included all the officers and men of the insurgent forces of Samar, and included the following: Gen. Claro Guevarra; Cols. Francisco Rafael and Sebastian; Lieut. Col. Narciso Abuke and one other lieutenant-colonel; 5 majors, including Eugenio Daza, who led and probably planned the Balangiga fight; 14 captains, 12 first and 30 second lieutenants; or a total of 66 officers and 236 riflemen and 443 boleros. A few days later 5 more riflemen and 53 boleros also surrendered at Catbalogan. Arms and ammunition surrendered: One hundred and fifteen Krag rifles, 1 Krag carbine, 79 Remington rifles, 31 Mauser rifles, 14 miscellaneous guns; total, 240. Seven thousand five hundred rounds Krag cartridges, 500 miscellaneous; total, 8,000.

Following this general surrender, 18 men, with 2 Remington rifles, 1 shotgun, and 18 rounds ammunition, surrendered at Catbalogan on May 11, and Lieut. Ignacio Alar, with 3 officers, 35 men, 12 Krag rifles, 1 Springfield rifle, 3 shotguns, and 1,000 rounds ammunition, from Borongan, at Tacloban on May 13. This last surrender accounted for every insurgent officer known then to us in Samar, and for every rifle except two.

Though as a result of this surrender the country was relieved of all armed bodies operating against the United States, there were still out wandering bands of ladrones and of fanatics, known as Dios-Dios men. These last are religious savages who exist by plundering the natives of distant barrios, and by avoiding places where there are arms. A band of these raided a barrio near Paranas, Samar, shortly after the surrender, but were promptly run down by Lieut. Allen Walker, Philippine Scouts, with the native police of Paranas, and their leaders killed and the band dispersed. As a result 25 of them surrendered and took the oath of allegiance at Catbalogan on June 2.

These and other similar bands of fanatics and ladrones promised at first to be the cause of much trouble in Samar, but the natives have assisted the troops in operating against them to such good effect that marked improvement is shown now in the situation, particularly in the western part of the island.

In compliance with orders from division headquarters, all the ports of Samar were opened to coast trade on May 15, and vessels began arriving immediately with food, clothing, and supplies, naturally, of course, much needed at that time. Competition resulted from the number attempting to develop business in the native products of hemp and copra, and the former, which had sold for from 8 to 10 pesos per picul, rose to 24 pesos, a higher price than ever known before in Samar. The prosperous condition of affairs tended naturally to the production of a feeling of content among the people benefited, and I doubt if, under good management, they will soon be disposed to create trouble again. Upon the opening of the ports provisional appointments of officers as inspectors of customs, to hold until they could be relieved by civil appointment, were made at all garrisoned ports.

Prompt steps were taken and orders sent throughout Samar, directing all officers to lend every encouragement to the people in rebuilding their homes and towns, establishing schools, and organizing local municipal government under General Orders, No. 43, 1899, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps. This order was selected in preference to General Orders, No. 40, 1900, because of the conditions which prevailed.

In all parts of the island people were either concentrated about the garrisoned towns, or scattered through the hills; everywhere timid and primitive, and understanding little of government, further than an acquaintance with soldiers and police, both of which before the appearance of the Americans had often maltreated and

^aNot printed.

robbed them. General Orders, No. 40, presented too complicated a form of government and would require time to explain; and, believing that the civil commission would desire to establish civil government at an early date, it appeared to me a matter of importance to get the people back into the towns with recognized leaders through whom higher authority could communicate with as little delay as possible. With this in view the services of Rafael, Abuke, and Daza were secured, and each given a district through which he was sent to persuade the people to return to their pueblos and rebuild their houses, and to urge the principales to report at the nearest military station to receive the oath, and for the organization of local governments under the direction of the station commanders. These were directed in every case to follow as far as possible the wishes of the people.

The provincial government for Samar was inaugurated June 16, at Catbalogan, and though but forty-nine days had elapsed, municipal governments throughout the entire island had been organized and representatives of every town but one were present. In view of the topographical features of Samar, and the difficulty of communication, as well as the nature and condition of the inhabitants, I view this as a triumph for the Army.

On May 1, four days after the surrender, the brigade was composed of the following troops: First Infantry, 12 companies, headquarters, and band; Seventh Infantry, 4 companies; Ninth Infantry, 4 companies; Eleventh Infantry, 8 companies, headquarters, and band; Fifteenth Infantry, 8 companies; Nineteenth Infantry, 2 companies; Twenty-sixth Infantry, 4 companies; Eleventh Cavalry, 4 troops; Philippine Scouts, 8 companies; total, 54 companies.

These troops garrisoned 53 stations (see Exhibit F^a) all but eight of which were in Samar. Five companies of the Eleventh Infantry and one company of scouts formed the garrison of these eight stations in Leyte. The remainder of the brigade was in Samar.

Under peace conditions this left Samar largely over-garrisoned, and the lack of proper shelter for troops in many parts of the island likewise made immediate reduction desirable, and measures were adopted at once to this end.

Two companies of the Eleventh Infantry were returned to Leyte. The companies of the Seventh, Ninth, Nineteenth, and one company of the Twenty-sixth Infantry and the four troops Eleventh Cavalry have been withdrawn from the brigade, and the Fifteenth Infantry and remaining companies of the Twenty-sixth Infantry and two companies of scouts are now preparing for withdrawal. As a consequence many stations and substations have been abandoned, but there still remain more troops and stations than will be necessary as soon as the civil government is fully organized.

After withdrawal from the brigade of the troops now designated disposition of the remainder will be made as follows:

Samar.—Guiuan, one company Eleventh Infantry. The people of this town have been friendly since the occupation, and in consequence should have the protection derived from the presence of troops for six months or a year to come. There are no barracks in Guiuan, and the convent and some municipal buildings are occupied, which should be given up.

A small expenditure here would sufficiently house the necessary troops until they could be withdrawn.

Borongan, two companies First Infantry. Troops should be kept here a year, though one company may probably be earlier withdrawn. There are comfortable barracks for two companies.

Oras, with subposts at Dolores and Tubig, two companies First Infantry, now having comfortable barracks, Oras itself having enough for both companies. As soon as the constabulary are established at Tubig and Dolores the troops can be withdrawn and one company will be sufficient for the necessary protection of the friendly natives.

Laguan, one company First Infantry and one company of native scouts, with subposts at Pamujan and Palapag. These substations have been ordered abandoned, but the friendly natives are so exposed to the depredations of the ladrones that I have retained small detachments there until the constabulary can take care of these places, or the civil government arm the native police. Laguan ought to be retained at least a year, as it controls the whole valley of the Catubig River. Comfortable quarters have been erected for one company.

Catubig, one company First Infantry, who have comfortable quarters owned by the military. This place can be abandoned as soon as the constabulary can take charge or the local police are armed.

Catarman, one company First Infantry, with comfortable quarters. It should be abandoned as soon as the constabulary are organized.

Bobon, one company First Infantry, with quarters owned by the military. This also may be abandoned when the constabulary and local police can take charge.

Calbayog, one company First Infantry and one company of Philippine Scouts. Calbayog is important, as it controls the country drained by the Gandara and Oquendo rivers. It is a distributing point as well as the market or collecting point of the products of a large part of the island of Samar and of quite a third of its population.

Catbalogan, headquarters, band, and one company First Infantry, and one company Philippine Scouts. Like Calbayog, it is important as a center of distribution of supplies and the market for the products of the country from the Gandara River south to Santa Rita, and for the islands which, with Samar, form the Bahia de Maqueda. Catbalogan is the only point on Samar south of Calbayog where there is a harbor with sufficient water for a ship of any size to anchor. From Hiabong to Villareal a vessel drawing 5 feet of water can not approach nearer than 2 miles of shore. The people of the western coast of Samar are the most restless, and have among them many foreigners or residents from other islands, all of whom are more or less unscrupulous and ready to create trouble whenever possible; and there should be a permanent garrison of about one battalion located so that it could act promptly on any part of this coast. After looking over the ground it appears to me that the best place for such a post is on Parasan Island, where there is one of the best harbors in the archipelago, and where a vessel of any size can lie at anchor in any weather with safety. The military has nothing in the way of buildings at Calbayog, Catbalogan, Paranas, or Santa Rita, except two storehouses at Catbalogan and small temporary barracks at Santa Rita Island, the serviceable material of which could be removed to Parasan; and as soon as quarters could be built the garrisons of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Paranas and Santa Rita could be withdrawn. I have marked Parasan on the accompanying map with a blue cross. It is $8\frac{1}{2}$ miles southwest of Catbalogan and controls the whole western coast of the island of Samar.

Continuing around Samar, the next pueblo after Catbalogan that is garrisoned is Paranas, with one company Philippine Scouts. The troops there are comfortably quartered. The importance of a garrison at Paranas rests on the fact that it is near the mountains, where Dios-Dios and other ladrone bands pass and commit their depredations, but as soon as the constabulary or armed police can take charge this company may be sent back to Panay, where it belongs.

The Forty-fifth Company of Scouts, now at Paranas, is an efficient company, and its commander, Lieut. Allen Walker, an excellent officer. He and his company deserve great credit for their conduct throughout the campaign in Samar.

Santa Rita and Santa Rita Island are to be garrisoned, after withdrawal of the Fifteenth Infantry, by one company of the First Infantry, though on account of the more favorable conditions of supply and shelter it is planned to place there the company of scouts now at Laguan. Santa Rita's importance is the fact that it is situated at the head and narrowest part of the Straits of San Juanico, which afford there easy crossing for roving bands of ladrones when they find that the authorities are pressing them too closely in either Leyte or Samar.

Binatac is now garrisoned by a company of the Fifteenth Infantry preparing to return to the United States. After its departure it is intended to bring the company of scouts now at Salcedo to take its place; not because of any military advantage, but because the company is not needed at Salcedo and is not properly quartered there, while Binatac has good barracks built by the troops and simplifies the problem of supply.

Basey, one company First Infantry, occupying convent and local public buildings. This garrison can be withdrawn, as the constabulary and police can take charge of the pueblo.

Leyte.—Tacloban: The garrison consists of one company Eleventh Infantry, quartered in comfortable barracks constructed by the military. At this station there is a fair-sized piece of ground belonging to the provincial government, and it is understood that when it was purchased the military was to have the use of as much of it as required for military purposes. The barracks, hospital, and one set of officers' quarters now in use here are on this ground. There is enough of this land to construct a battalion post, and the town has a commanding position and a good harbor. If there were quarters for a battalion the garrison at Tanauan, Dulag, and Baybay could be withdrawn at once with advantage. The garrisons at Carigara, Ormoc, and Maasin are only useful now to guard our cable connections and to send out parties for repair of telegraph lines. Jaro is useful only for the latter.

I recommend that measures be taken at once to secure land on Parasan Island, and that permanent battalion posts be constructed there and at Tacloban; and that comfortable but not expensive company quarters be constructed at Calbayog, Catbalogan, Carigara, Ormoc, and Maasin. By the time these are completed the civil

government should have so organized their constabulary and police forces in Samar as to be able to take care of the people. Then two battalions of white troops could be concentrated, one at Parasan and the other at Tacloban. These troops would be sufficient to dominate the locality, and six companies, if needed, could be placed in twenty-four hours at any seacoast town of either Samar or Leyte. The three companies of Leyte scouts could be placed at Maasin, Ormoc, and Carigara, and the two companies of Samar scouts at Calbayog and Catbalogan, which would cover all the cable stations.

On my assuming command of this brigade the situation in Leyte was deplorable. Though the island was under civil government it was not safe to go out of the garrisoned places, and a number of towns in the southern part of the island were under a government appointed by the insurgents, several hundred of whom were in the field under Peñaranda and Jorge Capili, two noted and fairly capable leaders. The civil governor appealed to me for troops, and even from Manila I was asked if I could garrison several towns. The restlessness of the people was so great that an attack was threatened on Tacloban, and it was said that 500 insurgents were in the vicinity.

Feeling that it was desirable to have everything settled quickly, and believing that considerable advantage would result if the Leyte insurgents knew that all in Samar had surrendered, and of all that had been done since toward helping them to a better condition of life, I sent for Guevarra, Rafael, Sebastian, and Abuke to visit me in Tacloban at my house. Upon their arrival I induced them to write letters to Peñaranda and Capili to the effect that the Samar insurgents had surrendered and had received kind treatment; that the war was over, and all hope of a successful revolution past, and to remain out longer meant simply to entail hardships and destruction on their own people. The civil government closed the ports of the island there by cutting off the resources of the insurgents, and the constabulary were operating vigorously. All of which evidently had its effect upon the insurgent leader, for Peñaranda surrendered to the constabulary at Baybay with 19 officers, 400 men, 81 guns, 27 revolvers, and 6,000 rounds ammunition; and Capili, with a still larger armed force, is expected to come in within a few days. When he does there will be no organized force of insurgents in the field within the limits of this brigade.

Much was heard of American deserters during the campaign in this brigade and much of the damage sustained at various times by our troops was attributed to their energy and skill. They were more or less desperate characters, and possibly did do more toward keeping up the insurrection than people at a distance would be inclined to believe. Five of these renegades have been reported in this brigade, as follows:

1. Winfrey, late Forty-third Volunteer Infantry. Killed in an engagement near Parasan, Samar.
2. Long, late Forty-third Volunteer Infantry. Killed by insurgents in a quarrel near Ormoc, Leyte.
3. Jas. A. Kearney, late Forty-third Volunteer Infantry. Surrendered at Consolacion, Leyte; tried, convicted, and sentenced to five years' confinement.
4. Will Denton, late Ninth U. S. Infantry. Captured in northern Samar; tried, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment.
5. Warren, late Eleventh U. S. Infantry, not definitely accounted for, but reported by surrendered Leyte insurgents as dead.

McKenna, Company C, Eleventh Infantry, believed once to have been a deserter, but who, it is now alleged, wandered away from his station while drunk and was captured by the Leyte insurgents as a prisoner and held until their surrender, when he was returned to his proper station. He is now awaiting trial.

Cholera.—Cholera made its appearance in this brigade at Tacloban on May 8, and, though promptly discovered and in a large measure checked, has slowly spread to the surrounding towns—Palo, Tanauan, Dagami, and Carigara, Leyte, and Basey, Samar. Medical aid has been sent to all points of danger and every possible measure has been taken to stamp the disease out. In connection with this I feel that I ought to call attention to the energy, skill, and fearless conduct of Maj. S. C. DeKrafft, surgeon, U. S. Volunteers; Capt. Bruce Ffoulkes, assistant surgeon, U. S. Volunteers; First Lieut. W. W. Reno, assistant surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, and Contract Surg. E. H. Sargent, U. S. Army. The excellent fight these four officers have made against the cholera entitles them to the gratitude of the people of both Leyte and Samar, many of whom are alive to-day because of the good work of these American medical officers.

I inclose a copy of the report of the head of each of the staff departments of the brigade, except the adjutant-general, whose office is too closely connected with my own to need separate report;^a and I desire here to express my thanks to them for their

^a Not printed.

faithful and efficient services. The adjutant-general, chief quartermaster, judge-advocate, and chief commissary have shown marked ability in their departments, and their services have been of great value to the Government.

In closing this report it seems proper to suggest the urgent desirability of the civil government's early consideration of the question of communication in the island of Samar. I would suggest that telegraph lines and trails be constructed along the lines marked with red on the inclosed map.^a A hundred thousand pesos spent under a competent supervisor on trails and telegraph lines would, within a few years, save many times that amount in necessary police and constabulary expenses alone, to say nothing of the increased value of property and safety to life that would result.

Respectfully submitted.

F. D. GRANT,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

BAYBAY, LEYTE, P. I., October 15, 1901.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit general report of the operations of A, C, and I companies of this regiment from September 10 to October 10, covering the movements of detachments from Baybay, Inopacan, Matalom, Maasin, and Malitbog.

On September 10 Captain Shelton left Baybay, with 5 scouts, en route to Matalom. The general plan was to have rations sent to Consolacion, on Malitbog Bay, and to use that as a base of operations, but later this was changed to Bontoc, as a better location, and to make a combined movement with detachments of about equal strength from Matalom, Maasin, Malitbog, and Consolacion. A request for a detachment from Abuyog at same time was also made. Accordingly Captain Shelton was given to the 16th to reach his station at Consolacion. He arrived on the 14th, and under his directions scouted for three days in that vicinity to gain information, and, if possible, to rout out any parties of insurgents. Lieutenant Macklin left Malitbog and Lieutenant Myer Matalom on the 18th, and Lieutenant Hocker left Maasin on the 19th and scouted six days at the headwaters of the Maasin River. On same dates details were sent from Baybay and Inopacan to cover country east of those places and south of Inopacan, with a view of cutting off any moving parties of insurgents. These parties were sent out at intervals until the last of September. No notice was received whether party left Abuyog as requested or not. The general plan of scouting in circle around Consolacion, as far south as San Isidro, and Libagon, on Malitbog Bay, and about 15 miles interior was faithfully carried out by the officers, and with good results (see accompanying reports), until the 27th of September, when it became evident that the large party had broken up; and as the detachment from Matalom would on final return examine country back to that place, a plan was arranged by Captain Shelton, and approved by me, to scout the country embraced in the eastern peninsula between Consolacion, Libagon, Cabalian, and Hinunangan. Accordingly Lieutenant Macklin was sent by banca to the east coast and given four days to place his detachments, and on October 2 Lieutenant Myer was sent to Libagon, while Captain Shelton guarded the north. The results were shown in reports. Lieutenant Myer had captured at Libagon on the 24th of September one Roque Tajardo, whom he was obliged to kill, after a personal struggle, to prevent his escape. This man, while an official of Bontoc, was a valued delegado of Jorge Capili. Lieutenant Macklin burned 1 insurrecto post, captured another important official collector of Capili's, 1 lieutenant, and 4 bolomen. As was expected, finding no trail direct from Consolacion to Hinunangan, Captain Shelton scouted northward toward Abuyog on October 2 and 3, and it was for this reason that a detachment was requested to start south from Abuyog on that date. On October 7 all three detachments started for their proper stations, the two for Matalom taking different routes, as was the original plan, for their return. During this return march they discovered and destroyed quite an important post of insurgents at Balive.

The results of these expeditions were as follows: The capture of 2 delegados (1 killed), 1 lieutenant, 4 so-called soldiers and 12 bolomen, 1 rifle, 2 revolvers, and a number of bolos, knives, etc.; the destruction of 4 quite important posts or rendezvous, and a breaking up of at least one of the valleys used as a haunt for parties of so-called insurrectos, and it is believed the gradual disintegration of the band called Capili's, although they still continue in the country in smaller parties, which

^a Not printed.

it will take much time and hard work to drive to the wall. But it was thought that this plan, which is being continued at intervals, will eventually drive them into surrendering, except in one or two instances, where fear of punishment for civil crimes may continue to deter them.

I left Baybay on September 16, accompanied by 3 men of Company C, as guard, and my personal interpreter, and moved up and down the coast as far as Malitbog and around the island of Panaon, examining the towns and villages, giving such orders as were necessary, forwarding additional supplies and information, and in general keeping in touch with all the detachments in the field until the 30th of September. On that date, based on information received, I started for Hindang, to take a detachment from Inopacan and one I had with me a short distance into the interior. On landing at Hindang, however, in a storm on that night, I unfortunately sustained an injury to my right knee which compelled me, on the 2d instant, to return home for medical attendance, and from which injury I am still suffering.

The whole additional expense incurred during these expeditions is less than \$100.

Since the return of these detachments three combined detachments have been sent out from Matalom in search of supposed parties of insurgents.

Certain changes in and additions to current maps will be found in sketches accompanying reports. Lieutenant Macklin's report has not been received at this date, but will be forwarded later. All the officers and men of these detachments deserve credit for energy displayed in face of bad weather and trying country. There was no serious sickness during the time. I note the remarks of Captain Shelton in regard to shoes.

On the 23d of September I received notice of the murder at Bato, near Matalom, of the secretary and the flight of the presidente and three or four of his police. A recommendation had been made by me a week or two before for the suspension of this official on suspicion of harboring and abetting insurgents. Being in Maasin at the time, I sent Lieutenant Finch from Matalom to install a new presidente, as it was deemed a military necessity. This action was approved at your office and by the civil governor, and upon request of the latter I went to Bato and established, by vote of the electors, a complete government, and appointed a police force to serve without pay. These were confirmed and appointed by the governor, and I received his thanks by telegraph. There was no further military object to report at the time. Since then I have received valuable information from them, and the town has been free from insurgents. I visited Panaon on report that many taxes were collected there for use of insurgents. I visited five towns on the island, but found no evidence of the truth of these reports. These places are all poor, and absolutely no rice was found in any place, the people living entirely on bananas, coconuts, and camotes. This island rises sharply from the sea 300 to 500 feet, has deep water in most places around it, but no good anchorage, except at Liloan, which will accommodate only small vessels. The strait connecting cove there with Malitbog Bay is passable only for small vessels, 14 feet being the least water observed. The strait is not over a quarter of a mile long and 50 to 75 feet wide. It has a strong current at times, due to tides. There is a heavy growth of coconut on the island and an almost inexhaustible supply of large timber. There is a considerable growth of hemp. I estimate about 1,500 or 2,000 people there.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT L. MYER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Eleventh Infantry.

MALITBOG, LEYTE, P. I., *October 8, 1901.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.
(Through Lieut. Col. A. L. Myer, Eleventh Infantry.)

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the recent campaign made in conjunction with Company A, Eleventh Infantry, under Captain Shelton and Lieutenant Myer, in the vicinity of Bontoc, in compliance with your instructions of September 9, 1901:

On the afternoon of September 18 I left this place by banca with 60 men of Company I, Eleventh Infantry, Contract Surg. William F. Graham, U. S. Army, 1 private of the Hospital Corps, and twenty days' field rations.

Headquarters were established that evening in Bontoc, in obedience to your instructions, and early on the morning of the 19th I left with 15 men to scout the country south toward Banday.

While there I searched several houses of men of bad reputation and known to be connected with the insurgents. Many people left town on approach of troops. Nothing accomplished.

September 20 I visited the town of Old Sogod with 35 men. The presidente, as was the case at Bantay, had left town, probably on my arrival, and I was informed by the police rather reluctantly that he had gone to the mountains and had joined the insurgents.

On my return from this town I sent a detachment of 15 men off up the mountains on what appeared to be a fresh trail. They followed this trail until near the top of the mountain, but were unable to discover anything.

On the morning of the 21st, with 50 men of Company I and a guide, I left Bontoc. A march of 4 miles was made before daybreak, and we were able to start up the trail, found the day previous, without being noticed by the natives. This trail carried us northwest up the mountains just west and northwest of Old Sogod. Very few houses were found on or near the trail, but it appeared to be well traveled; horses, hogs, and sheep had been taken up not many days previous. Toward the top of the mountain the trail branched out in many places, and at times became so indistinct that I had to trust mostly to the guide. Near the crest of the mountain and some distance off the trail we discovered quite a large house. It had recently been occupied and had stored in it between 800 and 1,000 pounds of rice. House and contents burned.

The remainder of the journey was without event except for the great number of vigilante posts, and actions of the guide led myself and men to believe we were near an enemy, but such did not seem to be the case.

This trail led us down the mountain on the other side into the valley of the Maquilao. For some time this valley had been occupied by Capali's forces, but as Captain Shelton had burned the camp a few days previous nothing was found. Near the head of the valley I divided my force into three detachments, and believe we covered every trail that led to anything for nearly 8 miles. The valley is rich, and abounds in hemp, coconut, a small amount of rice, and many potatoes. The separate detachment joined at 4 o'clock, when I went into camp on the Maquilao River near where it joins the Hilaan. A severe rainstorm came on about 3 o'clock, and, as the command had been in the river and rain almost the entire day, I decided best to camp at first opportunity. We had marched twelve hours, and, as nearly as I can judge, covered 20 miles.

September 22: Broke camp 5 o'clock a. m.; divided command, sending 20 men with First Sergeant Perkins up the mountains west of Maquilao; left 10 men to guard rations, while the remainder I took with me up the valley of the Hilaan. Neither party accomplished anything, except to destroy a few large houses containing more or less supplies—rice. I found what appeared to be a new camp building, but it was so incomplete and green I could not destroy it. I covered about 15 miles and returned to camp about 4 o'clock. Neither party having met Captain Shelton or Lieutenant Myer, I deemed it best to return to Bontoc for conference, arriving there at 6 o'clock.

September 23: Remained in camp in Bontoc, awaiting return of Captain Shelton.

September 24: Went to Bantay, by banca, and searched that town.

September 25: With 45 men of Company I, accompanied Captain Shelton and Lieutenant Myer, in command of Company A, up valley of the Hilaan. Returned to Bontoc 4 o'clock, and that night went with Captain and Lieutenant Myer to New Sogod, searching that town about 11 o'clock. Returned to Bontoc 11 a. m., September 26.

Embarked on banca 8 o'clock evening of 26th, with same command and arrived at Bantay about 1 a. m.; searched town, and marched on to San Isidro, arriving there at daylight. In searching these towns nothing was found, but I believe the effect to have been good on the people. Returned to Bontoc same morning.

September 28: Remained in Bontoc until 12:30 p. m., when I left, with 50 men of Company I, under verbal orders from Captain Shelton to go to Cabalian and Hinunangan and scout that section. The banca arrived at 2 o'clock a. m., 29th instant, at Malitbog. Here I left 10 men, and after arranging some business of the post, and getting money to pay subposts, left at 2 o'clock p. m. and arrived at Cabalian that evening. At this place I learned that bolomen and a few rifles had been in the vicinity recently, so had to change somewhat the prearranged plans of Captain Shelton and myself for me to scout from Hinunangan.

On the morning of the 30th I sent Sergeant Rabb with 20 men by trail to Hima-taigan, with instructions to get the teniente of police as a guide and go to Naba. At 5 o'clock that morning I left on the direct trail for Naba. We surprised this town, though were unable to find anything except 1 bolo, or rather dagger, being made. All trails leading from the town were scouted, and after the arrival of Sergeant Rabb's

party, about 2 o'clock, I returned to Cabalian. Sergeant Rabb reports the trail from Himataugan to Naba bad. He covered a good deal of territory, but found nothing. In Naba I learned that about 50 bolomen had been there some time the week previous. I have given special instructions to Sergeant Rabb to watch Naba, sending a detachment there at least once in every 10 days. From the condition of the surrounding country, the large houses, and the great quantity of rice on hand, I judge it to be a rendezvous of the insurgents located in what is known as the fifth zone.

I left Cabalian early the morning of the 2d of October, first sending out a detachment of 20 men under Corporal Smith, with three days' rations, with instructions to go into camp near Naba, scout all the country roundabout, and act in conjunction with me from Hinunangan. I also sent a detachment east of Cabalian to Anajauan. This detachment consisted of 19 men and was commanded by Sergeant Lowe. I gave him orders to try and work toward Naba, and thus act with Corporal Smith and myself. On arriving at Anajauan and entering the town a native jumped from the window of one of the houses. He was captured, and on searching the house Sergeant Lowe found the following persons: Second Lieut. Leonardo Bernado, insurgent artillery; Seveno Palman, sergeant of boleros; Roberto Maputan, bolero; Eulijio Galimbia, bolero; Tomas Seriam, servant of teniente; Mariano Pelete, ex-presidente of Hinunangan, collector for Capili. In the room were found papers of lieutenant, 2 revolvers, 30 rounds of revolver ammunition, 3 bolos, 1 Krag rifle, bayonet, and scabbard, and 1 dagger; also the flag of the detachment. Bernado had in his personal baggage 50 pesos, which I took possession of and have since given him. All prisoners and captured articles were turned over to me shortly after capture. From conversation with prisoners I found that 7 rifles were with party the night before, but left about midnight, for which place or camp I am unable to ascertain from prisoners. All papers found are herewith inclosed. This party had arrived in Anajauan the day previous and were there to make the regular collections of money for Capili.

The capture of Mariano Pelete, captain, as he is called, I regard as the most important event that has occurred toward breaking the insurrection in this section. This man, though unable to read or write, had all the characteristics of a criminal. He has been the terror of this country for months and has at all times proven himself the faithful servant of Capili.

So far as I am able to ascertain the last collection was made August 26, when 900 pesos were taken from the town of Hinundayan. This money, after collection, was taken by Mariana, in a small boat, and, according to his own statement, was delivered to Capili at Hilaan. I took this man and the others on with me to Hinunangan. The news of his capture had preceded us and on arrival there was great rejoicing. Prominent citizens united in requesting me to ask that he be banished from the island.

I left Hinunangan 5 o'clock a. m., the 3d instant, with 17 men of Company I and the lieutenant of police and 4 armed policemen. We covered the trails south and southeast of this town, endeavoring to drive any insurgents who might be in the neighborhood toward Naba or up the coast. I found where they had camped the Saturday and Sunday before—about one-half mile from Hinundayan. I discovered evidences of their having left that section, which confirmed the statements of Pelete and the teniente of artillery, Bernado. I marched into Hinundayan from the west, surrounded the town as the "drum signal" was given in a most energetic manner as we entered. I had previous information of the disloyalty of the presidente, Telesforo Sanico, and so went in search of him. He was found sitting at his desk with a courier waiting near by to take a message he was writing when taken. This message was only partially written, but was to a man in the next town informing him we were there. Teniente Bernado and Captain Pelete both informed me they had been assisted in their work in Hinundayan by this man, that he had furnished his police to assist in collections, and had quartered and entertained them in his own house on their last visit, August 26. The presidente and teniente of police of Hinunangan informed me he was a bad man, so, on their statements, I took him prisoner and now have him at this place. I also arrested Damiano Carajotay, policeman, for lying and aiding the enemy.

I informed the teniente of police that during the absence of the presidente he would perform the office and attend to the administration of the town.

On the return to Hinunangan, and on the outskirts of Hinundayan, in crossing a bridge it gave way and the command, with the exception of the advance guard, fell into the river below, a distance of about 10 feet. Fortunately but one man was hurt—ankle slightly sprained.

I left Hinunangan early the morning of the 4th instant and went to Cabalian, from which place I sent out our party toward Naba to meet one sent out the same morning from Hinunangan. I took with me 20 men, marched to Himataugan and thence

north, endeavoring to get to Naba by another trail and, if possible, locate bolero camp. I had an excellent guide in one of the men captured by Sergeant Lowe. He tried to take me past all vigilante posts, but when near camp we were discovered. Unfortunately, on arrival at camp all had left. This place would probably accommodate 25. Supper for about that number was cooking. Destroyed kitchen and quarters; captured 2 boleros near camp. Returned to Cabalian and left there afternoon of the 5th for Malitbog to leave sick. We arrived at Malitbog at daylight the 6th instant, and that morning I left with 15 men for Bontoc.

I regret to inform you that our guide of the 3d instant, the teniente of police of Hinundayan, after returning to his home, was taken out that night by 6 persons unknown, and either taken to the mountains or killed. On sending for him and going to his home I was informed that they had been notified that he was murdered for assisting our troops. For some time he had been friendly to the Americans and had assisted them in every way possible. I have given special orders to the subpost detachments to watch the towns of Himataugan, Anajauan, and Hinundayan.

They are by far three of the worst towns of the thirteen I have inspected on this trip.

In conclusion I desire to invite the attention of the regimental and district commander to the excellent conduct and behavior of the men of Company I out with me on this trip, they showing by every action the excellent training they had received under my predecessor.

During the entire trip, lasting nineteen days, not one man went on sick report, except 2 with fever. Not one man went sick with sore feet, though several marched their shoes off. On two occasions they were without food for eighteen hours and scarcely any sleep, but they were at the same time ready and willing for any duty and no complaints were made. It was a pleasure to command them and they were truly a credit to their regiment, as they wished to be. All papers found are inclosed herewith for the information of the district commander. They were in the possession of Captain Mariano and Teniente Bernado.

EDGAR A. MACKLIN,

First Lieutenant, Eleventh U. S. Infantry, Commanding Post, Malitbog.

MATALOM, LEYTE, October 11, 1901.

The ADJUTANT, Baybay, Leyte.


SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of a detachment of Company A, Eleventh Infantry, between September 18 and October 8, 1901.

The detachment, numbering 39 men and 1 officer, left Matalom at 7.30 a. m., September 18, and proceeded to Anajauan by way of Bato and Tubenuch, arriving there at 2 p. m.; the trail was found to be in fair condition. The detachment camped at Anajauan and left there for Bontoc at 6.30 a. m., September 19. Owing to the bad condition of the trail caused by the heavy rain of the night before, the detachment was not able to reach Bontoc on that day, but camped about an hour's march from that place. I went into Bontoc that night and reported to Captain Shelton and then returned to the camp, leaving there at daylight. The detachment reached Bontoc at 6.30 a. m.

On September 29 I took a detachment of 15 men up the Bombon River to a point about 6 miles from its mouth to try to find a better trail from Bontoc to the point where the Anajauan trail strikes the river. Left Bontoc at 7 a. m. and went to the Nueva Union and then followed the trail along the river for about 5 miles, but failed to find a way up the hill to connect with old trail; returned to Bontoc by old trail, reaching there at 2 p. m.

On October 3 I left Bontoc with a detachment of 25 men to find a trail from Libayan to Naba over the mountains. I left Bontoc in the banca at 1 p. m. and arrived in Libagon about 12 o'clock that night. Started from Libagon with 16 men and went south along the coast until I struck a trail leading up the Amayo River, which led over the mountains and into the Naba valley about 3 or 4 miles from the coast. I reached Himatayan at 2.30 p. m., and from there followed the beach to Cabalian, arriving there at 4 p. m. The detachment left Cabalian at 4.30 a. m. and marched to Libagon, following the beach to a point about two miles from the strait, where the trail to Paro and Himayangan turns off. Reached Himayangan at 11.30 a. m. and from there followed the beach to Libagon, reaching that place at 4 p. m. The trail over the mountains is a fair one, although it runs in the river bed for some distance and there are two very steep descents. The trail along the beach is very hard to march over, owing to the character of the beach, which is covered with large stones in many places. I saw no suspicious places on the trails and the people seemed friendly and did not run on the approach of troops. I left Libagon by banca at 6.30 p. m., October 5, and reached Bontoc at 11 p. m.

SKETCH OF OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN LEYTE, September 18 to October 8, 1901



Heintz & A. Myer
11 Jnt
Sept 18 - Oct 8 -

On October 7 I left Bontoc at 7 a. m. with a detachment of 25 men and marched to Anajauan, leaving the pack train to follow under charge of Sergt. Morris P. Kuhns. Reached Anajauan at 11.30, the trail being in much better condition than before. After an hour's halt I took a detachment of 16 men and went in the direction of Bolien to try and connect with Captain Shelton, who was on his way to that place by another trail. I reached Bolien at 2.30 p. m., about the same time that Captain Shelton reached that place, and reported to him. The pack train and guard reached Anajauan at 12.30 p. m. October 8, and remained there until 5 a. m. October 9, when it proceeded to Matalom, reaching there at 11.30 a. m.

The detachment also took part in all operations between September 20 and October 8, 1901, under command of Captain Shelton.

The inclosed tracing shows the trails followed, as accurately as possible. It was not found practicable to make any road maps during the operations owing to the amount of time which would have been lost.

Very respectfully,

EDGAR A. MYER,
First Lieutenant, Eleventh Infantry.

JARO, LEYTE, P. I., *October 23, 1901.*

Captain ALEXANDER, *Carigara, P. I.*

SIR: Pursuant to your telegram of 19th, I have the honor to submit the following report of reconnoissance to the eastward of San Miguel. I left the post of Jaro with 2 laborers and 3 soldiers, and not being able to procure a guide at this place, went to the town of San Miguel, where I was furnished a guide by the presidente of that place. We took a trail from there circling around toward the east in the direction of Malibago. After leaving the town of San Miguel we marched about 2 miles, coming to the river. All trails ending there we were forced to wade the river, the foliage being so dense that we could not get through, the water of the river being from 1 to 5 feet deep. After we reached the river we did not see a house or person and no signs of cultivation. We went up the river about 6 or 7 miles, where the river being deeper we were forced to return. There is no trail from San Miguel to Malibago, and the only way one can get there is by following the river. The way the natives reach the town from San Miguel is by going to Buybuy and to Bobatang and to Malibago. We returned to San Miguel by same trail as we went, and returned to Jaro. The country through which we passed was so rough that it was impossible to make any map of same.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT J. DOYLE,
Corporal, D, Eleventh Infantry.

[First indorsement.]

POST OF CARIGARA, LEYTE, P. I., *November 1, 1901.*

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general first district, Department of the Visayas.

The rumored presence of the insurgents in the island of Biliran has been investigated and proved unfounded.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Captain, Eleventh Infantry, Commanding.

BAYBAY, LEYTE, P. I., *October 31, 1901.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: In addition to reports submitted during month, I have the honor to submit report as follows of scouts from this post during October:

October 1, detachment of 21 of Company C, Eleventh Infantry, and Company D, Leyte scouts, returned to post from Ciabo.

October 3, detachment of 9, same organizations, to Caridad and return. Distance about 15 miles.

October 7, detachment to Caridad and return.

October 15, detachment with officer toward Ormoc. Distance about 12 miles.

In addition to above there have been almost daily mounted patrols covering country for from 4 to 6 miles from post.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT L. MYER,
Lieutenant-Colonel Eleventh Infantry, Commanding.

MALITBOG, LEYTE, P. I., *October 31, 1901.*ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that during the past month Company I, Eleventh Infantry, has performed the following field service:

October 1 to 6 in field near Cabalian and Hinunangan. Destroyed one large bolero camp; captured 4 boleros October 2, also teniente of artillery and chief delgado of district and 2 revolvers.

October 7 and 8 near Bontoc—nothing accomplished.

October 12 to 18, Lieutenant Ellis and 20 men, in addition to command at subpost of Cabalian and Hinunangan, scouted country in vicinity of those places for boleros—nothing encountered and reports say band had separated when camp was burned.

In addition to these detachments I sent or went with parties into upper bay country and also sent 1 expedition to Parauan under Lieutenant Ellis. This party captured 1 revolver and 20 rounds of ammunition.

In addition to these parties sent after insurgents I have made an effort to stop the great amount of smuggling in this neighborhood, and parties of four or five men have been out nightly or daily, as the occasion demanded.

Very respectfully,

EDGAR A. MACKLIN,
*First Lieutenant, Eleventh Infantry, Commanding.*POST OF CARIGARA, LEYTE, P. I., *November 1, 1901.*THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of scouting parties for the month of October, 1901.

Alangalang to Babatungon, September 28 to October 1, by Sergeant Ryle; Carigara to Biliran and return, October 3, by First Sergeant Small; Alangalang to Dapdap River and Santa Fe, October 7, by Sergeant Ryle; Jaro to southern mountains and return, October 23, by Corporal Doyle; Alangalang to Santa Fe, October 24, by Corporal Drake; Barugo to Sabung to San Miguel, October 24, by Corporal Freedman; Leyte, Leyte, P. I., October 28, by Sergeant Slaten.

In addition to the above, small parties from Alangalang, Barugo, Jaro, and Carigara have been sent out every few days to make reconnaissances in all parts of this jurisdiction.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
*Captain, Eleventh Infantry, Commanding Post.*POST OF DULAG, LEYTE, P. I., *November 6, 1901.*THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith reports of hikes and scouting parties, made in the district under my command during the month of October, 1901, as follows:

Report of the subpost of Abuyog, made by First Lieut. Alphonse Strebler, Philippine Scouts; reports made by First Sergt. Martin Kimble, Sergt. John Nealon, and Sergt. Charles T. Kurtzell, of Company M, Eleventh Infantry, together with map showing trails followed.


Very respectfully,

J. H. H. PESHINE,
*Major, Eleventh U. S. Infantry, Commanding Post.*ABUYOG, LEYTE, P. I., *October 31, 1901.*THE COMMANDING OFFICER, *Dulag, Leyte, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of scouts and expeditions in the district during the month of October, 1901:

Scout along coast to visita of San Roque, south of Abuyog, night of October 3 and 4: Twelve men Company M, Eleventh Infantry, and 12 scouts Company C, under

Sketch showing operations in vicinity of Dulag, Leyte, during the month of October, 1941



command of Sergeant Ritter, captured 15 boleros and wounded 1 who tried to make his escape.

Scout along Bito River, October 4 to 5: Fourteen scouts of Company C, under command of Corporal Mayne, Company M, Eleventh Infantry, captured 1 prisoner.

Scout to Buena Vista, October 4 to 5: Five men Company M, Eleventh Infantry, and 5 scouts Company C, under command of Corporal Deffenbach, Company M, Eleventh Infantry, destroyed cuartel of bolero Teniente Arenas.

Scout along Cadaguan River, October 5 to 6: Fourteen scouts Company C, under command of Sergeant Flores, Company C, scouts, killed teniente of boleros Juan Arjon.

Scout along lower Higasaan, October 5 to 6: Five scouts under command of First Sergeant Juntilla, Company C, scouts, captured Teniente Andres Tisbe and 2 boleros. Scouts on these last two hikes wore insurgent uniforms.

Scout of Lower Sayog Valley, Jamamara Valley, across mountain range, over Camarines trail and down lower Higasaan Valley, October 5 to 8: Seven men Company M, Eleventh Infantry, and 7 scouts, Company C, under command of Corporal Lee, Eleventh Infantry, captured 10 boleros in Jamamara Valley.

Scout up Baliri River Valley, October 7 to 8: Nine men Company M, Eleventh Infantry, and 5 scouts, under command of Corporal Deffenbach, captured 5 boleros.

Scout up Baturauen River, October 7 to 8: Seven scouts Company C, under command of Sergeant Flores, Company C, scouts, captured 2 boleros.

Scout to Laguna de Bito district October 7 to 8: six scouts, under command of Sergeant Larnace, Company C, scouts, captured 11 prisoners and killed 1 bolero who attempted to escape.

Scout along right bank of Bito October 13 to 14: Twelve scouts of Company C, under command of Corporal Trimmer, Company M, Eleventh Infantry, burned camp of bolero teniente Eliseo, about 14 houses.

Scout to Laguna district: Four columns of 10 men each left on different trails to surround camp of Capt. Geronimo Baldos, October 16 to 18; burned camp of above captain.

Scout into Bito Valley, near foothills, October 19 to 21: Twenty men Company M, Eleventh Infantry, and 20 men Company C, scouts, under command of Sergt. Joseph Ritter, Company M, Eleventh Infantry. Party fired upon from trenches on small bluff on left bank of river while advance guard was in center of stream. Men returned fire and drove the enemy out of his position. Two insurgents were killed—one shot through head, other through right breast. Destroyed cuartel and camp.

Scout into Upper Bito Valley October 23: Twelve men Company M, Eleventh Infantry, and 12 men Company 39, Leytes, under command of Corporal Deffenbach, Company M, Eleventh Infantry, burned bolero camp of about 90 shacks.

Scout to Bito Lake October 24: Twelve men Company M, Eleventh Infantry, and 12 men 39, Leytes, under command of Corporal Trimmer, M, Eleventh Infantry, burned camp of bolero captain, Lopez Margate, about 70 shacks.

Scout to lower Higasaan October 24 and 25: Twelve men Company M, Eleventh Infantry, and 6 men Company 39, Leytes, under command of Corporal Mayne, burned cuartel of bolero captain, Aguidon Reas.

During the month the following insurgent officials have surrendered to me: On October 8, teniente of boleros, Margarita Rada, and 9 of his band; on the 9th he brought in 20 and on the 10th 4 more of his band; on October 12, Teniente Balbino Arenas surrendered; on October 30, captain of boleros, Pastor Pensona; On October 31, Teniente Francisco Tisbe, father of Teniente Andres Tisbe, now in confinement here.

During the month the town has increased twofold in population; that is, people who had not been in town since the American occupation have thought it safer to move in.

Nearly every hike brought in more or less prisoners, but, as there was not enough evidence against many of them, I had to release a large number. The greater part of them are now living in town.

I inclose herewith a letter captured which I think fully explains itself.

Though the men of this command have been worked hard and fast during the month, most all of the marches being done at night, the health and general condition of the men kept good throughout.

Very respectfully,

ALPHONSE STREBLER,
First Lieutenant, Philippine Scouts, Commanding Subpost.

REPORT OF HIKE UNDER COMMAND OF SERGT. CHARLES T. KURTSEL, COMPANY M, ELEVENTH INFANTRY, PER VERBAL ORDERS COMMANDING OFFICER POST OF DULAG, LEYTE, P. I.

BURAUEN, LEYTE, P. I., *October 21, 1901.*

Left Burauen at 11.30 o'clock p. m. on the night of the 19th, taking trail leading to La Paz; when about 2½ miles out of Burauen, entered a shack where there were 8 native men who could give no account of themselves. Upon search being made, one dagger and one fighting bolo were found. I placed the natives under arrest and made them accompany the party to La Paz, arriving at the latter place at about 7.30 o'clock on the morning of the 20th. Made a thorough search of the town of La Paz for any insurrecto element there, but found no evidence of same.

After breakfast at 9 o'clock a. m., left the town, taking up the trail leading to Julita, arriving at the latter place at 3 o'clock p. m. After dinner followed the Dulag-Burauen road, arriving at Burauen at 6 o'clock p. m. The prisoners were sent under guard to Dulag for confinement pending investigation.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES T. KURTSEL,
Sergeant, Company M, Eleventh Infantry.

REPORT OF HIKE UNDER COMMAND OF FIRST SERGT. MARTIN KIMBLE, COMPANY M, ELEVENTH INFANTRY, PER VERBAL ORDERS COMMANDING OFFICER POST OF DULAG, LEYTE, P. I.

DULAG, LEYTE, P. I., *October 4, 1901.*

Left post October 2, 1901, at 10.40 o'clock a. m. Command consisted of 9 Americans and 2 Leyte scouts; followed road leading to Burauen as far as Julita, arriving there at 1 p. m. Procured guide and took the trail leading to Tabontabon; proceeded in a northeasterly direction for about one hour; the sun becoming obscured by the clouds, the guide evidently lost his course, for at 4 o'clock p. m. he stated that it would take three hours to reach Tabontabon; dismissed the guide and sent him back to Julita as worthless; went into camp at about 4 o'clock p. m. Broke camp at 5 o'clock a. m. on the 3d and proceeded without a guide arriving in Tabontabon at 7 o'clock a. m. After breakfast proceeded by trail and road to Dagami, arriving at 12 o'clock noon, where dinner was had. Left Dagami at 1.30 o'clock p. m., following the Burauen road about three-quarters of a mile; then left road, taking a westerly course until we struck the mountains, distant from Dagami about 7 miles; went into camp and left the morning of the 4th, taking southerly course alongside of the mountains to a point about 5 miles from and nearly west of Burauen. Here we captured an outpost, a native, under circumstances so suspicious as to justify his arrest. All mountain trails which we crossed showed signs of being vigorously used. Country traversed, except mountains, covered with hemp, cocoanut, banana, and occasional rice paddies.

Returned to post by way of Burauen on the 4th, at 10:45 a. m.

Respectfully submitted.

MARTIN KIMBLE,
First Sergeant, Company M, Eleventh Infantry.

REPORT OF HIKE UNDER COMMAND OF SERGT. JOHN NEALON, COMPANY M, ELEVENTH U. S. INFANTRY, PER VERBAL ORDERS COMMANDING OFFICER POST OF DULAG, LEYTE, P. I.

DULAG, LEYTE, P. I., *October 4, 1901.*

Left Post October 2, 1901, at 10.40 o'clock a. m.; command consisted of 9 Americans and 2 Leyte scouts; followed trail leading from Dulag to Tabontabon; country traversed is well settled and under cultivation, mostly hemp and rice. About 9 miles from Dulag came across trail leading from mountains which appeared to have been used by a small party but a short time before; followed this trail about 2 miles; came upon a party which appeared to be farm laborers; when seen one man acted suspiciously and was placed under arrest; when questioned could give no account of himself; the others had papers signed by officers at Dulag and Tanauan. The prisoner was taken to Tabontabon, where command arrived at 5:30 o'clock p. m. and camped for the night. Left Tabontabon at 6 o'clock a. m. on the 3d and followed main road to Dagami, arriving there at 9 o'clock a. m. Turned over the native

prisoner to Lieut. Hendryx, of that post, for investigation. Left Dagami at 10 o'clock a. m.; followed road and arrived at Bureau at 8 o'clock, where the command remained until 1 p. m., and from there traversed the Bureau road to this post. Distance hiked, 40 miles.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN NEALON,
Sergeant, Company M, Eleventh Infantry.

MALIBAGO, LEYTE, P. I., November 16, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte.

SIR: I have the honor to report that Sergeant O'Keefe and 3 privates from Company A, Twelfth Infantry, and 8 native scouts left Malibago at 6 a. m. November 7.

We landed on a small island to the east of Santa Rita, Samar, for the purpose of searching the place. We found nothing but an insurgent flag and some papers. I turned flag and papers over to the commanding officer of gunboat *Mariveles*. The same date we went to a small town called Mauban, in the eastern part of Malibago, for the purpose of bringing back two sacks of rice left at Mauban by the presidente of Malibago on his way from Tacloban with rice for Malibago. I could not find the two sacks of rice, however, and I brought the man who was in charge of the place and another man that I found in the town, said to have come from Samar the day before; turned them over to the commanding officer at Santa Rita the same date.

On our way from Mauban to Malibago we saw two boats with about 30 natives coming from Samar; I called to them to come to us; they did not come and I ordered the men to fire at them. We kept up a good fire at them all the way from Samar to Leyte, until they were lost from sight among the bushes on the Leyte side. I think the greater part of them were killed because there were but a few men in the boats as they reached the Leyte side.

On the same date Private Saylor, Company A, Twelfth Infantry, and 3 native scouts parted from us in another boat, and I ordered them to scout the Samar side. Private Saylor reported to me at Malibago with two captured boats, and also reported that he and the 3 scouts killed 8 natives who were trying to cross from Samar into Leyte. We arrived in Malibago about 10.30 p. m.

On the morning of November 8 Corporal Homan, Twelfth Infantry, and 4 privates from Company A, Twelfth Infantry, and one native scout left Malibago and went to Babatungon, a small town to the west of Malibago, for the purpose of scouting around the town and surroundings; found nothing, and returned to Malibago.

On the morning of the 9th of November 11 scouts stationed in Malibago were recalled to Tacloban and replaced by 12 men from Company L, Eleventh Infantry.

On November 10 Corporal Homan, Twelfth Infantry, and 6 privates captured 2 large boats, one a sailboat, the other had no name or mark of any kind. The sailboat was named *Pashico*, number of license 202. The corporal brought the boats to Malibago. There was nobody in the boats.

On the 11th of November I left Malibago with 6 privates to watch boats which were said to be crossing near Mauban, Malibago, from Samar. We saw a few men on the Samar side watching. We fired a few shots at them, but can not say if we killed them or not. We got fired on by a gunboat, and returned to Malibago.

On the morning of the 12th we captured two large boats near the island of Neboy, Malibago. The commanding officer at Santa Rita said that the two boats belonged to him and that he thought that they floated away with the tide from Santa Rita. I said he could have the boats if he wanted them by sending an order for them, so that I could account to my commanding officer for them.

On the morning of the 13th of November myself and 6 privates went to look around the hills to the west of Malibago. We found nothing but a few women and a number of children. They seemed to be half starved. I asked why they were not sent to school. The mother said she was afraid of the Americans. I told her she should not fear the Americans as long as she did what was right. I brought the women and children to Malibago for the purpose of sending them to school.

On the morning of the 14th of November I left Malibago about 7 a. m. with 9 privates and scouted all the hills on the east of Malibago, because I had reason to suspect that there was some one signaling to the bolomen in Samar from the hills on the east of the town of Malibago. I could find nothing, however.

Destroyed all houses along the hills where the signaling was, and left orders that if there was any more signaling that I would be around and kill everybody I found.

The night of the 14th there was no more signaling from the hills around Malibago. There is signaling from the hills around Iganega, every evening.

In regard to the rice brought to Malibago by the presidente, I kept all the rice in the soldiers' quarters but four sacks, which I left with 4 Chinamen in town. I am having no rice leave the town.

I gave orders that if the country people wanted rice they should come into town and send the children to school and live in the town of Malibago. Malibago is to be a big town in about a year from now.

There is a man in Babatungon of the name of Asinor, and I have the greatest reason to suspect that he is working for the cause of the bolomen of Samar. Some time ago I heard that he was to have a hemp press in Babatungon. I called to see him, and a man who was with Asinor asked me what I wanted there. I said I came to see Mr. Asinor and to look at the hemp press work. There was no hemp press, but an office. The said Asinor was a great friend of Vicente Deis, now a prisoner. This Asinor is surely working for the bolomen and the insurgent cause. There should be a few good American soldiers in Babatungon, because the place is very bad, and the police are just as bad as the presidente. All the people in town helped the bolomen all that they could for the last two and a half years. There should be no rice left to Babatungon until some good American soldiers could see that the bolomen of Samar did not get the rice.

I have now in Malibago 12 boats (10 large boats and 2 small ones), about 2 peculs of hemp. The boats were all captured coming from Samar by me and my men.

The people of Malibago asked me if I would please thank the commanding officer for his kindness in giving them some rice.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. O'KEEFE,
Sergeant, Eleventh Infantry Band.
(In charge at Malibago.)

U. S. S. VICKSBURG, THIRD RATE,
Near Guiuan, P. I., October 29, 1901.

SIR: 1. I have the honor to report that Friday, October 26, one company of marines visited the intrenchments in the direction in which the *Vicksburg* fired and destroyed a number of shacks and about 2,500 pounds of rice. The 27th I sent a party in two boats around the western point, under Lieutenant Butler, that destroyed a number of shacks and secured 3 small canoes. The same evening I captured a large banca and 2 canoes. October 28 a party under Lieutenant-Commander Glennon operated to the eastward, and one company from Balangiga and garrison went eastward at the same time. They burned 15 or 20 shacks and captured 5 canoes. About 6.30 p. m. the *Villalobos* came in and anchored. Major Waller, U. S. Marine Corps, came in her.

2. This morning we embarked 75 marines under Captain Porter and steamed down the coast near Guiuan, where we landed about 87 men on a river to the eastward to operate against the neighborhood and to destroy habitations. This party expected to return about 4 o'clock.

Very respectfully,

E. B. BARRY,
Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

The SENIOR SQUADRON COMMANDER, COMMANDING SOUTHERN SQUADRON,
U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

U. S. GUNBOAT VICKSBURG, THIRD RATE,
Calabogon, P. I., November 8, 1901.

SIR: In continuation of my No. 15-A, I have the honor to report that Lieutenant Butler destroyed the town of Gigoso October 29. As we approached the anchorage several natives were seen hiding about the houses. I fired one 6-pounder shell over the town before sending ashore, whereupon all natives disappeared.

2. The chart of the southern end of Samar is incorrect. By cautiously feeling our way we got within a quarter of a mile of the beach in 16 fathoms of water where the chart shows 1½.

3. The expedition under Major Waller returned and we got under way at 6.45 p. m., anchoring at Balangiga at 9.08 p. m.

4. October 30, just after daylight, another detachment of marines was brought aboard and we proceeded to Labuan, where the detachment was landed, the steam

launch as usual towing the boats to near the shore, Naval Cadet Landenberger in charge. The town was fired first by the natives, but they fled upon the approach of the landing party. Several shots were fired at our men, apparently by but one rifle. No casualties occurred. The rest of the town was destroyed by the marines. The expedition returned at 3 p. m., and we anchored off Balangiga at 4.20 p. m.

7. Saturday, November 2, got under way at 8.30 a. m., as previously agreed upon, and stood down to Nipa-nipa. Sent in boats with steam launch, Naval Cadet Bricker in charge, and effected junction with marine force from Basey. Party worked down the beach to southward and shelled several places where natives were seen. Marines burned all shacks and either destroyed or captured all boats found. Quartered all expedition aboard for the night; also three prisoners.

8. Sunday, November 3, anchored off Lipata searching for rumored camp. Destroyed a small town and surrounded Lipata, but found it deserted. This town was also destroyed, as well as some shacks on the shore. Fired four 6-pounder shells at a bare spot resembling an intrenchment, but it was found afterwards to be simply a clearing. The firing was excellent, one shell striking within 5 feet of the point aimed at, distance about 600 yards. The expedition did not reach the city of Nipa-nipa, but returned when within 1 mile of that place. No hostile force was encountered, though a few scattered natives were seen.

10. Anchored off Basey about 6.30 p. m. and landed the marine detachment. The steam launch towed up four captured bancas, one extremely fine and made of wood resembling mahogany.

11. Monday and Tuesday remained at anchor, making preparations for an expedition up the Sojoton River, and assisting in making the platform for a 3-inch rifle belonging to the marine post here. Tuesday a reconnoitering party of 10 marines, under Lieutenant Carpenter, entered the river in a boat and was fired upon; no one was injured.

12. Wednesday the expedition left for the Sojoton River about 5.30 a. m. It consisted of 29 men and 5 marines, in the steam launch, with a 1-pounder; first cutter, with the Colt's automatic, and the whaleboat, under Lieutenant Glennon, accompanied by Lieutenant Butler, Naval Cadet Landenberger, and Assistant Surgeon Ohnesorg; the marines' cutter, several bancas, and their 3-inch rifle mounted on a platform secured to three stout bancas, and a Colt gun, under Major Waller, accompanied by Captains Dunlap and Bearss, First Lieutenants Day and Williams, and 100 men. Total force, 9 officers, 134 men. About 4.30 p. m. the expedition returned, and all boats in tow of steam cutter. About 2 miles from ship 3-inch banca platform towed under and capsized, losing some ammunition and some other stores. Gun hung by breeching and later was recovered, with the loss of one wheel. There were killed, by the insurgent fire, 2 marines of Basey detachment; no other casualties were reported. It has been reported since, through Philippine sources, that from 35 to 50 insurgents were killed. One bamboo gun was captured.

15. November 8, about 6 a. m., with Brigadier-General Smith, his aid, 2 other officers, and orderly and servant aboard, left Tacloban and anchored about 1 p. m. at Catbalogan.

Very respectfully,

E. B. BARRY,

Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

The SENIOR SQUADRON COMMANDER, COMMANDING SOUTHERN SQUADRON.

U. S. S. QUIROS,

Off West Coast of Samar, October 30, 1901.

SIR: 1. I have the honor to report that Monday afternoon, October 28, I proceeded across San Bernardino Straits with this vessel to Matnog, in Southern Luzon. There I was informed by Lieutenant Harker, Fifteenth Infantry, U. S. Army, in command, that the sergeant in command of a detachment of his company at Magdalena, the next town north on the straits, had reported that native craft had been seen crossing the straits north of Magdalena, when gunboats were not in sight, undoubtedly going to Samar.

2. Tuesday morning, the 29th, I left Matnog at 5 o'clock and proceeded to the northward, along the Luzon coast. About 7 o'clock a good-sized proa was seen hauled up on the beach, about a mile above the town of Talaonan. I sent a boat in to investigate, with orders to destroy if not properly licensed. The boat returned about 8.30, reporting as follows:

3. That 1 large and 2 small proas, 2 bancas, and 1 large war canoe had been found, and that behind the trees, completely hidden from view from the sea, was a large

bamboo house, occupied by an old Chinaman, giving his name as Pedro Garcia. The house was searched and found to contain about 60 large sacks of rice and 2 bins of rice, estimated in all at 15,000 to 20,000 pounds, and a large quantity of hemp. On the ground in the vicinity was a quantity of hemp spread out to dry, which had evidently been recently brought in by water in the large proa, which showed evidence of having been but a short time out of the water. The Chinaman being unable to show any papers covering the boats, or business papers, the boats, house, rice, and hemp were destroyed, personal effects being first removed.

4. The presence of this large amount of rice in this secluded locality, convenient to transfer across the straits to Samar, at their narrowest point, and the evidence of the recent arrival of hemp by water, with the presence of the boats and absence of papers, was deemed sufficient cause for their destruction.

5. The Chinaman, Pedro Garcia, was taken to Matnog, and turned over to Lieutenant Harker, in command, who expects to get further information from him.

6. It is suspected that the hemp was destined for Gubat, and that the rice has been accumulated in small quantities, in the spot where found, from Bulusan and Gubat. Smith, Bell & Co. have a powerful launch at the latter place, which collects hemp along the Luzon coast.

7. I would suggest that all ports in southern Luzon from Gubat to Bulan, inclusive, be closed to trade if it can be effected, and this rice was undoubtedly destined for Samar.

8. I would also suggest that if possible another gunboat be sent to the patrol station. Good anchorage, protected from all weathers, can be had in the river at Mauo, and splendid fresh water obtained there, and boats of the *Pampanga* class can enter. Another protected and secure anchorage is at Santo Niño, island of Limbancauyan. With assistance of a native pilot the Quiros can work along the north coast of Samar when the weather permits.

9. Inclosed is the report of Naval Cadet Keating, who was in charge of the boat which landed on the Luzon coast.

Very respectfully,

The SENIOR OFFICER PRESENT,
Catbalogan, Samar.

W. B. FLETCHER,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

U. S. S. QUIROS,
Straits of San Bernardino, October 29, 1901.

SIR: 1. I have the honor to report that upon landing this morning in the cutter, about 7.30 a. m., on the coast between Bulusan and Magdalena, in compliance with your order to investigate some boats ashore there, I found 1 large proa, 2 medium-sized proas, 2 bancas, and 1 so-called war canoe, about 40 feet long.

2. One of the proas (medium) had evidently come in but a short time previously, was wet, and had remains of hemp lying in her.

3. After stationing outposts I began investigations, and discovered a large nipa shack, shut out from view of the sea, and surrounded by bamboo poles, upon which many yards of wet hemp were spread out to dry. I approached the shack with Larsen (seaman), McCabe (apprentice, first class), and Beasley (apprentice, first class), and demanded of a woman (Filipino) who was sitting in the doorway where the captain of the boat was. She replied, "No aqui." McCabe went in and discovered a Chinaman inside the shack, who was evidently the owner of the boats, as all their gear, sails, oars, etc., were inside or around the shack.

4. I asked him for paper or licenses for his boat, and he replied that he had none; whereupon I told him that if he did not show them to me I would destroy his boats, and gave orders to that effect, the boats being all cut up and burned.

5. Next we searched the shack and discovered in the two wings of the shack about 25 tons of dry hemp in bundles, the piles being approximately 6 feet high, 4 feet thick, and 15 feet long. Then we found 1 large bin full of rice, holding several tons; 1 smaller one holding about 1 ton, and McCabe, on looking back of the hemp piles, found between 60 and 70 gunny sacks, also full of rice, each sack holding about 200 pounds.

6. After giving the Chino time to remove his personal effects, our men aiding him, we set fire to the shack and burned it and its contents, returning to the ship with the Chino, but leaving his effects with his wife, a Filipino.

7. The Chinaman gave his name as Pedro Garcia, and stated that he was from Amoy, China.

8. In conclusion, I would respectfully state that this shack was fully three-quarters of a mile away from any village; there is a good channel and landing there between the reefs, and it is an excellent point from which supplies can be transmitted to Samar Island, across the straits.

Very respectfully,

A. B. KEATING, *Naval Cadet.*

The COMMANDING OFFICER.

U. S. S. VILLALOBOS,
Balangiga, Samar, P. I., October 31, 1901.

SIR: I have the honor to report affairs in connection with the cruising of this vessel since her departure from Cavite, P. I., as follows:

October 18, 1901, Maj. E. F. Glenn, U. S. Army, judge-advocate of the Department of Visayas, came on board with 6 soldiers and 5 native scouts and 2 prisoners. Capt. L. W. Cornish, Ninth Cavalry, U. S. Army, came on board for passage to Cebu. Left Catbalogan at 2 p. m. for Malibago, Leyte, arriving 5.15 p. m. Sent an armed crew ashore with Major Glenn and Captain Cornish, who arrested and brought on board an insurgent agent with spear. The commanding officer took sick.

October 19, 1901, left Santa Rita at 7.30 a. m. and stood into Babatungan, Leyte, overhauling en route a banca, cleared from Iloilo for Tacloban. Sent ashore with Major Glenn and Captain Cornish a landing party in charge of Cadet Hellweg. Arrested and brought on board the presidente and 5 men, with a small quantity of hemp. Left Babatungan at 3.50 p. m.; hove to and overhauled a lorch, cleared from Cebu, with 750 sacks of rice for Tacloban. Bad weather setting in, stood for and anchored in Buad Channel for the night.

October 20, 1901, left anchorage at 5 a. m. and stood over to Biliran Island, where armed landing party landed at various places, with Major Glenn and Captain Cornish, and made the following arrests and captures all—insurgent agents: At Caibiran, chief of Police, Manuel Catalan, and Estavan Matuguinas, a murderer, and the presidente of Culaba, Corvacio Abanido; at Mapuya, Teniente Pio Herras; at Cauayan, Teniente Andres Bemadas; at Almeria, Presidente Catalino Edicto; at Naval, Baldomero Sangon and M. Caneja, with a large sum of Filipino funds. Anchored off Naval for the night.

October 21, 1901, at Biliran arrested ex-Presidente Manuel Nerras, with funds and documents. At Cabudgayan arrested Teniente Luciano Ulidan, with funds. At 11.10 anchored off Carigara, Leyte, and turned prisoners and funds over to the U. S. Army authorities. The prisoner captured at Malibago was turned over to the authorities at Santa Rita on the 19th, while the 2 prisoners taken on board at Catbalogan were kept on board and taken to Cebu to give testimony.

Besides the above 5 revolvers and about 200 rounds of ammunition and 3 bolos were captured.

The funds, cash and certificates of deposit, captured amounted to over \$200,000 Mexican.

October 22, 1901, left Carigara at 3.30 p. m. for Cebu, arriving at 7 a. m., finding the *Isla de Cuba* and *Panay* at anchor. The commanding officer, in order to have proper medical attendance, was sent aboard the *Cuba* at 10 p. m. General J. H. Smith and aid came on board at 10 p. m. for passage to Catbalogan. Left Cebu at 10.45 p. m. for Catbalogan.

October 23, 1901, arrived at Catbalogan at 12 m., finding the U. S. flagship *New York* and *Iris* at anchor.

October 24, 1901, left Catbalogan with General Smith and two aids on board at 5.30 a. m. for Tacloban, arriving at 10.40 a. m., the General and aids leaving the ship. The *Frolic* arrived at 1 p. m. Left Tacloban at 2.30 p. m. with one of General Smith's aids on board for passage to Catbalogan; anchored in Buad Channel for the night, arriving at Catbalogan at 7.30 a. m. the following morning. While in Buad Channel sent out an armed boat crew in charge of Cadet Hellweg, destroyed three barotos and captured a native making for the Samar coast in a baroto.

October 25, 1901, turned native prisoner over to military authorities at Catbalogan. Have since learned that he was shot and killed in making a second attempt to escape. By order of the senior officer present, Naval Cadet B. T. Bulmer reported on board for temporary duty. Upon request of Major Glenn to make a number of arrests in the vicinity of Buad, took on board one soldier and two native scouts and visited the following places: Zumarraga, arrested Tio Pindon (Pinduco); Mualbual, arrested Teniente Tio (Boco). The place had been destroyed by fire some time previous by a gunb at.

October 26, 1901, Talalora had been destroyed by fire, but was being rebuilt. Burned 5 nipa huts and destroyed 3 barotos. Landed at Daram and found the town destroyed and the women, who were living in small huts, in starving condition. Turned the two prisoners over to military authorities of Catbalogan. In obedience to order of senior squadron commander commanding Southern Squadron, left Catbalogan at about 5.30 p. m. to report to Commander E. B. Barry, U. S. S. *Vicksburg*, at Tacloban. Anchored off Aokon Island for the night.

October 27, 1901, arrived at Tacloban at 8.15 a. m. and sighted the *Mariveles* coming in with colors half-masted. When within hail the commanding officer reported that he had on board the body of Naval Cadet Noa, who had been bolooed and shot by the insurgents near Nipa-nipa, at 5 p. m., October 26, in landing while out in a banca preventing smuggling, and requested that I telegraph the senior officer at Catbalogan that he was enroute for that place. Telegraphing to the senior officer, took on board a sergeant and 25 soldiers and left to destroy Nipa-nipa and neighboring barrios. Near Nipa-nipa a crowd of about 30 bolomen was seen in the rocks. Two volleys of ship guns and all rifles on board were fired at them without any apparent effect, as the rocks offered exceedingly good hiding places. Landed soldiers and two armed crews under Cadet Hellweg, without resistance. The town had been destroyed by the army some time previous. For a distance of about a mile along the beach all the huts, from 25 to 30, and 4 barotos were destroyed; 3 bolos, a spear, and a small quantity of lead were taken. Returned to Tacloban and disembarked the soldiers at 7.30 p. m. The pilot who was sent aboard by the captain of the port was worthless and tried to mislead. Matters were reported at Tacloban and the pilot placed under arrest by the captain of the port.

October 28, 1901, went alongside dock and took on board 24 tons 1,640 pounds of army coal. Left Tacloban at 1 p. m. with stores for Basey, where Major Waller, U. S. Marine Corps, came on board for passage to Balangiga. When off Capines Point sighted a baroto with two men in it making for the shore. Landed an armed party under Hellweg to destroy baroto and neighboring huts. In landing, the two men tried to escape; one was shot, and the other, who was captured with a bolo, has since given such valuable information about the insurgents near Lipata that I am of the opinion that they were both coast guardsmen instead of fishermen, as the one claimed. From information gained from the prisoner there are 30 insurgents encamped in huts in the cemetery behind Lipata, armed with 2 revolvers, 1 rifle, and 27 bolos, and under the command of Teniente Bacarrio Mantillo, who has been collecting from the natives war contributions, compelling those who are unable to pay to build barotos. At this place 5 huts and 4 barotos were destroyed. Arrived at Balangiga and reported to the commanding officer U. S. S. *Vicksburg* at 6.30 p. m.

October 29, 1901, off Balangiga.

October 30, 1901, sent prisoner over to *Vicksburg* to be used by the marines as a guide in landing at Labuan and Lipata. At anchor off Balangiga.

October 31, 1901, at anchor off Balangiga.

Very respectfully,

C. H. FISCHER,

Ensign, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

The SENIOR OFFICER PRESENT,

United States Naval Force.

U. S. S. *VICKSBURG*, THIRD RATE,
Basey, Samar, P. I., November 7, 1901.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report in regard to the expedition of yesterday up the Sojoton River:

At 5.15 a. m. the first cutter, with an armed crew of 13 men and a coxswain, carrying a Colt gun in the bow, in charge of Lieutenant Butler; the whaleboat, with an armed crew of 6 men and a coxswain, in charge of Cadet Landenberger; and the steam launch, carrying a 1-pounder gun, an armed crew of 7 men, a coxswain, and 5 marines, Assistant Surgeon Ohnesorg, and myself left the *Vicksburg* for what is the easterly mouth of the Basey River, the steam launch towing the other boats. Arrived at the bar off the river mouth, the towed boats were cast off. A channel was sounded for without success, there being none by which the steam launch could enter at that stage of the tide.

Accordingly she proceeded to the marine cutter, which was sighted towing the bancas and flooring which serve as a platform for the marine 3-inch gun and towed them to the bar, again attempted to cross, but finally was compelled to withdraw, as the tide was ebbing. She was anchored off the bar in about 1 fathom of water, the 5 marines from the ship, Dr. Ohnesorg, and myself going to the first cutter. The

marine cutter towed the gun platform over the bar and was joined by the first cutter and whaleboat in the river mouth, and the three boats proceeded to tow the platform up the river.

Somewhat over a mile from the river mouth, at the junction of the western and eastern branches of the river, the boats were joined by a number of large barotos containing marines, all of which had come up by the westerly branch. The barotos were paddled by marines, with one or more Filipino paddlers, some of them prisoners, in each baroto. The barotos could proceed a little faster than the tow and formed a long column ahead. When the column had proceeded about 3 miles up the river some shots were fired apparently from the rear, though it was impossible to tell the direction with any accuracy, and the boats and barotos answered by a few shots fired in various directions at will.

Desultory firing continued as the column proceeded until, at a narrow bend of the river where a small branch empties into it from the east side, a bamboo gun was fired from the east bank at the baroto column and was apparently accompanied by a few Krag shots, though they were lost in the fusilade from the boats that immediately followed the report of the bamboo gun. Two marines were hit at this time, one being instantly killed, the other dying in the course of two or three hours. The tow was cast off except by the marine cutter, and the stopping of the paddling bunched the boats and barotos. The wounded man was brought to the gun platform, which served as a hospital, and the marine cutter went ahead with the platform.

On starting up again two bamboo guns were fired from a point on the bank down on the starboard quarter, and a fusilade from the boats followed; there were no casualties. The rifle in the hand of Boatswain's Mate (First Class) Schonberg, who was in the whaleboat, was hit, apparently by a Krag bullet, and one side of the barrel pierced, the stock being cut away. The first bamboo gun was captured, the others not.

The column proceeded slowly up the river, with occasional shots from the shore which did no damage, until a mound on the western bank was reached. A few Filipinos were reported as seen on this, but I did not see them. The ground was well swept with rifles and the Colt guns in the first cutter and the marine cutter, and a landing was effected without apparent opposition. The crest of the hill was occupied. It was practically the only clear ground that was seen on the river banks. At the base toward the river was a trench.

Dinner was eaten here, and in view of the impossibility of going farther and being able to get out of the river before night, the boats immediately afterwards started on the return trip, the first cutter leading, the barotos following, and the whaleboat and marine cutter bringing up in the rear towing the gun platform. A small force of marines was landed on the eastern bank to proceed downward, but their motion was slow and they were finally recalled. Proceeding down the river the banks were thoroughly felt with rifle shots from the leading boat and barotos, and commanding stretches with the first cutter's Colt gun. There was no opposition from the shore on the return trip that I know of, except that a bamboo gun was fired at the last boat from her port quarter. This was apparently one of the bamboo guns not captured on the trip up the river, and was probably in a trench behind the mangrove front on the river bank, as the fusilade which followed its discharge would have rendered its position untenable otherwise. The position had, moreover, been well searched in passing by the Colt gun on the first cutter, and by the leading barotos.

A couple of miles below this the column was met by the steam launch, which had passed over the bar as the tide rose. The first cutter was made fast astern of her, then the whaleboat, marine cutter, gun platform, and all the barotos in a long column. I transferred from the first cutter to the steam launch, and at bends where there was an opportunity to sweep the side of the river for a quarter of a mile or more the 1-pounder was used for that purpose, as well as at any visible places in the rear of the banks that might serve as shelter for the enemy.

As the column proceeded out of the river mouth, the barotos cast off and made their way to Basey, inside the Hinamoc Island. The steam launch with the remainder of the tow proceeded around the island and were about halfway from the island to the ship when word came from the rear asking the steam launch to slow down, which was done at once. Simultaneously looking back, it was seen that the gun platform had capsized, the two dead bodies which had been placed on it, the 3-inch gun, some rifles and ammunition, and the crew of the gun, in charge of Lieutenant Bootes, going with it.

The lines were all cast off, and Private Carroll, of this ship, then in the first cutter, dived under the platform, which still floated upside down, and recovered one of the dead bodies which was floating there. He also dived for the other body without success, and deserves credit for the zeal displayed when so many were shivering with cold from a drenching rain that all had passed through.

The capsizing was in about 28 feet of water, and as the platform was still fast to the gun by the breechings which had been placed to run the gun carriage out, and was apparently anchored there, an attempt was made to tow the platform by the steam launch. The towing proved successful and the platform was brought to the ship, where the gun, minus one wheel, was recovered and the platform righted. The 3-inch gun had been fired from the dinner position of the expedition up and down the river several times, but not during the passage of the boats up or down the river.

I have to report that the Lee gun failed frequently while attempting to load quickly, the cartridges jamming or not feeding. Probably half of the cartridges missed fire, and a number of them hung fire dangerously. The ammunition had been selected and had very good external appearance, being mostly of the Union Metallic Cartridge Company. The Winchester ammunition, much of which had been culled over on board ship for appearance of deterioration and from which many cartridges had been thrown out, gave better results in the Colt gun than the Union Metallic Cartridge Company's ammunition.

The absolute lack of faith of the ship's officers and crew in the Lee guns is a demoralizing element that might show itself in a call for volunteers for a desperate enterprise, and in order that the service may not be placed at a disadvantage in the joint expeditions that will continue, in all probability, in this locality, I think that every endeavor should be made to replace them on this ship with Krag-Jørgensen guns and new ammunition.

The marines other than the five from the ship were from Basey and were about 100 in number, all under the command of Major Waller, who was accompanied by Captain Bears, Captain Dunlap, Lieutenant Day, Lieutenant Williams, and Lieutenant Bootes, all of the Marine Corps. There was excellent morale throughout the entire force, and cordial cooperation from beginning to end.

Very respectfully,

J. H. GLENNON,

Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. Navy, Executive Officer.

The COMMANDING OFFICER.

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT OF SOUTH SAMAR,
FIRST DISTRICT OF THE VISAYAS,
Basey, Samar, P. I., October 27, 1901.

SIR: 1. In obedience to your verbal instructions, I have to report that on the 28th instant I took command of the substation of South Samar, first district of the Visayas, beginning with Basey and running east and south, including Balangiga, relieving Captains Bookmiller and Blatchford at the above-mentioned points in the order named. My headquarters were established, at your suggestion, at Basey.

2. This post I occupied with 158 men, one 3-inch rifle, and a Colt 6-millimeter automatic gun. Balangiga was occupied the same day by Capt. D. D. Porter, U. S. Marine Corps, with 159 men. The shelling of the insurgent trenches by the *Frolic* and *Vicksburg* was witnessed by the brigadier-general commanding the first district, Department of the Visayas. Returning from Balangiga, I sent an expedition to San Antonio, south of Basey, acting upon the information given me by Captain Bookmiller. Some bolomen fled at the approach of the party. Only two were captured. There were about 20 in all. The barrio was destroyed because of the smuggling of rice to the insurgents. Oath was administered to 48 men.

3. Francisco Laguilla presented himself, stating that he had been captured two months ago and made to work for the insurgents; that he had escaped from them in the Sojoton Mountains, about 15 miles up the Cabacan or Sojoton River. He reported this force to be 200 strong and having 2 rifles and many bamboo cannon. This statement was to some extent corroborated by a man from San Antonio, although he gave a different name to the locality, and placing the position of the enemy at the overhanging rocks about 13 miles up the same river—Cabacan. I also received information that a large force of bolomen had approached this town last night, but hearing of the strength of the force and the presence of 2 guns, they fell back to the River Cabacan.

4. An expedition was sent out this morning from Balangiga to Quinapundan, the result of which I have not yet heard. On the night of the 26th the telephone wire was cut at a point between Basey and San Antonio, about 2½ miles from this point. A quarter of a mile of wire was taken away and the insulators broken. This damage was repaired to-day.

5. This morning a small expedition went to Gibasey and destroyed that village. These people have been giving information to the insurgents. The presidente of the

barrio, Serrafio Eleano, already under suspicion by Captain Bookmiller, was in and out of Basey twice yesterday without reporting or getting permission to go or come. He again arrived in town this morning, was unsatisfactory in his answers, and denied knowledge of the presence of the insurgents in his barrio or neighborhood. I have positive knowledge that they were present there on the 25th instant, but went back to the Sojoton Mountains, where they are in force about, estimated, 400, with 2 rifles and many bamboo cannon.

6. It was my intention to go toward Nipa-nipa, searching for a supposed powder supply, to-day, but a gunboat appears to be working in that direction now. I shall push in toward the Sojoton Mountains and attempt to dislodge the enemy from the overhanging rocks and drive him from his stronghold.

7. The position is reported as practically impregnable. I believe I can dislodge them with shrapnel. Shall therefore try a gun platform of bamboo and boards which, I believe, can be made sufficiently stable, of very little draft, and easily managed. A steam launch would be most useful on this expedition.

Very respectfully,

LITTLETON W. T. WALLER,
Major, U. S. Marine Corps, Commanding.

The BRIGADIER-GENERAL COMMANDING FIRST DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT OF SAMAR,
FIRST DISTRICT OF THE VISAYAS,
Basey, Samar, P. I., October 31, 1901.

SIR: 1. I have to make a further or supplementary weekly report on the operations near Balangiga.

2. On the 26th an expedition was sent to the trenches previously occupied by the insurgents. The troops found them empty, but they destroyed the houses on the way up. Three bolomen were killed, and about 3,000 pounds of rice which was stored in a shack near by was destroyed. It was impossible to capture natives. Some equipments of the Ninth Infantry were found in the trenches. On the 28th a party was sent to the eastward and destroyed the small village on the Paglaloanan point. On the 30th I went to Balangiga on the *Villalobos*, and on the way down we destroyed two villages, killing one man and capturing another. The latter reported that he was a coast guard, ordered to report the approach of gunboats to the teniente commanding the town of Alabas, on Point Capines. He also stated that there were 30 insurrecto soldiers stationed there. These men are armed with one Krag, two revolvers, and bolos, or short, heavy daggers, as he described them. The rifles were captured from a soldier of the Ninth Infantry, who was taken in August(?) last on the island near Basey, either Hinamoc or Isla de Dios. The man was sent as a prisoner to Lucban, and is now a prisoner at Ciento; meaning by this, I think, the headquarters of Lucban, who is now near the Gandara River.

3. On the 29th, carrying out the general's instructions, I took a party to Quinapundan. Guided by Captain Yost, A. M. C., the detachment went to the mouth of the river on the U. S. S. *Vicksburg* and landed. The landing was opposed from trenches on the hill opposite the landing. I should say that three rifles were used—there may have been more, but I should say three, judging from the fire which was delivered—fast at first, and then intermitting fire, finally only one rifle firing. Captain Porter, with a few men, rushed the hill, and the enemy retreated, leaving some Krag shells. The detachment then proceeded to Quinapundan. On the way a Krag bayonet, bright and clean, was picked up. It had been hit by a bullet and the guard bent so as to be useless for firing. One native was killed on this expedition. Quinapundan had not been occupied since its destruction, and no crops of any kind were in the ground. We returned by the same route and found the boats engaged with the enemy at the same point as the morning rifle.

4. The town near the river mouth was destroyed by the *Vicksburg*. On the 30th I took a detachment to Lauaan to look for the powder factory reported to me to be in the neighborhood, but, being unsuccessful, I proceeded to Bulasao, about 3 miles west. The town was partially fired by insurrectos, and I did the rest, destroying 23 houses.

5. Upon embarking we were fired upon from the crest of the hill near by, also from thicket from the beach. We attempted to surround and cut off the enemy, but they escaped. I should say that not more than three rifles were used here, all Krags. The fire was exceedingly good, although we had no casualties. It was too late to attempt to reach Alabas, so we returned to Balangiga.

6. The situation there is such as to demand an immediate change in the camp, or else it will be washed away. I require cement and nipa to put up new barracks for the men. I purpose to utilize the church and other stone buildings. About 18,000 bundles of nipa are required and about 40 men. It is impossible to impress natives, therefore I should like to be authorized to employ natives here and send them down. This can be done at the rate of a half peso per diem, but we will have to feed them. I wish to clear the place as far as possible, and get the men into better and stronger position.

7. My reports show that the people driven from the towns are falling back on the Sojoton district. I shall attack this country as soon as I can get a good platform made for my 3-inch gun, which is needed for the purpose of shelling the enemy out of the overhanging cliffs, at a point about 15 miles from here.

8. I reached Basey this morning, and this afternoon went to the hill overlooking the town and instituted the work of clearing away the undergrowth and trees from around the old stone fort on top. I shall occupy this as a signal station and outpost. Ten good men with rifles could do terrible execution with the troops in this town, as the fort commands the whole town, especially the barracks or men's quarters.

9. A prisoner reports that the people from Balangiga are encamped on the river, about five hours away—say 7 miles; that they have 20 rifles. I sent a party out there to-day, but have no report of the result as yet. A small scouting party was sent over the trail toward Santa Rita on the 30th. They found the trail good, killed one boloman, and returned.

As soon as this coast is cleared a little more I purpose to go to Pambujan with 150 men, and, if possible, drive the enemy from his position near there. The *Vicksburg* will shell, and we storm, the position. I believe it will then be possible to move entirely across the island between Basey and Lanang. Having a chain of posts along this line would cut off the southern end of the island entirely. The Cabacan River, freed from the enemy, would make an excellent waterway by which to move troops. I should require more men, however, to garrison these points and to move about at the same time.

10. The general desires me to work up toward and connect with the garrison at Pambujan. I feel that to move quickly and attack with fresh men from the *Vicksburg* would be better than attacking with tired troops, impeded by rations, etc., over the trail from Balangiga via Quinapundan.

Mules or horses and carts are needed at Balangiga for the work there, and may be used on many of the trails as pack animals. The proposition of a gun platform for the attack on the Sojoton district is difficult, but I believe I can overcome it. I shall try, at any rate.

11. To-morrow I send a detachment to Santa Elena, halfway between this point and Santa Rita. The next day I shall clear up the coast from the mouth of the Cabacan toward Point Capines and finally take Alabas. This point being about halfway between Basey and Balangiga, it may be necessary to garrison with a small force.

Very respectfully,

LITTLETON W. T. WALLER,
Major, U. S. Marine Corps, Commanding.

The BRIGADIER-GENERAL COMMANDING FIRST DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT OF SAMAR,
SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Basey, Samar, P. I., November 12, 1901.

SIR: 1. I have the honor to submit the following report of work in my district from November 1. Sent an expedition to Santa Elena, which found the town deserted. The secretario appeared and asked permission to return; not being in my district, I did not grant it. Also on 1st sent and went with an expedition to destroy all towns between Cadacan River and Punta Capines. This we did and returned on the afternoon of the 2d. On the 4th sent an expedition to go into the different streams north of the town and destroy all bancas and barotos, and burn any out-lying houses that may have escaped before. On the 5th sent a scouting party up the river Cadacan; at a point about 7 miles up they were fired upon with rifles and bamboo cannon (lantacas). They drove the enemy off, killing 6, capturing a lantaca. On the 6th I took an expedition consisting of 100 men, 1 Colt gun, and one 3-inch rifle, joined by two boats from the *Vicksburg* with a Colt gun. The tide made badly and

we were obliged to pull the distance, towing the float with the 3-inch. At a point about 8 miles up the river the boats were opened on from both banks with rifles and lantacas. We had 2 men killed, drove off the enemy, and captured lantacas. Proceeded farther up the river, landed to rest men and give them dinner. The *Vicksburg's* boats having to return, and having lost so much time in morning, I deemed it advisable to return also. After leaving the river, and when approaching the *Vicksburg*, a cross sea was developed which caused the float to yaw; she shipped several seas and suddenly sank, turning over. The men were saved and the 3-inch gun recovered, but with one wheel off. Fifteen rifles were lost, but I do not think there is any chance of these being recovered by the enemy, as there was about 35 feet of water where the accident occurred and these people are not good divers. I am sorry to say we lost the body of Private Lynch.

2. On the 7th a party went out from Balangiga, scouting to the northward, and discovered an intrenchment with 30 rifles. The insurgents fell back, but the party was too small to follow, being only 20. They got shells and ammunition, all Krag's.

3. On the 8th sent a party to Eba to destroy it and kill or capture all men. They destroyed 40 houses, 3 carabaos, about one-half ton of hemp, killed 9 men, captured 11. One of the captured men admitted that they were insurrectos, and stated that he had been fighting against us on the 6th; that we had killed 20 that he knew of.

4. On the 9th sent a party across the Cadacan River to follow the trails and destroy all houses. They destroyed 55 houses and killed 2 carabaos. Another party, on the 10th, destroyed 40 houses and 3 carabaos. Captain Porter took out an expedition and worked around his place for three days. He found strong intrenchments everywhere, and many relics of the Ninth Infantry. He destroyed 100 shacks, killed 1 man, and captured 7. The behavior of the seven is rather significant. The party had crept up to and surrounded a house when a man jumped out, fired wildly with his rifle, jumped down a short bluff and escaped, although pursued and fired on. The 7 men captured had their wives and children with them, and these they tried several times to kill. The house contained many little things that had belonged to the Ninth Infantry.

Résumé of the happenings: Two hundred and fifty-five houses burned, 39 men killed, 18 men captured, 17 bolos captured, 1 ton hemp and one-half ton rice destroyed, 13 carabaos killed, 50 bancas destroyed (approximately).

Very respectfully,

LITTLETON W. T. WALLER,
Major, U. S. Marine Corps, Commanding.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL, SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

BASEY, SAMAR, November 5, 1901.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I propose to leave early in the morning for the Sojoton with about 130 men, one 3-inch rifle, one 1-pounder, and two Colt automatics. If circumstances permit I shall leave a garrison on or near the overhanging bluffs, then return, go to Balangiga and get a column through from that direction. About the 17th I propose joining Captain Barry in an attack on Omagongong, near Pambujan. I think three columns moving from different directions and arriving at about the same time will jar the natives somewhat.

I sent a party of 10 up the river this morning; they went about 7 miles; were fired on from different points by Krag and bamboo guns. They got one of the bamboo guns, but no Krag. No casualties on our side; a bullet through a hat was the nearest.

If these plans suit you I shall endeavor to carry them out, also to carry out the instructions already given by the general.

Very respectfully,

LITTLETON W. T. WALLER, *Major.*

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT OF SAMAR, SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Basey, Samar, P. I., November 23, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: On the 15th instant I started a second column to operate with the first in the Sojoton region. The second column went by boat to Odoc, there landed and proceeded by trail to Liruan, joining the first column under Captain Porter. On the 16th I went with the boats and stores to Liruan, having previously given orders to

the first and second columns to unite on the 16th, and to proceed to the neighborhood of the enemy's strongholds in the Sojoton, where I would join them with the third column, and together we would force the position by operating from river and banks. On the march to Liruan the second column, 50 men under Captain Bearss, in accordance with my orders, destroyed all villages and houses, burning in all 165. The plans worked well until the evening of the 16th, when we reached the overhanging cliffs in the Sojoton, known to be fortified in every way and held as a last rallying point. We were able to communicate with the flanking column at that time, about 200 feet directly above us, although not in sight. Through a misunderstanding the river column halted and camped for the night, under the impression that the word from the flanking column reported it impossible to move the boats except to destruction. On the 17th shore column struck the enemy's trail on the left bank of the river, and saw from the traps, bows, spears, etc., that it led to one of their camps, followed the trail and came upon a number of bamboo guns. One of these commanding the trail had its fuse burning. Acting Corpl. Harry Glenn, U. S. Marine Corps, rushed forward and pulled out the fuse. Coming over the crest of the cliffs, the column rushed the enemy's cuartel, finding them empty; food was cooking, and everything showed that the enemy had just left. The column passed on to a higher cliff and discovered two camps on the opposite side of the river, which at this point is about 150 feet wide. The camps were about 150 yards distant, with their people at work preparing food, cutting bamboo, and variously employed. Captain Porter brought up his men and a Colt gun, which was carried by native carriers. The preparations took about ten minutes, signal was given, and fire opened from the Colt gun and the men already stationed. The enemy was completely routed, about 30 killed. The troops destroyed the cuartel and food, went down the cliffs, and by means of two very small bancas and a raft crossed the river. Scaled the cliffs on the opposite side, destroyed the camps there, and scaling other cliffs on the right side, by means of the bamboo ladders which the enemy had not taken time to destroy, found another camp, which they also destroyed. The enemy fired two volleys from seven rifles and then fled. The men in this march have overcome incredible difficulties and dangers. The positions they destroyed must have taken several years to prepare. Reports from old prisoners state that they have been three years working on the defenses. No white troops have ever penetrated these positions before, and they were held as a final rallying point. In addition to the spears and traps there were innumerable rifle pits and many bamboo guns. The cliffs over the river are honeycombed with caves. These caves are reached by bamboo ladders, also by ledges of rock with bamboo hand rails. Tons of rock were suspended in cages held in position by vines, and in readiness to be precipitated on people and boats below. Instant destruction would have been the fate of the boats had they attempted the passage of the river until after the cliffs had been taken.

The cliffs were of soft stone of volcanic origin, the nature of pumice. It cut the men's shoes to pieces; many of the men were barefooted, and all had bad feet. The march was heroic, and too much praise can not be given the men. We in the boats were not ten minutes away in point of distance, but unable to reach the flanking column at this point. Two attempts were made, but boats struck. The troops captured and destroyed 40 bamboo guns, rice, food, and cuartel.

It was impossible to follow the enemy farther, as rations gave out and it became necessary to return, which we did, arriving on the 19th, in the afternoon.

I wish to recommend especially Capts. D. D. Porter and H. I. Bearss either a medal of honor or brevet. These officers carried out their instructions in the face of hardships, dangers, and incredible obstacles. Not only was personal courage of a high order displayed, but intelligence, determination, and zeal. Each footstep in the advance up the cliffs carried its own dangers. These captains report to me, and I in turn cordially indorse their recommendations of First Lieuts. C. C. Carpenter and H. R. Lay, and Second Lieut. A. C. Rogers. Where all did so well it seems almost impossible to distinguish extraordinary service. Each one carried his life in his hands. Asst. Surg. J. M. Brister, U. S. Navy, is especially recommended by Captain Porter for his work and assistance. Gunnery Sergt. J. M. Quick and Acting Corpl. Harry Glenn, of Company H, are especially mentioned, the first for conspicuous conduct, Glenn risking his life to pull out the fuse of the bamboo gun. Sergeant Quick now holds a medal of honor for Guantanamo. I do not believe there is anything too good for him. Corpl. Robert Lakaye, of Company D, for swimming the river unarmed in the presence of the enemy to secure bancas. First Sergeant Grogan, of Company F, is especially recommended by Captain Porter for his great zeal and for constantly encouraging the men under the most adverse and trying circumstances. Private Campbell is mentioned for his conspicuous work with the Colt gun under extreme difficulty. For the river column I can only say that they tried to be in, but could not get there. It is my opinion, and in this I am supported by the opinions of

all the officers, that the presence of the boats in the river made it possible for the flanking column to reach the camp and surprise the enemy.

The result of the work is that years of labor has been destroyed by us. We have proved to them that their impregnable places may be taken. We have swept away a stronghold held for the last rally.

As soon as the men are in a fit condition to move I shall establish a camp and again work up both sides of the river, striking a trail that I know to exist and which will lead us to the east coast near Hernani. First, however, I wish to work southward a little, destroying all houses and crops, and if possible get the rifles from Balangiga. This plan has been explained to the general, meeting with his approval. The men are picking up fast and will be ready in two or three days for more extended operations.

A steam launch would be of great use to me in sending up stores to the working column.

I hold 20 of the lantacas or bamboo guns; the others were destroyed. Forty in all were captured, all loaded but one.

Very respectfully,

L. W. T. WALLER,

Major, U. S. Marine Corps, Commanding.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, November 29, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Division of the Philippines.

This operation was made under my directions, as one of other movements on the north and west coasts of Samar, with disposition of troops on east coast to prevent escape of the enemy, and the demonstration mentioned in the latter part of report is still part of my general plan of operations, going on over the whole of Samar. Reports of said operations will soon follow.

Maj. L. W. T. Waller, U. S. Marine Corps, now brevet lieutenant-colonel, has proven himself to be an officer of exceptional merit and carries out my wishes and instructions loyally and gallantly. He deserves another brevet for his services thus far, and I urge this recognition; also a general order from division commander congratulating him and the Marine Corps of this command.

I concur in his recommendations of the following officers and men:

For brevets of major, U. S. Marine Corps—Capt. D. D. Porter, Capt. H. I. Bearss. Highly commended—First Lieut. C. C. Carpenter, U. S. Marine Corps, First Lieut. H. R. Lay, Second Lieut. A. C. Rogers. Brevet of one grade—Asst. Surg. J. M. Brister, U. S. Navy. Certificate of merit—Gunnery Sergt. J. M. Quick. Medals of honor—Corpl. Robert Lakaye, Company D, U. S. Marine Corps, Acting Corpl. Harry Glenn, Company H, U. S. Marine Corps—Highly commended—First Sergeant Grogan, Company F, U. S. Marine Corps, Private Campbell.

J. H. SMITH,

Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., December 9, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army, inviting attention to the within report and the remarks of the brigade commander as contained in the first indorsement hereon. The work of the marines in southern Samar has been gratifying, and they have accomplished much good in the short time they have been there. I recommend such action be taken as may be deemed appropriate and proper under the circumstances.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., December 9, 1901.

Official copy respectfully furnished Rear-Admiral Frederick Rodgers, U. S. Navy, senior squadron commander, flagship *New York*, Cavite, P. I.

It is with much pleasure I forward you a copy of the report on the splendid work accomplished by the battalion of marines stationed in southern Samar, the original of which I have caused to be forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army at

Washington for such action by the authorities as may be deemed proper and appropriate.

In this connection your attention is respectfully invited to my telegram of November 30 sent to Major Waller, a copy of which was forwarded to you on the same date.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,
Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS, SUBDISTRICT SOUTH SAMAR,
Basey, Samar, December 1, 1901.

SIR: 1. On November 23, having been informed of the presence at or about Eba of many ladrones, I sent Lieutenant Gridley with 20 men to clear them out. He reported having done so, killing two, one of them armed with the "snake kris," the first I have seen here.

On the 25th the expedition into the Sojoton district failed by reason of the swamping of three boats and the inability of the *Florida* to pass the bar at the mouth of the river. This expedition got away in small boats and bancas on the morning of the 27th, established a supply camp about 8 miles up the Cadacan River and about 2 miles from the scene of the last engagement with the enemy. Two columns were sent out by the banks of the river to meet a third proceeding by boat, at a point about 200 yards from the junction of the Cadacan and Sojoton rivers. The left column, under Captain Dunlap, met the river column, under my immediate command, at the point and about the time designated, but the column under Captain Porter, on the right bank, did not appear. Carrying Captain Dunlap's men to the right bank of the river, I directed him to proceed up this bank until he reached the junction of the two rivers, select a strong position, and camp. I left a Colt gun with him and returned to the supply camp for one day's rations for him, informing him that I would meet him at the same spot in the early morning.

Captain Dunlap pushed up the right bank of the river to the Sojoton River, then up the right bank of that river for a short distance, descended the bank, forded the river, and took up a trail that led him to the camp and powder mills of the insurgents. Here he found powder mills, bamboo guns, tools, bolos, and spear heads in all stages of construction, scrap iron from which the projectiles for the guns were made, and hammers for beating them out; also a small brass cannon. This, or a similar gun, was reported to have been used during the last engagement. There were footprints of American shoes in the soft clay near the cuartels. There were kerosene cans, lamps, two American spades, empty sliced-ham tins, and others such as are used in our commissary department. The camp had been hurriedly abandoned, but all papers were taken. We could find no trace of the direction of the flight of the different encampments. The Sojoton River is not navigable at this time for boats, except very small bancas, above the encampment of Juan Colinares. My boats grounded about 200 yards from the mouth of the Sojoton. We destroyed the powder, powder mills, 27 bamboo guns, tools, sulphur, etc. This column I sent back to the camp. They could find no trace of the insurgents to the north.

Returning by the river, I found the column under Captain Porter trying to make its way up the right bank. He had lost his trail the morning before and had proceeded as far in a north and easterly direction as Mount Sojoton, or about 7 miles beyond the appointed rendezvous. He could find no trails except such as had been probably used for timber. He struck the Sojoton River and followed it back along the south bank. Some distance from Mount Sojoton and to the south and east a well-defined trail, one that had not been recently used, but had existed for years, ran to the east and north. This leads me to believe that this column did not reach Mount Sojoton but did reach Mount Asgad, and the trail reaches eastwardly until it strikes the Suribao or the Lanang rivers, emptying on the east coast. The different maps do not agree in the location of these two rivers, although, there would seem to be no reason why the points where they empty on the east coast should not be accurately located.

This column came upon large cuartels, finished and unfinished, but which looked as though they had not been occupied for some time—many days. Captain Porter describes the Sojoton River at the upper part as disappearing into gravel and earth and appearing again a hundred feet below. Another stream flowing into the Sojoton from the east and having its source in the Loog Mountains, I think, has a fall of considerable volume, falling clear and vertically about 90 feet. This column turned back at a point about 2 miles from the position captured by us on the 17th and again attempted to make its way up the cliffs on the right side of the river. At this point I met them and receiving their report directed them to return to the supply camp.

My own expedition passed up the river and communicated easily with the left column; proceeded up the Sojoton as far as possible for the boats to go, or about 300 yards.

Leaving the boats under guard and guided by Captain Dunlap, who had come down to meet me, went to the camp of Juan Colinares, before mentioned.

I forgot to mention that on the 27th a banca containing 3 men attempted to cross the river above the supply camp. They were fired on and jumped or fell overboard. Two reached the bank and the other was never seen. There was blood in the boat, some papers, apparently registers of births and deaths, a cane with a brass head and a cross carved on the wood—such a cane as the *padres* use. There were also an American spade, cartridge shells, including a Hotchkiss 1-pounder case, and the uniform of an insurgent officer—I mean a coat with four pockets and a pleat or band around the waist similar to those worn by insurgent officers in the provinces of Cavite and Zambales, Luzon.

I left Captain Porter in the supply camp and returned with Captain Dunlap to Basey. Captain Porter returned to-day and reports that 2 more boats, containing 3 men each, attempted to cross the river above the camp.

I think I may say the river is clear for about 15 miles and as far as navigable. The insurgent forces in this, to them, "District of Basey and Santa Rita," are without organization and are seeking food and shelter in the swamps and jungle of the surrounding country, either in very small bands of 2 or 3, or alone. Many people present themselves for permission to live in the town. They report that they are afraid of the *ladrones*. I have turned away most of these people.

My impression is that the force of about 350 men, located in several different camps, have been so punished by the repeated hammerings and by the capture of their stronghold that they have scattered and fled, a disorganized crew. Some I believe to have gone toward Santa Rita and others toward Nipa-nipa. I propose to follow both with small columns. I shall march to Balangiga and then operate to the north and east.

This, of course, is if the plan suits the commanding-general, having in view the policy and plans so clearly outlined by him to me.

Very respectfully,

LITTLETON W. T. WALLER,
Major, U. S. Marines, Commanding.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

[Copy of cablegram.]

MANILA, January 28, 1902—8.30 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington:*

Major Waller, 4 officers and 50 men of the Marine Corps, 36 native bearers, four days' rations, started last week of December from Lanang, on the east coast of Samar, to cross the island to Basey, about 35 miles on map. Trail at one time existed, but found in places only. Lieutenant Lyles, Twelfth U. S. Infantry, accompanied the command. Incessant rains from the start, swollen streams, and other natural obstacles made progress extremely slow. When rations consumed, men exhausted rapidly, dropping on the way. Major Waller separated from Captain Porter, Lieutenant Williams and major part of the men proceeding toward Basey, where he arrived January 9 with 2 officers, 13 men, also Lieutenant Lyles. He returned to the mountains next day with relief, but returned to Basey about ten days later unsuccessful. Porter was to build rafts, but timber would not float. Second day after separating from Waller Porter moved toward Lanang, arriving January 11 with 2 men, all exhausted physically and mentally. Lieutenant Williams and over 30 men left in mountains in similar condition with native bearers. Relief expedition under Lieutenant Williams, First Infantry, delayed starting two days by storm raging and torrent river. Started 13th, reached marines 18th, saving Lieutenant Williams and all except 10 men not found, who are no doubt dead from starvation, namely: Privates Sanjule, G. N. Foster, Thomas Brett, J. Woods, F. F. Brown, T. Murray, M. Bassett, L. A. Bailey, J. Baroni, P. J. Connell. R. Kittle died hospital, Tacloban, January 23. Captain Porter, Lieutenant Williams, and 18 men hospital, Tacloban, not very clear in mind regarding much of the time covered by period of suffering. All will probably recover. Major Waller at present disordered in his recollections. Suffering of this command twenty days can not be described. Efforts of Lieutenant Williams, First Infantry, and his relief party unequalled for courage and labor.

CHAFFEE.

LANANG, SAMAR, P. I., *January 19, 1902.*

The COMMANDING OFFICER, *Lanang, Samar, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the relief party to the rescue of a detachment of United States marines, consisting of 1 officer and 30 enlisted men, reported lost in the mountains of the island of Samar.

The expedition was undertaken in compliance with verbal orders commanding officer, *Lanang, Samar, P. I.*, of January 11, 1902. The party consisted of 1 corporal, 1 lance corporal, 8 privates Company K, First Infantry, 1 private Hospital Corps, U. S. Army, and 30 native laborers. The men carried shelter tents, ponchos, and 100 rounds of ammunition and 300 rations of hard bread, bacon, and coffee. The transportation consisted of 7 small native boats, the best that could be procured at this station. The party embarked at 4.30 a. m. of the 12th instant, and upon the attempt to proceed up the Lanang River it was immediately discovered that all the boats were being carried out into the ocean by the strong current, owing to the seven days' previous downpour of rain.

The party was compelled to wait until the 14th instant, when another attempt was made, encountering great difficulties and endangering the lives of the men of the detachment at every moment. The expedition reached the barrio of Cantunco, where camp was made on the mountain side and under the continuous downpour of rain. It was found on the following morning that the river had raised more than 15 feet during the night, and we were unable to leave that point until the morning of the 16th instant. At an early hour we embarked, and with great difficulty reached the barrio of Aras-as and made camp for the night. On the following morning we found that another rise in the river had occurred, and the day was spent in preventing the boats from leaving camp and floating down the rapid stream. On the morning of the 18th instant we proceeded up the river and found the current exceedingly rapid, and the boats with their contents were frequently overturned and washed down the stream for a distance of 200 or 300 yards, but were recovered, and further effort was made to push on into the interior to rescue the stranded party. About 9.30 a. m. the party, while encountering difficulties in the stream, were fired upon by the insurgents from the mountain side, but fortunately the 11 shots did no damage. The expedition pushed on up the river and found 10 of the half-starved marines, without shoes, shirts, or trousers enough to cover their privates, and 8 of the number, unable to walk, were lying on the ground under a heavy rainfall, delirious with fevers, etc., the result of exposure and the absence of food since the 1st of January.

After giving these men the medical attendance available, we left the boats at this point and hiked up the mountains, wading and swimming streams to the distance of about 1½ miles, and carried the officer and 14 enlisted men, who were on the verge of starvation and death, to the boats, and the entire party proceeded to Lanang. With the occasional overturning of boats, and with the assistance of the rapid current in proceeding downstream, we reached Lanang at dusk, where the men were carried to the hospital and placed under care of the post surgeon.

I submit the following recommendations for certificates of merit, and earnestly desire to see them awarded. It is a very little reward to give men for their devotion and fearless exposure of their lives in the saving of this stranded party.

Corpl. George M. Cross, Company K, First Infantry; Lance Corpl. Jesse K. Ellis, Company K, First Infantry. Privates—Frank A. Watson, Company K, First Infantry; Reuben Mott, Company K, First Infantry; Oliver Marks, Company K, First Infantry; Martin Donahue, Company K, First Infantry; Peter Moody, Company K, First Infantry; Albert Rose, Company K, First Infantry; Philip Maguire, Company K, First Infantry; George E. Riggs, Company K, First Infantry; William E. Bate-man, Hospital Corps, U. S. Army.

Each and every man above named is recommended for conspicuous gallantry shown when lives, boats, and cargo were in great danger of being washed down the river and the object of the relief party defeated. I also recommend the above-named men for faithful and meritorious service in rescuing and carrying the helpless and starving marines from the mountain range to the boats under exceedingly trying conditions.

KENNETH P. WILLIAMS,
Second Lieutenant, First Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE GARRISON OF BORONGAN, SAMAR, P. I., FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, 1901.

Troops composing garrison: Company C, First Infantry, and Company C, Seventh Infantry, since October 13, 1901. Number of expeditions against insurgents, 8; number of engagements, none; number of enemy killed, unknown; number of enemy wounded, unknown; number of enemy captured, 2; number of rifles captured, none; amount of stores captured, none. Many houses and much food products destroyed.

Garrison lost—killed, none; wounded, none.

Approximate summary of miles covered by detachments of the garrison in scouts and reconnoissances, 180.

Condition of affairs in vicinity of garrison: Arriving here October 13, began patrolling to discover conditions in surrounding district. Found many people living in surrounding barrios and single houses. These people were undoubtedly furnishing food to insurgents, in many cases, no doubt, under compulsion. Many of these people had passes and assurance of American protection, the same issued by former commanding officer, so I gave them permission to enter and live in town, provided they took the oath of allegiance and brought two months' supplies. They were given seven days to get in. Many came. At the end of the seven days all houses outside were burned and the surrounding country is being constantly patrolled, but no large bodies of insurgents have been discovered.

WILLIAM WALLACE,
Captain, Seventh Infantry, Commanding Post.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE GARRISON OF SULAT, SAMAR, P. I., FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, 1901.

Troops composing garrison, Company D, First Infantry; number of expeditions after insurgents, 7; number of engagements, 2; number of enemy killed, 30; number of enemy wounded, 2; number of enemy captured, 3.

Garrison lost—killed, none; wounded, none.

Approximate summary of miles covered by detachments of the garrison in scouts and reconnoissances, 156.

Condition of affairs in vicinity of garrison, hostile.

Remarks: Approximately 90 houses were burned and 25 carabaos were killed.

M. S. JARVIS,
Captain, First Infantry, Commanding Post.

PALAPAG, SAMAR, P. I., October 19, 1901.

The ADJUTANT, *Laguan, Samar.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

On October 16, at 6.30 a. m., I left Palapag with 23 men, Company B, First Infantry, going southwest to Jangtud (a barrio both of Laguan and Palapag), then southeast, east, and northeast, over and along the top of a high table mountain, following a stream most of the way, to barrio of Cansapot, of Palapag. Next day we went south to Malica, which I burned, and over another mountain of similar formation, it being almost level for about 6 miles, to the barrio of Nagbucoc (of Catubig), in which were people of Palapag, Laguan, and Catubig. On the 18th, northwest through barrios of Iraya, Guighaan (or Guigtraan), and Jangtud, of Laguan, then northeast to Palapag, arriving here at 3.30 p. m. Killed 1 native, wounded 3, captured 3; burned 62 houses and 25 bushels palay.

Very respectfully,

L. W. JORDAN, JR.,
First Lieutenant, First Infantry.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT OF LAGUAN,
Laguan, Samar, P. I., October 2, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, District of Samar, Tacloban.

It will be noted that Lieutenant Jordan has traversed the locality noted "Table Mountain," hitherto rumored to be a "stronghold." In my opinion, expeditions like that described will produce excellent results.

A. WILLIAMS,
Major, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding.

LAGUAN, SAMAR, October 31, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DISTRICT OF SAMAR,
Tacloban.

SIR: I have the honor to report that since my last arrival here (15th instant) I have visited Catubig and Palapag. An attempt was made to visit Pambujan, but was abandoned on account of an impending storm and the condition of the surf. Pambujan has since been communicated with by landing at the mouth of the Burabud River and proceeding by the coast road $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Owing to the prevailing rough seas the launch has been unable to proceed to Catarman, nor has the gunboat *Pampanga*, which arrived here on the 24th instant, been able to reach that place. Endeavors have been made to send communications to Catarman by the *Laoang* and the *Legaspi*, but I am not at all certain that landings have been made.

In accordance with instructions the distributions of troops based on Lagoon is: At Lagoon proper, one-half Company B, First Infantry (Lieutenant Dabney), and one-half Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry (Captain Kilburn); at Catubig, Company A, First Infantry (Captain Lacey, Lieutenant Miller); at Palapag, one-half Company B, First Infantry (Lieutenant Jordan); at Pambujan, one-half Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry (Lieutenant Parker).

Lagoon is rapidly increasing in population and houses are being rebuilt, about 6,000 people being on the island. In a few days the road on south coast of island (communicating with Pangpang, and thence to Palapag) will be cleared to a width of 8 feet. The coast road (Samar) between Lagoon and Pambujan has been thoroughly cleared for its entire width (20 feet), and if the bridges were restored it would be a good wagon road. These bridges could be repaired at comparatively small cost—a little skilled labor and some timber, principally flooring (about 150 yards in length needs flooring). This matter was brought to the attention of Captain McGregor, chief engineer of the department, at his last visit. The natives worked energetically for several days, as many as 450 being engaged. By crossing the narrow arm of the sea at Lagoon troops can now march dry shod to Pambujan. The people assembled here seem friendly and desirous of peace.

At Pambujan the people are returning and rebuilding houses. Lieutenant Dabney, First Infantry, lately relieved, reports that the presidente is quite energetic and evidently very desirous of pacification. About 600 are now in the town. The troops have been active in scouting and have made it uncomfortable for those who are "outside" (insurgents and insurgent sympathizers). The garrison will soon be comfortably sheltered within the walls of the burned church, and I believe will be secure from the possibility of sudden attack. The reopening of the coast road makes it possible to communicate with Lagoon independently of the precarious route by sea. It is hoped to repair and reopen this road before long to Mondragon and possibly to Catarman.

At Catubig there stands only the walls of the church, a few stone foundations, and the scattered posts of former dwellings. It is important that this town be restored as soon as possible. The Catubig Valley still contains much hidden palay, and many natives are scattered about in the hills. Reports are current that Luchan is not far distant and that insurgents are quite numerous "two or three days' journey" to the southward. Abukey is reported as being between the upper Catubig Valley and Oras. Captain Lacey is very energetic and is making effort to bring the peaceable people into the town and to clear the district of others. At present about 50 natives are collected. The site selected for barracks not being considered safe, attention has been given to sheltering the troops within the walls of the burned church, the only place that can be made secure. Captain Lacey has secured some wire which he is using to construct entanglements.

At Palapag matters are encouraging. The town, which is not on the ocean as indicated by maps, is reached from Palapag channel by ascending a narrow stream which is very shallow except at high tide. This stream enables the town to be reached by rowboats, but visitors generally land $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles below the town and proceed by the old Spanish road which has lately been cleared about 50 feet, and is wide, dry, and suitable for vehicles.

The troops are now roofing a large abandoned building, formerly the "tribunal," with stone foundation, which should be soon ready for occupancy, and which will afford comfortable and secure quarters. This garrison has been quite active and possesses undoubted ascendancy over the natives. The late visit of detachment under Lieutenant Jordan to Gumay, and the traversing of a portion of the Mesa de Palapag (both indicated to me as objects desired by superior authority), can not fail to produce good results.

With a view to clearing up the situation, every effort will be given to collecting the people into the towns and to secure or destroy all palay, carabao, abaca, and other valuable property. In this connection it is noted that carabao are reported as dying in great numbers from rinderpest, especially in the neighborhood of Palapag.

I feel it my duty to say that to accomplish good and permanent results more troops are necessary in this locality. Parties of 25 men can go out over night and 50 men can go anywhere, according to present indications; but to send out such parties and at the same time to leave a proper force in the towns is impossible with the present strength of the garrisons. Scouting in this territory, as must be known, severely tests the strength and endurance of the troops, and on return to the stations a large percentage of the men are always temporarily disabled from sore feet, fevers, etc. It has been my intention to use the garrison here to reinforce the subposts when an expedition out of ordinary is contemplated, as in case of that to Gumay; but even now we are at a loss for men fit to take the field, owing to causes above mentioned. I therefore ask that two more companies be sent here as soon as possible. Good use could be made of disciplined native scouts.

This recommendation is independent of the situation in the vicinity of Catarman, about which, much to my regret, I can not intelligently report. With the increase asked for, however, I believe that, unless unforeseen occurrences arise, the territory within radius of action from here can soon be freed from insurgents and insurgents' control.

It is learned that the insurgents are suffering and dying in consequence of being deprived of salt, and I report this news as possibly of value. At all events salt is evidently an article in great demand by the people in the mountains.

Quite an important consideration in connection with the situation here is the prospect of a famine among the natives. No rice is being planted, and the carabao, which is the main dependence in its cultivation, are dying from rinderpest. This section has but little fruit. Even the banana is scarce at present. Outside of rice and fish, which are not plenty, the camote (sweet potato), the gaway (taro), and a root called obi seem to be the main reliance for food. As long as the peaceably disposed continue in fear of the "outsiders" there will be little cultivation of even the roots named. In Catubig Valley it is estimated that there is secreted a six-months' supply of rice by the presidente of Laguan. This we are planning to have brought in under protection of troops. In the neighborhood of Oras there is considerable rice—spoken of as three-years' supply. This latter fact may have something to do with the reported congregation of insurgents under Abuke in the Oras district.

As a means of relief I have tried to impress on the people at all stations that they can seize and appropriate rice hidden by those with the insurgents, as well as carabao, abaca, etc., owned by such people. This will preserve such property from destruction or from falling into the hands of the insurgents, and is, I understand, in line with the policy of my superiors. Abaca is especially valuable, and I have had hope that it would be brought in in considerable quantity, contemplating that it could be eventually sold and the money used by the collectors in the purchase of food to tide over impending famine. As yet nothing has resulted, the people being evidently afraid to act as proposed. If more troops were at disposal the matter could be managed without difficulty.

I beg leave to renew my verbal recommendation that Laguan be placed in telegraphic communication with Calbayog, via either Catubig or Catarman, and that substations be connected with Laguan by telephones. From observation and inquiry I believe this to be feasible at a little more expense than the cost of cable (for short crossings of arms of sea), wire, and insulators, and possibly a few poles. The labor of construction need not cost anything. It would seem that the main line should connect coast towns; but a line from Calbayog to Catarman, via Cervantes, although it might be interfered with occasionally, could, I think, be maintained. The advantages of telegraphic communication, in a military sense, would be incalculable.

Since the 15th instant the troops of Laguan, Catubig, Palapag, and Pambujan have killed 19 insurgents, captured 74, burned 247 houses and cuartels, including an arsenal, and secured 1 rifle, 3 wire-wrapped cannon, 33 rounds ammunition (caliber 30), and \$139.51, Mexican currency, belonging to insurgents. They brought in considerable rice, but destroyed between 400 and 500 bushels otherwise liable to fall into the hands of insurgents. The scouting parties have marched considerably over 250 miles in bad weather and over very difficult country.

Very respectfully,

A. WILLIAMS,
Major, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding Subdistrict.

LAGUAN, SAMAR, P. I., *November 23, 1901.*The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban.

SIR: In accordance with verbal instructions of the brigade commander I have the honor to submit the following project of field operations to follow those now in progress. No special region can be determined as the locus of any considerable body of insurgents, although the preserve of small bodies south of Pambujan, east of that place, in the Buyog and Jangtud areas, indicate the necessity for cleaning the sections named. A force is understood to be in a stronghold not far south of Navas with a "few rifles." I propose as follows:

About 30 men to operate from Pambujan, south of that place, penetrating into the mountain district, to carry five days' rations. About 30 men (from Lagan) to operate in the Buyog district (west side of the Catubig) and in the mountains south of it; five days' rations. These parties are to divert attention from the principal movements, to destroy rice, etc., liable to be made use of by the insurgents, and possibly destroy one or more bodies of insurgents.

About 70 men to ascend the Catubig by boats to Navas; 30 to proceed direct to Napanala, and 40 to proceed southward to the divide between the Bacod and Catubig rivers, and thence to Napanala.

About 40 men to ascend rivers to Tinanocan (Jangtud) and thence to proceed southward to Napanala. These troops to start from Palapag or Lagan.

Forty men at Oras, to be joined at Concepcion by 30 from San Ramon, and on combining to proceed to Napanala.

Upon reaching Napanala the several parties will, if possible, communicate; those from Catubig and Palapag to return to station (in absence of contrary instructions) by any route deemed advisable, preferably so as traverse country not previously scouted; that from Oras to send 30 men back by way of Gumay.

It would greatly add to the possible success of these movements if forces could operate at the same time at headwaters of the Gandara and Bacod rivers, and also eastward from Catarman.

The forces with the principal expedition should arrange to be in the field seven or eight days.

To enable garrisons to be maintained during these operations, it is imperatively necessary that a temporary reenforcement of a full company be sent to Lagan, to be distributed to Pambujan, Palapag, Lagan, and Catubig, and that at least 50 men be sent to Oras. About 50 native scouts would prove a most valuable addition. It is also essential that Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, now at Catarman, return to Lagan so as to participate in these operations.

I also bring to attention that the sending of Contract Surgeon Richardson to Manila, as witness before court-martial, and the illness of Captain Sinks, assistant surgeon, United States Volunteers, leaves but one surgeon (Contract Surgeon Trew) in this section.

Very respectfully,

ARTHUR WILLIAMS,

Major, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding Substation.

LAGUAN, SAMAR, P. I., *October 25, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT, LAGUAN, SAMAR, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of operations at Pambujan, Samar, P. I., between October 7 and October 24, 1901, inclusive:

On October 7, 1901, pursuant to verbal instructions from the commanding officer Lagan, Samar, I assumed command of the substation Pambujan, Samar, P. I., then garrisoned by 4 noncommissioned officers and 36 privates of Company A, First Infantry, and 1 private of the Hospital Corps. On the night of October 8 an expedition consisting of 1 second lieutenant and 21 enlisted men visited the barrios of Galutan and Cabayva, both in the hills on the west side of the Labangan River, about 15 miles from Pambujan, reaching there between daylight and sunrise. Four natives were killed and 6 men and 4 women were captured. About 1,000 pounds of rice, 30 houses, a number of traps and spears, and a quantity of tobacco, potatoes, sugar cane, corn, "gabi," and vino were destroyed. A few papers, which have already been forwarded to your office, were found.

On October 11 1 second lieutenant and 15 men visited Cababtoan, about 5 miles from Pambujan, destroyed 14 houses, killed 1 native and captured 1, and destroyed about 2,000 pounds of rice.

October 16 1 second lieutenant, 20 enlisted men, and 9 natives (including the presidente of Pambujan) made an expedition to the hills between the Pambujan and Labangan rivers, about 18 miles from Pambujan, and captured 4 native men, 3 women, and 1 boy, also a number of papers and \$139.51 in Mexican and Spanish currency, the property of Fabiano Sosing, he being one of the prisoners. Six houses and 1,440 cubic feet, approximately, of rice were destroyed, the rice being the property of the above-named prisoner. The papers and money have already been forwarded to your office.

On October 21 a detachment of 12 men destroyed about 240 cubic feet of rice near the Pambujan River, about 5 miles from the town, 5 carabaos, thought to be the property of the vice-presidente, Fabiano Sosing, formerly the insurgent presidente of Pambujan. These were hidden, and on the following morning a detachment of 6 men and 3 native policemen were sent out for the purpose of bringing them into the town. It was discovered that several natives, armed with bolos, were taking them away. These natives showed fight and two of them were killed. The carabaos were recovered and are now in Pambujan.

On the night of the 22d a detachment started for a town called Pipa where, it was reported, about 100 natives, chiefly women and children, live, but owing to high water in the Labangan River was compelled to return.

On October 23 a party of 6 native policemen went into the country to collect rice and at 2.30 p. m. 5 of them were captured by insurgents; the sixth reached Pambujan at 6 p. m., reporting the fact. At 6.30 I ordered Sergeant Wheatlav and 9 privates, 4 of the latter being of Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, to proceed with 1 of the prisoners and 4 native policemen along the trail taken by the insurgents, and, if possible, overtake them. Two insurgents, acting as outposts, were surprised and captured at daylight, and shortly afterwards the cuartel was discovered. An attack was made, during which 7 insurgents were killed and 2 wounded, the latter escaping. The insurgents, of whom there were about 20, returned the fire, but without doing any damage to the attacking party. Three of the native policemen were rescued, 1 of whom had been severely beaten and had been bound to a post, his arms stretched, and his body lifted by a rope around the neck until only his toes touched the ground. Two of the policemen had been killed previously, 1 by beating and the other, after having been beaten and suspended by the neck, had been stabbed three times in the abdomen. The 2 dead policemen were buried and the town burned.

I wish to express here the sorrow of the enlisted men and myself over the fate of the 2 native policemen who, to the last, were devoted to the American cause. Their loss is regretted as much as if they had been of our own number.

Seventeen houses and about 75 pounds of powder were destroyed. One rifle (a converted Mauser) and three wrapped native cannons and 33 rounds of rifle ammunition were captured. This ammunition consisted entirely of reloaded caliber .30 shells.

The entire garrison, the presidente, his subordinates, and the native police have done excellent work in and about Pambujan. I wish to recommend particularly Sergeant Wheatlav and Private Raymond, of Company A, First Infantry, for their splendid work in the above-mentioned expedition and engagement, the former having conducted the operations, and the latter, who commanded the "point," and killed 2 of the insurgents. I wish to commend the work of Private Van Lace, Company A, First Infantry. He was my interpreter and at various times secured valuable information.

On October 24, having been relieved, I returned to Laguan.

Very respectfully,

WARD DABNEY,
Second Lieutenant, First Infantry.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT, LAGUAN,
Laguan, Samar, P. I., October 27, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, District of Samar.

The excellent work done by Lieutenant Dabney and his little command merits in my opinion high commendation. I heartily join in inviting special attention to the services of Sergt. Harry Wheatlav and Privates Raymond and Van Lace, Company A, First Infantry.

The funds captured, \$139 Mexican, are held for instructions, and the captured papers are forwarded herewith.

A. WILLIAMS,
Major, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding.

LAGUAN, SAMAR, P. I., *October 28, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT, LAGUAN, SAMAR, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

With 25 men, Company B, First Infantry, and 25 from Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, I left Palapag at 6.30 a. m., October 21, going southwest for 5 miles, then northeast and north over a high range of mountains. At dark I left 30 men (some of them ill) on top of the mountain, and with 20 continued until 9.30 p. m., when I entered the barrio of Kabatuan. Here we captured 3 and killed 2 (one the *teniente* of the barrio). On the 22d I sent back to Palapag 10 men who were not well enough to continue the march. Continuing down the coast we reached Mapanas, which had been deserted and afterwards partially destroyed by a cyclone. Tried to find the trail from this visita across the mountains to Gumay, but the guide was not able to locate it, so continued the march down the beach round the northeast corner of the island through barrios of Caotanan and Dao; then through mangrove swamps and over mountains to the northeast, north, and northwest of Gumay; then southeast to Gumay; then from Gumay northeast along the old Spanish road and the Palapag River to Palapag, which we reached the afternoon of October 27. About 10 miles of the trail is along the top of a high table-land, with a river flowing through it. This, I am told, is a continuation of the Mesa de Palapag, farther to the south. Saw very little rice planted, but a large number of potato patches have been planted on the hill-sides back quite a distance from the river and main routes of travel. We started with only four days' rations and found it quite difficult (hurried as we were) to get food the remaining three days. Killed 4 natives; captured 3; burned 118 houses. Distance traveled, including side scouts, approximately, 115 miles.

Very respectfully,

L. W. JORDAN, Jr.,
First Lieutenant, First Infantry.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT OF LAGUAN, P. I.,
Laguan, Samar, P. I., November 1, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general district of Samar.

Most of the district traversed by Lieutenant Jordan has not hitherto been entered by our troops. The garrison of Palapag was reinforced by 35 men from here, so as to leave a sufficient force in that town. As many as possible of the Twenty-sixth Infantry were sent out to acquaint them with the methods of scouting best adapted to this section.

Gumay proper is deserted, but it is reported that about 2,000 natives are living in the Gumay district. Much rice is also reported as hidden there. Formerly a visita of Palapag, Gumay under the revolutionary government was annexed to Oras, and the disposition of the people is said to be in favor of the insurrection. More than one day's tedious marching is required at present to reach it from Palapag, and probably also from Oras; but water access via Oras is easier. Lieutenant Jordan is of opinion that the place should be occupied. Supplies would probably have to enter via Oras.

All the barrios, visitas, etc., of Palapag, with the exception of Gumay, are responding to our efforts to gather the people into town, and it is estimated that 4,000 have come in.

Lieutenant Jordan has again traversed a portion of the Mesa de Palapag and obtained considerable information respecting it. The mesa is much more extensive than at first supposed, and should be thoroughly explored. At least 50 men should be in party, and several days will be required. Maps now in use are very defective, and effort is being made to obtain reliable data for their correction.

Lieutenant Jordan and his troops have exhibited most commendable zeal, energy, and endurance.

A. WILLIAMS,
*Major, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding Subdistrict.*CATUBIG, SAMAR, P. I., *November 9, 1901.*ADJUTANT SUBDISTRICT LAGUAN, *Laguan, Samar, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report:

I left this place at 10 p. m. November 1, with a detachment of 14 men of Company A, First Infantry, and accompanied by Contract Surg. N. C. Trew, U. S. Army.

Proceeded to the barrio of Sagodsoron. Burned 2 houses and captured and brought in 4 native men and 17 women and children.

Returned 5.30 a. m. November 2. Marched about 7 miles.

Very respectfully,

F. E. LACEY, Jr.,
Captain, First Infantry, Commanding Company A and Post.

[First indorsement.]

LAGUAN, SAMAR, November 10, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general first district, Department Visayas.

This little expedition was intended to surprise a party of natives, but its object was frustrated, it appears, by an alarm being given by an old man who was met on the way, and who appeared so feeble and suffering that he was not molested.

A. WILLIAMS,
Major, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Commanding Substation.

CATUBIG, SAMAR, P. I., October 28, 1901.

THE ADJUTANT SUBDISTRICT OF LAGUAN.

(Through commanding officer Company A, First Infantry.)

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of an expedition under my charge on the night of October 26:

Pursuant to verbal orders from the commanding officer Company A, First Infantry, I left station at 9 p. m. October 26, with 30 men, and accompanied by Contract Surg. Niel C. Trew. Proceeded up the Catubig River in bancas about 3 miles and landed about midnight. Spent the balance of the night in the hills lying a mile south of the river and secured 48 natives, whom I brought to Catubig and turned them over to the commanding officer there.

At 5 a. m. October 27 Surgeon Trew, with 20 men and all of the natives, returned to the river, leaving myself and 10 men behind. About a half ton of palay had been discovered and I endeavored to transport a portion of it to Catubig, destroying the balance by fire. I was unable to carry the palay, owing to the condition of the trails over a steep mountain, and abandoning the same, I scattered it as much as possible.

Having no guide, I missed the trail to our boats and struck the river about a half mile downstream from them. After firing signals to Surgeon Trew, he came down the river with the boats, picked up my detachment, and proceeded to Catubig, arriving at 9.45 a. m.

Very respectfully,

FLOYD C. MILLER,
Second Lieutenant, First U. S. Infantry.

[First indorsement.]

CATUBIG, SAMAR, P. I., October 29, 1901

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant subdistrict Laguan, Samar, P. I.

Most of the people within referred to are people who desired to come into town to live, but were afraid to do so.

I have released all except 6, and have instructed them to build houses.

On the 28th I sent out some natives, under guard, to get palay that belongs to Pedro Estudido, an insurrecto sympathizer. I have also sent another expedition for the same purpose to-day.

An expedition to Las Navas is contemplated for to-morrow night.

F. E. LACEY, Jr.,
Captain, First Infantry, Commanding Company A and Post.

COMPANY E, NINTH INFANTRY,
Turangan, Samar, October 19, 1901.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS.

(Through military channels.)

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the action at a temporary camp on the Gandara River on the morning of October 16 last between a party of insurgent riflemen and bolomen and a detachment of E, Ninth Infantry.

Said detachment consisted originally of 25 men of Company E, Ninth Infantry, and 1 private of the hospital corps, under command of First Lieut. George W. Wallace, Ninth Infantry, being stationed there for scouting purposes and to destroy the growing rice crop.

I later reenforced it by 21 men, deeming the original party not large enough for the purposes in view, and also sent 12 native prisoners to do the rice cutting.

A few days before the action Lieutenant Wallace went to Calbayog to see about getting a large number of natives to expedite the destruction of the crops. He intended upon his return to move his camp down the river to San Pelayo, where he would be better situated, both for defense and for cutting rice.

He was, however, delayed in Calbayog by adverse winds, and did not get back to the river until the day of the fight, and then only in time to meet the survivors on their way to Calbayog with the wounded.

From the reports of noncommissioned officers and men, which I have every reason to believe reliable, I gather the following facts:

Just after reveille that morning the sentinel on post saw a native coming over the brow of a small hill, about 75 yards from camp. The sentry fired at once, killing or wounding the man, who was an officer, and gave the alarm.

Insurgents in large numbers appeared and rushed down the slope directly into camp. They were dressed in white uniforms, with white caps, one officer wearing a red sash across his breast, another in red trousers.

Parties of insurgents appeared on the right and left flanks of the camp and also rushed in. A general hand-to-hand *mélée* occurred. Fortunately every man had his magazine and gun fully loaded, and bayonets were fixed.

These instructions were given subsequent to the Balangiga affair, and proved of inestimable value, for by the time rifles were reached and belts on the insurgents were in the camp.

The fight lasted but a few minutes and resulted in the utter defeat of the insurgents. To illustrate the closeness of the conflict I will state that 77 natives were found dead within the limits of the camp in a space of ground 50 feet by 80 feet in area; only 4 killed outside of this space. They were driven away with heavy loss. Our men lost 8 killed, all by bolos, and 11 wounded; 2 of the latter by gunshot wounds.

The killed were: Privates Orville J. Dromgoole, Edward F. Burns, William Loftin, Carl M. Johnson, Jack Pleoplis, William H. Ritchie, George W. Teachout, and Charlie Wilson; the wounded were: First Sergt. William Gormly; Musician Charles W. Buck; Privates John P. Kelly, Martin G. Lyons, Frank McAndrews, Robert L. Hampton, Eugene Dewitt, Joseph A. Monahan, Henry Stierle, Jack M. Russell (gunshot wound), and Private Julius Heinze, of the Hospital Corps (gunshot wound).

First Sergeant Gormly died about five hours later, just after leaving camp. Private Kelly died that evening on the way down the river.

After the fight the killed were buried, and the wounded made as comfortable as possible by means of "first aid" dressings. The dead natives found and counted numbered 80, and 1 was killed later on the edge of the river; total of 81. Three of these are believed from their dress to be officers, and I have reason to believe from a description of one that he is one Chrysostomo Lamentigar, of Tarangnan, and presidente of this place when Lucban was in Catbalogan.

The detachment lost one rifle in the river, the man owning it, Private Peoplis, jumping in with it when he found himself overwhelmed. He was recovered, but not the rifle. The detachment lost a revolver also, which, when rendered useless, was thrown away and not recovered.

The insurgent flag, 10 feet by 4 feet, with motto "In hoc signo vinces" over the star in white triangular field, was captured by the detachment; also 3 rifles—Krag (data concerning numbers will be furnished later, as these were left temporarily in Calbayog)—and 3 belts, American, nearly filled with ammunition.

It was thought that there were not more than 6 or 8 rifles in the party.

There were picked up about camp and in the vicinity about 175 bolos and daggers, but in going downstream with the wounded the boats were so overloaded that these had to be dumped in the river.

After the bodies were buried, the sergeant in charge decided that the wounded must be taken at once to some hospital for treatment, and as this would so deplete his force, he then having only 19 uninjured men, he decided to take the whole detachment downstream. They were also entirely out of rations at the time, and the action seemed the wisest to be taken.

The tents were so badly cut and slashed by the insurgents as to be of no further use, and were burned, together with the mens' knapsacks and clothing (except blankets for the wounded) which could not be carried, owing to lack of space in the boats.

The men remained at the camp over five hours after the fight had ended and only left because of the needs of the wounded and lack of rations, which the *Denver* had been unable to convey to them owing to a series of accidents.

One man certifies to seeing one native officer with an American officer's sword and scabbard, also a revolver, so it seems to be probable that some of this party may have come from the vicinity of Balangiga.

In connection with this report I desire to call attention to two serious defects in ordnance equipment as brought out by this action. The death of 2 men is due to the bayonet. After the magazines were exhausted the men had to use the bayonet, and in several instances when once they had plunged the bayonet into their opponents it was almost impossible to pull them out. Two men were killed by bolos while in this predicament. It would seem as if a sharper, slenderer bayonet should be furnished.

The other defect was in the belt, because of the contracting of the material due to wet and damp weather. The men were seriously hampered by the difficulty of getting cartridges out of the thimbles, and valuable time was lost.

The men seem to agree that the attacking party numbered about 200.

I inclose several papers taken from the pockets of one of the dead officers. I have had these lists looked over by men who knew this section—also the Gandara—and they only recognize two or three names. As will be seen, two are recognized as belonging to Caibiran (island of Leyte) by a former resident of that town, and one to Santa Margarita; the rest seem to be strangers hereabouts.

I desire to commend to the notice of the department commander the men of this detachment. Though taken at an unseasonable time and under adverse circumstances, they stood their ground nobly, and with the courage of the American soldier, they beat off and utterly defeated a large party after inflicting a most serious loss on it.

I am unable to pick out any one man as more deserving than another. Every man of Company E and Private Heinze, of the Hospital Corps, did his duty manfully and steadfastly.

Very respectfully,

F. H. SCHOEFFEL,

Captain, Ninth Infantry, Commanding Company E.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY M, NINTH INFANTRY,
Mutiong, Samar, P. I., November 1, 1901.

THE ADJUTANT FIRST INFANTRY, *Catbalogan, Samar, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to respectfully submit the following report of the actions and scouts performed by Company M, Ninth Infantry, during the month of October, 1901:

October 1, scouted to Hitaasan, thence to Calbiga River up to Calbiga; returned same day; distance, 20 miles.

October 2, arrested second lieutenant, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 13 men, sent into Mutiong with orders to burn same after murdering outposts with bolos, all to be done on signals from outside.

October 3, scouted to Hiabong and return; arrested 1 lieutenant, 1 corporal, and 7 bolomen, sent into that place with orders to burn same.

October 4, scouted country north of Mutiong with small detachment after party of bolomen; found nothing; distance, 10 miles.

October 5, scouted coast in direction Catbalogan; distance, 12 miles.

October 7, scouted country east of Mutiong; captured 5 sacks of rice; distance, 10 miles.

October 9, detachment scouted country northeast of Mutiong; destroyed several rice fields, captured 6 bags of palay, two insurgent horses; insurgents escaped; distance, 10 miles.

October 10, detachment scouted country direction of Mugbug; destroyed a quantity of rice and hemp, killed three bolomen, destroyed houses occupied by same; distance, 15 miles.

October 11, scouted coast in direction of Catbalogan; all well; distance, 20 miles.

October 12, scouted country in vicinity of Mugbug; small party attacked; killed 1 man, destroyed some houses; 12 miles.

October 13, scouted country in vicinity of Mugbug; attack small party; killed 2 men, destroyed some rice and houses; 18 miles. Sent party to Hitaasan and Calbiga, captured 3 bolomen, killed 1, destroyed several houses; distance, 15 miles.

October 14, detachment scouted to cuartel of bolomen; found camp deserted; destroyed cuartel; distance, 18 miles.

October 15, detachment scouted vicinity of Hitaasan; captured 1 boloman and killed 1 major of bolomen; distance, 10 miles.

October 16, sent detachment to Hiabong to arrest presidente and some other natives; distance, 8 miles.

October 19, detachment scouted from Calbiga to Hitaasan, to San Sebastian, to Paranas, to Mutiong; distance, 20 miles.

October 20, detachment scouted to mouth of Calbiga River and return; distance, 20 miles.

October 22, detachment scouted country northeast of Mutiong; destroyed several houses, considerable rice, captured 1 boloman; distance, 15 miles.

October 24, detachment scouted to Hitaasan and then to San Sebastian, thence to Calbiga, thence to Hitaasan; distance, 25 miles. Returned Friday a. m. Killed 3 bolomen, destroyed about 200 houses in the mountains.

October 25, detachment scouted northeast of Mutiong; distance, 6 miles.

October 26, detachment scouted east of Mutiong; destroyed several houses and rice fields; distance, 10 miles. Another detachment scouted to Paranas, thence to Bori; captured 1 boloman, an escaped prisoner, killed 8 men, destroyed about 15 houses, and burned 1,000 pounds of palay; distance, 12 miles.

October 27, detachment scouted trail to Hiabong and return; distance, 8 miles.

October 28, detachment scouted country northeast of Mutiong; attacked by small party of riflemen, who were driven off with 2 killed; destroyed houses near by.

October 30, detachment scouted country east of Mutiong, destroyed 3 houses full of palay, about 3,000 pounds, and killed 3 men guarding it; distance, 12 miles.

October 31, detachment scouted country from Mutiong; attacked small party of bolomen, killing 3; destroyed small cuartel and 11 houses near by, with about 2,000 pounds of palay.

Very respectfully,

J. B. SCHOEFFEL,

First Lieutenant, Ninth Infantry, Commanding Company M.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY M, NINTH INFANTRY,
Mutiong, Samar, P. I., November 10, 1901.

ADJUTANT FIRST INFANTRY, *Calbalogan, Samar, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the record of the following scouts since the 1st of the month:

November 1, detachment scouted country east of Mutiong; attacked small party of riflemen, who were driven off with 1 killed; distance, 12 miles.

November 2, detachment scouted country northeast of Mutiong; captured and destroyed about 3,000 pounds of palay; distance, 15 miles.

November 4, detachment scouted in mountains; killed 1 man—collector of revenues for insurgents; distance, 13 miles.

November 5, detachment scouted from Calbalogan; destroyed several houses and small quantity of palay; distance, 15 miles.

November 6, detachment scouted vicinity of Butalong; killed 2 bolomen, destroyed house and considerable charcoal, with about 75 rounds of reloaded ammunition.

November 7, detachment scouted from Jiabang through valley to Mugbug Valley; attacked by small body of riflemen, who were driven off with 1 man killed; destroyed about 25 houses and 2,000 pounds of palay.

Very respectfully,

J. B. SCHOEFFEL,

First Lieutenant, Ninth Infantry, Commanding Company M.

TARANGNAN, SAMAR, P. I., *December 24, 1901.*

THE ADJUTANT NINTH INFANTRY,
Calbayog, Samar, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report in full the fight which occurred at Dapdap.

Having the intention of trying to locate the body of riflemen and bolomen north of me, along the Gandara River, I sent out, at 2 o'clock this morning, a party of United States scouts and a number of police from Tarangnan to Dapdap, to try to secure men for guides, and at 5.30 a. m. Lieutenant Lang and 18 scouts and many natives of the town left for Dapdap. I, with 18 men of Company E, Ninth Infantry, and about 16 natives, left for Talingpa, hoping to locate the insurgents between the two parties. I had given Lieutenant Lang instructions to remain in and about Dapdap until my arrival there.

My command had proceeded to within about a mile of Dapdap in advance-guard formation, proceeding slowly and cautiously on account of the nature of the country, I being with the point and a native guide in front to look out for traps, etc. At this point the trail began to close in entirely with exceedingly tall grass, which shut out entirely all view of the country. After proceeding in this a hundred yards the guide was heard to give an exclamation, jumping backward toward Corporal Russell. Instantly there started up bolomen on both sides of the trail, rushing toward us. Fire began immediately, the men in the rear rushing forward to support those in front; but they were obliged to run a veritable gantlet of bolomen in order to reach us, and this accounts for the heavy loss in men. After firing the shots from the magazines the men clubbed their guns, slashing and killing the bolomen that way, who were beaten off with the loss of many of their men. I do not know the exact number, because many of the wounded bolomen jumped or rolled down the steep hillside. I think a conservative estimate would give the bolomen 75 or 100 (no rifle-men whatever), and the loss from 25 to 30. Signals were at once sent to Lieutenant Lang at Dapdap, about a mile away, to come to our assistance with the scouts and the natives of Tarangnan who were with Lieutenant Lang. These natives of Tarangnan gave us the most eager and cordial assistance in making litters and in carrying the dead and wounded to Dapdap.

The following is a list of those killed at the time of the fight: Sergt. John P. Swisher, Corpl. James Gaughan, Private Frank McAndrew, Private John Marr, Private Joseph A. Weippert, Private Thomas Clark (recently joined, died on way to Dapdap), and Private George Bedford (died in the hospital at Tarangnan). The wounded are as follows: Capt. F. H. Schoeffel, left buttock, slight; Corpl. John H. Russell, Private Philip Bradley, Private Arthur Bonnicastle, Private Daniel L. McPherson, and Private George Claxton, left arm amputated.

A guide and two native policemen also wounded, guide seriously.

The men of Company E behaved with their usual admirable bravery, and those who survived deserve the highest kind of admiration that can be given.

The natives of the bolo party seemed to be entirely made up of the "Dios Dios" element, wearing red hats and chin straps, and carrying in these hats a strip of paper which marks their character. Who they were or where they came from can not be ascertained.

F. H. SCHOEFFEL,
Captain, Ninth Infantry, Commanding at Tarangnan.

SANTA RITA, SAMAR, P. I., *October 26, 1901.*

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following operations at this station for the week ending October 26, 1901, viz:

October 24, 1901, myself and 13 men cooperated with Ensign Sargent, gunboat *Leyte*, in district back of Talalora, in search of rice supposed to be in that district, but it could not be found; distance by boat, 24 miles; distance marched, 10 miles; total, 34 miles.

October 25, 1901, 1 corporal and 5 men cooperated with Ensign Sargent, gunboat *Leyte*, at Babatungon, confiscating boats; number of boats sent to this station, 14 large and 66 small; total, 80.

Very respectfully,

B. P. NICKLIN,
First Lieutenant, Ninth Infantry, Commanding.

SANTA RITA, SAMAR, P. I., *November 2, 1901.*

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DISTRICT OF VISAYAS,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of operations at this station for week ending this date, viz:

October 29, 1901, 2 noncommissioned officers and 9 men traveled by boat, a distance of 6 miles, scouting along coast between Santa Rita and Cabungdan, Samar, P. I.

October 30, 1901, First Lieut. B. P. Nicklin and 23 men traveled by water on gunboat *Gardoqui* 6 miles to Iganega, Samar, P. I., and scouted 10 miles interior from that place and return; distance marched, 20 miles.

Very respectfully,

B. P. NICKLIN,
First Lieutenant, Ninth Infantry, Commanding.

VILLAREAL, SAMAR, P. I., *November 9, 1901.*The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT OF VISAYAS,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of operations for week ending this date, viz:

In compliance with letter from your office dated November 1, 1901, company was moved from Santa Rita to this place, and Second Lieut. K. S. Snow, Ninth Infantry, and 30 men sent from here to take station at Zumarraga, Buad, P. I., November 7, 1901. One noncommissioned officer and 7 men traveled by water to small island northwest of this place and scouted 2 miles on same; distance traveled by water, 4 miles; by land, 2 miles.

Very respectfully,

B. P. NICKLIN,
First Lieutenant, Ninth Infantry, Commanding.

MAUO, SAMAR, P. I., *October 19, 1901.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF VISAYAS, *Cebu.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that at 4.30 a. m. October 17 a detachment of my company, L, First Infantry, stationed at Weyler, was attacked by a force of ladrones, under the reported command of one Abuke, said force consisting of 10 riflemen and 100 other natives, armed with bolos and a species of cannon made from piping wrapped with rope. In this attack Charles A. Bock, Company L, First Infantry, was seriously wounded, and died at 5.40 a. m., same date. The attack was repulsed after about one-half hour. The firing was resumed by the ladrones in the hills to the north and east of the town and kept up intermittently until 11.30 a. m., same date, when it ceased, but was resumed a little after 12 m. and lasted about two hours. It was recommenced about 5.30 a. m. October 18 and lasted until the detachment of the Twenty-sixth Infantry landed, under Lieutenant Delaplane, when it ceased entirely. The ladrones in question lost 3 men killed, 1 man wounded, 1 Remington rifle, model 1876, in good condition; 100 rounds of mixed ammunition, mainly Krag-Jorgensen; 7 cannon, and 3 cans of powder. The powder was destroyed; the balance of the property turned over to Lieutenant Delaplane. There were no other casualties in the detachment than the above one mentioned. Immediately upon receipt of this report, at 5 a. m. October 18, it having been sent through from Weyler by native couriers at 11 a. m. October 17, I sent all available men I had under Second Lieut. D. A. Lindsay, First Infantry, to reinforce my detachment at Palauit and Malaga, increasing the force at Malaga to 20 men, that at Palauit to 1 officer and 19 men. Sergeant Merriwether, First Infantry, who was in charge of the detachment at Weyler, having reported that he had sent to Calbayog for assistance, and knowing assistance could be obtained from there in less time than I could send word to the detachment at Malaga to abandon Malaga and join forces with Sergeant Merriwether at Weyler, I had to depend upon assistance reaching him from Calbayog. I can not praise too highly the conduct of Sergeant Merriwether and his detachment in repulsing this night attack with such a minimum though deeply-to-be-regretted loss and for their conduct during all the day and night of the 17th in holding the town and in the extreme care he used in returning the fire of the ladrones, as evidenced by the amount of ammunition they still had when relieved.

In this connection I desire to call attention of the department commander to the fact that, in accordance with telegram received by me from him October 13 relative to stations of my company, I consulted with Col. C. F. Robe, Ninth Infantry, fully explained the work being done, the fact that the 40 men scattered south of the Mauo River at Palauit, Malaga, and Weyler were not only in danger of being attacked and cut up by piece meal, but that they were of absolutely no use in the work of pacifying this district and punishing the ladrones who infest the inland border, as the utmost they can do with safety is to guard the towns in which they are stationed.

Colonel Robe agreed with my views, and had decided to relieve my three detachments south of the Mauo River with a company of the Twenty-sixth Infantry, thus allowing me to increase my detachments at La Granja and Lavezares to 30 men each and taking the strain off this post, but upon the arrival of the Twenty-sixth Infantry at Calbayog he was informed by General Smith's aid-de-camp that the orders of the department commander were that two companies of the Twenty-sixth

Infantry that were being disembarked were to be stationed at Calbayog. In view of this fact Colonel Robe withdrew his consent to my request.

From information I have since received the ladrones who attacked Weyler came from and went back to Catarman.

Very respectfully,

H. L. JACKSON,
Captain, First Infantry.

[First indorsement.]

CALBAYOG, SAMAR, P. I., October 22, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to adjutant-general first district, Department of the Visayas, Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

The messenger reported in the foregoing letter did not report.

CHARLES F. ROBE,
Colonel Ninth Infantry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS NORTHWESTERN SAMAR,
Mauo, Samar, P. I., November 2, 1901.

ADJUTANT GENERAL SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Tacloban, Leyte.

SIR: In compliance with instructions contained in letter from First Lieut. G. H. Shields, jr., aid-de-camp, to the commanding general of the First Brigade, dated October 29, 1901, I have the honor to submit the following report of operations in the territory known as northwestern Samar for the week ending November 2, 1901.

October 29, detachment of Company L, First Infantry, scouted from Malaga to Mount Malhog, south and east from Malaga, in order to destroy, if possible, an outpost stationed there by a ladrone, "Abuke," for the purpose of intercepting dispatches coming from and going to Calbayog. Outpost was struck about 11.30 and the ladrones scattered, leaving all their supplies, which indicated the outpost consisted of about 20 men (which were destroyed), and 2 dead ladrones behind. Detachment then returned to Malaga. Distance marched, about 12 miles. No casualties in detachment.

October 30, a native, one Marcelo Greba, who had received the oath of allegiance to the United States, was arrested by detachment of Company L, First Infantry, for attempting to levy contributions in the vicinity of Lavezares for the ladrones, and while attempting to escape was killed.

October 31, detachment of 30 enlisted men of the Twelfth and Twenty-sixth Infantry, under charge of Lieutenant Delaplane, Twenty-sixth Infantry, started from Weyler for Pilar. Owing to the roughness of the country and the condition of the men, only 8 miles were covered the first day, and as it was impossible to reach Pilar with the quantity of rations carried the expedition returned November 1, 1901.

October 31, detachment of Company B, Twelfth Infantry, scouted to top of mountains east of Palaut and returned by a different route.

November 1 and 2, First Lieut. H. H. Tebbetts, First Infantry, with 15 enlisted men, Company L, First Infantry, left La Granja at 10.30 a. m. November 1 with the object of destroying a ladrone outpost at the barrio of Pinirayan, about 7 miles south-east of Lavezares; marched all night, and about 5.30 a. m. were fired upon by the ladrones; returned the fire and charged outpost, routing it with a loss to the detachment of 1 native guide killed, and to the ladrones 2 killed and capture and destruction of their supplies. Detachment then returned to La Granja, destroying 6 carabaos en route. Distance marched, 20 miles.

In conclusion, I have the honor to state that no reports have as yet been received from substations Caranian, Bobon, and Catarman; so they are not included in this report.

I have the honor to request that the chief quartermaster be directed to fill and ship to me, for use at different substations, the inclosed stationery requisition: 1 flag, storm (balyards not needed), and 2 field ranges; and that the chief surgeon be authorized to procure and ship, for use in post hospital here, at as early a date as practicable, the need being urgent, 1 sterilizer.

Very respectfully,

H. L. JACKSON,
Captain, First Infantry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS NORTHWESTERN SAMAR,

Mauo, Samar, November 11, 1901.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,

Tacloban, Leyte.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following weekly report of the operations of troops in the territory under my command:

Company L, First Infantry, November 1, 1901, detachment at Lavezares, Samar, was attacked by 3 riflemen and about 30 bolomen at 2.35 a. m. Attacking party advanced to within 200 yards of quarters of detachment and then retreated; no casualties.

November 6, about 2.30 p. m., detachment at Lavezares was fired upon from the hills surrounding the town by 6 riflemen, at a range of about 600 yards, and with 1 bamboo cannon, at a range of 1,200 yards. Fire was quickly subdued; no casualties. Company I, First Infantry; no report received. Ilocano Scouts; no report received. Detachment Company M, First Infantry, at Cervantes; no report received. Company B, Twelfth Infantry; commanding officer reports no engagements, but scouting from different stations to familiarize men with surrounding country.

I have the honor to recommend that a supply commissary be stationed at this point, and that the *Laoang* or a similar boat be stationed here for use in supplying posts from Weyler to Laguan, and inclose herewith estimate of cost and material needed to build storehouse for 60,000 rations.

I have the honor to inclose herewith special requisitions for medical supplies, quartermaster stores, and equipage, badly needed at this post and substations.

I have the honor to request that the chief ordnance officer be directed to send me 20,000 rounds rifle ammunition, caliber .30, and 4,000 rounds Springfield ammunition, caliber .45, for use of scouts.

Very respectfully,

H. L. JACKSON,

*Captain, First Infantry, Commanding.*CATARMAN, SAMAR, *November 3, 1901.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT OF VISAYAS.

SIR: I have the honor to report arrival at Catarman, after a most difficult march via Oquendo, Taragbutan, Lope de Vega, and Cervantes. I embarked my company on bamboo rafts at Cervantes and passed down the Catarman River. At point 3 miles from Catarman a double banca occupied by myself, Civilian Scout F. W. Bessell, and 16 native scouts capsized, precipitating all of us into about 10 feet of water. An old fish corral near by afforded means by which we were saved. We clung to this corral several hours, until the tide went out, and by great effort righted the banca, with which, in addition to another raft sent out to us, we were rescued. During the hours we were clinging to the corral rain poured incessantly. My scout, Bessell, and one native scout, Alfonz Agbayani, attempted to swim to shore, but were so chilled and weakened by the long strain they were unable to reach shore and were drowned. Sixteen Springfield rifles and waist belts, 1 carbine, and 2 revolvers were lost; but before I proceeded I secured all this property but 10 rifles and 1 carbine, and 1 belt with 50 rounds .45 caliber cartridges. These I shall be able to secure later, when the river falls. Bessell and Agbayani were buried with military honors at this station. Between Calbayog and Catarman I met but 4 natives, 2 of whom I killed, it being clear to me these 2 men were serving as vigilantes; this at a point between Oquendo Viejo and Lope de Vega. I found en route fifteen houses, and destroyed them. Further than this my expedition was uneventful. I regret the losses sustained, but it was almost unavoidable. I may add that I discovered some new traps and many bamboo spits on the trails. Three guides sustained painful foot injuries by stepping on small, sharp spits along the trail. My scouts carried extra shoes, with which I was able to provide my guides and avoid further accidents of that nature. Request of Captain Jackson to meet him at Lavezares can not be complied with by the date he specifies—the 9th. Interment of my two soldiers, securing my lost property, and the generally worn-out condition of my company precludes the possibility of making the march to Lavezares at once. Bobon and Caranian are in need of reinforcements. I shall send them from my company at once. Recent bolo attack on Caranian makes it advisable to increase that garrison by 15 men. I believe it advisable to have an officer at Bobon, and will go there unless otherwise ordered. I will take the initiative against every point adjacent to Caranian, and will make a clean sweep of that field.

It makes a thorough cleaning up. I believe I shall be able to do some good work in this field, and I shall at once proceed with vigor.

Very respectfully,

G. A. DENSMORE,
*First Lieutenant, Tenth U. S. Infantry,
Commanding Twenty-third Company Ilocanos.*

SANTA RITA, SAMAR, P. I., November 16, 1901.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith the final report of operations at this station of First Lieut. D. T. Merrill, Twelfth Infantry, made to adjutant-general, Sixth Separate Brigade. Also report by same officer of operations on 15th instant, which is considered complete and self-explanatory.

Very respectfully,

JAS. P. HARBESON,
Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Commanding Company A.

CAMP AT SANTA RITA, SAMAR, P. I., November 7, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SIXTH BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte.

SIR: I have the honor to report that a scout made on the 6th instant, resulting in killing 3 bolomen at barrio Iganega and Cabungdan, destroying 6 barotos and burning 21 houses.

From captured papers it appears that an extensive supply of rice has been supplied from Leyte, from Babatungon and Carigara, through barrios of Iganega, Talalora, Nabatas, and Cabungdan. The following natives of Babatungon, Leyte, have been sending rice to Samar: Juanita Leomong (woman), Francisco Quico, Chino Ledora, Villamor Quico, Estaban de la Peña. This had been supplied with the knowledge of the presidente, Estaban Casara, who is also a lieutenant of boleros. Capt. Telesforo Regaule is the captain of boleros at Babatungon, with about 60 men; it is understood that 4 Remington rifles in the hands of the police will be used by the insurgents at the proper time.

The captain of the insurgents in the mountains back of Iganega is Domingo Navaro, with about 40 bolomen; jefe local Catalino Ragrag, at Nabatas. Hilario Baleria, Catalerio Sabala, have sent rice from Carigara to Nabatas. They are at present in the latter town.

The captured papers will be forwarded as soon as translations can be made. In this connection I request, if possible, that a competent translator be supplied here from the native language into Spanish; natives in town are used now, but they are not to be relied upon.

I inclose herein a list of insurgent officers operating between Santa Rita and Basey. They are reported to have about 10 rifles. Abdon Luna, captain of boleros, Justo Vinos, sergeant, Faustino Obis, corporal, Nicolas Jacobe, corporal, Donateo Lacambra, lieutenant, Narseso Lacambra, corporal, Felesiano Amante, sergeant, Rufino Lacambra, second-lieutenant and Marcelo Otanquino, major and commandante; this list supplied me by natives.

A small launch or some means of towing barotos with troops could be used here with the greatest advantage, as much valuable time is used in paddling from place to place.

Very respectfully,

DANA T. MERRILL,
First-Lieutenant, Twelfth Infantry, Commanding Camp.

CAMP AT SANTA RITA, SAMAR, P. I., November 9, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows on the operations for the week ending November 9, 1901:

Company A arrived at Santa Rita at 3 p. m., November 4, 1901. On November 5, 1901, one squad detached for duty at Malibago, Leyte.

November 6, 1901, 25 enlisted men, 2 native scouts, Lieutenant Merrill in command, scouted to barrios of Cabungdan and Iganega. Killed 3 bolomen, captured important papers, burned 21 houses, destroyed 5 barotos. Distance traveled, 15 miles.

November 7, 1901, 23 men, Lieutenant Merrill, Dr. Dudley; scouted barrio Tuman-dog, killed 1 boloman, who was prisoner and attempted to escape. Traveled 8 miles; burned 1 house.

November 8, 8 enlisted men, Lieutenant Merrill in command, searched islands of Inababuy, Canayan, and Lantarita, found evidence insurgent occupation, burned 4 shacks, captured 2 barotos, destroyed 1.

I have the honor to report, in addition, that it is my plan to bring all native boats into the immediate vicinity of Santa Rita, and destroy all found on the Samar coast outside. All of the barrios are supporting small bands of bolomen in the hills behind and have sent in rice to supply them. This particularly applies to Iganega; much smuggling is done from Babatungon.

I request that the squad from here on duty at Malibago, Leyte, be returned here, in order for me to be able to send out scouting parties of reasonable strength.

I forward captured papers, of which I have translations, and renew my application for an interpreter.

Very respectfully,

DANA T. MERRILL,
First Lieutenant, Twelfth Infantry, Commanding Company.

CAMP AT SANTA RITA, P. I., November 14, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,

Tacloban, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following operations from this station:

November 9, Corporal Langdon, with 2 men, went into straits south with one baroto at night to scout for natives crossing. Nothing seen.

November 10, detachment, 17 enlisted men and Dr. Dudley, in command Lieutenant Merrill, scouted to Iganega to cooperate with gunboat *Gardoqui*, burned 45 houses at barrio Iganega and destroyed all food possible; 15 other houses destroyed on the coast and 3 boats destroyed.

From 7 a. m. to 5 p. m. November 11 and 12, 30 enlisted men Company A, under command of Lieutenant Merrill, with seamen and soldiers under Ensign Sargent, U. S. Navy, and Cadet Green, scouted in boats up Silanga River to head of navigation about 20 miles; burned one insurgent cuartel, with quarters for about 20 men; just evacuated by insurgents; destroyed 17 native boats, 26 houses, about 5 tons of palay ready to be harvested; killed 10 hogs, 2 carabao, and cut down hemp and banana trees. Distance traveled, about 40 miles. Time, from 5.30 a. m. November 11 to 3 p. m. November 12.

Very respectfully,

DANA T. MERRILL,
First Lieutenant, Twelfth Infantry.

SANTA RITA, SAMAR, P. I., November 16, 1901.

The COMMANDING OFFICER, *Santa Rita, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows on a combined Army and Navy expedition up the Santa Elena River to a barrio of the same name:

Lieut. D. T. Merrill in command, with Lieut. De W. C. Lyles and Dr. Dudley, 30 enlisted men Company A, Twelfth Infantry, and 25 seamen from the gunboats *Leyte*, *Mariveles*, and *Gardoqui*, under command of Ensign Tarrant and Cadet Woods, scouted in 7 boats 4 miles to head of navigation of Santa Elena River, landed, and scouted inland 2½ miles, burned 90 houses, destroyed 2 tons palay in the grain, killed 1 pony, 3 sheep, 20 hogs, burned 1 10-ton lorchá, new, and destroyed 4 bancas.

Marched and moved by water 20 miles from 5 a. m. to 4 p. m., November 15, 1901.

Very respectfully,

DANA T. MERRILL,
First Lieutenant, Twelfth Infantry.

SANTA RITA, SAMAR, P. I., November 22, 1901.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 16th instant Sergeant Beaber and 7 men of Company A, Twelfth Infantry, left this station at 9.30 a. m. for the site of Iganega, 4 miles west and on Samar. Such live animals as were found in the burned town were killed, and 800 pounds of camotes brought in for use of company. Detachment returned at 6 p. m. Scout about the town showed the country to be practically abandoned.

On the 17th instant Corporal Thompson and 5 men left this station at 8 a. m. for Malibago, southwest 3 miles on Leyte, returned 5.30 p. m.; country reported quiet and nothing seen.

On 18th instant Captain Harbeson, Twelfth Infantry, left this station on board gunboat *Gardoqui* at 8 a. m. Arriving at Malibago the town was found to be in apparently peaceful condition. There are about 100 small barotos on the beach and in a small stream near the town. Sergeant —, Eleventh Infantry, in command of 12 men of the Eleventh and 8 men of the Twelfth Infantry, is so quartered that he might be easily rushed. The sergeant is erratic and, if not crazy, surely much affected by the heavy strain under which he has been serving for some time. The sergeant is energetic and sincere; he has done much and good work and seems to be continuing the same; however, further report will be made after more deliberate and extended observation.

At Malibago Secret Service Agent Leon Brillo was met conspicuously displaying an army Colt's revolver and a letter from Lieutenant Bates, Seventeenth Infantry, aid-de-camp, permitting him to visit Malibago and Babatungon in search of "documents" connected with Vicente Reyes. Brillo requested that he be given a baroto in which to go to Babatungon and that a gunboat lay off the town while he searched for the documents.

After scouting that part of the straits comprising the station of the *Gardoqui*, Captain Harbeson and 15 men of Company A, Twelfth Infantry, were landed at Babatungon. There are but 4 barotos to be seen in the town, and there is apparently no rice, as is claimed by the secretary. Leon Brillo, who had landed there hours before, had discovered nothing. He was towed to Santa Rita, whence he left the following morning with a baroto, which he did not leave at Malibago as instructed and which he has not returned. At Babatungon three shotguns were found in the tribunal, with no guard in sight. The party returned at 6.30 p. m.

On the 20th instant Captain Dudley, medical corps, Captain Harbeson and two men, Twelfth Infantry, left the station at 1.30 p. m., going southeast along the coast. At about 1 mile from the station the party turned inland without trail and proceeded to a point about 3 miles north of Santa Rita, where a well-traveled but poor trail was found leading into the interior. From this point the party proceeded to the coast, striking it at a point about 2 miles northeast of Santa Rita. The scout developed the fact that unless the one trail crossed branches at a more distant point there is but one overland trail leading from Santa Rita. The party returned at 6.30 p. m.

On the 21st instant Captain Harbeson and 10 men of Company A, Twelfth Infantry, proceeded aboard the gunboat *Leyte* to a point 2 miles west of Babatungon on the the Leyte shore and secured a raft containing 300 cubic feet of sawed lumber and two barotos, which had been abandoned by the gunboat *Gardoqui* on a former attempt to bring it from a burned town in Samar. The lumber will be used to complete quarters for the company.

Prisoners and other natives examined here during the past week state there are no insurgents in or about Santa Rita. Reymundo Mansanes states that Captain Navarra has gone to the Gandara River country with 3 Remington rifles and 15 bolomen, and that there are now some 250 bolomen and 20 Remington rifles in this section. Pedro Bartoleno, recently discharged by expiration of service from Company I, Leyte Scouts, states he was told 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 6 men of the insurgents, with 5 Remingtons, 1 Krag, and 2 shotguns, crossed from Samar to Babatungon on Leyte on or about the 5th instant in quest of rice, and that they returned to Samar.

Respectfully submitted.

JAS. P. HARBESON,
Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Commanding.

SANTA RITA, SAMAR, P. I., December 7, 1901.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,

Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 1st instant Sergeant Reath and 4 men were sent to Babatungon, Leyte, to relieve detachment of Eleventh Infantry there.

Corporal Langdon and 4 men were sent to Malibago to relieve detachment of Eleventh Infantry there.

Upon information that the insurgents had been beaten and scattered in the south and were expected to retreat toward Santa Rita, Sergeant Beaber and 14 men were sent east on the only trail leading from point of defeat. Detachment left 11 a. m., marched 8 miles, destroyed 7 houses, and captured one of the authorized vigilantes from this station. Twenty natives voluntarily accompanied the detachment upon the suggestion of the commanding officer, proving themselves absolutely worthless. Detachment returned 5 p. m.

On the 2d instant Captain Harbeson, 8 men and 2 scouts, accompanied by 20 natives of the town, left at 7 a. m., marching eastward on the only trail by which the beaten insurgents could retreat toward Santa Rita. The detachment marched continuously until 1 p. m., when a small settlement of 4 houses near the Silanga was reached. Here sentinels were posted ahead on the trail and the detachment remained until 2.30 p. m. when the houses were burned, two cavares of gathered rice and about 2 acres of growing rice destroyed, and all chickens caught or killed. The detachment returned to sitio Tomandug and were there met by barotos, and reached Santa Rita 7 p. m.; 8 houses were burned on the return. Nothing was seen except at the small settlement that was burned. Here several men ran into the bushes, but could not be shot, as the natives from town were mixed up with them. The town natives did more harm than good, and proved quite a nuisance. The trail is narrow, runs over hills and through marshes. Three miles out of Santa Rita it is well traveled; beyond this point there is very little travel and the trail exceedingly difficult. A sketch mostly from memory, copied by Second Lieut. DeW. C. Lyles, Twelfth Infantry, is submitted herewith. The sketch is necessarily inaccurate, as but limited notes could be taken in the rain. This trail has since been guarded by native police, who have reported nothing seen. Distance marched, about 18 miles.

On the 4th instant Sergeant Ghents and 4 men patrolled the Samar coast west, making one landing; left 7.30 a. m.; returned 4 p. m.; saw nothing.

On the 5th instant Lieutenant Lyles and 3 men went aboard gunboat *Gardoqui* to Babatungon and found the sea too rough to relieve the detachment Twelfth Infantry there; returned to Malibago, relieved detachment Twelfth Infantry there, and brought in 31 sacks rice and 128 barotos; returned 8 p. m.

On 6th instant Lieutenant Lyles and 4 men left 6 a. m. on sailboat for Babatungon, and relieved detachment Twelfth Infantry there, and brought in 8 barotos and 25 sacks rice; returned 8.30 p. m.

Corporal Langdon went to Malibago and destroyed 16 unseaworthy barotos at that place.

On the 7th instant Sergeant Ghents and 6 men patrolled the Samar coast west; left 7 a. m.; returned 2 p. m.; nothing seen.

Alejandro Daco, prisoner at Santa Rita, states that he transferred 300 cavares of rice from the island Canoag to Nabatas, barrio of Talalora, in the month of October. This rice was shipped from Carigara. He says this trade is discontinued, as there are no more rice merchants near Talalora. Rice may be carried by land from Carigara to Babatungon.

Further report will be made upon the above.

Very respectfully,

JAS. P. HARBESON,

Captain, Twelfth Infantry, Commanding Santa Rita.

—
TWENTY-FOURTH COMPANY NATIVE SCOUTS,

Hilaasan, November 8, 1901.

The ADJUTANT, *Catbalogan, Samar, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that since November 3, the date of my last report, I have scouted the country up the Bulacan and San Sebastian rivers, killed 2 insurgents, burned 24 houses, and destroyed about 4,000 pounds of palay.


Pursuant to orders, I scouted the country in the foothills and mountains back of Pinabagdao and Villareal. I was unable to locate the insurgents, but learned from the natives in Pinabagdao that a band of insurgents numbering 16, with 2 rifles, 4 revolvers, and the rest boleros, passed through the town the day previous. They came from the vicinity of Villareal, and were headed for the mountains, where they

Route Sketch, Vicinity of S. Rita, Samar, P.I.

Capt. J.P. Harbeson, 12 Inf.

Scale:

1 1/4 1/2 3/4 0 1 2 miles



(Copy by D.C. Kyles & Co. 12 Jan.)

THE MORRIS PETERS CO. PHOTO-LITHO WASHINGTON D. C.

probably went. I think this is the same band that captured the lieutenant of the barrio of Bungan. They were looking for the presidente of Pinabagdao, but he escaped to Calbiga.

Very respectfully,

J. E. GAUJOT,
First Lieutenant, Tenth Cavalry, Commanding Company.

CAMP AT MANOTAC, SAMAR, P. I., November 14, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL SIXTH BRIGADE,
Department of the Visayas.

SIR: I have the honor to report that this company arrived at Calbayog, Samar, P. I., October 26, 1901, and disembarked the same day.

On October 29 the company left Calbayog and proceeded up the Hibatan River in native barotos and made camp at a point called Kabadiangan, or, as called by some, Himonini. From there several scouting parties were sent out to the north and northeast, as per instructions of the district commander. A number of houses were burned and a quantity of palay destroyed. A sulphur deposit was located in a cave to the northward of the camp, but it had evidently not been frequented for a long while, and was of little value.

On the evening of November 8 the company moved its camp farther up the Hibatan River to a point on the right bank called Manotac. This is a well-situated camp, with an abundance of good drinking water for the men, and it is sufficiently high above the river to prevent inundation.

From this point several scouting parties have been sent out to the northward and toward Oquendo, and shacks burned and all supplies which would be of advantage to natives destroyed. On the 12th a scouting party from the company destroyed to the eastward and southward a number of houses and a quantity of hemp, supplies, and clothes. The party secured also an insurgent flag.

The health of the command is good and the spirits of the men excellent. Have no recommendations.

Very respectfully,

FRANCIS J. MCCONNELL,
First Lieutenant, Twelfth U. S. Infantry, Commanding Company C and Camp.

CAMP AT MANOTAC, SAMAR, P. I., November 21, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Tacloban, P. I.

SIR: In pursuance of instructions, I have the honor to forward herewith report of operations for the week November 15 to November 21.

On November 15 a scouting party from this camp destroyed to the westward, and in the direction of Oquendo, a number of houses and a quantity of hemp palay. The natives, mostly women, were sent into Calbayog.

On November 16 in conformance with the orders of the brigade commander, this company participated in the joint movement made by the troops to the northeast, northward, northwest, and west of here, in the general direction of Mount Pauros. My orders were to keep in touch on my march north toward Pilar, on the right, with the forces from Oquendo, and on the left with forces from Weyler. This was done.

Twenty-five men of the company comprised the force moving to the north, on the right, along the mountain region between Oquendo and this station, and commanded by First Sergeant Eckert. Thirty-five men commanded by myself comprised the force to the left, and moved along the ridge to the left of the valley of the Hibatan River.

The force under Sergeant Eckert destroyed a number of houses, each house generally containing rice; several prisoners were taken, but they were not of much importance. His first camp was made at Cabatuan, to which point he had moved eastward from the mountains in the hope of capturing the family of Colonel Rosales, and if possible securing any correspondence of importance which might be there. Although this point was arrived at at night, the family had fled. The house was destroyed. Sergeant Eckert moved next day to Caganibong, burning all houses and driving all natives north. This point was arrived at at 5 o'clock p. m., where he awaited a conjunction with my party.

The party under my command on leaving Manotac immediately struck off to the left to reach the highest trail which would keep us well in touch with the Weyler

detachment, and at the same time give us control of the valley to the right as we marched northward. The marching was arduous in the extreme, but the men behaved admirably, no one falling out.

Toward the middle of the afternoon we captured an old man and impressed him as guide. We were now evidently in a hostile country, as we could frequently hear the signaling of the natives warning the insurgents of our approach, and the houses which we were burning showed signs of recent occupancy. Some of these shacks were evidently used as shelter for outposts to watch our movements up and down the valley. This could be easily told by the view which they commanded toward the south.

At about half past 4 o'clock the guide showed by his nervousness that we were coming into the vicinity of hostile forces. Shortly after this we came out of the dense brush through which we had been traveling, into a large open space close to the foot of the mountains. The trail here led along the mountains for quite a distance. After traveling for about ten minutes the guide stopped, whether from fear or lack of knowledge of the road I can not say. I was just questioning him as to whether he really knew the road or not when, at a distance I estimate to be at 150 yards, we were fired on from a point on our left which seemed to be a place cleared off some time previously for the cultivation of potatoes. The fire was quite brisk and to my mind seemed to be entirely of Krag rifles. The men at once faced to the left, lying down, I called out, "What outfit is that?" wanting to assure myself that it could be no mistake on the part of the troops coming from Weyler. No answer being received I ordered the detachment to answer the fire by volleys. I divided the detachment into two portions, the section on the right firing by volley, then the section on the left, and this effectively silenced them, the enemy retreating over the mountain. After waiting in the vicinity for a short while, we proceeded in a northeasterly direction and crossed the river to Caganibong, effecting a junction with Sergeant Eckert, whom we met at the ford, with 10 men, on his way to give us assistance in case of need.

We camped that night at Caganibong and marched next morning to Pilar, arriving there on the 18th, as directed in the orders pertaining to my part in the combined movement. On the night of the same day Captain Jackson arrived. I remained with him at Pilar on the 19th, and returned to camp at Manotac on the 20th.

This was a very hard hike, being mostly along the mountain side, except the latter part of the march, which was in a species of carabao mud, and as a consequence of which the men who went on the hike are suffering from sore feet. Notwithstanding this the men behaved well. Both on the march and under fire, they thoroughly did their duty.

I was accompanied on this trip by Captain Rossiter, surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, and one Hospital Corps man.

Very respectfully,

F. J. McCONNELL,
First Lieutenant, Twelfth Infantry, Commanding Company C.

CALBAYOG, SAMAR, P. I., November 20, 1901.

THE ADJUTANT, *Calbayog, Samar, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of a scouting party of which I was in charge:

By direction of the commanding officer I left Calbayog, Samar, P. I., at about 11 o'clock November 18, 1901, with a party consisting of 4 native scouts and 9 native policemen. Having orders to scout the country in the vicinity of Naporo, Samar, P. I., I proceeded to that place via Santa Margarita, arriving at Naporo at 4.30 p. m. November 18.

It having been reported that people from Santa Margarita having permission to gather palay near Naporo had been hampered by the insurgents, I scouted in a northeasterly direction from Naporo across a large rice field to the mountains beyond. I met several natives in the rice field gathering rice, who said they were from Santa Margarita and had the permission of the presidente of that place to do so. I then ascended a ridge of mountains and camped for the night in a nipa hut.

The next morning I scouted the crest of this ridge of mountains a mile and a half to the east. Returning I kept to the mountains until reaching a point opposite Naporo, where I descended to a trail and returned via Santa Margarita to Calbayog, reaching the latter place at about 12.30 p. m. November 19, 1901.

I found nothing in the mountains except a few nipa huts, which were not occupied, but which showed signs of recent habitation. I burned them and also a sack and a half of rice found concealed under some nipa near one of the huts.

The trails leading over the mountains from the above-mentioned rice field show signs of frequent use, and it is my opinion that people other than those given permission by the presidente of Santa Margarita come to this place for rice.

Respectfully submitted.

GEORGE W. HARRIS,
Second Lieutenant, Ninth Infantry.

OQUENDO NUEVO, SAMAR, P. I., November 22, 1901.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report below operations by the force under my command from November 1 to date.

On November 1, 1901, I received a letter from the commanding officer at Calbayog conveying to me the instructions of the brigade commander relative to the combined movement of troops to be made against insurgents in the vicinity of Mount Pauros, to commence on November 9. As therein directed, I communicated with the officers commanding the forces which were to touch mine on the right and left and settled upon the part of the Oquendo-Cervantes trail to be covered by our respective forces. On the 9th I left this station with 25 enlisted men and 1 contract surgeon, with six days' rations, and had proceeded about 5 miles along the trail to Oquendo Viejo, when I was overtaken by a courier bearing a letter from the commanding officer at Calbayog, dated the 8th instant, advising me that the proposed expedition had been deferred. I thereupon returned to my station.

On the 10th instant other information reached me, through the same source, that the deferred movement was to begin on the 14th. The distance to Cervantes being so great and the time so limited, I was unable to communicate with the commanding officer at Cervantes about the new movement, but presumed that he had his instructions from Catarman, which is much nearer him than is this station.

On November 13 I received instructions from the brigade commander, through the commanding officer at Calbayog, to cover the Oquendo-Cervantes trail as far as Lope de Vega on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, and advising me of the proposed location of other troops.

On the morning of November 14 I left here with 25 enlisted men of Company M, First Infantry, rationed for six days, 1 contract surgeon, and 20 native volunteer scouts armed with bolos. The command camped near Oquendo Viejo the night of the 14th. On the 15th the troops moved for a place on the trail a short distance above Taragbutan. While there two natives were captured in the act of gathering supplies. The following night camp was made on the trail about 4 miles from Lope de Vega and scouting party sent on to a point about 2 miles farther, and it then returned to the main body. The next day, the 17th, a detachment of 12 men was sent to Lope de Vega, where they remained until the 18th and then joined the main body. The main body moved to a point about 3 miles north of Taragbutan on the 17th and there camped until the 19th, patrolling detachments being sent out in both directions along the Oquendo-Cervantes trail and also along a trail running from east to west, followed by Abukey with his command a few weeks since in crossing in the direction of Pilar. On the 19th the troops were moved in to a place near Taragbutan, the trails being carefully covered. On the 20th the return movement was begun, and the command reached here on the 21st. Eighteen natives were brought in here as prisoners, the chief offense being that they had never presented themselves.

On this expedition the volunteer native scouts were of great assistance, and in fact most prisoners were brought in by them, as they ranged the mountains and were able to approach, without alarm, much nearer than could the American troops.

On this expedition few insurgents were found other than individuals armed with the ordinary working bolos, and while a number were found gathering supplies they had, with a few possible exceptions, no official connection with the insurgent forces.

During this movement no American force was encountered or heard of, and no knowledge was obtained as to the movement of those other troops engaged in the combined movement.

As there were but 50 enlisted men here for duty, it was deemed advisable to take but 25 enlisted men on the expedition, the others being absolutely necessary to properly guard this pueblo and protect the government property and supplies.

With the 25 men of my command, the trail from here to Lope de Vega, a distance of about 25 miles, was covered as well as it was possible to cover such a length of trail with the number of men noted, and it is not believed that any armed insurgents crossed the trail in an attempt to escape to the east. The condition of the trails shows that they have been used very little for the past few months, and the lack of houses and supplies shows that what natives remain in the territory covered by my troops live far up in the mountains, with very few exceptions.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ELIAS CHANDLER,
Captain, First Infantry, Commanding.

DEPARTMENT OF VISAYAS,
Oquendo Nuevo, Samar, P. I., November 23, 1901.

The COMMANDING OFFICER, OQUENDO NUEVO, SAMAR, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith my report as intelligence officer of a scout by a detachment of Company M, First U. S. Infantry, which I accompanied from November 14 to November 21, inclusive. Map inclosed.

Very respectfully,

T. B. McCOWN,
Contract Surgeon, U. S. Army, Intelligence Officer.

DEPARTMENT OF VISAYAS,
Oquendo Nuevo, Samar, P. I., November 23, 1901.

The INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report of the country passed over by a scouting party of Company M, First U. S. Infantry, November 14 to November 21, inclusive. Map inclosed.

We left this station at 6.30 a. m. November 14, crossing the Hibatan and Oquendo Nuevo and going north on the west bank of river as far as Oquendo Viejo (a distance of 8 miles), where the river was crossed, and camped for the night.

The 15th we followed trail northeast to Taragbutan, where we crossed the river again, camping 1 mile north of town. Camping ground marked "X." November 16 marched north on trail 8 miles, camping at "X," north of watershed. November 17 one half of detachment went to Lope de Vega and remained until the 18th, the other half returning south of watershed where trail crosses from west to east, where they camped, the detachment returning from Lope de Vega and joining the other on the 19th. November 20 returned 5 miles north of Oquendo Nuevo. Returned to station November 21.

Country generally hilly, clay soil, heavily wooded and much underbrush. Valleys are cultivated, principally raising hemp. It is not thickly populated. There are no houses in district between Oquendo Nuevo and Cervantes, as they have all been burned. Very small steam launch may come up the river from sea to Oquendo Nuevo; small boats go as far north as Taragbutan.

The Hibatan River can be crossed at low water any place a trail crosses.

Country is not passable for troops off the roads or trails.

Respectfully,

T. B. McCOWN,
Contract Surgeon, U. S. Army, Intelligence Officer.

VILLAREAL, SAMAR, P. I., January 4, 1902.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following weekly report of operation of Company D, Eleventh Infantry, during the past week:

Acting upon information received from a prisoner captured in my expedition of the 26th ultimo, I proceeded on the night of the 1st instant in search of the remainder of the party attacked on the previous occasion, taking with me 20 men of Company D, Eleventh Infantry, the local presidente, and 5 native volunteers, with two days' rations for the party. Leaving Villareal at 9 p. m. the party proceeded in barotos to and up the Igut River, where we disembarked at 10.45 p. m. and marched nearly due east, picking information en route. The objective of the expedition was reached



at 8.50 a. m. on the 2d instant, when I found the cuartel of one Capt. Jorge Langara, consisting of 7 good nipa houses. I at once charged the village, and in the ensuing engagement (if it could be so called) have to report the following casualties: Killed: Capt. Jorge Langara, Sergt. Fermin Fabilane, and two unknown soldiers. Mortally wounded: Lieut. Eliseo de la Torre; this latter was seen to fall shot through the back, but his body was not found, he probably having strength enough left to secrete himself in the thick jungle. Captured 5 rifles in excellent condition, as follows: United States magazine rifles, model 1898, Nos. 210812, 203842, and 149301; 2 Spanish Remingtons; also all of Captain Langara's papers.

The identity of the killed and wounded officers and noncommissioned officer is established beyond a doubt.

This success finally disposed of all armed parties in this immediate vicinity, as I have been unable to secure any information from any source pointing to the existence of any other firearms in this locality.

I desire to call the attention of the proper authorities to the gallant conduct of the men of my attachment. The difficulties of the route traversed could not be exaggerated, and these had been intensified by rain for two days previous. The last mile was up a practically vertical trail running up a knife-blade ridge, and while I started up with 20 men I actually went into action with but 12, the remainder being absolutely exhausted and sent back to join the cargadores with the rations, who had been left behind.

I also desire to thank the presidente and the 5 volunteers from this town, whose services were of great value.

Captain Langara's papers will be forwarded by the first opportunity.

Total distance marched, approximately 40 miles.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Captain, Eleventh Infantry, Commanding.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I., January 9, 1902.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general of the division, through military channels.

I consider that this report well evidences the characteristics which have impressed Captain Alexander's work upon my attention. I recommend that he be given some recognition for the skill, courage, and persistence shown in this expedition.

J. H. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

CATARMAN, SAMAR, P. I., *January 28, 1902.*

The ADJUTANT, SUBDISTRICT SAMAR, *Catarmán, Samar, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of my command during the week ending January 28, 1902:

Pursuant to General Orders, No. 4, headquarters Northwest Samar, dated January 21, 1902, I left this station on January 22, 1902, with 60 men of Company I, First Infantry, and 15 native police equipped for fifteen days' field work, and proceeded to a point about 4 miles east of Mondragon River, crossing the same and establishing a base at Cardosa, a barrio about 5 miles south of Mondragon. Leaving there a detachment of 35 men, I proceeded with 30 men of Company I, First Infantry, and 10 native police to the headwaters of the Mondragon River, thence southeast to the Pinamidacan River. With Cagbayan, the reputed headquarters of Lucban's forces, as an objective, I took a southwesterly course to the Cagmanaba River, following the same toward its source, my object being to enter the Cagbayan district from the south. At the junction of the Cagmanaba and Cagminadgum rivers I arrived on the 24th instant. My detachment was fired on by insurgents in ambush, and Sergt. George Prentice was instantly killed and Corpl. John Fagan received a wound in the head, causing a fracture of the skull. The insurgents were immediately pursued, 4 being killed. Those armed with rifles escaped. The wound received by Corporal Fagan compelled me to abandon my objective and return, 25 miles distant, to the nearest point, Cervantes, where medical assistance could be obtained.

Incessant rain had swollen the Cagmanaba River to such an extent as to necessitate following the mountain side, cutting a trail as I went for about 5 miles to a point where the Cagmanaba becomes a mountain stream. Here considerable trouble and

danger was encountered in passing waterfalls, 23 in number, the smallest of which was at least 10 feet in height. Crossing the watershed to the northwest into the Cagcanayan Valley, thence down the Cagcanayan River to the Hibalognan River, I encountered a still greater difficulty in that I was compelled to cut a trail a distance of 14 miles or cross the river eleven times. The latter course was considered the most expeditious, and was pursued. Eight times I found it necessary to swim the Hibalognan River, but fortunately I did not lose a man or rifle. Upon my reaching the Catarman River, at a point about 5 miles north of Cervantes, I found a small baroto, in which my entire detachment crossed the river one at a time, and proceeded to Cervantes. Under ordinary circumstances the distance could have been covered in two hours, but the swollen condition of the streams necessitated cutting a trail through the mountains, and the time consumed was six and one-half hours. On arriving at Cervantes it was found that in order to secure the proper medical attendance for Corporal Fagan it would be necessary to go to Catarman. No boats being available, rafts were constructed and the detachment brought to this place, although at a great risk of losing men and arms on account of high water. The detachment arrived at Catarman at 9 p. m. January 27, 1902. Throughout this march the entire detachment was exposed to imminent danger and intense suffering. From the time when Corporal Fagan was wounded until the column reached Cervantes, a period of thirty-two hours, no food was taken, nor did the column halt but once, for five hours, when it was found absolutely impossible to proceed on account of darkness and the condition of the trail. From the time I left Cardoso, at 10.30 a. m. on the 23d, till I reached Cervantes, at 9.30 p. m. on the 25th, my men were unable to cook any food on account of having no dry wood, and even had they had, there was not a dry match in the column, all having been wet in swimming the Mondragon River twice on the 23d. Of three days' rations carried by my men the greater part were still in their haversacks when I reached Catarman.

The most remarkable circumstance of the entire march was that Corporal Fagan, who was suffering the most excruciating pain from his wound, absolutely refused the proffered assistance of his comrades and walked the entire distance to Cervantes. This I consider the most extraordinary display of pluck and energy I have ever witnessed, and only to be compared with the willingness of the entire detachment to suffer and risk their lives that Corporal Fagan might receive proper medical attendance. Every man in the detachment suffered intensely from sore feet and a great many had no shoes when I arrived in Cervantes. From the point from where I was compelled to turn back to Abuke's headquarters is but a day's march, and I was in an excellent position to reach there had I not been compelled to return. I received from prisoners considerable valuable information in regard to the number and distribution of Luchan's rifles, etc., which information I have submitted to the commanding officer northwest Samar, and among the prisoners captured, in number 6, are some who I think will prove valuable guides. The detachment at Cardoso is still in the field and no reports having been received I am unable to report upon its operations. The number of ladrones killed during the expedition was 26.

Very respectfully,

FRANK PRATT,
Second Lieutenant, First Infantry.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS NORTHWEST SAMAR,
January 28, 1902.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general Sixth Separate Brigade, Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

In forwarding this report I desire to express thereon my grief for the killing of Sergeant Prentice and wounding of Corporal Fagan, and in addition my great admiration for the pluck and endurance shown by the detachment. Having to abandon their objective when in one day's march of it, and with everything pointing to a successful campaign on their part, as they had found the "back door" to Abuke's barrio, on account of the impossibility of taking their wounded comrade with them, they made their way back to the Catarman River, a distance of over 20 miles. Corporal Fagan, with his fractured skull, walked the entire distance, crossing the Hibalognan River eleven times in one day (eight times being compelled to swim it), wading down the Cagmanaba River, which necessitated their climbing down or going around 23 waterfalls, the smallest of which was at least 10 feet high, and then poling on rafts the 28 miles to this place. This, without an opportunity, on account of the incessant rains, of cooking any food for three days, arriving here barefooted and barelegged and with their feet in a condition that can best be likened to raw beefsteak. I am of the opinion too much credit can not be given each and every indi-

vidual member of this detachment, and I therefore recommend that Second Lieut. Frank Pratt, First Infantry, be recommended for a "brevet" of first lieutenant in the Regular Army, that Corpl. John Fagan, Company I, First Infantry, be granted a certificate of merit, and that the members of the detachment be mentioned by name in orders. I inclose herewith a list of the men composing this detachment.

H. L. JACKSON,
Captain, First Infantry, Commanding.

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, February 8, 1902.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Department South Philippines.
Recommendations of first indorsement concurred in.

J. H. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[Third indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH PHILIPPINES,
Cebu, P. I., February 15, 1902.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Division of the Philippines.

Lieutenant Pratt and his detachment seem to have done their full duty in a very satisfactory manner, but I am unable to concur in the recommendations made in the first and second indorsements.

J. F. WADE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

Enlisted men on detached service in the field under command of Second Lieut. Frank Pratt, First Infantry, from January 22, 1902, to January 27, 1902: Sergeants. George Prentice, Samuel M. Murphy; Corporals. John Fagan, Jacob Love; Privates. Harry H. Bales, Robert L. Abston, Boaz Adkins, Harson Aldridge, Wesley Breeding, Eugene Brown, Granville B. Bryant, William Burk, Frank H. Cooper, Homer E. Curtis, Lee Duvall, Edward A. Lamphier, Frank B. Loback, John McGuigan, Owen S. Mercer, Charles F. Nauman, Charles H. Newport, Eugene Pennington, George T. Reid, Herbert L. Roby, Frank C. Robinson, William L. Schraag, Joe Sparkman, Jacob Sweitzer, Fred M. Van Arnam, Jake Bendursky.

LAGUAN, SAMAR, P. I., *February 23, 1902.*

The COMMANDING OFFICER, *Laguan, Samar, P. I.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

In accordance with verbal instructions received from the commanding officer Laguan, Samar, P. I., to again take the field in search of the insurgent general, Lucban, I started from Laguan at 6.30 a. m. February 12, 1902, with a column composed of 40 men, Company 39, Visayas, Philippine Scouts; 1 corporal and 8 privates, Company B, First U. S. Infantry; 1 private of the Hospital Corps, and 4 white scouts, with 70 native carriers carrying fifteen days' rations; boarded the steam launch *Comillas*, steamed up the Catubig to Tagabiran, where I arrived at 10 p. m. same day.

I disembarked my command at 5 a. m. February 13, and started along trail leading to a sitio called Sag-od, on the Sag-od River. At about 7 a. m. Private Luther Ward, Company B, First Infantry, stepped into a karang-kadang, which penetrated through his shoe and left foot, making him useless for further hiking, so I detailed 2 privates of Company B, First Infantry, to take him back to the launch, and proceeded on my march. Made camp at 5 p. m. on right bank of the Jopili River; started at day-break next morning, the 13th, and arrived on the left bank of the Sag-od about 7 a. m. This river is called the Sag-od, but is nothing more except the Catubig River above the falls. From there the Catubig changes its course to nearly due west. Crossed the Sag-od on a rope and struck into mountains between this river and the barrio of San Jose, or Buan, as it is sometimes called. After marching for about three hours the guide suddenly declared that we were on the wrong trail. This assertion necessitated a return march to the Sag-od, where the rest of the day was spent scouting along its banks and mountains in search of a trail. At 6 p. m. Sergt. Pedro Lora returned, stating that his guide had found the place from which he had started a month previous in company with Modisto, one of Lucban's guides. This night we

camped on the banks of the Sag-od. Early the next morning we again struck into the mountains over a trail indicated only here and there by a broken twig or leaf. At 12 m. the advance guard captured 3 men, 7 women, and 10 children living in a mountain cave near the dry bed of the Balasbas River. The odor of deer meat frying over a fire had put the scouts on their track. Made camp at 5 p. m. on the banks of a small mountain stream.

The country traversed this day was wild and inhospitable, the mountains being all of volcanic origin, and the sharp-pointed honeycombed rocks were hard on the men's feet. From early morning till evening only one tiny stream was encountered that contained any water. On the 16th I continued my march over the mountains to the Yava River, on the banks of which I arrived about 10 a. m. I followed this river in a southeasterly direction till about 1 p. m., when we arrived at a small clearing containing 3 small houses. Here we captured 1 man, 4 women, and 3 children, and a basket containing the clothing, uniform, and insignia of Second Lieut. Ponciano Jazmines. Upon being informed that quite a number of people were living in the visita of Yava, I concluded best to halt the column and capture everybody that was to be gotten. This was necessary, as I had to pass through this visita on my way to Tamay, where I believed Lukban to be. Four small scouting parties scouted through the surrounding mountains and ravines during the afternoon; one of them, under command of Corporal Repasa, did not get back until the afternoon of the 17th, having gone too far to return the same night, in their endeavor to capture the "teniente" of the visita of Yava. Corporal Repasa stated to me upon his return that he captured the outpost of "Teniente" Antonis at about 6 p. m. on the 16th, and made him lead the way to Antonis's house. In the dusk they were mistaken for insurgent soldiers by the natives, and by the time the "teniente" and his people, who lived in 6 small houses in a clearing, recovered from their surprise, they were prisoners of Repasa's squad. One of the natives made a fierce attack with a bolo on Corporal Repasa, who, taken unawares, dropped his rifle and went at his man in bolero style, with his bare hands; upon seeing the fight between the two men Corporal Briones came to his comrade's assistance and killed the bolero by breaking his head with the butt of his rifle. Corporal Repasa brought back the "teniente" of the visita, 4 men, 4 women, 3 children, and the latest reports of insurgent chiefs to Colonel Guevara, including a few recent letters from Lucban to "Teniente" Antonis and the ordnance stamp of Company C, Ninth U. S. Infantry. On the afternoon of the 17th another scouting party brought in 4 men, who had a basket of rice, a box of clothing, some dried carabao meat, about 3 pesos in copper coin, 1 peso in silver, and 2 pesetas and a letter from a "teniente" of a barrio on the upper Yava for Col. Claro Guevara. These 4 carriers were to deliver these goods to "Teniente" Antonis, who was to forward them to Guevara. Upon questioning Antonis he said that Lucban had left Tamay about the 1st of February and gone to Matarag near Matuguinao where he was then supposed to be with Colonel Guevara.

With this information I concluded to go first to Matarag, which was to be a three days' hike southwest of Yava and try and get Lucban and Guevara together. Accordingly I started out on the morning of the 18th, with 30 scouts of my company; 1 corporal and 4 men, Company B, First Infantry; a private of the Hospital Corps; 1 civilian scout, and 30 carriers with 8 days' rations; leaving 10 scouts; 1 man, Company B, First Infantry, and 3 civilian scouts, in command of Sergt. Tomas Estoliro, with the prisoners, carriers, and the rest of the rations in camp near the house of "Teniente" Antonis. About 11 a. m., as the advance guard neared the entrance of a tunnel through a mountain, a messenger emerged from its depths and was at once handed over to me. This man had in his possession a letter from Lucban, written on the 16th of February, and addressed to the "teniente" of Yava. The messenger stated that he had received the letter the same morning, about 4 a. m., from the "teniente" of Maleju. At last I was certain that I was on the right track and started the column at rapid gait up and down the mountains as fast as we could go. At 4 p. m. the advance guard espied an outpost about 200 yards ahead; quickly and silently the men advanced through the brush and in a few minutes the "Teniente" Pedro, of Maleju, found himself a prisoner with his Remington and 50 rounds of ammunition, though his boy made good his escape. Knowing that this man had given Lucban's letter that same morning to the messenger I inferred that Lucban himself could not be very far away from this man, and consequently I quickly persuaded him to tell me the truth, and in a few minutes' time he told me that Lucban and his adjutant were on top of a mountain two hours' hike from where we then were. Leaving the packers and a small guard behind, I started at once with the rest of the column, as fast as the brush and the rocks permitted, up the mountain, "Teniente" Pedro, of Maleju, leading. No trail of any sort led to Lucban's quarters, but in forty-five minutes' time we were within 50 yards of his place. Here I halted the column and sent 10 men, under Sergeant Bayona, over the mountain ridge, with orders to lie down in the brush in front and to the right of the three houses. As soon as these men had got-

ten to their position I advanced at a run with the rest of the column, taking him completely by surprise. When Lucban heard the noise of our feet running over the coral rock he came to the door with his secretary, to whom he had just been dictating a letter addressed to Capt. Basilio Dias, of Matuguinao. Seeing that escape was impossible, he descended to the ground, raising his hands up and calling "Paz." His secretary and muchacho did likewise. Upon perceiving me he exclaimed: "Good afternoon, Lieutenant; I am General Lucban, and now your prisoner." He then ordered his secretary, First Lieut. Luciano R. Ortiz, to turn over his (Lucban's) Winchester carbine and the lieutenant's revolver, with about 25 rounds of ammunition apiece. I then entered his house and took from him all his papers, but allowed no one to touch any of his property, of which he had but very little. All he had left were two suits of clothing and one pair of shoes. Everything else had been captured by Captain Jackson, First Infantry, last August, in Del Rosario, and by my men on last "hike," commanded by Captain Bell, First Infantry. There was nothing in the house except about 25 pounds of rice and a few "camotes." Speaking of his wife's capture in Del Rosario last August, he said that if Captain Jackson's men had not fired before they came near the house he would have been captured then, but, hearing the shots, he made good his escape without being wounded, as supposed. This had been a hard day on the command, as it rained nearly continuously all day, and only three stops were made, of only a few minutes' duration each, from daybreak until 5 p. m., over a rough and mountainous country. Thousands of "limatok" covered the trail, and those men who had no shoes suffered greatly, the blood running freely from their feet where these leeches would fasten themselves. However, fatigue and pain were forgotten after Lucban's capture. Lucban informed me that a few days previous he had ordered Guevara to the east coast and that he himself had only arrived at that mountain where we effected his capture at 3 p. m. on the 18th about two hours before his capture.

On the morning of the 19th I started on my return march, and camped that night at the visita of Yava, where I had left the rest of the force the day before. On the 20th, after dispatching "Teniente" Pedro, of Maleju, with a letter to Capt. Basilio Dias, written by his wife, asking him to surrender, I started again across the mountain region from Yava. No incident of any kind happened on the return march, and on the evening of the 21st I camped again on the left bank of the Sag-od River. From here Mr. Pickering, brother of Captain Pickering, First Infantry, who accompanied me on this expedition, and 7 scouts volunteered to continue the march to Tagabiran and from thence by barotos to Catubig to notify the commanding officer at that station to have boats at Tagabiran about 11 a. m., February 22, to take my command to Catubig. At 11 a. m., February 22, I arrived at Tagabiran, and there found Contract Surgeon Trew and a detachment of Company A, First Infantry, awaiting me with barotos. In these I embarked my men and arrived at Catubig at 2.30 p. m. Left Catubig at 7 p. m. on the launch *Comillas*, arriving at Laguan at 9.30 p. m., February 22, 1902.

The command marched in these ten days a distance of about 124 miles to place of capture and return, not counting the distance by boat to Tagabiran and return, which is about 28 miles south of Laguan. This makes the total distance from Laguan to Maleju about 90 miles south. The country traversed was mostly wild and mountainous, with hardly any trail to speak of. Though most of my men had only three days before they started on this "hike" returned from a seventeen days' "hike," and their feet were in no enviable condition when we started, they never complained, but were always cheerful and eager to obey my commands. One shot fired would have spoiled and brought to naught our work, but neither Corporal Repasa nor Briones fired that shot when the first named was attacked by the bolero. The whole detachment—members of Company B, First Infantry, as well as scouts—are deserving great credit for their excellent work, as without their hearty cooperation and intelligent execution of my commands I would never have been able to effect Lucban's capture. The credit lies with the men of my command. I especially wish to recommend Sergt. Pedro Lora, to whose intelligence and energy is due, more than any one else, that I found my way across the mountains. On our last "hike" under your command this man has shown his value, and this has simply been a repetition of the other.

I am sorry to state that a great part of my men are worn out at present, as they have been nearly continuously in the field since the company's arrival here on the 29th day of November, 1901.

Summary: Marched 124 miles; captured General Lucban, his secretary, Lieutenant Ortiz, 2 rifles, 1 revolver, about 100 rounds of ammunition, the latest correspondence of Colonel Guevara, and the clothing and insignia of Second Lieut. Ponciano Jazmines.

Very respectfully

A. STREBLER,
First Lieutenant, Philippine Scouts.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, March 4, 1902.

Respectfully forwarded through the adjutant-general Department South Philippines. I consider this report a very concise and graphic description of the country traversed by Lieutenant Strebler and his command. It is impossible for anyone not familiar with the interior of the island of Samar to form any conception of the difficulties and hardships experienced on this expedition. Lieutenant Strebler and his entire command are deserving of the highest commendation, as this may well be considered one of the most important captures made in the Philippine Islands. It is confidently expected that with the capture of General Lucban the insurrection in Samar will soon be crushed.

It is strongly recommended that Lieutenant Strebler be commissioned first lieutenant in the Regular Service and that Sergt. Pedro Lora be commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Philippine Scouts.

J. H. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH PHILIPPINES,
Cebu, P. I., March 10, 1902.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Division of the Philippines, Manila, P. I.

Lieutenant Strebler conducted this expedition, resulting in the capture of Lucban, with great energy and intelligence. His appointment in the Regular Service is recommended.

Sergt. Pedro Lora, Thirty-ninth Company, Native Scouts, has earned promotion. His appointment as a second lieutenant of Native Scouts is recommended.

J. F. WADE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

PARANAS, SAMAR, *February 24, 1902.*

THE ADJUTANT, CATBALOGAN, SAMAR.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report:

On February 21, 1902, I sent a detachment of 21 men of Company E, Twenty-first Infantry, and 27 natives to the barrio of Beri (situated near the Calbiga-Borongon trail and about halfway across the island) for the purpose of capturing Eugenio Daza, an insurrecto major, who was in command at the Balangiga fight, and 25 rifles. The detachment was commanded by Sergt. Charles A. Shawger, of my company. The detachment returned to-day.

The object of the expedition was not accomplished, as they found, on arriving at Beri, that the major and riflemen had left for Basey five days before and were now in the vicinity of that place.

The detachment was twice attacked by about 200 bolomen, dressed in a uniform consisting of black shirts trimmed with red and with red handkerchiefs tied around their heads, evidently "diosdios" men. The detachment killed 80 of them. One of the friendly natives from Paranas received a bad bolo cut on the hand. This was the only casualty on our side.

Sergeant Shawger says both attacks were sudden and fierce and he admired the bravery of the enemy. The men of the company, as well as the natives, acted bravely and with great coolness.

Very respectfully,

W. M. SWAINE,
Captain, First Infantry, Commanding Company E.

APPENDIX G.

REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. GEORGE W. DAVIS, U. S. A., COMMANDING
SEVENTH SEPARATE BRIGADE.

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
*Zamboanga, P. I., August 1, 1902.*THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: The last annual report of the Department of Mindanao and Jolo contained an account of military operations to about the end of May, 1901. It results that this report, bringing down the record to the close of the fiscal year, will relate to a period of one year and one month.

The only change in the geographical limits of the command resulted from the segregation of the island of Paragua with the adjacent Cuyos and Calamianes groups, this in pursuance of General Orders, No. 30, Division of the Philippines. The change took place on March 1, 1902.

The official designation of this command as a geographical department was discontinued on the 30th of November, 1901, in pursuance of General Orders, No. 148, War Department, same year, and thereafter, without territorial change, it was known as the Seventh Separate Brigade, this in pursuance of General Orders, No. 354, Division of the Philippines, 1901, a designation which, subsequent to October 31 preceding, had been applied to the troops serving in the Department of Mindanao and Jolo, as required by General Orders, No. 311, Division of the Philippines.

On the 31st of August the undersigned assumed temporary command of the Department of Mindanao and Jolo in pursuance of General Orders, No. 207, Division of the Philippines, 1901, and the former commander, Brig. Gen. W. A. Kobbé, U. S. Army, took his departure on leave of absence. When the Department was discontinued on November 30, command over the troops had devolved upon the undersigned by General Orders, No. 354, Division of the Philippines, above cited, a command which he had already been exercising for the preceding three months.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

General Orders, No. 30, 1899, office of the military governor in the Philippine Islands, appointed Brig. Gen. W. A. Kobbé, U. S. Volunteers, military governor of the district of Mindanao and Jolo, and in pursuance of General Orders, No. 1, Division of the Philippines, 1900, district commanders, when instructed by the commanding generals of departments, were required to supervise matters connected with civil government, as might be required by the military governor of the islands.

General Otis was designated by the President to exercise the functions of military governor in the Philippines (see Executive Order of March 27, 1900). On May 4, 1900, General MacArthur succeeded to the duties and responsibilities of command and government, and on July 4, 1901, Major-General Chaffee relieved General MacArthur as commanding general, and also as military governor, but his authority in the latter capacity did not apply to the regions in which civil provincial government had already extended or should thereafter extend. The only provinces in Mindanao over which civil rule had been applied are the two northern ones, Misamis and Surigao.

Within the unorganized territory it is understood that military government has been continuous and still prevails, only that the military governor has no power of appointment and control over the civil officers (who are paid out of civil funds) such as judges, fiscals, collectors of revenue and customs, school-teachers, and forestry agents.

The foregoing recital of facts and authorities is introduced here in order that there may be set forth the basis for the position taken; that the present brigade commander, as the successor of General Kobbe, was still required to perform the duties or exercise such functions of civil government in the unorganized territory of Mindanao and Jolo as may pertain to the exercise of his command, or as might be delegated to him by the military governor in Manila.

Acting within the prescription of cited orders, the officers locally commanding at or near Jolo, Siassi, Bongao, Dapitan, Cotabato, Paran-paran, Tamontaca, Davao, Mati, Caraga, Baganga, and Catei, have exercised authority to preserve the peace and control the local administration of the Christian inhabitants of these towns, which were organized municipally in accordance with the provisions of General Orders, No. 43, 1899, or General Orders, No. 40 of 1900, office of the military governor in the Philippines.

In respect to the government of Zamboanga, the conditions are quite unlike those obtaining elsewhere. In this place municipal civil rule under the code was implanted on July 1, 1901, and since that date the municipality of Zamboanga, as respects local government, has been autonomous, but as no provincial government exists, and as the District of Zamboanga (called Comandancia during Spanish times) was under military government, it remained for the commanding general, as the delegate of the military governor in Manila, to carry out the provisions of the municipal code, that required a supervision by the military over municipalities which were not situated in organized provinces.

In act 82 of the Philippine Commission it is required that the municipal code shall not apply to non-Christian tribes, and in acts 127 and 128, which extend the provincial government act to Misamis and Surigao, there is a declaration to the effect that the provisions of these acts do not apply to the non-Christian tribes residing within the limits of those two provinces. It followed that the government of the Moros and savages remained with the military.

It seems clear from the orders and laws cited above that the commanding general of the Seventh Separate Brigade is charged with the following-described duties:

1. To command the troops and see that there is a correct administration of staff duties throughout the brigade.

2. To exercise the authority of a military governor in respect to civil affairs over all the territory that is not provincially or municipally organized, and to preserve the peace therein.

3. As respects the municipality of Zamboanga to exercise the supervision over its affairs, which would pertain to the provincial governor and the provincial board if the provincial code had been extended to this town.

4. As respects the Moros and other non-Christian tribes living within the provinces of Misamis and Surigao, to maintain peace and preserve order among them, and to protect the civilized inhabitants.

Following this prefatory statement of the duties of the brigade commander, will be found an account of the more notable military incidents, and a statement respecting civil affairs.

THE SEVENTH SEPARATE BRIGADE.

The strength of the command and changes in same that have taken place since June 1, 1901, are tabulated below so as to show these at a glance.

Organization.	May 31, 1901.			Dec. 31, 1901.			June 30, 1902.		
	Offi- cers.	En- listed men.	Total.	Offi- cers.	En- listed men.	Total.	Offi- cers.	En- listed men.	Total.
Headquarters	6	6	8	8	11	11
Post noncommissioned staff	4	4	12	12	13	13
Medical department	8	124	132	15	118	132	20	173	193
Engineers	8	110	113	4	196	202
Signal corps	15	15	20	20	1	28	29
Fifteenth Cavalry	6	473	479	15	491	506	36	1,020	1,066
Twenty-fifth Battery Field Artillery	4	102	106
Tenth Infantry	19	1,142	1,161	15	1,011	1,026	29	1,136	1,165
Seventeenth Infantry	22	1,167	1,179
Twenty-third Infantry	28	1,173	1,201
Twenty-seventh Infantry	86	1,898	1,434
Philippine Scouts	506	506	5	173	178	4	194	198
Total	67	3,437	3,504	83	3,092	3,175	145	4,262	4,407
Attached	4	4	6	7	13	5	5

DEPARTMENT AND BRIGADE STAFF.

On June 1, 1901, the roster of the Department of Mindanao and Jolo showed the following general and staff officers present for duty:

Brig. Gen. W. A. Kobbé, U. S. Army, commanding the department; Capt. John J. Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, acting assistant adjutant-general; Capt. S. A. Cloman, Twenty-third Infantry, inspector-general; Lieut. Col. J. N. Morrison, Judge-Advocate's Department, judge-advocate; Capt. I. L. Fredendall, Quartermaster's Department, chief quartermaster; Capt. T. B. Hacker, Subsistence Department, chief commissary; Lieut. Col. P. F. Harvey, Medical Department, chief surgeon; Capt. Robert S. Smith, Pay Department, chief paymaster; Capt. F. W. Kobbé, Twenty-eighth Infantry, acting engineer officer; Capt. C. F. Parker, Artillery Corps, signal and ordnance officer.

On June 30, 1902, the roster of the Seventh Separate Brigade showed the following general and staff officers for duty: Brig. Gen. George W. Davis, U. S. Army, commanding the brigade; First Lieut. Henry S. Wagner, Fourteenth Infantry, aid-de-camp; Maj. S. W. Fountain, U. S. Cavalry, Adjutant-General's Department, adjutant-general and acting judge-advocate; Maj. J. S. Pettit, U. S. Infantry, Inspector-General's Department, inspector-general, and in charge of civil affairs of Zamboanga; Maj. J. E. Sawyer, Quartermaster's Department, chief quartermaster; Capt. A. M. Davis, Subsistence Department, chief commissary; Maj. Chas. Richard, Medical Department, chief surgeon; Capt. J. J. Morrow, Corps of Engineers, engineer officer; Second Lieut. Jas. A. Higgins, Thirtieth Infantry, acting signal officer and ordnance officer.

All matters affecting the pay of the army were administered from headquarters, Department of South Philippines, but Capt. R. S. Smith, Pay Department, was stationed at brigade headquarters and made pay trips from that station.

DISTRICTS AND POSTS.

In June, 1901, this department was subdivided into four districts, designated numerically, the senior officer present for duty in each having authority to make dispositions to meet emergencies, and was responsible for correct administration; but this designation was discontinued when the brigade organization took the place of the departmental one, and thereafter the troops occupying certain adjacent stations came under the control of the senior of the officers commanding the several detachments, all of which detachments constituted a post or command of a single officer. He could move troops as emergency might require without waiting to hear from the brigade commander, but without superior authority he could not permanently change the stations of any organization, staff, or noncommissioned staff officers. On June 1, 1901, the troops were distributed between 29 stations, but these included the Paragua Archipelago, while at the present time there are but 20, taking no account of Paragua, which has been transferred to another brigade. The discontinuance of active operations against insurgents permitted the reduction of the force on the north coast of Mindanao and the abandonment of several stations.

MILITARY OPERATIONS.

The Filipino insurrection.—At the date of the last annual report there was only one locality where resistance to American sovereignty continued, i. e., the western part of Misamis Province. Here there had been active operations the previous year, carried on by the Fortieth Volunteer Infantry. The insurgent leaders were Vicente Álvarez and Rufino Deloso, the former a native of Zamboanga and the latter of the island of Cebu or of Leyte.

Álvarez, through a capture—which was a virtual surrender—gave up this struggle the previous October and was confined as a military prisoner in Manila, but Deloso continued in command of a force variously estimated at from three to four hundred insurgents and whose arms included some 30 or more rifles. With him were also 4 American deserters from the volunteers. In June, 1901, this chief, with a considerable part of his following, moved by land to the Lake Lanao country for the purpose, as currently reported, of raising the Malanao Moros and securing their assistance in continuing the war. He is also reported to have taken with him to the lake some twenty to twenty-five thousand dollars in silver. The movement was at once known to our troops, and attempts were made to intercept him near Misamis, but this failed. A force of about 100 native scouts was also sent from Zamboanga to Tucuran, on the south side of the isthmus, and Deloso's trail followed toward the lake for two days; but he was a week in advance and the troops turned back, for it was not deemed to be expedient at that time to enter the hostile Moro country with so small a force.

The Malanaos proved hostile or unfriendly toward the insurrectos. There was some fighting, and quite a number of Filipinos and Moros were killed. Deloso reached the lake at a rancheria named Watu and remained in the vicinity some two months. As purchase money for supplies sold to him and as loot, the Moros are said to have secured possession of all the insurrecto silver.

In August Deloso was back in the western part of Misamis, but seemed to have no considerable organized following in any one locality or ever after to have assembled any large force, for the troops resumed active operations against him and the ladrone bands which still infested the country.

Within a very few days after the return of the insurrecto chief from the Moro country at an interview with Captain Ryan, Fifteenth Cavalry, Deloso promised in a week to surrender himself and his followers, but the promise was not kept. He did not, however, operate persistently against our troops, nor could any considerable force of his followers be found in any one place; yet there were many killings, simple murders, of innocent Filipinos, and the troops were also sufferers from the acts of the outlaws who, as insurrectos or ladrone, still infested the country lying west of Iligan Bay. On September 18 a sentinel on post at Langaran was killed, and on November 18 three soldiers employed in extending a telegraph line toward Langaran were treacherously boloded by ladrone or insurrectos disguised as peaceable natives, some of whom had already taken the oath of allegiance to the United States.

On the 7th of April Deloso, with 3 other officers, surrendered to the constabulary commandant at Oroquieta. On the 18th of the same month there was a further surrender of 16 officers and 375 men, whose arms included 20 rifles of various patterns, and since that date 30 more men have surrendered, turning in 6 rifles and 10 pistols.

Lieutenant Elliott reports the surrender as follows:

OROQUIETA, MINDANAO, P. I., *April 21, 1902.*

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL SEVENTH SEPARATE BRIGADE.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the surrender of Gen. Rufino Deloso and his forces to the constabulary at this post.

On the 7th instant General Deloso, with 1 captain and 2 lieutenants, presented themselves to Senior Inspector J. H. Green, of the constabulary, with the assurance that the remainder of his forces, with their arms, would present themselves as soon as they could be gathered together. On the 18th instant 3 majors, 4 captains, 9 lieutenants, and 375 men, with 3 Krag-Jørgensen rifles, 2 Krag-Jørgensen carbines, 1 Springfield carbine, 1 Winchester rifle, 4 Remington carbines, 9 Remington rifles, with about 1,000 rounds of ammunition, 396 bolos and knives, surrendered.

Rufino reports this to be a complete surrender of all his forces north and west of Oroquieta, and that not more than 35 men and 10 rifles of his entire force yet remain out, which were scattered at such a distance from his place of rendezvous that he could not get them together in time to come with the rest. He expects, however, that the remainder of the arms and men will come in in the near future. All of the officers and men who surrendered took oath of allegiance, and were given freedom to return to their homes by Senior Inspector Green.

Of the arms surrendered, 2 Krag-Jørgensen carbines were recognized as those carried by Privates William J. Jonas and John R. Joe, Troop D, Fifteenth Cavalry, who were murdered near Manila, with Corporal Hutson's construction party on telephone line, November 18, 1901. Many of the officers and men who presented themselves were recognized as men who had previously surrendered to the military authorities of this post or had been taken prisoners and liberated and taken the oath of allegiance.

From a personal observation and conversation with Rufino, I believe the surrender is complete and that all of his officers and men are contented and satisfied to return to their homes and go to work. Rufino made a speech to his officers and men before disbanding and advised them to return to their homes, go to work, and to abide by the Government of the United States. He seemed to have thorough control over all his officers and men, as well as many principals who had assembled here for his surrender from the different towns from Misamis to Langaran. The best of feeling seems to prevail among the people of this vicinity, and it appears that the district is thoroughly pacified.

In my interview Rufino stated that the first communication received from Inspector Green leading up to the surrender was brought to him in March, in his camp at Tuburan, far back in the mountains west of Oroquieta, by Hilarian Tamini, former major of his forces, who surrendered here to the military authorities in October, 1901. Tamini was employed as secret-service man by Senior Inspector Green upon my recommendation. Subsequent communications brought about an interview between Rufino and the constabulary, where arrangements were made for the sur-

render. In my opinion, the main reasons why the constabulary were successful in their undertaking are that they were provided with a liberal amount of funds to employ in secret-service work and for other purposes; also that they had the authority to grant any liberal terms to such class of men. Inspector Green had the cooperation of the principal men of the municipalities along the coast, many of them former officers of Rufino. Their influence and labor was of much assistance to him.

Rufino informed me that it was his belief that he would get more liberal terms from the civil than the military authorities, and that his main reason for holding out so long was that he was waiting to see how the general cause of the Filipinos would turn out and to observe the drift of the civil administration. He also stated that after his return from the Moro country he had ordered many of his officers and men to return to their homes and keep him informed in regard to the sentiment of our Congress with respect to the Philippines and the drift of the Administration; that it was not his intention to take any more active part in the insurrection until further developments in the administration of the islands. In case the insurrection was continued, he had made arrangements for arms to be shipped in quantities of 50 at a time from Borneo. He believes that his followers will run down and capture any outlaws remaining out. His intentions are to make Oroquieta his home for the present and to go to Manila in the near future to have an interview with the civil governor regarding matters pertaining to the province and about the Moros and Monteses, of which, by his close association with them, he has gained much valuable information. He was satisfied with the treatment he and his followers received from the military authorities. The military and constabulary at Oroquieta have been working together in bringing about this surrender, and their relations are as friendly as could be.

Aneceto Villamor, private, of former Company B, native scouts, who deserted from Langaran in August, 1901, taking with him his rifle, belt, and ammunition, and joined the insurgents, came in with Rufino's forces. I placed him under arrest, and now have him in confinement.

Rufino reports that the two American deserters from Misamis were disarmed and left in the mountains with the Monteses, and that the American deserters, Morgan and Miller, from Oroquieta, were killed some time ago near Manilla by his own men.

Very respectfully,

W. B. ELLIOTT,
First Lieutenant, Thirtieth Infantry, Commanding.

OROQUIETA, MINDANAO, April 20, 1902.

General DAVIS, Zamboanga, Mindanao:

I wish to thank you for the assistance your commanding officer, Lieutenant Elliott, gave me in bringing about the surrender of Gen. Rufino Deloso and his forces.

GREEN, *Inspector.*

The commanding officer at Oroquieta wired as follows:

OROQUIETA, MINDANAO, P. I., July 15, 1902.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, ZAMBOANGA, MINDANAO, P. I.:

Referring to your wire of the 12th, since Rufino surrendered 30 men have presented themselves to Inspector Green, with 6 rifles, 10 pistols, and 4 unserviceable shotguns.

WILLITS.

These surrenders were not made directly to the troops, for Deloso says he held out to watch the course of events in the Philippines, and that he surrendered to the constabulary because he could secure better terms from them than from the Army. There can be no doubt, however, that the pressure applied by the Army was the prime cause for his giving up a struggle that had already been waged for more than two years and was impossible of continuance.

It will be observed that Deloso is reported to have said that after he returned from the Moro country he had abstained from active operations, but it appears that two of the rifles he surrendered were the identical arms taken from two of the soldiers who were murdered near Manilla on November 18, which seems to prove that he or his men did not, in fact, abstain from hostilities.

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT.

On the 15th of May, 1901, the old comandancias of Misamis and Surigao were the subjects of legislation of the Philippine Commission, the object of which was to effect the civil government of these districts, to be thereafter denominated provinces.

At the date of the passage of these two acts the insurgents were not active, and the military governor in Manila recommended the enactment of the measures which are now found as Statutes No. 127 and 128 of the Commission.

On July 3 the department commander reported the dispersal or capture of the insurrecto forces in West Misamis, and that Rufino Deloso was a fugitive. One rumor had it that, enriched with booty, he had returned to his home in the Visayas, while another declared his purpose to present himself to the military authorities at Zamboanga. What he actually did was to furlough some of his men and march with the rest to the lake country to secure Moro reinforcements for a more active prosecution of the war. Failing to secure desired and expected help, he came back to west Misamis in August, as above stated, and thereafter the condition of affairs in that part of the province was about as unsatisfactory as could be imagined.

The undersigned relieved the former department commander on the last day of August, 1901, on which date it was known that the insurgent chief was back in his old haunts. Active campaigning with the object of establishing peace and good order was in progress; in fact, it had never been interrupted.

General Orders, No. 179 of 1901, Division of the Philippines, July 20 of that year, directed the troops to abstain from any interference with the civil authorities in the organized provinces of the Philippines, and enjoined that the Army should not be used in preserving the peace except under certain conditions which were stated in the order. Before the 4th of July, 1901, the military had been responsible for peace and good order everywhere in the Philippines. The new relations of the military to the civil power were set forth in the division order just cited. The ability of the civil authorities to relieve the Army from responsibility for the peace of the organized territories where disturbances continued was measured by the state of organization, strength, etc., of the civil police. In regions where the constabulary had not been organized the military still remained responsible. That was the exact situation which existed in west Misamis, certainly up to the end of the year 1901.

The towns were autonomous, as contemplated by the municipal code, except that they had no adequate police force to cope with the insurgent and ladrone element that infested the country, but the provincial governor who had himself been the leader of the Filipino forces, and who had but a few months before submitted to the United States authority, expressed himself openly in opposition to the continuance of military supervision, and the relations which existed between the civil officials and some army officers were not cordial and friendly.

The army officers at Misamis, Jimenez, Loculan, Oroquieta, and Langaran had indubitable proof of the fact that supplies and intelligence of military operations were constantly being carried to the insurrecto and ladrone chiefs, who were hiding in the mountains, and some expeditions sent out to break up and destroy these bands were rendered abortive or ineffective because news of the movements and their objective preceded the expeditions themselves. Clear proof of such action and of furnishing supplies was secured, proving without a question the treachery of the municipal officials of one town, and in December they were summarily arrested and suspended from office by the local military commander. This was followed by the tender of the resignation of his office by the civil governor of Misamis.

The officer in charge of the Philippine constabulary visited the locality, an inspector of this force was ordered thither, and many constables were added to the police force. In January the civil governor of the Philippines reported his readiness to assume charge of all matters pertaining to civil government in west Misamis, and on February 7, 1902, the military was relieved from all responsibility for preserving the peace in this region, and the troops at all stations in the west part of this province were ordered to be withdrawn; but in response to the request of the inspector of constabulary one company of native scouts was retained in two of the towns to cooperate with the insular constabulary in assisting in the work of that corps.

This incident of service is here referred to at some length for the reason that it has been cited as a case of the unwarranted interference by the military with civil government.

Absolute peace appears now to prevail throughout Misamis, but it has not been secured without a long struggle; it had to be conquered, and the burden fell to the Army, of course. Here on a small scale, as in Samar and Batangas on a much larger scale, the work was most arduous, and only a strong devotion to duty by officers and men and a willingness to prove it by the sacrifice of their lives, if necessary, in carrying into effect the orders of their superiors, has made civil government possible in that part of Misamis.

It may be that officers in local command in construing their orders and instructions have in some instances exceeded their authority, but their purpose ever was to

make treason odious, and success at last crowned their efforts. Deloso and his followers were fought and chased until they neither dared to assemble nor show themselves in any hostile attitude, and then gave up. But before they were brought to this mood they had to be thoroughly whipped.

MORO OPERATIONS.

The Amirul incident.—Some time before the evacuation of Mindanao by the Spanish troops Andang, a brother of Dato Udassan, of Malabang, was killed in the Cotabato Valley, near Tamontaca, by the followers of Piang. About this time or soon after a follower of Udassan named Budi seceded from his former overlord and joined Piang.

This Moro lived at Callalanuan, between Paran-paran and Malabang, and he was raided by Udassan on several occasions, once on April 3, 1900, when property valued at \$300 was taken from him. On May 24 Callalanuan was again attacked by Udassan, and 31 men, women, and children were carried off.

Dato Udassan said in a letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Brett, commander at Paran-paran, that his reason for attacking Budi was that this man was a vassal of his forefather and was then his enemy.

On April 29 Lieutenant-Colonel Brett, Thirty-first Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, with Lieutenant Castle, Thirty-first Infantry, commanding 26 men of Company H of the same regiment and 100 of Piang's Moros from Cotabato (among whom were 60 armed with rifles), proceeded to Malabang to demand satisfaction for the raiding of Callalanuan.

The Malabang Moros were found inside a small Spanish blockhouse near the landing, and a parley ensued between the American officer and the occupants of the blockhouse, talking across the stream, 100 yards wide. Brett's troops and his Moros were strung out along the beach. He asked to see Udassan, but a Moro chief named Amirul came out and said the one wanted had gone to the mountains. Brett believed this to be untrue and he told Amirul he proposed to search the blockhouse, to which the latter assented, provided Brett brought no arms, and then he walked off. At this moment Brett turned to order up the soldiers to attack the blockhouse. Instantly a shot was fired, but from whence or by whom no one could swear positively. Some said it was fired from near the blockhouse and others said it was fired by Catog, a Piang Moro. Then firing became general on both sides, troops and Moros. The affair ended by a withdrawal of the troops and Rio Grande Moros and their concealment under the steep bank at the beach until they could be reembarked. Dato Amirul, together with 14 other Malabang Moros was killed, but no soldier was hit, and only one of Piang's men was wounded. This affair has been the occasion of much hard feeling on the part of the Lake Lanao Moros toward the Americans and the Rio Grande Moros. It seems certain that had Lieutenant-Colonel Brett been unaccompanied by Piang's adherents there would have been no difficulty in reaching an imicable understanding. The Lake Moros have long been on bad terms with those from the Rio Grande, and the presence of the latter was considered by the others as a hostile act.

The facts as narrated above are taken from the reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Brett, Major McMahon, and the inspector-general of the department, who investigated the affair, together with the complaint entered respecting it by Dato Dacula, who was a blood relation of Amirul. This complaint was received by the department commander in June, 1900, and was replied to by letter on the 2d of the same month. The following is a translation of the letter of Dacula:

"Letter from the Dato Dacula, of Cumalarang, to his friend, the American general of Zamboanga, to whom I send my best regards.

"I advise you that my son, Amirul Umbra, of Mindanao, was murdered at Malabang by people of Dato Piang. This people went to Malabang on four crafts towed by American boats, having told the Americans that they were going there for the purpose of calling upon Amirul and put a claim before him against Moro Udassan. Amirul told them that as he did not know the whereabouts of Udassan, he could do nothing, and suggested that they investigate themselves, allowing him to retire, not being acquainted with said Udassan. On taking leave of the Americans, he went in the direction of his vinta, and while on his way there some people of Dato Piang, who came from one of the crafts towed by the American boats, snatched the kriss away from one of the companions of Amirul. This, on hearing of such insult, brought his vinta back to the beach and took back the said kriss.

"As he was leaving the rancheria the people of Piang fired upon his party by order of their chief, Dato Inuk, and his people doing the shooting together with the Americans, and killing Dato Amirul on the spot.

"There is no reason why Piang and the Americans should behave in such a manner. When the American Government took possession of the archipelago the sultan of Mindanao was told by them that in establishing themselves here they would attach us to them through friendship. The sultan then issued an order forbidding the datos to cause any conflict to the Americans.

"Beside this, the sultan was promised that for the trial of any of his subjects by the Americans the sultan's opinion would be heard. Being it so, how is it that the American authorities tolerate the people of Piang to commit certain abuses?

"Therefore I beg the American authorities, including the general, if he is a good friend of us and of the sultan of Mindanao, to comply with what has been agreed. We do not want any help, but we neither want you to help the others; that is to say, Dato Piang. The Spaniards may not have been good, but during their domination, which extended for three hundred years, never a similar case occurred and never one of my subjects was imprisoned. The American Government, which is only here three years, has already given us motive for disgust. I truly regret what happened to my nephew Amanicapal and to my grandson Andang. The killing of ten or twenty thousand of Piang's people could not satisfy me. Had they been killed by datos equal to them I might be less regretful."

This incident is here related in some detail, because it resulted in bitter feeling of the Malabang and Lake Moros toward the native inhabitants of the Rio Grande Valley, and has had an important bearing upon the intercourse between us and the Malanaos, as the Lake Moros call themselves. In April of this year a council with these people was had at Malabang and another council at Fort Gandungan on April 28, and the visit of the Americans to the lake was mentioned. On both occasions the Moros referred to the killing of Amirul with bitterness, and satisfaction for the outrage was asked.

The incident dates back to a time anterior to command by the undersigned, and a characterization of the tragedy and comment respecting it are therefore omitted.

The Sugut incident.—On September 25, 1901, an unarmed Moro living near Paran-paran, once friendly to the Americans, was murdered by a band of Moros living near Sugut, 7 miles from Paran-paran.

These Moros were followers of Dato Amani Mindang, who at that time had shown a hostile or unfriendly disposition toward the Americans. On the evening of September 25 an officer and 32 men from Paran-paran, with a native guide and civilian, proceeded toward the village of the offenders—this with the permission of the district commander, Major Febiger. The object of the expedition was to demand surrender of the murderers. The village of Dato Mindang was reached about 7 o'clock on the morning of September 26, surrender demanded and refused. A fight ensued, resulting in the killing of the Filipino scout, the wounding slightly of the officer commanding, and the death of the dato and 11 of his people. The Moros belonged to a ladrone gang, and the neighboring Moros were much gratified that the freebooter had received merited punishment.

EXPLORATIONS.

The results of Spanish explorations of Mindanao and Jolo were not well known to Americans, and the interior of the great island of Mindanao continues to be almost unknown. The policy pursued by the United States during the last century with respect to our own unexplored western country involved the use of the Army, not only to subdue and civilize the savage inhabitants of the mountains and plains, but also to make clearer to future settlers and miners the topography and other physical aspects of the vast unoccupied region west of the Mississippi. The same policy has been followed in Mindanao, and the troops stationed in the vicinity of these unexplored regions have been constantly utilized to collect data respecting the topography, trails, routes available for roads, character of the soil, as well as the numbers and condition of the native inhabitants. The southern portion of the Rio Grande Valley and the highlands lying west of the Gulf of Davao were traversed by several exploring parties, and our knowledge of their real resources has been greatly extended. An officer with a small detachment ascended the Rio Grande to near its source, and crossing the divide proceeded to the north coast of Mindanao via the northern drainage. Everywhere the detachments and explorers were received with kindness by the Moro inhabitants, and wild mountain savages also, as soon as the timidity of the latter could be overcome. A trail was explored and opened through from Paran-paran to the important military station of Malabang, and although a little known Moro region the troops were not molested by the natives. It was not until March, 1902, that there was objection made to our traversing the country at will.

ATTACK ON LIEUTENANT FORSYTH.

On March 15 of this year a detachment of one officer and 17 enlisted men, while following a trail to the north of Paran-paran toward Lake Lanao, without warning of any kind were fired upon by a large band of Moros and one man killed at a place about 25 miles from the post. Friendly runners had already been sent ahead to notify the inhabitants of the proposed excursion through their country of a few men "on a peaceful mission of exploration, observation, and better friendly acquaintance." The attacking force was so numerous and the country so densely wooded and difficult that the officer commanding fell back. He was again fired upon, and, conforming to his instructions, he withdrew toward Paran-paran, but was forced off the trail he had used in the advance, and his horses had to be abandoned in the jungle, as also was the body of the soldier who had been killed.

MORO AGGRESSIONS.

A few days later a soldier walking for pleasure a mile outside the post of Paran-paran was killed—probably by Moros—but this was not established as a fact. On March 30, 1902, 2 soldiers out from Malabang for recreation were set upon by 6 Moros; 1 soldier was killed, the other escaped wounded. The names and identity of the assailants were very soon learned from friendly Moros, nor was there any question whence came those who attacked the detachment of explorers from Paran-paran. All were from the south shore of Lake Lanao. Bayan was the name of the largest rancheria in the neighborhood, whence had also come those who had stolen cattle from Malabang the previous year.

SPANISH OPERATIONS.

Just before the change of sovereignty about 40 points in Mindanao and Jolo were occupied by the military, but the Spanish force was not greater than the American now occupying the same region. Our detachments are less numerous, but with greater average strength. The Spanish forces serving in Mindanao, Sulu, and Paragua in normal times consisted of enlisted men, as follows:

Spanish artillery	116
Native engineers (3 companies)	300
Native "disciplinarios" (4 companies)	400
Native infantry, principally "deportados" (3 regiments and 1 additional company)	3,360
Total	4,176

In 1891 a campaign against the Lake Lanao Moros was undertaken by the Spanish governor, and this was still in progress when the war with the United States commenced. The Spanish forces serving in Mindanao during General Blanco's administration and subsequently were largely increased. There were upward of 3,000 men at the north end of the lake guarding the road thereto from Iligan and manning the gunboats on the lake, but all were withdrawn by December, 1898.

For the meager knowledge we possess respecting the lake country and its inhabitants we are indebted to the Spanish records and published letters of the Jesuit missionaries. It is stated in these records that the Spanish explorers penetrated to the lake from the north and also from the south as early as 1639, but the accounts are very meager. It is admitted that the Spanish troops were forcibly expelled a year or two after the date above given. Thereafter the country remained unknown, and, so far as we know, was unvisited by Europeans until 1890. This year General Weyler, the governor of Mindanao, organized an expedition for the conquest of the lake country, and the following year forts were built on the southern coast at Baras and Malabang. The expedition consisted of some 600 men, almost all native Filipinos, but never succeeded in advancing more than 10 miles from the coast, or halfway to the nearest point on the lake. The next year an expedition also started for the lake from Iligan on the north coast and from Malabang on the south, the troops being commanded by General Weyler. He penetrated to the lake at the point on the north shore where it discharges through the Agus River. The accounts say that three cotas were taken and many Moros killed, but the latter assert that the Spaniards lost heavily. Whatever the fact, it is certain that the Spanish column returned to the coast and that no points were then permanently occupied or held by the Spanish forces. About this time a line of blockhouses was built across the

Tucuran isthmus west of the lake, and these points, as well as the coast points, Baras, Malabang, and Liangan, and one 10 miles from the coast on the Agus River, were held until the Spaniards evacuated the country in 1898.

Governor-General Blanco concentrated a large force at Iligan and carried out systematic operations for an advance by constructing a good wagon road 21 miles long to Lanao, which was made secure by the construction of a dozen or more blockhouses. Marahui, at the northern outlet of the lake, was occupied by a large force. Materials for constructing several small steel vessels, prepared in Hongkong, were transported over the road, assembled, and the boats were launched upon the lake. A slip for docking the boats was built, barracks and storehouses constructed, and the conditions in 1898 were all favorable for the rapid subjugation of these savage Moros. When the war came on between the United States and Spain the forces of the latter power were all pressingly needed elsewhere; the Lanao country was abandoned and the gunboats sunk in the deepest waters.

When the American troops occupied the coast points at Iligan and Malabang, in the year 1899, the Moros were again in undisputed possession of the interior, and no attempt was made to penetrate to their country.

The Spanish estimate of the population of the Lanao region gives the numbers all the way from 250,000 to 400,000, but authority for these figures has not been ascertained. After careful inquiry, the opinion is ventured that the Lanao population has been very greatly overstated in works that are now commonly cited as authorities.

HOSTILITIES IMMINENT.

The murders of unoffending members of the army stationed along the seacoast of Mindanao could not be permitted to pass if it was intended to continue to occupy the country and maintain United States sovereignty. Colonel Baldwin, the commandant at Paran-paran—two, and perhaps three, of whose soldiers had been murdered, and 21 head of whose horses and mules had been seized by these Lake Moros—asked for additional troops and authority to punish the aggressors. On the 20th of March, 1902, the authority asked for was granted, the additional force was ordered to be supplied, and preparations were at once begun for an expedition to the lake.

A PEACE MESSENGER.

About the end of March the Sherif Mohammed Afdal, an Afghan and Moham-medan priest, residing with Dato Ali in the Rio Grande Valley (to whose daughter the sheriff is married), and who had, during the Spanish times, lived in the lake country, was induced to go on a mission of peace to Lanao and explain to the natives why the American troops were preparing to visit the lake, and the necessity for the Moros to comply with the demand to deliver up the murderers and the captured horses. It was hoped that the influence of this prominent priest would suffice to turn them from their defiant attitude.

On April 9 the sheriff reported at Malabang, returning from his visit to the dato of Bayan and neighbors. He reported his failure to influence the Moros to abstain from resistance. Their attitude was generally hostile, and many with whom he came in contact regarded him as an enemy who sought to aid the Americans in overthrowing the Moros, changing their religion, and enslaving their people. He told them of the benefits the Rio Grande Moros had secured by the presence of the Americans, who never had interfered in any way with their religion, women, and children, or had they taken Moro property.

PREPARATIONS.

On the 11th of April the division commander visited Paran-paran and later Malabang, where he met several of the Illana Bay Moros, and some from the lake country, but there was no general response to the invitation sent out to come in and state their case against the Americans. There was a talk with the leaders on the 12th and 13th, but no definite statement was elicited from the datos explaining why they were hostile to the Americans. But a great deal of stress was laid on the Moro grievance—the killing of Amirul by the Rio Grande Moros under American officers and by American troops.

On April 13 the division commander, by courier to the offending datos at the lake, sent a letter in which he explained the reason for the presence at Malabang of a large force of American troops. They were informed that if within two weeks the murderers and the horse thieves were not given up the aggressors would have to

suffer the consequences. The paper also contained the assurance that the other datos living near the lake need feel no concern, for the Government wished to continue the former friendly relations with them; but in any event the United States proposed to explore the country, build roads, and secure trade routes to the coast. They were also informed the United States had no intention of interfering with the religion of the Moros or with the exercise of their lawful rights.

This letter was as follows:

GENERAL CHAFFEE'S LETTER TO LANAOS MOROS, APRIL, 1902.

MALABANG, MINDANAO, April 13, 1902.

To the Moros of Lake Lanao:

Under the treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States, executed in the year 1899, the Philippine Islands, including the island of Mindanao, were ceded by Spain to the United States, together with all the rights and responsibilities of complete sovereignty.

Among the rights thus acquired by the United States is that of commerce and free communication throughout these islands by its civil and military agents, and by all its citizens when engaged in lawful pursuits. The responsibility of the Government to protect its citizens and agents under these and all other conditions and to insist upon the full recognition of its power to do so by all the inhabitants of the Philippines, native and foreign, will not be disputed by any enlightened government or people.

In pursuance of these principles, and acting under the authority of the President of the United States, the Sulu Islands were occupied, as well as the country along the Rio Grande de Mindanao as far as Reina Regente, for the purpose of facilitating the commerce of that river and bringing the people dwelling on its banks into closer trade relations with the other islands and with other countries. To these efforts in their behalf, which were carried on under protection of the Army, the Moros of those regions have offered no objections, but have everywhere received the agents of the Government with hospitality and kindness, fully recognizing the peaceful and beneficent purposes of the Government and the benefits which will surely follow them. But when, in the execution of the same object, I endeavored to examine the country between Paran-paran and Lake Lanao, the roads were obstructed, the troops were fired on, one of the soldiers killed and two other soldiers who were in the immediate vicinity of their own camps, were treacherously assassinated. Certain horses and carabao have also been stolen. These acts of enmity and hostility are said to have been committed by followers of the Dato Adta, of Paigoay, the Sultan of Bayan, and the Dato Amanitampugu, of Tubaran, upon whom demand has been made for the delivery of the assassins and the restitution of the stolen property, such demands being fully in accordance with Moro customs as well as the universal practice of all nations. Up to this time no reply has been received to these demands, but they must be complied with, otherwise it will devolve on me, as the military representative of the Government, to enforce them. Such a course can not but prove disastrous to the datos concerned, who will thus bring upon themselves and people all the evil effects of war.

In order to avert, if possible, such unfortunate and serious complications, I sent Sherif Mohammed Alfdel, an Afghan, a high priest of the Mohammedan religion, the sacred character of whose office was fully known to you, to explain the objects of the government in exploring your country, as already set forth herein. I also came to Malabang in person and requested the datos named in this proclamation to meet me in conference, hoping by an exchange of views to clear away all misapprehension as to our purposes, to adjust the present difficulty, and to lay the foundation for continued peace; but although I have remained here three days, they have failed to meet me or to acknowledge my request.

Therefore, in the discharge of my office as military governor and commanding general of the Army in the Philippines, I now call publicly on the Dato Adta, of Paigoay, the Sultan of Bayan, and the Dato Amanitampugu, of Tubaran, to deliver to me or my representatives at Malabang or Paran-paran the assassins referred to in this proclamation, who are known to them, and to make restitution of the Government property which has been stolen by their followers, within the period of two weeks from this date, or suffer all the consequences which such refusal, if persisted in, will certainly bring upon them.

With the other datos about Lake Lanao the Government has no cause of complaint, and it is earnestly hoped that they will continue the friendly relations now existing. Nevertheless to them and to all the Moros of the lake region I give notice

of my purpose to explore the country between Illana and Illigan bays and about the lake, to build roads, and to carry out in full the peaceful purposes of the Government in respect to free communications and trade throughout this country. But lest some evil-minded persons may mislead you as to said purposes I feel it proper to declare that there will be no interference with your religion or your lawful rights, in the enjoyment of which you will be fully protected.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

Military Governor and Commanding General.

Colonel Baldwin, who had previously moved his headquarters to Malabang, was directed to continue to push his preparations for a punitive expedition.

As soon as military activity was shown at Malabang, the Moros evidently expected an advance of the troops from that side, and proceeded to blockade and intercept the trails leading from the coast to the lake. A great many trees were so felled as to entirely close these routes of travel until the obstructions should be removed.

Colonel Baldwin, who was to lead the troops, selected as the most practicable the westernmost of these Moro pony trails that connected the objective with the base—a route afterwards referred to as the Ganosi trail.

The Rio Grande Moros wished to participate in these operations against the Malanaos, but their aid in a combatant capacity was declined. Several hundred of them were, however, employed as carriers and in the opening of the trails, and for a time rendered valuable assistance. But when they found that they were not permitted to join the troops in the attack and work their will with their enemies, they became dissatisfied and returned to their homes in the Rio Grande.

On the 12th of April the road was open for wagons 7 miles, which was found to be the limit of its practicability for wheeled transport, without a vast amount of labor; but the troops continued clearing and improving the way for packs toward the lake.

The advance was fired on by the Moros in the jungle, but no soldier was injured. Colonel Baldwin's expectations of being able to take field guns on wheels to the lake were found to be entirely unrealizable, and it was very soon evident that beyond the 7-mile post all the supplies would have to be transported by mules.

ADVANCE OF THE TROOPS.

By the 17th of April the trail had been cleared for about 10 miles and Baldwin advanced. The belief was that the distance to be traversed to reach Ganosi would not fall short of 35 miles. The moving of a separate column of 200 men direct to the lake from Paran-paran, over the route traversed by Forsyth, was disapproved by the division commander, and the troops proposed thus to be used were transferred to Malabang.

The force under Colonel Baldwin, when he began his advance, numbered about 800 infantry, 225 dismounted cavalry, and 4 mountain guns. He had 10 6-mule teams, and at first only 40 pack mules, but this number was soon increased to 80 and not long after to 250. Later, 600 additional infantry arrived at Malabang. Fully one-half the troops were required to work and to guard the camps along the road and the base at Malabang. It resulted that the number of rifles actually available at the front did not exceed about 600, and of course this number was daily reduced as the sick list grew.

The division commander had notified the Moros that he would give them two weeks' grace in which to comply with his demands, and the commander of the troops was personally instructed accordingly, but he was required to continue his preparations and to reopen the trail. Of course that necessitated an advance of the pioneers and their guards. By the 18th the head of the column had reached the outlet of Lake Tapao, one of the feeders of the Mataling River, the valley of which is to the east of the trail followed. It was supposed that this place was about half way to Ganosi, when in fact it was about 5 miles from the last-named point. So much for Moro conceptions of distances. The commanding officer reached Tapao early in the day, but found the topography and jungle growth absolutely prohibitive for an encampment for a single company, far less two battalions; nor was there any grass for the stock. The Moro obstructions had been found to be considerable, but they were far from being impregnable, and the troops had no great difficulty in passing forward.

At the outlet of Tapao, called Pulug by the natives, the commanding officer, deceived as to distance, had to decide either on withdrawal to near Malabang, the nearest point where both water and grazing could be found, or he must press forward to the open country reported just beyond. Two companies and a mountain gun were

sent forward to reconnoiter, and 2 miles distant good grass as well as abundant water was found at a defensible position. The commanding officer of the advance reached a fort at the spring then occupied by a half dozen Moros, who, after a parley, allowed entrance. Several Moros were seen on the neighboring hills, and not long after they opened with rifle fire. The officer had been ordered not to fire upon any Moros unless he should be attacked. Since it was evident that he must defend himself or retire, he fired a few volleys and a few shots from the light gun, whereupon the Moros retired. He also sent back to notify his commanding officer of the occurrence. Colonel Baldwin moved forward with the whole force present, and by 2 p. m. had reached the scene of action, which was called Fort Gadungan. The hostile Moros were still aggressive, and a sufficient force was advanced in open order to drive off the assailants. This was accomplished in a short time without casualty to the troops. A few Moros were seen to fall. The next day, the 20th, the hostiles reoccupied the hills and again fired on the troops, their base appearing to be a cota a mile or more to the north, called Pualas, over which a red flag was flying. White flags were displayed over many farmhouses and all such were strictly respected.

On the 20th the commanding officer wired a report of his operations, but as it had to be sent by courier to the end of the wire, the message was not received by the brigade commander until the 21st. Immediately Baldwin was cautioned that as the days of grace allowed by the division commander to the datos to comply with his demand had not expired he "must not assault any forts or occupy any hostile places until the expiration of the period." Baldwin's message was immediately wired to the department and division commanders, and the admonition of the brigade commander above quoted was repeated to them.

On the same day a telegram was received from the division commander, repeating one from the Secretary of War, directing that the expedition should not leave the seacoast without authority; but the division commander was evidently not yet in receipt of previous dispatches sent from Zamboanga. General Chaffee suggested that part of the expeditionary force return to Malabang, and authorized the reopening of the trail, 5 miles beyond the 7-mile camp. Orders were immediately sent to Baldwin "to abstain absolutely from any aggressive move whatever or any advance and in every way to favor a friendly conference." At the same time the division commander was given the opinion of the writer that to retire would be to ruin our prestige, and to withdraw a part of the force would be dangerous.

On the 21st Baldwin wired (received Zamboanga the 22d) to the effect that on the 21st he had captured Fort Pualas and had delivered to him the war flag previously flying over Fort Ganosi, 2 miles away. On the 22d the division commander ordered that Baldwin cease hostile advance. The same day this message was communicated to Baldwin by wire, and he was ordered to evacuate Pualas, or any other fort he had occupied, and retire to his camp, confining his operations to work on his communications.

On the 23d of April the instructions of the President were communicated by the division commander, these to the effect that no expedition against Moros be made until all efforts by negotiations were exhausted. In event that force should be required, he directed that it be sent under General Davis; also that war with the Moros should be avoided if possible. On the 24th the division commander directed that the expedition remain in existing camp until the arrival of the brigade commander, and the next day the division commander modified his previous dispatch expressing displeasure and thanked Colonel Baldwin for results accomplished through seizure of an advantage at hand, of which all were ignorant before the day it was recognized.

The brigade commander arrived at Gadungan on the 27th of April and had daily talks with the friendly datos, numbers of whom presented themselves, but the Sultan of Bayan sent an unfriendly letter and refused to present himself, saying, among other things, that he recognized only the Sultan of Turkey as his sovereign. The division commander's proclamation of the 13th of April had been responded to by the three datos addressed. One of them declared his friendship and innocence of the crimes charged. Another was noncommittal as to his participation in the murders and warned the Americans to leave, and his letter contained a rude drawing of a fort bristling with guns. But none of them made any friendly responses to the warning or offered to present themselves.

The Sultan of Ganosi wished the troops to visit his fort, and this invitation was accepted on April 28 by Colonel Baldwin, who marched his troops there under the escort of the Sultan and many of his followers. On the following day parties were sent out to look for camps farther east nearer to Bayan. On the 30th the troops moved to Binadayan, about 2 miles from Bayan, and overlooking the lake, where water was available for the troops and animals.

AN ULTIMATUM.

On the 1st of May the brigade commander sent, under flag of truce, a summons to the Sultan of Bayan and some of his neighbors to the effect that if within twenty-four hours the murderers were not given up or a peace delegation sent to camp the consequences would be bad for the Moros.

The substance of it was the same day telegraphed to the division commander. On the 30th of April the camp was fired upon by Moros at a distance of 600 yards, but the troops did not reply. There was no other response to the letter sent to Bayan, save that on the morning of May 2 about a hundred Moros advanced, and again rifle shots were fired into camp, but the deployment of a few squads was sufficient to disperse them.

Two or three hostile forts were in plain view a mile or two away, apparently manned by a considerable force, who sent us yells of defiance and flashed their spears and campilans in the sunlight.

At 12 o'clock on May 2 the troops advanced to the attack of the Moro cotas, of which the nearest one, on Lempessen hill, was within the territory of the dato of Binadayan, an ally of Bayan. It was situated on higher ground than any other near-by position. The principal stronghold of the Bayan Moros, Fort Pandapatan, was on a neighboring height about 1,000 yards away to the south, but lower than Lempessen by 80 feet. It was evident that the commanding height must be occupied. The artillery shelled the fort at 1,200 yards, but its garrison held on. A rifle fire was opened on the advancing troops from the timber on the verge of the cliff, where the plateau breaks down a thousand feet to the lake. A company was deployed to silence the fire. The fort was assaulted about 1.30, and about 2 o'clock the position was carried, the garrison retiring mainly to Pandapatan, over which the red flags were still flying. When the troops reached the crest the Moros in retreat were fired upon and several men were killed, only one American soldier being hit. One bronze and one iron cannon were captured. For character of that work see sketch.

The battery was brought to Lempessen hill (Fort Binadayan), while an infantry force, advancing directly upon the work from the west, came under a heavy Moro fire and halted at about 400 yards, when the artillery opened and the place was shelled for nearly an hour.


The heaviest Moro fire appeared to come from pits and intrenchments outside the work; also from cannon fire from the parapet and through embrasures, but the rifle fire from outside was silenced. At about 3 o'clock the infantry advance of three companies was resumed and the Moro fire reopened. Colonel Baldwin sent other companies in assistance and support and by 4 o'clock the work was entirely surrounded, but there was no cessation in the vigor of the defense. The troops advanced through and over the ditches, pitfalls, and bamboo stakes to the parapet itself, but it was 10 feet in height and covered with a growth of thorny bamboo, so that escalade without ladders was impossible, and these could not be ready for some time.

After the defenders were driven inside the inclosure the contest continued, but on unequal terms, for the troops could not see their antagonists and were exposed to the Moro lantaca fire through parapet embrasures and others through the walls. A great many Moros had been killed in the trenches outside—many of them in hand-to-hand struggles. In an attempt to force the entrance gate one officer was killed, another wounded, and several men killed and wounded.

As night approached it became evident that the fort could not be taken save by escalade, and that was not possible without ladders or until the walls should be overthrown by dynamite. A small supply of the latter and exploding device was at Gadungan, 7 miles away. Baldwin disposed his troops for the night so that escape of the defenders was impossible, and reserve ammunition was brought up from the camp 2 miles back, so that by 9 o'clock at night the belts of the men were refilled. Before dark a downfall of rain began and continued nearly all night, resulting in much increased suffering to the wounded and discomfort to the men in the flooded trenches, for they were without blankets or even blouses, and rations in haversacks were spoiled or exhausted.

During the night one attempt was made by a few Moros to break out and escape, but this was not successful. At daylight several white flags were seen flying over the fort, and through a friendly dato and our interpreter a parley was held, which resulted in the unconditional surrender of the survivors, reported to be 83 or 84 in number. They came out, deposited their arms, and were guarded across the valley to near Fort Binadayan and there held under a strong guard. At about 8 a. m. 8 other Moros who had remained concealed in the fort made a rush for liberty, cutting and slashing at and troops, but they were all stopped but one.

By 10 o'clock the American casualty list was known, the aggregate being 7 killed and 44 wounded; of the latter 3 died within three days. Some poor grass huts in Bina-



Nº2.

EXHIBIT 33, F

TO ACCOMPANY ANNUAL REPORT
OF CAPTAIN JAY J. MORROW,
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U. S. A.

DATED JUNE 30, 1902.

Report omitted






MAY 1902

ENGINEER OFFICE
ZAMBOANGA, MINDANAO
JULY 1902.

FORT BINADAYAN FROM FORT PANDAPATAN

TO ACCOMPANY ANNUAL REPORT
OF CAPTAIN JAY J. MORROW,
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U. S. A.
DATED JUNE 30, 1902.
Report omitted.



AND IN
DRAWN

HALL

dayan were temporarily utilized for sheltering the wounded, but arrangements were at once made for better shelter, and orders were given to prepare the old fort as a place of confinement for the prisoners until they could be otherwise disposed of. Authority was asked of the division commander to retain a few of the leading men as hostages and to release the remainder, but about 1 o'clock that day, before the sick could be removed from the fort and the place made ready to receive the prisoners, the latter rose to their feet at a concerted signal and made a rush, several seizing and endeavoring to gain control of the arms of the soldiers on guard. One rifle was secured by a Moro, but he was shot before he could get away. So sudden and unexpected was the rush that but one Moro was killed inside the line of guards. The latter fired at the fleeing, and the soldiers in camp did the same, the result being that 8 were recaptured, about 30 escaped, and the rest were probably killed, but the bodies of only 35 were found. This occurrence was greatly deplored by the brigade commander, as he wished to prove his peaceable and friendly intentions by giving all their liberty save a few leaders.

On the 3d day of May the dispatch of the division commander was received, directing the capture of the hostile fort if the leaders did not comply with the demand sent to them on May 1.

The whole strength of the sultan of Bayan proper and of Pandapatan were combined to resist the Americans, while half or two-thirds of all the Binadayans were in the fight also. Besides, there were delegations of fighting men from Bacolod, Butig, Paigoy, Masiu, Dirimuid, and several other rancherias. As near as could be learned, the aggregate fighting force assembled to meet the United States troops numbered 600 men, of whom about 400 or 500 belonged to Bayan and Pandapatan. The Americans were unable to count all the dead, for many were carried away or fell in the high grass and were never found. The surrendered Moros stated to the commanding officer that they estimated their own loss at between 300 and 400. It is certain that the sultan of Bayan and the Raja Muda, also the sultan of Pandapatan were among the slain. The Pandapatan community was almost obliterated, and of the Bayan people the most prominent survivors said that there were but 15 or 20 men left. There were no women or children killed, for all had fled.

On the 4th day of May Camp Vicars was established. It is located about a thousand yards to the south of the captured fort, near unfailing springs of excellent water; to that place the wounded were removed the same day, and grass and bamboo huts were erected for their shelter. All were made as comfortable as possible and every effort made to move forward the hospital supplies, tents, cots, and clothing.

The troops were paraded and the following was announced to them:

ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE TROOPS OF THE LAKE LANAO EXPEDITION.

IN FIELD, CAMP VICARS, MINDANAO, May 7, 1902.

Announcement by Brig. Gen. George W. Davis, U. S. Army, Commanding the Seventh Separate Brigade.

The troops of the Lake Lanao expedition have been paraded in order that the following telegrams may be read to them:

1.

CEBU, May 4, 1902.

General DAVIS:

My sincere congratulations to Baldwin and to the officers and men engaged yesterday, also to yourself, for your energetic and skillful conduct of the whole affair from first to last. It was necessary to give the Moros a lesson. It seems to have been done in such a way that it will not have to be repeated.

WADE.

2.

MANILA, P. I., May 4, 1902.

General DAVIS:

Please accept my congratulations for yourself and express to Colonel Baldwin and all the officers and men engaged in battle May 2 my high appreciation of their bra-

very, gallantry, and soldierly conduct. My congratulations to both officers and men. I sincerely regret death of some and wounding of others. Let no comfort be withheld from the latter that can be supplied to them.

CHAFFEE.

3.

MANILA, P. I., May 6, 1902.

General DAVIS:

Order that the following message from the President of the United States be read to every company and troop serving in your brigade. It will be published in division orders for the information of other commanders as a special mark of tribute to the survivors of the assaulting force at the battle of Bayan:

“WASHINGTON, D. C., May 5, 1902.

“CHAFFEE, Manila, Luzon, P. I.:

“Accept for the army under your command, and express to General Davis and Colonel Baldwin especially, my congratulations and thanks for the splendid courage and fidelity which have again carried our flag to victory. Your fellow-countrymen at home will ever reverence the memory of the fallen and be faithful to the survivors, who have themselves been faithful unto death for their country's sake.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.”

CHAFFEE.

Soldiers:

Words at my command fail to convey an adequate expression of admiration for the gallantry and self-sacrifice which I saw displayed by the assaulting lines and the investing cordon on the 2d of May. The memory of this sanguinary action will be treasured by all participants and observers as long as they live. For the Twenty-seventh Infantry and the Twenty-fifth Mountain Battery, Bayan will ever be an inspiration.

At this moment of exultation and triumph do not forget the vanquished, whose persistent gallantry commanded the admiration of all who saw the magnificent defense of their stronghold. A race of men who have been able to make such a fight and convert this wilderness into a garden have many qualities which, if guided aright, will make them and their posterity valuable citizens. None can doubt this who have seen what they have accomplished here without the aids which civilized people enjoy.

Let no word or act be ever brought home to American soldiers that discredits or disparages these Moros. Let it be the unrelenting effort of every officer and soldier to assist and elevate them, a sacred duty which is devolved upon the Army, an added burden which must be borne, and every American relies upon our troops to execute this sacred trust.

So far there has been no act of despoilment, injury, or insult. Let none be ever charged to American soldiers.

Our flag is an emblem of honor and freedom, and it rests with you that it become such an emblem to the Moros and ever so remain.

GEORGE W. DAVIS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Very considerable numbers of friendly datos with their following presented themselves and brought to camp their produce for sale. Several of the horses lost by Forsyth were brought in by Dato Grande, of Macadar, who from the first showed himself to be a loyal friend of the Americans.

The new camp was at an elevation of 2,900 feet above the sea; the soil here, as everywhere about the lake and all the way to the sea, consists almost entirely of a rather coarse, black, volcanic sand, which is porous and never gets muddy under foot, no matter how much it rains, unless cut up by the animals. The country is without timber, save scattering clumps of trees and large bamboo in the gulleys. The surface is rolling and the general slope always away from the lake margin toward the sea. From the camp Iilana Bay is in plain view. So open and unobstructed is this high table land that mounted troops and pack trains can go almost anywhere without difficulty. The Moros have considerable area under cultivation, the principal crop being upland rice, and the culture was seen to be perfect, no weeds in the fields and all well fenced. The houses of the inhabitants are of

bamboo frame and thatched with the tall, coarse grass. Many sweet potato patches were seen, and considerable green corn was brought in for sale. The commissary was able to purchase one or two days' fresh beef each week. There was an abundance of chickens and eggs.

On the 12th of May the division commander arrived at Camp Vicars and had conversations with the friendly datos. He left definite instructions for the guidance of the commanding officer, as follows:

CAMP VICARS, MINDANAO, P. I., May 13, 1902.

Gen. GEORGE W. DAVIS,
Commanding Seventh Separate Brigade.

GENERAL: The division commander orders as follows:

"When Colonel Baldwin has selected the ground for his camp the boundaries will be carefully and prominently staked so as to be plainly visible to the Moros. Beyond the boundary the troops will confine themselves to the roads, trails, and meadows and will be forbidden trespassing on the cultivated fields or interfering in any way with the private property of the Moros.

"Colonel Baldwin will be directed to make every effort to cultivate friendly relations with the Moros, and by fair, straightforward, and kindly dealing win their confidence. Similar instructions will be given to all officers and enlisted men of his command, who will take no advantage of the ignorance, inexperience, or good nature of the Moros in commercial transactions, paying them a reasonable price for such articles as they may sell, without any attempt at sharp practice, of which it is said there have already been some instances.

"Under no circumstances short of an attack by Moros will Colonel Baldwin or the members of his command resort to active hostilities or occupy or molest any fort or cota without authority from you. All punitive operations for redress or any other purpose must be conducted under and by virtue of your orders, and then only on full investigation as to the necessity for such action, when an immediate report will be made to the division commander.

"Having given the Moros a severe and, it is believed, salutary lesson as a result of their treachery, defiance of United States authority, General Chaffee now wishes them to feel that our purposes are peaceful, that their personal welfare and material prosperity are objects of solicitude at all times, and that they can rely absolutely on our protection and willingness to promote them. They will therefore be encouraged to return to their customary pursuits, to visit our camps, to supply the troops here and in Malabang, and to furnish such assistance in the way of general labor as may be needed.

"Such intercourse, if properly conducted, will go far toward the promotion of confidence and good feeling, and will convince the Moros that the only purpose of the Government in resorting to harsh measures was the establishment and maintenance of peace."

Very respectfully,

J. P. SANGER,
Colonel, Inspector-General, Chief of Staff.

The route of the advance and, at first, the route of supply and telegraphic communication were via the Ganosi trail. Supplies were wagoned out 7 miles and packed the remainder of the way, the total distance being about 25 miles, all but the first 3 miles and the last 6 from Malabang being in very dense jungle and forest. The trail was very narrow and in many places cut deep into the volcanic sandy soil, was densely shaded so that the sun could not penetrate; and when there was rain the mule tracks were badly cut up and very muddy. The climb from the 7-mile point to the Lanao Plateau was nearly 2,000 feet, and some of the hills were exceedingly steep and horribly muddy when wet. Several hundred men, besides the Rio Grande Moros, were kept constantly at work in slashing trees so as to let in sunlight, in corduroying over worst mud spots, and in making new tracks and cut-offs; but it was soon evident that the task of supplying a large command over this trail would be a very difficult and expensive undertaking.

Explorations for a better route were undertaken, and by the 10th of May, the middle or Tubaran route had been traversed and reopened and the Macadar trail was also reopened. The route via Tubaran was found to be worse than Ganosi, but the one via the Mataling Falls was capable of being made into a practicable wagon road as far as the falls (14 miles) without any great difficulty, and all the way to Vicars without any impracticable features, but at considerable cost in labor. A force of troops as pioneers was at once set to work upon it, and a company of engineers reported from Cebu to assist in this. Work upon this route has been pushed unremittingly ever since the 17th of May, the average number of troops camped along the road reaching 600 men. Loads of 2,500 pounds for six mules are now hauled to

the lower Mataling crossing (13½ miles), and thence packed to Vicars. Now there is an accumulation of 35,000 rations at Vicars. Tents and cots for the men, also hospital supplies in abundance, have been forwarded to the front. Grass for the animals at Vicars is brought to camp by the Moros and sold on favorable terms.

At the Malabang base the Spanish fort built by Weyler is used for hospital and storage purposes. Additional shelters for stores have been erected, and nipa shelters for five companies of troops, a new hospital, and stables for horses and mules are also under contract. All the troops in Vicars are in conical and wall tents, and hospital tents in adequate numbers are in use. Through bamboo tubes, spring water has been brought to the neighborhood of all the companies and so chance of water contamination is prevented.

The maps accompanying this report will serve to convey a fair idea of the topography between Malabang and Lanao, and the location and construction of the roads, trails, and telegraph line, also the altitudes.

PRESENT ATTITUDE OF THE LAKE MOROS.

There are many hundreds of Moros living south of Lake Lanao, who profess friendship, and as to the fidelity of some there can be no doubt. The principal of these datos are:

Dato Grande of Macadar, sultan of Ganosi, Amini Tampuga of Tubaran, sultan of Binadayan, Adta of Paigoay, dato of Madullum, dato of Madumba, dato of Tugaya, sultan of Bucayanan, sultan of Busac, dato of Butig (one of them), sultan of Bayan (new man). Also several others, but none of these named above are now in the first class of leaders, as respects numbers of followers and power, although the dead sultan of Bayan was in this class.

On the 4th of July last, from 700 to 1,000 friendly Moros, by invitation, visited the camp to participate in the festivities, and did so with evident zest and pleasure. The datos owning ponies have used them in packing supplies for the troops and have been most helpful. Through Dato Grande's efforts some of the horses and mules lost by Forsyth were found and turned in. But not all the Lanao datos are reconciled to the presence of the troops on the lake. The notable ones who have manifested unfriendliness are the sultans or datos of Bacolod and the sultan of Masiu, the former having his fort on the west shore and the latter about 10 miles to the eastward of Vicars, on the east shore near the southeast corner of Lanao.

Touch with the Moros living around the north end of the lake has been kept up through visits by Captain Pershing to Marahui, where the Spaniards maintained a military and naval station, and by visits of the Lake Moros to Iligan. Some of these express concern and anxiety to know the purposes and policy of the Government, and some say they do not and some say they do wish to have the American troops occupy the lake region. A report of Captain Pershing on this topic will be found in the appendix. Until nearly the close of May there was no act of violence by Moros or unfriendliness shown. Toward the end of May the telegraph wire, where it traversed the Gadungan and Ganosi territories near the lake, was cut and several hundred yards carried away—this on several successive days. About the last of the month there was an attack on the camp near Gadungan by Moros from Bacolod.

On May 24 an officer and sergeant near Gadungan were assaulted by a Moro carrying a white flag. The sergeant was boloed and his arm severed from his body by a single blow, but the assassin escaped in the grass.

On June 1 Colonel Baldwin visited Bucayanan and Busac by invitation and under friendly escort of Dato Grande and other Moros. While in camp at night shots were fired at the troops and a first sergeant killed. The troops had not fired or made any hostile demonstration. It was subsequently learned that the attacking party was almost certainly from Masiu.

June 2 a sentinel on post at Paran-paran was approached by two Moros and a paper offered for inspection; as it was being handed back the sentinel was slashed with a bolo and badly cut.

June 8 the telegraph line was again cut, this time on the Macadar route to which the wire had been transferred with the abandonment of Ganosi by the packers.

June 17, pack train again fired upon.

June 22, two soldiers on the road assaulted by ten Moros; both cut and two rifles lost.

June 25, the use of the Macadar trail forbidden to armed Moros unless with passes.

June 25, two Moros tried to sneak up to troops on trail; were seen by the guards and both killed—this on the Macadar road.

June 26 a rifle in the possession of one of the men of Dato Adta seized in his house. It was the rifle that had been taken from Private Lewis when he was murdered near Malabang on March 30.

June 28 the bodies of the two men who had been implicated in the murder of Lewis were brought to Camp Vicars by Dato Adta. Both had been killed because, as was alleged, they had resisted arrest. The dead men were recognized by friendly Moros as of the party that had murdered the soldier at Malabang, March 30.

July 2 the sultan of Binadayan brought to camp and turned in a rifle, one of the two that his people had obtained from the two soldiers assaulted on the Macadar road June 22. Every possible effort was made to identify the attacking parties in each of these cases, and to definitely trace the crime, and valuable data has been collected for future use.

July 8 a sentinel at the Mataling crossing was assaulted about 2 o'clock in the morning and badly cut by a Moro who had already sneaked into camp and stolen a rifle and belt of ammunition.

The division commander was kept informed respecting the attitude of the Moros. Under date of June 27 he communicated his further order to the effect that the troops would not be withdrawn, but that expeditions for punishing the assailants would not be undertaken without his express sanction.

The brigade commander was present with the expedition from April 27 to May 17, and was again at Camp Vicars on June 9 and 10, also on July 7 and 8.

The force available for operations from Malabang and under the orders of the senior officer present consisted of the entire Twenty-seventh Infantry, the Twenty-fifth Mountain Battery, two troops mounted of the Fifteenth Cavalry, and one company and detachment from another of the Corps of Engineers, in all about 2,000 officers and men. At this date two additional companies of infantry are under orders to report at Malabang.

THE MALANAO MOROS.

General Blanco is said to have reported the number of these at 400,000 souls, while Gen. Gonzalez Parrado in his book on Mindanao, published in 1898, gives the number of the Malanaos at 300,000 and the Moros in the remainder of Mindanao as reaching an equal number, but American officers, who have had some opportunities to acquire information, do not estimate the Moro population of the lake country at more than 100,000 and all the rest of the same race in the island at more than 125,000. It is said that at some ancient period there was a Moro overlord in Mindanao, as there is now in Jolo, but this sultanate has fallen to pieces, while the sultan himself has fled from his former seat and now lives obscurely with a few followers on the shore of the gulf of Sibuguey. He is, however, the only Moro in Mindanao, outside the Malanao bands, who is recognized as possessing indisputable right to be addressed as sultan, but in the lake country there are a hundred sultans at least, some of them having a following of but two or three families, while others have a following of as many thousand men.

Having their homes around the lake are three principal Malanao branches or racial subdivisions—the Unayans, the Bayabaos, and the Masius. The first named inhabit the southern margin, and it is against some of these that the recent operations have been conducted. Within each of these three subdivisions, each having many sultans, there is a sort of shadowy overlordship recognized, but not strong enough to hold the individuals composing the subdivisions under one leader, for the different bands of the same great group are often fighting, just as the datos in Sulu are frequently found at war with the sultan and with one another, only the bond or subordination, or whatever it may be, is of a very slight tenure, more sentimental than real. Sometimes the fighting men of one band will turn to help a neighbor in a tribal contest, and sometimes not all the members of a tribe at war will fight under their own sultan or dato.

The government under which they live is a sort of a religious patriarchy. They all recognize blood as the *sine qua non* for legitimate succession to chieftainship. In some of the tribes one will be the real sultan and respected as such, yet within the tribe there will be a group of families dependent on a dato who is far more powerful than the sultan himself, and without whose consent the sultan resolves nothing. Of the Bayabao branch is the community of Bacolod. At the present time the sultan is for peace with the Americans, but one of his datos, Pandalunan, is for war, and is strong enough to prevent the sultan from making terms of submission.

This circumstance is favorable to us in our efforts to bring these people under civilized control. They have never before been brought face to face with Christians under circumstances at all analogous to those which now exist. They know that one of their strongest communities, which has openly defied us, was completely overthrown, but they do not and can not understand why their conquerors, having prisoners in their possession, should willingly set them at liberty, nor are they able to comprehend a policy which results in the passive course the Americans are pursuing, instead of going on to complete the conquest of those who are still defiant.

The writer is confident that the sultans and datos around the lake who have not yet presented themselves will yet do so, and that in time we shall be able to accomplish more by bloodless methods than through the severe and destructive operations of war; but we must not forget that power is the only function of government that they respect, and the time may come when force must again be used.

Around the lake, as elsewhere throughout Mindanao and Sulu, there is a great need for labor if a development of potential resources is to be accomplished. There are no laborers available now save the Moros. Outside of the moral question of right and wrong of war itself is another which should not be disregarded in considering the true policy of the United States and in its determination.

Whatever may be the number of Moros, whether a few or many hundred thousands, all and many times more than all of these people will be needed as agricultural and mechanical laborers and helpers in the cultivation of the soil and the utilization of its productions for the benefit of themselves and mankind. They are able to produce rice, sugar cane, coffee, corn, cattle, beautiful woven fabrics, and thrusting and cutting weapons; they manufacture bronze cannon and gunpowder, and give surprising proofs of their ingenuity and industry. Their Moro boats are fashioned and rigged and sailed with the utmost skill and are admired by all strangers. A race of men who are capable of doing all this and who possess many manly qualities should be kept alive and not shot down in war. They should be aided and encouraged and taught how to improve their own natural and social condition and benefit us at the same time. Mohammedans in Turkey and India and Java have proved to be industrious and useful members of the communities. Mohammedan Malays in Sarawak, a British protectorate in Borneo, perform all the skilled and unskilled labor of that prosperous colony, and are as plainly showing their adaptability for the higher duties and occupations as have the Japanese. The Moros have certainly equal or greater capacity for usefulness.

If, unfortunately, the Moros must be further chastised and a defiant element overthrown, the problem will be a simple one. The capacity of the Malanaos to resist continuous military operations is very limited. Indeed, the Moros elsewhere have slight capacity for prolonged resistance against modern arms in the hands of trained men. In this respect warfare with them greatly differs from that waged against the Filipino insurgents, and still more does it differ from the fighting we had with our own hostile Indians. Moros in considerable numbers only fight from and in defense of their cotas.

As before stated, the Malanaos are an agricultural people. There are very few fish in the lake and little food is obtained by fishing. Each principal dato, or sultan, or headman has his dwelling house inclosed by an earthen or rock breastwork, covered and matted together on the exterior, with living bamboo all covered with thorns. These are surrounded usually by ditches anywhere from 5 to 30 feet deep, and in a few instances there are two or more rows of these ditches, and between and outside the ditches are pits 6 or 8 feet deep, studded at the bottom with sharpened stakes, into which it is designed the assailants shall fall and there be impaled. The sally port, or entrance way, is always narrow and often indirect; hence the opening passage can not be raked with fire from the outside. Inside these structures is always the dwelling house of the chief, and here his followers rally to his and their own defense. To shelter these defenders from the weather, also from missiles thrown over the walls, such as hand grenades, rocks, etc., there sometimes is a split-bamboo shed, its roof sloping outward at an angle of about 20 degrees from horizontal, 10 feet or more in width. It is said that in some instances the shed has been made stronger and covered with earth, so that it may also serve as a bombproof, but none of the forts seen were thus protected. Small cannon and lantacas are used in defense; some mounted outside so as to rake the ditches, some on the parapets to fire through barbetta embrasures, and others are fired through apertures or embrasures which pierce these earthen and rubblestone walls, and these are 75 to 100 feet on a side and 10 to 12 feet high, the outer face nearly vertical, while inside they have steps two or more feet wide and high. The parapets at the top are about 3 feet in thickness, while at the bottom they are not less than 12 feet thick. It is self-evident that works of this nature can not be battered down with mountain or ordinary field guns, nor can they be carried by escalade without ladders or mining operations. Fortunately, however, it is quite unnecessary to assault these defenses.

The Moros have no adequate arrangements for enduring an investment. There is no known instance of a well or water cistern inside any of these works. Their supply of ammunition, and especially of powder, is very limited and their food resources are small. These works are very old and were designed to enable the occupants to resist attack from other Moros, for intertribal lootings and wars are going on all the time, while a strong Moro cota is invulnerable against a Moro attack, which, failing

to effect a surprise, is never pressed home. Most of these forts could be surrounded by 300 to 400 men, at a range of 200 to 500 yards, and every chance of escape closed, so that hunger and thirst would compel a capitulation in a week or two, the small field mortars meanwhile keeping up a continuous high-angle fire, which would send projectiles everywhere inside these works and pierce the bamboo sheds.

There is no instance reported when a Moro force has rushed a considerable body of civilized troops, nor is there any reported case when a fight ever took place in the open—a stand-up attack or defense by the Moros. The Filipinos have been able to make successful rushes upon small bodies of trained soldiers and they have shown some proficiency in tactical dispositions. The North American Indians were not wanting in courage to attack our troops, and in some instances they were successful, but the Moros have never waged war in this manner and seem to be incapable of effective, persistent guerrilla operations.

Were the Filipinos or American Indians defending the Lanao country we would have on our hands a problem of vastly greater difficulty than the one which now confronts us, for the force would be brave, desperate, resourceful, and elusive, while now we know beforehand exactly where to find the enemy and what will be his general plan of operations. The moment his cota is captured he is powerless, and the survivors either surrender or take flight to some other chieftain.

In the operations which we have been carrying on there have been hundreds of favorable opportunities for a Moro force of a hundred or so to fall upon little parties of eight or ten and annihilate them, but there has been no such attack nor any that resembled it. Had our advance been contested by American Indians we would not have reached Ganosi. The Moros seem to depend entirely on their cotas. They fight well behind their works, but seem to have no capacity to carry on an aggressive war beyond the ambushing of small parties and assaults on individuals found off their guard.

SULU MOROS.

The occasions during the year when troops were required for any aggressive purpose in the Sulu Islands were very few. There was an occasional clash between the sultan and his so-called vassals; in fact, almost every instance of the disturbance of the peace grew out of controversies over personal property or resulted from the imposition of fines or taxes by the sultan upon his people.

In a few instances bloodshed followed these clashings, but seldom did it go so far. There is now and long has been a sort of hostility, or armed neutrality, between the sultan and two of his principal datos in the island of Jolo. The former insists that these recalcitrant subjects do not pay proper respect to his highness and make obedience to the overlord; but when the trouble between them is probed to the bottom it is usually found that each has been stealing cattle or slaves from the other.

Unfortunately, the United States is a party to an agreement which in effect guarantees to the sultan right and authority to exercise his kingly power over his people and the right also to resolve questions of justice between his people, even in cases where murders have been committed. We have recognized his right to give or withhold his consent for Americans or foreigners to own land or travel through his dominions. By that agreement the sultan and his datos concede to the United States the sovereignty of the Sulu Islands and recognize the use of the American flag; but these concessions, when read in connection with the article reserving prerogatives, rights, and dignities of the Moros, are seen to be more shadow than substance. If the validity of this agreement is recognized, our sovereignty over these islands is a very limited one.

On the 27th of October, 1899, the Secretary of War informed the division commander in the Philippines that the President had given his conditional approval and confirmation to the agreement between General Bates and the Sultan and his datos, dated August 20, 1899.

The reservations to full and complete approval were two in number, one relating to slavery, which General Bates was told could not be recognized by the United States, and that this fact must be distinctly communicated to the Sultan and his datos. The other reservation was a specific recognition by the President of the right of Congress of the United States, under the treaty of Paris, to disapprove or annul the agreement altogether.

On the 4th of April, 1900, General Bates wrote to the Sultan and his datos to the effect that the President had approved the agreement, save the tenth article, relating to slavery, which, said the General, was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, but "will be reserved for future conference, determination, and agreement." This communication was transmitted to His Highness through Major Sweet, the commanding officer at Jolo, who on April 13 told the Sultan that "the question [of

slavery] will probably be considered in a conference between the Moros and some authorized American representative, in which your pecuniary interests in your slaves will be recognized and some method will be agreed on so that slavery shall cease without pecuniary loss to yourselves," but nowhere in those letters does there appear any caution or reminder to the Sultan of a fact, distinctly stated in the letter from the Secretary of War of October 27 to General Otis, that the agreement was approved subject to the action of Congress. Of course it is possible that the Sultan knew of the constitutional limitations upon the treaty-making power of the President, but it is not at all probable that he was so aware. If he was not told this or did not know it, then it results that he has committed himself to an agreement, inviolable so far as he is concerned, and capable of being changed only through "mutual consent of the parties in interest," but which could be brushed aside and ignored by our law-making power without his knowledge or consent.

The feature of this agreement, bearing upon slavery, was some time since the subject of a special report to the adjutant-general of the division, a copy of which will be found in the appendix. In October last a report was made to same headquarters upon Moro affairs generally, and a copy, without the inclosures, is herewith submitted.

In the appendix will also be found the annual report of the commanding officer of the troops in the Sulu Archipelago, in which the military situation is reviewed down to and including May 31 last. The last quarterly report of the same officer to June 30 is also inclosed. Therewith will be found copies of correspondence between the military commandant and the prominent Moros. This is included in order that a specimen of the correspondence may be seen and an idea conveyed of the Moro mind and its workings in the official relations which exist between the sovereign power and a sultan subject, who yet claims to be also a sovereign.

The recommendation contained in the report of October 24, 1901, urging that a definite policy be adopted and pursued in our intercourse with the Moros of Sulu, is again respectfully submitted, for under the Bates agreement constant friction will exist between the supreme governing power and the Moro authorities until there is a better understanding than now exists respecting the "rights and dignities of His Highness."

The predecessor of the present Sultan, in 1898, granted to certain persons absolute ownership and dominion, with power of life and death, over all his territories (aggregating several million acres) and subjects (4,000 or 5,000 in number) in the island of Borneo; all this for a money consideration of \$5,000 Mexican per annum, and the present Sultan is a beneficiary of this deed of sale, in that he receives the amount above stated. This incident proves that there can not be any insuperable reason forbidding the sale, by a Mohammedan Malay king, of his royal sovereign dominion over an extensive region and the allegiance which his subjects, who inhabited this region, owed to him.

The following is a copy of the commission to govern Moros in Borneo, given by the Sultan of Jolo, which was furnished through the courtesy of the governor of North Borneo:

"COMMISSION FROM THE SULTAN OF SULU APPOINTING BARON DE OVERBECK I
BANDAHARA AND RAJAH OF SANDAKAN, DATED 22D JANUARY, 1878.

"To all nations on the face of the earth whom these matters may concern:

"We, Sri Paduka Maulana Al Sultan Mahomet Jamal Al Alam Bin
Paduka Al Sultan Mahomet Fathlon, Sultan of Sulu and its depen-
greeting:

"Whereas we have seen fit to grant unto our trusty and well-beloved friends, Gustavus Baron de Overbeck and Alfred Dent, esquire, certain portions of the dominions owned by us, comprising all the lands on the north and east coast of the island of Borneo, from the Pandassan River on the northwest to the Sibucu River on the east coast, including among others the States of Paitan, Sugut, Bangaya, Labuk Sandakan, Kina Batangan, and Mumiang and all the lands and territories in Darvel Bay as far as the Sibucu River, together with all the lands belonging thereto, for certain considerations between us agreed; and

"Whereas the said Baron de Overbeck is the chief and only authorized representative of his company in Borneo;

"Now, therefore, know ye that we, the Sultan Sri Paduka Maulana Al Sultan Mahomet Jamal Al Alam Bin Al Marhom Sri Paduka Al Sultan Mahomet Fathlon, Sultan of Sulu and its dependencies, have nominated and appointed and do hereby nominate and appoint the said Baron de Overbeck supreme and independent ruler of the above-named territories, with the title of Datu Bandahara and Rajah of Sandakan, with absolute power over life and death of the inhabitants of the country,

with all the absolute rights of property over the soil of the country vested in us and the right to dispose of the same, as well as the rights over the productions of the country, whether mineral, vegetable, or animal, with the rights of making laws coining money, creating an army and navy, levying customs dues on home and foreign trade and shipping, and other dues and taxes on the inhabitants as to him may seem good or expedient, together with all other powers and rights usually exercised by and belonging to sovereign rulers, and which we hereby delegate to him of our own free and sovereign will.

"And we call upon all foreign nations with whom we have formed friendly treaties or alliances, and we command all the datos, nobles, governors, chiefs, and people owing allegiance to us in the said territories, to receive and acknowledge the said Datu Bandahara as the supreme ruler over the said States and to obey his commands and respect his authority therein as our own. And in case of the death or retirement from office of the said Datu Bandahara, then his duly appointed successor in the office of supreme ruler and governor in chief of the company's territories in Borneo shall likewise, if appointed thereto by the company, succeed to the title of Datu Bandahara and Rajah of Sandakan, and all the powers above enumerated be vested in him.

"Done at the palace of the Sultan, at Lipuk, in the island of Sulu, on the nineteenth of Moharam A. H. 1295, being the 22d day of January, A. D. 1878."

If the Sultan of Sulu could accept a money consideration in satisfaction for this transfer of title in Borneo, then he might find no insuperable objection to a cession of his kingly rights or pretensions over his lands and vassals in Sulu. It is suggested that through such cession for a small yearly cash payment the Moro overlord could be induced to retire and leave the United States to deal with the Moros in such manner as might seem best adapted to serve the purposes of the United States in Moro lands, and which is understood to be to civilize the inhabitants and develop the country, to abolish piracy, slavery, and polygamy, all of which are now practiced in the Sulu islands or waters, to establish schools for education of the Moro youth, and to turn his bloody spears and kris and campilans into utensils of industry. It will take a long time to do this, but the presence of the Sultan, who is contented by us to possess royal rights and dignities, is a positive obstacle to the execution of such a policy, and he must be removed or mediatized before any real progress can be made.

If we pursued the English or Netherland plan of governing native races through native kings, sultans, rajahs, and datos, then this sultan would fit into the scheme; but it seems to the writer quite out of the question for us to quote to the Moros the Declaration of Independence, and particularly the clause which asserts that all men are born free and equal, and at the same time concede to certain persons living under our flag the inherited legal right to tax, enslave, and even behead their fellow-men, without recourse to judge or jury.

RIO GRANDE MOROS.

The conditions which exist among these people are generally satisfactory, in some respects eminently so. Their number reaches probably 80,000 and there may be a hundred thousand souls. These Moros were thoroughly subdued by one of the Spanish governors in the last years of the decade closing with 1890, since which time they have been no trouble, save during the period subsequent to the withdrawal of the Spanish troops and the arrival of the American forces. Then there was bloodshed and anarchy at Cotabato, resulting from attempted or actual extortion and robberies of Moros by the officers of the Filipino government, which was set up by the Christian natives of Cotabato. Major Febiger, who was commander at Cotabato during most of the past year, was successful in maintaining friendly relations with these people. They have furnished many military supplies, performed much labor needed by the garrisons, and shown by their words and actions entire satisfaction with the existing state of affairs. Of course, slavery is still practiced among them, but they evince a disposition, not yet shown in Sulu, in all things to conform to our requirements in their intercourse with one another, with the Filipinos, and with our own people.

The telegraph is now extended through almost the whole western and southern part of the valley of the Rio Grande, and the work of furnishing and setting poles and transporting the supplies for the linemen has been done by these Moros, and almost daily and hourly the datos at the telephone stations along the way talk with each other over the wires. They are as anxious as we are to have the lines maintained and will not permit any interference with them.

When the expedition to Lake Lanao was undertaken, in March last, Dato Piang and Ali offered the services of 2,000 of their armed followers to assist the troops in

their operations against the Malanaos; the offer was declined, but several hundred of these men, as laborers, were employed to handle supplies, clear the roads and trails, and to build shelters.

DAVAO MOROS.

The numbers inhabiting the Davao and Sarangani country have not been ascertained by the United States authority, but the Jesuits have stated their numbers at something like 8,000 in both localities. All live near the coast. These people have given us no trouble, but just before the country was occupied by the Americans the Rio Grande Moros and those of Talick were at war. The former, who were much the more numerous, succeeded in surprising the Talick people, and some two or three hundred were slain and many carried into slavery. One of the considerations leading to the occupation of the Spanish post of Macar by our forces was the wish to protect the survivors of the Talick outfit against further aggression.

THE SAVAGES.

We know but little respecting the numbers of these people, and for what is known we are indebted to the Jesuit missionaries, who have traveled and lived among them.

In 1897, the Spanish general and governor of Mindanao collected what data he could respecting population, and he gives in his book on Mindanao the result of his inquiries. The following are the numbers assigned to the different wild races of Mindanao:

Tribes.	Numbers.	Tribes.	Numbers.
Subanos.....	70,000	Dulanganes.....	4,000
Manobos.....	35,000	Tagacaolos.....	17,000
Mandayas.....	30,000	Tirurayes.....	10,000
Buguidnonos.....	25,000	Bagobos.....	12,000
Atas.....	20,000	Calaganes.....	4,000
Tagabelies.....	10,000	Mananuas.....	3,000
Bilanes.....	10,000	Samals.....	2,000
Guiangas.....	6,000		
Manguangas.....	4,000	Total.....	262,000

In the explorations conducted by our troops in southern Mindanao many of these wild people have been seen. Usually they take flight on the approach of the white man, or indeed any stranger. They are very poor, and have the rudest arms and habitations and most scanty raiment. The bow and arrow and the blowgun with poisoned darts are among their arms, and they subsist upon the products of the jungle, and some are head hunters. The Moros raid their villages and carry away captives into slavery, and have been doing so from time immemorial. A considerable business is done in slaves, for Lebac and Cran, on the southwest coast of Mindanao, and Dinas, near Point Flecha, are points of departure of the slave boats for the Sulu Islands, which are the principal markets.

The nefarious traffic could be stopped were we able to occupy all the points where the Moro vintas resort, and maintain proper patrols. The service of the navy gunboats in guarding the waters of the seas of Celebes and Sulu is a very useful restraint. A few Moros caught in this traffic were tried by military commission and sentenced to terms of imprisonment, but it will not be possible to entirely stop the business until our occupation and control so influence the minds and actions of the populace as to make slaveholding unpopular. In the appendix is a paper wherein the subject of slavery is treated at more length—a case of protest by the Sultan of Sulu because the military commander has given protection to seven of the Sultan's slaves and has prevented their recapture. It is hoped that this case will bring the matter so prominently to the attention of the authorities that it will result in conclusive action and furnish a precedent for the future.

In the building of the telegraph line from Davao through the country inhabited by the Bagobos, Guiangas, Bilanes, and Tagabelies no opposition was met with, but usually the inhabitants would take flight at sight of our men. Finally our officers were able to persuade some of these people to work for us, cutting and setting telegraph poles and carrying supplies.

Between the inhabitants of the coast towns of Baganga, Caraga, and Catel and the Mandayas, who live in the mountains to the west, there has been some friction and bloodshed, for the mountain tribes are here more numerous and inclined to be aggressive, in the absence of American troops, and there is little doubt that the Filipinos are not pleasant neighbors for the mountaineers.

In the mountains north of Zamboanga—in fact, in the interior of the whole panhandle of Mindanao—are found the strongest of these native wild tribes, called Subanos. Some of them are possessed of skill in working metals, clay, and fibers. They make a special earthen jar, which sells for 50 pesos or more in Borneo, whither they are carried by traders to sell; but the American troops have not come in contact with these people. At Santa Maria, 60 miles north of Zamboanga, a lumbering company has installed sawmills, and the labor of these Subanos is utilized to some extent in the lumbering operations.

That the Spanish estimates of population of these tribesmen is greatly exaggerated seems probable. It would not be surprising if the Spanish estimates should suffer a large reduction when census enumerators make verification.

The Jesuit missionaries have been at work among these infidels since 1861, and the padres claim to have converted many thousands to Christianity. If the work of these religious men, or of some other denomination who would be equally as energetic, industrious, and self-sacrificing, could be continued, the probability is that in a few decades these pagan tribes would conform to civilized customs and become useful members of the communities. Their labor is required in the development of the country, and every possible effort should be made to bring them within civilizing influences. The Jesuit missionaries were assisted by the Spanish Government. Several of the priests who yet remain have been engaged in this work for twenty years or more, and the scene of their labors and surroundings have been the most forbidding that could be imagined. Very often the priest, without a single civilized companion, would bury himself in the jungle among these savage nomads and there spend year after year in the work to which he had consecrated his life. Through a continuation of this work by religious men who have the true spirit these people can be rescued and saved; but, failing in the employment of such agencies, it is probable that the same fate will befall these savages as that which attended our contact with the Hawaiians in the Sandwich Islands, with our Delaware Indians, and with the South California Indians. They will be destroyed by the advancing wave of Anglo-Saxon occupation and attendant vices. If they are to be saved at all it must be by the missionaries, and these can not be secured and held to their self-sacrificing work without support, either by the Government or by associated private effort, for the kind of men who would undertake this task and succeed in it are not those who have private incomes and social ambitions.

CIVIL AFFAIRS.

In the first pages of this report is a statement of what was understood to be the scope and limitations of authority of the commanding general respecting governmental matters that lie outside of those functions which pertain to command over portions of the Army serving here.

Under the heading of "Filipino insurrection" are some observations relating to certain aspects of the military operations in Misamis that touched upon civil affairs. The transition from military to civil would have been effected more promptly if the municipal and provincial police had been ready sooner to perform the functions for which the corps was created. It was not easy for the local commanders of troops to keep their hands off of the known insurrecto sympathizers while their soldiers were being shot down and while friendly and innocent natives were being murdered by the lawless bands still hiding in the mountains. Military pressure was applied until the ladrones and lawbreakers became fugitives and the civil police was ready to take over the responsibility which the troops were glad to lay down. As soon as the division commander knew of readiness of the constabulary to relieve the troops, the transfer was made and the Army retired from all participation in police matters, except where, as in Oroquieta, the constabulary chief asked to have a force remain to assist him. In east Misamis and in the province of Surigao there has not only never been any interference by the military, but the utmost harmony has prevailed.

At the beginning of the year there were several detachments of troops in the provincially organized territory north and east of Iligan who had been retained because a recurrence of disturbances had been feared; but early in the year all but three points—Cagayan, Butuan, and Surigao—were given up. In May Cagayan and Butuan were evacuated, and now there is but a single company of soldiers in the territory referred to, and this would have been recalled but for an expressed desire of the governor of Surigao to have it remain for the present.

Throughout all other parts of Mindanao military government was continued and still continues. In one municipality there is a town organization under the municipal code, but in all other municipalities the town governments are still under mili-

tary control and supervision, although in many the machinery of municipal government is exactly the same as though they were under the code completely.

The Spanish system, which was replaced by the American, consisted in the superior control of civil affairs by military officers, and in communities where the civil population was small no better method of regulating local affairs could be desired. There is really no difference between the Spanish and the American methods, except that now all the larger places have a presidente and council by election, and matters respecting collection of customs, internal and forest revenues, and educational and judicial matters are regulated by officials who do not report to the military officers.

The total Filipino population in the territory controlled by the brigade commander does not exceed probably 60,000 souls. They may be stated about as follows, grouped as were the Spanish comandancias:

Dapitan	17, 273
Cotabato	1, 012
Zamboanga	19, 003
Davao	19, 429
Sulu	1, 000
Total	57, 717

There is a small Christian community in Basilan, but the affairs of this island have been administered by a marine officer who reports to the Navy Department.

The following tables give certain statistics relating to all the principal municipalities and villages, as well as figures of their population, taken from the most recent data:

MUNICIPAL STATISTICS.

A statement of the receipts and disbursements of municipalities in provinces under military control for the period named.

[Insular currency.]

	Period.	Receipts.	Disbursements.	Balance.
Bongao	Jan. 1 to Dec. 1, 1901	\$1, 019. 10	\$779. 91	\$239. 19
Catel	June 18 to Dec. 31, 1901	572. 50	572. 50
Cotabato	Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1901	16, 183. 65	15, 829. 62	354. 03
Davao	do.	3, 252. 36	3, 237. 58	14. 78
District of Dapitan	do.	2, 474. 28	2, 565. 78	91. 45
Municipality of Dapitan	do.	3, 858. 19	3, 858. 00	. 19
Dipolog	Jan. 1 to Dec. 1, 1901	2, 817. 18	2, 816. 76	. 42
Jolo	Jan. 1 to June 30, 1902	17, 467. 62	13, 296. 88	4, 170. 79
Lubungan	Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1901	1, 458. 89	1, 458. 88	. 66
Mati	do.	419. 50	370. 10	49. 40
Puerto Princesa	June 4 to Dec. 31, 1901	990. 21	773. 88	216. 33
Siassi	Sept. 19, 1901, to Mar. 31, 1902	2, 226. 02	1, 888. 65	337. 37
Zamboanga	July 1, 1901, to Feb. 28, 1902	14, 475. 56	12, 887. 88	1, 588. 18
Paran-paran	Sept., 1901, to June 30, 1902	977. 93	843. 33	134. 60

Included in this amount are the sums of \$543.69, \$416.91, \$219.32—\$1,179.92—collected from the municipalities of Dapitan, Dipolog, and Lubungan, respectively, and dropped by them under the head of disbursements.

A statement giving the receipts and disbursements of moneys derived from provost courts for the periods named.

[Insular currency.]

	Period.	Receipts.	Disbursements.	Balance.
	1901.			
Bongao	January to October	\$680. 41	\$582. 72	\$147. 69
Cotabato	January to July	541. 00	541. 00
Davao	do.	10. 42	10. 42
Jolo	January to December	6, 059. 24	6, 020. 14	39. 10
Paran-paran	January to July	54. 50	54. 50
Siassi	September to October	523. 90	125. 78	398. 12
Zamboanga	March to November	440. 50	440. 50

POPULATION.

The figures regarding the population of the following municipalities are taken from the authorities given, and do not include non-Christian tribes.

From the Official Guide of the Philippine Islands, published by the office of the secretary to the governor-general, 1898: Bongao, 217; Siassi, 263.

From *El Archipiélago Filipino*, published by the Society of Jesuits, 1899: Cotabato, 1,012; Dapitan, 7,627; Dipolog, 5,090; Lubungan, 4,556; Puerto Princesa, 3,121. From census 1900: Zamboanga, 20,933.

From Col. W. M. Wallace, Fifteenth U. S. Cavalry, commanding, 1902: Jolo, 1,166.

From Maj. C. D. Cowles, Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, commanding, 1902: Baganga, 2,513; Caraga, 5,663; Catel, 2,447; Davao, 8,354; Mati, 452.

From Maj. C. St. J. Chubb, Twenty-seventh U. S. Infantry, commanding, 1902: Paran-paran, 200.

A petition was sent up some time ago from a few people in Jolo, who wished relief from military control, but the brigade commander felt constrained to disapprove it, as the non-Moros and non-Chinese inhabitants are very few in number, and four years ago almost all of them were "deportados" and "disciplinarios" under Spain. They have very little property and are outnumbered several fold by the Moros residing at Jolo and its suburbs.

During the year there has been no disturbance of the peace in any part of the islands, save in West Misamis and in the Lake Lanao country.

The civil courts have administered justice in the thirteenth and fourteenth judicial districts. Recently the case of murder by Moros of eight Dyack traders from Borneo was tried by Judge Ickis at Dapitan, but while the "Bates agreement" is recognized as in force this can not be done in Sulu.

NAVAL COOPERATION.

The naval vessels cruising in these waters have varied in number from two to six or eight, and have rendered very efficient service. On several occasions when army transports have needed assistance the naval officer in charge on the station has promptly responded to every call. In the policing of the seas against illicit trade and furnishing to evil-minded Moros a manifestation of vigilance and national power, the presence of national war vessels has been very valuable.

Piracy in these seas was scarcely impeded by the Spanish war vessels until light-draft steam gunboats were provided; this advent was the death knell of the pirates. Now these whilom sea rovers limit their forays to an occasional assault on other Moro boats, but the merchant vessels of all nations are as secure in the Sulu Sea as in the Atlantic Ocean.

The habitations of the Joloano Moros, as a rule, are built over the water or very near the shore line, and all are within the range of modern machine and quick-firing guns. The Moros know how helpless they are, and the knowledge of their vulnerability is a guaranty of good behavior. For these reasons there should be a fleet of light gunboats maintained in the Sea of Celebes, of Sulu, and in the coast waters.

Besides the government of Basilan by the Navy, the village of Polloc, in Paran-paran Bay, is also under the control of officers of the naval service. There has been entire harmony of purpose and actions by these two independent branches of the public service.

COMMERCE.

The trade of the Sulu Islands is almost exclusively in the hands of the Chinese, as is that of Cotabato, while the trade of Dapitan, Zamboanga, and Davao is divided between the Chinese merchants, natives, and foreigners.

In the Sulu Islands the free-trade privilege, i. e., exemption of Moros from payment of import duties on goods imported by themselves exclusively for Moro consumption, which was granted first by military order of General Otis and later by legislative act of the Philippine Commission (act 64), came to an end on the 31st of December, 1901. Anticipating this, the Moros ordered considerable quantities of goods from Singapore and other nearby ports. Some of them arrived in time to escape the duty, but some did not arrive until after the 1st of January. The Sultan claimed to be interested in these delayed arrivals, and requested that all duties on this merchandise be remitted, also that the law requiring the imposition of duties on goods imported for Moros be repealed, so that the Moros could have free trade. The military commander at Jolo recommended the allowance of both privileges. The papers were sent forward by the brigade commander recommending allowance of the first, but disapproving the request for free trade. The most important com-

modity imported from abroad and consumed by the Moros is tobacco, which, according to the present tariff law, pays a customs duty of 95 cents gold per pound. All such tobacco has been imported from China, but as the Philippines produce excellent tobacco and the Moros can do the same if they will try, there seemed to be no good reason to favor such exemption, and there are many other good reasons for denying the privilege. But the Moros of Jolo, and especially the Sultan, appear to consider that they are very hardly treated by being compelled to conform to the rules respecting importations that govern all other inhabitants of the Philippines. The subject is referred to here, for the Sultan is importunate, and it is likely to be presented again.

In this connection attention is invited to the fact that in the British protectorate of North Borneo, where some three or four thousand Sulu Moros are found, whose lands, houses, and even their persons were sold by the Sultan for a cash consideration, the scheme of local taxation is much more burdensome than is ours in Sulu. In North Borneo, besides paying customs duties like everyone else, Moros have to pay the personal direct taxes, as follows: License on each boat or vinta over 18 feet, \$1 per year, and others according to size up to \$3 per annum. As every Moro owns at least one boat, this amounts to personal tax; on all fish caught there is a tax of 10 per cent of the value of the fish; and on pearls and pearl shells a heavy tax is collected. If a native wishes to collect jungle produce he must pay a license tax of \$3 per annum, and if the produce itself is taxable, a further impost is exacted. The buyers of jungle produce and those who furnish supplies to the Moros must also be taxed. Moros in Jolo are exempted from all these taxes and yet object to paying the ordinary customs duties on imported goods. The collections at Jolo during the fiscal year (which included six months' free trade for Moros) amounted to \$61,000 on goods carried in 121 vessels, of which 42 were under foreign flags. At Zamboanga duties collected amounted to \$43,132 on goods transported in 173 vessels, of which 40 were foreign. Only coastwise trade can be engaged in elsewhere in Mindanao and Jolo. At some ports army officers act in the capacity of customs inspectors, while at others civilians perform these duties. The military commander has appointed collectors of internal revenue at places where there were no incumbents of these positions designated by higher authority, but as all collectors of customs and taxes perform the duties under the orders of their superior civil officials, the military commanders have no jurisdiction over them. The figures respecting collections at Zamboanga and Jolo were kindly furnished by the collectors at those places.

As there is a civil superintendent of schools for these islands, the brigade commander has not intervened in respect to any matters of education.

PARAGUA GROUP.

The Tagalo insurrection which broke out in Luzon in 1896 against the Spanish authority, by 1898 had extended to Paragua, its leader being a native of that island named Sandoval. He had a following of some four or five hundred men, and an armament which included nearly 100 rifles of various patterns. An arbitrary government was maintained, administered with cruel rigor, and a reign of terror existed. The inhabitants of the Cuyo group were peaceable, industrious, and well to do. They had no sympathy with the insurrection, and took no willing part in it, but were compelled by this merciless tyrant to furnish men, money, and supplies in aid of a cause for which they felt no respect.

It was not until June, 1901, that American troops could be spared to occupy this beautiful and fertile group of islands, whose people had been harassed by their oppressors for more than two years. The account of this occupation by General Kobbé will be found in the last annual report of the division commander.

By July the insurrecto force in Paragua had been dispersed, captured, or killed, and the governor, Rufo Sandoval, who was also the general of the insurrecto forces, had died of disease. The number of rifles captured was 80. Civil municipal government was established in all centers of population. Schools were instituted and everything possible was done to help the people in resuming their ordinary vocations.

The points first occupied were Puerto Princesa, Cuyo, Culion, Taytay, and Baquit, but later the last four were vacated, and the island of Busuanga, the most northern of the group, was occupied by a company of infantry. A company of native scouts was recruited in Cuyo and near-by islands, and in December was stationed at Alfonso XIII, an old Spanish post on the southwest of the island of Paragua, in the Moro country.

Balábac is one of the Paragua group, but it has been in charge of a marine guard, who are also charged with the care and maintenance of an important light-house there situated, an aid to vessels utilizing the Straits of Balábac, a much frequented



route followed by vessels passing between the China Sea and the Sulu Sea. No American troops have ever occupied this island, and the marines report to the senior naval officer on the Zamboanga station.

All that part of the island of Paragua south of the 10th parallel north is inhabited entirely by Moros, whose numbers reach something like 1,500. Besides there are numerous nonchristian natives, usually called savages, who live in the mountain fastnesses and come to the coast only for trade. In the south part of Paragua these Montesces, as the Spaniards called them, are affiliated with the Moros and are claimed by the *datos* as their vassals. The number of Moros and Moro savages is stated to be about 6,000.

The Filipino inhabitants, save the Cuyoans and some pagan converts, are all recent arrivals—colonists—from other Philippine Islands, and it is asserted that many of them were deported from their former homes and forced to Paragua. The Christian population of the group is only about 25,000, more than half of whom inhabit the Cuyos Islands. Emigration of these people to Paragua ought to be encouraged, as they are now crowded for room in Cuyo. They are a good class of people, industrious, and quite as intelligent as the rest of the Filipinos. They appear to consider that a *bolo* is not an essential part of the outfit of an adult. All these islands are rich and valuable, but quite undeveloped. The northern island of the Calamianes, called Busuanga, should become the home of a large population, for which it is admirably adapted.

Spain ordinarily maintained in Paragua but a small force of the army, but this was supplemented by some three or four hundred men of the guardia civil, which which occupied twelve or more points. There was a repair station for gunboats in Puerto Princesa, and a docking slip; also a small naval force of marines.

A small military force will have no difficulty in preserving order in the Moro country, but there is no necessity apparent for maintaining garrisons in other parts of the islands.

The distance of Paragua from the depot at Zamboanga and its greater proximity to Iloilo led to the segregation of these islands from the territory occupied by the Seventh Brigade, and their annexation to the territory of the Fifth Brigade, which embraced the neighboring island of Panay, with headquarters at Iloilo. The transfer was effected on March 1, 1902, in pursuance to General Orders, No. 30, Division of the Philippines.

MILITARY POSTS.

As previously stated, about twenty points are now occupied, five of which are on the north coast of Mindanao—Iligan, Misamis, Oroquieta, Dapitan, and Surigao.

In view of the relations which now exist between us and the Lake Lanao Moros, Iligan and Misamis are points of considerable military importance, and this must continue until the Moro opposition to our presence in the lake region ceases. The lake itself has an area approximately of 100 square miles, but its watershed is probably not more than double its own area. The altitude of this sheet of water above the sea is about 2,100 to 2,200 feet, while the table-land and the mountains surrounding it have summits 3,000 to 6,000 feet high. In all high altitudes in the Tropics the rainfall is greater than on near-by lowlands, and, as might be expected, the outflow of the lake is very great. It finds its way to the northern seas by the Agus River through a distance of 20 miles, so there is a fall of over 100 feet to the mile. The lowest pass to the lake is therefore via the valley of this stream, and this fact the Spaniards recognized by selecting it as a route to the interior. During General Blanco's administration this road was made, and has a length of just about 21 miles. Throughout most of the distance the way was through primeval forest, which the Spanish troops felled to a width of 200 feet. The steepest road grades were not more than 10 per cent, and all the rivers and watercourses were bridged. Agus River itself was crossed on a well-built span of 150 feet, supported on wire cables, but when the troops retired in 1898 this bridge was destroyed. Before this route can be restored the river must be rebridged, but fortunately the masonry abutments are still intact. Early in the year funds were asked for with which to restore and reopen this route, but notice of action on the estimates, by superior authority, has not yet been received.

The Spaniards built a small fort at Iligan and made it the base for operations to the lake at Marahui, the point where its waters escape through the Agus to Iligan Bay on the north. Strong blockhouses lined this route as before remarked, and a considerable military and naval establishment was founded at Marahui.

Iligan has a poor harbor, and its landing facilities are not satisfactory. An incomplete rubble masonry wharf was left by the Spaniards, but it is not now much used,

as it is found to be easier to land supplies on the beach some 2,000 feet to the north, where a wooden wharf is being erected.

Five company organizations are now at Iligan, a larger force than is necessary for the local needs, but it would have to be increased were it to supply troops for service around the lake. As a route for operations to the interior, the one via the Agus is much to be preferred to the southern one via Malabang, because the ascent is more regular and gradual, and especially because the summit to be surmounted is only a hundred feet or so above the lake, while via the Mataling the climb to the neighborhood of the lake amounts to almost or quite 3,000 feet; in other words, the lake margin can not be reached on the south shore without descending nearly a thousand feet within less than a mile. Another advantage of the Iligan base over that via Malabang lies in the fact that the former is very much nearer to Manila—the point from which all supplies must be shipped—than the latter. As respects the ease or difficulty to be encountered in landing supplies, there is not much difference.

Misamis is important because it is the site of a fort, where are quarters for a company; because it is the dividing line between Moro and Filipino country; and third, because it is a convenient point whence to patrol and care for the telegraph crossing the Tukuran-Lintogup Isthmus.

Oroquieta is still occupied by a company of scouts, because the inspector of constabulary wished to have them retained until his men were better in hand. As soon as civil government is established in Dapitan, and the constabulary in control, the company of soldiers at that point could then be transferred to Sindangan and Santa Maria, the Subano country on the west coast of the panhandle farther south. There will probably be no military reason to long maintain a detachment at Surigao, and that company should soon be available for use elsewhere. At Iligan there is a fine site for a permanent post, which has been carefully surveyed and all its physical features are now known. The map herewith shows these physical features; also the proposed military reservation for Iligan, and its relation to the city streets, etc. The present barracks at this post are of a temporary character, but will serve for shelter for a few years.

Zamboanga has good barracks, headquarters building, and hospital, all adequate for two companies. There is a residence suitable for the brigade commander. The brigade depot is situated inside Fort Pilar, and buildings are in good condition. During the year a timber wharf extension has been united to the incomplete Spanish masonry wharf. At this date this structure is about completed and will soon be ready to receive, at low tide, vessels up to 16 feet draft. A railway connects this wharf with the depot storehouses inside Fort Pilar. The climate of Zamboanga is salubrious, and the place is favorable for a military headquarters for southern Mindanao and Jolo, but it has no other military consequence. There is no space for more buildings, unless a site 3 miles away is utilized, and there is no military necessity for more men than enough to guard the storehouses, etc. During the year the garrison was withdrawn from San Ramon, where the Spaniards had a prison, and applied the labor of the convicts to working a government farm. The place is now in the custody of an agent of the civil government, but a guard is maintained for the safety of the agent.

The post of Paran-paran has dependencies in Malabang, Camp Vicars, and Tukuran. This place was selected by General Weyler as the headquarters of the forces in Mindanao. He erected the barracks and constructed the fort, Asturias, at the summit of the hill. There are passable accommodations at this place for three companies and regimental headquarters. The Spanish hospital was burned, and the sick are now cared for in a temporary structure of nipa and poles. A fine spring supplies good water to the troops and fills a swimming tank. The wharf was never completed for discharging vessels, but materials have been accumulated toward its completion, so that the landing facilities can here be made what they should be, and a reappropriation has been asked of an allotment which lapsed at the close of the fiscal year. When the road to Cotabato, now under construction, is completed as it should be in a few months, army wagons can pass and repass between these two posts. During the most of the year the protection afforded by Paran-paran Bay is entirely satisfactory, but when the southwest monsoon blows strong vessels near Paran-paran must seek safety in the same bay near the naval station of Polloc, 2 miles away.

Malabang is the name of a river and a spring feeding it, situated 18 miles northwest of Paran-paran, at the head of Illana Bay. Here the Spaniards established themselves in the year 1639 and built a fort and prison, but it was abandoned in 1641. In 1890 General Weyler laid out the present fortifications, which were finished the next year, and named for General Corcuera, who commanded in Mindanao two hundred and fifty years before.

A mile to the west the Mataling River discharges its waters, its source being on

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the southern rim of the Lake Lanao basin. On the north bank of the Mataling River, near its mouth, is an extensive savanna or prairie, almost perfectly level and well grassed over. The soil is coarse, volcanic black sand, and the surface is some 19 feet higher than the water in the river which traverses the prairie. The water is excellent and abundant; so, too, is grazing for animals, and, in fact, there can not be found in the Tropics a better place for a military post or a reserve camp; only it has a slight disadvantage, which consists in the fact that all supplies have to be landed on an open beach, and sometimes during the southwest monsoon the surf runs high.

Fort Corcuera is in good condition and has room for one company, but it is now used exclusively for hospital and storage purposes. Contract has just been made for the erection here of shelter for five company organizations.

The conditions existing respecting Camp Vicars and the road thereto have already been described.

Tucuran must be held because it is the place of landing of the two cables—Paran-paran and Zamboanga. The Spanish built a line of block houses across the isthmus, with the object of fencing off the Lanao Moros from the country to the west. They built a good two-story barrack and our troops utilize it. Tucuran is also favorably situated for furnishing and supplying a small detachment at a place called Dinas, down the coast toward Cape Flecha, a point where Moro slave trading has been carried on the past year, and the home of a considerable number of Moros who have given some trouble. A detachment should be established at that point and maintained from Tucuran, which is now a station dependent on the post of Paran-paran.

The dependencies of Cotabato, an important point in the Spanish times, and is so now, are Tamontaca, Tiviran, Cundaranga, and Reina Regente. All the trade of the Rio Grande Valley centers here and the aggregate of it is considerable. The number of Moros in the valley is estimated at 80,000. The Christian population is about 1,000. There are a few Chinese merchants and they monopolize the trade. As the government is military, the army commandant of this post comes directly into contact with the civil interests. The report, herewith, of Major Febiger, who exercised command at Cotabato most of the year past, contains much that is interesting respecting that place and the Moros.

In civil government an interesting experiment has been tried; a Moro board of arbitration has been established for the purpose of adjusting difficulties between Moros. Attention is respectfully invited to an account of its affairs in Febiger's report.

The Rio Grande is navigable the whole year, as far as Reina Regente, by launches drawing 6 feet of water; so the supply of the upriver stations presents no difficulty. The Spaniards occupied Picket, some 20 miles above Reina Regente, but it has not yet been thought necessary to reconstruct the place and regarrison it. Lieutenant Van Horn, from Cotabato, made his way up the Rio Grande via the Mulita, across the divide to the northern drainage, and so on to Cagayan de Misamis, thus adding materially to our knowledge of the interior of this great island. The establishment of stations at Lebac and Cran, on the western coast south of Cotabato, is recommended, as this coast is inhabited by Moros who are regularly engaged in kidnapping the mountain natives and selling them as slaves. Both these places were occupied by the Spaniards and should be reoccupied, so as to prevent this traffic, and to guard points which will become centers of settlement and trade. The station of Reina Regente is a very picturesque place, well constructed, and in the center of the Rio Grande valley, which must some time become a very valuable agricultural region. The Spaniards made a horse trail from Cotabato to Polloc and Paran-paran, but it was not well kept up. During the year the wagon road before referred to has been under construction; its length, 13 miles. It should be completed in a few months, and will be a very useful route of communication with Paran-paran, the best harbor on the west coast of Mindanao, which is destined to become a trade center if there should be large commercial development on this island. Vessels drawing more than 4 or 5 feet can not enter the Rio Grande at low tide.

Davao has two substations, Mati and Macar, the former on the bay of the same name, 30 miles north of Cape San Agustin, and the latter at the head of the Sarangani Bay, to the west. Two companies of soldiers at Davao have no difficulty in maintaining orderly government in the old comandancias of Davao and Mati. When civil government is established in this country, as it may be at any time, and a small force of constabulary is available, the troops at Davao will no longer be needed, or certainly one company will be enough. There was never any insurrection in this part of Mindanao.

Macar is on the western shore, and back of it, to the west, stretches a grassy plain for 50 miles, where there is no timber—a country well adapted for grazing. There are no Christian inhabitants in this region, but the natives are numerous and some-

times at war with each other. In 1898 the Rio Grande Moros killed over 250 of the Talick people, and the survivors of the latter now live in mortal dread, and but for the presence of the troops the raiding would probably continue.

During the year the road that joins Jolo and Maibun was completed, and is used to some extent by the Moros bringing their goods to market at Jolo. The buildings of the post proper were all constructed in Spanish times and are adequate to shelter four companies and the band, but quarters for officers are inadequate. Some of the houses are in bad repair, but are yet occupied. The hospital stands over the water and has floor space for 100 beds—a much larger number than has ever been used. The harbor is generally safe, and is used by vessels of the usual interisland traffic type, but goods have to be lightered. The wharf of masonry was never completed for direct use by ocean steamers. To complete it would cost some \$17,000 Mexican, for which estimates have been submitted. Attention is invited to the new map of Jolo.

Siassi, a substation of Jolo, has excellent accommodations for one company, and Bongao the same, but the pipe needed to complete the water supply at Siassi has not yet been received.

Cagayan de Sulu, a small island lying in the Sulu Sea, 120 miles from Jolo and 80 miles from Sandakan, is the home of some 2,000 Joloano Moros, in two bands. They were at war recently, and it became necessary to send a detachment to this point to stop the bloodshed. Peace was soon restored and the troops withdrawn. The island is a fertile one, adapted to stock raising and cocoanut culture. The Moros on this island own the Jolo Sultan as their spiritual and temporal chief, but they yield him very little respect and pay no tribute.

Generally the troops in the brigade are well sheltered and their material wants well supplied. In the province of Misamis and Surigao, except in Iligan, there is no restriction upon the alcoholic liquor traffic, nor is there any in Zamboanga, where municipal government under the code is administered by the local authorities. Everywhere else throughout Mindanao and Jolo the sale of intoxicating liquor is forbidden by general orders. It is hoped that this restriction will continue to be enforced.

STAFF REPORTS.

Attention is invited to the annual reports of the brigade staff, which contain much valuable information and statistical data.

The adjutant-general calls attention to the personnel employed on clerical work, nearly all of which consists of detailed soldiers. The pressing need for a more permanent force is very urgent, as the exigencies of the service require that the enlisted clerks be changed so often that it is difficult to secure and retain efficient men.

Target practice has been held, as directed in General Orders, No. 355, Division of the Philippines, 1901, but there has been so much active field service and so many changes of stations that there was necessarily less system and method in this training than was desired. It is also cause for regret that for the same reasons it has not been found practicable to carry out the educational programme prescribed in General Orders, No. 155, Headquarters of the Army, 1901.

The necessity of retaining in the service the native scouts, now authorized, seems to have passed with the cessation of insurrection and the organization of a native constabulary. Beyond the organization of a company of Moro scouts for the Lanao country, there appears to be no need for scouts in this brigade, but the plan of creating a Moro police in United States pay and under our control is worthy of attentive consideration.

So active has been the service and so uncertain the stations of officers that the presence of officers' families in considerable numbers has at some posts proved to be a serious embarrassment, and still continues so to be. It is an evil that ought to be avoided, and an officer's family ought not to be permitted to follow the officer when it is impracticable to properly care for the noncombatant women and children.

The roster on file at division headquarters, Manila, contains much valuable data respecting the brigade, and shows graphically the composition of the different commands.

The absence of many officers on detached service and for other causes interferes greatly with efficiency. There are 37 companies of regular troops in the brigade, and the captains of 16 of these organizations are absent from them. It is respectfully submitted that a War Department regulation be made, and strictly enforced, that no officer of a regiment serving in the Philippines be detailed on any service in the United States, and that whenever an officer is ordered home or granted leave of absence for any purpose taking him to the United States, he be transferred to a regiment there serving, and an officer to replace him be immediately sent to join in his stead.

Major Pettit calls attention to the difficulty under which he has performed his duties. He does not overstate these difficulties. All the troops were inspected in July, August, and September, 1901, and before the close of the month of August proximo all the posts will be again inspected. The brigade commander and the inspector-general have personally visited every station, some of them several times, but it has not been found possible to send the inspector to all the stations as often as was desired. Capt. S. A. Cloman, Twenty-third Infantry, was the department inspector-general until the middle of September, 1901, when he was succeeded by Major Pettit, whose term of duty at Zamboanga had already lasted nearly two years, and his intimate knowledge of the military conditions prevailing make him a very valuable staff officer. Attention is invited to his report on the Zamboanga district covering the time of his command.

The following are extracts from Major Pettit's report as inspector. He has been here two years, was formerly colonel Thirty-first Volunteer Infantry and commanded this station:

* * * * *

"Bongao, Dapitan, Macar, Davao, Mati, are the only posts not in telegraphic communication with brigade headquarters. The long distance from main depots and the extensive territory covered and the few boats have occasionally delayed the filling of requisitions from remote posts, but the lack has generally consisted of luxuries, rarely the necessities of life and good subsistence.

"There are no complaints needing serious attention or which can be traced to neglect or inefficiency. The troops in the field on the Lake Lanao expedition were restricted to bacon, coffee, sugar, and hard bread from three to four weeks. The trail over which the supplies had to be packed was a very bad one and the loads had to be limited to the actual necessities of the troops.

"NATIVE TROOPS.

"They are armed with the Springfield carbine and uniformed in regulation clothing. All of them draw shoes and leggings, but are rather uncomfortable when wearing them. A few of them can read and write, but their education does not extend much further. Discipline is good from point of view of obedience on the spot, but constant supervision is necessary to insure an exact performance of duty carrying with it personal responsibility, such as guard duty, care of property, etc. They learn the mechanical parts of drill instruction quickly, and attached to white troops in the field, armed with bolos, they are very useful in cutting the way, in preparing hasty shelter for troops, etc., but as a fighting force against their own people I don't think they have much value.

* * * * *

"There are 37 officers in the brigade absent from their commands at present date. The command of important posts falls frequently to young lieutenants, and the care and discipline of the troops therein is not what it should be. Little military instruction in posts can be had until a more settled condition of affairs shall exist. Officers' schools are generally neglected. There has been but little target practice, and this should be corrected during the coming year.

"The attitude of the natives is friendly, with the exception of some of the Lake Lanao people. The population is composed principally of Moros and pagans, with a scattering of Filipinos.

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"The equipments furnished by the Ordnance Department are excellent. Complaints have been made by the officers in the Lake Lanao expedition that the .38-caliber Colt is too light—that it failed to stop Moros unless it struck them in a vital spot. The same complaint was made concerning the caliber .30 United States magazine rifle.

"The arrangement of the bayonet scabbard is still unsatisfactory. Great numbers of bayonets are lost, scabbards broken and condemned. The magazine rifle has undoubtedly proved itself to be a simple, strong, efficient, and reliable weapon. It is possible that it may fail to stop a man occasionally, but I don't think there is much danger of the failures turning the tide of battle.

"ATTITUDE OF NATIVES.

"The natives in the territory covered by the brigade are, with but few exceptions, incapable of successfully conducting any form of self-government based on justice and

good law. Their attitude toward the United States is largely one of indifference, and I doubt if the advantages of our form of government are appreciated or understood. In twenty-five or fifty years hence possibly some beneficial results may be noted. The fear of punishment is the main incentive for good behavior. They have no forms of industry other than that necessary to supply their simple wants. Their military strength is not formidable, and the number of arms and fighting men has been usually overestimated.

* * * * *

"PAY.

"The Navy pays in Mexican money at the official rate—at present \$2.35 for \$1. Our men are paid in gold, which they have to exchange for Mexican currency at the rate of 2 for 1, which puts the soldier at a disadvantage in purchasing power of his money."

* * * * *

Lieut. Col. J. N. Morrison, U. S. Army, was the judge-advocate until March, 1902; but as no officer was available for the post, he was succeeded by Maj. S. W. Fountain as acting judge-advocate. There have been no notable trials by military courts during the year. The military commission, as a means of administering the laws of war among natives, has been used in the case of ten persons, five of whom were Moros. This tribunal has of late been seldom convened, as it was much preferable to have the criminal trials of the nonmilitary conducted by the civil courts, and it is not likely that it will be necessary to hereafter make use of this instrumentality for administering justice. Provost courts have decided minor cases at Cotabato, Davao, and Jolo, and there have been a few trials at Zamboanga. A report of fines collected is forwarded for file at division headquarters.

The brigade quartermaster gives statistics respecting expenditures in his department and how applied. The shelter for the troops is now generally satisfactory. All are in barracks save those engaged in Moro operations from Malabang, and these are in good tents and all the men have bunks. Until the Government is ready to establish permanent posts the present conditions must prevail. At Davao, Cotabato, Paran-paran, Zamboanga, Jolo, and Iligan means have been provided for condensing water and are in use. The supply of the troops by sea has involved considerable expense for steam vessels. To the troops on the north coast rations and forage are supplied direct from Cebu, but all other stations have their wants supplied by shipments made generally from the Zamboanga depot, although it has occasionally happened that the Manila transports have made deliveries direct to Malabang and Jolo. The present means of water transportation are adequate, but if the number of stations should be increased another steamer should be provided. The small launches that are designed only for harbor work are of necessity used for communicating and towing between points separated by the open sea, and the boats suffer from this buffeting, for which they are not adapted. There are now five of these launches in the brigade; also four other steamers of capacity from 70 to 200 tons.

Native grass has been largely used for forage, but there are few animals that can be kept in good condition on such forage and still be required to work hard. At Camp Vicars it was fortunately practicable to purchase rice grass in the milk or in a more matured state, and it was good forage; but now, after the harvest, the animals must rely on native grass. If our camps were permanent and the grass fields were cared for and mowed at stated intervals, the quality of the forage would be improved, but mowing machines would have to be provided.

Interpreters are required to be paid from civil funds, but they are greatly in arrears owing to delay in receiving remittances. The quartermaster disburses this money, as he also does the subsidies for the Moro sultan and datus of Jolo. They also have been in arrears, and the fact is cause for complaint.

Considering the difficulty of communicating promptly with the remote points and the various interruptions and delays to be expected in moving supplies, the troops have been almost uniformly well fed. There were instances where some minor article of subsistence was deficient, but none which caused hunger or suffering. The loss of nearly all the cattle in the country through rinderpest made it impossible in many cases, and impracticable generally, to secure live beef cattle or to make contracts for delivery of fresh beef. About all the fresh meat used was brought by refrigerator ships. It was found to be impracticable to make deliveries of frozen beef at points like Malabang, Cotabato, and Jolo. It is evident that no other kind of fresh meat can hereafter be supplied save the Australian frozen beef. There are now cold-storage chambers provided or under construction at Zamboanga, Jolo, Malabang, and Iligan.

The following is the statement of expenditures by the chief quartermaster:

Statement of expenditures by the chief quartermaster, Seventh Separate Brigade, for constructions, repairs, and rents during the fiscal year 1902.

CONSTRUCTIONS.

Iligan	\$3, 109. 94
Misamis	417. 25
Jimenez	700. 00
Langaran	200. 00
Surigao	11. 25
Jolo	1, 161. 75
Bongao	3, 000. 00
Siassi	3, 292. 63
Cotabato	487. 60
Davao	1, 290. 00
Macar	1, 975. 00
Tucuran	338. 32
Malabang	1, 533. 14
Alfonso XIII	250. 00
Cuyo	450. 00
Busuanga	500. 00
Puerto Princesa	942. 50
San Ramon G. F.	1, 244. 40
Chief quartermaster	1, 578. 98
Paran-paran	4, 021. 19
Zamboanga	6, 459. 22
Total	32, 963. 17

REPAIRS.

Iligan	\$1, 257. 88
Misamis	200. 00
Jimenez	80. 00
Dapitan	20. 83
Surigao	49. 00
Cagayan	130. 00
Jolo	1, 204. 43
Davao	177. 80
Paran-paran	2, 577. 75
Macar	75. 00
Zamboanga	791. 57
Mati	150. 00
Cotabato	2, 269. 00
Tucuran	47. 75
Zamboanga	5, 266. 73
Puerto Princesa	1, 751. 34
Reina Regente	2, 753. 70
Cudaranga	390. 00
Total	19, 192. 28

RENTS.

Iligan	\$1, 742. 00
Misamis	934. 20
Jimenez	720. 60
Surigao	50. 00
Langaran	760. 00
Oroquieta	1, 524. 04
Dapitan	156. 00
Cagayan	3, 221. 02
Jolo	1, 074. 20
Cotabato	1, 275. 00
Zamboanga (chief quartermaster)	1, 436. 00
Cuyo	127. 50
Culiom	66. 50
Zamboanga Post	142. 00
Total	13, 229. 06

The recommendation of the chief commissary is concurred in that tobacco be added to the soldier's ration. The disarrangement of the system of supply of fresh vegetables resulting from cholera in Manila has prevented frequent deliveries of potatoes and onions, and this will continue until the disease disappears, but suffering by the men has not resulted. The components substituted for fresh vegetables have generally been available.

The subject of the beef supply of the brigade was fully covered in report made under date of September 30, 1901, and need not be again referred to except to emphasize the fact of immediate need of cold-storage plants at central points of supply of small garrisons from these places. Beef cattle were purchased at points in Paragua and at Davao and shipped to north coast posts, and also to Paran-paran, with the result that most of them died of rinderpest, and this plan of supply was at once abandoned.

The full and detailed statement on engineering operations is contained in Captain Morrow's report. The services of the engineer troops have been most valuable, and in the work now in progress of connecting Camp Vicars by wagon road with Malabang the aid of the engineer officers and men is indispensable. A number of maps and sketches prepared in the engineer office accompany this report.

The following figures are taken from Captain Morrow's report:

Statement of allotments for the fiscal year 1902.

	Mexican currency.
Jolo-Maibun road	\$5, 000
Cuyo-Lugbuan road	2, 500
Paragua roads	1, 020
Davao district roads	15, 000
Cotabato-Tamontaca road	6, 000
Cotabato-Paran-paran road	45, 000
Paran-paran-Malabang-Tucuran trails	5, 000
Malabang-Camp Vicars road	10, 000
Repair and construction of wharves	25, 000
Outstanding debts	41
Total	114, 561

Statement of work performed and amounts expended under foregoing allotments as shown by reports received up to June 30, 1902.

Jolo-Maibun road (completed): Total length, 10½ miles	\$4, 750. 00
Cuyo-Lugbuan road (completed): Total length, 5 miles	2, 500. 00
Paragua roads: (Paragua transferred to Fifth Separate Brigade. No reports received.)	

DAVAO DISTRICT.

Davao-Cotabato road (50 miles completed)	\$575. 00
Davao-Tagum country road	294. 50
Trails	299. 20

Cotabato-Tamontaca, in process of construction.

Cotabato-Paran-paran, 8½ miles constructed	12, 060. 52
Paran-paran-Malabang-Tucuran trails	2, 000. 00

Malabang-Camp Vicars road, 13 miles constructed.

WHARVES.

Zamboanga, "L" on end of pier under construction	\$13, 500. 00
Jolo, repairs	560. 00

The work of the Signal Corps detachment in maintaining the submarine cable service and in building and operating land lines has been of great value. In the advance to Camp Vicars the telegraph was usually but a very few miles behind the head of the column, the details of construction falling to Lieutenant Cooper, of the native scouts, who was for a long time signal sergeant in the brigade. Lieutenant Lenoir succeeded to the charge of the work and superintended installation of the line over the Macadar trail. Since his relief the charge of the signal work has devolved on Captain Morrow. The construction of the land line—Cotabato-Davao—is approaching completion, and in two months or so should be in operation

throughout. The labor has been done by Moros principally, and they have also furnished the poles.

The acting ordnance officer reports the transactions of his department. It has been found convenient to keep a small stock of equipments and ammunition at the Zamboanga depot. A considerable quantity of ammunition of an earlier fabrication than 1900 has been turned in to the arsenal at Manila, because it was found to be defective. Very efficient service was performed at Bayan and Ganosi by the Twenty-fifth Mountain Battery, which has 4 Vickers-Maxim guns. The whole outfit is very well adapted to its purposes, but the projectiles and bursting charges are not heavy enough to demolish the Moro forts. Two field mortars, 3.6 inch, have been asked for, and are now en route from Manila to be used against the Moro cotas should the occasion arise. It is believed that with high-angle fire the interior of every part of these inclosed works could be reached.

The report of the chief surgeon presents the more important statistics respecting health and mortality. Considering the arduous service, the numerous exchanges of commands, and the fact that a very large number of the men were newly enlisted recruits, the showing may be considered satisfactory. Of twenty-five company organizations that on June 30, 1901, were serving in the command, but eleven now remain. There are two officers now commanding posts and stations who exercised command a year ago, while five different officers of the medical department have held the position of chief surgeon during the year.

Notwithstanding that this year the troops have been employed in considerable numbers in very active campaigning, and that the service was exceedingly trying, the records show smaller rates per thousand of sick and deaths than last year; also that the mortality from disease in this year is about 11 per thousand, while last year the deaths from disease amounted to over 19 per thousand. A comparison of statistics of sickness and mortality for last fiscal year with the year ending June 30, 1902, is shown in the following table:

	1902.	1901.		1902.	1901.
Average strength	3,075	2,544	Deaths from disease	34	49
Admissions	8,059	8,854	Rate per thousand	11.5	19.23
Rate per thousand	2,621	3,487	Cases of diarrhea	1,562	1,066
Ratio of sick to average strength (per cent)	5.95	8.11	Rate per thousand	507.9	419
Deaths	52	53	Cases of typhoid fever	39	50
Rate per thousand	169.1	208.3	Rate per thousand	12.7	19.6
Deaths from dysentery	15	19	Deaths from typhoid fever	3	6
Rate per thousand	4.88	7.47	Cases of rheumatism	182	129
Cases of dysentery	441	407	Rate per thousand	59.1	50.7
Rate per thousand	143.4	159.9			

The fifty-two deaths reported in the brigade during the year were due to the following causes:

Gunshot wounds	18
Bolo wounds	3
Drowning	5
Ptomaine poisoning	1
Typhoid fever	3
Dysentery	15
Diarrhea	2
Bronco-pneumonia	1
Tubercular peritonitis	1
Abscess of liver	1
Tetanus	1
Beri-beri	1
Total	52

The chief surgeon makes reference to the showing of a small increase this year as compared to last in the numbers per thousand sick with diarrhea, and assigns as probable causes the hard work and exposure of the troops composing the Lanao field force, and also that the troops were obliged to subsist almost entirely on field rations.

Elsewhere reference has been made to the hardships, exposures, and privations that had to be endured by the troops. The number employed actively in the field has reached at times 50 per cent of the total strength of the brigade, and all those

who were at the front received their supplies, clothing, medicines, etc., by means of pack-mule transport.

The rainfall was at times tremendous, reaching in the last days of June 11 inches in two days, and the men were often drenched to the skin for days at a time. Very few fresh vegetables could be had and very little fresh meat. It is surprising to those who know by experience how great was the sickness in the summer campaign in the Gulf States during the civil war that a still greater proportion were not sick from intestinal disorders. It is a satisfaction to learn that dysentery, the most deadly of all camp diseases, last year caused the death of but 15 in the brigade, giving a death rate of less than 5 per thousand, while the year before the mortality from this cause was more than 50 per cent greater.

The Medical Department has operated ice machines at Zamboanga, Jolo, and Cagayan. Recently the machine last referred to has been removed to Iligan, which is the most important station on the north coast. An ice plant is now being installed at Malabang.

With each of these machines is, or will be, a cold-storage chamber for keeping refrigerated beef in a frozen condition. The quartermaster constructs these buildings and refrigerators, the commissary pays the surgeon for keeping the beef, and the medical officer operates the machine, buying the fuel of the quartermaster, who also attends to hauling and delivering. It is recommended that some simpler administrative method be devised for preserving fresh beef than the one now pursued.

The assistance rendered by the officers and men of the brigade has been loyal and efficient. The service has at times been very arduous, but there was no complaining or remonstrance. Nothing could be finer than the spirit in which the troops entered and continued on the work of opening the routes of supply, a work that was most irksome and uncongenial, but all seemed to realize that success depended as much on those who were helping on the muddy trails as upon their more fortunate comrades who were bearing the flag to victory in the enemy's works.

GEO. W. DAVIS,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

APPENDIX 1.

GENERAL DAVIS'S REPORT ON MORO AFFAIRS.

OCTOBER 24, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Manila, P. I.

SIR: The military situation in this department, and especially the aspect of it that is affected by our relations with the Moro tribes, seems to me to be deserving of some general observations, and the attention of the division commander is respectfully invited to this important subject. My personal knowledge is necessarily limited, but there are certain bald facts known to all and undisputed that seem to me to point to the need for the announcement of a definite policy in our intercourse with these Mohammedan Malays.

In 1578 Spain sent her first armed expedition against the Moro pirates, and during the three hundred and twenty years following hostilities of greater or less importance were in progress somewhere in the Moro country all the time, and everywhere throughout this vast region a part of the time.

The undersigned has not been able to ascertain what was the exact status of the Moro power in an international sense previous to 1851. Then it was defined in a formal agreement, but it would seem that the Sultan of Jolo was regarded by Spain as a sovereign and independent ruler until he formally surrendered and submitted to Spain on the date last given above. Previously the war carried on seems to have had for its motive the suppression of piracy in the Jolo Archipelago, but Mindanao seems to have been regarded as a Spanish province from the time of the first settlement in 1632 by right of discovery in 1521.

In a hurried glance at the current histories of these islands I note two treaties between the Spanish authorities and the Joloanos; also two surrenders of the latter to the former (those of 1851 and 1878). As respects the Mindanao Moros I find in print the record of the surrender of the Sultan of Mindanao and a large number of his dates in 1887, this by formal document signed by both parties, but there is no other agreement or treaty.

As respects the status of affairs and intercourse between the United States and the Moros, this appears to be set out to some extent in what is usually described as the "Bates agreement." The signers of the document were Maj. Gen. John C. Bates, U. S. Volunteers, for the United States, and the Sultan of Jolo and several of his chiefs for the natives. This was on August 14, 1899.

By the terms of this document the agreement was not to be of effect until it had been confirmed by the President of the United States. In a letter from General Bates to the Sultan, dated April 4, 1900, the fact was announced to his highness and the signatory dates that the President had not approved the tenth article of the agreement, respecting slavery, but that all other provisions were in full force and effect. With the Moros of Mindanao the American authorities have had no negotiations, nor does there exist any written or other agreement in pursuance of which special rights and privileges can be claimed over those enjoyed by the native inhabitants generally.

So far as I can judge from my brief opportunity for observation, our treatment of the Mindanao Moros and the pagan tribes is based on the same general rules that have always governed our actions in intercourse with the Indian tribes on our Western frontiers. We recognized their right to regulate their own interior tribal affairs according to their native rules and customs. We did not interfere with their religious beliefs and worship. If they wished to resolve a tribal contest by force, we did not interpose or attempt to punish the Indians of one band for destroying the property or lives of their opponents. If the victors carried off to captivity the women and children of their victims, we did not, in practice, force restitution. The Indians paid no taxes, and if individuals and bands passed and repassed our frontiers with dutiable goods we ignored the transaction. Their ponies and peltries and manufactures they were permitted to sell to anyone who would buy, and we charged no licenses or tax—municipal, State, or national. They were not asked nor permitted to take part in any functions of general or local government. We would never recognize as valid the titles to lands which reservation or wild Indians might attempt to convey.

The Army has encountered in Mindanao aboriginal and nomadic races not materially different from those with which our troops have long been familiar. There are many natives of the great island of Mindanao who, although grown to manhood, have never seen a white man. They are water nomads, so to speak, and not land nomads; but in a region of less than 100 square miles in north central Mindanao are about a quarter of a million Moros living about the borders of Lake Lanao. These have fixed habitations, and depend less on fish and more on agriculture than any others of their race; but notwithstanding their comparative fixity of residence and agrarian character, they are the least known and most unfriendly of all. At one time or another all others have been subdued by the Spaniards, but these have always defied the invader, Spanish or American, although their permanent conquest was at hand in 1898 when the Spaniards evacuated the Malanao country, as their home was called. On condition that certain proposed visitors go alone and unarmed two army officers, separately, ventured into the edge of the lake country, one from the north and one from the south, each safeguarded by a detachment of armed Moros. This beehive of Mohammedan savages is governed by many score of mere hereditary chiefs, each entirely independent of every other, and there is no central authority or common head over all, but they are cemented together by a common religion and a common interest—self-preservation. It is a patriarchal government pure and simple.

There is, or was, a real or pretended sultan of Mindanao, whose seat was in the Rio Grande Valley, but other dates who are stronger have driven him away from his ancient home, and he has migrated to a remote part of the sultanate. He is without power or influence, but the Jolo Sultan has been able to retain some central control and authority. Some writers say that the Jolo potentate was once overlord for all the Moros in the Philippines and Borneo, but he now has authority over only those of his coreligionists who live in the Sulu Archipelago. While he describes himself as "The Sultan of Sulu and its dependencies," he makes no pretension to substantiate control anywhere outside of the Jolo group. But the Sultan's pretensions to sovereignty are often not recognized by some of the local chiefs; indeed His Highness has been at war, so called, with two of his own dates, almost within sight of his own palace, for several months past and until a few days ago. The entire population of two small Sulu islands migrated in a body and came to Zamboanga for safety and to escape oppression and slavery by the Sultan because they did not pay the taxes imposed.

Previous to 1851 the Spaniards seem to have been almost constantly at war with these sea rovers. The ostensible object was the suppression of piracy, but the real

object appears to have been conquest and religious propaganda. It was not until 1851 that the Sultan yielded openly. Then he and his principal *datos* surrendered and declared themselves subjects and dependents of the Queen of Spain, and renounced forever the right to make treaties, conventions, or agreements with any powers, persons, or chiefs. They accepted the Spanish flag, renounced the right to erect forts and defensive works of any kind, to purchase and use firearms of any description without a license from the Spanish commander, condemned to capture and confiscation any boats having on board any other than *armas blancas*, solemnly pledged themselves not to carry on, and to prevent anyone from carrying on, piracy in the "dominions of Jolo," and to "persecute" those who violated this pledge.

Spain accorded titles of nobility to the Sultan and his *datos*, with right of blood succession, and conceded to the former a subsidy of 1,500 pesos annually, 600 pesos to each of two *datos* and 360 pesos to one other. The right was also accorded to the Sultan to collect the taxes they had been accustomed to gather for their own support, except that Spanish ships were to be exempt and Jolo crafts were to be free in Spanish ports.

In 1878 there was another capitulation, preceded by a military conquest. The reason why this agreement was made has not been ascertained, for many of its provisions are the same in effect as were signed in 1851, which was still subsisting. Besides, the Joloanos were under the heel and had to accept any terms offered. But wherein the two capitulations differed, the later one appears to have been easier on the natives than the former.

Article I declared acceptancy of complete Spanish sovereignty and the Joloanos were loyal subjects of His Majesty.

Article II increased the Sultan's subsidy to 2,400 pesos yearly and gave to his heir 700 pesos, and 600 pesos to each of two *datos*.

Article III gave to Spain the right to occupy any place needed for public purposes, paying for property taken.

Article IV gave the Sultan the right to collect dues from foreign ships at ports where he had officials.

Article V gave him the right to appeal directly to the Governor-General in Manila and to make complaints respecting Spanish subordinates.

Article VI gave the Sultan the right to issue licenses to his people to carry muzzle-loading firearms, two persons to guarantee the trustworthiness of the licensee.

Article VII gave the Sultan the right to issue licenses to local craft, but to leave the islands permission of the Spanish commander had to be obtained.

Article VIII required the suppression of piracy.

Article IX permitted free exercise of religion by Mohammedans. Catholic missionaries could visit and reside in the islands.

Article X. Moro culprits to be delivered to the Sultan and Christian delinquents to the Spanish authorities for punishment.

Article XI. The Spanish flag to be flown in the town of Jolo and on Jolo craft at sea.

Article XII and Article XIII provided for observance and modification of the capitulations.

But we know as a fact that between the date of this treaty and the departure of the Spanish authorities, a period of over twenty years, war or insurrection existed a large part of the time. Once the Spanish garrison was completely overthrown, it is said, but on another occasion the Sultan's town and palace were destroyed. So far as I can learn, the only period of peace was during the rule of blood and iron of General Arolus, "the man for the position," who ruled with "relentless firmness combined with absolute justice—the only safe policy;"^a but his successor was assassinated and nearly the whole garrison massacred. The Spanish authorities continued to pay subsidies to the Sultan and *datos* until the Philippine evacuation. Slavery^b was never tabooed and polygamy was not even mentioned, while according to the law of the Koran, and immemorial custom, the *dato* had the power of life and death over his subjects. These ancient rights were not taken away.

The American agreement, it seems to me, should never have been made. The treaty of Paris obliged the United States to respect the rights of provinces, municipalities, ecclesiastical bodies, corporations, and individuals.

^a The Philippine Islands, by Worcester, pp. 193 and 473.

^b The Spanish "Presupuesto" (estimates) for 1896-97 carries 8,100 pesos allowance for the "Sultanes y *datos* de Jolo y Mindanao," but I have not been able to ascertain the names of the persons to whom the payments were made. Forman gives the names of the beneficiaries—date unnoted—amounting to 6,100 pesos, but at least 1,800 pesos of this amount was paid to Mindanao sultans and *datos*. Under the "Bates agreement" the American payments to Joloanos alone amounted 9,120 pesos annually.

The agreements of 1851 and 1878, both of which seem to have been unrepealed when sovereignty was transferred, furnished workable rules for regulating and defining the rights, duties, privileges, and responsibilities of the Moros toward the United States under the new sovereign power. It would not be improper to describe these Spanish-Moro agreements as charters or franchises. By and under them no obligation was imposed upon the Moros or privilege conceded by Spain, than such as we have for a number of years been in the habit of conceding to our plains and reservation Indians. Slavery was not mentioned verbally or alluded to by implication. It was a perfectly simple matter to have informed the Moro natives that the United States was the new nation demanding submission and obedience to the law like any other natives. This idea they would have grasped instantly and all matters would have moved forward without more friction in Mindanao than now. The Spanish subsidies could have been continued if we thought proper; but instead, we negotiated and signed a new agreement, proceeding apparently on the theory that a change of sovereignty of a country abrogates all treaties, but in fact both of these old agreements commenced with the formal declaration that the Moros were the subjects of the King of Spain, indeed they were no less "subjects" than were the Filipinos, and are now no more so to the United States under the "Bates agreement" than are the Filipinos without it or one like it.

It is true that the Sultan has conceded by this agreement the right of "any person to purchase and hold land" if he consents, and Americans or foreigners wishing to enter the country have the right (?) to "ask consent" of the Moro authority. On the other hand, the United States twice refers to the "Government of the Sultan." In Articles IV and XII the United States abdicates its sovereign powers, conceding to the Sultan his right to refuse consent to the purchase of land or to trade in a country over which the United States is as completely sovereign as she is over the District of Columbia. By the insertion of a clause about slavery, which was disapproved, the slave has apparently lost the right he may have formerly had of purchasing his freedom. There can be no hazard in the statement that the Spanish Government would never have inserted such provisions in any agreement with Moros, nor in the further statements that the Sultan will not, until forced, fail to insist on our observance of what he calls a treaty with the United States.

This agreement is indeed the law of the land until Congress shall otherwise direct, or until the signatory parties shall agree upon modifications. That the Sultan will hold to all so far conceded by us goes without saying.

The "Government of the Sultan," as the patriarchal Moro régime is called, is not a good definition. There is, however, some sort of a government in all savage and wild tribes, indeed in the most primitive of them—and the Moro governments have advanced beyond the most primitive form. While they have no written laws (save those contained in or based on the Koran) they yet have some learned men who are lawgivers, but the executive power is the head or chief, and he may not be restricted by anyone in executing his own will, even to the taking of human life.

The question has been asked, "What form of government should take the place of this one we see in operation?" The student of history knows that the transition from patriarchal forms and mediæval feudalism to a government of law was slow in the extreme even with the Caucasian race. How many of us have seen the failure of attempts to make self-governing citizens quickly out of the breech-clouted, naked savages. It seems to me the worst misfortune that could befall a Moro community, and the nation responsible for good order among the Moros, would be to upset and destroy the patriarchal despotism of their chiefs, for it is all they have and all they are capable of understanding. Christian missionaries have utterly failed to make converts anywhere among the Mohammedans. They appear to be as firm in their adherence to the rules laid down by the Prophet as were the Medes and Persians to their laws. While we may refuse to recognize their rulers, and even destroy them, we can not eradicate a deep-seated religious conviction, the principles of which have been cherished for more than a thousand years. They have no knowledge of or respect for any other law than the one which exacts an eye for an eye. It seems to me to be our duty to respect this conservatism and deeply rooted prejudice, to utilize it and to use these dados in our efforts to lead these people away from slavery, polygamy, piracy, and despotic rule, just as the Dutch have in Java and the English in India. That much success can be obtained with this generation I do not expect. Our only hope is with the rising generation and those to follow.

If Anglo-Saxons, Irish, Italians, Germans, Danes, and Swedes could be induced to emigrate to the Moro country in tens and hundreds of thousands, and take up and possess the earth as these people have done in the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and the Argentine Republic, the Moro problem would soon be solved, but there can never be such invasion of these tropical jungles by white men. The native races will continue to form 95 per cent of their inhabitants, probably for ever and ever. They will be fishermen and pearl divers as long as the sea yields its support. They will

gather wax and jungle products as long as the forests remain, and sail the seas in their vintas as long as they can find trunks of trees out of which to fashion them. By degrees they may be taught rice and coffee and sugar cultivation. Even the Chinese, who have been invited by the British Company to emigrate to North Borneo, will not come in numbers greater than are needed as merchants, mechanics, domestic servants, clerks, and stevedores, nor would they emigrate to the Moro country in the capacity of homesteaders and agriculturists. One of the causes assigned for the Filipino outbreak against Spain in 1896 was the forced emigration of Filipinos to Mindanao and Paragua.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

I enter upon this with great diffidence, for I realize that the one who offers a solution of the problem that has remained unsolved for over three hundred years is entering on dangerous ground. I shall, however, venture to offer a few suggestions.

1. That the Bates agreement be abrogated and set aside. This will probably require the action of Congress, for the Moros surely will never willingly give up the rights they now enjoy.

2. That no sultan or king over all the Moros of any region or over other datos be recognized.

3. That hereditary datos be recognized as headmen in the several bands, and those who can earn wages in the performance of public service be paid as such, but that no pension or subsidy be allowed to any sultan or heir apparent or to any other chief.

4. That government over the Moros be military, and that all violators of the law which amount to capital offenses, also slave catching, be tried and punished by the courts that may be established by the supreme government.

5. That trade in domestic products of the Moro country, carried on by Moros with any part of the Philippines under the American flag, be free, unlimited, and undutiable, and that export taxes on Moro products shall not be imposed, this immunity from taxation to continue for ten years.

Of course the sultan and his adherents would be displeased to lose the power to extort tribute from his people, and especially to lose his subsidy from the government. It might result in hostility, but I doubt that, for before the change was made there would be a sufficient force on the ground and in the waters adjacent to quickly crush any force mustered by the sultan, but if an outbreak did occur he would have to be disciplined only once.

The fact is that the treaties the Spaniards made amounted to very little anyway. There was never one made that was not soon violated. The only agreement they can understand is one emphasized with blows, and that the Americans and Jolo Moros must some day come to blows I have no doubt. As respects the Malanao country, we should not lose a day in setting on foot a movement for reoccupation of their country abandoned by the Spaniards in 1897-98, and that means the following:

(a) The reopening of the wagon road from Iligan to the lake, to be guarded by a battalion of troops.

(b) The launching of light-draft gunboats on the lake, like the three which are now sunk in the lake.

(c) The installation of electric motors driven by turbines with the abundant water power of the Agus River.

(d) The utilization of this power to operate a trolley railroad on the wagon-road grade.

(e) There should be a regiment of troops in the lake country.

(f) The extension of the road around the lake, to and across the divide to Parapanan, which would be the base ultimately and a commercial port for all southern Mindanao, the road to be extended to Cotabato, where it would tap the trade of the Rio Grande Valley.

This would take some years to accomplish, and would cost two or three million dollars, but it will solve the Moro problem in Mindanao, and lead ultimately to the commercial development of this great island, of which one-half is now dominated by savages who are much more savage and intractable than the Igorrotes and Mandayans.

There is an alternative method of procedure, and this it to profit by the example set by England and Holland, especially the latter power—for the Dutch govern more Malays in Java than the aggregate of all the rest in the world, and among them are a million Mohammedans. The Dutch did not, and do not, overturn the native rulers, nor do the English in India and in the Straits Settlements; neither do they make treaties with them. The plan so successfully introduced in Java by Governor Van den Bosch in 1834 was to show the local kings and rajahs a way and means by which their own revenues could be greatly increased. A resident who nominally had no

power was appointed for each local prince, but yet this Dutch adviser was the real power behind the native throne, and the rajah knew it. All the resident had to do was to advise, watch, inspect, and report, and the rajahs apparently did the rest. From 1834 to the close of the century it was never necessary to interpose force with these rulers, while in that period the population increased more than 300 per cent, and the trade from almost nothing to many hundred million guilders.

If the Sultan of Jolo is to be retained as a puppet kingling, he should be stripped of all real power through measures such as have been so successfully employed in other oriental lands. It is possible that his quasi sacred character under the law of his religion might be utilized in some way for the benefit of his people, but I prefer the other course, and that is to abate the sultan nuisance, just as the Moros themselves have done with their own sultan in Mindanao.

So far our policy seems to me to have been based on opportunism. The Moro dates are constantly asking for information as to our policy for the future, but the Army can only say, "Keep quiet;" but they will not do this always. The slave catching and trading is gaining constantly, and this will never be stopped until we stop it forcibly.

I can not too strongly recommend that the policy of the United States with respect to the Moros be decided on without delay, and that it be announced and enforced at whatever cost. When these born pirates feel the weight of our power they will believe we are in earnest and respect us, but until then they will despise and hate us.

As bearing upon the very important questions here presented, I invite especial attention to the inclosures.^a

Very respectfully,

GEORGE W. DAVIS,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

APPENDIX 2.

GENERAL DAVIS'S REPORT ON SLAVERY.

JULY 3, 1902.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

(Through regular channels.)

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a letter from Col. William M. Wallace, commanding at Jolo, Jolo Island, in which is inclosed an appeal by the Sultan of Jolo to the division commander for relief from what he considers an illegal requirement imposed by the undersigned, and which results in the protection against recapture of slaves escaping from their Moro masters.

It is understood that the order of the undersigned to which exceptions are taken and to which the appeal relates is the provision contained in paragraph 3, General Orders, No. 12, of this year, headquarters Seventh Separate Brigade. (See copy of whole order herewith.) I also inclose copy of a telegram received from the commanding officer, Jolo, dated March 20, 1902, and my reply thereto of the same date, in which I struck out two words as not to be applied to Jolo, which were contained in the original paragraph 3 of the general orders above referred to.

I also invite attention to the following as bearing upon the subject of slavery in the Philippines:

Copy of letter from the Secretary of War to General Otis, dated October 27, 1899, in which the former communicates the orders of the President respecting the "Bates agreement" with the Sultan, and remarks as to slavery.

Copy of letter from Gen. J. C. Bates, U. S. Volunteers, to the Sultan of Jolo and other signers of the "Bates agreement," dated April 4, 1900, announcing the approval of the agreement by the President, excepting the section relating to slavery.

Copy of letter from Major Sweet, Twenty-third Infantry, dated April 13, 1900, respecting slavery, in which he practically promised recompense for the slaves.

Copy of Article X of the "Bates agreement," referred to above.^a

Copy of hearing (extract) of Governor William H. Taft before the House Committee on Philippine Affairs, respecting Moro slavery in the Philippine Islands.^a

I would venture to remark, in this connection, that my knowledge of the prevailing conditions respecting slavery as practiced by the Moros warrants the statement that it is quite impracticable to secure the freedom of slaves by remuneration of the owners. Governor Taft's views on this subject are entirely sound. If the slaves

^a Not printed.

were all made free to-morrow, many thousands—probably tens of thousands—would continue in voluntary servitude, for they could not now exist in freedom in most of the Moro country. They are not specially unhappy as slaves, for they have few wants or necessities save those that are felt by all animals, and these their sultans, datos, and owners find it to be to their interest to supply. Nor do I believe that slavery is very uncommon among the Christian Filipinos. It will never be eradicated in these islands until public sentiment in the communities is opposed to it, and this sentiment will be of slow growth. Meanwhile the escaping slaves should be protected in their freedom, and all should know that the taking and owning of slaves and holding them in bondage is forbidden by our laws. They should be encouraged to abandon their masters, and recaptures should be forcibly prevented.

The Sultan declares that the seven persons referred to, now under the protection of the military, are his property, "according to Moro law, custom, and the Moham-medan religion," but the Secretary of War, on behalf of the President and by his direction, says in effect that slavery can not be recognized by the United States. To return these escaping slaves or to permit the Sultan to recapture them would be a recognition of slavery by me and a violation of the orders of the President, but I consider that the real purposes of this presentation is to prepare the way for a claim for indemnity, and this is the situation that must be met sooner or later.

Dato Mandi, of Zamboanga, has abolished slavery among his people and has made no claims for any compensation, but the sultan is avaricious and shrewd and construes General Bates's and Major Sweet's letters as holding out a promise that they would be paid for their slaves, notwithstanding the positive injunction of the Secretary of War that no such promise or encouragement be given.

Very respectfully,

G. W. DAVIS,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[Translated copy.]

To my father, the governor-general of the Philippines, General Chaffee, from his son, His Highness the Sultan Hadji Mohamad Jamalul Kiran:

As my father knows, Article 6 of the agreement between General Bates and the sultan and datos of Jolo says that I shall be allowed to write direct to my father the governor-general if I have any complaint to make against my father the governor of Jolo. Now, I wish to inform my father the governor-general that I think my father the governor of Jolo is not doing that which is right toward me and my people. There is in the Moro town of Buz Buz, which is located within the American block-houses, a family of seven persons who are all of them my slaves since they were born. I have allowed them to live in Buz Buz for a long time. Yesterday while I was staying at Tullei, I sent for the family to come to me, because I wanted to talk to them; they refused and did not come and went to my father the governor of Jolo and asked for his protection. My father the governor, Colonel Wallace, gave them a letter of protection and sent me a copy of it, which I send with this letter to my father the governor-general. This letter of protection takes away my rights over the seven persons, who are my slaves according to Moro law, custom, and the Moham-medan religion. My father the governor, Colonel Wallace, assured me it is duty to do so, as he has been ordered by my father General Davis at Zamboanga to protect all slaves who come to him to ask for protection. I have asked my father the governor of Jolo for a copy of this order from the governor of Zamboanga, which he has given me, and I send it also with this letter to my father the governor-general. Now, I inform my father the governor-general that I and my people believe that this action of my father, Colonel Wallace, is not right and is showing bad faith on the part of the United States. To protect slaves who refuse to return to their rightful owners is just the same as to free them. Now, General Bates has informed me and the datos in his letter of April 4, 1900, that my great father the President of the United States has approved and confirmed the agreement except the tenth article, and that the subject of slavery will be reserved as a matter for future conference, determination, and agreement. Major Sweet, who was at that time governor of Jolo, and sent me this letter from my father, General Bates, wrote me a letter with it, saying that the people of the United States were just and that the question would probably be considered at a conference and our money interest recognized. Therefore let us keep mutual faith, do not encourage our slaves to run away from their rightful owners and then protect them so that the owner can not get them back, but let the matter be settled as it is said in the letter of my father, General Bates.

I beg my father the governor-general to tell my father the governor of Zamboanga to revoke this order to protect escaped slaves belonging to me and my people. I am sure my father the governor-general will understand that this order is not just toward me and my people. Slaves are part of our property, and to have this property taken away from us would mean a great loss to us.

Greetings to my father the governor-general from his son the sultan who loves him and is believed by him. May your life be long and happy.

Sixth day of Rabi Alawal, 1320—June 13, 1902.

Translated at the request of the sultan and with consent of the commanding officer, Jolo.

CHARLES SCHUCK,
Official Interpreter and Translator.

JOLO, P. I., June 24, 1902.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL SEVENTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Zamboanga, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that while the sultan was staying at Tullei, on the 12th instant, a family of seven persons appeared at these headquarters and asked for protection, as the sultan was claiming them as his slaves. Conformably to orders received from the brigade commander they were given a letter of protection, translated copy of which was furnished the sultan. The latter considered this action unjustified in view of the Bates agreement and General Bates's letter of April 4, 1900, to the sultan and datos regarding the subject of slavery; he wished to know by what authority I acted thus. I furnished the sultan translated extract copy of General Orders, No. 12, current series, Headquarters Seventh Separate Brigade, and telegrams of March 20 and May 29 from same source as far as referring to the subject. The sultan then informed me that he was going to complain direct to the division commander and requested me to permit the official interpreter, Mr. Schuck, to translate his letter, to which I consented. I herewith inclose copy of the sultan's letter of complaint for the information of the brigade commander.

Very respectfully,

W. M. WALLACE,
Colonel Fifteenth U. S. Cavalry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-THIRD INFANTRY,
Jolo, Jolo Island, April 13, 1900.

To His Highness the Sultan of Jolo, from his brother the Governor of Tiange, greetings:

I send you a letter and translation received from General Bates, but do not let it worry you. The people of the United States are just, but are opposed to slavery, which at one time existed in America. The question will probably be considered in a conference between the Moros and some authorized American representative, in which your pecuniary interests in your slaves will be recognized and some method will be agreed on so that slavery shall cease without pecuniary loss to yourselves. This method has been adopted by England in her dealings with some of her slave-holding colonies with satisfaction to all parties.

Very respectfully,

O. J. SWEET,
Major, Twenty-third Infantry, Military Governor.

[Telegram received.]

JOLO, JOLO, March 20.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, ZAMBOANGA:

Does the order to inform owners of slaves that those who wish to leave their masters will be protected against recapture apply to the Jolo Archipelago? The sultan, his datos, and other chiefs were informed when article 10 was thrown out that the subject of slavery was to be left for future consideration and agreement. I have always held them to a strict observance of the agreement.

WALLACE.

[Telegram sent.]

ZAMBOANGA, MINDANAO, P. I., March 20, 1902.

COMMANDING OFFICER JOLO, *Jolo, P. I.*:

Referring to your telegram March 20 respecting recapture of slaves, the brigade commander replies that the last two lines of paragraph 3, General Orders, No. 12, are not to be interpreted in a manner that would be a violation of any provision of the Bates agreement, but if any slave escapes from any Moro in Jolo or anywhere else and appeals to you for protection against recapture, you must not fail to give him that protection.

So far as applies to the Jolo Archipelago, the last phrase in paragraph 3 should read as follows: "And that those who leave their masters will be protected against recapture and forcible return to bondage."

It is not intended to disturb the relations existing between Moros and their slaves who wish to remain so, nor is it intended to invite persons held as slaves to flee.

FOUNTAIN.

[Copy.]

ZAMBOANGA, MINDANAO, April 4, 1900.

To His Excellency the Sultan of Jolo and the Dato Raja Muda, the Dato Attik, the Dato Calbi, and the Dato Joakanain, Island of Jolo:

I have the honor to state that I have been directed by the military governor of the Philippine Islands to inform you that the President of the United States has confirmed and approved the agreement of August 20 last between the Sultan of Jolo and the Dato Raja Muda, the Dato Attik, the Dato Calbi, and the Dato Joakanain on the one part, and myself, as representing the United States, on the other, except as to the tenth article, which reads as follows: "Every slave in the archipelago of Jolo shall have the right to purchase freedom by paying to the master the usual market value."

The subject of slavery or peonage will be reserved as a matter for future conference, determination, and agreement.

The Constitution of the United States forbids slavery in any part of the United States, and it remains to find an equitable mode of abolishing the institution. All other articles of the agreement are in force.

Very respectfully,

J. C. BATES,

Major-General, U. S. Volunteers.

A copy of this letter has been sent to (1) His Excellency the Sultan of Jolo; (2) to the Dato Calbi and the Dato Joakanain; (3) to the commanding general, district of Mindanao and Jolo Archipelago, and (4) to commanding officer, Jolo, P. I.

S. E. SMILEY,

Captain, Fifteenth U. S. Infantry, Aide-de-Camp.

[Copy.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 27, 1899.

SIR: The President instructs me to advise you that the agreement signed August 20, 1899, between Brig. Gen. John C. Bates, representing the United States, of the one part, the Sultan of Jolo, the Dato Raja Muda, the Dato Attik, the Dato Calbi, and the Dato Joakanain, of the other part, is confirmed and approved, subject to the action of Congress provided for in that clause of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain which provides: "The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territory hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by Congress," and with the understanding and reservation which should be distinctly communicated to the Sultan of Jolo that this agreement is not to be deemed in any way to authorize or give consent of the United States to the existence of slavery in the Sulu Archipelago, a thing which is made impossible by the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. At the same time when you communicate to the Sultan the above-mentioned understanding, the President desires that you should make inquiry as to the number of persons held in slavery in the archipelago and what arrangement it may be practicable to make for their emancipation. It is assumed that the market price referred to in the agreement of August 20, 1899, is not very high at present, and it may be a comparatively moderate sum, which Con-

gress might be willing to appropriate for that purpose, would suffice to secure freedom for the whole number.

It is needless to suggest that the inquiry should be prosecuted in such a way as not to create the impression that we now have authority to make arrangement, and in such manner as not to create extravagant expectations.

Very truly, yours,

ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War.

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,
Commanding United States Forces in the Philippines, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 12. }

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Zamboanga, P. I., March 4, 1902.

I. By the agreement with the Sultan of Jolo, made on May 20, 1899, the Sultan was recognized by the United States as possessing authority to bring to trial and punishment all Moro criminals for crimes committed against other Moros, but in all other cases his jurisdiction over criminals was denied. The said agreement is in force only in the Jolo Archipelago. If the crimes of murder, assault with intent to kill, rape, kidnaping, robbery, or arson are committed within the islands embraced within the territorial limits assigned to the Seventh Separate Brigade, army officers who may have knowledge of the perpetration of these crimes will do all in their power to bring the offenders to justice. But in the organized provinces of Misamis and Surigao the punitive actions of the military will be confined to offenses committed by members of non-Christian tribes against other non-Christians, while in the Jolo Archipelago Moro criminals who may be charged with crimes against other Moros will be disposed of as provided by the above-cited agreement.

II. Mindanao and Jolo have now been occupied by the United States more than two years, and during that time there has been no overt act or resistance against our authority by Moros or other non-Christians, and no punishments have been required or inflicted save for crimes against or acts of violence upon individuals. But in some extensive regions it is said that the inhabitants wish to remain isolated and to exclude visits of Americans. It is the military policy to endeavor to overcome and counteract this idea, and thoroughly to explore the country and make known its topography, physical characteristics, resources, and the number and character of its inhabitants.

III. During explorations and operations in the territory occupied by non-Christian tribes, the brigade commander enjoins that the greatest prudence be observed by all concerned to avoid a conflict with these tribes, all of whom are now peaceful. To this end he directs that messengers be sent well in advance of all expeditionary forces or scouting parties to inform the inhabitants, whose rancherias are to be visited, of the coming of the troops on a peaceful mission of exploration and observation. By the observance of this policy and the employment of native runners and guides detailed by the datos and chiefs, peaceable entrance into and establishment of posts in the territory which has heretofore been closed to our people will, it is believed, be easily effected. Through peaceful means the brigade commander wishes to overcome the desire of these people to remain isolated and to exclude Americans. He wishes to buy such of the native produce and to employ such of the laborers as the Army may need, to establish market places, to impress upon the natives the fact that the taking and selling of slaves is forbidden by our laws, and to inform those who, from Spanish times, have been holding slaves, and those who are held as slaves, that the United States does not recognize the right of any man to own another, and that those who may wish to leave their masters will be protected against recapture and forcible return to bondage.

IV. The brigade commander also directs that officers who are brought in direct contact with the non-Christian inhabitants see to it that in the future, as in the past, they are treated with kindness; that those who are peaceable be not molested in their persons or property, and that they be not interfered with in religious practices or in the observance of their tribal usages or customs. Peaceable Moros will not be disarmed, though in possession of modern weapons, but no firearms or ammunition can be imported or kept for sale in the towns in the unorganized provinces.

V. American promoters, prospectors, miners, and travelers who can not give a satisfactory account of themselves or show proper credentials will not be permitted to enter the interior of the islands inhabited by Moros.

"The two words in italics (*wish to*) were omitted from the revised.

VI. Persons claiming title to lands derived by purchase from Moro datos or other non-Christians are entitled to the same, but no greater, rights and privileges respecting said lands than the Moros enjoyed. If any military officers have received for record or acknowledgment any deeds or other conveyances of real property sold by Moros since August 13, 1898, a copy of the record or acknowledgment will be forwarded to these headquarters, and the same principle will apply to all future transactions of the same character. If commanders of posts or stations have knowledge of sales by Moros of public lands to any persons, they will report the names of purchasers, if known, and the lands transferred to or claimed by the buyers.

By command of Brigadier-General Davis:

S. W. FOUNTAIN,
Major of Cavalry, Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX 3.

REPORT COMMANDING OFFICER, COTABATO.

JUNE 4, 1902.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SEVENTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Zamboanga, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with your letter of March 10, 1902, I have the honor to submit herewith report of the affairs of Cotabato and the Rio Grande valley, as called for therein. The delay in rendering this report is due to the fact that your letter was received at the same time as the order to prepare for Lake Lanao expedition, when I took the field soon afterwards, only returning to this post yesterday, and I am now under orders to sail with my battalion in a few days for the United States. The report is necessarily meager, as I have not had time to collect the necessary data.

Prior to the departure of the Spanish garrisons from the district of Cotabato the following-named places were occupied, as follows:

Don Victorino Oloris, military-civil governor of the district of Cotabato, with headquarters at that place.

Don Pascual Gonzales, lieutenant-colonel, Sixty-eighth Regiment of Infantry, commanding post, with garrison of 11 officers and one company of infantry, Sixty-eighth Regiment, 125 men; one section of artillery, 25 men; half company of infantry, 60 men; detachment convict regiment, 25 men—235 men.

Pikit: One officer, 50 men, Sixty-eighth Infantry, and detachment 8 artillerymen—58 men.

Reina Regente: Maj. Santa Maria commanding; 1 officer and 60 men Sixty-eighth Infantry; detachment 25 engineers and 14 artillerymen—99 men.

Cudarangan: Detachment 25 men Sixty-eighth Infantry, under a sergeant.

Tumbao: One lieutenant, 25 men Sixty-eighth Infantry, and 8 artillerymen—33 men.

Libungan: Detachment 12 men Sixty-eighth Infantry, under a sergeant.

Tiburan: One officer 25 men Sixty-eighth Infantry.

Tamontaca: Detachment 25 men Sixty-eighth Infantry, under a sergeant.

Polloc: Maj. Rafael Moreno de Gueara, detachment 25 infantrymen, 25 marines.

Paran-paran: Commanded by Don Jose Munoz, commanding Sixty-eighth Regiment of Infantry and 14 officers; one company Sixty-eighth Infantry, 125 men; one company convicts, 150 men; detachment of engineers, 100 men; detachment of artillery, 50 men—425 men.

The Spaniards were about three weeks vacating the district, using the steamers *Rosario* and *Castellano*, of the Compania Maritima, for the purpose, concentrating at Zamboanga. The last detachment left Cotabato between January 16 and 21, 1899.

The Spaniards left a sort of triumvirate in charge of Cotabato, consisting of Ramon Vilo, a Filipino; Celestino Alonza, a Chino, and Dato Piang, a Moro, representing the three races, the first named being the president of the council, as it were, and he gradually absorbed all the power to himself.

Polloc was left in charge of Alejandro Garcia, who was president of the village.

Paran-paran was placed in the hands of Dato Baqui.

The subposts around Cotabato were left in charge of local datos in their vicinity or they took possession of them.

About six weeks prior to the departure of the Spanish from Cotabato there was a conspiracy discovered among the native soldiers for a rising in favor of the Filipino republic, and about 50 of them were shot by order.

The Spaniards left in the hands of Ramon Vilo for the protection of the town of Cotabato about 170 good rifles—Remingtons—and 20,000 rounds of ammunition, 3

brass field pieces, and 2 brass siege guns, all of which finally drifted into the hands of the Moros by sale, loan, or capture. It is also said that about 100 rifles were turned over to a Señor Rosales, of Paran-paran, for a similar purpose, which seems strange, as Dato Baqui was left in charge. They are supposed also to have drifted into the hands of the Moros. About 40 rifles were left at Polloc for protection.

The month following the departure of the Spaniards the Illano and Lanao Moros attacked the villages of Panay and Polloc, burning houses, and killing and running off cattle. No lives appear to have been lost.

Affairs at Cotabato seem to have run smoothly at first, Ramon Vilo gradually acquiring power and flying the Spanish flag until finally, on the occasion of his birthday (July 21), he raised the Filipino insurrecto or Katipunan flag and announced himself as Filipino governor of the district of Cotabato, though his authority was not acknowledged outside. Either at this time or previously a municipal government was formed and the following either elected or appointed:

President, Don Ramon Vilo; vice-president, Don Tomas Vilo (his brother); treasurer, Raymundo Ventura; judge, Pedro Aquino; captain of police, Don Esteban Ortuosto, with one first lieutenant, Don Jose Ventura, and second lieutenant, Don Sabino Olaza, with 3 sergeants, 6 corporals, and 50 privates, which the above civil government appointed.

Troubles then commenced. Taxation does not appear to have been heavy, though levied gradually in the form of contributions, and on the Chinos in a roundabout way. Vilo does not appear to have personally acquired much money from this source, but apparently did from his transactions in the disposition of the arms left by the Spaniards; but he appears to have been drunk most of the time, and personal abuse lead to his downfall. He apparently roamed the streets clubbing people and threatened to have them killed when they resisted, and from all accounts seems to have had shot some 16 persons during his régime. His jealousy seems to have been excited against the president of Polloc, Alejandro Garcia, for gaining popularity and refusal to raise the Filipino flag or acknowledge him, Vilo, governor of the district. Garcia was finally arrested by Vilo's orders or direction and brought to Cotabato with his family, where they were tried by Vilo's judge on indefinite charges (peculation on the part of his sons is the only one I have been able to locate), and early in September he, Garcia, and his two sons, adopted son, servant, and a Moro friend captured with them were shot.

This act, and I imagine general complaint from the Chinos of Cotabato, led to a conference, which turned into an attack on Vilo and his adherents on September 10. His armed followers were but few at this time, he having but about 26 rifles and the 2 guns, the Moros having acquired the rest. They took refuge in the convent or priest's house, and though the firing was quite heavy, from the appearance of the church and convent building, from the Moros under the river bank to the east of these buildings, yet the Filipinos seem to have died by the cold steel, their ammunition having given out. Ramon Vilo, his captain of police, Esteban Ortuosto, and a few others were killed.

The attack is credited to Dato Piang, though apparently he was not present, the Moros being led by Dato Ali and his half-brother, Dato Giambangan.

The Moros then looted the town, although apparently the Chinese residents, with whom they were always friendly, were not molested—only the Filipinos. About the same time they took possession of and looted Tamontaca and Kolaganan, the pueblo of Dato Baqui (Wata Mama, of Mindanao), who was absent in Paran-paran.

Dato Piang then apparently took possession of the district, as in a number of papers (deeds to confiscated property) he designates himself "chief of the district of Cotabato."

Alejandro Dorotheo was appointed president to represent the Filipino population, Celestino Alonso for the Chinese, and Catoc (a first cousin of Dato Piang) for the Moros, Ignacio Ortuosto for Tamontaca and Rimigio Silva for Polloc. Baqui still held Paran-paran against the Piang Moros.

A number of Filipino girls were married under pressure to Chinamen, to save them from a worse fate, and were promptly divorced on the United States forces taking charge.

Tomas Vilo and his family were taken up to Bacat as prisoners of Piang, some say to save them from the vengeance of Guimbangan. However, they were released the following month and started back to Cotabato by vinta, were captured by Guimbangan's people, taken ashore at Muntay, a short distance from Tumbao, and Tomas Vilo himself was murdered there by one Ampatuan-Bapani Manakup and his family then sent down to Cota. This is supposed to have been at Piang's connivance and suggestion, though why such roundabout means should be used I could never find out, except that Tomas Vilo was quite wealthy and Piang promptly confiscated all his property. This has since been returned or made good to his widow.

Soon after these events the U. S. gunboat *Castine* visited the mouth of the river, though no one came ashore. The ship was visited by the prominent Chinamen, with the request that United States forces land and take possession. A United States flag was given them, but nothing further done at this time. Dato Piang also evidently made the same request after the surrender of Zamboanga to authorities there.

December 12, 1899, a force consisting of two companies of the Thirty-first Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, under Major Brett, of same regiment, were landed and took possession of Cotabato. On December 22 Capt. W. H. Gillenwater, Thirty-first Infantry, with his company, E, were sent to and took possession of the town and naval station of Polloc. On January 5, 1900, Company E was relieved at Polloc by Company H, same regiment, under Lieutenant Corwine, and proceeded across the bay and took possession of Paran-paran. February 1, 1900, a patrol from the main guard at Cotabato was established at Lamontaca, and on June 28 a detachment was placed permanently in the post at that point.

On February 1, 1900, the first visit was made to Dato Piang at his pueblo, Bacat, by the commanding officer and his officers on the U. S. gunboat *Panay*.

April 29 there was an expedition to Malabang, under Major Brett, with friendly Moros as allies, to arrest Dato Odessan, resulting in a skirmish in which 16 men, including the amirul of Mindanao, Dato Ama ni Kapal, were killed. No casualties on our side, although our forces retired and returned to Paran-paran without making the arrest.

July 29, 1900, Company D, Twenty-third Infantry, 2 officers and 157 men, arrived from Jolo, and left for Malabang September 19, where they took station, the Spanish post at that point having been voluntarily vacated by the Moros holding it. This garrison furnished a detachment for Tucuran at beginning of construction of telegraph line across the trocha.

April 18, 1901, the Thirty-first Infantry garrisons were relieved by Companies A and C, Twenty-third Infantry, Major McMahon, of the Thirty-first Infantry, remaining in command until July 1, when he was relieved by Major Febiger, Tenth Infantry.

Companies A, C, and D, Seventeenth Infantry, arrived in the bay on the transport *Buford* September 16, and grounded near mouth of river. Companies A and C, Twenty-third Infantry, departed September 26 in same transport, Major Febiger remaining in command, being transferred to the Seventeenth Infantry. June 7 Companies A, C, and D, Seventeenth Infantry, departed, having been relieved by I Company, Tenth Infantry, under Major Hoyt, same regiment.

The garrison was added to in October, 1901, by the enlistment of 20 native scouts for Company 50, half of them being native Moros of the upper Rio Grande.

The natives of the Rio Grande Valley are divided into two factions—their language even being different in numerous details, and they are not at all friendly—the up-the-river, or Saraya, and the down-the-river, or Sangre Maguindanaos. During the interim between the Spanish evacuation and the arrival of the United States forces there was more or less trouble between them, and some murders and much thieving and looting, making their dislike of each other more pronounced, and it seems impossible to adjust their differences, which, in addition, are inherited in the nature of feuds.

During this interregnum the Saraya Moros raided the country of the sultan of Talic, south of Lake Buluan, capturing his fort, killing some 200 of his men, carrying away women and children and animals, destroying what they could not remove. They were led by Datos Ali and Ynok, and as near as I can ascertain the attack occurred in October, 1899, two months prior to our occupation of the Cotabato district. There was evidently an old standing feud between the two peoples which, owing to the absence of white authority, was taken advantage of by the river Moros. In the same month, year indefinite, though probably 1898, the same chiefs attacked the sultan of Nanangan, whose country lies, with indefinite boundaries, equidistant from Tibiran, Talayan, and Bacat. He was killed and many of his people and some women and children carried off, the remaining inhabitants becoming subjects of Datos Ali and Piang. In neither case was the latter present, though undoubtedly the directing power. I have been unable to locate any recent fight in which he was personally engaged, but so much is he feared by Moros and Filipinos alike that his name is synonymous with Saraya Moros.

Prior to the departure of the Spanish an imaginary line a few miles east of Tumbao was supposed to divide the Saraya from the Maguindanao Moros, but the former had pushed this line considerably west by the capture of Nanangan. The submission of the sultan of Talayan for fear of a similar fate and the adhesion of the sultan of Talicoco to the up-river faction encouraged Piang to push Dato Balabaran, of Tibiran, farther west, leaving the country at that point a sort of neutral ground, under no particular jurisdiction. The representatives of the three rival datos

occupying the port at that point, Tibiran, as in June, 1901, Balabaran, had fled to Tamontaca. The latter part of June a party of Nunangans, about 120 in number, fled from their own country owing to the harsh rule of Piang's representatives. Half found their way to the sultan of Talicoco, the other half were overtaken at a point a few miles west of Tibiran, a few killed and the rest captured. This was done by Piang's representatives in compliance with what they considered would be his wishes, though not by his orders. The resulting investigation pointed to about five men as the murderers, who were arrested, but pending trial escaped. On demand, Piang promptly released and sent in the survivors of the massacre. The other sixty were allowed to remain in Talicoco, with whom the others were finally domiciled. This and similar actions has gradually weaned Talicoco from the Piang faction, and a marriage was arranged and accomplished between Talicoco's daughter and Balabaran's son, thus healing that breach. So at date the sultan of Talicoco is neutral, with a leaning to the Maguindanao faction, but looking to the Government as his main support and friend. His request to occupy the site of the old Spanish fort at Tumbao has also been granted, thus shoving the dividing line farther east again, near its original boundary.

This massacre showing the lawless and irresponsible condition of the people of Tibiran, there apparently being no one to hold responsible for that district, it was determined to regarrison the Spanish fort at that point, which was accordingly done July 20 with a detachment of 1 lieutenant and 25 men, later reduced to a sergeant and 14 men, with most happy results, as there has been no trouble in that section since.

On August 12 an outrage was reported from Tukuran, man murdered in vinta, and his companions, a woman, a girl, and two boys, taken as slaves to Dinas by one Sulug, who had sold them to one Sulungan, a slave dealer from Jolo. I proceeded there under orders on the gunboat *Panay*, with a detachment on launch *Detroit*. Sulug was under the protection of Sultan Malalis, who returned an impertinent and aggressive reply, but decamped when we advanced on him. We burned his place and chased him upstream, capturing one large abandoned vinta. He and Sulug were subsequently inveigled by Dato Baqui to come into Cotabato, where they were arrested and tried for this and former outrages, the Sultan finally receiving four years at Bilibid and Sulug but three, as the evidence of the murder was only circumstantial, the eyewitnesses having been sold into slavery and deported. But the action was quite a setback to Dinas as a place of exchange for slaves, and no trouble has been reported from there since.

Numerous reports and scares, always found untrue on investigation, regarding proposed raids and reprisals by Piang constantly coming in, it was decided best to regarrison the old Spanish blockhouse at Cudarangan, just across the river from Piang's pueblo at Bacat, which was done with a sergeant and 15 men November 19, much to the relief of the Maguindanao faction, and with no objections from Piang. The old Spanish fort at Reina Regente was garrisoned with a similar detachment January 5, 1902, principally with the idea of protecting its buildings from further destructions by the natives, as Cudarangan is the strategic point. This fort, Reina Regente, has been partly dismantled, and Fort Pikit almost entirely so by the natives, who claimed that former commanding officers had given them permission to do so, with half the iron roofing and timbers brought into Cotabato, which I have no doubt was so, as in the early days of our occupation material was impossible to get through regular channels, and the troops at Cotabato were lacking the barest necessities, and even the church there was denuded of its flooring and ceiling for repairs to shelters for the garrison.

In the fall of 1901 the extension of the telegraph line from Cotabato to Davao was commenced, first rebuilding the line to Tamontaca, which was connected by telephone. At date all the occupied upriver posts, Tibiran, Cudarangan, and Reina Regente, are on the line, using telephones for communication, and the wire is strung about 20 miles south of the last-named point.

The Moros are a most litigious race, their complaints and remonstrances are interminable, reaching back many years, if they can get a hearing. Since our occupation they have considered themselves in great part as independent of the legal jurisdiction of their datos, and that it was the principal business of the commanding officer to hear and decide on their complaints, and especially so between datos themselves. This evil became such a nuisance that it was decided to organize a board of arbitration, chosen by the Moros themselves, to hear all such complaints of a purely civil nature, that the complainants were not willing should go before their local datos. The natives seem much pleased with the idea, and such a board was finally organized, the chiefs from each faction, Sangre Maguindanao and Saraya, choosing their own representatives, and these two selecting the third. Complaints to go before the board

first must be submitted in writing to the commanding officer, who if he thinks complaints are well grounded forwards them to the board. The result has been most satisfactory, in that since its organization, December 7, 1901, not a single case has been presented. They evidently, not being sure of the action of the board, have taken their cases to their local *datos* as of old, with whose rights, privileges, and customs they were given to understand it is not the intention to interfere at present, so long as they are not antagonistic to our laws, and the rival *datos* settle their disputes by arbitration between themselves, and all the parties are satisfied.

The subject of slavery among the Moros is a difficult one to discuss, as the word does not define the condition that exists, and when it approaches slavery as understood by us it has so many and indefinite side issues and ramifications that a white man can not grasp it. The so-called slaves, taken as a whole, are more like peons of the soil, vassals or serfs of feudal times. There is hardly a single follower of any *dato* that is not in his debt for money, supplies, or material advanced, and his vassalage is due to such debt. The *datos* have always claimed the power of life and death over all their followers, so-called slaves as well as others. There is no distinction in their ordinary treatment. We call them slaves because the Spaniards did, who seem to have had no other word to describe their condition, or else used it through carelessness. I have known of cases where sons have sold or pawned their parents for debt, and where a wife has done the same with herself to cancel her husband's obligation. This seems against all nature if they were true slaves, even among a barbarous people. And a man will frequently be claimed by two persons, he owing each of them money. To quash the constant complaints on this subject, and not being able to get a decision from higher authority, I finally announced to them, on the broad base of the Constitution, that as all Mindanao was now American territory slavery would not be acknowledged, and that requests for the return of escaped slaves, or of those who had changed their allegiance from one person to another, would not be entertained, and that a man's body as collateral for a debt would not be considered. This seemed to be satisfactory and settled the question in this jurisdiction, as they well know the Spaniards had frequently made the same announcement, and their chiefs, especially the once powerful *Dato Uto*, had promised in writing to abstain from owning or selling so-called slaves in future.

Regarding civil government, I do not consider that the people of this valley of the Rio Grande should be intrusted with it for several generations, unless added to by heavy leaven from the outside. And this will apply to the whole district. A conservative estimate of the valley gives a Moro population of 80,000. Of the pagan tribes—*Tirurayes*, *Manobos*, *Bagobos*, etc.—many of whom have never seen a white man, it is impossible to estimate. They are but one remove from animals. As against these 80,000 Moros, there are not to exceed 1,000 Chinamen and as many so-called Filipinos, though much mixed with Moro and Chino blood. There is but one town of any prominence—*Cotabato*. The villages of *Paran-paran*, *Polloc*, and *Tamontaca* have such small Filipino population as not to be considered. *Cotabato* has about 1,000, of which 600 are Chinos, or Chinese descent by Moro wives; the rest renegade Filipinos. The intelligence is all among the Chinese, who also own and control all the business. The most intelligent and best educated citizen, not a Chino, is a full-blooded Moro, educated by the priests of *Tamontaca*, with a course at school in Manila. But he is a Moro in spite of his education. They had local government in these towns after the Spaniards left, first by Filipinos and then by Chinese and Moros, as is cited above, with poor success. The Moros despise the Filipinos, and the latter are in mortal fear of the former, and any delegation of power to Filipinos, even in minor offices, would inevitably lead to trouble and possible bloodshed.

The Moros are a race of warriors, and though not equal in my opinion to our American Indians, they have the same lack of respect and veneration for a civilian, even in high official positions. A military governor, with civil functions in addition, might answer, but you can not reverse the case with hopes of good results. The more I look into it the more impressed I am with the correctness of the theory of the Spanish scheme of government for this section. It is a Moro proposition here pure and simple, and it is from that view point we should look at it. Since our occupation the governing of the district has been purely a military one, and seems to be thoroughly satisfactory to all but the military, on whom it installed much extra work. But I do not see how it can be avoided. A resident judicial officer would help, but he would have to be an American and not a native, owing to race prejudices. The commanding officer has not only been governor of his district, but also mayor of the town. Money for municipal purposes has been raised by the municipal taxes, principally from gambling and opium licenses and a small tax on stores, averaging a little over 1,000 pesos per month, and ample for present needs. The running expenses have been for pay of police, care of leper colony and paupers,

rent of buildings for schools, pay of street cleaners and sanitary laborers, pay of a town clerk, etc., and public improvements. In the past nine months several streets have had cement sidewalks laid, public gardens have been inclosed by cement copings, a market building erected with cement floor, and a commercial covered dock built 100 feet long. This last yields a revenue from boats landing and unloading. At present buildings for public schools are in course of construction.

Since last September the public schools have been conducted by the American teachers sent here for that purpose, two men and one woman, a soldier being detailed to run a mixed school in Tamontaca. Previously all teaching was done by soldiers detailed for the purpose. The average attendance at the four has been about 140. English only has been used, and the progress has been most encouraging.

The following is a brief résumé of the receipts and expenditures of the municipality at Cotabato, Tamontaca being considered a suburb, for the year ending December 31, 1901 (amounts in Mexican money):

Month.	Receipts.	Expenditures.
January.....	\$1,243.75	\$756.57
February.....	1,342.00	844.04
March.....	1,245.00	2,244.27
April.....	1,356.80	661.65
May.....	1,456.80	1,212.67
June.....	1,464.80	1,251.96
July.....	1,516.00	1,499.31
August.....	1,181.00	1,729.95
September.....	2,614.00	1,338.68
October.....	91.50	852.16
November.....	1,384.00	1,974.51
December.....	1,288.00	1,463.85
Total.....	16,183.65	15,829.62

Surplus January 1, 1902, \$354.03.

Detailed report of above, showing items, rendered the post commander at Parapan latter part of March, 1902, by order.

Record of the receipts by collection of internal revenue (forestry, stamps, cédulas) go back to September 17, 1901, only, and are as follows to end of that year (amounts in Mexican money):

September 17, received from predecessor.....	\$4,499.10
Collections:	
September 30.....	14.69
October 31.....	1,637.93
November 30.....	29.70
December 31.....	2,225.21
Total.....	8,406.63

In my opinion, the government of the Moros will have to be for many years purely a paternal one. Most army officers are fully capable for such government, but as few changes as possible in the personnel should be made, as the Moro's loyalty is to a great extent a personal one. They are like children, and look to the governor as to a father, if he has tact combined with firmness. Their own government for generations has been based on the old feudal system—personal loyalty to the chief—and if we adopt the same system, with but few necessary changes, we have a system of government ready to our hand, one they are used to and familiar with, and answers the purpose very well until we can gradually educate them up to a freer and better one. They are creatures of habit, custom, and routine; any sudden disturbance of what they are accustomed to demoralizes and upsets them and they then appear stupid and contumacious, but they are not really so. We should cut our coat according to our cloth and not rush innovations on them. I have found them most loyal, affectionate, and hospitable, and once you gain their affections I have implicit confidence in them. They are not lazy, as popularly supposed, and if not separated from their families and given routine work they labor well and steadily. They have a great deal of personal dignity and much pride; they can easily be led but not driven, and rough handling is apt to lead to the sudden death of the person applying it, if not in a sudden gust of passion, by brooding over it, resulting in running amuck or "seeing red," as they put it, when they become completely crazed. This propensity seems to be a trait of all tropical people, not peculiar to the Moros alone, but perhaps

more aggravated with them. They seem to have but little real affection for their wives or wives for their husbands, but both are devoted to their offspring, which is not reciprocated, however, by the children as they grow up. It is impossible to trace their relationships, owing to numerous wives and concubines, and consequent half brothers and sisters, so that all of one settled section, sometimes much extended, are related, and they are great sticklers over the ties of consanguinity.

I consider that in course of time the Rio Grande Moro will become a useful citizen, though not on our lines. In spite of his feudal system he is also a good deal of a democrat and has many communistic principles, as in the ownership of land and its cultivation. He is naturally happy and cheerful, very hospitable, with inordinate curiosity and a desire to know all the details of whatever is going on. This latter may be due to his having no literature.

Dato Ali, Raja Muda of Tinunkup, is the real power of the valley and 70 per cent of the population are his followers, though controlled by Dato Piang, who is his father-in-law. Ali is of the blood royal, one of the aristocrats of the valley, but lazy, indifferent, spoiled, with great conceit, unresponsive, and apparently dull, not the least attractive in appearance or manners. He is naturally a fighting man, and that is the only thing he wakes up for or apparently takes any interest in, leaving the government to his father-in-law, Piang, a man not much his senior in years.

Dato Piang is from the people, the son of an itinerant Chinese merchant and a Moro woman of no particular standing, both dead. He assumed the title of dato and is looked down upon and hated by the Moros of the blood, though through fear of him it is seldom given expression by them. In Uto's war of 1888 he was a simple follower—as he expresses it himself, “a private soldier”—of that dato. He is very shrewd, has brains, and is self-made, being now quite wealthy and a power in the valley, as he controls all of Dato Ali's influence over the tribes and adds to this his own brain. He is the only prominent Moro who seems to appreciate what the American invasion means and the business opportunities it brings with it. The Chinese blood in him makes him a shrewd business man, and he has accumulated quite a fortune and is daily adding to it. He practically controls all the business of Cotabato, especially exports, through his Chinese agents in that place; has complete control of the Moro productions, and working with the Chinese merchants makes it practically impossible for a white firm to enter into business in the Rio Grande Valley, even with much capital behind them. I consider him the fulcrum on which our lever should work for the uplifting of this section, as he fully appreciates that any trouble with the Americans will inevitably be for the harm of his people and their financial business loss.

Dato Uto formerly held the position that Ali and Piang now fill. He is old, childish, and diseased, though the richest Moro in the valley; but by his extreme penuriousness has driven from him practically all his followers, even his so-called slaves, over whose loss he is constantly complaining. His first wife, the Raja Putri, or princess, combines to the greatest degree of any individual Moro the best descent, and is looked up to and respected by all Moros accordingly. Piang and Ali will both be suitors for her hand on Uto's death, which can not be long delayed, and there will be apt to be trouble over this and the division of his estate. The princess is also wealthy in her own right, and Uto informed me that he has left his property to be divided between her half-brothers. But Ali is a blood relation of Uto's, though they are not at all friendly, and is apt to put in his claim backed up by force.

The Sultan of Talicoco I found a Piang man. He is now inclined to the Maguindanao side, but is first and last for the Government, as he realizes that he now belongs to neither party. He has been very useful in adjusting the balance of power in the valley. The Sultan of Talayan is in a similar case, and if supported by a small garrison in his district would transfer his allegiance from Piang and thus restore the division line to where it was formerly.

In course of time the scattered Nunangans should be gathered together and returned to their own country and placed under the son of their old sultan or some strong dato of the Maguindanao faction. This should be done diplomatically, so as not to hurt Piang's amour propre, for, first, last, and all the time, Piang, though a savage, is our friend and can be our greatest aid.

Dato Guimbangan lives at the old Spanish fort of Labungan and is Dato Ali's half-brother. This is the only claim to prominence, as he has but a small following. He is very fat, of a bad disposition, and inclined to be unreconstructed; was suspected of being implicated in the murder of a soldier of the Thirty-first Infantry in December, 1900, though it has never been proven against him. He depends for protection upon his brother Ali, who is fond of him.

Dato Ynok is headman, sometimes called secretary of war, to Piang and Ali, and

TO ACCOMPANY
OF CAPTAIN
CORPS OF ENGINEERS
DATED

Report

much trusted by them. He is more of a warrior than a diplomat, large, good natured, popular with every one, and can be trusted.

Dato Baqui, living a few miles below Cotabato, is the most powerful chief of the Sangre Maguindanao, and is a bitter enemy of both Ali and Piang. He is untrustworthy and untruthful, though loyal to our Government and always full of complaints and remonstrances. He is much related and connected with the prominent Moros around Fort Malabang. He is a slave to the opium habit, which is gradually killing him and makes him querulous and at times stupid.

Sultan Balabaran formerly occupied and governed the district around Tibiran, but left there in June, 1901, and located at Tamontaca, through fear of aggressions of the Sultan of Talicoco, backed up by Piang. He is of a timid and even cowardly disposition, though of good address, and is afraid or ashamed to return even under the protection of the garrison at Fort Tibiran.

The other datos of the Maguindanao are of but little importance and have but small followings, though of good birth and lineage. Dato Catug is the best.

Catok, the cousin of Piang, is a half Chinese, and lives in Cotabato and is always looked to as representing his race in the town; was chief of the Moro police under the Americans up to the fall of 1901, when that body was disbanded. He is intelligent, speaks Spanish, and can be relied on in cases not clashing with Piang's interests or those of his own faction. He is none too popular with the Maguindanaos.

I am extremely sorry that lack of time prevents my going more freely into details, but the above covers the main points.

Very respectfully,

LEA FEBIGER,
Major Seventeenth Infantry, Commanding.

APPENDIX 4.

REPORT COMMANDING OFFICER, JOLO.

JUNE 2, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL SEVENTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Zamboanga, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with your cable instructions of 22d ultimo, I have the honor to submit the following report covering the period from May 1, 1901, to June 1, 1902, principally relating to affairs on Jolo Island, and to state that since discontinuance of the third district of Mindanao and Jolo, October 31, 1901, the posts of Siassi and Bongao communicate direct with brigade headquarters, and no information regarding affairs in the Siassi and Tawi-Tawi group is received here which would enable me to include those groups in this report.

The authority of commanding officers in the Jolo Archipelago to interfere in native affairs is restricted and limited by the Bates agreement. No opposition has occurred of Moros against the authority of the United States necessitating action of troops. In a few instances of trouble between chiefs, small detachments were sent to the scene of disturbance, and their mere presence then sufficed to restore order.

The long-standing differences between the sultan and the brothers Datos Calbi and Joakanain led in June, 1901, to open war between these parties, after the district commander, Major Sweet, had in vain endeavored to bring the sultan and datos together at his quarters in Jolo to arrange a peaceable settlement of the trouble. Failing in these efforts, Major Sweet succeeded, however, in restricting the fighting to Jolo Island by sending orders to the chiefs of the southern islands, among whom were partisans of the sultan as well as the datos, to remain neutral. The war, with but small casualties on either side, lasted until September 19, when the hostile leaders met at Jolo and concluded peace. But the ill feeling between the contending parties evidently remained.

In September, 1901, Troop B, Fifteenth Cavalry, took station at this post, and from December 4 to 10 made the first trip of American troops through the island. Reaching Loog, in most parts of which white men never before had set foot, hostile demonstrations of armed natives were encountered, who, evidently misinterpreting our purpose, assembled in large numbers. Correspondence with the sultan on the subject, and consequent arrangements made by him, led to a friendly reception of the troops by the natives in all parts of the island touched on two succeeding similar trips, and in fact no further trouble in this respect is expected.

The unabated rancor between the sultan's party and Datos Calbi and Joakanain, intensified by frequent retaliative acts of violence on either side, culminated in

February again in open hostilities, and, though the sultan apparently took no active part, threatened to involve the whole island. The sentiment of the people, which in the previous fight had been largely in favor of the datos, seemed to have undergone a radical change, and the datos had but few supporters among the chiefs. March 20 a number of houses in the near vicinity of Jolo and belonging to some of the datos' people were burned by Maharajah Indanan's men. I at once informed the sultan and the maharajah that this must not recur, but during the following night a nipa house, erected for shelter of road party on the new Jolo-Maibun road was maliciously burned. I then sent peremptory orders to the sultan, issued under article 1 of the agreement, that the war must cease. The sultan communicated this order to the chiefs, the datos receiving similar orders from me. The order has been obeyed.

In the interest of peace I have since made every effort to bring about a reconciliation between the hostile parties. The sultan is conciliatory but insists that the datos come to Maibun to pay respect to him and settle the differences in conferences. The datos have not yet complied, and I hear that the sultan is urged by most chiefs to again fight the datos and compel their submission.

Frequent complaints having reached me of cattle stealing, unjust imposition of fines, etc., I suggested to the sultan that he issue a proclamation to all his people, forbidding crime and misdeeds, and offered to assist him in enforcing such order. The sultan has acted upon my advice; copy of his proclamation dated May 3, 1902, is appended, marked "A." ^a I believe that this proceeding has had a good effect; in several instances stolen cattle have lately been returned and thefts are abating.

At the present the political situation of the islands may be summarized as follows: The sultan, after having been mainly engaged in gambling for several months, seems lately aroused from his indifference and taking an active part in the management of affairs of his country. He is to all appearances a man of good intentions, but weak and vacillating character. His prime minister and adviser, Hadji Butu, is shrewd and for a Moro, of advanced ideas; his friendship toward the Americans seems sincere. The chiefs, with but few exceptions, are unruly, arbitrary, and extremely selfish, their apparent friendship for us, in many cases, superinduced by fear. The mass of the people welcome our interference in the interest of peace.

Owing to lack of adequate transportation visits to the many small islands composing the "Jolo Group" have heretofore been impossible, and little or nothing is known here concerning them. Chiefs of the islands of Pangutarang and Panducan visited Jolo in April and complained to the sultan of taxes levied by Dato Joakanain. The sultan referred these chiefs to me, so I gave them a letter of protection and limited their taxation to from 50 cents to 1 peso per man, payable once a year to the sultan, with the condition that this protection will cease if the islanders ever take part in any fighting. The sultan was notified of this and has expressed his satisfaction.

The population of Jolo Island is estimated to number about 50,000 souls. Of these approximately 85 per cent live on or in the vicinity of the sea shore; the remaining 15 per cent are distributed over the interior, the western half of the island being more populated than the eastern part. It is believed that one-half of the people gain their livelihood by exploiting the wealth of the sea, the product being mother-of-pearl shell, black shell, beche de mer, and shark fins, which are exported, and fish, which, fresh or dried, are a principal part of Moro diet. Some are engaged in trade on a small scale between the different islands of this archipelago or with Mindanao coast places, others in the manufacture of so-called *armas blancas*, such as *krises*, *barongs*, and spears, and of primitive implements of husbandry, or in boat building, etc. The remainder of the people follow agricultural pursuits. Though the soil throughout the island is of great fertility not more than one-fifth of the land is actually cultivated. Rice, tapioca, and, to a lesser degree, corn, which, besides fish, constitute the staple food of the natives, are, for that reason, the main crops grown; sweet potatoes, yams, and sugar cane are also planted. Fruit is plentiful, mangoes, mangostines, oranges, limes, bananas, and bread fruit grow wild, also ginger, cinnamon, and cocoa. The *sago palm* is found in swampy places. Tobacco is grown to a very limited extent. Copra and hemp are exported in considerable quantities; the planting of hemp has conspicuously increased lately. Coffee is grown on a plantation near Jolo, on the slope of Bud Dato, with excellent results.

The island is well adapted for stock raising and breeding of ponies; the Sulu ponies stand 11 to 13 hands high and are muscular and very enduring. The island is slowly recovering from the effects of the cattle disease which ravaged it three years ago, killing 75 per cent of the stock. This epidemic had, however, one good result; it

^a Not printed.

also practically exterminated the innumerable wild hogs which had been a real plague.

There can exist no doubt but that Jolo Island, although of limited extent, has splendid agricultural possibilities. Furthermore, the climate is salubrious and the island is free of those violent atmospheric disturbances which so often and disastrously occur in other parts of the Philippines.

Trade in the Sulu Archipelago is almost exclusively controlled by the Chinese.

The Sulu Moros are still a more or less savage people. They profess the Mohammedan religion and adhere to its outward customs and rites, but, excepting a very few, they may be said to have no deeper knowledge of their creed. Any interference with their religion or customs, however, or attempt of conversion, will undoubtedly meet immediate and fanatical opposition. They being profoundly ignorant, superstitious, and very excitable, a multitude is easily stirred up and swayed by one suave fellow.

The sultan is, nominally, the absolute ruler of his people, also the head of the church. The sultanate is hereditary so far as succession is confined to male members of the royal family, elective so far as the chiefs in assembly may under exclusion of the next heir, elect another member of the family to the succession. The present sultan, Mohamad Jamalul Kiram, having no issue, his brother, Dato Mohamad Muallil Oassid, is the Rajah Muda or heir presumptive; he has two children, girls. The younger brother, Dato Mohamah Amerul Uram Attik, has one girl child.

The rank of dato is next to the sultan's. It is the only hereditary rank. All sons of datos are datos from their birth. The sultan and datos appoint the lesser chiefs, but all appointments made by datos are supposed to require the sultan's approval and confirmation. The sultan also appoints the priests to office.

Rank alone, though respected socially, carries no weight politically unless sustained by an adequate number of "followers." It is therefore the endeavor of all chiefs to extend by all means their sphere of influence and add to the number of their adherents. This rivalry accounts, to a great extent, for the enmity and feuds between chiefs. Another factor detrimental to peaceable conditions is the retaliation practiced by the Moros in the absence of a strong arm of justice to punish evildoers.

Slavery is and has been a most vexatious question. The sultan and datos Calbi and Joakanian were informed by General Bates, in his letter of April 8, 1900, that he had been directed by the military governor of the Philippines to advise them that the President had approved and confirmed the agreement of August 20, 1899, except as to the 10th article, and "that the subject of slavery or peonage will be reserved as a matter for future conference, determination, and agreement." The matter has since remained in abeyance. The Mohammedan religion sanctions slavery. Children of slaves are born slaves, and savage Moro custom and law make slaves of captives in war and delinquents in payment of fine or debt. Though the slaves as a rule are well treated, and an outsider may even find it difficult to distinguish by appearances master from slave, the fact remains that the ownership is absolute. The master may at any time sell or barter the slave, part husband from wife, child from parent. A girl slave must submit to her owner. The sultan has lately informed me that after his return from Mecca he proclaimed that any runaway slave, if not reclaimed or recaptured within one year after escape, should be free. Slaves appealing to the commanding officer are granted protection from recapture, which is virtually the same as liberating them; but such action infringing, in the belief of the Moros, on their property rights and the Bates agreement, may lead to friction, which might be avoided by a conference and agreement as indicated in General Bates' quoted letter.

Moro custom also is that a debtor may place himself, or his family, or any member of the latter, with his creditor as security for the debt until the latter is paid, either in money or work. Frequently, if a girl is put as security, the abominable condition is attached that while she thus remains with the creditor she must submit to him.

Polygamy is an institution based on the precepts of Mohammed, who permitted each believer to have four legitimate wives besides concubines. Of the Moros, those of sufficient means indulge in a plurality of wives; in most cases, however, allotting to each a separate home, to lessen the possibility of family quarrels. The sultan and some chiefs or wealthy Moros maintain concubines.

As a rule women are treated kindly by their husbands, though their position, alike amongst most people of low civilization, is that of submission only. The common women work hard, they weave cloth, embroider, make baskets, mats, knit fishing nets, etc., or their help is required in the fields at sowing, weeding, and harvesting.

The Moro is fairly industrious, though addicted to gambling and cock fighting. The frequent feuds, arbitrary rule, and extortion of chiefs have not encouraged him

to do more than provide for his immediate needs. On about 7 miles of the new Jolo-Maibun road Moros only were employed by the contractor. They received from 33½ to 50 cents Mexican, per diem, working from 6 to 12 and 2 to 5 o'clock each day, and nearly all of those employed remained steadily at this work from start to finish, about three months. But indulgence with their peculiar habits and customs is required.

Very respectfully,

W. M. WALLACE,
Colonel Fifteenth U. S. Cavalry, Commanding.

APPENDIX 5.

REPORT OF COMMANDING OFFICER, JOLO.

JULY 2, 1902.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL SEVENTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Zamboanga, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report on Moro affairs for the quarter ending June 30, 1902:

No change in the political situation has taken place. My order issued March 23, 1902, that peace must be maintained among the Moros has been obeyed and no fighting has occurred during the past quarter. But true to Moro custom, the hostile factions continue to manifest their ill-feeling toward each other by mutual stealing of horses and cattle, thus keeping the fire of strife smoldering. To remove this constant menace to peaceable development and secure the punishment of thieves and evil doers I have made every effort to bring about a reconciliation between the sultan and his principal opponents, Dato Calbi and Joakanain. (See inclosures 1-12.) The sultan having quit gambling, which so engrossed his attention during the previous quarter, seems aroused from his indifference and taking an active part in the management of affairs. He is conciliatory but insists that it is due to him as sultan that the datos pay proper respect to him and make overtures toward an amicable settlement of existing differences by returning to him certain property which he claims was stolen from him and is held by the datos. The latter prefer counterclaims, and this matter of personal property appears of paramount importance with both parties, the interest of the country being of secondary consideration. However, at my suggestion and assurance of cooperation, the sultan has issued a proclamation to all his people (inclosures 10 and 11), forbidding crimes and misdeeds, and has given proof, in several instances, that he is in earnest and wishes to enforce it.

During May and June the sultan visited Tullei at different times, staying several days, and in each instance paying me a friendly call, the main topic of the conversation being always his trouble with the datos. I learned that Dato Calbi went to see the sultan while the latter was staying at Tullei and that they have come to an understanding. The difficulties between the sultan and Dato Joakanain still remain uncompromised.

An incident during one of the sultan's visits at Tullei, June 12, has been made by him a matter of complaint direct to the division commander. A family of seven persons living in Buz Buz, having been sent for by the sultan, who claims all of them as his slaves, appealed to me for protection, which was accorded them conformably to general orders and instructions received. The case was reported by me to the brigade commander in my letter of June 24.

Chiefs of the islands of Pangutarang and Panducan visited Jolo in April and complained to the sultan of taxes levied by Dato Joakanain. The sultan referred them to me, so I gave them a letter of protection (copy, see inclosure 12) limiting their taxation to from 50 cents to 1 peso per man, payable to the sultan once a year. The sultan, upon being notified of my action, expressed his satisfaction. Similar letters, omitting the paragraph referring to taxation, have, at request of the respective chiefs, been granted the inhabitants of Tongkill (Toquil) and Bullaan (Belauan) islands. All these letters contain the clause that the protection ceases immediately if the thus protected ever take part in any fighting. It is believed that gradually the people of other islands of this archipelago will apply for the same protection, and the policy adopted will tend to materially and peaceably increase American influence in native affairs and in general develop better conditions.

Acting under said letter of protection, the chiefs of Pangutarang sent a messenger to me June 6, stating that a band of 17 Moros armed with guns had come there

from Moubu, Jolo Island, to extort money from the inhabitants. I at once sent Lieutenant Norton, Fifteenth Cavalry, with a detachment of 12 men and the interpreter, Mr. Schuck, to the island to investigate the matter. On arrival, Lieutenant Norton found that the greater part of the band, under their leader Asjali, had already left the island, but seven men had remained, and these were surprised in their camp by Lieutenant Norton, who seized five guns which were in their possession. Investigation proved that the leader, Asjali, had, without authority or cause whatever, imposed a fine of 210 pesos upon the islanders and tried to compel payment by a display of guns, in which purpose he had partly succeeded. I have confiscated the five guns seized—all Remingtons in good condition, valued by the Moros at 100 pesos each. They have been sent to Manila, as provided in general orders. The leader Asjali was tried by the sultan and fined 535 pesos, which he has paid. The money and goods taken from the Pangutarang people have been returned to them.

June 1 I received a letter from the sultan's brother, the Dato Rajah Muda, informing me that he was going to Tapul Island to settle some cases, and that if evil reports should reach me concerning his doings there not to believe them. Soon after I heard that the Rajah Muda was busy fining Tapul people under one pretense or another, but no official complaint was made to me. However, I had a hint conveyed to the Rajah Muda that his actions had come to my knowledge and an investigation was intended. He immediately decamped for Maibun, much to the relief of the Tapul people. It is said that on his return the Rajah Muda met with a very unpleasant reception from the sultan, who entirely disapproved his proceedings in Tapul.

The road to Jolo-Maibun was completed in the latter part of April. It is used to a considerable extent by Moros of the adjacent country, who bring their produce to the market at Jolo. But no funds being provided for the maintenance of the road, and the soil being loamy and very fertile, the rains heavy, it is now already overgrown with tall weeds and grass, and the ditches begin to fill with the sediment washed down. To leave the road to take care of itself would mean a pure waste of the money expended on its construction. An early favorable action on the recommendation looking toward proper care of the road, contained in report of First Lieutenant Wigmore, Fifteenth Cavalry, engineer officer, Jolo, dated March 20, 1902, and forwarded same date to the chief engineer officer, Seventh Separate Brigade, is therefore requested. The appropriation for the construction of this road was made from insular funds, and in this connection I beg to state that this amount and the cost of the pumping works at Jolo are to my knowledge the only large expenditures ever made of insular moneys for public works on this island. The public wharf and the sea wall at Jolo also require to be kept permanently in repair, and unless a regular appropriation from civil funds is made for that purpose decay is sure to follow, and will in the end necessitate a large expenditure, besides impeding traffic at this port.

Affairs at Siassi and the territory embraced within its jurisdiction are satisfactory. During May trouble was reported on the island of Lugus between Dato Amilhussin and Maharajah Sarapuddin, friction between whom has occurred time and again. I summoned both chiefs to await my arrival at Siassi and then went there to personally investigate the matter. As is the case usually, it was found that either party had seized cattle from the other. One of Sarapuddin's men had been murdered, and it appeared that Amilhussin was protecting the alleged murderers. I ordered both parties to return the property seized and to keep peace in future, warning them that any disobedience of my orders would cause serious trouble. The alleged murderers of Sarapuddin's followers were arrested and taken to Jolo, where they were tried by Moro judges and those found guilty sentenced.

June 24 the commanding officer at Siassi wired to me that a free girl had been stolen there and sold into slavery, the purchaser having taken her to Patotol, on the northeastern coast of Jolo. I sent Lieutenant Enslow, Fifteenth Cavalry, with a detachment, on the launch to the place named. He arrested the purchaser and recovered the girl, bringing both to Jolo. The girl has been returned to her people. The thief is held at Siassi, pending trial by the judge appointed by the sultan. There being no incriminating evidence against the purchaser he has been released.

Shortly before Captain Simonds, Twenty-seventh Infantry, was relieved from the command at Siassi by Captain Eltinge, Fifteenth Cavalry, he visited, on U. S. S. *Culamianes*, the majority of the chiefs within his jurisdiction; it is believed that this trip, promoting closer relations with the chiefs and their people, will bear good results.

At Bongao First Lieutenant Gracie, Twenty-seventh Infantry, was relieved from command at that post and the Tawi Tawi group of islands by First Lieut. Warren Dean, Fifteenth Cavalry, during the first week of June. Nothing of import has occurred within that jurisdiction during the past quarter. Lieutenant Dean reports

that on the Sunday following his arrival at Bongao the neighboring datos and chiefs were assembled by him for a conference, and that all expressed their most friendly feeling toward the United States authorities.

In conclusion I wish to state that the salaries payable to the sultan and others under the Bates agreement, as well as the salary of the official interpreter at Jolo, have not been paid since January 1, 1902. Such long delay leaves a bad impression with the Moros, and should, if possible, be avoided.

Very respectfully,

W. M. WALLACE,
Colonel Fifteenth U. S. Cavalry, Commanding.

1.

[Seal of Dato Calbi.]

I beg to inform my father, the governor of Jolo, that the son of Imam Atti was present in Maibun at a meeting between Maharajah Indanan, Panglima Hassan, Sarip Saquib, and Hegasan, in which it was agreed between them to go out on the night of the 8th of this moon (19th of April) to take Tambang. I think that if the sarip is a party to this it is very suspicious. If my father, the governor, consents I will return to Tambang to strengthen my fort, but if my father says I shall not go back I will do as my father wishes and remain quiet. I depend on my father. It was my intention to see my father, but my teeth ache. I trust I will soon be better.

Received April 9, 1902.

CHARLES SCHUCK,
Official Interpreter and Translator.

2.

JOLO, P. I., April 10, 1902.

To His Highness the Sultan of Jolo, from his father the Governor of Jolo, Colonel Wallace, greetings:

I am sure that you will be as much surprised as I am to find that Maharajah Hajerol has not completed the payment of his debt as fixed by the court. There remains still \$50.50 Mexican to pay. Will you kindly see that he makes this payment without further delay.

I also inform my son, the sultan, that rumors have reached me of a meeting, said to have taken place at Maibun, at which Panglima Hassan, Hegasan, Sarip Saquib, and Maharajah Indanan were present, and it was decided to attack Tambang on the night of the 8th of this moon. I can not believe such tales, as the sultan has promised to inform me before he takes or consents to any such far-reaching measures. I am convinced the sultan shares my view that it is far better for the country if the people live in peace and cultivate the land than that they go about fighting and destroying. The United States desires peace to reign on the island.

I have informed Dato Joakanain of the sultan's above-mentioned promise, and advised him not to take any notice of said rumor, but let his people remain quiet and attend to their work. These constant rumors of impending trouble and fighting undoubtedly make the people restless and apprehensive of danger. I therefore earnestly request my son, the sultan, to let all his chiefs and people know of his intention to cooperate with me in the maintenance of peace and good order. This will inspire the people with confidence and dispel their fears.

Very respectfully,

W. M. WALLACE,
Colonel Fifteenth U. S. Cavalry, Military Governor.

3.

JOLO, P. I., April 10, 1902.

To my son the Dato Joakanain, from his father the Governor of Jolo, Colonel Wallace, greetings:

I have had a long talk this morning with Hadji Taib, who is an excellent man. After most careful consideration I feel very sure that the best and in fact the only way to friendly relationship with the sultan is for you to go to Maibun in obedience to his order given some time ago. The sultan desires this meeting and believes that

you are not showing him proper respect by not going to him. When you are there, and have paid your respects to the sultan, you will have an opportunity to talk the whole matter over with him, and I believe and earnestly hope that you will come to a conclusion that will insure friendly relationship, not only between yourself and the sultan, but between yourself and all of those who are now at enmity with you. I was positively assured by Hadji Taib that if you went to see the sultan all would be well, but that if you did not do so there could be no settlement.

I ask you to go without delay—indeed, I command you to do so—so that when the sultan comes to see me on Monday, as he has promised, he may assure me that all is well between you. The sultan is the acknowledged head of the Moro people, and as such you owe him respect and obedience, remembering always that your first allegiance is to the United States of America, which is in accordance with article 1 of the agreement. You know that article 9 of the agreement makes the sultan the judge in all matters between Moro and Moro, but article 1 acknowledges the United States to be the sovereign power. The sultan understands this very well, so that when the United States called upon him to stop the war between the datos and other chiefs he immediately promised to do so.

I am, your sincere friend and father,

W. M. WALLACE,

Colonel Fifteenth U. S. Cavalry, Military Governor.

4.

JOLO, P. I., April 11, 1902.

To my son His Highness the Sultan of Jolo, from his father the Governor of Jolo, Colonel Wallace, greetings:

I inclose herewith copy of a letter which I sent to Dato Joakanain after the conversation I had yesterday with Hadji Taib. I have ordered therein that the dato shall go to you without delay, and I sincerely wish that when the meeting between you takes place reconciliation will result and lasting friendly relations be established. I shall be glad to hear from the sultan when he comes to visit me that that is the case.

Very respectfully,

W. M. WALLACE,

Colonel Fifteenth U. S. Cavalry, Military Governor.

5.

This letter from the white and clear heart of your son, who loves you and who is loved by you, His Highness the Sultan Hadji Mohamad Jamalul Kiram, to my father who loves me and who is loved by me, the Governor of Jolo, Colonel Wallace:

Hadji Taib has given me your letter, and I understand its contents thoroughly. I was not aware that Maharajah Hajerol had not yet completed the payment of his fine. I thought that he had paid everything. I have sent him word to pay the remaining \$50.50. You know how poor the Moros are, and this is a proof of it. I beg you to forgive him. Perhaps this delay is caused through his inability to obtain the necessary money.

With reference to the news you received as to an alleged meeting held at Maibun between Maharajah Indanan, Panglima Dammang, Hegasan, and Sheriff Saquin, in which the taking of Tambang was discussed, I am very pleased to hear from you that you did not believe it but asked me about it. You have acted like an old man; it clearly shows your wisdom and good judgment. These reports are false, and the person who informed you lied to you. You and I have agreed that all fighting should be stopped. The taking of Tambang was not discussed here at all. What I, Sheriff Saquin, and the chiefs discussed was the means of maintaining peace in the country. The majority agreed that peace and order could only be established if Dato Joakanain came to see me, and above all to obey the proper laws, because he is the one who is always opposing good laws. His ideas are not good, because the majority don't agree with them; therefore I wrote them some time ago requesting them to come here in order to have a conference here in Maibun about establishing order and peace throughout the country. But up to now Calbi and Joakanain have not made their appearance. Therefore I inform you about it. If you really love me and support me as mentioned in article 1 of the agreement, you are our strength and protector,

then you ought to arrest every one who brings a false report to you. If these reports were of less importance, it would not matter so much, but in this case it is of very great importance and is liable to create trouble. Therefore you ought to arrest these kind of people and put them in jail or send them to me, so others may take a lesson from it; otherwise they will do it again.

Greetings and best wishes to you.

5-1-1320. (14-4-1902.)

CHARLES SCHUCK,
Official Interpreter and Translator.

6.

This letter from your son, His Highness the Sultan Hadji Mohamad Jamalul Kiram, to my father, the governor of Jolo, Colonel Wallace:

The letter you sent me by Sheriff Saquin has reached me and I understand its contents. I was pleased to hear of your conversation with Hadji Taib, who informed me of all that was said. I thank you very much for this proof of your fatherly love for me, in giving Dato Joakanain such advice. The copy of your letter to Dato Joakanain has pleased me very much. It is a very good letter. You were quite right in saying that no good can be established if Dato Joakanain does not come to Maibun to meet me. I may be their junior in years, but I am their senior in rank. I am the parent of the Moro people and, as you rightly termed it, I am the head of the Moro people according to the Mohammedan law. I shall await his arrival here before I go to see you, so that I may be able to give you some news. If he does not come within four or five days, I shall go to you and consult you. Perhaps they no longer wish to take part in the government of the country. I depend upon you, who are here to help me to bring order and peace into the country.

Greetings and best wishes.

Fifth day of the moon Moharram 1320. (14-4-1902.)

CHARLES SCHUCK,
Official Interpreter and Translator.

7.

JOLO, P. I., April 14, 1902.

To my son, His Highness the Sultan of Jolo, from his father, the governor of Jolo, Colonel Wallace, greetings:

Please write me a letter assuring me that if Datos Calbi and Joakanain come to Maibun they will be received kindly, and after having paid their respects to you and talked matters over they will be allowed to go in peace.

Very respectfully,

W. M. WALLACE,
Colonel, Fifteenth U. S. Cavalry, Military Governor.

8.

This letter from your son, His Highness the Sultan Hadji Mohamad Jamalul Kiram, to my father, the governor of Jolo, Colonel Wallace:

Your letter which you forwarded by Hadji Taib has reached me and I understand its contents. I shall give you that which you asked me for, but I also want from them a sign assuring me that they won't deceive me, and, above all, you; because they have always some excuse and they are very deceitful. Their talk is very nice and sweet, but the meaning of it is different. Perhaps the reason you ask me for a letter is that you think I may deceive them. You may ask everybody as to whom I have deceived—no sultan deceives. But I will do as you ask me, because I wish to hasten the meeting between us. Very good; my father may send some one with them, whoever my father wishes to be his representative, who may witness their good or bad behavior when they pay their respects to me. I am their chief; therefore they must obey my orders, which are for the good, according to the customs of our ancestors. But if they come to me and want me to do as they wish, it would not be right, and we would never come to an agreement; above all, that would be disrespectful. Therefore, advise them as well as their followers not to say anything

disrespectful in my presence, but to obey my orders, which are for the good. I also beg to inform you to believe everything Hadji Taib may tell you; it comes from me. He does not tell lies and does not wish to create mischief, but he will do that which is for the best of everybody.

Greetings and best wishes.

Tenth day of Moharram 1320. (April 19, 1902.)

CHARLES SCHUCK,
Official Interpreter and Translator.

9.

This letter from your son, His Highness the Sultan Hadji Mohamad Jamalul Kiram, to my father, the governor of Jolo, Colonel Wallace:

I beg to inform you that your letter has reached me and that I understand its contents. The reason why my brother Joakanain can not come to Maibun is because he is sick. Even if it was not so, it is now such a long time since my father has ordered them to come to Maibun to meet me, but they have not done so. Notwithstanding this, if they return me my property which they have, slaves and cattle, I shall not be angry with them, but we would be brothers, as formerly. But if they do not return me my property, even if they come and see me we will never come to an agreement and there would only be trouble afterwards. During this moon, while I was absent in Loog, some more of my property was taken over to them: 3 rifles, 1 Mauser, 4 Remingtons, 2 horses, and 2 buffalos.

Twenty-fourth of the moon Sapar 1320. (May 31, 1902.)

Greetings and best wishes to you.

CHARLES SCHUCK,
Official Interpreter and Translator.

10.

JOLO, P. I., May 1, 1902.

To my son, His Highness the Sultan of Jolo, from his brother, the governor of Jolo, Colonel Wallace, greetings:

What shall be done to maintain peace in Jolo? The order to stop all fighting has been strictly obeyed; the fighting has been stopped; but the various chiefs are stealing from each other right and left. One man says fourteen horses were stolen from him last night, but that he could not get them because the governor had ordered him not to fight. Of course it will not do for a man to stand still and see his property taken from before his eyes, with no means of protection.

The sultan must protect his people. It is his duty to see that the stolen property is returned and the guilty party is punished. He is the sultan, and as such should have the welfare of his people at heart and see that order is maintained in his country. If the sultan does not protect his subjects, then he is not a good sultan, and the people are unfortunate indeed.

Considering the above facts and circumstances, the governor advises his son, the sultan, to issue a proclamation to all his people that theft, robbery, burning of houses, unjust fines, or other unlawful acts will be severely punished. Of course such an order will have no weight unless it is strictly enforced.

Therefore the governor hereby declares that he will assist the sultan in every way possible to carry out the proclamation that he shall be pleased to issue. The governor knows that this will be for the good of all the Moros. The people will not have anything to fight about, and so will not wish to go to war. They will go to work instead of going about all the time with a gun or other arms looking for an enemy. The result will be that they will become contented, and every man will have enough and be able to contribute to the support of the good sultan who is constantly looking out for the protection of their interests. This same idea applies equally well to all chiefs. The people, living happy and contented, will till the soil and so be able and willing to contribute to the support of their chief who protects them.

Therefore let us agree to severally punish all evildoers, no matter how high or low their rank and station.

Very respectfully,

W. M. WALLACE,
Colonel, Fifteenth U. S. Cavalry, Military Governor.

11.

24th Moharram, 1320. (May 3, 1902.)

This letter, as a sign of truth, comes from the throne of His Highness the Sultan Hadji Mohamad Jamalul Kiram:

I inform you all, hill people and shore people, Moros and Samals, the order has been issued that all fighting shall be stopped; also all stealing, taking from one another, robbery, punishment of innocent people, or any violation of the laws.

And as my father, the governor, will assist me in establishing and maintaining order in the country,

Therefore be it known to all that I forbid crime.

Whoever violates this agreement between my father, the governor, and myself will be punished, as he has violated our orders.

All will be treated alike, be they high or low, rich or poor.

My father, the governor, and I have agreed that the governor will assist me in upholding the laws of the country and to punish whoever violates this order.

(Seal of the sultan.)

12.

Jolo, P. I., April 18, 1902.

To Panglima Zutugan, island of Pangutarang, greetings:

Having asked for the protection of the United States, and having been referred to the commanding officer of Jolo by the sultan, therefore be it known to all concerned that the inhabitants of the island of Pangutarang are hereby declared neutral. They will not be called upon by any chief to take part in any fighting.

A tax will be paid to the sultan once a year, amounting to 50 cents to \$1 Mexican per man. No other taxes will be collected, and the people will not be interfered with or molested in any manner by any person or persons whatsoever.

This protection will cease if the islanders ever take part in any fighting.

W. M. WALLACE,

Colonel, Fifteenth U. S. Cavalry, Military Governor.

Similar letter, same date, to Iman Mualam Amad, island of Pangutarang, and to Panglima Amsali, island of Panducan; in the latter case "island of Panducan" being substituted for "island of Pangutarang" in body of letter.

APPENDIX 6.

REPORT OF COMMANDING OFFICER, DAVAO.

MARCH 31, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL SEVENTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Zamboanga, Mindanao, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with the instructions of the brigade commander, I have the honor to submit the following narrative of all military affairs in this province from its evacuation by the Spaniards to the present time.

A brief outline of its history before and during the Spanish occupation may not be without interest, and will be given first.

The island of Mindanao was the first of the Philippine group discovered by Magellan in 1521, and on account of its being the time of the feast of Pentecost, he allowed his men to land near the Butuan River for the purpose of hearing mass, which was the first celebrated in the archipelago. Notwithstanding that the Butuan River rises near the Gulf of Davao, over three hundred years elapsed before the Spaniards actually occupied and established their authority over this gulf. This was in the year 1845, previous to which time it had been dominated by the Moro pirates, who occupied the coast and mouths of rivers and exacted tribute alike from the savages in the interior who used the rivers and the traders who came by sea. A detailed account of the subjugation of the Moros, written by Padre Mateo Gisbert, S. J., who has been a missionary here for over twenty years, is appended hereto (Exhibit 1); also a list of the Spanish politico-military governors during the period of Spanish occupation, prepared by Teodoro Palma Gil, presidente of Davao, P. I. (Exhibit 2.)

Without following the different changes which took place from time to time in the boundaries of the territory under their command, it will suffice to say that at the

close of Spanish rule here the territory under the jurisdiction of the Spanish governor at Davao embraced the comandancias of Glan, Davao, and Mati, with a coast line extending from the Tuguis River on the south to Point Balingangan or Catarman on the north, and was known as the fourth politico-military district of Mindanao. It was bounded on the north by the comandancias of Surigao and Butuan, on the west by Cotabato, on the south by the Celebes Sea, and on the east by the Pacific Ocean. Besides his military duties, the governor performed those of collector of internal revenue, captain of the port, judge of the court of first instance, and the ordinary duties of a civil governor. Davao was district headquarters.

Each comandancia was commanded by a Spanish captain, except that of Davao, which was usually commanded by a major, who was also governor. From first to last there were 14 military stations in the district, viz: Macar, Glan, Balut, Tumanao, Malagal, Digos, Daron, Davao, Tagum, Cuabo, Mati, San Luis, Manorigao, and Baganga. Both Spanish regulars and native soldiers and police were employed from time to time. Davao, Malagal, and Malipano Island were also used as naval stations. Their harbors are good, also those at Macar, Glan, Tumanao, Mati, and Boston, but the latter place and other points on the east coast, except Mati, can not be reached by sea with safety from December 1 to April 1 during the time of the northeast monsoon.

Considering the comparatively short period of Spanish rule here, considerable progress in civilizing the natives and developing the country was made and it seems upon the whole to have been satisfactory and successful. This was due in a large measure to the high character of the Jesuit priests, against whom no charges of immorality or fraud have been made. They claim no property except their convents and have spent their lives in a labor of love. Yet their zeal in the cause of their religion has sometimes blinded their judgment and led them to resort to forcible measures to convert the savages and Moros. Many of these people were, by the aid of the military, shorn of their long hair and forcibly baptized. They were then known as new Christians, forced to build towns and live in settlements, which were called reductions. When the Spanish Government was overthrown, the Moros renounced Christianity to a man and resumed their former Mohammedan religion. A few savages remain Christians only in name. Religious freedom and tolerance by our Government has removed the principal grievance or cause of discontent under their former rulers and all of the tribes profess friendship for the American Government. Not a single injury has ever been done by any of the inhabitants here to an American. Yet the various tribes and races are often jealous and afraid of each other, and but for the presence of a strong peacemaker in the form of our Army they would be perpetually at war with one another.

The following list of inhabitants, prepared from the best available sources, is approximately correct: Christians—Visayans, 20,429. Non-Christians—Bagobos, 8,000; Guirangas, 2,000; Tagcaolos, 7,000; Manobos, 6,000; Calaganes, 500; Atas, 3,000; Bilanes, 8,000; Sanguiles, 1,000; Moros, 11,000; Mandayas, 8,000. Total, 74,929.

These people all possess the same physical characteristics and appear to belong to the same race—Malay—differing only in customs and dialects, but all understand more or less Visayan.

They are all more or less religious fanatics after their own fashion, and some of the wild tribes formerly practiced human sacrifice, though they pretend now that they have discontinued it in compliance with orders from this office. The sacrifices were made to appease the evil spirit, usually when there was sickness in the family, or to avert impending danger. They believe that the good spirit will not harm them and that it requires no sacrifices. The unfortunate victim selected for the sacrifice was usually a slave, who, by reason of sickness or old age, was unable to be of further service. Unlike the Jews of old, they do not believe in offering up the best they have. Moreover, they usually turned the sacrifice to profit by giving a feast to which all the neighbors were invited. Each one who brought a present to the value of about a peso had the privilege of cutting the person offered as a sacrifice with a bolo or spear, which they believed would keep the evil spirit away from their households.

All the tribes except the Christians practice polygamy—probably a necessary institution to prevent extinction during the time when many of the men were killed off in their tribal wars. With the Moros the custom is sanctioned by their religion.

All are equally averse to labor, and they will not work unless compelled to do so. If they have a little rice, fish, and sweet potatoes they are satisfied. They often live on sweet potatoes alone. The lack of good labor is the most serious obstacle to the proper development of the vast natural resources of the country.

The women of all the tribes weave coarse cloth of cotton or hemp for their families. Much cheap cloth of bright colors is imported and sold.

In the less civilized communities the men are armed with bolos, spears, shields, and bows and arrows. They have a few guns of obsolete pattern, but little ammunition.

Slavery exists everywhere in spite of the fact that it was against the Spanish laws and is prohibited by our own. One of my first acts on taking command here was to issue an emancipation proclamation and forbid buying or selling slaves; yet many of the slaves are mere children and have no other guardian except their masters, their parents being unknown or killed in order to effect the capture of the children. The capture of each child is usually attended by bloodshed and is the principal cause of tribal animosities and wars. These people are so secretive and underhanded that it is difficult to get at the truth about anything. They profess to be opposed to slavery, yet every family that can afford it has them. The slaves do all the drudgery and are not always well treated, but are afraid to complain when questioned about it. The owners live in idleness and the effect is demoralizing in every way. I have heard and read many apologies for the institution of slavery in these islands, but I consider all the arguments in its defense as not only specious but mischievous. It is slavery of the worst sort, and the institution is so firmly rooted in the social system here that strong and radical measures will be necessary to abolish it effectively. Bandos, proclamations, and punitive measures will not accomplish it. Every slave should be taken from his master and placed in a mission, educated, taught some trade and how to work on a farm. As soon as they become able to support themselves they should be set free. Frequent inspections should be made for slaves in families and any violation of the law should be rigorously punished. Mild measures in dealing with these people is a mere waste of time. They respect only force. This refers to the manner of governing them. In the ordinary daily intercourse with them, kindness and suavity of manner toward them counts for much and is appreciated by them.

Davao Province is mostly mountainous like the rest of Mindanao, but it contains numerous valleys along the seashore, bays, and rivers. They are exceeding fertile, but the area under cultivation is small. The savages make small clearings in the mountains, and raise principally corn, rice, and sweet potatoes. I believe that soil can be found here suitable for raising all kinds of cereals, fruits, and vegetables. However, many pests in the form of insects and wild animals will be encountered, and tender plants will have to be protected from the fierce rays of the sun.

The province abounds in primeval forests of all kinds of lumber, from the best to the poorest. Its mineral wealth is unknown, but that there is an abundance of good coal I have no doubt. My detachments have found drift coal in Catel River and a river near Jovellar, near Mati, and natives report that there are coal deposits near Nuin and Cran.

The waters abound in fish, but the natives are so lazy they catch hardly enough for their own use.

The principal product of the province is hemp, of which large quantities are raised, and the output is increasing yearly. It is of excellent quality, and, I am told, sells for several pesos per picul more than any other hemp in the Manila market.

Considerable rubber and gutta-percha were obtained near Sarangani Bay in former times, but very little of late. The supply is probably more abundant than ever.

Almaciga is obtained in the mountains from San Agustin north. It is the resin of a tree from which it is extracted by gashing, and is also found in the ground, often in large lumps, where it may have been deposited ages ago by the resin exuding from wounds made in the trees by insects or otherwise. Some wax of wild bees is also exported. Rice can be raised here, but as a rule the natives prefer to raise and export hemp and import rice. The hill tribes raise some rice and barter it with the Moros and Samals for dried fish. There are no skilled industries or craftsmen, but nearly every native can build a nipa house.

Owing to the lack of communication with the outside world, the Spanish troops remained at Macar, Glan, Balut, Tumanao, Davao, and Mati until relieved in January, 1899, all sailing together on the steamer *Churruc*, which had been chartered for the purpose. The Spanish governor, Comandante Bartolome Garcia, and his immediate command, embarked at Davao, January 15, 1899. He desired to take with him all the arms of the civil police, but was prevailed upon by the Christian inhabitants to leave them 70 rifles and a supply of ammunition for their protection against the savages and Moros. After the departure of the Spanish governor, the peaceable and law-abiding inhabitants held a meeting in the tribunal building for the purpose of establishing a provisional government until the arrival of the one destined to rule over them, be it Filipino or American.

A government junta was formed, composed of a presidente, vice-presidente, treasurer, secretary, and three councilors. Don Antonio Matute, a Spanish merchant, was elected presidente, and the other offices were filled. The Tercio Civil de Policia was reduced to 25 men, the command of which was given to Bonifacio Quidato, an orderly person loved by the people.

At first the people were pleased with the new government, but soon evil-disposed persons began to sow discord among the inhabitants, saying that the established government had no authority to act, as since the Spanish Government left they had been free, did not need chiefs to command them, and that each could do as he pleased. But Quidato, faithful to his duty, watched their acts, and they, seeing that it would be impossible to accomplish their evil designs, decided to get rid of him. For that purpose they tampered with the soldiers, who, on the night of February 6, 1899, led by Juan Reyes, Basilio Bautista, and Lucas Auting, entered the house of Quidato, and while asleep in bed inflicted a cut on his neck and head which caused instant death. They at the same time killed his wife and brother-in-law, of minor age. They then took possession of all the arms and ammunition and carried them to the opposite shore of Davao River, firing shots in the air until daybreak. The provisional government was overthrown. Matute, the presidente, escaped in a sailboat, and all the Spaniards and prominent natives sought refuge in different directions. Anarchy and a reign of terror ensued, and murder and robbery were the order of the day. The mob broke into the government safes, which they found empty, and robbed stores and other vacant houses. To make matters worse, they got drunk on stolen liquor and ran through the streets shouting "Kill all who know anything! Kill all the rich!" Subsequently Padre Saturnino Urios, a Jesuit missionary, sent Victoriano S. Jose to treat with the leaders of the movement for peace, which he effected, and also secured their arms and ammunition. For this act the pueblo made him chief of police. Antonio Joven was elected presidente. They behaved well and performed their duties satisfactorily until August 1, when Samuel Navarro, a Moro-Visayan mestizo, rebelled against them and, assisted by the Moros, took possession of the government, after firing a few shots at the populace.

Navarro became chief of police and the pueblo elected Estanislao Palma Gil presidente. Their rule appears to have been unpopular, and they are accused of malfeasance in office and tyrannical conduct. It is charged that Navarro, fearing an uprising of the Visayans against him, leagued himself with the Moros to massacre the former or expel them from the country on Christmas eve, but that the arrival of the American forces December 20, 1899, frustrated the plot. I doubt if anything so horrible was ever contemplated by either Navarro or the Moros. The Visayans, naturally timid, were at that time in such a state of panic as to readily believe any wild rumor set on foot.

Prior to the arrival of the Americans all the Spaniards and priests had made their escape from the province, except a Spaniard by the name of Palacio, who was held as a prisoner by the Bagobos, and Garcia Neila, who remained at Mati in defiance of the threats of the insurgent chief Garcia at Baganga.

The Spanish captain commanding the comandancia of Glan, 1 sergeant, and 10 men were treacherously killed by Moros in 1898. The captain had gone to one of the barrios north of Glan for the purpose of receiving a lot of arms for which one of the datos pretended to have negotiated the surrender, but which, in fact, was only a ruse to lure him to his death.

Prudencio Garcia, a native of the province of Camarines, island of Luzon, an ex-sergeant in the Spanish army, who took part in the revolution against the Spanish Government in Cavite in 1872, and afterwards resided in Baganga, raised the flag of the insurrection in that town September 26, 1898, and was joined by the few soldiers of the civil police and others in that vicinity. There being no force to oppose him there or in that locality, and being short of provisions, having consumed all the cattle and palay belonging to the inhabitants, he resolved to go to Caraga, which had refused obedience to him. He entered the town by surprise with 300 followers in December, a few shots were fired, but no blood shed, and with cattle, rice, and other things peace was made. The death of the insurrecto chief Manuel Sanchez, an exiled Cuban insurgent, which took place at Manorigao, appears to have been ordered by Garcia on account of the bad conduct of the said Sanchez. Moreover, the demoralization which without doubt excited the revolution was manifesting itself more boldly each day, neither respecting private property nor the lives of individuals, and threatened the speedy dissolution of the pueblos in which it existed. For this reason the peaceable and honest citizens were continually demanding a good and strong government that would protect them in such a critical situation.

In April, 1899, Garcia left Baganga, as it was impossible for him to remain in that

pueblo on account of the hatred of the people he had conquered, and he was also threatened by the loyal forces of the lieutenant of the civil police of Mati, Señor Manuel Garcia Neila, who as a man of peace wished to maintain order at any cost until a suitable government could be established. Garcia intended many times to go to Mati and from there to Davao to establish his government, but he did not attempt it for fear of the forces that he reckoned Señor Neila had.

Before leaving Baganga, Garcia desired to mollify a man who possessed much influence in that revolution, and for this purpose he promised him one of his daughters in marriage if he would help him to accomplish his ambition; that is to say, to be recognized as a chief. Having obtained this and no longer needing his assistance, and in order quickly to free himself of him, killed him and a brother of minor age with his own hand with a revolver. He embarked quickly in a steamer in his service, which he had taken from Aldecao & Co., of Surigao, to which pueblo he fled, occupying it after being fired upon by the inhabitants, who opposed his entrance on account of their resentment against him for the murder of the Gonzales family, which he ordered to be murdered so that he might take possession of the government of Surigao.

The foregoing facts have been obtained from reliable native sources. Garcia is now provincial governor of Surigao.

AMERICAN OCCUPATION.

The first American to visit Davao is said to have been a captain of the Twenty-third Infantry from Zamboanga, acting as a commissary in search of beef cattle. He came on the *Churruca*. Soon after his visit, Gen. J. C. Bates, U. S. Army, commanding the military district of Mindanao and Jolo, arrived on the *Manila* December 14, 1899. General Bates was immediately called upon by a delegation from the town, composed of Samuel Navarro, jefe provincial; Estanislao Palma Gil, presidente local; Nicolas Pizarro, aid to the jefe; Beneficio Casada, first teniente; Cypriano Bustamante, second teniente, and Isidoro Palma Gil, school teacher. They welcomed General Bates and awaited his orders; previous to the arrival of the *Manila* they had voluntarily raised the American flag. This delegation stated that in and about Davao there were about 2,000 Christian souls, and in the vicinity there were about 14,000 "savages," who, however, were peaceful and submissive to the jefe provincial.

It was also learned that in the vicinity of Davao there were about 17 different tribes, speaking about as many different dialects.

General Bates and staff, accompanied by Captain Navarro, then went ashore and inspected the town. Davao is situated on the Davao River near the head of the gulf of that name and retired about one-quarter of a mile from the said gulf. Large vessels can anchor quite close to the mouth of the river. The town is well laid out, with long avenues bordered with palms. The Spaniards left Davao about February 15, ultimo, and since that time, for the protection of the town, the inhabitants have maintained a militia of about 30 men (15 rifles), which is to be discontinued upon the arrival of the American troops. There is a good-sized church, attached to which is a convente in good repair, capable of containing 125 men. The local barracks is in bad condition (no floor and needs a new roof), and has space for about 40 men. The two school buildings are very dilapidated. The tribunal is commodious; could contain 75 men if flooring were mended, new roof made, and after a thorough policing. There is also a government house which could contain about 40 men if the building should be thoroughly renovated. Some of the private houses are neat and well built. The health of the community is said to be good. The water is obtained from the Davao River. The staple of the vicinity is hemp; there is sufficient cattle in the immediate vicinity to supply a small garrison, but not enough for export (price about 4 cents per pound on the hoof). The townspeople appear to desire the advent of American troops. They desire to know if there would be a monthly steamer, and if it would be possible to obtain a Jesuit priest, and named their former pastor, Padre Mateo Gisbert, as the one most desirable.

It was learned that on October 10th ultimo the steamer *Sulu*, Sandakan, ran the blockade and procured a cargo at Davao. ("It is believed that prior to the *Sulu* the *Labuan*, Sandakan, had done the same thing."—Extract from official records.) Companies I and L, Thirty-first U. S. Volunteers, under command of Maj. Hunter Liggett, Thirty-first U. S. Volunteers, arrived on the *Brutus* at Davao December 20, 1899, where they found the American flag flying and were met by the presidente local and his aid, who piloted the steamer to the nearest safe anchorage. Next day Major Liggett proceeded with Company L on the *Brutus* to Mati, where they arrived the same day. An American flag was flying over the town. They were met by Manuel Garcia Neila, an ex-Spanish soldier, and Francisco Rojas, presidente local.

Major Liggett, without landing his troops, proceeded the same day to Baganga for the purpose of leaving what might be needed there and bringing back the remainder to Mati. He arrived at Baganga on the 22d of December, where he found a white flag displayed from the church. He was met by some town officials and about thirty of the inhabitants. There were but few in the place, the rest being reported "out on the farm." Found church and town buildings ample to shelter one company. The presidente asked for an American flag, which was given him. It was at once hoisted in the place of the white flag before flying and the people seemed delighted. "Their only cause of apprehension," says Major Liggett in his report, "seems to be a certain robber, named Garcia, who comes down from Surigao and levies tribute. There is no fear from native sources. They said that Garcia could not make them a visit before February on account of danger to his boat if he attempted the harbor during the prevalence of the northeast monsoon. After weighing the matter carefully, I decided to land no troops at this place at the present time, the principal reason being that there is no certainty of getting into the place during January. This they all say is the most dangerous month and troops coming here must be rationed for at least two months, and if practicable for three months. The people seemed disappointed. The *Brutus* with all on board returned to Mati, December 22, where Company L was placed in camp. Company M, Thirty-first Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, having arrived here, sailed for Baganga January 2, and after some delays en route, caused by the *Brutus* breaking her shaft, arrived there January 8 and disembarked. May 23, 1900, Company L, except 1 officer and 25 enlisted men, were transferred from Mati to Caraga, reaching there May 24, 1900, where they were quartered in the tribunal buildings and convent. A detachment of 14 men, Company M, was stationed at Dapuan, 6 miles north of Baganga. The subdistrict of Davao was created by General Orders, No. 18, Department of Mindanao and Jolo, July 23, 1900, to embrace the military stations of Davao and vicinity, Mati, Caraga, Baganga, Dapuan, and whatever points may be hereafter occupied, protected, or influenced within the boundaries of the late Spanish provinces (sic) of Davao and Mati." Maj. Hunter Liggett, Thirty-first Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, was assigned to the command of the subdistrict with headquarters at Davao. Company D, Tenth Infantry, arrived at Davao April 29, 1901, and took station. Companies I and K were relieved from duty May 3, 1901, and embarked on the *Aeolus* for Zamboanga. Companies L and M having preceded them a short while. Major Liggett remained here in command and reverted to the status of captain of Fifth Infantry on the date of muster out of the Thirty-first U. S. Volunteers. I arrived here September 30, 1901, with Troop G, Fifteenth Cavalry, and relieved Captain Liggett and Company D, Tenth Infantry. They proceeded on the *Vizcaya* to their new station outside of my command. The subdistrict of Davao was extended when I was assigned to the command by the verbal orders of the department commander to include the old Spanish comandancia of Glan. All districts were discontinued by General Orders, No. 54, Department Mindanao and Jolo, dated October 26, 1901, but the territory under my jurisdiction remained the same. Special Orders, No. 235, Department of Mindanao and Jolo and Seventh Separate Brigade, dated November 9, 1901, provides that "all military stations located in the comandancias of Glan, Mati, and Davao are hereby designated as subposts to Davao." The limits of this territory were further defined in General Orders, No. 10, Seventh Separate Brigade, dated February 20, 1902, to include "the old comandancias of Glan, Davao, and Mati as far north as the eighth parallel of north latitude."

I visited the east coast soon after my arrival here, and, seeing the helpless condition of the people and that they needed protection, I decided to station small detachments at Mati, Caraga, Baganga, and Catel. The people were afraid of the Mandayas who live in the mountains overlooking their towns and hemp fields. No raids or attacks have occurred since by the Mandayas. I am led to the belief from observation and inquiry that the so-called savages are more sinned against than sinning, and if dealt with justly there would be little to fear from them. My detachments endeavored to establish friendly relations with them, but they seemed to be afraid to come into the towns and the detachments were too weak to undertake expeditions into their country.

Company L, Seventeenth Infantry, joined this station October 17, 1901, Capt. E. W. Howe, commanding. He proceeded October 23 with 36 enlisted men to the east coast and stationed 9 men at each of the following places: Mati, Caraga, Baganga, and Catel. He has since remained in command of the east coast with station at Mati. On November 2, 1901, I proceeded with Second Lieut. E. C. Bolton, Seventeenth Infantry, and 28 enlisted men of Company L, Seventeenth Infantry, and 1 man, Engineer Corps, to Cuabo, Sarangani Island, Glan, and Macar. At Cuabo I stationed 7 men, Seventeenth Infantry, taking the remainder to Glan, where I sta-

tioned them. The old Spanish cuartel, raised about 10 feet from the ground on strong timbers and roofed with cogon grass, was subsequently repaired and occupied. There are only two other buildings there, belonging to a Chinaman, who was allowed to remain after the evacuation by the Spaniards, by paying heavy tribute to the Moros for the privilege.

I was informed that we were the first Americans that had ever landed there, though several vessels had anchored in the harbor, presumably driven there by storms. The harbor is an excellent one for all classes of ships.

At Macar I found one government house occupied by a Moro dato. There were no other houses there. It is located on a bluff some 20 feet or more high, which slopes gently back and up toward the hills and mountains. The country is open, rolling, and covered with grass for many miles around. The largest vessels can anchor within their length from shore. Macar lies between and close to two rivers, and there is a small stream within 50 yards of it. It is an ideal spot for a cavalry post, and I recommended in my report that a troop of cavalry be stationed there. My recommendation was favorably considered by General Davis, commanding the department, and pending the arrival of the troop I transferred the detachments of the Seventeenth Infantry from Cuabo and Glan to Macar, where they arrived January 11, 1902, one native scout being left at Cuabo to keep up communication with Mati.

Second Lieut. Ben Lear, jr., Fifteenth Cavalry, and a detachment of 10 men, Troop G, Fifteenth Cavalry, mounted, with 4 pack mules, arrived there from this post, via Malalag, overland, January 11, 1902, with instructions to build telegraph line from there north to connect with line under construction from this post to Cotabato via Macar. Troop E, Fifteenth Cavalry, arrived at Macar February 6, 1902, relieving the detachments from this post. The troop is now encamped while barracks, etc., are being built.

The dato at Macar is a brother-in-law of the sultan of Talik, who lives near by. In 1899 the sultan was driven out of Talik by Piang and the Cotabato Moros, who killed and enslaved many of his people and robbed him of much of his property. About 2,000 of his followers made their escape and settled near Macar on Sarangani Bay. They appear to be a spirited, warlike people, but were doubtless greatly outnumbered in their war with Piang.

I visited both Sarangani islands where the Spaniards formerly maintained detachments. About 100 yards off the east shore of the larger one, called Balut, on a small island, still stands the old Spanish fort in good condition. It consists of a stone wall about 8 feet high, with a step or banquette inside and bastions in the angles. The wooden barracks within have disappeared. Water is obtained near the beach at low tide.

On the smaller island only the site of the cuartel remains. It is situated on an excellent harbor on the west side of the island, which is called Tumanao.

Balut Island is mountainous, but it is said to be quite fertile. There are about 2,000 Bilanes on the two islands besides a few Sangulies. Several hundred of the inhabitants died of starvation there about two years ago, due to a failure of the crops from drought.

Excellent timber, gutta-percha, and rubber trees abound in the vicinity of Sarangani Bay, which lies near the sixth degree of north latitude, above which rubber and gutta are said not to thrive. The country affords fine grazing for cattle, carabaos, and horses, but there are few there. That region has never been developed for lack of protection to life and property. A similar condition of undevelopment exists on the Tagum River north of Davao, but there are no rubber or gutta-percha trees, and the country is covered with dense forest and jungle. The valleys are broad and fertile and well adapted for the cultivation of hemp and sugar. The Moros there who have heretofore lived by the sweat of other people's brows are beginning to realize the necessity of working for themselves, and have planted some hemp. They also gather nipa for sale here and frequently come here to trade, which was not formerly the case. They have expressed a desire for an American merchant at Tagum, but unless protected by the presence of troops neither Americans nor natives will venture to go into business or settle there. These Moros treacherously murdered the Spanish governor of Davao in 1861 while on a visit in Tagum. They also murdered some prominent native Visayans who subsequently went there to reside. Since then the Moros have been in undisputed possession.

If a company of infantry is not available for the purpose, I would recommend that a company of native scouts be stationed as far up the river as it may be practicable to supply it by water. The steam tug can always ascend the Tagum 6 miles from its mouth and during high water about 12 miles. Bancas can ascend it much higher.

CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

Soon after the arrival of the American forces the towns of Davao, Mati, Caraga, and Baganga were organized as pueblos under General Orders, No. 43, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, 1899. Subsequently a pueblo was organized at Catel from territory formerly a part of Baganga.

January 1, 1901, Davao was organized under General Orders, No. 40, Office of the Military Governor, 1900, and again under the municipal code, December 3, 1901. Mati held an election under municipal code December 3, 1901, and is now acting under that code, though it is believed that the organization to be complete will require the approval of the civil commission, as the previous organization was under General Orders, No. 43. The remaining pueblos are still acting under General Orders, No. 43, though steps have been taken to organize them under the municipal code. Delays have been caused by the jealousy of rival towns, neither wishing to be a barrio of the other. The matter is in abeyance at present, as I have recommended that provincial government be first established and that the new government be allowed to organize the municipalities to its own satisfaction, if not to that of the people. The latter seems impossible. A part of the expenses of the provincial government will have to be borne by the general government for a few years. The help thus advanced can ultimately be repaid. It is impossible to make an estimate of the revenues available at this time, but in view of the vast natural resources of the country, the provincial government will ultimately be self-supporting. The presidente of Davao, Teodoro Palma Gil, has displayed decided executive force and ability in the government of this municipality. He is a well-educated native Visayan, speaking Spanish and all the native dialects. He owns considerable property and is interested in the prosperity of the province. For these reasons and because he knows and understands the people and they know him, I have recommended his appointment as governor of this province.

Industrial and social conditions are improving slowly but steadily throughout the province. The cultivation of hemp, the principal staple, is being largely extended and there is increased activity in all the industries peculiar to the country. A better feeling of security for life and property is felt everywhere, settlements abandoned during the insurrection are being reoccupied and new ones are springing up. The mountain tribes and Moros are joining in these movements, express themselves in favor of good government, and are proving their sincerity by their acts.

SCHOOLS.

Under my present instructions, I have no control over the school question, but as I am asked to report upon it I shall do so from the best information available.

The following list of children living in civilized communities is believed to be approximately correct:

Municipality of Davao	800
Municipality of Mati	350
Pueblo of Caraga	500
Pueblo of Baganga	400
Pueblo of Catel	775
Total	2,825

Perhaps one-fourth of these attend school. There are 3 American school teachers in the town of Davao, where the average attendance of children in school does not exceed 50 boys and 50 girls. The head master has inspected the schools in the other towns, which are all under native teachers. From my own observations I should say that progress in the English language is slow and disappointing. Native teachers are incapable of giving proper instructions in it, and it would be impracticable and too expensive to furnish American teachers for all the schools. As a solution of the difficulty I would suggest that the Government establish two schools in this vicinity, modeled on the plan of the Indian school at Carlisle, Pa.; one for boys, the other for girls, at which children from all the civilized settlements and savage tribes could be educated and returned to their homes as teachers. This would be the most effective and economical solution of the educational problem here.

ROADS AND TELEGRAPH LINE.

From the post records I learn that 130 miles of military roads had been constructed before my arrival here. From what I have seen of them myself and from the reports

of my subordinates who have traveled them, they hardly deserve to be called roads. They are overgrown with bushes, grading is conspicuous by its absence, and the temporary pole bridges over ravines and small streams were rotten and impassable. No attempt was made to bridge the larger streams. There is not a wheeled vehicle along the entire length of the so-called roads, except at Davao, and the natives would not use them if they were boulevards; they prefer to travel by water. For the first 20 miles from here south the military road follows the foothills; the telegraph line follows the beach. Beyond the telegraph line follows the military road for a distance of about 20 miles, and from there about 20 miles of new road has been built following the telegraph line through the forest. I have had a wagon road built along the telegraph line from here to where it joins the military road, and have made the latter road passable for wagons, so that now a road passable for wagons extends along the telegraph line throughout its length, and it is the intention to have a wagon road follow the telegraph line to Macar and beyond if practicable. This road is necessary for the construction and maintenance of the telegraph line, and will be a useful means of communication between this post, Macar, and Cotabato. No other roads are needed in this vicinity. Roads will be required in the Tagum country if troops should be stationed there, but not otherwise.

A good trail, passable for pack train at all seasons, should be constructed at once from Cuabo to Boston to enable scouting parties to patrol the east coast from Mati. Should funds on hand be sufficient, the Davao river should be bridged near its mouth in order to reach deep-water anchorage and avoid the dangers and delays in handling cargo now caused by the tides and rapid currents at its mouth. It would also connect with the telegraph road south, and a dock extending into deep water could be built at small expense. There are other streams of less importance that should be bridged if the funds are sufficient, but the work should be done under a competent engineer, as difficulties will be met that only professional skill can overcome.

When I arrived here September 30, 1901, 15 miles of the telegraph line toward Cotabato had been completed, but as the signal funds were exhausted, work was suspended until November 15, when it was resumed under Sergt. Fred Yandean, Signal Corps, U. S. Army, who has remained in charge to the present time. The old line was poorly constructed, and required two weeks to repair it, a detachment of soldiers and about 30 natives being employed. The first 5 miles the poles are too small, are of inferior wood, and will soon have to be replaced. The line practically follows the beach to Digos and from there runs southwest toward Macar, 60 miles of which are now finished and in good working order from Davao. For nearly the entire distance it passes through a dense forest of large trees and jungle, through which a clearing about 60 feet wide had to be cut by native laborers unskilled in the use of the ax and often unwilling to work at all, escaping to the mountains until brought back by their datos. The farther the line penetrates the interior, the more difficult it becomes to obtain laborers and the more indifferent they are.

Progress has been and will be unavoidably slow, but the work can and will be completed.

The plan of my predecessor was to build the line via Digos to Lake Buluan, and there connect with Cotabato by a cable laid in the Rio Grande. As there was no cable, and no likelihood that one would ever be furnished for the purpose, in view of its great cost and the difficulty and expense of laying it, I decided to send out an exploring party in search of an all-land route from Davao to Cotabato. Second Lieut. Ben Lear, jr., Fifteenth Cavalry, with a detachment of Troop G, Fifteenth Cavalry, was dispatched October 9, 1901, for that purpose, via Digos, lakes Buluan and Liguasan, and the Rio Grande, arriving at Cotabato October 25. He remained there and explored the country until November 13, when they started back to Davao, arriving here November 25, 1901. Distance traveled, 350 miles, or 175 miles each way. Pack mules were used for 75 miles from here, but beyond the trail was impassable for animals and native carriers were employed. The natives were wild and timid, many of them never having seen a white man before. The journey was accomplished under many difficulties and hardships, and much credit is due to Lieutenant Lear and his men for their nerve, energy, and endurance. A through land right to Cotabato was found, and the object of the expedition was accomplished, but when it was decided to establish a post at Macar, on Sarangani Bay, it became desirable to include that station on the through line or to run a separate line to it from Digos, a distance of about 90 miles. Lieutenant Lear, with a small detachment, was again sent out to explore a route from Macar via Malalag to Digos. He left Macar December 17, and arrived at Malalag December 21, 1901. As the beach between Malalag and Digos is well known, it was not explored. Lieutenant Lear followed the old Spanish trail, and reported it practicable for telegraph line and animals. However, as the trail lies in the beds of streams with high banks and subject to sudden floods, as there is about ten miles of almost impassable swamp between Digos and Malalag,

I decided to seek a more direct route, a little west of south from Digos to Macar, and, if possible, avoid the objectionable features of the first-named route. For this purpose Second Lieut. E. C. Bolton, Seventeenth Infantry, with a small detachment of Troop G, Fifteenth Cavalry, left Macar January 12, 1902, crossed the divide about 10 miles west of Malalag and arrived at Digos January 19, 1902, reporting route practicable for telegraph line. At his own request I subsequently sent Lieutenant Bolton back over the same route to explore it more thoroughly and to return over the route followed by Lieutenant Lear via Malalag, so that he could compare the advantages and disadvantages of the two routes. He reported in favor of the route located by him, and, as it avoided the swamps and beds of rivers, I adopted that as the one for the line. Explorations made since indicate that a wagon road can be built over it, the highest elevation is only about 300 feet. Work has been somewhat retarded for lack of tools and skilled linemen. Sergt. Fred Yandean is the only Signal Corps man here. As said before, he is in charge of the construction and has performed the duty faithfully, intelligently, and satisfactorily in the face of many discouraging conditions and obstacles. From Macar there should be no serious obstacles in the way of putting the line through along the foot hills south of the lakes and river to Cotabato.

Lieutenant Bolton, with a small detachment Seventeenth Infantry, left Macar the latter part of February to explore trail via Cran and Leback on the coast and thence across the mountains to Cotabato, and, if practicable, back from Cotabato south of the river and lakes to Macar.

He reached Cotabato but has not returned and I have not yet received his report. If the coast trail is impracticable or undesirable, I would recommend that a route be located by compass on solid ground and cut through, whether any existing trails can be found or not. That is what I am having done between Digos and Macar. It shortens the route and lessens the labor.

After the line to Cotabato is finished, I would recommend that the line be extended around the shore of the gulf via the mouth of the Tagum River and Cuabo to Mati.

In the month of December, 1901, Lieutenant Bolton, with one man Seventeenth Infantry, made a reconnaissance from Glan across the peninsula to Nuin, and around the beach back to Glan in search of a coal mine said to be near Nuin, to explore the country and learn something of the inhabitants. The journey was made successfully, but no coal was found, the jefe of Nuin disclaiming any knowledge of its location or existence. I doubt if he told the truth as he has lived there many years and I have heard from different sources that there is coal there and that the Spaniards used to mine it for their boats. Its location is probably being concealed in the interests of private parties who are waiting until Congress passes mining laws for the Philippines, when they will claim it.

February 21, 1902, Lieutenant Lear, with a detachment of 7 men of Troop G, Fifteenth Cavalry, left here on the chartered steam tug for the purpose of exploring the country from the Tagum River to Catel and from Catel to Cuabo for a route for a road or trail and to obtain information of the people and country through which he passed.

The tug ascended the Tagum about 6 miles, and from there the detachment proceeded by bancas to Mabatias, about 6 miles higher up the river. Thence they proceeded on foot to the headwaters of the Hijo River and across the mountains to Compostela, on the Agusan River, which is the main source of the Butuan River. A wagon road could be built from the Tagum River across the mountain, but from there to Compostela, two days' march, the country is level and marshy and the road would have to be made in the form of a dike, which would be very expensive. The valley of the Agusan in Spanish times pertained to the comandancia of Butuan, and the natural line of communication with the outside world is by bancas down the Agusan and Butuan rivers. The latter is navigable for river steamers for quite a distance from its mouth. The usual time required for a banca to ascend from the sea to Compostela is eleven days. Above that point boats can not go.

I am reliably informed that about ten years ago, during an earthquake, quite an extensive tract of country traversed by the river settled and sank from 20 to 60 feet, forming a lake, above the surface of which the tops of trees still project. From Compostela Lieutenant Lear proceeded to Catel over a very difficult trail and from there along the east coast back to Cuabo, where he arrived March 13, and embarked on the steam tug for this post. From the Hijo the country is inhabited by Mandayas, who are quite wild and uncivilized, and in times past have been accustomed to murder and rob their neighbors occasionally, but they have committed no depredations since I took command here that I have heard of.

To Lieuts. Ben Lear, jr., Fifteenth Cavalry, and E. C. Bolton, Seventeenth Infantry, and the men under their commands is due much credit for the energy, zeal, nerve,

and endurance with which they have accomplished, under great hardships, explorations hitherto regarded as too hazardous and impracticable to be attempted with small detachments. They have blazed the way for future explorers, have given us the only definite information we have of the interior of the country, and have made an all-land route for telegraph line to Cotabato possible. Detailed reports and maps of their explorations have been forwarded to brigade headquarters from time to time.

POSTS.

Mati and Macar are subposts of Davao. Each is located on a government reservation formerly occupied by the Spanish troops from about 1895 till 1899. At Macar there is only one building. It is about 30 by 40 feet, floors and walls of boards with corrugated iron roof and contains three rooms. New quarters for one troop are now being constructed. The water supply is good.

At Mati there are three government buildings with board floors and walls and nipa roofs. Additional quarters and storehouses will be needed for one company of infantry. Until recently detachments from Mati have been stationed at Caraga, Baganga, Catel, and other points. The water supply is good.

At Davao the temporary nipa shacks, built by the volunteers about two years ago, are in a tumble-down condition, and a commodious barrack is now being built for one troop of cavalry.

The detached nipa shacks, poorly adapted for barracks, are being torn down and material used for other purposes. The new barrack is located near the old channel of Davao River, on the old Spanish cuartel lot, that an unscrupulous Spaniard had appropriated to his own use, but which was recently recovered. It is an excellent site, high and dry, with an unobstructed view of the gulf. A bath house will be constructed in the river within a few yards of the barracks.

A nipa stable was erected for 100 horses soon after my assuming command here and I have recently had a large nipa shed built over the coal supply (about 600 tons) for our chartered steam tug. There are buildings used as hospital, storehouses, and offices, and one set of officers' quarters containing 6 rooms, kitchen and dining room, all with nipa roofs. All the officers at the post occupy this one building, but materials are on hand for another double set, which will be erected at an early date. Drinking water is obtained from wells and boiled, and the health of the command is good.

I have had the reservation boundaries at Davao and Macar defined by boards of officers, and those at Mati will be defined in a similar manner.

The maximum temperature at Davao from May 10, 1901, to March 31, 1902, was 98 degrees, minimum 68 degrees. Total rainfall 85.8 inches, year 1901.

The troops in this province at the present time are as follows:

Davao.—Medical department, 1 captain and surgeon U. S. Volunteers; Hospital Corps, 11 enlisted men; Corps of Engineers, 5 enlisted men; Troop G, Fifteenth Cavalry, 2 officers and 80 enlisted present; Seventeenth Infantry, 1 major, 1 battalion sergeant-major, and 1 sergeant Company L; post noncommissioned staff, 1 quartermaster-sergeant.

Macar.—Medical department, 1 contract surgeon; Engineer Corps, 1 enlisted man; Troop E, Fifteenth Cavalry, 3 officers and 86 enlisted; native scouts, 2; horses, 15; mules, 8.

Mati.—Seventeenth Infantry, Company L, 1 officer and 48 enlisted men; Engineer Corps, 1 enlisted man; native scouts, 5; mules, 2.

The Seventeenth Infantry, including myself, will be relieved at an early date by the Twenty-seventh Infantry.

The discipline of the troops is excellent, and they have performed their various duties in a satisfactory manner.

Capt. Edgar W. Howe, Seventeenth Infantry, has been in command on the east coast since October, 1901. He has shown ability and tact in dealing with the natives and has maintained good order and friendly relations with them.

Capt. H. W. Cooper, assistant surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, has been on duty as surgeon here since my arrival. He has performed his duties skillfully and successfully. No deaths have occurred, and the health of the command is good.

First Lieut. Charles E. McCullough, Fifteenth Cavalry, has been on duty as quartermaster, commissary, ordnance officer, and signal officer since September 30, 1901, and has commanded his troops since December 28, 1901. He has discharged the duties of these various positions faithfully, intelligently, and successfully.

The services of Lieutenants Bolton and Lear have been mentioned in the body of this report.

Very respectfully,

C. D. COWLES,
Major, Seventeenth Infantry, Commanding.

EXHIBIT 1.—*Conquest of Davao, Fourth district of Mindanao.*

It is almost three centuries that the Spanish flag has been waving in the Philippine Islands, and the natives, governed by the wise provincial laws, had arrived at a state of civilization and progress such that they were the admiration of the ancient people. The light of the sacred gospel had been shed upon the dense darkness of barbarous idolatry of the savages who, now united by common faith and the same customs, Tagalogs and Visayans, Ilocanos, and Bicolos, were all faithful subjects of the Spanish Government, there being found in almost all of the islands and provinces of the archipelago skillful artisans and brave soldiers, who, both on land and sea, were, almost without exception, long-suffering almost to heroism. The very neighboring province of Surigao, formerly called Caraga, had been distinguished more than once for valor of its sons, who not only prevented the Moros from attacking their coast towns, but, moreover, led by the parish priest and by the alcalde of their province, were accustomed to make war with the Malanaos, whom they dominated and from whom they collected taxes, in addition to freeing many hundreds of Christians that the Moros had enslaved in their frequent predatory excursions. Furthermore, the Bay of Davao was always under the despotic and barbarous dominion of the Moros, and the Dato Bago, a Maguindanao Moro, was the ruler of this part until the arrival of Oyanguren.

Jose Oyanguren, a native of Vergara, a province of Spain, was cognizant of these coasts, because of his trading, knew the points which Bago and the other datos were occupying in the bay. These lived ordinarily by piracy, being very much disposed to rob any ship that might anchor in the bay. Hence the few boats which came here always brought letters of authority from the sultan of Mindanao, but the authority of this officer was only nominal here, therefore a sloop which came here from Manila in 1845, with a cargo of merchandise, did not consider necessary the letters of recommendation of the sultan. When the said boat was anchored and prepared for the friendly barter of effects, the Dato Ongay, with many Moros, went aboard carrying several lots of wax to cover their treachery, carrying also their bolos concealed within, with which they murdered the crew when they were unwatchful, taking from the sloop all of its cargo under the orders of Dato Bago. When this happened there were on the beach three sailors belonging to the crew of the sloop, who, when they saw the terrible treachery on board, left the net with which they were fishing and pulled their boat to the island of Samal in order to go from there to the Hijo River, by which they went without detention to the Agusan, arriving without incident at Surigao, where they notified the government of what had happened here. Then it was that Oyanguren offered his services to the governor-general of the Philippines to conquer and punish the Moros of this bay as they deserved, which idea was approved of and authorized by Gen. Narciso Claveria and of the sultan of Mindanao, who could not approve of the criminality of the Moros.

On the 22d of May, 1838, when there had expired the term of one year given to the dato of the Bay of Davao in which to do homage to the sultan of Mindanao; organized under the dominion and government of Spain, to cease their depredations and rebelliousness, but this not being done, and on account of the previously mentioned act of atrocious piracy, it was determined that all the Bay of Davao and its limits should be incorporated definitely with the ancient province of Caraga, in order that the governor-general of the Philippines might take the most conducive measures for the repression of such happenings and for the civilization of its inhabitants. The Moros of Davao and coast of Sarangani were, therefore, separated from the other Moros of Mindanao by an agreed treaty, which was signed by the Sultan Escandar Cudarat Funda and the principal datos of the Rio Grande of Cotabato before Brig. Gen. Agustin Bocalan and Cayetano Figueroa, governor of Zamboanga, on the 15th of May, 1845.

When this was agreed upon Jose Oyanguren proceeded to the conquest of this bay with one brigantine and three sloops and other lesser expeditions who volunteered from the bounties of the coast of the Pacific and the province of Surigao, arriving and anchoring in Maripanao in September, 1848. This expedition numbered in all 70 people, counting the wife of Oyanguren and other women who came with her. It was a very small force to fight the many Moros that there were in this bay, for the Dato Bago alone, when he wished, could gather together more than 400 fighting men, but the Christians counted upon the superiority of their arms and in the protection of God whom they worshiped. All was favorable to them from the beginning, as even before entering the bay they caught a dugout of Moro pirates at doubling the cape of San Agustin, which prepared them, without doubt, for more important victories. Another of the things which animated them more also was the welcome and friendliness which the inhabitants of this bay extended to them, as

they were very much worried by the robberies and outrages of the Moros. Hence, when they understood that Oyanguren came solely to make war with the Moros, he became at once in touch with them and they favored his enterprise well from the beginning, although they did not do so openly for fear that Oyanguren might leave them later on the horns of the bull. But as soon as they saw that his intention was to definitely end the barbarous government of the Moros in order to establish in its stead a new stable Christian government all then declared themselves in his favor, there being not a few Bagobos who delivered many Moro heads to Oyanguren for the reward of 30 ordinary plates, which they received for every one of them. Nevertheless, the conquest was a matter of difficulty at the beginning. The Moros of Davao had cannon in abundance. In the part which is to-day called the "Old Town" they had a fort in which they could impede the entrance to the river of any of the boats which Oyanguren brought. A little above this point, called Tagum, where the cemetery is to-day, Bago had another fortification with cannon and men who were under his immediate orders, all of whom had the river free to communicate with the Moros of Maa and Lapanday and they worked as continuously as they could to prevent the success of Oyanguren. He, however, was not sleeping. His people were not many for so many Moros, but they were very faithful and truly resolved to conquer or die in the attempt. Having had three killed the first and only time in which they tried to enter the river it made them change their plans, and Oyanguren understood that he must attack from land. However, he first sent out some scouts who explored at night and hid themselves in the day, observing the movements, how many there were, and what positions they occupied, returning at the end of a week to Oyanguren to give an account of all they had seen and observed. After this scouting the first thing which Oyanguren did was to build a fort in Santa Ana, a point on the beach, to deposit and secure his impedimenta. This was finished in three months, and they opened a road through the middle of the swamp which lay beyond the fort at Santa Ana, in order to pass the meadow where was the fort of Dato Bago, on the site of the present cemetery. In this road the Samales worked faithfully to the end, their work being paid for by Oyanguren with two yards of cloth for every yard of road which they made. The principal object of this road was to be able to take by land a pair of cannon, with their caissons, which were conveniently located on the hillside of the present cemetery, that they might easily bombard the fortifications of Dato Bago, the principal ruler of this bay. In order to complete this road, it was necessary to fight continuously with the Moros, who day and night molested the soldiers and civilians who were occupied on the work. But far from stopping it after having left many dead on the field, they retired to the fort of their Dato Bago, which was bombarded for three days and then abandoned by the Dato Bago and those who were with him, escaping up the river in dugouts at night as far as Lapanday. Dato Bago, upon receiving the messenger whom Oyanguren sent him before the battle that he should surrender or leave, replied that before leaving his ranch he would bury the point of his campilan in his heart, escaped, however, leaving not only his ranch but also his cannon in the power of the Christians, who were thus able to reenforce their artillery and carry forward the conquest of the entire bay. The number of cannon captured in Davao by Oyanguren amounted to 13. In the other rivers the Moros hardly had more than some crudely made wooden guns. The most rebellious element was that at Tagum, to where had fled Bago, Madaoin, Hijo Padada, who had to surrender themselves before the passing of one year, although their submission was always a feigned one. Oyanguren, who now knew their duplicity, should now have cleared this bay of such bad guests, but he contented himself with establishing his business, having delivered the government of the district which he had just conquered to Valerio Navarro, who was an officer, formerly a captain, and who governed without disagreeable incident on the part of the Moros as did his successors Gonzales, Castro and Solis, but it did not happen thus with Jose Pinzon. He was the fifth governor of Davao after Oyanguren, who, understanding the necessity of reducing the mountain tribes to civilization, began by making a town of Mandayas, in Tagum, and in order also to settle the fertile meadows which that fine river waters, this being so far advanced that the Governor Pinzon went there to inaugurate it, but the Moros were determined that this should not be, and that the Mandayas should continue subject to them; hence they did not hesitate to assassinate the governor, which they did on the 18th of March, 1861, in the very town of Tagum, to which they invited him with the object, as they said, to deliver to him a woman that they had chosen for him. This was not true, but only a net which they spread in order to assassinate him treacherously, caring only to impede the settling of the

Mandayas, but also that they should believe that the moment had come for the recovery of the government of all the Bay of Davao. When Pinzon was dead they horribly mutilated his body, sending an arm to the Moros of Matian and a leg to those in Padada, with the notice that they should prepare themselves to all go against Davao, whose governor they had just killed. The situation of this seat of government was very delicate on this occasion, as with the governor there had been assassinated also the soldiers who went to Tagum as oarsmen in his boat and there did not remain here more than the section of the civil guard which was commanded by one Reyes Antonio. He took the entire command and government of all the district and gathered together the men of the town, determined not only to defend themselves against the Moros should they come to attack Davao, but that they would go out to attack them as soon as they knew where they were. The population of Davao had then only four small wards and from each one of these were chosen 15 men, making 60 altogether. These and 17 soldiers of the guard left Davao, led by Capt. Antonio Cervantes, a captain of one of the sloops of Oyanguren, and one of the most distinguished conquerors of the Moros of this bay. The said Cervantes had had notice that the Moros of Padada, obedient to the design of those of Tagum to come and take Davao, were now in Tagulaya, distant but six hours from this town, with their dato, Diamoro. He was awaiting the arrival of the other Moro allies in order that they could continue to Davao, but before they arrived there the Christians obliged them to accept battle. It was very spirited, each side fighting with great bravery, but the Moros could not withstand the attack of the Spaniards, fleeing in rout as soon as they saw their dato was wounded. The Bagobos, who were witnesses to the battle, remaining neutral, having come out to see the conflict between the Moros and the Spanish, and seeing how the victory was declared in favor of the Spanish, also drew blood with their campilanes, killing the Moros who remained wounded on the field. After this blow neither the Moros of Padada, nor those of Tagum, nor those of any other part attempted to go against Davao. The Spanish remained in peaceable possession of all this district with a naval station in the town and detachment of civil guards in Hijo, Digos, and Melal in order to prevent the Moros advancing any projects, as they might do, being in communication with the Moros of the lakes of the interior who might come down the river Padada. Governor Carrillo, who succeeded Pinzon, with the object of avenging his death and to assure peace here, wished to clear all the Moros from this bay, which could easily have been done, aided by the military expedition which came from Cotabato through the interior in 1862, at the order of the commanding general of Mindanao, one Tenorio, but the worst Moros having already been punished, the others were seemingly so submissive that he permitted them to remain here as subjects of the Spanish Government, not as Moros, as they had been cut off from the other Moros in 1845, through the wish of their sultan, but as the other savages of the district. But it was true that the Moros here had never merited the confidence of any governor, as they had always been deceivers and traitors, never wishing to work in their towns and plantations. Averse to civilization, they had been the greatest obstacle which had retarded the reduction and civilization of other tribes of savages who have accustomed themselves to live in the mountains in order to be free of the rapacity of the Moros. These do not number more than 5,000 in all the district, but there is hardly a river, no matter how small, which does not have its groups of Moros. These groups or settlements only consist at times of two or three nipa houses, but however much the number of these may be reduced they remain always slaves of the datos. Of these there are few who know or can read the Koran, but this does not prevent many of them acting as priests, having certain importance among their people and also making proselytes among the other neighboring races of savages, especially among the Mandayas, from whom they take their women and slaves; but as they acquire the people by violence and deceit, those slaves whom they wish to retain they make Moros like themselves in order that they may not escape nor become Christians under the penalty of death.

Upon the Spanish Government leaving here in 1899, these Moros believed they were going to be again owners of lives and property as before, being under the dominion of Spain, and they were plotting to take possession of Davao on a set day and to take the women and possessions of the Visayans, when there providentially arrived the troops of the Government of North America, who came to take this district after having become in possession of Zamboanga and Cotabato, the new government being received here with joy by all the Christians, they seeing in it the guarantee of order and peace which they so much desired.

MATEO GIBBERT, S. J.

EXHIBIT 2.—*Names of Spanish governors of Davao, and data furnished by Señor Teodoro Palma Gil, presidente of Davao, Mindanao, P. I.*

Jose Oyanguren, 1848, first governor with the title of alcalde. He conquered Davao, governing in a civil capacity the province of New Guipuzcoa, which comprised the territory from Sarangani to Cape Cauti, on the Pacific coast. During his time the town of Davao was known as Nueva Vergara. He was relieved in 1852 by Valero Navarro, civil governor, with the title of alcalde. He was relieved in 1854 by Jose Maria Gonzalez, captain of infantry, the first military governor.

Jose Maria Solis, 1856, captain of infantry.

Luciano Castro, 1858, captain of infantry.

Jose Pinzon, 1860, captain of infantry, assassinated by the Tagum Moros.

Enrique G. Carrillo, 1861, comandante (major) of infantry. During his time the towns of the Pacific coast from Cape Tagobon were set apart and were attached to the district or province of Surigao. But the whole territory from Sarangani Bay to Cape Tagobon on the Pacific remained as the fourth district of Mindanao for purposes of general government. During Carrillo's governorship the naval station was located at Davao. This man brought with him a company of infantry, and a detachment was stationed at Digos as a base for the operations in connection with the opening of the road to Lake Buluan. Carrillo was a zealous official and it may be said that to him was due the submission of all the tribes, for he punished severely the Moros who attempted to dominate Davao and opposed the advent of civilization.

Pedro Ybanez de la Guardia, 1864, major of artillery.

Antonio G. del Canto, 1867, major of infantry. The name of Vergara fell into disuse and Davao was substituted for it. The whole district remained the fourth district of Mindanao. The town was moved to its present location during this time. This man was extremely harsh and many of the inhabitants had to leave the place to escape the severity of his rule.

Francisco Sanchez, 1869, major of infantry, military governor.

Jose Maria Ventura, 1871, major of infantry. The civil police force was superseded by a company of penados, called "disciplinarios," under the command of officers and noncommissioned officers of the army.

Timoteo Rodriguez, 1874, major of infantry, a man of justice and honor and beloved by the people.

Jose Coris, 1876, major of infantry, who was in command a very short time, because of the quarrel that he had with the commander of the naval station.

Emilio Lopez, 1877, captain of the "disciplinarios," acting governor until the arrival of Faustino Villa Abille, 1878, major of the guardia civil, proprietary governor. He gained the sympathy of the savages because of his kindness. Owing to his tactfulness there were formed settlements known as rancherias, and later Christian towns, appointing chiefs from among those who formed the settlements. He prohibited human sacrifices and slavery, punishing with a strong hand those found guilty of these practices.

Joaquin Rajal, 1880, major of infantry.

Angel Rodriguez Ussua, 1883, major of infantry. In this time were discontinued the naval station and the company of "disciplinarios," which were replaced by a small gunboat and a company of infantry as a town garrison.

Julio Alvarez Sutomayor, 1884, major of infantry. Because of the dispute between Spain and Germany on account of the occupation of the Carolinas, the commands of Mati and Glan were created. There were established several detachments of infantry at various points of the province.

Maximino Lillo y Garcia, 1887, major of cavalry. The boundaries of the command of Mati were determined, being from the Hijo River in Davao to Cape Catarman or Paticangan on the Pacific. This was under the order of the Davao governor. Lillo was a very able governor. He colonized Malalag, opening a horse trail to that point and to the Tagum, where he placed a detachment, which reported great benefit to all, for it opened the commerce of the Tagum and the Moros remained intimidated and formed towns in their respective localities without molesting anyone.

Domingo Gijon Moragrega, 1890, major of infantry. An incompetent governor, controlled by his satellites, who made him commit many abuses which produced discord in the pueblo. In his time the detachment of infantry was discontinued and various detachments at other places were withdrawn, establishing in their places a section of the tercio civil de policia, which was of no benefit to the government, but on the contrary provoked the hatred of the people by its abuses. This governor left, to the delight of the inhabitants, and was relieved by Cesareo Ruis Capilla, 1892, lieutenant-colonel; governed three months. At his own request he was relieved by Silverio Ros, 1892, major of infantry. The town called him the hunter, for he passed his time hunting deer, giving no attention to the pueblo nor his duties. He was

relieved by Jose Tomasetti, 1893, major of infantry. An effeminate and pusillanimous man, allowing himself to be guided by those surrounding him. Father Saturnino Urios, a Jesuit missionary, took advantage of the situation to give impulse to the mission, and it was owing to the enterprise of this priest, with the aid of the governor, that the Moros and other infidels of Davao became Christianized. The departure of this governor was not regretted by the people, for, as has been said, he had no will of his own, a quality which caused him to commit many abuses.

Bartholome Garcia, 1897, major of infantry. In his time the Spanish Government in the Philippines ceased. He left in January, 1899.

APPENDIX 7.

REPORT COMMANDING OFFICER ZAMBOANGA.

ZAMBOANGA, P. I., *September 16, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF MINDANAO AND JOLO.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith my last quarterly report as commander of second district of Mindanao and Jolo, and in this connection I have deemed it advisable to give, in outline, a history of the district and its occupation by United States forces for the information of those who are to follow.

Very respectfully,

JAMES S. PETTIT,
Major, First U. S. Infantry, Commanding.

ZAMBOANGA.

The Spanish general, Montero, in command of the department, began to arm two companies of "voluntarios" in January, 1899, as he said "to protect the people after the troops were withdrawn." One of these companies was commanded by Melanio Calixto, a greaser from a Spanish gunboat; the other company, composed of "deportados" from the Colonia San Ramon, was placed in command of one Juan Ramos, a convict serving a life sentence for murder, but who was on parole under charge of (commanding) Colonel Oloris. These companies were armed by the Spaniards. In May Ramos attacked the town, burning part of it; the Spaniards built trenches and burned away part of the town to give clear field of defense. Fighting continued in a desultory way until the *Leon XIII* arrived to take away the Spanish garrison, late in May. General Montero was wounded on the wharf while embarking, and died of his wounds in Manila. One Vincente Alvarez, son of a Moro-Spanish interpreter, was chosen presidente of the "Republic of Zamboanga," and the ball opened. Alvarez was styled "General commanding the first district of Mindanao," and Calixto, the aforesaid greaser, was made "general" and second in command. Torrejon commanded the infantry and Ramos was chief of artillery, which consisted of 7 machine guns taken from a Spanish gunboat at Masinloc. Zamboanga had been burned except the two streets along the water front. Alvarez first had his headquarters at Santa Maria, but fearing the United States gunboats patrolling, he moved his court to Mercedes. The church at Zamboanga was sacked and Luis Lim, a mestizo, paraded the street in the priests' robes. People were robbed of their carabaos, rice, poultry, etc.; women were invited (?) to bailes and kept for days. Goy, Bautista, and Lorenzo were murdered by Alvarez's directions. They were perfectly innocent of any crime. Tribute was levied upon the Chinamen. Barrios & Co. alone paid over \$5,000 Mexican to save their property. This state of affairs existed until November, when Isidoro Midel, formerly captain of Tetuan, got the local people together, sent Calixto, who was at Mercedes, an invitation to bring in the arms and cannon to defend Tetuan. Calixto brought them in, and when near the church at Tetuan Midel turned out his guard, and instead of giving Calixto "present arms," he gave the command to fire. Calixto was killed, his men scattered, and his guns captured. Midel then went aboard the U. S. S. *Custine*, in the harbor of Zamboanga, and told Commander Very what he had done; also told him that as soon as he saw the United States flag at the fort he could land his marines and occupy the place, which was done, Midel having turned the town over to the United States. Mandi, a Moro dato, also had his fighting men out in vintas and offered their assistance and services. Although Alvarez had professed great friendship for Mandi, and lived at his house

for a long time, he began war on him. Mandi's houses were destroyed and Mandi fought them a battle near Curnan, killing a number of insurgents and capturing a lot of their women and children. He treated the latter with great kindness, and returned all of them to Zamboanga. Alvarez, who was in the tower of the church observing the landing, had men prepared to kill Mandi, but Mandi did not give him an opportunity. After Commander Very landed his men a meeting was held at the commanding general's quarters and Isidoro Midel was appointed presidente provincial, which office he held until February, 1901, when he was relieved at his own request. He never received a cent of salary during this time. Midel immediately began to gather up arms and turn them into the United States.

The gunboats went to Jolo for assistance and two companies of the Twenty-third Infantry, under command of Captain Nichols, were sent here to garrison the place. November 16, 1899, was "occupation day." Alvarez and his gang had left for parts unknown. The natives had to be fed and the country was destitute. Midel and Mandi were permitted to have armed escorts of 10 men and to pass the outposts at any time, and the guard was turned out for them.

This was the state of affairs when the Thirty-first U. S. Volunteer Infantry arrived here on the *City of Peking* and *Brutus* December 5, 1899, under command of Colonel Pettit. The troops were landed at once and 50 men of Company D, Thirty-first Infantry, under command of Captain Cabell, were put aboard the *Churruca* and *Isabela de Basilan* was taken without any resistance. Captain Cabell was appointed governor of Basilan. The two companies of the Twenty-third Infantry returned to Jolo. Cotabato was next occupied under command of Major Brett, Thirty-first Infantry, with Companies E, F, G, and H, Thirty-first Infantry. Company E was sent to Paran-paran, and a detachment to Polloc. The Moros were in complete control. Nearly all the Filipinos were killed or driven away, and none of them would have been left if the Americans had delayed occupation much longer.

The *Brutus* took Major Liggett, with Companies I and L of his battalion, to Davao. General Bates accompanied them and visited the east coast as far as Baganga. General Bates left for Manila December 20, 1899, and did not return. The command of the district, which included the Sulu Archipelago, fell to Col. J. S. Pettit, Thirty-first Infantry, who exercised it until it was made a department in April, 1900, under command of Brig. Gen. W. A. Kobbé. Malabang was occupied by Company D, Twenty-third Infantry, Captain Hagadorn, in September, 1900, and Tukuran by Company H, Thirty-first U. S. Volunteer Infantry, in October, 1900. Captain White opened the trail across the trocha at Tukuran and began at once on the telegraph line from Tukuran to Lintago. Baganga was occupied by Company M, Thirty-first Infantry, in January, 1900, and Company M evacuated Baganga in April, 1901; Lieutenant Danforth remained there alone until September, 1901. Caraga and Mati were occupied by L Company, Thirty-first Infantry, Captain Gilmer, until December, 1900, when they were turned over to the civil authorities and abandoned.

The Thirty-first U. S. Volunteer Infantry was concentrated at Zamboanga and left the department on the *Hancock* on May 14, 1901. The troops in the district were replaced by companies of the Tenth Infantry, Fifteenth Cavalry, and Twenty-third Infantry.

The cable was laid by Colonel Allen, Chief Signal Officer, on the *Burnside*, from Tukuran to Zamboanga on February 28, 1901, from Zamboanga to Jolo a few days later, and from Tukuran to Malabang and Paran-paran in July, 1901.

In accordance with authority from the Civil Commission, the organization of the province into a single municipality was completed in June, and the funds and records were turned over to the civil authorities on July 1, 1901.

The padres left before the storm (March, 1899). They began to return in June, 1900, and they went back to their same parishes. The church at Zamboanga was used for a few months as a storehouse for quartermaster property, and troops also occupied the convents until the padres arrived. The padres have made claims for all buildings occupied by the United States.

The establishing of schools was begun in January, 1900; schoolhouses were repaired and built, and native teachers hired. Fourteen schools were soon in working order, and books and stationery were sent by the United States Government from Manila. Schools were started promptly at all posts occupied by troops. Soldiers were detailed to teach English, and a good deal of progress was made in that direction. In January, 1901, Mr. Colton, district superintendent of schools, arrived and took charge of all schools in the department, leaving the post commanders only the task to provide the money to pay the expenses.

The custom-house was established here in January, 1900, with Lieutenant Lindsey, Thirty-first Infantry, as collector. A postmaster came on the *City of Peking* with the Thirty-first Infantry in December, 1899. Collectors of internal revenue were appointed in January, 1900, soon after our occupation.

MOROS.

The Moros are savages congregated in various tribes under various datos and sultans, without much law and order other than the will of their masters and chiefs. It has been our policy not to interfere with the internal management of the tribes, except in cases of life and death. The policy of the slavery question has been:

I. A declaration that every person who was free in April, 1899, the date of United States ownership, is now free and must be given his or her freedom if desired.

II. All persons other than Moros must be set at liberty at once. We believe this has been done.

III. The raiding, capturing, and invading of small tribes by larger and more powerful ones is prohibited, and all persons in captivity taken in this manner must be set free.

IV. All trading in slaves or arms between the different island peoples is prohibited, and all boats found containing slaves or arms, without a permit in writing from some United States officer in authority, stating the number of people, arms, and their destination, will be confiscated or destroyed at pleasure of the United States authority.

The "Bates treaty" has never been held as of any force in Mindanao or Basilan. Basilan was declared by the district commander not to be part of the Sulu Archipelago. This was also in line with our policy of alienating and detaching tribes from the sultan's temporal control to weaken his power. There are many sultans in Mindanao, but none of them, except possibly some on the lake, have any power. After the Spaniards conquered Uto in 1887 they had very little trouble in controlling the Moros. Dato Piang told me that the Spaniards were very easy on slavery at first, but afterwards they got very hard and were preparing to abolish it.

The Spaniards kept small detachments at many points along the coast; in many cases the soldiers were "Voluntarios." We should have detachments at Marigosa, Tubig, Glan, Mati, and either Caraga or Baganga.

Sultan Malalis, at Dinas, in conjunction with two other Moros, Sulug and Sulungan, continue to give us trouble with their acts of piracy. Dato Maseribi, a very good man, reported to the commanding officer at Tucuran in July that Sulungan had attacked a vinta of his and killed one man and had taken captive one man and two women. This was reported to me. Major Febiger was ordered to take the *Detroit* and a detachment to Dinas to investigate and punish Malalis. Upon reaching Dinas he found that Malalis had sent him an insulting message and had taken to the hills. His rancheria, consisting of four nipa houses, was burned, his son was captured, and one large vinta. They were taken to Cotabato.

Sulungan is a bad Jolo Moro, and is a relative, I believe, of the Sultan. He ought to be caught and punished for piracy. I wrote a letter requesting the cooperation of the commanding officer, third district, but have heard nothing from it. Rajah Muda Mandi promised me he would catch him.

The Tirurayes, a degenerate, cowardly race, living south of Cotabato, have been easy prey for these scoundrels. They will sell their children for a little rice, and it is very easy to capture them and carry them off. We had at one time nine Moros in jail at Cotabato for kidnaping and trafficking in children.

We would have broken up this nefarious business before this, but did not have the boat transportation. I will repeat a recommendation I have made, that one or two gunboats should be constantly on patrol duty between Marigosa, Punta Flecha, and the mouth of the Rio Grande and down the coast for about 40 miles, with instructions to overhaul every vinta and capture and destroy all those containing arms or slaves without a permit from some commanding officer. The Spaniards never permitted them to engage in that sort of traffic, and they expect to be harshly dealt with when caught. A half dozen captures would probably break up the business. June 28 eight Moros were killed near Taviran under very suspicious circumstances and apparently without cause. I went to Cotabato on the *Aeolus*, and in conjunction with Major Febiger investigated the case (the report is on file in your office). In my opinion Piang was not directly implicated in the affair, but approved of it after it occurred. It would not be good policy to make an enemy of Piang for this, but I think it an excellent opportunity to stop future affairs of that kind by notifying these datos that hereafter they must not kill, maim, or torture their subjects or slaves, under penalty of being arrested and tried by the United States courts.

Conditions on the east coast remain the same as usual; Lieutenant Danforth has been in charge. Now that the commanding officer at Davao has a launch he can visit the towns and regulate affairs. The changing of garrisons will necessitate the initiation of the new people into the policy to be adopted, but the subdistrict commanders, Major Febiger and Major Liggett, remain.

Very respectfully,

JAMES S. PETTIT,
Major, First Infantry, Commanding Second District,
Mindanao and Jolo.

APPENDIX 8.

CAPTAIN PERSHING'S REPORT ON MORO AFFAIRS.

MAY, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

(Through military channels.)

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report respecting the execution of instructions received by me at Iligan, P. I., by cable April 16 in connection with the transmission of General Chaffee's message to the Moros on the north of Lake Lanao, and to inclose accordingly copies of all letters sent and received. Upon receipt of the proclamation I had a translation made and sent a copy to each of the following Moros: Ahmai-Manibilang, the sultans of Madaya, Bacolod, Toros, Marahui, Dansalan, Guimba, Marantao, and Taraca. With each copy I sent a personal letter of transmittal, referring to the friendship existing between us and to previous conversations I had held with most of them respecting our relations and our desire to remain at peace with them. These letters were delivered by one of the datos of Marahui. In reply I received a letter from Manibilang and one from the datos of Marahui jointly, which, as I have learned later, included some of the sultans to whom I had written.

When General Davis visited Iligan early in April he told me that it was the intention of the military authorities to punish certain datos on the south side of the lake for their depredations and for killing our men, and told me to do all I could to convince all Moros on the north side that we had no intention of molesting any of our friends. I did so by fully explaining the situation there and our purpose with respect to it to the leading Moros I met in Iligan, and invariably they replied that we had just cause for the position we had taken.

In view of the strained relations existing at this time on the south side, and to the difficulty in making them clearly understand by letter, as well as to disabuse their minds of certain rumors they had heard and believed, I thought it best to go to Lake Lanao, if possible, and have a conference with the leading Moros there, and I so wrote Manibilang and others. It was not until April 28, however, that their invitation came. I left the following day, and upon arriving at Marahui in the evening found them very much excited and frightened. All sorts of rumors were afloat among them about our designs; one to the effect that we were preparing 1,500 men at Iligan to move against them, and soon. Many had packed up their household goods ready to move and had sent their women and children to their forts and other rancherias.

The next day, Monday, April 28, was market day at Madaya, and we held a conference of about an hour and a half there during the market, all the leading North Lake Moros being present, as well as many Moros from other sections of the lake, including Linok, Bayan, Ganosi, Taraca, and Aremain. I explained the meaning of General Chaffee's proclamation, corrected many false rumors and impressions, and assured them that none who were friendly to us would be molested, but that it was firmly the intention of the Americans to go where they pleased throughout this island. The Moros are, as is well known, very jealous of their religion, and, like all Mohammedans, stand ready to defend their faith by force of arms. What I have always said to them was given authoritative force by what General Chaffee said on this subject in his proclamation. At the conclusion all, except some of those from the South Lake country, expressed themselves as satisfied that no general war was to be waged and that they could proceed unmolested in their religion and in the pursuit of their lawful and peaceful occupations.

To explain the relation Manibilang bears to the North Lake Moros, it will be in place here to state that the part of Lake Lanao from Bacayauan, on the west coast, to Dalama, on the east coast of the lake, is called Bayabao, and is ruled over in a general way by the sultan of Aremain, recently deceased, and his family is intimately related to the family of Manibilang, formerly sultan of Madaya, and the latter seems to practically control this section. After stating that he and his people were relieved to hear what had been said, he told me he would go on Tuesday to Aremain and report the conference and felt sure that all the Moros of Bayabao would remain friendly. On May 9 the eldest son of the late sultan of Aremain, and the probable successor to the sultanate, came to Iligan, no doubt at Manibilang's suggestion, where he gave further assurances of friendship and good will and was presented with a flag. I am, therefore, still of the opinion that the Moros on the northern side of the lake will remain friendly and will not join the Moros on the south side against the Americans.

There will be noticed among the letters herewith, received from Lanao, one from the datos of Marahui requesting that no troops be sent there. This letter was written by Maciricampo and the conference included also some of the minor sultans on the north side. During my stay at Madaya, however, the subject of the occupation of Marahui by Americans came up in conversation, and I asked Manibilang why they objected. He said that so far as he and some others were concerned; they did not object, but that many of his people were still afraid, so the question up there seems to be one of gaining and holding their confidence. One Moro chieftain compared the average Moro to an untamed horse, and said if one attempted to ride him at once he would probably buck, but if one went at him gently and gained his confidence, he could be ridden without difficulty.

These letters, to which I have not particularly referred, are arranged consecutively and explain themselves.

Very respectfully,

JOHN J. PERSHING,
Captain, Fifteenth Cavalry.

Inclosures: Letter and copy of proclamation, marked "A;" letter to Ahmai-Manibilang, April 18, marked "B;" letter to Sultan of Bacolod and others, April 18, marked "C;" letter from Ahmai-Manibilang, April 26, marked "D;" letter from Maciricampo, April 26, marked "E;" letter to Ahmai-Manibilang, May 1, marked "F;" letter to Ahmai-Manibilang, May 4, marked "G;" letter from Ahmai-Manibilang, May 6, marked "H."

A.

O. B., CEBU, CEBU, *April 16, 1902.*

Captain PERSHING.

(Through Commanding Officer, Iligan.)

Following communicated for your information, by command Brigadier-General Wade, Cebu, April 14, 1902:

"SIR: I inclose herewith a copy of communication or proclamation, sent to the datos whose names are mentioned in it, and several others of the principal datos of the lake."

"This communication was translated into Moro and dispatched by runners. General Chaffee is very anxious to avoid a war with the Moros about Lake Lanao and wishes everything done that can be done to allay their suspicions and quiet their apprehensions as to our object in exploring their country; on the other hand, they must be made to understand that the sovereignty of the Government is complete and supreme, that assassination and robbery will not be tolerated, and such acts can only involve them in a war, the results of which will certainly be disastrous to them. As you have spent some time in Mindanao, and have been brought into contact with some of the datos of Lake Lanao, the General has sent you his proclamation, which he wishes carefully translated into Moro, and dispatched by trusty messengers to such datos as are accessible from your end of the lake.

"With this proclamation you are authorized to send such assurances of your own as to the peaceful and kindly intentions of the Government toward the Moros in general as may serve to promote the object General Chaffee has in view. The nature of such communication can be easily determined from the subject-matter of the proclamation herewith. Instructions have been issued for the movement of a column of about 1,200 men from Malabang toward the lake, which will begin about the 25th of this month, for the purpose of punishing the datos concerned in the murder of our soldiers. It is thought that this information may be of importance to you in your correspondence with the Moros. It is, of course, desired that this movement be understood as directed against the offending datos only, and that there is no intention to molest anyone else, hoping by this intimation to prevent a combination, or, in other words, to separate the peaceful from the hostile datos, and thus prevent a general war. You will report in writing the execution of these instructions, and will submit to General Chaffee a copy of any correspondence you may have with the Moros."

Very respectfully,

J. P. SANGER, *Chief of Staff.*

^a See page 485 for communication referred to.

B.

Letter to my friend, Ahmai-Manibilang, and to the Sultan of Madaya:

I have received a telegram from the military governor of the islands, in which he directs me to communicate to you and all Moros of Lanao, either personally or by letter, a proclamation issued by him in Malabang, April 13, and accordingly I am sending you a copy of this proclamation translated into your own language.

I have sent word to many, and have advised personally all the North Lanao Moros that I have seen recently of the action of certain Moros on the south side of the lake in opposing the American troops near Malabang and even killing American soldiers.

I have explained that we intended to punish the guilty datos, and all of my Moro friends have agreed that it should be done and that the Americans are right. I now write to you, my personal friend, what I have told many others. There is nothing else to do except to punish the sultans and datos referred to in the General's proclamation unless they accede to the demands made by the General; but I wish to reassure all of you that in punishing these bad Moros we have no intention whatever of molesting our true friends, and I wish you to communicate to all your people what I say and what is said in the General's proclamation.

If it is convenient I should like to visit the North Lake rancherias again and personally explain, more clearly than I can write it, this proclamation and the desire of the Americans for friendship and peace. I should like to go to see you on Monday (April 21) if you will send me word.

I am sending this letter with others by my old friend, Yanit, dato of Marahui, to whom I have explained the proclamation and this letter. With remembrances to your family and to that of your nephew, Ahmai-Sangacala, I hope to see you all again as soon as possible.

Your friend,

JOHN J. PERSHING,
Captain, Fifteenth Cavalry.

Iligan, April 18, 1902.

C.

To my friends, the Sultans of Bacolod, Toros, Marantao, Dansalan, and Guimba:

I have sent to Ahmai-Manibilang a copy of a proclamation to the Moros of Lanao, issued at Malabang, April 13, by the military governor of the Philippines, and inclose herewith a copy for you also. On account of our friendship I request that you advise all Moros in neighboring rancherias of this proclamation and the friendship which the military governor feels toward all the Moros. I told you many of these things respecting the intentions of the Americans when I visited you. I desire to visit the lake again, as I can then explain personally, and more clearly than I can write it, all this proclamation means. I again assure you of my personal friendship and that of Americans in general for the Moros, and hope it may last for all time.

Your warm friend,

JOHN J. PERSHING,
Captain, Fifteenth Cavalry.

Iligan, April 18, 1902.

NOTE.—A copy of this letter was addressed to each of the above sultans, all of whom I had met, and practically the same was written to the sultan of Taraca, but I had never met him, and the letter was modified accordingly.

J. J. P.

D.

Letter from Ahmai-Manibilang, of Madaya, to my friend, Captain Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry:

I am very much distressed, as I have heard that the Americans have arrived at Ganosi. Our women and children were frightened when they heard that the Americans had reached Lanao. I shall be very sorry if they come to Madaya, because you well know there are none here with bad intentions toward the Americans. The Spaniards always liked us because we never did them any harm, and they never molested us nor our rancherias. If it is true that we are friends, think before you do us any harm.

Received at Iligan April 26, 1902.

NOTE.—In this letter Manibilang evidently refers particularly to the Moros of the rancheria of Madaya, for as a matter of fact the Spaniards were stubbornly opposed by the Moros in general on the north of Lake Lanao.

J. J. P.

E.

Letter from Maciricampo to his friend at Iligan, Captain Pershing:

God be praised.

I have to inform you that all the datos of Laguna de Lanao (Marahui and vicinity) have held a conference and all join in requesting you as commanding officer not to come here with troops. You may come without troops.

Your friend,

MACIRICAMPO OF MARAHUI.

Received April 26, 1902.

F.

To my friend, Ahmai-Manibilang, of Madaya:

I have just received a telegram from General Davis, dated the day before yesterday, sent to me at Sungut from Iligan. He is now near Ganosi with the troops, and says that many sultans and datos have come to his camp to visit him, including the sultan of Ganosi, Pualas, Gadungan, and Madumba, all of whom say they desire peace; and as the sultan of Madumba is now a friend of the Americans I think we can go to the other side of the lake by way of Madumba and Ganosi to meet the General, and if you can go advise me at once.

The General says if you are friendly with the sultan of Bayan that you should advise him to accede to his demands and avoid war and its consequences for his people. I write you hoping that you may influence these Moros who lack confidence in Americans to believe as you do respecting our desire for peace.

The General says further in his telegram that he does not intend to send the troops from Ganosi to the northern part of the lake. Advise all the people of Bayabao.

May you live many years and your people always be at peace.

Your friend,

JOHN J. PERSHING,
Captain, Fifteenth Cavalry.

Pantar (or Sungut), May 1, 1902.

NOTE.—I was returning to Iligan when the above letter was written from Pantar (crossing of the Agus River), where I received a copy of a telegram from Major Pettit to Colonel Duggan, containing what is set forth herein.

J. J. P.

G.

Letter to my friend, Ahmai-Manibilang, of Madaya:

I take pleasure in advising you that I have received a telegram from General Davis that he is at present with the troops on the banks of the lake at Bayan. In a fight at Bayan the sultan and Rajah Muda were killed; also the sultan of Pandapatan and all the principal men. The General says you and your people should not be frightened, as he does not intend to disturb the Moros on the northern part of the lake. He wishes that all the datos and principal men of Bayabao come to see him, and I wish to know when they will be ready to go with me across the lake. The General wishes to be at peace with you all.

Please transmit this notice to all your people, that they may understand and not be alarmed.

Always, your friend,

JOHN J. PERSHING,
Captain, Fifteenth Cavalry.

Iligan, May 14, 1902.

H.

Letter from your friend Ahmai-Manibilang to my friend Captain Pershing, Iligan:

I am very glad to know that the general has reached Onayan (Bayan), and has killed many datos who were opposed to him. When the general has dispatched all the bad Moros over there then you can go there with your friends, the datos of Bayabao, from here. Ahmai-Sangacala is not here, and it is difficult to reach Madumba.

Received at Iligan May 6, 1902.

NOTE.—I sent Ahmai-Sangacala across the lake with a message to General Davis on May 3, 1902, and to ascertain whether or not it would be safe to cross the lake.

APPENDIX 9.

NOTES ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COUNTRY INHABITED BY NONCHRISTIANS IN MINDANAO AND THE NEIGHBORING ISLANDS.

All this vast region inhabited by Moros and pagans is now under military supervision and control as respects public administration and government, save customs and internal-revenue taxation, public instruction, forest supervision and protection, and the administration of justice in certain major civil and criminal cases.

The military sphere of influence also embraces a considerable territory whose inhabitants are principally Christians, such as the settled part of the old Dapitan commandancia; also of the Davao-Mati commandancias and the extremity of the Zamboanga "panhandle," but there are some thousands of Moros in each of these regions.

In the whole Sulu group there are probably about a thousand Christians. In the exclusively Moro part of Mindanao, but not including Iligan and Davao, there may be 1,500 Christians. In Cotabato and the Sulu Islands the Chinese are probably equal in numbers to the Filipinos. The municipality of Zamboanga is organized under the code, but the commanding general attends to the duties which would fall under the provincial officials if there were any. There are nearly 20,000 Christians, 500 Chinese, and some 3,000 Moros in the pueblo.

Provincial government can be implanted at any time in the Davao and Dapitan regions, but the present financial resources of these districts would yield a very scanty support for the complement of provincial officers. In each, a governor, who should do the work of secretary, and a treasurer-supervisor would suffice for the present, the total annual cost for salaries, clerk hire, and incidentals not to exceed \$2,500 gold, but for a year or two it will be necessary to extend aid from the insular treasury to one or both of these little provinces.

There are probably 500 Chinese and, approximately, 20,000 Christians in each of these districts, but they have no common interests and are so far apart that it would be quite impracticable for a single set of provincial officials to administer the affairs of both groups of Christian settlements.

There are 5,000 or more Moros and 25,000 to 50,000 of pagans in the Davao and Mati country and a few score of Moros and many wild tribes in the Dapitan district. The civil rule to be established should be limited in its scope and jurisdiction as respects non-Christian as it was in the provincial acts organizing Misamis and Surigao and as is contemplated by section 1 of act No. 82. The acts organizing these provinces should specifically commit the government of the non-Christians to the authorities who shall represent the Philippine government in the Moro country.

It will not be difficult to arrange this matter, but the control of the Moro and pagan country is much more difficult; indeed, it will be very difficult to devise a workable system of government over these races and to carry it to its ultimate, unless the governing agencies remain in large part military.

The President has announced that the office of military governor is discontinued everywhere throughout the Philippines, yet, however described and named, the only governing activities now existing in the Moro and pagan regions (except as to taxation, forests, schools, and some of the courts), are wholly military, and the rules for the commander's guidance as respects government are those general written and unwritten precepts that have controlled in all other countries and peoples that have been committed to the Army for temporary control, and they must so continue here until the Philippine Commission or Congress by legislation changes the form and character of government.

Martial law prevails in all this country and the writ of habeas corpus is unheard or unthought of in Jolo, Bongao, Siassi, the Rio Grande Valley, the Zamboanga Peninsula, except the town of same name, the Sibugay, Dumaquillas, and Tucuran country, as well as all around and across Malanao, from Malabang to Iligan; indeed, the region in question may be regarded as we formally regarded an Indian reservation whose inhabitants were hostile or unruly, and where the President was obliged to call in the Army to discipline and govern its hostile or unfriendly savage inhabitants.

The commanding general in the Philippines may not describe and sign himself as military governor, but until he is relieved from the responsibility of preserving order and protecting lives and property in the Moro and pagan districts he must continue to govern the non-Christian native inhabitants. The authority of the local military commander over this vast non-Christian reserve is the same as is that of the present commanding officer at Fort Sill, who now has under his control on the military reservation at that post some hundreds of Apaches—men, women, and children—all of whom are restrained of their liberty, i. e., they are nominally prisoners. If one of

them is bad and intractable, or violates the post orders, he is incarcerated, and if necessary ironed, just as was done the other day to a Moro sultan by the commanding officer at Camp Vicars, near Lanao, because the latter had not obeyed a demand upon him to deliver up two of his hostile followers who had assaulted two soldiers and stolen their rifles, and as has been done frequently in the cases of other Moros who were believed to be guilty of the murder of soldiers.

The text of the recent Congressional enactment respecting the Philippine Islands, which is understood to define and fix the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of these islands, has not yet been published here, and the writer is ignorant of its provisions, except in so far as the press reports have made them known, but there appears to be no doubt that the use of the Army in the preservation of order and protection of the lives and property of the inhabitants is to be controlled by the civil authorities; in short, that the relation of the Army to the civil government here is to be the same as exists between the Army and the civil authorities in the United States, except that here the requisition for assistance by the governor of a province may be filled by a local commander while in the United States the call of a governor of a State for troops may not be responded to save by a special order of the President in every instance.

The civil government in the Philippines may raise, maintain, and employ a local police, constabulary, or militia, the same to be in no way under the command of United States troops unless the civil authorities should choose to vest in said commander the military control of such local military force. It is also within the scope and discretion of the Commission to relieve the national forces from any and all responsibility of government and police power in the Moro and pagan country and over its inhabitants.

The Army is now intrusted with the responsibility of government in the provincially unorganized regions in Mindanao and Sulu, and this because these powers have been inherited, so to speak, since the time when the whole archipelago was exclusively military. It is assumed that such government, or some modified form of it, by the Army will continue until the troops are relieved from the trust.

There is no civilized inhabitant of the Philippine Islands, American, Spanish, or Filipino, who would even suggest that the Moros are capable of civilized and enlightened self-government, for a government of law—i. e., regulated liberty—is absolutely unknown to and unthinkable by them.

The Koran furnishes a religious code and combines with it a moral and secular one. It is the proud boast of the Mussulman that a people who live in accordance with the teachings of the prophet have no need for other codes, constitutions, charters, and bills of rights, for they say that a rule to regulate every possible human action or remedy every wrong or injustice is to be found in the inspired writings of Mohammed, as recorded in the Koran.

With such a class of people it is useless to quote the bill of rights or to assert the sin and wrong of slavery. The sultan, and dato, and pandita will not for an instant tolerate a suggestion that their royal and priestly functions could be taken away or assigned to another by or through some process we call voting, a word as meaningless to them as the act would be absurd. They know that from time immemorial there have been overlords and priests, that the present incumbents have inherited their prerogatives, and the right of succession had never been questioned.

Americans have come here to teach and convince these people that all men are born free and equal and that there is no such thing as inherited caste or privilege. The working out of this doctrine and the enforcement of it means the upsetting of the whole system of tribal and patriarchal government among the Moros, but they do not yet fully realize this. They ask us what we wish, why we have come among them, and what they are to do. Hitherto it had not been possible to answer these questions and they do not understand us in the least. All we have said and could say is, "Keep quiet and wait."

It has been the policy of the military government to disturb the statu quo as little as possible. The instances of positive interference by the military with the tribal customs and kingly prerogatives are very few. If slaves have fled from their masters and asked for military protection against recapture it has been accorded, and so far has not resulted in more than a protest.

If Moros have made recent forays and sold or attempted to sell their captives into slavery, the latter have been set at liberty when possible and the captors tried by military commission and punished. Of course slavery is still practiced generally.

If tribes were found at war with each other, they have been ordered to refrain, and troops have in a few cases been called out for forcible intervention, but it has not yet been necessary for United States troops to act forcibly in these tribal contests.

If property has been stolen by Moros from others of their race, they have been

compelled to make restitution when all of the facts were known and the thieves were within military control.

In Mindanao murderers of Moros and other natives have been tried and punished if caught, but in Jolo a Moro sultan or dato, in pursuance of ancient rights and privileges that have been recognized by the United States, may decapitate another Moro and the military may not intervene; this because we are pledged by Article III of the "Bates agreement" to respect these "ancient rights and privileges."

The right of the Sultan of Jolo to tax and fine his subjects is recognized. In some instances the Moros in Jolo have appealed to the military commanders for protection against impending persecution by the Sultan to enforce payment of the fines that were adjudged by his highness, but the cases of active military interference have been few. Generally the ancient prerogatives of the chiefs have not been taken away or abridged.

The Moros have generally pursued their daily avocations unmolested. Polygamy is practiced by all who wish to. There have probably been many beheadings of Moros that were not reported to the military. In three instances the arrest of offenders was requested of ruling datos of Lanao by the military, so the culprits could be tried on charges of murder or of murderous assault on soldiers, but the datos reported that they were unable to have them arrested alive and had simply had them killed and delivered their bodies instead.

If the military government in the Moro land is to be substituted by another, it may not be inappropriate to discuss the question of such substitution. With a people who have no conception of government that is not arbitrary and absolute, who hold human life as no more sacred than the life of an animal; who have become accustomed to acts of violence; who are constrained by fear from continuing the practice of piracy; who still carry on slave trade; who habitually raid the homes of mountain natives and enslave them; who habitually make slaves of their captives in war, even when of their own race; who not uncommonly make delivery of their own kindred as slaves in satisfaction of a debt for liquidation of which they have not the ready money; who habitually observe the precept of the Koran which declares that female slaves must submit to their masters, it is useless to discuss a plan of government that is not based on physical force, might, and power.

Every adult Moro and every youth past the stage of childhood habitually wears *krises* or *campilan*s. For a Moro male adult to be seen outside his house unarmed is a disgrace and indicates that he is a slave or a dishonored Moro and an unfit associate for the rest.

If a considerable proportion of the Moro inhabitants were familiar with and capable of comprehending what we call self-government, in other words, if they had a true conception of what we mean by the term "regulated liberty," then to inculcate the doctrines of government—the practice of which had made the Anglo-Saxons happy and prosperous—might not appear hopeless, but until there is such an element in the Moro country it is useless to talk about autonomy or any phase of it. The government over these people must for a long time continue to be exercised by some agency that has at its back an active force ready any moment to overpower these armed fanatics and compel them to observe the rules of well-being that we observe in our relations with our fellow-men. The National Army can do this, continuing the policy it is now pursuing. Perhaps the constabulary might also accomplish the same result, but this body of men is handicapped at the outset.

For some centuries the army of Spain waged war upon the Mohammedan inhabitants; the Spanish leaders and their priests could or would not tolerate the practice of the religion of Islam. The Spaniards of the sixteenth century came to Mindanao with the same motives that actuated their ancestors in their crusades in the Holy Land and against the Moors in Spain, these last having been fought almost continuously for over seven hundred years. There was no attempt during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries to establish an entente between the Spanish and the Moros in the Philippines. It was not until the last half of the nineteenth century that there was a Spanish recognition, by treaty or agreement, of the right of the Moros to even exist.

The rank and file of the Spanish army fighting the Moros were Christianized natives of the Philippines, who had themselves not long before emerged from Malay savagery, and as a matter of course the Mohammedans did not fail to raid the Christian settlements in the Visayas and Luzon. Legaspi found Mohammedan rajahs in Manila and wiped them out. It therefore results that between the Moros and the Filipinos there is the most bitter feeling, the most irreconcilable and intense hatred between these two Malay people, one Mussulman and the other Christian.

The Philippine constabulary is composed almost exclusively of natives, and it is required that they shall be natives of the province where they serve. It would be

quite impossible to enlist in the Moro territory any Filipinos who would prove efficient and satisfy the requirements of the law as respects nativity, but no matter whence obtained there would be inevitable hostility between the Moro and the Christian, unless there was a controlling force of American troops to prevent conflict. When the Spanish troops left Cotabato, Polloc, and Paran-paran the Moros promptly seized the government and killed many of the prominent Filipinos, who, for their crimes and robberies, probably deserved it.

Had the Spaniards left Jolo to the tender mercies of the natives probably no Filipino would have survived the inevitable slaughter. At Zamboanga the leading dato is a very intelligent Moro who has visited civilized countries. He is the only Moro fit for self-government in the whole of Mindanao. After the Spaniards left Zamboanga, and before the Americans arrived, there was fighting between the Christians and Mohammedans, but before the struggle had been carried far an American gunboat reached the place and put an end to the conflict. To attempt the police of the Moro country by constabulary would probably result in anarchy and bloodshed.

There is no other force available for governing these savage people save the Regular Army of the United States, and its action should be regulated in much the same manner as it was in respect to Indian affairs when and where the Indians were hostile or unfriendly and intractable.

The conclusion reached is that no form of self-government is possible in the country of non-Christians, and that the Philippine constabulary would not be able to preserve order at all.

Wherever there are existing aggregations of Christian inhabitants, as at Cotabato, Jolo, Paran-paran, Malabang, and Siasi, the people should be encouraged to organize municipal government, but the issuance of licenses should be controlled by the military, so that the commander could prevent trade in firearms and intoxicants of all kinds. He should also have the power to exclude all undesirable persons coming for any purpose. He should, however, encourage legitimate settlement and development.

In the administration of justice the commanding general will make use of the familiar military courts that were employed during the military government of the Philippines and that have been used during times of peace in the United States. I refer to the military commission. The Modoc murderers of General Canby were executed about 1872, in pursuance of a sentence imposed by military commission and approved by the President of the United States. The trial was conducted in the State of California. The general should have power to appoint or nominate for appointment a judge of court of first instance, a fiscal and necessary justices of the peace, for judicial administration of the civil and criminal codes among the Filipinos, Chinese, and Americans who may compose the non-Moro and nonpagan settlements; and he should also have the right, in his discretion, to refer to these courts for trial any of the non-Christian offenders against the laws. He will find it expedient to create boards or courts of arbitration, with power to decide minor questions at issue between sultans, datos, and their followers, just as Major Febiger did at Cotabato. It goes without saying that the commanding general should have power to mitigate and pardon sentences imposed, but should not carry into effect any sentence of capital punishment without reference of same to superior authority. Customs and internal revenue, forestry agents, and school superintendents should be appointed on the recommendation of the commanding general, but discharge their duties according to Philippine statutes, under the general, through whom all reports would be forwarded to superiors in Manila.

One of the most effective methods of punishment of Moros will be the imposition and collection of fines. According to Moro ethics there is no such thing as a crime against the state. The injury resulting from a murder, assault, or robbery is that suffered by the victim and his dato and kindred, and the wrong and injury, whatever be its nature, can always be righted and the demands of Moro justice fully satisfied by the payment of money consideration to the victim if he survives, or to his blood relations and dependents if he dies. When cattle, slaves, or other personal property are taken it is the privilege of the loser to make reprisals in default or restitution or indemnifications. If persons are killed in this strife it is not murder as we understand the term, but instead, and recompense failing, it is merely a justified and warranted killing—simply an eye for an eye. When the leading families, bands, or communities tire of the struggle they get together, and in their own way cast a balance of the losses and gains. American troops have occasionally intervened in these feuds, ordering cessation or requiring the sultan to exercise the authority he claims to possess and put a stop to the warfare. The discipline of those Moros will be facilitated by making their wrongdoing expensive. Imprisonment by Moros of each other is unknown beyond the brief detention that elapses between the capture of

the offender, whose life is forfeited, and his beheading. Imprisonment by the Americans meant little or nothing as soon as they found it was not a preliminary to execution. There is no humiliation attached to confinement in what we call a jail, but when they are fined so many carabaos, dollars, or slaves the punishment comes to them in a way they understand.

The courts that practice in the Moro country should have this phase of the situation in mind, but, above all, the punishment, whatever it may be, should follow the commission of the offense in the shortest possible time.

The Sulu Moros have made strenuous objection to the payment of taxes on goods imported, alleging that no such taxes should be levied, because under Spain none were levied or collected. Upon this subject the undersigned has written fully and can add nothing to the already full presentation of this subject.

Since the foregoing was written the full text of the recent Congressional enactment respecting the Philippines has been received and read for the first time. The most important section of this law affecting the Moros is the provision forbidding slavery. Upon this subject the writer of this paper some time since submitted his views and he can make no important addition to that presentation. He would remark, however, that the declaration of Congress will have no immediate effect upon the institution of slavery as practiced. The *datos* and sultans will not liberate the slaves, and if they did in many cases the freed slaves would not leave their masters. That the sultans will demand remuneration from the United States for their slaves is very probable, but it will be without avail unless Congress further legislates on this subject. The invariable rule of the military has been not to return escaping slaves and not to permit their recapture, and also not to invite slaves to flee their masters. This is about as far as any government over the Moros can effectively go.

The "Bates agreement," as it has been called, made in pursuance of instructions from General Otis and approved by the President (save the section relating to slavery), has been made the subject of special report, and reference to the papers is invited for an expression of opinion respecting that important document.

The Sultan of Jolo claims sovereign prerogatives over every Moro in the Sulu group and exercises some sort of authority over or claims certain homage from all Moros in Sulu. He also presumes to license Chinese traders and pretends to control the pearl fisheries. He insists on his personal ownership of all the land in Sulu and Paragua; but the United States has never recognized such pretension, unless it is found in the Bates agreement in the phrase of Section III, "The rights and dignities of the Sultan and his *datos* shall be fully respected." It is understood that he claims his lease of Paragua to Prince Poinatoski is an act entirely within his rights; that he has as much right to lease Paragua as he had to sell North Borneo, where a flourishing British colony now exists, based on a title derived from the Sultan's conveyance of his sovereignty to an Englishman.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the writer favors the continuance in the Moro country of the only rule of which these people have any knowledge or which they understand, a government by the military for the present, but which, as these fanatical people show peaceful and reasonable tendency, may be relaxed and a freer one substituted as they show their capacity for it.

While the Moros differ greatly in many respects from North American Indians, they yet resemble them in some of their characteristics. These Mohammedan Malays are more intelligent than our Indians, are further advanced in the mechanic arts, and have a written language, but in cruelty and brutality the Moro is the peer of any savage. While they are not far advanced in modern industrial ways, they appear to possess bright and receptive minds. They are close observers of all that transpires and show much interest in the doings of Americans, and they try to make out our purposes and intentions.

In the Rio Grande Valley they have responded to calls for labor, they have furnished many telegraph poles, distributed and set them on very difficult ground, they have supplied fuel and grass for the forces, and some hundreds of them have worked in opening roads and trails from Malabang to Lake Lanao; but it could hardly be said that this work was performed willingly, for when hands were needed for any purpose the call was made on the head *dato* and he turned out the men or the materials needed, for the control of Piang over his people is absolute and complete. All knew the refusal to work or fetch materials as ordered would have resulted in a swift and sure chastisement, which might be limited to a flogging with rattan, but possibly would not stop short of beheading.

There is one circumstance that may warrant an expectation of ultimate success in teaching these people habits of industry and inducing them to abandon their life of idleness and savagery—their eagerness to obtain money. With a people who are greedy for wealth and gain there is something to work on, for when we show them how to gratify their desires it is not unreasonable to expect them to regard our

teaching. Another circumstance in their favor is their abhorrence of alcohol in all its forms. There is reasonable basis for a hope that the Moros may some time become industrious producers and valuable members of the community. They are as cruel and bloodthirsty as our plains Indians, but they have more intelligence, more acuteness, and already have made more progress in industrial life. They were successful pirates and raided Philippine towns, even to Manila Bay, and their name is yet a terror to all Visayans and inhabitants of southern Luzon.

But they are Mohammedans, and attempts at conversion to Christianity, if made, would probably result, as have all other attempts to proselyte their coreligionists, in a complete failure. A prominent priest of the Jesuit order, who had spent twenty years of his life in contact with the Mohammedans of Mindanao, said to the writer that no missionary had yet succeeded in making converts among the adult Mohammedans in any country. If missionaries are sent among them they are probably doomed to failure, and, besides, any interference with their religion would be resented as an insult and resisted to the death. Our Government will not, of course, molest them in the practice of their religion so long as they observe our laws, but our Government should not at present permit others to attempt their conversion to Christianity.

Those of us who have spent the best part of a lifetime in observing the failure of Americans to civilize and make American self-governing citizens of "our Indian wards" not unnaturally have the feeling that the failure is due to a mistaken policy and treatment of these nomads. We have seen an attempt to establish and maintain a dual government—a military one up to a certain point, then a civil one, but with frequent recurrence to the stern rigors of military rule; and this went on for a century as the Indians died off or were slaughtered. The result has been disastrous to the aborigines. White men, it is true, have secured the Indian lands, and cities have been built over the ashes of burned tepees; settlements have grown into counties and States, and there is wealth and luxury where these people roamed; but there can scarcely be found an intelligent and well-informed human being who knows the real characteristics of our Indian policy in this century of dishonor who will not acknowledge that the crusade has been as heartless and cruel as any recorded in history.

In a certain way and degree nature protects the Moros against similar rapacity. Their homes are in the Tropics, and Anglo-Saxons and others of the Caucasian race can not make their homes in these jungles as they did in the North American prairies and mountain valleys. Those tropical lands can not be exploited without labor, and the white race can not or will not supply it. This condition of affairs is a protection to the Moros and pagans, and is all that saves them from invasion otherwise sure to come. It is therefore not surprising that a military man should prefer to pursue a course in the cause of civilization that would in his belief spare the Moros from the besetments and influences that have worked the destruction of savage aborigines elsewhere.

Were a free grant made now of 10,000 acres of land in Mindanao to an individual or corporation, with the condition imposed that within a reasonable period of time, say two or three years, the land should be cultivated or else the concession would stand forfeited, the grant would be useless unless the exploiter could fetch in contract labor, and that is now forbidden by United States statutes, unless the laborers come from our own country.

If the Moro and pagan lands are ever to become productive, the native inhabitants must supply the laborers, and they must be taught that labor is honorable and its remuneration certain. To that end every effort should be used to restrain the savage and bloody impulses of these people, to encourage industry, to desist from slave hunting and holding, and to secure for them as rapidly as they show capacity for it a participation in community affairs—in short, to begin an organization of what we call society, that is not held together by the dicta of a sultan, dato, or priest.

There are no more industrious, frugal, hard-working, and honest people in the world than the agriculturists of some portions of Turkey in Europe and in Asia, and these people are devout Mohammedans. The inhabitants of the British protectorate, Sarawak, in North Borneo, are all Mohammedan Malays. So, too, are nearly all the Javanese, and Sumatrans, and natives of the Straits Settlements, and they are great producers, although as laborers they are not as effective as Chinese, but they are useful members of the community, and crime is almost unknown among them because they are governed.

If the Moros are handled properly they can be started in the same path, and in a generation the existing million of fanatical Moro and pagan savages will be two million of industrious laborers, as industrious and peaceable and contented as the subjects of Raja Brooke in Sarawak. Over them, as over the Dyacks, Javanese, and Straits Malays, must be a just rule that is full of vigor, and as they develop a talent and capacity for participation in the government they should have the opportunity.

While it seems to the writer probable, indeed, almost certain, that development

or exploitation of the vast territories inhabited by non-Christians will be slow, he remarks that the form of government herein outlined would in no way retard the opening of the country if the settlers and development enterprises are really ready to occupy and possess the land. The military character of government of California, and of what is now Arizona, New Mexico, Montana, and Idaho, did not prevent or retard the occupation of those countries by home seekers. In those regions, as everywhere in the United States Indian country, the Army has supplied the advance guard of civilization and all required protection until the people were able to protect themselves and to form these settlements into Territories and States. If Cotabato, or Paran-paran, or Jolo, or any other existing Christian settlement should develop into an orderly and prosperous community that manifestly possessed the elements of permanent self-sustained existence, the scheme of government sanctioned by the Philippine Commission should provide the means for a transformation from military control to civil self-governing rule, such as has been provided for Zamboanga.

The islands of Basilan and Balabac and the hamlet of Polloc have been under the exclusive control, in civil matters, of the Navy, the military force consisting of U. S. marines. In the general law that should be enacted for the government of the Moro country these territories now under naval control should be provided for and the limits of the village of Polloc should be fixed, but it is almost self-evident that there should be but one local chief executive over the whole Moro country.

As respects financial resources, of course the requirements will be small, for all military expenditures are defrayed by the General Government, and the revenues of local origin will also be none too large to meet local requirements. Last year the collections of the customs officers at Zamboanga, Jolo, and Siassi did not exceed \$106,000. The internal-revenue collections were unimportant, and the forestry officials secured but a very small sum. It is not safe to estimate the total revenues of the Moro country, including Zamboanga, at more than \$150,000. The chief executive will need money to pay judges, justices of the peace, attorneys, village police, school-teachers, supplies, rents, and incidentals. He will also require means to make and repair schoolhouses, roads, streets, and wharves; to establish hospitals and asylums, and give aid to the helpless and needy. The total amount of net collections by collectors of customs and internal revenue, fines, licenses, etc., should go to a fund to be applied in the discretion of the chief executive to the general welfare, strict accounts to be kept and rendered to the auditor of the Philippine government. Annual reports would of course be forwarded to the governor of the Philippines, who, as chief executive, would correspond with and transmit instructions to the military commander through the division commander at Manila.

It is unnecessary to say that the commanding general vested with powers of government such as outlined above should be a level-headed man of the best ability. It is also of the utmost importance that his assignment be measurably permanent. Heretofore the generals in command have been too often changed. It has happened very often—indeed, it seems to have become a rule almost—to relieve a commanding officer as soon as he had become familiar with his duties. Zamboanga was first occupied by the military at the close of the year 1899. The commanders in the Moro country have since been Gen. J. C. Bates, Gen. W. A. Kobbé, Gen. George W. Davis, and Gen. S. S. Sumner, all in less than three years.

It is hardly necessary to remark that efficient administration can not be secured with such frequent changes of the head of the government. Now that the military force assigned to the Philippines is definitely known and its scope of duties and responsibilities are strictly limited, there should be no difficulty in selecting from the army in the Philippines such organizations and commanders as are to have long terms here.

In respect to the exterior trade of the Moro country, so important to the commercial development of the region, there is much to be desired. Now there are collectors of customs at Zamboanga and Jolo. Cotabato and Siassi have inspectors of customs, but at Basilan, Paran-paran, Bongao, Cagayan, Sulu, and Puerto Princesa there is no representative of the customs service. The merchants of Sandakan, British North Borneo, have long monopolized the trade of the Moro country to the north and east. This trade has been of considerable importance to those engaged in it, and they wish to retain and extend it. Of course it is to our interest to divert this trade to American ships and markets, but now legitimate commercial intercourse by anybody with these unequipped ports is practically forbidden; in fact, there is no course for the exporters and importers to pursue but to send their copra, hemp, pearl shells, dried fish, jungle products, coffee, etc., to Sandakan and Singapore in native boats without custom-house papers of any kind, and to import from the latter places and smuggle into the country the commodities received in exchange.

It is true that American vessels wishing to trade with these ports may call at Zamboanga or Jolo, receive a customs agent on board and proceed on their way, but the

local traders may not obtain direct from a foreign market anything in exchange. How much easier, simpler, and cheaper it is to carry on this trade in small native craft as they have done for these three years of our occupation, and are still doing. Nor does it seem fair to call such trade illicit when we do nothing to make it possible to conduct it legitimately. Of course the volume is not large for any place, but in the aggregate is a very considerable amount. There should be customs inspectors at all the little ports named and at any others where the necessity exists, and it behooves the merchants of Manila, Iloilo, and Cebu to make an effort to secure the traffic, but now our do-nothing policy forces these people to act as described above. The Spaniards had military detachments at all these places and the trade was regulated, but our military officers are forbidden to exercise any supervision or control whatever over the customs and internal-revenue services anywhere.

In suggesting, as above, that the superior local control of all functions of government in the Moro country should be lodged in the commanding general, there is no thought of separating the customs and internal-revenue services from the central office in Manila. Those officials should be appointed as now, and conform, in conducting their work, to the general laws and regulations of the Philippines.

The above embraces the mature judgment of the writer respecting government in and over the Moro country and adjacent pagan territories.

It will be seen that this scheme contemplates a government of this country on a basis which would make it practically a possession-colony, if you please—of the Philippine general government.

The control of the Philippine Commission over the territory throughout these islands in pursuance of the President's orders is full and complete in respect of all matters as to when, where, and how the troops may be used in preserving the peace and restoring order if it should be disturbed, and the appointment of civil officials. The control of the present governing commission over the military in the Moro country and the subordination of the military to the civil power would not be less complete than existed with respect to civil and military control in Idaho after the governor of that State had declared martial law and suspended the writ of habeas corpus. If the commanding general in Moro land should go too far or not far enough in carrying out the policy of the central Philippine government in this scene of activities a word from the chief executive in Manila would correct the error and make all conform to the general policy.

Respectfully submitted.

GEO. W. DAVIS,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

MANILA, P. I., August 25, 1902.

APPENDIX 10.

COLONEL BALDWIN'S REPORT OF OPERATIONS IN LAKE LANAO DISTRICT.

HEADQUARTERS LAKE LANAO EXPEDITION,
Camp Vicars, Mindanao, P. I., June 11, 1902.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL SEVENTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Zamboanga, Mindanao, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations and incidents connected with the troops under my command from date of landing at Paran-paran to May 4, 1902.

On arriving at Paran-paran, the island of Mindanao, I had received very particular instructions in regard to the delicate condition existing between United States troops and the Moros, who occupied all that portion of the island over which I had jurisdiction as post commander, which were under all circumstances to exercise the most pacific measures toward these natives, that a friendly and desirable relationship might soon be established. These instructions were communicated to and impressed upon both officers and men, and for a time, to all outward appearances, we were gaining the confidence of those with whom we came in contact.

At the same time instructions were received as to the desirability of making explorations investigating trails to reach Lake Lanao from the south. Runners and letters were sent out to the people of the lake country, advising them of our wishes and assuring them that our intentions were entirely of a friendly character. To some of these letters communications were received in a friendly spirit, notably, though, from persons of small influence. To most of our efforts in this line no attention was paid or else word received that they would be friendly with the Americans, but did not want them to come to the lake.

The first overt act, so characteristic of these people, was the assassination of Private Frank Morris, Company C, Twenty-seventh Infantry, on March 9, 1902, within less than a mile from post of Paran-paran.

Following this I sent detachments—small parties—out on the trail which led from Paran-paran to Lake Lanao, these parties going not to exceed 10 miles, under guidance of friendly Moros, meeting with no opposition, and being assured by Moros that we would meet with no opposition.

March 12 I sent a detachment consisting of 17 mounted men under Lieutenant Forsyth, Fifteenth Cavalry, with natives as guides, to explore and open the trail to the divide; he moved about 30 miles, when he was suddenly fired upon by natives. The trail was so difficult that it was impracticable for him to attempt to advance, and he very wisely turned back. The natives were concealed along the trail, which he was obliged to leave and endeavor to get through the thick underbrush. This he found impossible to accomplish, and was compelled to abandon his horses and horse equipments, but saved his arms and ammunition. In this affair he lost one man killed. Lieutenant Forsyth fell back to Buldun, where he remained overnight, sending word to me of the affair and asking for instructions. I at once sent out relief to him, fearing that he might be overpowered. He returned to the post without further action. The opposing parties were under charge of Sultan Weli, of Butig, with a following variously reported from 50 to 200, with 20 rifles. I forwarded Lieutenant Forsyth's report, made at the time, to brigade headquarters. (See first part of Appendix A and Appendix B. For my report in relation to this affair, see Appendix A.^a)

On the 30th day of March, 1902, Private Lewis, Company B, Twenty-seventh Infantry, stationed at Malabang, while out walking with another soldier, was cut to pieces by a bolo in the hands of a Moro, the other soldier receiving a severe gash in the back from one of the party of Moros, who were 6 in number. Only the man killed was armed. (See Appendix C.^a)

As soon as this occurrence was reported I was so convinced that there was an element that would carry on a warfare of this character that I presented again to the department that I did not believe anything of a lasting and satisfactory solution of the question, and establish the supremacy of the United States over the island and the people, could be accomplished in any other way than to advance the troops to the lake, peaceably if possible, otherwise if necessary; and that this would be the only way to stop this assassination of soldiers or American citizens and insure peace.

Under my instructions I had caused the several trails to be examined a few miles from the seashore and work commenced on what is known as the "Ganosi trail," with a view of building a road suitable for wagons, which I had been frequently informed by Moros I would have no difficulty in doing. After reaching a point 7 miles from Malabang, the character of the country changed and became so difficult it was apparent that the idea of a wagon road would have to be abandoned, for the present at least. In gaining the advance of 7 miles the troops had been fired upon, which was most convincing and conclusive evidence, with what had preceded, that by adopting only pacific measures we would never reach Lake Lanao from the south, and that we would soon have our little garrisons along the seashore menaced by the lake Moros if we did not force our way to the lake.

March 31 I moved my headquarters to Malabang. On the same day the second battalion of my regiment landed at that point.

Work was pushed on the road and trail, as well as the putting up of the telegraph line. On April 7 it was found that a portion of the road which had already been cleared had been obstructed during the night by the felling of trees and brush into it.

April 10 two troops of the Fifteenth Cavalry, Twenty-fifth Battery, Field Artillery, and pack train disembarked at Malabang.

April 11 balance of the Second Battalion, commanded by Major Scott, was sent to Camp No. 1, about 2½ miles from Malabang, out on the trail, from which point work on the trail was continued under Major Scott. On the same day Generals Chaffee and Davis and Colonel Sanger arrived at Malabang. The following day they rode out on the Ganosi trail about 7 miles, returning from Malabang about dusk that evening by steamer.

General Chaffee, while in Malabang, sent a proclamation to several of the leading Moros of the lake country defining the relationship of the United States Government to these people and demanding the surrender of the murderers of two of our soldiers and the return of the horses which they had taken from Lieutenant Forsyth's detachment, giving them two weeks' time to do this.

He also explained to me very fully the wishes of the Government in connection with any movement that might be made toward the lake by troops, instructing me

^a Not printed.

to continue work on the trail and that I must not come into unnecessary conflict with the natives, all of which I fully appreciated, not only the simple compliance with the order, but the importance of carrying out his instructions, as it was the policy of the Government in dealing with these people, to at all times use pacific measures, talking and acting in a most friendly way in our endeavors to establish friendly relations with them. These same instructions were also reiterated by General Davis. My subsequent actions and movements were in accord with these instructions and were constantly in mind, at the same time watching and protecting my command in every military sense.

April 15 Troops F and H, Fifteenth Cavalry, Captain Barnhardt commanding, with two small mountain guns under command of Lieutenant Mangum, Fifteenth Cavalry, were sent out to establish Camp No. 2, 7 miles from Malabang, where a limited supply of water had been found.

Fifty men of Company A, under Captain Hutton, Twenty-seventh Infantry, and Lieutenant Van Horn, Seventeenth Infantry, with 300 Rio Grande Moros, arrived at Malabang, the latter to be used as laborers on the road.

April 16 Major Febiger, with detachment of the Seventeenth Infantry, arrived in Malabang.

Having gotten about ten days' supply of commissaries at Camp No. 2 on the 17th day of April I left Malabang with 50 men of Company A, Captain Hutton commanding, available strength of Company B, Captain Moore commanding, and 35 men of Company D, Lieutenant Fries commanding, and the Twenty-fifth Light Battery Field Artillery, equipped as mountain battery, 4 guns, Captain McNair commanding, for Camp No. 2, and as I passed Camp No. 1 I was joined by the Second Battalion, Major Scott commanding, Company E, Captain Rogers commanding, Company F, Lieutenant Vicars commanding, Company G, Captain Phillips commanding, Company H, Captain Lyon commanding. Arriving at Camp No. 2, we bivouacked for the night along the trail.

Early in the morning of the 18th Major Scott, with Second Battalion and Moro laborers, Lieutenant Wigmore, engineer officer in charge, were sent forward on the trail with instructions to clear the same of obstructions for about 5 miles, or until he found water. At 2 p. m., with battalion under Captain Moore, Twenty-fifth Battery and pack train, I moved out of Camp No. 2, intending to go to where Major Scott might be camping. We found that the trail had been very much obstructed, but had been fairly well cleared by the Moros under Lieutenant Wigmore. The march was very fatiguing for both men and animals, and as we had come to no water, neither had we overtaken Major Scott, I was obliged to continue until it became dark, and getting tangled up in brush, had to bivouac in the woods at a point called Kalala-waun. I calculated we had marched about 7 miles. I was very uneasy as to Major Scott's whereabouts and safety, and there was nothing more for me to do but push forward until I could overtake him; besides, I must find water. Hence, daybreak, the morning of the 19th, I moved forward, overtaking the rear guard of Major Scott's battalion at Pulug, 8.15 a. m. A short distance beyond I found Major Scott's battalion bivouaced along the trail in a dense growth of bamboo, commanded completely by very high bluffs, covered with timber and brush, a position wholly untenable. Just before reaching Major Scott we passed a strong rifle pit covering the trail, the latter having been very heavily obstructed by fallen timbers, and it was reported by natives that there was a strong fort about a mile and half farther. I hesitated about going forward, but it was the only chance of securing a suitable camp in all respects. While the natives were noncommittal as to whether there would be any opposition made at this fort, I felt that I could do nothing else other than find out, and as we were less than 19 miles from Malabang, and the distance from Malabang to Ganosi had never been reported as less than 35 miles, leaving me still 16 miles from Ganosi, I decided, rather than return to camp No. 2, I would move forward and, if possible, locate a suitable camp about a mile and half farther in the open country. I immediately sent Captain Moore's battalion and one mountain gun to make a reconnaissance to Fort Gadungan, where he arrived at 9.40 a. m. without meeting any opposition whatever, and located where all the requirements of a camp were found. Soon after 10 o'clock he was fired upon. Sending this word back to me, I moved forward with three companies and the battery, leaving one company to guard supplies in camp. After arriving at Captain Moore's position, the Moros kept up quite a fusillade for two hours, when everything quieted down. We had been so deceived as to distance, I could not believe I was less than 10 miles from Ganosi, and being from 10 to 15 miles to the west of the Moros to whom General Chaffee had sent his proclamation, I did not believe, after careful consideration, that I was at all infringing upon the sanctity of the same, and with the permission of Dato Cali's people, of Gadungan, who had remained in the fort, and everything else being most favorable for a permanent camp, I decided to remain at Fort Gadungan, making no movement

of troops other than in self-defense, and realizing that any retrograde movement on my part would be most encouraging to the natives, as they would construe it as a defeat, the same as they had defeated the Spaniards several years before, and they certainly would have had reason for thinking so, as the troops of a second nation that had made an effort to reach this country and the first to have accomplished it. During the night the camp was fired upon, which was not returned.

Having a most defensible position I had no fear of my ability to remain, unless my rations should become exhausted. Though the trails were bad, by most strenuous efforts on the part of everybody connected in the forwarding of supplies we were able to remain, although on one or two occasions with no more than three days' rations on hand.

On the 20th the hostile Moros commenced reoccupying the position they had held the day before, coming from the direction of Fort Pualas, which was in plain sight of my position, flying the red flag, and evidently a rendezvous of 200 to 300 of them. About 4 o'clock I deployed skirmish lines to my front to drive the Moros away, which was accomplished, returning to the camp in about an hour.

The location of Fort Pualas was such, on account of its close proximity bordering what is known as the Ganosi country, whose people were apparently friendly, as evinced by such men as the Rajah Muda of Ganosi and some leading Datos, into which country the hostile Moros would and did come and attack my position, making it impossible to fire at them without endangering the lives of those who would be friendly, that it seemed to be such a menace to us that it would be only in self-defense to destroy it. This I did on the morning of the 21st without loss. Two lantacas and a lot of palay and other warlike material, such as is used by the Moros, were taken at this fort, and one Moro, the Sultan of Pualas, was killed. Soon after Fort Pualas was taken, Fort Ganosi, about 1,800 yards distant, hauled down its red flag and put up a white one, delivering to me the former. Returning to my camp, arranged the positions of the command with view of defense, and men prepared their camp to stay.

April 27 General Davis, commanding Seventh Separate Brigade, and Major Pettit arrived in camp. General Davis had previous to his arrival sent me the following wire:

[Extract.]

"ZAMBOANGA, April 24, 1902.

"* * * You will continue in command of the expedition after my arrival, as heretofore * * *"

Which I have done to the present moment. I fully appreciated General Davis's presence and have profited by his valuable service.

On April 29 I took a detachment of my command and marched over to the market place of Ganosi, where I found about one hundred people, a variety of the usual articles found in native market for sale, remaining there about a couple of hours mingling with the people freely. Everything seemed to be very quiet, the people not averse to our being there.

The following day left camp with larger portion of command, marching eastward to within 3 miles of Binadayan. This was the limit to which I was to proceed that day under orders of General Davis, and, no water being available at that point, which was obtainable a mile farther in advance, I sent back to the camp where General Davis was, presenting the conditions, when was authorized to go ahead to the water.

May 1 I sent Captain Moore's company a short distance to the east on a reconnaissance, and shortly afterwards rode out to that point myself with one company and gun; only went about 1,000 yards. Fort Binadayan, in plain sight, seemed to be strongly garrisoned—parapets covered with natives, besides many on the outside.

The Moros fired on my outpost about 9.30 p. m. from the east.

General Davis visited my camp, returning to Fort Gadungan in the evening.


From my camp General Davis sent a letter to the hostile Moros, giving them until 12 o'clock the next day to indicate their intentions to become peaceable citizens and surrender the murderers and captured horses.

May 2, at 8.50 a. m., Moros fired into camp from the lake, also on our outpost to the east.

General Davis arrived in camp a little after 9 o'clock.

The hour of 12 having arrived and no messenger from the people to whom General Davis had sent the letter the previous day, I was authorized to advance and engage the enemy, which I did, leaving camp about 12.15 p. m. Proceeded about 1,000 yards, when a few shells were thrown into a cota to my right front, where the previous day I had seen a great many armed natives; following up this shelling with a company of infantry, the place was captured and destroyed. Advancing a short distance farther, another cota from which shots had been fired was destroyed in like

NEAR LAKE L



SECTION A.B.

B

OFFICE
1884-5

manner. Another advance, which in a few minutes brought us to within 1,200 yards of Binadayan, where there was every evidence of occupancy. From this point, range 1,200 yards, the battery threw several shots at the fort, and the contour of the ground being suitable, Major Scott's battalion was advanced at the same time, in open order, with instructions to take the place, which was done a few minutes after 2 o'clock, our losses being 1 man wounded—many of the enemy killed. Those who escaped from this fort, in the main, went to Fort Pandapatan, less than a thousand yards distant. The battery and Captain Moore's battalion was moved rapidly onto the hill of Binadayan, where all the infantry, excepting Company G, which in this advance has gained ground quite a distance to the right, was halted, when the battery opened fire on Fort Pandapatan at about half past 2, finding the range to be 975 yards, which was kept up for nearly an hour with the utmost accuracy. As soon as we got on Binadayan hill the enemy opened fire on my troops, causing some casualties, but at the end of the hour's shelling the fire from them had ceased, when I sent Major Scott to join with Company G with orders to advance onto the fort. Arriving at a range of about 400 yards a very heavy fire from the fort was delivered, when I sent Company F forward with orders to deploy and form on the left of Major Scott's line. Immediately following F, Company E was sent forward in support in the same general direction F had taken. As soon as they came within 300 yards range the fire became very heavy from the fort, the flanks of the line swinging to the left and right, nearly enveloping the fort. At this moment Company B was sent forward in support of the line. In the face of this heavy fire from the fort the troops continued advancing until they had arrived at the very base of the parapet, having to pass through entanglements of the most dangerous character, crossing 3 lines of ditches which were filled, with Moros, who were, in the majority of cases, killed or mortally wounded.

Just before dark I received word that the troops were getting out of ammunition and that it was impossible to scale the walls of the fort on account of their height, although efforts had been made to do so. On receiving this word I sent Captain Nuttman, my adjutant, to the lines with orders that there was no more reserve ammunition, that the troops would fix bayonets and resist any efforts on the part of the enemy, and they must not retreat from the fort.

At this juncton I sent Companies A and H forward and gave orders that as soon as darkness would permit the troops should be withdrawn from the close proximity of the fort and form so as to completely envelop same, which was done without confusion or loss.

We had met with very serious losses, having 1 officer and 9 enlisted men killed and 3 officers and 37 enlisted men wounded, few of whom could be brought to the rear in daylight, as the moment they showed themselves the bearers would be shot down, and when night came it was so intensely dark it was found utterly impracticable to move them until the following morning at daylight. I had ordered Companies G and F to retire to Fort Binadayan, but Company F did not get in until the following morning, having become lost in their efforts to get back.

Medical officers were on the field attending to the wounded as best they could. Added to the misery of the situation both for wounded and men on the line, a heavy rain set it which lasted all night long. The suffering of these wounded men, having to lie on the battle field as they did, could not be alleviated and would have been made more aggravated had an effort been made to move them to the rear during the darkness, as the country to be traversed was filled with pitfalls, sharpened stakes, and ditches covered with grass, which were difficult to avoid in daylight when one could see where he was walking.

As soon as I discovered that I could not go into the fort without artificial means, I caused several scale ladders to be prepared, intending to scale the walls the following morning, which would have been done had it been necessary; but, much to my satisfaction, at the first dawn of day, several white flags were floating from the fort in place of the red flags which had been flying on the previous day.

After a short parley with the survivors, 83 in number, they laid down their weapons and marched out of the fort, surrendered, and were marched up to Binadayan and placed under strong guard. Owing to the fact that the fort was crowded with my own wounded men, there was no inclosed place to hold them, and they were necessarily in the open, but in close proximity to several organizations of my own command. They had shown no signs of uneasiness and were frequently visited and talked with by General Davis and myself. Still, about 1 p. m., May 3, they suddenly made a break through the chain of sentinels, two of them attacking sentinels, one succeeding in wrenching a rifle from a sentinel and starting to run away, but was shot and the rifle secured. The other Moro who had attacked a sentinel was killed on the line. With this exception no Moro was killed, except outside of the line occupied by the guard. A large portion of them were killed and wounded.

The latter were brought back and their wounds dressed by our surgeons, when they were set at liberty. I even paid some of the natives for taking the wounded outside of my lines.

ORGANIZATIONS PARTICIPATING IN ENGAGEMENT.

Twenty-fifth Battery Light Artillery, 4 guns, equipped as mountain battery, Capt. W. S. McNair commanding.

Seven companies Twenty-seventh Infantry, as follows: Second Battalion, Twenty-seventh Infantry, Maj. W. S. Scott commanding, composed of Company E, Capt. W. C. Rogers commanding; Company F, First Lieut. T. A. Vicars, commanding (killed in action); Second Lieut. A. L. Jossman, of this company, was seriously wounded and command of the company fell to First Sergt. C. Pederson, who a few weeks later was killed in a night attack made on my camp at Basak; Company G, Capt. J. W. L. Phillips commanding; Company H, Capt. S. P. Lyon commanding; First Battalion Twenty-seventh Infantry, Capt. J. T. Moore commanding; Company A, 50 men, Capt. J. A. Hutton commanding; Company B, First Lieut. F. B. Hawkins commanding.

My staff consisted of the following: Maj. R. S. Porter, surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, chief surgeon in the field; Capt. L. M. Nuttman, adjutant Twenty-seventh Infantry, acting adjutant-general; First Lieut. H. S. Wagner, Fourteenth Infantry, intelligence officer; First Lieut. H. L. Wigmore, Corps of Engineers, engineer officer; Second Lieut. R. G. Peck, Twenty-seventh Infantry, acting quartermaster and commissary in the field; Maj. T. B. Anderson, surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, chief surgeon at Malabang; Capt. E. A. Shuttleworth, quartermaster Twenty-seventh Infantry, depot quartermaster at Malabang; Second Lieut. T. W. Brown, Twenty-seventh Infantry, depot commissary at Malabang; to each and every one of whom I desire to express my thanks and appreciation of every duty they were called upon to perform, often under the most trying conditions, which brought out the true qualities of the soldier.

The following troops, forming part of the the Lake Lanao expedition, were stationed at Malabang and in camps along the trail: Battalion Seventeenth Infantry, under Maj. Lea Febiger; battalion Tenth Infantry, under Maj. R. W. Hoyt; Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, under First Lieut. W. D. Forsyth; Troops F and H, Fifteenth Cavalry, under Captain Barnhardt, and Company D, Twenty-seventh Infantry, under First Lieut. C. S. Fries.

While these troops were not at the front, the services they were called upon to perform were of the highest character, and without them the advance could never have been successful.

I can not close this report without calling attention to the most excellent work of the medical officers and hospital corps men and to the members of the signal corps, who by strenuous efforts kept the line up with the troops, making communication possible nearly all the time.

I desire to call special attention to the effective work done by the Twenty-fifth Battery Field Artillery, equipped as a mountain battery. On the several occasions it was called into action it demonstrated skill of the highest character, and established that branch of the service beyond any question as being a most effective and valuable organization to any command operating in a country where wheels can not be taken.

At the battle of Bayan the fire from the battery, after an hour's duration, temporarily silenced the fire of the Fort of Pandapatan, and not until the infantry line had gotten so close to this fort that it was impossible for the battery to fire longer without endangering our own men did the enemy venture to open fire again.

During the attack by infantry, when the fire from the battery was perforce silent, the men of the organization rendered most valuable assistance in going to the firing line and bringing back our wounded to places of comparative safety.

And alike with the infantry, there are no words of praise too strong to convey the full appreciation of the commanding officer for the services of the entire command on the 2d day of May, 1902, at the battle of Bayan.

Under trying conditions, where not an officer or soldier falters in the discharge of his duties, it is difficult to discriminate during a battle of the magnitude of that of Bayan, but under such circumstances there is generally some one or more who would and did display qualities that marked in the mind of their commanding officer and comrades special acts that calls for the special commendation and reward that is bestowed for such actions by our Government. These cases will be made the subject of a separate report.

To Lieutenant Vicars, and the nine men who were either killed on the battlefield or died soon after of their wounds, words are inadequate, and only profound respect and memory for them will ever be their reward from their surviving comrades.

There were captured during this battle 17 lantacas, 3 iron cannon, 1 brass howitzer, and 43 rifles of different patterns, also several hundred weapons such as are used by these people.

On the 4th of May I moved my entire command about one-half mile south of the battlefield, where a permanent camp was established, which was, in honor of Lieutenant Vicars, Twenty-seventh Infantry, who was killed on the 2d day of May, 1902, named Camp Vicars.

General Chaffee, Colonel Sanger, and Capt. J. R. Lindsey, Fifteenth Cavalry, aide-de-camp, arrived at Camp Vicars on the 11th day of May, 1902, departing the following day. The General was very profuse in his expressions of satisfaction and pleasure at the completeness of our work.

Appended hereto are reports of the commanders of different organizations engaged, and reports of the intelligence office and engineer officer, including maps of the trail and battlefield and a drawing of the fort, together with a file of orders. Official copies of telegrams from the President of the United States and from Generals Chaffee, Wade, and Davis are also inclosed.^a

Very respectfully,

FRANK D. BALDWIN,
Colonel Twenty-seventh U. S. Infantry, Commanding.

APPENDIX 11.

REPORT COMMANDING OFFICER PUERTO PRINCESA, ISLAND OF PARAGUA.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT MINDANAO AND JOLO,
Puerto Princesa, P. I., September 30, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT MINDANAO AND JOLO,
Zamboanga, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that during the past month all important points in this district have been visited personally by myself or by a commissioned officer. Having few officers present for duty, a number of detached posts are at present in command of noncommissioned officers. As a rule, they have performed their duties well; but the condition demands frequent inspection to insure the maintenance of tranquillity. At present there is no trouble existing in any part of the district of a serious nature. While the palay crop has been a failure in some places on account of late planting and attacks of locusts, the general condition of the people is greatly improved since our arrival, May last.

BARRACKS AND QUARTERS.

The work on barracks at Puerto Princesa has lagged for want of funds, and this is true of all Government work in the district. No funds have been received for current fiscal year.

HEALTH OF TROOPS.

There has been practically no sickness of a serious nature during the past month, the malarial cases at Puerto Princesa, reported last month, having all recovered. Instructions for isolation of all venereal cases were given soon after arrival, and at places where same have been followed there has been little trouble. This class of infirmity, however, furnishes the medical department with a greater part of its work, and it is believed that drastic measures to prevent spread should be taken. Lack of medicines for issue to natives and lack of medical officers has, however, greatly interfered with plans in this direction.

For some time to come it will be necessary for the medical department to render such service as is possible for sick natives, there not being a native physician or a drug store in the district. The commissary department has also been called upon to aid indigent and infirm poor, as the financial resources of the different towns were completely exhausted by the demands of the insurrecto government during the past three years. It will no doubt require at least a year for the people to recover suffi-

^a Reports, orders, and telegrams not printed.

ciently from the effects of insurrecto misgovernment to enable them to bear the full burden of the support of the most economically administered civil government that can be devised.

CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

While a civil government has been provisionally established throughout the district, many offices have been lopped off and salaries reduced. As a rule, the native civil officials have performed their duties faithfully and satisfactorily during the past month. In Cuyo, Agutaya, and a part of northern Paragua elections have been held for local offices.

SCHOOLS.

Schools are being established as rapidly as possible. At present fourteen schools are in operation, English being taught in all. The establishment of two agricultural and mechanical training schools has been repeatedly recommended. The methods of agriculture are crude and knowledge of use of tools extremely limited. The children are bright, quick to learn, and as a rule ambitious. This question is considered of the greatest importance in this district.

CHARACTER OF INHABITANTS.

The general character appears to be peaceful and domestic. Something new, however, presents itself from day to day, and positive statement at this time would not appear to be justified.

The Cuyuanos and Agutayanos are unquestionably good farmers, stock raisers, sailors, and traders. They are ambitious to learn, and have shown themselves loyal to the United States Government. There are, however, many deportados in the district; though, fortunately, most of the Tagalog prisoners held here under the Spanish régime have drifted back to Luzon or Mindoro.

WHARFS.

The only wharf left in the district is at Puerto Princesa, and it should be repaired as soon as possible. Estimates for funds covering cost of construction of new wharfs at Cuyo and Culion have been duly submitted, and estimates covering cost of repair of wharf at Puerto Princesa is being prepared.

ROADS.

Estimates for important roads have been prepared and forwarded for approval. The importance of having at least three good roads from the east to the west coast of Paragua and one across the island of Cuyo has been duly set forth in previous reports. A little work has been accomplished near Princesa and Cuyo in the way of repairing bridges and roads, but little can be done unless funds can be furnished from the central government. The Spanish authorities turned their attention to the island of Paragua only a few years prior to the late war, and they made every effort to induce the more advanced natives of other islands to come here, going so far as to make this port free to foreign trade, transporting natives of other islands and their effects free, and relieving inhabitants from taxation, except for local government.

Under these conditions very considerable progress appears to have been made in a comparatively short time, but the intervening period of insurrecto misrule has done much to tear down what had been built. The building of a few good roads across the island of Paragua will, it is believed, greatly encourage settlement of the island by Christian natives and prove of great value also to the military authorities in event of future trouble.

INDUSTRIES.

During the month the people have taken up the manufacture of cloth, especially in Cuyo, and native looms may be seen in many private houses. One Spanish firm has sent representatives here to arrange for getting out lumber, and I am informed that certain capitalists in Manila and the United States have arranged to establish a saw-mill on the bay of Malampaya on the west coast. Boat building is carried on to a limited extent. The island is very rich in native timber, and if properly instructed and directed the native inhabitants could find profitable employment in working same up into marketable articles of furniture, etc. With this end in view, application has been made for the establishment of mechanical training schools and for artisans skilled in the manufacture of rattan furniture.

THE MOROS.

During the month Dato Batoraso, who was appointed chief dato of Paragua and Balabac by Gen. J. C. Bates, U. S. Army, on his visit to this island two years ago, visited Puerto Princesa during the past month and left for Bono Bono a few days ago. He expressed himself well pleased with all he saw. His attitude has been friendly toward the American Government from the first, and it is believed that friendly relations can be maintained. The presence of a gunboat is considered indispensable at this time, as it is not deemed advisable or expedient to station troops among the Moros under the command of noncommissioned officers. The situation can be handled more diplomatically and efficiently with the aid of a gunboat, for which the Moros have a most hearty respect. By no other means can the slave and contraband trade be stopped.

The services of the officers of the gunboats ordered here under my instructions have proven very satisfactory; but the inconvenience attending their leaving this station during my absence from district headquarters can be readily understood, and I would respectfully request that, if possible, relieving gunboat be ordered here before the departure of the one on duty in this district. Under the Spanish régime the gunboats on this station were cleaned and repaired at Puerto Princesa.

PRISONERS—NATIVES.

During the month the cases of twenty prisoners have been investigated, and there being no specific charges against them, they have been paroled—i. e., given the liberty of the town where they are held and required to report each day.

Total paroled	50
Under guard	11
Captured during month	0
Killed during month	0
Total	61
Arms captured previous months	80
Arms captured during month	0
Total	80

No Americans have been captured, wounded, or killed since the date of taking possession of the district. Capt. E. A. Helmick, Tenth Infantry, reports that on recent trip to island of Balabac he found detachment of marines stationed at light-house out of medicines and one man seriously sick, whom he brought back with him to Puerto Princesa. It is believed that said detachment might be more conveniently supplied from this place by gunboat serving on this station.

NATIVE TROOPS.

None have yet been allowed this district. I am convinced that such troops would be of great service here and I have repeatedly recommended that authority be granted me to enlist or employ Cuyuans for service in Paragua and the Calamianes.

As stated before, the Cuyuans have been loyal to the American Government from the first, repeatedly requesting that American troops be sent to take charge of the islands. Their employment would have good moral effect throughout the district. I am satisfied that no ill effects would follow the employment of Cuyuans as recommended. They can be more easily cared for at small detached posts and on scouting service than American soldiers, and are practically immune to local diseases, which break down Americans even when carefully watched and cared for.

LACK OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.

From the first the work here has been seriously handicapped for want of officers. The three company officers present command separate posts, and are responsible for public property and funds. They also necessarily have all local civil duties to perform, and act as provost marshals.

The battalion quartermaster is also district adjutant-general and district quartermaster and commissary. Until recently there was but one surgeon in the district. This has thrown all the detached service on the district commander, and leaves a number of stations in command of noncommissioned officers. This statement is not

made in spirit of complaint, but is intended to add weight to the recommendation under head of "Native troops."

I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. LE ROY BROWN,
Major, Tenth U. S. Infantry,
Commanding Fourth District, Department Mindanao and Jolo.

APPENDIX. 12.

REPORT OF EXPLORING EXPEDITION COTABATO TO LAKE BULUAN, MINDANAO.

COTABATO, MINDANAO, P. I.,
January 29, 1902.

The ADJUTANT,
Cotabato, Mindanao, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with Special Orders, No. 7, post of Cotabato, Mindanao, P. I., dated January 19, 1902, I have the honor to submit the following report, inclosing road map herewith:

Proceeded to Cudarangan by quartermaster's launch *Detroit* on the morning of the 20th instant; arrived there at 5 p. m. Due to the delay in procuring guides and bearers and the transaction of other business with which I had been charged, it was found necessary to await the following morning before proceeding to Reina Regente.

Arrived at Reina Regente at 9 a. m., 21st instant.

To obviate the necessity of hiring numerous bearers it was decided to leave all property and rations not absolutely necessary for our use at Reina Regente.

Left Reina Regente at 11 a. m. with six bearers and one guide, but after arriving near Dato Alli's place the baggage and rations we still had were found to be a serious impediment to rapid progress. After having dinner I therefore decided to take one day's rations and push on to Utto's rancheria, sending one scout and the bearers back to Reina Regente with our baggage, where he had orders to hire a large vinta and bring all of our supplies to Utto's rancheria by water without delay.

Thus lightened we made rapid progress to the camp at A., arriving there at 2 p. m.; estimated distance marched, 8 miles. The trail for the first 5 miles was good, the latter 3 miles very bad, very muddy; always ankle deep, frequently knee deep, and sometimes waist deep in mud and water.

We made camp at A., and after I had investigated the country to the southeast found it overrun with water, the water in the Dansalan River being very high and very swift.

I found all available trails to the southeast from this point impassable, and from what I could see and from the reports of my guide, the trail to Utto's rancheria at this season was impassable without a vinta.

I therefore procured a passing vinta, and sent my guide back to Reina Regente to direct the large vinta which had been previously sent for to pick us up on its trip to Utto's rancheria.

The vinta arrived at our camp at dusk of the same evening. The next morning, the 22d, at 6 o'clock we left by vinta for Utto's rancheria. The trip up the river Dansalan was very slow and difficult against the swift current, and during the trip, which took until nearly 4 p. m., I landed several times, but found the land flooded, the river banks overflowing in all directions.


Up to this point very few houses and people were seen. A subdato was caught up with on the trail to camp. He was going eastwardly to some place on the Reina Regente Island, and had three followers, two of whom carried Remington rifles, caliber .45, in good condition, and about 50 rounds of ammunition each; the third carried native weapons. They were friendly, but had nothing to say, as they were in a hurry. We stopped at a house on the west bank of the Dansalan in a coconut grove. The owner was a friend of Dato Piang, placed there to look after the trees. He and his family immediately retired within their house upon our appearance, and no information could be gotten from the man except that he was a "friend of Piang's," and Utto's rancheria was two hours paddling up stream. I offered to buy a working bolo he had, as it was needed to cut wood, but he wouldn't sell it.

Utto's rancheria proved to be the driest and cleanest place I had yet seen. A native blacksmith shop is on the east bank near the town, and he was very busy making bolos, so the natives said.

Many of the houses here were well and neatly made, much better than any we had yet seen. There were about eight in sight.

with S.O. #7. Post of.
Manao, P.I. Jan'y 19th 1902.
Via Reina Regenta and
on by water. Jan'y 20th to
1902.

L. J. Mygatt.
2nd Lieut. 17th U.S. Infantry.



A young Moro met us at the bank where we landed, and said he was Utto's son. He took us to the native house at B. where we landed our supplies, sending our vinta around to the east in the estero, which latter they call Bacat. The house had a leaky roof and was in poor condition generally, which we found to our sorrow, as it rained heavily before the next morning. The house had accommodated the chaplain and his party the night before, and was the living house of the young dato.

That evening he called upon me, but had very few people with him and seemed disinclined to talk, being nothing more than a boy. He said he had very few people there and was looking after the place for his father, who was living near Cotabato. He had little to say, and not a murmur of a complaint against anyone could be gotten out of him; he seemed to be at peace with the world and said he was "Piang's friend."

The next morning, the 23d, my guide, Guintao, reported that Lieutenant Lear's trail to Buluan was now impassable because of high water; that it could not be made without vintas, and that, in any event, it would take six days by land. The information obtained from the residents was of the same caliber. As I did not believe the truth of the statements, I demanded to see the trail and try it.

Anticipating a rough trip, I took with me the sergeant, one native scout, and two guides, and no baggage except canteens, haversacks, and a little bacon, hard bread, and coffee, it being impracticable to carry anything more. Leaving orders for the vinta to wait there till 6 a. m. of the 25th (in the event I should not be able to get through and be compelled to return), at which time they were to leave with vinta for Buluan and there wait for me, we started on Lieutenant Lear's old trail.

For the first 2 miles the mud was up to our knees, after which we struck good, hard, sandy soil. For 5 miles the trail ran through a level country, the edge of the woods coming down on each side to a distance of 10 or 20 yards. The trail here was excellent, the grass short, and the country very pretty. The grass was of good quality and had been grazed short by carabao or cattle. The trail then ran into a high canebrake, the cane being 10 or 15 feet high, and we did not get clearly out of it till dark. For 7 miles the ground was solid, but the cane so thick that it was often very difficult to get through it, sometimes it being necessary to crawl on hands and knees or break it down. The guide was an excellent one and knew the trail thoroughly.

The next 4 miles was generally very muddy and swampy, oftentimes up to our waists in mud and water; the cane was much thicker. At dusk we arrived at C., on the river Taga, having marched about 18 miles.

I believe this river Taga is another outlet of Lake Buluan, but I could get no definite information about it from the guides; it flows in a northerly direction.

As an example of the simplicity and resourcefulness of the Moros and their perfect familiarity with the country's conditions, the following is given: That morning when we had started the two guides had eaten some rice. They had marched all day from 6 a. m. till dark and had made rapid progress, considering the difficulties (sometimes they had to be stopped in order for us to catch up). With the exception of chewing a little betel nut and buyos, they had eaten nothing and drunk nothing during the day; they seemed fresh at nightfall. As we had nothing in which to cook our meals except one tin cup and a meat can, and as the Moros had absolutely nothing, when we reached camp I wondered how the Moros would cook the rice which one of them carried. I did not have long to wait, when I saw my guide go to a bamboo thicket nearby, and with a few strokes of his bolo he lopped off several joints of bamboo, leaving the tops open. He then filled these cylindrical vessels with rice and a little water, stopped the open ends with grass, and leaned these improvised rice pots against the flames of the campfire. The joints of bamboo were green, which, together with the water inside, prevented them from burning through or cracking. In a very short time we had enough cooked rice to last five men several hours. The rice was very palatable, and I believe much more nutritious than the greasy bacon, hard bread, and coffee which we had. I had been ill for two days with fever, but this simple and wholesome diet on an empty stomach strengthened me so much that the next day I ate nothing but rice, finally arriving at Buluan in good health and very hungry.

After eating supper at camp at C. the mosquitoes came in swarms, being very plentiful in this marshy country, and probably being attracted to a great extent by the light of the campfire. They became so thick and troublesome that we built a ring of fire and smoke, inside of which we laid down, trying to sleep. Although our heads were within a few feet of the fire and smoke, the pests were still most annoying, making it impossible even for the Moros to get any rest. This went on for nearly four hours, at which time I decided that it was better to march all night rather than to wear ourselves out in this way.

I ascertained that the village of a dato called Mopuk was but half a day's march to the southeast, and that we could get a good rest there; so, although much fatigued, we pushed on. The trail proved to be partly good, but mostly mud and water. Almost upon starting we crossed a low place and got wet to our middles. At this hour of the night in the swamp the water felt icy cold. The heavy dew soon soaked us through as the grass hung over our heads. We were very soon wet to the skin, and active walking did not seem to warm us any. The sergeant had a serious chill before morning. After a hard trip of about four and a half hours we arrived on the east bank of the river Taga, which we had to cross in order to get to Dato Mopuk's, a mile south. Here the ford was found to be too swift and dangerous to attempt at night, so we built a fire where we were, after much difficulty, and shivered about it till daylight. The two guides were tired out and went to sleep, curled up under a tree, while we were trying to get warm. In some unaccountable way they had each managed to carry a dry "malung," tied in a bundle, which they had now opened, and after wrapping themselves up went sound asleep. The guides seemed to be prepared for any and all emergencies. (I would recommend Guintao to anyone who makes this trip in the future as an excellent guide. He is one of Piang's men.)

The next morning we forded the Taga, which was very swift and breast deep, by joining hands in crossing. The trail from this ford to Dato Mopuk's was the worst I ever saw or hope to see again. The entire way was heavy black mud and swamp water. After wading through the mud and fording several small freshets and lakes, we came to Dato Mopuk's "village." It consisted of one large house, about 30 by 90 feet, and not more than six other shacks. There was a small rivulet, now swollen into a torrent, and very deep, which we had to cross to get to the houses. A vinta was sent for us, which was so small that with four of us in it it sank, luckily in a shallow place. After being safely landed, finally, one by one, we reached the other side without further mishap at 8 a. m. the 24th instant.

Dato Mopuk gave us his large new house, just completed but not yet occupied, and brought us some chickens and eggs, a large cane mat, and a mosquito bar big enough for all of us.

The mat was very dirty, and he thought it was strange that I should have it washed. He was a stolid, stupid man about 35 years of age, of average size for a Moro, and with a noticeable and disgusting deformity about the lower lip. Upon being asked if he cared to please the Americans, he replied that he did, because they were great friends of Piang. I then asked him if he was at war with any other dato, or if he had been imposed upon by any more powerful neighbor, or if he had complaint to make of any nature. I assured him that the Americans would see him righted if his claims were justifiable. He seemed much embarrassed by this question and waited some time before he answered. Finally all the reply he vouchsafed was "I am Piang's friend."

He claimed he had 2,000 followers, but there were no houses or other indications in sight to prove his statement. He said the principal occupation of his people was raising palay.

We rested at this dato's house all that day and night. The next morning at 8 o'clock we left for Buluan, which we made at 3 p. m. the same day, the nature of the trail being similar to that of the preceding night.

Buluan is situated on comparatively high ground and about 4 miles from the nearest mountains. Northwest of Buluan and west of the Buluan River there is a couple of square miles of land which is said to be always above water. Good, clear drinking water is plentiful all the year, and is supplied from a stream at a short distance.

The Datos Balmol and Mongora live here in close proximity. They say they don't fight with each other because Piang won't let them, and that Piang took their men away until they have but 200 now left.

A tiange of considerable size was visited at this place. About 200 Moros were present, all armed with spears or bolos. They are the same class of natives that are seen about Cotabato. The principal products in the tiange were palay, sugar cane, dried fish, river shrimp, a few bananas, and salt, and some native mats and cloth.

I had to wait at Buluan a day for my vinta, which had not yet arrived. It was nearly two days making the trip, starting at 6 a. m. the 25th and arriving at 4 p. m. the following day.

The river at Buluan is about 150 feet wide and 6 feet deep. The river at Buluan itself is reported to be the same all the year. The water is almost black, and smells strongly of decayed vegetation, the latter condition being due, doubtless, to the river being an overflow to Lake Buluan, which lake is full of vegetation, much of it in a decayed condition.

The river from Buluan to Lake Liguasin is about 18 miles long. It is very swift, with many esteros running in almost the same direction and joining the main river lower down. The ascent of the main river by vinta is impracticable, the

small esteros being used instead, their current being much slower. Even so, progress by paddling in some places is impossible, it being necessary to use poles against the banks.

The descent to the lake, of course, was made quickly. Upon entering Lake Liguasin the water was clear for a mile or so; it then became studded with small floating islands which grew thicker and thicker as we proceeded northward, the voyage through the lake to the Rio Grande taking from 10 a. m. of the 27th until 5 p. m.

The way was so blocked that oftentimes we had to go back and start in a new direction, which was the only way to get through the densely and closely packed vegetation and small islands in our course.

It seems that no constant path across the lake is known, as the winds shift the islands about so that a new route has to be found each time the trip is made. We went about 15 miles in crossing the lake; much of it was done by poling through the islands or over the floating cabbage.

Arrived at Cudarangan at 8 p. m.; left Cudarangan 6 a. m., 28th; arrived at Cotabato 12.30 p. m. same day.

Total distance marched, 52 miles; total distance by vinta, 130 miles; total, 182 miles.

To the best of my knowledge and belief a practicable land route can be found east of the Dansalan River to Utto's rancheria, as the natives report the river itself fordable at low water, and the sergeant in command of the detachment at Reina Regente reported to me that he had made this trip without a vinta some three or four weeks ago, when the water was much lower, although even then it was a very rough and wet trail.

The land trail marked on map is practicable for a telegraph line, and I believe the shortest land route to Buluan that is passable at all seasons.

The habits and language of the natives met are similar to those of the natives about Cotobato, being all Moros of the Rio Grande Valley and under the immediate influence of Dato Piang.

The water from Cotobato to Buluan is practicable by vinta. Estimated length of time for voyage of ordinary sized vinta loaded with supplies, five days.

The map inclosed was made with the assistance of a cavalry sketching case and an extra compass, except from Utto's rancheria to Buluan, where it was impracticable to carry the sketching case. Distances were necessarily estimated, but every effort was made to obtain the true direction.

Respectfully submitted.

L. J. MYGATT,

Second Lieutenant and Batt. Q. M. and Commissary, Seventeenth U. S. Infantry.

APPENDIX 13.

REPORT OF EXPLORING EXPEDITION, COTTOBATO TO MACAR, MINDANAO.

COTTOBATO, MINDANAO, P. I., *January 27, 1902.*

The ADJUTANT,

Post of Cottobato.

SIR: In compliance with Special Orders, No. 2, current series, dated Post of Cottobato, Mindanao, P. I., January 7, 1902, I have the honor to report as follows:

January 8.—Left Cotobato at 7.30 a. m. with 8 enlisted men of Company A, Seventeenth Infantry, and 2 privates Company 50, Philippine Scouts, and proceeded up the Rio Grande River to Taveran, arriving at 11 a. m. Had considerable difficulty in getting enough rowers for the party. Left Taveran at 5.30 p. m. in 5 small vintas with 13 rowers; rowed until 7.30 p. m., and camped for the night on high ground at the junction of the Estero Vintana with the Estero Butilan (or Talayan).

The high-water mark on the trees was 9 feet above the water level at this time; it was 4 feet above the ground. If water was that high, the entire surrounding country would be inundated. Mosquitoes very bad, and water has to be boiled. Distance by launch, 26 miles; in vintas, 7 miles.

January 9.—Left camp at 7 a. m. and turned to right at Estero Vintana. The outlet of this estero has been cut by hand, and with the water as it was at this time is only passable for smaller-sized vintas; 3 to 6 feet wide and 2 to 10 feet deep; estero in places choked up by water cabbages; poles necessary to get through. About 5 miles up reached Tokal, the site of the old rancheria of the Sultan of Nunangin; entirely deserted now, no trace of houses; everything was destroyed by Piang in 1898. Current was against us until we reached Tokal, and for about 200 yards there was no current, and from there on the current was with us. About 2 miles from

Tokal a small estero, "Mangay," entered the one we were on from the left; not passable by vintas. About a mile farther we had to land, as vintas could go no farther by boat. Disembarked at 10 a. m. and put packs on our rowers. Had to send to some houses about 600 yards away for 3 Moro packers, and then did not have enough, so carried part of the loads ourselves. Marched about 4 miles and reached the Talayan River, the trail running along the bank, which was quite high, for a while, and then over a hilly country on right side of the river, across a swamp about a half mile wide, and on other side was the rancheria of the Sultan of Talayan. Distance by vinta, 8 miles; marched 10 miles; arrived at Talayan at 4 p. m. The sultan was very friendly. He sent word out to the datos around there to come in, and I met them all. The sultan says he has about 600 men, 10 small arms, 20 lantakas, and 4 old cannon. He has a very large crop of rice, and a large number of storehouses filled with it. I saw about 25 houses besides the storehouses.

January 10.—Left Talayan at 8.30 a. m. with 24 native bearers carrying all our packs and rations across the Talayan river in boats; the river here about 25 yards wide, with high banks, quite deep. We proceeded up the left bank of the Talayan, passed the rancheria of the Rajah Mudá; road was through high grass part of the time and over a large field about 4 miles across; the grass knee deep; good trail; recrossed the Talayan River about 5 miles up; river here was knee deep, rocky bottom, clear, and good water. Went about a mile up the right bank and crossed and camped for lunch at "Taboo," a tiangi for the Tirurayas. There was no one there; just about five small houses to sell things in; they sell yams and rubber. The trail was very good to this place. From Taboo there are two trails leading out—one to mountains southwest and one to the southeast; was told the one to the southwest was only to a town of the Tirurayas; the other was over the mountains, so I took the southeast one. The trail was very poor and indistinct, passing at times up the beds of different creeks running into the Talayan River; passed a large banyan tree with eleven large trunks coming down from a height of 50 feet and taking root, these trunks being about the size of a man's body; tree was 150 feet high at least. Marched until 5.30 p. m. and camped on the bed of a branch of the Talayan; the mountains over which our trail leads seem to go straight up from here. Distance marched, 11 miles.

January 11.—Left camp at 7 o'clock and took trail up the mountain; trail was well worn here, but very steep and slippery; met a Tiruraya native about halfway up, who guided us to the village of Tapook; five houses in sight; name of timuay (dato) was Bandara; he has about 80 people. Before we reached Tapook our trail led out on a point where we could look down about 1,000 feet into a pocket in the mountains, where the Talayan River heads. We could see three large waterfalls in different directions dropping down into the valley; all had a fall of from 300 to 400 feet. It was a very beautiful scene. These falls are called the Falls of Maneeri. Camped for noon at Tapook, and afterwards got some more Tiruraya carriers, and under the guidance of the timuay took a trail to the next village. The natives were very friendly, and curious as soon as they found out we were not going to hurt them. They said they had heard of Americans, but did not know whether we were black, red, or yellow. The Tirurayas were very well-built men, small but almost perfect physically; they are the very best carriers one can get for mountain work; they will carry 50 pounds all day long and so fast that one has to call to them to stop to catch up. Our Moro packers were not to be compared to them. They were very well satisfied with 15 cents' worth (Mexican currency) of red cloth for a day's work; they have no use for money, as all their buying and selling is in trade. We arrived at the town of Rumut at 5.30; four small huts in sight, all situated on the tops of the small peaks.

The headman, or timuay, is called Urang Kiya. He has about 80 men. All his crops are in camotes or yams, as are all the crops of the Tirurayas so far. These yams are excellent eating, being much better than any I had seen before, very large and mealy. Small patches of camotes are scattered around through the mountains; some at a great distance from the town. I was told that it was done in case their town was destroyed and they had to flee, or that sometimes the wild hogs would destroy one patch and they had to have others to fall back on. I asked them if they were at war with anyone; they said they were at war with the Durangen. I asked why, and they said they did not know; that their fathers were at war. They can not remember of anyone being killed, only if one of their men should stray into Durangen country, and a Durangen should die, the Durangens would kill their man, as it was presumed that he had bewitched the dead man. The Tirurayas would do the same with a Durangen. Marched 10 miles.

January 12.—Left Rumut at 7 a. m. The timuay Urang Kiya offered to guide us to the next village; we accepted his offer and got about six new packers, letting the Tirurayas we had from the last town go. The Tirurayas were all anxious to carry packs for half a yard of cloth, but they will only go from one to two days' journey

away from their villages, as they are afraid to come back alone. They are very timid people. We had to be very careful in entering a town to send a man on ahead to let them know we were friendly, and the man we sent had to be some one they knew. Trail to next village very poor; we had to cut our way most of the time; looked like it had not been used for six months. There is but very little, if any, communication between some of the Tiruraya towns and none at all with anyone else. Trail was up and down several high mountains; passed the river Paraguas and 3 miles farther the river Clamay, and on top of hill overlooking the latter reached the town of Rabon at 11 a. m. All the rivers there are small and clear; no traces of gold or minerals. The timuay of Rabon is named Si-alla, and he was a sort of head timuay; said he had heard of town of "Tlan," three days fast traveling. We were inquiring about Glan. This is the first place we have received any information about any towns at all other than the next village. We can find no one that has ever gone into country southeast of here, where we should go; they say there are no towns and no people living there and no trails, and as I have to depend upon the towns to buy enough yams for my Moro packers to live on, I have to travel where they are. All our course has been south or west of south so far, no trails leading to the southeast. At all these villages everyone and everything we have is a curiosity, especially our firearms. I generally give an exhibition at the request of the timuay at each village, first cautioning them not to be afraid and run when the gun goes off. I take a rifle and shoot into a large tree; if it goes through they are thunderstruck. I shoot a bird on the wing with a shotgun or a can thrown in the air, and once I worked my Mauser revolver as fast as I could, but I did not try it again, as when I stopped all the Tirurayas had run away, and it was some time before I could reassure them. Left Rabon at 12 m., passed falls of Rabon, arrived at town of Guas, timuay Sapalou, at 1.30; has 100 men; four houses in sight; corn and yams. Arrived at town of Creas 6 p. m., timuay Madoo; 100 men; eight houses in sight. Trail was very good most of the time; in places overgrown by running bamboo or bahuca, so that one had to bend double to pass underneath; very hard traveling. Distance, 13 miles marched.

January 13.—Left Creas 7 a. m. Our trail was very good at first, no steep mountains to climb, the trail going along the side of the main range; underbrush all cut down and a large number of rubber trees; traveled 6 miles, and trail was very poor, a great deal of bahuca or rattan growing over it, about waist high, making it necessary to stoop all the time. The character of the country has changed some; it is not so rugged. Crossed two rivers—the Mac Mac and the Malayao, the latter being the largest; stopped for half an hour and washed bed rock for gold; found a trace, one color and no more; before crossing the Malayao we passed a large camote or yam patch, with about ten houses in all, deserted; yams were in good condition. Arrived at a large valley from 2 to 3 miles wide; open country, but high grass, except in places where it had been burned. This has been the first open country we have met; heretofore we could never see more than a couple of hundred yards, on account of heavy timber, even on top of the mountains. The river "Tran" runs through this valley; river about 50 yards wide and waist deep; water slightly muddy. Camped at noon on high bank of river; saw a large mountain bearing 75 degrees east of south; natives called it Mount Matutum; same name as the volcano north of Sarangani Bay, but found out afterwards that it was not the same; mountain was 30 miles away; Matutum means "has burnt," in native language, and all extinct volcanoes, nearly, are called the same. Crossed river at 1 p. m. and followed up bed of creek emptying in same on other side about a mile, and came out on high grassy hills overlooking the river; was delayed considerably by our Moro packers giving out, although they had very light loads. Their feet are all cut up, and they can not march very fast; we have to stop every little while for them to catch up; I can not leave them behind, as they would either starve or force the natives to give them food and make trouble. Arrived at Manobo, town of Boom Boom, 5.30 p. m. Distance marched, 16 miles.

This is the first Manobo town we have met; natives are very much the same as Tirurayas, but, if anything, even more timid. They are not as good as Tirurayas. The timuay of Boom Boom is named Mangoda. To this place I had no trouble in procuring all the bearers and guides I wanted, but here I almost had to impress them. Heretofore the timuay of the village has generally guided us to the next voluntarily, but here, although the timuay said the night before he would have guides for us at daylight; when daylight came I had to send for him to get them, and at 8 o'clock they had not showed up, and the people, whenever we asked them to guide us, would go off. The timuay did not seem to help us any; so I told him I would start in ten minutes, and if he did not have four men to guide us in that time I would take him (the timuay himself), willing or not willing. He started to saunter off then, but I told a man to stop him, and when he saw that I meant what I said, he called out, and in ten minutes we had four men, or rather an old man, his two sons, and one other.

The people seemed to be very much afraid, and I saw some of the women leaving their houses and taking to the timber, but there was no other way to do, as I had to have a guide to the coast. These Manobos here have very little, if any, communication with outside people, or even with their own tribe. They worship "a big black bird in the mountains." One man said he had seen it. I told them I wanted to go in a southeast or easterly direction, but they told me there was no one living in that direction, and that the only trail going out led in a southwest direction and led to the coast. As I had to depend on the towns that I passed for food for my packers, I decided to go in that direction.

January 14.—Left Boom Boom at 8.30 a. m. Trail was very poor and much of the time over fallen trees that the natives could run along like squirrels, but the Americans would slip off. We had to go on the ground and climb over them; trail led out in a southeast direction; trail was very crooked; natives seemed to have no idea of a straight trail between two points. We traveled 6 miles, first going southeast and then south southwest, west, and north, making a large circle; trail finally went on to an open marshy country, about 2 miles square, entirely surrounded by high mountains. This was about 6 miles from Boom Boom, and from there on the trail went fairly straight in a westerly direction. Crossed the river "Secoon;" washed for gold, but found no traces; about 4 miles reached "Taboo," a tungi of the Manobos; one house, no one living there. "Taboo" means "tungi," or market place; stopped for dinner. Left Taboo at about 1.30 p. m. and marched about 1 mile, where trail started down the hill; could see the sea from top of a tree at Taboo; trail went down almost straight; very steep, without a break; trail very well worn; dropped about 2,000 feet in a couple of miles walking. At the foot of the mountain there was a kind of lake, made by the overflowing of the Tran River, which comes out of the mountains just north of here. Walked about 2 miles and came to the Tiruraya town of Ulas; 5 houses; 80 people; crops of corn. These people had formerly lived in the mountains and had just come down. Distance marched, 16 miles.

The mountains here are high and steep and run up from close to the sea.

January 15.—Left Ulas about 6.30 a. m. and marched south and southwest; trail very good, cut up in places by caribacs. Reached town of Baloolow about 10.30, Moro town. Dato Matabala, a relation of Dato Guinbangin, says he had not lived here long; he had moved from town of Tran, near mouth of river of that name. Moved on account of there being more rubber to be had at new place. He said there was a famine in the country south of us; he is planting no rice, but depending upon Chinamen to trade rice and cloth for rubber. As soon as my Moros struck their countrymen, some of them refused to go a step farther. Their feet were all cut up and sore, and I guess the work was too hard for them. Fifteen refused to go and nine said they would stay. I told them they would have to come with me to Leboc, half a day's journey, whether they wanted to or not. Finally, after a little maneuvering, we got them started. Baloolow is 7 miles from Ulas. Left Baloolow about 11 a. m.; trail very good along the coast for quite a distance and then overland across a point to Lubok. Trail overland very poor, in fact no trail at all, through high grass. Our guide was lost. Said he had not been over the trail for over 3 years. Passed the old Spanish fort of Lubok, about 60 yards square, surrounded by a moat; wall 4 feet thick, of stone and in good condition; gate gone; no buildings standing inside the fort; all overgrown with underbrush. Arrived at Lubok about 5.30; no trace of an old town; about 20 small huts on coast, erected within three months; Dato Wata Mama Timan in charge. Distance marched, 21 miles.

January 16.—Stayed at Lubok; discharged the 15 Moros and told them to go back to Cotobato, and that when I returned I would put them in the calaboose for leaving me. I gave them just enough money to buy food on way back, to prevent them from stealing. Made arrangements to get vintas in the afternoon to take us to Cran, about 40 miles down the coast. I could not go by land on account of famine. The Moros depend entirely upon the Manobos and Chinos for food, and do not till their ground at all. Their entire business is the rubber trade. They have only been engaged in it to such an extent since the Americans came. The Dato Timan was most friendly; said we were the first Americans he had ever seen; he seemed very intelligent, and asked questions about our Moro policy and what we expected of the datos. Was told that Dato Matabalaw had killed three other datos in that part of the country; names of killed were Dato Mamun, Dato Imhan, and Dato Pima, or something like that; were killed about two years ago. Suluila, a son of one of the men who were killed, escaped and reported same to Colonel Brett, who was governor at that time; nothing was done. Suluila is with Dato Baqui and Calug, near Cotobato, at present. I was told Matabalon had taken a slave, name unknown, since Americans came, but that the slave's parents bought him free and all are living with Matabalon at present. I was told Chinos were using false scales in buying rubber; told the people if they were sure to take Chino, scales, rubber, and witnesses to Cotobato and same would be regulated and Chino tried by a court.

The rubber business is alienating all the Moros from any other work. If the crops of the Manobos would fail all the Moros would be thrown on the Government to rescue from starvation. All rubber is cut; people have not heard of order prohibiting same, and do not know about tapping trees. In all probability would not do it anyway. In my opinion, the only way to stop it is to confiscate all cut rubber, and in time they would stop cutting and learn to tap trees.

In the afternoon, as we were getting ready to embark in vintas, the U. S. S. *Annapolis* came into the bay. I signaled her to send boat ashore, and when that came went on board. The captain was very kind, and said he would take me and detachment to Cran, so embarked that night and lay at anchor in the bay until morning.

January 17.—Left Lubok at 5.30 a. m. on the U. S. S. *Annapolis*, and arrived at Cran about 10.30 a. m. Dato Timan came with us, as Cran is under his jurisdiction. Met at Cran Dato Tubotubo, Andung, and Ponongsang; all were very friendly. Chino vinta at Cran buying rubber. They pay about \$15, Mexican currency, per picul for rubber, and give cloth in trade. Left Cran about 1 p. m. Sent some of our blankets and heavy baggage we could do without on board Chino vinta to take to Cotobato, as we could not get enough bearers to carry same. All Moros at Cran in rubber business; have no food; got some rice for ourselves from the Chino vinta. All the Datos at Cran came along with us; they report good coal fields three days' journey from Cran in the mountains; saw no specimen from same. Marched along the coast; good trail. Four miles from Cran met Dato Pinul Cali. Marched 4 miles farther and camped for night at Louan River at 6.30 p. m. Distance by boat, 46 miles; by marching, 8 miles.

January 18.—Left camp at 6 a. m. and marched 12 miles and camped for noon at River Soab; left at 2 o'clock and marched 13 miles to the rancheria of the Rajah Muda of Mindanao, named Mamacu, son of the old Sultan of Mindanao, who used to live near Cotobato. He has not been there very long; is engaged in rubber trade; has very little rice he has bought from Chinos. Road was along coast until 3 miles from the Sultan's, as he calls himself, although he is only the Rajah Muda. Road there went inland around a high promontory; very bad trail, all flooded; two deep rivers, crossed by a narrow log. Arrived at the rancheria at 6 p. m.; distance marched, 25 miles; men rather tired. All our baggage was sent from Cran in a vinta rowed by our bearers; they arrived about the same time as we did. Passed a couple of Bilan houses on high promontory. They had a good crop of yams and corn.

January 19.—Left camp at 7.30 and marched 6 miles to Dato Danna, where we heard it was about two days' journey to Macar overland; that there were no troops at Glan, and all had moved to Macar; all are engaged in rubber trade; Dato Danna was very friendly; said Americans had been there, and he had been to Glan; he was the richest, and seemed the most prosperous of any dato we have met so far. I saw 7 good Remington rifles, a Winchester, 9 Lantakas, and an old cannon.

He gave us some corn for our bearers; said there was a famine along the coast, as but very few of the Sangils (or Sangalase) raised rice this year. The Sangils are to all appearances the same as Moros; found out a Chino vinta was expected that evening going to Makar, and as these people were acquainted with Americans, and food was scarce, I decided to wait for her until evening, and if she did not come, to push on on foot. Vinta arrived at 6 p. m.; we started at 10.30 p. m., and rowed all night; distance marched, 6 miles; by vinta, 15 miles.

January 20.—On board vinta; stopped at Camanga, a Sangil village at the mouth of Saragani Bay, at 7.30 a. m.; decided to wait until noon for a wind. I went ashore hunting; went about 4 miles east to the bay; country was very fine; trail excellent; not so heavily timbered as farther north; grass about knee deep. I saw no signs of any tilling of the ground; wind came up about 12 o'clock, and we started; very good wind down the bay; arrived at village near the barracks of Macar about 4.30 p. m.; marched half a mile to Macar, and stopped for the night; distance by vinta about 35 miles.

At Macar found Lieutenant Lear, Fifteenth Cavalry, and a detachment of 14 men at work on telegraph line. There was also a sergeant and 12 men of Company L, Seventeenth Infantry, stationed there. I could draw no rations, although my time would expire in one day, and it was a six days' return journey at least; was able to buy what savings they had made in hard bread, coffee, and bacon. The coffee was very acceptable, as we had been out of same for three days; met the Sultan of Talik, who had formerly lived just south of Buluan, and was driven out by Dato Piang in 1899, and 200 of his followers killed. The famine extends down this far. I could buy no rice at all. Moros here are engaged in rubber, no lands being cultivated except by Bilans in the mountains.

January 21.—Left Macar at 7.30 a. m.; had 5 pack horses; marched all day through a beautiful valley covered with grass about knee high; valley about 50 miles long and 6 to 10 miles wide.

An old bed of an immense river flowed at one time through this valley. Bed, in

places, is very distinct, about 600 to 1,000 yards wide and 50 feet or more deep, covered with trees and underbrush; volcano Matutum, extinct at present, on our right, about 10 miles away. Looks like this river had at one time drained the interior. Ground having raised, due to volcanic action, has shut the river off and made the two lakes, Buluan and Liguasan, and the entire surrounding country a marsh, water finally going off in its present course, the Rio Grande River. I should say almost anything would grow in this upland valley, and in time it will be the best portion of Mindanao for homesteads. The Simuay River runs in the bed of the old river, but looks like a drop in the bucket, although it is 30 or 40 yards wide, thigh deep, and very swift, making crossing same a very difficult feat. Water is scarce in the valley, except the river, but I am sure that wells sunk but a short distance would furnish all that is necessary. We marched 18 miles to last water in river close to trail (although we could procure same at any time by going a mile out of our road), refilled all our canteens and continued the march, and made a dry camp 6 miles farther on at 6 p. m. Camp not dry long, as very hard storm came up and made a stream where our beds were.

January 22.—Left camp at 5.30 and marched over the divide 7 miles to first water, where we stopped at 8.30 a. m. for breakfast. Had to send men about half a mile to the west to the bed of the creek for water. Found a large number of papaya trees, showing Moros had lived there at some time; found out it was before Piang drove the Sultan of Talik out of the country; marched until 5 p. m., and camped on the trail; good wood and water; distance marched, 21 miles over a splendid trail all the time so far since leaving Macar; very good country for cavalry; grass a little coarse, but if same was burnt new grass would be good.

January 23.—Left camp at 6.30 a. m., marched over good trail 12 miles to old rancheria of Sultan of Talik, destroyed by Piang in 1899; no trace of houses left; a small moat overgrown with bushes; found two or three old skulls and numerous bones; bushes grown 6 feet high over all; arrived at Talik 11 a. m.; camped for dinner at river, which we had to swim over first and make a foot bridge to carry our stuff over; sent back the five horses, one of whom had slipped a colt at the place we stopped for breakfast; before that she had been going slow, but the loss of the colt helped her along and she was better after that. Left river at 2 p. m. and marched 6 miles through mud knee deep, all cut up by carabao and grass 10 feet high, very hard walking, and camped at night at the deserted village of Louan; about 30 houses still standing; ground all around ankle deep in mud; place looked like it had been drowned out; was old village of Dato Malaclat, who has moved nearer Lake Buluan. I don't blame him for moving. After nightfall mosquitoes were so thick men could not sleep with mosquito bars, even if they kept them out, on account of the buzzing. I had to give up and go hunting wild hogs, of which there were a great many. Shot at a hog at close range, but missed on account of mosquitoes, I believe. I never saw so many, and hope I never will again. Guide also informed us he had lost trail and did not know where he was; sent two Moros on ahead at night to follow up trail we were on, as some one must live in that direction; trail seemed to be well used. They returned about 12 m. and said they had come to some houses where Moros were living and we could go from there to lake. Saw a mountain to the west that was about 20 miles away; we had passed same to the east about 5 miles on trip down; could go back that way, but question of food prevents us; also several of the men's shoes are all worn out and feet partly bare. All the country passed from Macar to the lakes has small villages of Bilans on tops of the mountains to the west of the valley, easily seen from trail. Distance marched, 18 miles.

January 24.—Left camp at 7 a. m.; trail very, very bad; all mud and water and tall grass; passed Moro village about 5 miles; trail from here was for a mile through water waist deep, and muddy at bottom; good only for ducks and carabao; arrived at Dato Malaclat at 12 m.; distance marched, 8 miles. Dato was very friendly; lives on only dry ground I have seen to-day. Got 7 small-sized vintas from him, and embarked at 4 p. m.; rowed for an hour, and had to tie up behind a submerged grassy island on account of wind, and waves coming in the boats; stayed an hour and left, but had to stop after a short row behind another island. It rained, and sun went down, and so did the waves. Pulled out once more, and arrived at Buluan town, at north end of lake on the Buluan River, at 9 p. m., and camped for the night; saw the datos at Buluan, who were friendly. I had sent to one of them by one of my Moros, who returned, saying he could not get in. Then I sent my Philippine scout to tell the dato I wanted to see him. When he came, I asked why he would not let the man I sent come in, and he explained by saying that he was asleep and only women in the houses, who were afraid to awaken him, which, I suppose, was true. Distance by vinta, 8 miles; marched 8 miles.

January 25.—Got two large vintas from the dato at Buluan, and left at 7 a. m. Our route was through the Buluan River connecting the two lakes. The entrance

to the river from Lake Buluan was not more than 3 feet wide on account of being choked up by floating islands of grass; but it widened out to about 40 yards wide for a couple of miles, when it was hard to distinguish the river from the numerous esteros; about 3 miles came to some solid ground on left bank, where there was a tiange or market. After this I could see no solid ground on either bank until I reached the Rio Grande River. Buluan River is very swift—so swift in the channel we came down that vintas must go up by another route. In one place we passed over a small fall of a couple of feet in height with our vintas, the turn at the bottom being so sharp and we going so fast that we could not turn, and our vintas went through the high grass on the bank about 30 feet. We had a hard time to get out. Entered Lake of Liguasan about 1 p. m. Lake very much the same as surrounding country, a few patches of open water, large floating islands, and rest covered with lily pads and water cabbages; small channel made by boats forcing their way through. Character of lake changes after every wind. Where there had been open water was a floating island, and vice versa. Our guide had been through the lake a number of times, but after wandering vaguely around he said, about 4 o'clock, that he was lost and did not know how to get out.

We thought we were in for it, as the lake water is unfit to drink, as in fact all the water in both lakes and rivers is without boiling. Luckily about 4.30 we saw a vinta, the first one we had met, and it proved to be occupied by an old man who had lived on the lake all his life. He said he was going our way part of the distance and would pilot us out, so we followed him, and he took us back a couple of miles and headed in an entirely different direction from the one we were going. We went about 6 miles fairly good rowing, in some places choked up. At about 7 o'clock our guide told us we were on the right path and could make it all right alone, but I had had enough of lake traveling without a guide, so told him he would have to stay until we were out. About 7.30 we had to stop on account of darkness and waited until 8 for moon to rise. Route was very bad now, all high grass and choked up water cabbages; it took us until about 10.30 p. m. to get out a distance of about a mile. Entered the Rio Grande or "Pulangi," as the Moros call it, at Cabacsalan. The river here and the lake are only about 30 feet apart, connected by a canal a couple of feet deep and lately cut. A couple of houses were here. Mosquitoes were so bad we could not stop for the night; had supper and at about 11.30 went on down the river in our vintas—very fast traveling. Along river there were numerous houses; seemed fairly well settled. Arrived at Riena Regente 2 a. m. Distance on lake and Buluan River, about 30 miles; on river, about 15 miles.

January 26.—Left Riena Regente 8 a. m., arrived Cudarangan 9.15 a. m. Saw Dato Piang, who was friendly, and got one large vinta from him for Cotobato, letting the two I had from Buluan return. Arrived at Cotobato 7.30 p. m.; distance 36 miles. Total distance marched on foot, 207 miles; by vintas, etc., 226 miles; aggregate, 433 miles.

Men returned all in good condition, except two men had very sore feet, due to shoes giving out, being almost constantly wet. Four days' emergency rations were used; it was satisfactory in so far that it stopped hunger, but was not very palatable to the men; it was not used consecutively; whenever we had nothing else we used it; at the last, one or two meals a day. I consider it serves its purpose very well.

On account of continual foggy weather and tall timber in mountains, map submitted herewith is only approximately correct. I could take no bearing on distant objects.

Respectfully submitted.

R. O. VAN HORN,
First Lieutenant, Seventeenth Infantry.

APPENDIX 14.

EXPLORING EXPEDITION COTABATO TO CAGAYAN, MINDANAO.

COTABATO, MINDANAO, *March 18, 1902.*

The ADJUTANT, *Cotabato, P. I.*

SIR: In compliance with Special Orders, No. 17, current series, post of Cotabato, copy attached hereto, I have the honor to submit report of exploring expedition from Cotabato to Cagayan, Mindanao, as follows:

February 11, 1902 (first day).—Left Cotabato at 8.30 a. m. on quartermaster launch *Detroit*, with party consisting of 4 enlisted men of Company A, Seventeenth Infantry; 11 Philippine scouts, Company 50; 9 Moros, and 2 Filipinos (4 of whom were armed, the rest being unarmed and taken along to carry packs); Mr. Haines, and Mr. Dunleavy, civilians, and a discharged soldier, Mackintosh.

We proceeded up the Rio Grande or Pulangi River to Cudarangan, arriving there at 2 p. m., procured from Dato Piang 10 large-sized vintas and about 35 Moros for rowers and packers. Left Cudarangan on launch, towing vintas, and went up the river to a point 4 miles above Reina Regente, the launch being unable to proceed farther upstream on account of unusually low water, the river having fallen 9 feet since I had been up before—about two weeks' time. We disembarked at 5.30 p. m. and camped for the night; distance by launch, 43 miles.

February 12, 1902 (second day).—Left camp at 6.45 a. m. and proceeded upstream in vintas, the launch returning to Cotabato; stopped for dinner at 12 o'clock at Libugan, half mile farther up than Cabacsalan. Left 1 p. m., rowed until 5 p. m., and camped for the night at Talitay, a Moro tiangi or market on left bank of river; distance rowed, 18 miles. No map was made of this part of route, as same has already been accurately plotted.

February 13, 1902 (third day).—Left camp at 6.30 a. m., rowed upstream; passed Pikit (an old Spanish fort in very bad repair, but walls of buildings and fort itself still serviceable) at 10.15. At 11.30 stopped for dinner at Igan; left at 1 p. m.; arrived at Balindagun, a Moro tiangi, at 5.30 p. m., and camped for the night. Was told there was an overland from this place to the Cabacan River; also from a point, Inogu, a tiangi below Pikit, to the same place; distance by land, one day's travel from latter place, two days by boat, owing to the many curves in river; distance about 18 miles rowed this day. All distances given in the report are estimated.

February 14, 1902 (fourth day).—Left camp at 6.30 a. m., rowed upstream until 11 a. m., and stopped for dinner at Mangudis, where there were about ten houses. We had to wait about an hour for all the boats to catch up, the current being rather swift and some of the boats making better time than others—the smaller and narrower the boat the better time it would make. Left at 1 p. m. and rowed until 5.30, and camped for the night on sand bar about half a mile below forks of Rio Grande and Cabacan River; distance traveled, about 18 miles.

There are a large number of wild hogs here; they come out on river bars after nightfall. I saw several this night and shot one.

February 15, 1902 (fifth day).—Left camp at 6.50 a. m.; rowed to the forks of Cabacan and Rio Grande rivers; the Rio Grande not having been accurately mapped above this point, I commenced my map, submitted herewith, at this point.

Proceeded up the Cabacan River about one-fourth of a mile to the village of Dato Mantauen, who is a relative of Dato Alli, who controls all this section of country.

We purchased some rice here which I had sent word to have hulled. I made arrangements with the dato to have a couple of guides from here to take us into the Monobo country; one was a Moro trader named Lumayum, and the other was a Manobo; both were away, so I had them sent for, with orders to come up the river and catch up with us.

Left Dato Mantauen's at 8.45 a. m.; rowed back to the Rio Grande and up it; passed Katituan, which is a straight reach of river about 4 miles long, the only place I have seen where the river runs for any distance in a straight line; passed "Pinto," a spur of hills at the head of Katituan. Pinto, in Moro, means port or gate to the mountains. We stopped there at 12 o'clock; left at 1 p. m.; rowed until 5 p. m., and camped for the night at a high bluff on the left bank of river near Panga, a deserted Moro village, one house still standing but in decay; distance rowed, 15 miles; current very swift, at times our boats hardly making headway against it.

February 16, 1902 (sixth day).—Left camp at 6.30 a. m. and rowed about 4 miles, and arrived at Dato Masaloot's 8.50 a. m. I was told he was the last Moro dato on the river, a few scattering houses of his people extending perhaps 5 miles farther.

The dato could not give me any information except that he knew of no trail up the Rio Grande River; that there was no trade in that direction with the Manobos, all of the latter coming to the Molita River and down that. Was told that one could go up the Rio Grande for five days' journey farther, but could make but a few miles a day, and they did not know of a land trail to any Manobo village from head of navigation on Rio Grande. I was told that the Molita and the Rio Grande ran close to each other and that head of Molita was very close to Rio Grande, all traffic with mountain tribes being by way of Molita.

They told me I could go as far in two days on the Molita as would take seven days' journey on the Rio Grande in about the same general direction, and, also, I could get into communication with the Manobos, they having two general trails from their villages to the Molita River, one a day's journey and the other two days' journey. I knew if I could once get the confidence of the Manobos I could go anywhere from town to town, getting guides and additional packers at each town to go as far as the next.

As the Molita River seemed to be the outlet of the country north of here, I decided to go via that to my destination.

I sent a Moro trader on ahead with a present of red cloth, buttons, etc., to the

timuai (dato) of the first Manobo village on the first trail. I told him to travel all night and have the timuai and some of his men meet me at the point on the Molita where the trail started from. Stayed at Dato Masaloot's until 1 p. m., my Moros in the meantime being engaged in pounding up rice.

Arrived at Molita River 2 p. m. Molita is a very pretty stream about 40 yards wide and 6 feet deep in the deepest part, at the mouth; current not as swift as the Rio Grande. Rio Grande seemed to be as wide and deep as at any point lower down, and a good deal swifter, our boats hardly being able to get along, in places actually being carried back a foot or so until a pole could be used, the oars alone not being sufficient.

We were told when the river is higher one could go up easier, but I doubt it. Had to wait an hour at Molita, as I had left map at Dato Masaloot's and had to send a runner back after it. As soon as we started up Molita we made twice as good time as we did on Rio Grande, the current not being so swift and the stream shallower, at places not over 3 feet deep, enabling us to use poles to much better advantage. Stopped at 5 and camped for the night; distance traveled, about 12 miles.

February 17, 1902 (seventh day).—During the night the Moro trader, Lumayun, arrived, bringing with him some rice. This man has a Manobo wife from this part of the country and has some influence with them. He told me he did not know the trail himself, but could get Manobos who did. He said either trail led north, but the one farther up the river was best. Left camp at 6.25 p. m. and rowed until 11.30 a. m., 10 miles, when we reached a small rest house, marking place where first Manobo trail crossed the river.

Found here a signal to stop, also the vinta of the Moro I had sent ahead from Dato Masaloot's with the presents to the Manobos.

We stopped and went into camp, expecting the Manobos to arrive at any moment; waited all the afternoon and that night, but no one turned up. On account of the large number of Moros coming along with the boat as rowers and followers of the head man whom Dato Piang had sent along to look after us, and as I was short of rice, only having enough for about twelve days for just the men I was to take as packers, I decided to leave the boats and send them back, as I could not feed 30 or 40 extra men and have enough left. So I paid them off and told them they could go. My relations with all the Moros so far have been very friendly, they offering to do everything they could for me. All the country above Piang's on the river is under him, or rather under Dato Alli, and through him by Piang. I saw but a very few firearms either at Mantauen's or Masaloot's. The former has about 500 men and the latter 200.

February 18, 1902 (eighth day).—Stayed in camp until 8.35 a. m., when the Manobo guide from Dato Mantauen's arrived; the other Manobos not having arrived I started on the trail, which was quite plain and seemed to be fairly well traveled. We had only been gone half an hour when we met the other Moro with the Manobos he had gone for. He had with him the timuai and three followers, and although he had told them about us, we had to stop and talk at a distance of about 300 yards for 10 minutes before they would come up to us, and then they seemed to be very much afraid. I talked to them about the two trails, the one we were on and the one farther up the Molita. They said we could go by either to Boguan, which is near Sevilla (no one along the road had ever heard of Sevilla, all the natives call it Boguan). The trail we were on lead east to Dunguanan, and from there on turned more to the north. The Manobos said the other trail farther up the Molita was the best, as it was quicker and the trail better. They said we could cut across the country to it and reach it in a day, so I decided to do that. We left the trail here, the Manobos cutting their own trail. They went in almost a perfectly straight line north-northeast. I verified the same by the compass. If I had not had the compass I would have had a hard time to go in a straight line, especially as it was too cloudy to see the sun, but the Manobos never seemed to be in doubt. We crossed several creeks running into the Molita, our roads going up the bed of some and down that of others. We touched the Molita twice. At one point our Moro guide from Mantauens left us, saying he would go up the other trail in his vinta as he was not feeling well enough to walk. We crossed the Ulanan and Dumatun rivers, about 30 feet wide and 1 or 2 feet deep.

We camped on the latter at 5 p. m.; distance marched, 11 miles. Country passed over was quite hilly, none very high, though very heavily wooded, fine timber, and a number of rubber trees. There seemed to be no distant chain of hills; all very much cut up; a number of coral rocks, especially in the beds of streams, were found.

February 19, 1902 (ninth day).—Left camp at 6.50 a. m., our trail going in a northerly direction over same kind of country as day before. Arrived at Dumatug River 9 a. m., and went down that a short distance, when it ran into the Molita, where we found the main trail and our Moro guide waiting for us with about 10 Manobos, three of them timuais or datos.

He said he could not accompany us all the way, as he was sick, but that the

timuai he had told to go along all the way was perfectly reliable. I discharged three of my Moro packers here, who seemed to be unable to keep up, and I got Manobos in their places. The Manobo is a much better packer than a Moro, as he is accustomed to walk over mountains with heavy loads, and Moros are not. The only drawback to Manobos as packers is they will not go far away from their own towns. I presume, though, as soon as they become better accustomed to Americans and have confidence in them this may be remedied.

Our trail led up river one-eighth of a mile and then in a northerly direction over low, well-wooded hills composed almost entirely of coral rocks. A large number of felled rubber trees were seen. Walked about 4 miles, and stopped for dinner at a river near the Manobo town of Manipung. The wife of the timuai brought us a few yams, and I made her a present of some cloth and a looking-glass. She went away highly pleased, and in about twenty minutes there were twenty or thirty women and children around with a few yams apiece and all wanting looking-glasses. Some of the women are not bad looking, and were decked out with brass rings on fingers and toes and all the way up the arms, and some around their ankles. Everyone was very friendly and very curious to see the white people. One of the timuais gave us a war dance with shield and spear, which was a very good imitation of a fight with another man. We continued the march, and traveled until 5.30, when we camped for the night at a small creek, Salilung. This is the first water we had come to in 5 miles, the country being of solid coral formation, very hilly, the water going down in sink holes like caves, a large number of which we passed, the water running off in underground channels. Distance marched, 15 miles. Had a talk with the timuais in the evening. The one we had met first said he lived at Balut, near Dunguanan; had formerly lived at Salagalpon, but moved on account of war with Dato Alli eight years ago. He seemed to be friendly enough with Alli now, as he is Alli's chief rubber collector. He said the place marked on the map "Dato Mopondo" has another name, Mopondo being dead. Considerable gutta collected in this section. Was told the Moros gave them about \$1 Mexican worth of cloth (5 yards) for 1,000 pieces of gutta 7 inches long by $1\frac{1}{4}$ inches in diameter. I do not know how true this is.

February 20, 1902 (tenth day).—Left camp at 6.40 a. m.; marched in a northerly direction over country much the same as day before; good trail; crossed the Inawan River, which runs in a westerly direction and empties into the Malidagao, which in turn runs into the Rio Grande above Pikit.

I was told it was a two days' journey to the Malidagao, going west. Marched until 12 o'clock; crossed the Tibutuc, a tributary to the Inawan, shortly after leaving the latter; after the Tibutuc there was no water on account of coral formation till we came to the junction of the Balowi and Manobo creeks at 12 o'clock, where we camped for noon. Left at 2 p. m., the country looking better; no coral; passed a couple of camote or yam gardens, and at 3 o'clock stopped at the old Manobo town of Anapuan for the night. The place was built at the end of a steep hill surrounded on three sides by very steep sides, and could only be approached by one path about 6 feet wide. Town consisted of 6 houses, surrounded by a high and strong stockade, with a lookout in a large tree at least 70 feet high. The place was entirely deserted, but had only been so for a short time, and I think temporarily. I met the two timuais of the place, Malahanai and Maramboy; they told me all the people had moved to the town of Malahanai to gather crops.

I made arrangements to get seven new packers from here, the ones we had with us since we left the Molita wishing to return, although the timuai who was conducting our party still remained with us. The Malanao Moros had made a raid over this section a year ago to capture slaves; I was told that they did not get any, the Manobos receiving word of their coming and leaving the country. Distance marched, 13 miles.

February 21, 1902 (eleventh day).—Left Anopuan at 7 a. m. and came back on the same trail we had taken the day before for a mile and a half, and took a small trail, not near so good as the main one, which led about 4 miles in a direction east and south of east; came to a small creek, Barol, which we walked up the bed of for over a mile, and then we struck more to the north until we came to open country, the first we had seen so far.

I feel convinced, now that it is over, that our guides took us in a circle around the town, and that the main trail led straight through it. They did it here and farther on, at Ininilinkit. I suppose they were afraid of our knowing the location of their towns. I did not suspect this so much at the time, but feel sure of it now.

We reached the open country at 9.30. It is called Buc Buc, and is an open country about 2 miles square, swampy in the center. It is a lake in the rainy season. We entered timber country after crossing the open; crossed the Alapiny and Apulean rivers, running into the Molita. They were 30 feet wide and 2 feet deep. Camped for noon on the former; washed for gold; found no trace, but a great deal of black

sand, commonly known as "magnesia iron sand." From Buc Buc we could see a small, conical hill, Pugak, which they told us we would pass by. It bore 30° east of north. Also another high mountain, Cul Cul, due north. Half a mile past the Apulean River we came out into open, rolling country, grass knee high, and from here on, with the exception of a few rivers, our trail into Cagayan was much the same—all open, rolling plateaus—excellent trail, good for cavalry clear to Cagayan.

After a half mile in the open the trail led straight ahead of a point of timber in which I know was the Monobo town of Ininilinkit. I saw a couple of houses, but our guides insisted it was better to stay in the open, so we left the trail and circled the timber around the point. It was hard walking, on account of the high grass, and we crossed two marshy places about 100 yards wide, where I could find no bottom with a stick, the grass holding us up. It felt like walking on a spring mattress. About 3 miles farther, crossed the Molita River for last time. River here 40 yards wide, 3 feet deep, and very swift, running a trifle south of east. We could also see the Rio Grande River, or rather the canyon it ran through, and there seemed to be no particular watershed visible between the two rivers.

A short distance beyond the Molita we came on the main trail again which had run straight through the point of timber while we had gone a mile out of our way, and here my suspicions about the guide leading us around in order to avoid the town was confirmed. If we had time I would have gone back just to show him I knew where the town was.

About 2 miles farther came to Maramadai River, running into Molita, and camped for the night at 4.50 p. m. Distance marched, 13 miles. The nights are cold up here at this season of the year; I found one blanket and a heavy piece of canvas not near enough; I had to put on all my extra clothing, and the Moros sat up around the fire most of the night.

February 22, 1902 (twelfth day).—Left camp at 7 a. m.; marched 4 miles to Cuyah River, which runs into Rio Grande; there was a slight watershed between the two rivers hardly noticeable; 2 miles farther crossed the Madumag, which runs into the Cuyah, and 2 miles beyond that came to the "Tlandig" town of Lumabag; the timuai and a couple of old men were all that were left in the village. Although I sent on word ahead of my coming, the timuai said his men had left as soon as he had heard we were accompanied by the Moro trader, Lumayun, and that Lumayun had sent for him some years before and he had not gone, so was afraid. These people are half caste Manobos, mixed with Filipino blood, and have formerly been under the Jesuits' influence, when the Jesuits were at Sevilla, and were converted, thus getting the name "Tlandig," either by intermarriage or mixture of so many kinds of blood—they are the poorest set physically I have ever seen—small legs and arms, no chest, large abdomen and misformed heads, and with no intelligence; they are a great deal worse than the Manobos or any other tribe I have seen. My Manobos packers did not care to go any farther, so I had to get some of these people, and wasted three hours in talking before they could scare up seven misformed creatures that could only carry a few pounds each. The tamuai that had come with us from the Molita wished to return, but I persuaded him to go on with us to Sevilla or some place where we could get another man to guide us and act as interpreter. Left Lumabag at 1.45 p. m. town of Solagalpon a little south of east from Lumabag, half a day's journey; our trail led northeast; crossed Culamen and Cagakup rivers and Nabalantung River, and 2 miles farther on descended a steep hill 300 feet from mesa above to valley of Rio Grande below and camped for night at 5 p. m. on the Taganibung River, running into Rio Grande a short distance below. One of the party killed a deer in the evening. Distance marched, 15 miles. Sent a Manobo on ahead to town of Balibatuan to give notice of our arrival, but he returned at 2 a. m. saying that no one was present.

February 23, 1902 (thirteenth day).—Left camp at 6.30 a. m., crossed Timantud River, and passed Mount Pugak, one-eighth of a mile to our right, at 7.15, crossed Lungus, Balibatuan, and Maliling rivers, camped for dinner at the latter, passed town of Moliling, 3 miles to our left, about 20 houses; at 1.35 reached remains of old town of Sevilla, a few burned bamboo posts. Town was burned some years ago by prairie fire; at 2 crossed Malapari River, about 40 yards wide and 3 feet deep, draining a large open valley extending as far as we could see, about 20 miles to the west in direction of Lake Lanao. I believe that one could go up this valley and get within a few miles of lake, and be all the time in open grassy country practicable for cavalry and mountain guns. Arrived at the town of Boguan 3.40 p. m. Town deserted by all but 10 Filipinos, who met us with a white flag. I had a talk with the presidente, but he would not give me any information whatever and what he did say was plainly not the truth. He even said he had lived there all his life and had not been an hour's distance away except toward Cagayan. I asked him why all the people had left, and he said they were afraid of the Moros. I had sent word on ahead that we were coming to the town below, and he knew that the Americans were also in the

party. I told him that so long as he did not show any confidence in us I could show none in him or his people. I told him until I saw some women and children in town, showing that they had confidence in us, also a precaution against a night attack, I would keep him and four of the most intelligent looking of the others under surveillance and have them sleep in the same house we were quartered in; so I put a sentry over him, and the next day, as some of the women returned, I released them. Distance marched, 17 miles.

February 24, 1902 (14th day).—Stayed at Boguan all day trying to get information about the surrounding country. I had sent for all the head men of neighboring barrios, but, either on account of ignorance, stubbornness, inability to tell the truth, or poor interpretation, my interpreter understanding very little Visayan and they knowing no other language, or for all these reasons, I was unable to extract a bit of reliable information. In the afternoon a "Filipino merchant" from Cagayan came in from the next town, Linabo. He could talk Spanish, and seems quite intelligent; had formerly been an officer of insurgents, and still carried a revolver, said he had permission from a Major Case to whom he had surrendered to do so. I did not see the permission, but, on account of civil government pertaining here, did not take it away; at any rate, through him, I was able to talk to the presidente and others, who had no hesitancy or bashfulness whatever in denying all they had said the day before. They told me it was a two days' journey to Lake Lanao, over good trail open country all the way, and coming out on lake at the Sultan of Dagats, who had 5,000 men. No trail from here to Agusan River, which I could see was true, as mountains to the east were impracticable to pass. From the town of Oroquieta, about 7 miles northwest of here, there was a good trail, six days' journey, and well traveled, a small party of Montesas having just come over with their families, and were at Oroquieta now. I made arrangements to have them meet me there, also to buy there a couple hundred pounds of rice for my Moros, as I had but two days' rice left, intending to go by the trail to Agusan River the next day. I also sent word on ahead who we were and for what purposes we were coming, so everyone would not leave. The Rio Grande makes a large valley in here, 30 miles long and 8 wide, good rich soil covered with short grass, well watered; would support a population of 100,000, and would raise almost anything. The Rio Grande from here down runs in a canyon, with two large falls near Salagalpon. One of our party, Mr. Haines, left us at Boguan with the intention of returning to Cotabato, down the Rio Grande by raft, making portages around the falls; result of his expedition noted with this report later on.

February 25, 1902 (fifteenth day).—Left Boguan at 6.55, trail excellent, forked short distance from town, going one through Linabo and the other direct to Oroquieta; we took the direct one, arriving at Oroquieta at 10.20. We found the presidente and one other man in Oroquieta, all the others having left. He had received word of my coming, also about the two guides and rice, but all had left town before he had received notice; at least he said so. He told me there were 1,000 people living in Oroquieta; we stayed there until 1 p. m., three hours, and but a few, six or seven, returned. I was unable to get either the guides or rice unless I stayed there a day, so I decided to push on to Cagayan. The presidente said there was a good trail to Agusan River, and that there were a number of Monteses living in Oroquieta who knew it and could be used as guides; he said it was a 5 days' journey, going easy each day. If I could have been assured of rice for carriers, I would have tried it. Another thing that made me decide on Cagayan was that most of my carriers were footsore, and getting worse each day; in fact, by the time I reached Cagayan I had some who could hardly hobble along and were unable to keep up or to carry loads. The Moro soldiers who had shoes were all right to go farther, but not the rest of them. Left Oroquieta at 1 p. m.; arrived at town of Calisungui, about 400 inhabitants, at 1.50; could not find a living thing; all entirely deserted and all belongings taken away; could not even find the messenger the presidente of Oroquieta said he had sent on ahead. Arrived town of Silipon, 500 people, 4 p. m.; found it entirely deserted; presidente gone, and, worse luck, not even a stray chicken left behind. Camped for the night; distance marched, 18 miles over open table land, well watered, grass knee deep, road excellent; could drive an escort wagon the part of the trail traveled to-day.

February 26, 1902 (sixteenth day).—Left Silipon at 5.50 a. m., crossed three creeks; trail ran near head of Tagalaoan river; saw a waterfall on that river over 200 feet high; crossed the Atugan river, which runs in the bottom of a very deep canyon 300 feet deep or more; trail very worn. I was some distance in advance of my party and by myself, having gone on ahead to see what a dog was barking about in the bottom of the canyon. I met coming up seven carabaos loaded with rice and vino. When they saw me, although I was but a few feet ahead and called out "friend" to the hombres riding the carabao, they jumped off and ran away. I stopped and sent my Filipino interpreter on ahead to catch them; he returned shortly afterwards with two of the party. I asked where they were from, and they said Tagalaoan and Caga-

yan. I asked why they ran, and they did not know except they were afraid; they said they had seen Americans before and knew we were Americans; they had a pass signed for one month by the presidente of Agusan, town near Cagayan, to trade with Monteses. There are Monteses living in the towns we passed through and what he said might be true, but I can not see what makes them so terribly afraid of Americans not engaged in warfare. Arrived at town of Impasugon at 10 a. m.; found the presidente there and a few men, all the women and children having left. I saw a couple of women leaving town just before we got in. Also found another carabao caravan laden with rice and vino, they said, "for towns of Linabo, Boguan, and Oroquieta, as the people there did not till the fields;" they said they got hemp in exchange. Had dinner and left at 11.35 after getting a horse from the presidente as pack horse in exchange for the one we had from Boguan, paying off latter and letting him go. Presidente said road ran by town of Sumilao, where we could get another horse; he sent men on ahead to arrange for me. Sumilao, a little southwest from Impasagan, about 2 miles out. Main trail led straight ahead, and we took a trail leading to the left and towards Sumilao, crossed three streams all running in very deep gulches, and arrived at Sumilao at 1.50; found every one had left; no one in sight, not even the horse we were to get; our guide from Impasugon said he did not know the road from here on, but finally admitted that our road was the main one we had left two hours before. I had thought so myself and questioned him at that time, but he said we must pass Sumilao, so I went there but kept my eye on the guide all the time. He finally admitted he had taken us there to get a horse and he could go back as it was farther to the next town on the road we should have taken. I felt like whipping him, but we struck out on another trail, nearly going back in the direction we had come.

Arrived at Ulaman River, which runs in a very deep canyon, at 4 p. m., and camped for the night. Our guide had taken us over 11 miles out of our way. We made camp about 4 miles by the right trail from Impasugon and camped on the main trail. Distance marched, 21 miles. Trail forked at bottom of gulch, one trail going to west of a high butte, the other going east. When we asked our guide anything, he would say "yes," no matter to what question. These people are the worst for supposed "friendly" natives under the civil government I have ever met. There was a native in creek bed when we got there, but as soon as he saw us he ran like a deer.

February 27, 1902 (seventeenth day).—Left camp at 6 a. m.; took left-hand trail; marched 5 miles to town of Ilabung, also entirely deserted. Marched about 2 miles to Mangesua River, which runs at the bottom of a very deep ravine. Our trail led down ravine for 4 miles before we could find a place to get out; trail very good and much traveled, a little muddy in places, made so by the many carabaos; would be bad in rainy season; met two hombres on foot, who ran at sight, and a little farther on came suddenly on a caravan of rice and vino. Hombres were not in a position to run, so I bought some rice from them. A little farther on in the trail found a loose sack of rice just as it had been dropped; borrowed same and repented having bought any before. Camped for dinner at Cumacay River; left at 12.30; had gone but short distance when we saw a pony coming down the trail loaded with rice, but no hombre with him. As we had plenty of rice, we left him continue his lonely journey. Arrived at town of Tanculan at 1 p. m. As usual, found that all had left. Marched over good trail until 5.30 p. m., and camped for night at small spring about 2 miles from town of Agusan. Distance marched, 24 miles. Just before reaching camp saw string of carabaos coming toward us about 800 yards away. They turned to left and tried to pass us about 400 yards. I stopped and called to them, and they all commenced running over a hill. It was very funny, especially as my Moros commenced jeering them, and then they ran as if for their lives. Two horsemen rode out from Agusan and stood watching us for 10 minutes. I walked toward them all alone, and they turned and headed for Agusan as fast as they could make their horses go.

February 28, 1902 (eighteenth day).—Left camp at 5.50 a. m.; marched to the outskirts of the town of Agusan, where we were met by Inspector Mohler, of the insular constabulary, and about 12 armed natives. He had marched from Cagayan that night on the information obtained by the two horsemen we saw the night before, who reported that a band of Moros dressed in black were coming to attack the town. The American school teacher at Agusan, hearing this, resolved to do the Paul Revere act by alarming the country, which he did most effectually, and, incidentally, coming down the road on a dead gallop, he met a party with an American lady from Cagayan on horseback. He did not stop, but yelled "Moros!" and went by on a gallop so fast that the horse the lady was riding reared and threw her out of the saddle on the road. The people in Agusan had returned when Inspector Moehler came through, but all were very much excited there and on the road to Cagayan. The people in the country around Boguan and the other towns had not sent word to Cagayan, showing either they knew we were Americans, or else their not being in sympathy with the government. The people at Agusan did not know of our com-

ing until they saw us the night before. We marched slowly into Cagayan, as my Moro packers were knocked out by the trip of the day before. Reached Cagayan about 11 o'clock. Distance, 11 miles. Expedition all in good health, with exception of sore and bruised feet among the Moros.

Total distance traveled from Cotabato to Cagayan, 290 miles. Map of route from Cabacan River, or its junction with the Rio Grande to Cagayan, submitted herewith.

March 1 to March 10, 1902.—Remained in Cagayan awaiting transportation.

March 11, 1902.—Left Cagayan at 5 a. m. on quartermaster's launch *Erica*; arrived at Iligan 11 a. m.

March 12, 1902.—Left Iligan at 2.30 p. m. on launch *Erica*; struck a reef in Iligan Bay, and were delayed and had to anchor for the night in open bay.

March 13, 1902.—Arrived at Misamis.

March 14, 1902.—Left Misamis on *Erica* at 5.30 a. m. and went to head of Panquil Bay, where we took small boats up what was supposed to be Lintogue River, but which afterwards proved not to be that but another; we could not get up by boat; tried three different branches but could only go a short way on each, so at 4.30 p. m. left boats and marched through swamp and dense timber until 7.30 p. m., when we reached ground dry enough to make camp and stop for the night.

March 15, 1902.—Left camp at 5.50 a. m. and marched west, skirting the hills until 8 a. m., when we reached Lintogue and found a detachment of the Twenty-seventh Infantry awaiting us. Left there same time and arrived at Lubig 12 m. Left Lubig 2 p. m.; arrived Tucuran 4.15 p. m. Distance marched, 23 miles.

March 16, 1902.—Stayed at Tucuran.

March 17, 1902.—Left Tucuran 1.30 p. m. on quartermaster's launch *Detroit*, arriving at Parang 8 p. m.

March 18, 1902.—Left Parang-parang 8 a. m.; arrived Cotabato 12 o'clock m.

On my return to Cotabato, I interviewed Mr. Haines about his trip down the Rio Grande River. He reported returning from Boguan to Sevilla on same trail I had taken. From Sevilla he went south to Balibatuan on good trail, thence to the west of Mount Pukak to the trail we came up on until past my old camp on the Tagani-bung River, where he left the trail and struck off to the southeast and east, camping northeast of Lumabug first night out. The second day he went eastward until he struck the Rio Grande at the place where the upper falls were supposed to be. The river from Sevilla to this place has been flowing through the before-mentioned plain and could be rafted, but at this place there was a sharp curve and river flowed over volcanic rock very swift and deep and about 40 yards wide, but had no falls as had been supposed. Mr. Haines built a raft here and floated downstream past Salagalpon; river here still flowed on volcanic rock, swift but in straight reaches. Below Salagalpon he went ashore to shoot a bird and heard a noise ahead and walked a short distance to see what it was and found that the river ran ahead against a solid wall of rock, turned at right angle to the left and flowed through deep canyon, the walls of which appeared higher the farther down he went, and Mr. Haines decided not to try to go farther by raft, for if raft could get by sharp curve, and he once entered the canyon and found out he could not get downstream, it would be almost impossible to get back up again. He abandoned the raft and continued down along the high bluff and passed Matankis, a Manobo town. He could not even get down to the bed of the river from here or to get water, and, as the river kept bearing to the east and southeast, he left the river and struck to the west and camped fifth day out on the Molita, at a point below my last crossing.

Sixth day.—He rafted down that eight hours and broke raft on rocks, left river, and walked northwest four hours and camped.

Seventh day.—Struck our trail some distance from upper crossing of Molita, built raft, and camped four hours' distance below the upper trail.

Eighth day.—Passed Dato Massaloots and stopped at Cabacan River, where he procured a vinta.

Ninth day.—Rowed down stream that night and arrived at Cotabato ten days from Boguan on March 6. He was told at the town of Matankis, below Salagalpon, by the Timuai there, that there was a trail from there going due south and coming out at or near the junction of the Rio Grande and Molita. He started out in that direction from there under the guidance of two Manobos from Matankis, but instead of going south they struck west and northwest on a good trail, and when he ordered them to go south they did so until a favorable moment, when in thick brush they left their packs and skipped out, so Mr. Haines had to return and follow out their main trail, as described.

Respectfully submitted.

R. O. VAN HORN,
First Lieutenant, Seventeenth Infantry.

FINAL REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. ROBERT P. HUGHES, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Iloilo, Panay, P. I., November 30, 1901.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: In closing the chapter of the department of the Visayas, which has been in my charge during its existence, I desire to submit a final report. Maj. Robert H. Noble, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. Volunteers, submitted a report of the department, except the island of Samar, up to include the 30th of June, 1901. Samar is taken up from May 1, 1901.

The Civil Commission visited the department in April last and organized civil governments in the eight provinces then in the geographical boundaries of the command. At that time the island of Samar did not form a part of the department, having been detached in order to give the department sufficient force to continue active operations in the island of Leyte. The islands of Samar and Leyte being separated by the very narrow strait of San Juanico, the Canal

de Daram and the Bahia de San Pedro y San Pablo, coupled with the fact that Samar was so weak in troops that active operations were very limited in extent, caused me anxiety for Leyte and its new government. In order to better protect the latter I recommended to the division commander that Samar should be reassigned to this department, which was done on the 7th of May. The troops then consisted of 1 battery light artillery, 6 companies First U. S. Infantry, 1 company Second U. S. Infantry.

The artillery was located by platoons at Laguan, Calbayog, and Catbalogan. The company of the Second Infantry at Laguan. The First Infantry had 2 companies at Borongan, 1 company at Guiuan, 1 company at Calbayog and 2 companies at Catbalogan.

A personal inspection of the situation and conditions then existing in the island demonstrated the fact that the forces were entirely inadequate for offensive operations. The garrisons at Catbalogan and Calbayog were inclosed by a cordon of insurrecto guerrillas, who would fire into the towns from time to time as the spirit or spirits moved them. A great many of the coast towns had been burned. La Granja, Lavezares, Pambujan, Catubig, Mondragon, Palapag, Oras, Sulat, Tubig, Borongan, Paranas, etc., were either totally destroyed or to such a degree as to afford little or no shelter for troops. On careful inquiry it was found that the insurgents had adopted and were pursuing the system followed by Russia in 1812. It should be noted that there did not exist a single roadway into the interior. The only road that had ever existed ran along the coast from Calbayog to Lavezares, where there was a break to near Bobon, where it was taken up and continued to Laguan, where another break occurred and it was again taken up at Oras and extended with breaks to Guiuan. But this road had not been kept in repair and was almost obliterated by overgrowth, and all bridges, whose number was legion, had been broken down by natural decay or by fire. There was not a single road or carabao trail leading into the interior. It was evidently the intention of the enemy to make the coast untenable for our troops and to withdraw to the interior of the island, which is filled with beautiful small valleys, where they can secure all the necessities of life except salt. This being the case, it was determined to attack the interior if possible and drive the enemy to the coast for his food supplies. The difficulties were recognized and after carefully weighing them it was decided to initiate the operations in the north and work southward. One of the great considerations in arriving at this conclusion lay in the fact that the great rice supply of the island comes from the north third of the island. Much of the crop was cached in the fields near where grown and was drawn on by the insurrectos, and it was desired to shut off this supply. Furthermore, the key to the interior of the island lies in the line of the Gandara and Catubig rivers. The secondary lines were the Hibatan and Catarman rivers, and the eastern branch of the Gandara and Bacot rivers. The bar at the mouth of the Gandara is difficult and a launch drawing over five and a half feet of water can not cross it without great difficulty. But after crossing the bar a launch drawing five and a half feet can reach Taviran, on the western branch, and Sapinit, on the eastern branch. At the time of the study of the situation there were obstructions across the mouths of the Gandara, but they were of native construction and were not considered serious. The Hibatan was navigable for a boat drawing

five and a half feet of water as far as Bato, 4 miles up, but sampans could reach Oquendo. The Catarman was navigable for a like launch as far up as Hilabuga. The Catubig was navigable for a similar launch to Poponton and the Bacot to Hinolosan. While these lines were being occupied, Colonel Harbach, at Catbalogan, was to endeavor to clear out the section east and south of the Gandara and Bacot line and east of the Paranas, Villareal, to the upper waters of the Ulut, where it was hoped cooperation might be effected from the two companies at Borongan. If anyone looks at this general scheme the natural query will be, Why is the south end of the island omitted from the general initiatory plan? The answer lies in the fact that that portion of the island is occupied by savages, who at that time did not have firearms and made war with knives, and were not organized or counted in the insurrecto organization. It was believed then that with prompt success against the insurrectos these savages would range themselves with us without a quarrel. Guiuan, which is quite a superior town for that section, was occupied by one company, and Basey was under the sphere of influence of the garrison at Tacloban. At this time the foundry and general shops of the insurrectos were located at Blanca Aurora, on the east branch of the Gandara. The armory and cartridge shops were at Matuguinao, and powder was being manufactured on the Oras, near Concepcion, and at Multo. After this inspection and projected plan of operations, additional troops were asked for and Calbayog was selected as the headquarters of the department "in the field."

The finding of transportation for such shallow waters was very difficult, but the chief quartermaster of the division chartered a launch that would answer for the Catubig, and the quartermaster of the depot secured a lorchas as a tow for her. The launch *Hercules* was drawn from Capiz, and a light-draft lorchas from Iloilo for work on the Gandara and Hibatan. Fortunately, the Chinos in Calbayog owned five fine strong sampans, which they very kindly put at our disposal, and their kindness in so doing is worthy of more substantial recognition than I have yet been able to give them.

In order to cut off the war resources of the insurrectos it was recommended that the ports of Samar should be closed to commercial vessels. The insurrecto government, so called, had established impost duties on all imported and exported goods, which was yielding a very fair income to their support. An order closing the ports of Samar was issued May 15 and has been enforced.

TROOPS.

A detachment of 20 native scouts under Hoover was sent from Leyte to Catbalogan to act as guides, etc.

A detachment of 25 native scouts, Hunsaker's, was taken from Panay to Calbayog.

A colt's automatic gun and a gun detachment were taken from Panay to arm the steam launch *Hercules*.

Troops sent by the division commander.—Companies I and M, First U. S. Infantry, landed at Calbayog May 21.

Companies A and B, First U. S. Infantry, landed at Laguan May 21.

One troop, Ninth U. S. Cavalry (Young's), dismounted, landed at Calbayog May 21.

Second Squadron, Tenth U. S. Cavalry, dismounted, landed at Calbayog May 21.

Two troops, Ninth U. S. Cavalry, dismounted, landed at Catbalogan May 23.

One troop, Ninth U. S. Cavalry, dismounted, landed at Santa Rita May 23.

Troops withdrawn.—One company, Second U. S. Infantry (Miller's), from Laguan, May 23.

The Navy sent the gunboats *Arayat*, *Paragua*, *Mindoro*, *Basco*, etc., under the general direction of Commander Selfridge, of the *Princeton*, to cooperate.

Work began on May 22. On that date Captain Newman, with Company G, First U. S. Infantry, marched out with orders to take the route Santa Margarita, Butad, Tagnao, where on arrival he was to seize barotos and send Lieutenant Penfield and a strong detachment down the Gandara to remove the obstructions at the mouth of the river, find the channel across the bar, and report at Calbayog when his task was accomplished.

On the 23d Captain Chandler, with Company M, First U. S. Infantry, and Hunsaker's Scouts, left Calbayog with orders to cross the country and strike the Hibatan at or in the vicinity of Bato, to continue the movement up the river to Oquendo, sending Lieutenant McCue to clear the way out of the mouth of the river.

On the 25th Captain Trippe, with Troop F, Tenth U. S. Cavalry, was ordered to make a scout up the Calbayog River.

All three commands ran into guerrillas of the enemy the first day out of Calbayog, which they brushed away without casualties on our side, but the enemy was not so fortunate as to escape without some loss.

Captain Newman reached the right bank of the Gandara at Tagnao on the evening of the 24th after three days of hard work. A number of barotos were captured, and Lieutenant Penfield floated down the Gandara during the night of the 24th and was fortunate enough to find the best channel, which is the most northern of the three forming the delta at the mouth. The obstructions consisted of a double row of light stakes, which he found it possible to remove from the main channel, and he reported the river open on the morning of the 25th. Lieutenant McCue reported about the same time from the Hibatan that he had cleared the way at the entrance to that river.

On May 26 Captain Young, Ninth Cavalry, was ordered to proceed to Tagnao via the Gandara River, reporting upon arrival to Captain Newman, who was to continue his movement up the Gandara with this increase of force.

On the same date Captain Read, Tenth Cavalry, with Troop H, was ordered to proceed by sea to Mauo on the northwest coast and open operations in that vicinity, extending the hand across to Captain Chandler, who was to extend his operations up the Pagsanhan. It was discovered that the map was incorrect and that Mauo was much farther north than was given. Apparently the Canaguayon had been given the name of Mauo.

On the 28th Captain Newman had passed the junction of the two branches of the Gandara at the site of the pueblo of that name and had detached Captain Young's troop to follow the eastern branch to Blanca Aurora, while he himself followed the main branch to Taviran. As

Blanca Aurora was beyond steam navigation, Captain Carleton's troop, Tenth Cavalry, was sent up to Sapinit, the end of navigation on the eastern branch, to establish a temporary supply camp, and to act as a reserve and support in case of need for both Newman and Young.

On the 29th Lieutenant Huston, Tenth Cavalry, was ordered to report to Captain Chandler, at Oquendo, with his troop of the Tenth Cavalry, and with this addition of force Chandler was to continue his movement across the divide via Lope de Vega to the headwaters of the Catarman River. It was the intention at the time to extend this movement gradually to the town of Catarman by the river and take possession of that place, as landing on the coast at that season was unsafe.

Captain Chandler took possession of Oquendo.

Company I, First U. S. Infantry, was sent to report to Captain Read to take position preferably at Lavezares, but as that pueblo had been burned some time before, as had La Granja also, and so thoroughly that, no shelter for the troops could be found, Colonel Crane, adjutant-general, who had been sent with the company to decide on its basal location, finally disembarked the company at Barobaybay on the northwest coast. The inhabitants left their homes at all points on the approach of our troops, and they also burned all the towns that they thought would afford shelter for our troops.

On the 30th Colonel Harbach started out Captain Swaine and Captain Tayman with their companies, the former for the Upper Ulut and the latter to Salanga, thence north.

During this time instructions had been given the commanding officer at Laguan to push all his available force up the Catubig as far as the transportation available would justify, which was in the vicinity of Poponton. The force was to be of sufficient numerical strength to enable a command to be kept in the field constantly by a system of reliefs; the idea being to drive all insurrectos out of the country on both sides of the Catubig and interfere, as far as possible, with their obtaining a supply of rice from that district, in which that cereal is grown in great quantities.

The commanding officer at Borongan was instructed to act against the insurrectos in the rice district about San Julian and to endeavor to pick up the trail running west from Borongan and extend a hand to Swaine on the Upper Ulut in vicinity of Lokeloken.

May 30 Captain Young, Ninth U. S. Cavalry, found the insurrectos in some strength south of Blanca Aurora. On the 31st he pushed on and drove them out of Blanca Aurora, which place they left in ashes. The débris of the place discovered the fact that there had been a foundry, general workshops, powder mill, etc., in operation. Captain Young found much of the machinery, etc., in a cave in the mountains in the vicinity and destroyed it. Captain Newman had reached Singal on the right branch of the Gandara.

Captain Carleton had scouted south from Sapinit to Cantagi, but found no enemy.

JUNE.

Samar: June 1 Major Smith, commanding at Laguan, sent a detachment of 70 men under Lieutenant King to Catarman. The sea was not favorable for landing and in doing so 2 men were drowned and 8 rifles lost. Lieutenant King was very actively engaged in scouting about Catarman until withdrawn. He succeeded in destroying one ammuni-

tion factory and many storehouses of rice. The people deserted their houses and remained concealed in the hills. Small detachments of insurrectos were seen, but could not be brought to a trial of skill and strength. On the 13th the detachment was withdrawn to Laguan.

Captain Newman, First Infantry, reached Taviran June 2 and Matuguinao June 22. He was fired on but once in the whole march. No casualties. Matuguinao was found in ashes. Some old worthless cartridge material and some small tools were found, but the shops were all destroyed.

Hunsaker's Panay Scouts were withdrawn from the Hibatan and sent to Newman at Matuguinao for scouting purposes.

The terrain north of Catbalogan was found to be such that Tayman was forced over westward until he was on the line already occupied by Young and Carleton, and after consulting all the detachment commanders as to the situation in their vicinity, so far as learned, it was determined to fit Tayman out with a pack train at Catbalogan and exploit the trail traced on the maps running north from there to the headwaters of the Bacot. Swaine was fitted out with a pack train of carabaos which was sufficient for his necessities at Louan, and a pack train of mules had been transferred from Panay to Catbalogan. Captain Swaine found a heavy population on the Upper Ulut and located himself there to control them.

Captain Bell, quartermaster First U. S. Infantry, did some excellent work in opening up the trails to send forward supplies.

Captain Cornish, Ninth Cavalry, occupied Villareal with a detachment of his troop from Santa Rita.

A battalion of the Ninth U. S. Infantry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Foote, reported for duty on the 16th. This battalion was distributed as follows: One company (Kinney's) to Calbayog, for future assignment; one company (Schoeffel's) to Tarangann; one company (Hersey's) to Oras; one company (Bookmiller's) to Basey.

Lieutenant-Colonel Foote took station at the last-named place and was able to take possession without any opposition or burning by the inhabitants. Kinney's company was sent on the 19th to support Newman, who had pushed upstream to Matuguinao.

On the 18th Lieut. A. L. Conger, aid-de-camp, was sent with the little steamer *Lao-ang* to Guiuan with instructions to the commanding officer at that place to place Lieutenant Townsend and 60 men at his disposition. The time had come to make an effort to cut off the supplies being brought over from Leyte, and some knowledge of the people and conditions on the southern neck was desired. Lieutenant Conger's instructions were to take Lieutenant Townsend and the detachment to Pambujan or vicinity and cross the neck to Balangiga and bring back information consequent on his observations and experiences. On arrival at Guiuan he found Colonel Dempsey gone and Lieut. E. E. Downes in temporary command. Lieutenant Downes seems to have been of the opinion that his knowledge of local conditions justified him in changing the projected movement and to send Lieutenant Townsend with 50 men to Lanang while he took 25 men to make the scout which had been assigned to Lieutenant Conger. Lieutenant Downes was landed in the vicinity of Pambujan by a gunboat and started inland. The first night out there was an alarm and one of the men was wounded, apparently by our own people, as no other shots seem to have been fired. In continuing the movement the next day

this wounded man had to be carried. A native was captured and made to serve as a guide and he ran the party into an ambush for which it was not prepared. Lieutenant Downes was marching between the point and main body and was attacked by a native and killed with a stiletto. One of the men was killed and three wounded, all with bolos. In the mêlée five rifles were lost. The detachment being thus weakened in strength, and embarrassed with four wounded men, abandoned the ground immediately and returned to Guian. Information of this was brought to me by Captain Selfridge of the *Princeton* on the 28th. As soon as transportation could be secured Lieutenant Townsend, First Infantry, was sent with a detachment of 50 men to punish these people. He succeeded in getting a fight out of them on July 9, killing 30 of them. Lieutenant Townsend was attacked as Lieutenant Downes had been and was wounded, and had it not been for Assistant Surgeon Pinto's prompt use of his revolver Lieutenant Townsend would certainly have been killed.

Captain Chandler made an exploring expedition across the mountains to the head waters of the Catarman. Reported Catarman River navigable for barotos as far up as Lope de Vega.

Captain Read, on the northwest coast, reported numerous scouts and a decidedly favorable change in the temper of the people on his line. Instructions were given to extend his left—Beacham's company—to Bobon and Catarman.

Major Smith was active on the Catubig, but had so far failed to find a connection with Newman at Matiguinao.

Lieutenant McCue, First Infantry, made a scout from Oquendo to the head waters of the Pagsanhan. Found and burned a camarín of hemp which was owned by one of the insurrecto provincial council, which was being smuggled out to the neighboring islands.

On June 3 Dr. Lucban, of Manila, accompanied by one Gavino Villareal, reported at Calbayog with letter from the division commander. His mission was to visit and confer with his brother, Señor General Lucban, of Samar. The following day Señor Villareal was sent on the *Hercules* to Blanca Aurora and passed through the lines with letter to Lucban. He returned in a few days saying that he had been stopped by an insurrecto captain, who took the letters, saying he would forward them to their destination, and allowed Villareal to return. No answer being received, the same messenger was taken to the falls of the Upper Gandara on the 20th of June and set ashore on the right bank. He returned in a week and reported he could not find anybody. Dr. Lucban and Villareal sailed for Manila on the 28th. It was discovered by papers subsequently captured that Lucban received the letter of the division commander, but did not answer it, but made the receipt of it the subject of a proclamation to the people of the island in which he stated that the letter tendered him a general's commission in the U. S. Army if he would come in, but that he declined the offer and would continue the fight.

First district: On June 12 at Ormoc, Leyte, 1 lieutenant and 20 bolomen surrendered. On the 11th 1 boloman was killed and 7 captured by the native scouts of Jaro, Leyte. On June 12 Captain Steedman, Eleventh Infantry, struck a band of bolomen near Abuyog, Leyte, captured 7 of them and destroyed their property, and on the 13th killed 1, wounded 2, and captured 7.

Second district: On the 4th 25 bolomen surrendered at Dumanjug.

On the 7th Joaquin Conde y Villamor and 3 companions, with papers from Malvar of southern Luzon, captured in Cebu. June 18 Major Woodbury succeeded in driving Samson from his chosen position in Bohol; captured 7 guns and burned barracks, supplies, houses, etc. June 22 Lieutenant Feeter, Nineteenth Infantry, in Cebu, ran into band of insurrectos, capturing 2 men and 4 ponies. June 23 Lieutenant Helms, Nineteenth Infantry, ran into small band of insurrectos in Cebu, killing 2 of them. June 28 Lieutenant Feeter, Nineteenth Infantry, captured 2 of Eslan's band, who were afterwards killed in attempting to escape. June 29 detachment at Barili killed 1 of Lodoy's band.

Third district: No action.

Fourth district: June 15 Capt. C. G. Morton, Sixth Infantry, reports that Corporal Gunn and detachment killed 7 ladrones and captured 4 rifles. June 12 Lieut. D. E. W. Lyle, Eighteenth Infantry, reports the killing of Alejandro Arante, a notorious ladrone, near Banate, Panay.

Observation on the effect of the monsoon on the waters off Calbayog showed clearly that our troops on the interior of Samar had a very uncertain line of supply. The water was apt to blow clear off the bar at any time, and would be so stormy occasionally that such shallow vessels as we had to use could not weather it. Lieutenant Penfield, First Infantry, was detached as engineer of roads and bridges in Samar and directed to construct a road from Calbayog to the Hibatan and then prolong it from Calbayog to the Gandara. This was done with much skill and energy and it was finished just as the first storm cut us off from the use of the sea routes.

Two companies of the Eleventh Infantry reported and were sent to Leyte to relieve the two companies of the First Infantry temporarily there, and they were transferred to Samar. Company L reported to Calbayog for assignment, and K was sent to Lanang, on the east coast, for station.

Company L (Captain Jackson) was sent temporarily to Laguan for the special purpose of exploring the mesa of Palapag and ultimately to find a trail that would connect Newman at Matuguinao, on the Upper Gandara, with Poponton, on the Upper Catubig.

On July 1 Captain Chandler, pursuant to instructions, detached Lieutenant McCue with a platoon of his company to cross the range and take up a location on the Upper Catarman. McCue found Lope de Vega nothing but an ash heap and continued his march to Cervantes, where the town was burned, but the church had escaped the flames, and he located there. He found the enemy on the north slope.

Captain Read, Tenth Cavalry, succeeded in convincing many of the natives along the northwest coast that they did not wish any more war, and they began coming in, building new houses and proposed to stay with us.

Lieutenant Beacham, First Infantry, did not find the same spirit in the people along the north coast. They abandoned the coast towns and located in the mountains, well concealed. Beacham and McCue succeeded in establishing communication up the Catarman River by barotos.

At Laguan the troops have kept up their activity, and Major Smith reports under date of July 22 that Marcos Espiña, a local jefe, surrendered with 2 lieutenants and 91 men, with 2 brass pieces, 2 revolvers,

1 Krag, 2 Mausers, 25 miscellaneous rifles, 75 bolos. He further reports as surrendering at Palapag on the 25th Fernando Opinion, with 2 rifles and 1 revolver; on the 28th, the surrender of 2 rifles.

Captain Hersey, Ninth Infantry, from Oras, reports that he has succeeded in constructing shelter for stores and men, and has taken the field on the Upper Oras.

Captain Jarvis, First Infantry, at Borongan, was ordered to change location of his company to Sulat.

At Borongan an effort was made during June to explore the trail to Catbalogan, but the going was found impracticable for animals, and the detachment returned to Borongan June 27. The same detachment started again on the 30th, with carriers, and came through, but Lieutenant Murphy, who was in charge, reported the trail impracticable in present condition.

The detachment of Company H, First Infantry (Lieutenant Townsend commanding), was relieved from Lanang and sent to Pambujan, near which place he had an engagement on the 9th, in which he was wounded.

A detachment under Captain Pinto, assistant surgeon, was attacked near the same place on the 11th and had one man wounded. Company K, First Infantry, was sent to Lanang.

After the death of Lieutenant Downes, Major O'Connell was taken from the first district to command at Guiuan.

JULY.

Samar: Lieutenant-Colonel Foote, at Basey, was instructed to make an effort to discover the trail reported to connect Basey via the Cadauan or Sohoton River with the east coast, near Borongan, leaving the Cadauan near the caves of the Sohoton. Lieutenant Drouillard and Captain Bookmiller both made efforts, but failed to find any passable trail.

Between the 1st and 5th Captain Young pushed an expedition up to Multo, capturing a lieutenant and a rifle and destroying workshops, etc. He then crossed to Matuguinao, but found no enemy on that part of his scout.

Captain Bookmiller, Ninth Infantry, made an expedition from Basey east and south to Nipa. In this latter he destroyed a quantity of supplies, etc.

Captain Cornish, Ninth Cavalry, from Santa Rita, reports the capture of a captain and lieutenant of boleros at barrio of St. Helena.

Captain Tayman, First Infantry, fitted out with a mule pack train, left Catbalogan on June 23, and, going by Mutiong, Bunga, Colapi, and Hinacaan, reached San Jose the 29th, where he came on Guevarra and some of his people, whom he brushed away without loss to his command. It was evident that San Jose and vicinity afforded a fine supply station for the insurrectos, but Captain Tayman was not successful in finding a way through either east or north for his pack train. He returned to Catbalogan the 9th of July and reported that the route taken by his command to San Jose was impracticable. It was determined to try for a route from Blanca Aurora, and preparations began for so doing. He started on this new effort on the 28th with a train of pack mules, going by the way of Salanga.

Captain Young, Ninth Cavalry, and Captain Newman, First Infantry,

on the headwaters of the two branches of the Gandara, found no indications of offensive action on the part of the enemy, and Lieutenant Huston's troop, Tenth Cavalry, was sent the last of the month to Newman, to be pushed into the country for developments.

Lieutenant Hunsaker's detachment of Panay scouts had become so exhausted by constant scouting that it was returned to Panay on the 27th.

First district: Lieutenant Hendryx, native scouts, had a skirmish in the mountains of Masarijoc on the 21st. Succeeded in capturing 2 rifles and 3 brass pieces, and in burning barracks, supplies, etc. On the 28th authority given to transfer station of troops from Consolacion to Malitbog.

Second district: Insurrectos fired into Cebu on the nights of 20th, 21st, and 23d. On the 28th Lieutenant Croft struck Lugas's band near Guadalupe, killing 7 and capturing 13, with a loss of Lieutenant Croft and 2 men wounded.

Third district: Tranquil.

Fourth district: Report shows 3 rifles captured. The Thirteenth Battery of Field Artillery. Captain Foster, was relieved from duty in the department on the 28th and sailed to Manila.

AUGUST.

Samar: Seven companies of the Ninth Infantry were sent to Samar by the division commander to relieve the squadrons of the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry, that of the Ninth going to southern Luzon and that of the Tenth going to Panay. In preparation for this change Captain Young's troop, Ninth Cavalry, on August 7 was ordered relieved at Blanca Aurora by a detachment of Carleton's troop of the Tenth Cavalry, in order to initiate the movement by coming to the coast at Calbayog. On the 9th two companies of the Ninth Infantry (Anderson's and Connell's) came in on the *Liscum*, and she was ordered to proceed to Santa Rita, where Anderson's company would be landed to relieve Cornish's troop, Ninth Cavalry, and thence to Balangiga, where Connell's company would land and take possession of that town. On her return she took off Cornish's troop at Santa Rita, picked up Troop I at Calbayog, and sailed for Legaspi on the 16th.

The *Relief* arrived at Calbayog on the 16th with two companies (D and M) of the Ninth Infantry, which were sent to Catbalogan and Calbiga to relieve the remaining two troops of the Ninth Cavalry (K and L) and transfer them to Legaspi.

August 23 the headquarters and the remaining three companies of the Ninth Infantry came in and were landed at Calbayog. The transport sailed on the 27th for Iloilo with Troops E, F, and H, Tenth Cavalry. Troop G (Carleton) sailed for Capiz on the 28th, thus completing the change. Of the nine companies landed from the *Larvon*, one went to Sapinit to relieve Carleton, one to the mouth of the Bacot at Paric on the east coast, and one remained at Calbayog.

The companies of the Ninth Infantry proved to be little more than half companies in numerical strength, running from 68 to 80, or an average of about 70 men. A good deal of attention was devoted to getting the troops under shelter. The torch had preceded us at most places, and it was necessary to provide better accommodations to lessen the sick lists. Mauro, Oquendo, Cervantes, Paric, Oras, Sulat, Sapinit,

Blanca Aurora, Taviran, Matuguinao, and Lanang had to be assisted in this way. In most instances it was found possible to get roofs made from nipa or grass by natives, and flooring, etc., was supplied by the quartermaster's department.

The plan adopted of encouraging natives who wished to be at peace to come into the vicinity of our stations and erect houses and plant fields to support themselves brought in heavy communities along the shore north and south of Calbayog, north and south of Mauo, about Laguan, Oras, and Santa Rita. But they were short on rice, and they were encouraged, and in some instances given protection, to go out to the hemp fields of well-known insurrectos to cut and prepare abaca for the market, which was sold and proceeds invested in rice for them. This plan had a dual result; it fed the poor and reduced the available means of our enemies. It was undertaken in addition to find and have them gather the crop of mountain rice.

In order to check smuggling, troops were sent to occupy the island of Biliran, on which captured papers showed Caibiran, Biliran, Culaba, and Naval were busy centers in this work.

On the 23d of July an order was issued relieving Company L, First Infantry, from duty at Laguan and transferring it to the northwest coast, relieving Troop H, Tenth Cavalry. In making this change Captain Jackson was directed to take 50 men and cross the island via Catubig, Poponton, Matuguinao, Taviran, and Gandara. Leaving Tagabiran on July 29 he found evidence of the enemy to the west of his line of march, but as his orders were urgent he did not spend much time on side issues, but succeeded in finding a trail to Matuguinao, which place he reached on the 1st of August. He reports construction of a trail for mule pack train practicable.

From Oquendo Captain Chandler, in a report of August 11, states that many natives are coming in and taking the oath of allegiance, while others are starving in the mountains. That he has scouted the country and finds it too poor to support the population without smuggling, which he has taken measures to stop. Lieutenant McCue, with a platoon of Chandler's company, at Cervantes, reports that his command was attacked on the 21st by an insurrecto force having 4 guns and 20 rifles.

On the 25th Captain Chandler reports that the cutting and working of abaca has begun as contemplated.

Captain Jackson, Company L, First Infantry, was instructed to take a command from his company and from Company I (Beacham's) and explore the north side of the Pambujan Mountains and upper Pambujan River, starting from Catarman.

An effort was made to secure a combined movement from the Catarman, the Mondragon, the mouth of the Pambujan, and from San Enrique, on the south side of the Pambujan Mountains (Newman). The combination failed; the force intended for Mondragon for lack of means of transportation; that operating in the Pambujan Mountains for lack of efficient or, may be, well-intentioned guides. Captain Newman found the river he was to follow ran south instead of north, as given on the maps. The final result was that Captain Jackson's command from the Catarman was the only one that reached the designated region. Starting from Lieutenant McCue's camp on the upper Catarman with four days' rations and abundance of resolution he finally found himself in Lucban's sitio of Rosario without knowing it, and

without being expected. Not being acquainted with Lucban, he was brought to a realization of what he had run on by his muchacho pointing to a woman in one of the houses and announcing that "that is Mrs. Lucban." The men then opened fire on some fleeing people, and it has since appeared that Lucban was wounded, but not seriously. Three men who were with him were killed, and his two military secretaries were captured, one of them being severely wounded. The official papers of the headquarters were taken in good condition. Mrs. Lucban and her child were brought to Calbayog. Captain Jackson continued down the Pambujan River, and found the insurrectos had destroyed Suba by fire before he reached there, but he found much of the machinery and materials of the military workshops they had there and destroyed them. In coming down the Pambujan in barotos, the one in which Dr. C. R. Ohliger, contract surgeon, was riding, was swamped. All the soldiers held to the batangas of the baroto and got out safely, but unfortunately the doctor was overconfident in his natatorial powers and attempted to swim ashore, but sank before he reached the shallow water and was not seen again. The current was unusually swift, and he was undoubtedly carried out to sea. The detachment was out ten days, and when their rations ran out they lived on what they were able to collect from the country.

Laguan: Maj. F. A. Smith having been relieved from command in order to assume the duties of inspector-general of the department, the command fell to Capt. F. E. Lacey, jr., who continued to actively scout the district contiguous to his post. By this method there was collected in Laguan a colony of 2,500 people.

Oras: Captain Hersey, Ninth Infantry, has been very active, and has made life so miserable for the people in the bush that several hundred have come in, taken the oath of allegiance, and settled down under the protection of the Americans.

Sulat: Captain Jarvis reports having made 13 expeditions, in which he had 6 engagements, and reports a total loss to the enemy of 11 killed, 2 wounded, and 9 captured.

Borongan: No action reported.

Lanang: No action reported.

Pambujan: Two scouts were made, one commanded by Lieutenant Townsend, First Infantry, and the other by Lieutenant Murchison. In both cases good work was done without loss on our side.

Guiuan: Three expeditions were out, and the one under Lieutenant King, First Infantry, seems to have been conducted with skill and exceptionally good judgment. No losses on our side.

Captain Tayman succeeded in making a pack trail through from Blanca Aurora to San Jose. The map is so misleading that San Jose must have moved. From San Jose a trail was found that led over to and down the Bacot, which was as expected. Lieutenant Nowlen, First Infantry, followed this trail as far as Tamay, when he ran into a station of the insurrectos and brought back 2 rifles, and burned their barracks, supplies, etc. This was the home station of Colonel Rafael's command. This work of Captain Tayman assures our connection with the east coast by the Bacot, which is navigable as far up as Hinolosan.

The squadron of the Tenth Cavalry was transferred from Samar to Panay to relieve the Eighteenth Infantry ordered to the United States. Three troops were sent to Iloilo August 26 and one troop to Capiz on August 29.

First district: Tolosa garrison was withdrawn as being no longer necessary. The island of Biliran was occupied by a mixed command of the United States troops and native scouts on the 31st, the object being to close it as a refuge for people driven out of Samar and to stop smuggling.

On the 31st the quarters of the insurrectos under Capili were burned and stores destroyed.

Second district: On the 17th the police of Argao, Cebu, had a skirmish with insurrectos in the mountains. Police had 1 man wounded and inflicted small loss on the enemy.

On the 18th Godinez was discovered moving north and pursued by Lieutenant Cecil, Nineteenth Infantry, and attacked and driven back, his people scattering in the brush.

On the 28th Lieutenants Cecil, Nineteenth Infantry, and Monday, Philippine Scouts, ran into a band of insurrectos and caused them some loss.

Third district: No action.

Fourth district: No action.

SEPTEMBER.

Samar: On the 2d a band of boleros which had been gotten together at Liruan, a barrio to the north of Basey, made an attack on a party of 12 men of Company G, Ninth Infantry, sent out to look after the telephone at Tacloban. The rush was made from the long grass at the side of the trail, which concealed the assailants completely. The detachment had 2 men killed and 2 wounded, but succeeded in inflicting a much heavier loss on the enemy.

September 5, Lieutenant Schoeffel, Ninth Infantry, captured a number of insurgents and a quantity of supplies on Buad Island.

Captain Swaine, First Infantry, found and destroyed an insurrecto barrack back of Paranas on the 13th.

September 4, Lieut. C. C. Kinney, Ninth Infantry, from Matuguinao, states that there are people in the mountains about him, but very difficult to approach.

September 6, Captain Palmer, Ninth Infantry, reported from Sapinit that Taguite was visited by a detachment and rice and abaca burned.

On the 13th Captain Chandler, First Infantry, reports a scout on the Dinabuhon, returning via Taragbucan and Oquendo Viejo. Captured 4 insurrectos.

On the 14th Lieutenant Reed, First Infantry, and Lieutenant Hoover, Philippine Scouts, made an expedition from Lauan to Magpog and brushed the enemy out and destroyed the barracks, etc.

Lieutenant McCue, First Infantry, reports that the guerrillas between his location at Cervantes and Beacham at Catarman still keep up their efforts to stop river navigation, but they hope to drive them out by turning night into day.

Captain Jackson, First Infantry, who has charge of the northwest coast from Weyler to Lavezares reports that he has now 10,000 peaceable, self-supporting people on his line and no insurrectos within 9 miles of the coast.

On September 25 Captain Hersey, Ninth Infantry, reports that during his absence on the Dolores River Sergeant Wesley, who was left in charge at Oras, finding the enemy in the vicinity, went out and

attacked a band of 30 riflemen, drove them into the brush, killing 2, mortally wounding 2 officers, and wounding 7 men, without loss to his detachment.

Sulat: Captain Jarvis reports that he made nine expeditions during the month, and had one engagement, with a total result during the month of killed, 3; wounded, 5, and captured, 5.

Major Getty, First Infantry, reports five expeditions, with two engagements and 10 of the enemy captured. Many people coming to Borongan and taking the oath of allegiance.

On September 12 a company of the Ninth Infantry, Lieutenant Brown, Ninth Infantry, commanding, was sent to Paric, at the mouth of the Bacot, to establish itself there and to maintain a station at Hino-losan, at the head of navigation. This completed the third line across the island: First, via Hibatan, Lope de Vega to Catarman; second, via Gandara, Matuguinao, and Catubig; third, via Gandara, Blanca Aurora, San Jose, and Bacot.

The community of peaceable, self-supporting people at Oras has increased under Captain Hersey's management to 2,500.

On the receipt of instructions from the division commander that the disturbance in Cebu must be put down as soon as possible, it was determined to act at once. Two troops of cavalry had been promised in June, and it had been hoped that they would arrive for that purpose; but as nothing had come, the necessary measures were taken to do the work with means within the department. Two companies of infantry and 50 native scouts each from Hunsaker's and Walker's companies were drawn out of Panay. The department commander considered it quite necessary to press the operations in person, and in order to do so intelligently he changed headquarters from Calbayog, Samar, to Cebu, island of Cebu, on the 15th.

On the morning of the 29th the following telegram was received:

BASEY, SAMAR, *September 29, 1901.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Cebu:

Twenty-four men Company C, Ninth Infantry, 11 wounded, arrived here from Balangiga. Remainder of company killed. Insurgents secured all company supplies and all rifles except 26. Company was attacked during breakfast yesterday morning.
BOOKMILLER.

This was followed immediately by the following message:

BASEY, *September 29, 1901.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Cebu:

I leave here at 9 a. m. with 53 men, Dr. Combe, and 3 Hospital Corps men on the *Pittsburg* for Balangiga.

BOOKMILLER.

Knowing that Bookmiller could not be absent from Basey with the force he had taken for many hours without inviting an attack at that place, a telegram was sent to Col. Isaac D. DeRussy, Eleventh Infantry, commanding first district, at Tacloban, inquiring if it would be possible to draw enough men out of Tacloban and contiguous sections to occupy Balangiga and make an effort to punish the assassins, to which the following was received:

TACLOBAN, *September 29, 1901.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF VISAYAS, Cebu:

Can organize a command of 125 men without difficulty and move on short notice.
DE RUSSY.

TACLOBNA, *September 29, 1901.*CRANE, *Cebu:*

Message received. Will be under way in two hours. There was sent by *Pittsburg* this morning medical officer to render assistance to wounded. Will take ten days' rations.

DE RUSSY.

As the success of this effort of the savages supplied them with quite a number of rifles and much ammunition, while heretofore they had been dependent upon their knives and stilettoes, Captain Garst, of the Navy, was requested to find a gunboat that could give prompt warning to contiguous stations and then to stand by near Pambujan until the station could be strengthened. The *Arayat* was found at Calbayog and was off on her mission at 3.10 p. m. September 29. Lieut. William R. Shoemaker, who was her commander, discharged the duty with his customary promptness and good judgment. The same day the following was received from the division commander:

MANILA, *September 29, 1901.*HUGHES, *Cebu:*

Your cable relative to Company C, Ninth Infantry, received. Battalion of Seventh and Twenty-sixth Infantry will be sent to Samar as soon as possible. Where will you have them landed?

HALL.

In reply to inquiry the following was received:

BASEY, *September 29, 1901.*ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS, *Cebu:*

The following is an account of the attack at Balangiga from statements of those who escaped:

At 6.45 a. m. September 28, while Company C, Ninth Infantry, was at breakfast, at a given signal, which was the ringing of the church bells, an attack was made by approximately 450 bolomen. Two hundred attacked from rear of quarters and about 200 from the front. Attack was simultaneously made on the officers' quarters. The company was completely surprised, the attacking force from the front gained an entrance to the sleeping quarters after overpowering the guards and gained possession of the guns, and a fight ensued for their possession in which the men met their death. The mess room was in the rear. The enemy was beaten off temporarily by about 25 or 30 men who had succeeded in gaining possession of their weapons. Quartermaster-Sergeant Frank Betron, Company C, assumed command and while trying to collect the survivors and get away in boats the attack was renewed as the sergeant and men left. The strength of the command was 3 officers and 72 men. Statement of casualties: Captain Connell, Ninth Infantry, Lieutenant Bumpus, Ninth Infantry, and Major-Surgeon Griswold, killed; 40 enlisted men killed, 6 missing, 13 wounded, and 13 present for duty. Party attacking the officers in convent entered their quarters through the church in large numbers led by the presidente of the town. Of the approximate 101 rifles on hand 26 were saved. Of the remaining 75 over 15 had the bolts pulled. There were 25,000 rounds of ammunition in boxes. The survivors have no doubt the attack was led by the town officials. There were 95 prisoners in the guard tents who joined in the attack at the signal. Missing men are not accounted for, because of the capsizing of their baroto, and will probably be picked up by Captain Bookmiller, who is now en route to Balangiga.

DROUILLARD, *Lieutenant.*

On October 30 the following was received from Captain Bookmiller:

BASEY, *September 30, 1901.*ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT VISAYAS, *Cebu:*

Have just returned from Balangiga. Lieutenant Drouillard's telegram of yesterday explains the condition at Balangiga correctly. Landed there at noon yesterday; inhabitants deserted town as we entered, firing but one shot at us. Buried 3 officers and 29 men Company C. A number of bodies were burned in quarters, the building being fired as we entered. We secured or destroyed most of rations. All ordnance gone. Insurgents secured 57 serviceable rifles and 28,000 rounds of ammunition.

Fifty-eight men of Company C and 1 hospital corps man killed or missing. Twenty-eight men accounted for. Found 2 men in a baroto en route here. After burying dead, burned the town and returned to Basey.

BOOKMILLER,
Captain, Ninth Infantry.

Later on the same day the following was received:

BASEY, *September 30, 1901.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF VISAYAS, *Cebu.*

Lieutenant Bumpus and Dr. Griswold killed in convent. Captain Connell outside, evidently jumped from window second story. Sentinel and one member of guard at foot of convent stairs when attack was made; both killed at their posts. No one at stairs leading from the church to the convent. Insurgents entered here. One soldier (officers' cook) and 2 natives in convent at time. Sixty-nine native prisoners in confinement 23d instant. This number increased each day from town and surrounding country. The chief of police informed Captain Connell that 90 more would be in on the morning of the 28th, time of attack.

BOOKMILLER,
Captain, Ninth Infantry.

Captain Connell was specially selected for the station of Balangiga. He was personally known to the department commander as a young, vigorous, zealous officer. Before he sailed for the station he was given as full an account of the region as possible and of the temper of the people inhabiting it, as gathered from the results of various expeditions from Guiuan and Pambujan that have been made.

The method of attack employed in the cases of Lieutenants Downes and Townsend was fully stated to him and great caution advised. The exercise of great care and caution was emphasized, and this may have been one of the factors in making the surprise possible. Lieutenant Conger, aid-de-camp, who visited the station August 15, reported on his return to headquarters that the company was held in hand, and that the men were not permitted to go about the town singly with the freedom that is usually permitted in occupied towns, but required to go in parties of not less than 3, and at least 1 of the party should carry a rifle. This strictness may have prevented information of the proposed attack from reaching the commanding officer, and may have aided in making it possible to execute the plan adopted without discovery. The company reported with a greatly reduced numerical strength, but it was sufficiently strong to take care of itself at Balangiga, as there were virtually no serviceable rifles in that part of the island. A band of bolomen had been organized on the Cadauan, but it was small and had been much broken by the company at Basey. On the arrival of the company the people received them with apparent good will. This was prearranged, as is shown by a captured letter written to Lucban in May last. The straightforward, honest nature of Captain Connell does not appear to have been proof against the wiles and duplicity of the people about him. Every man about him was well prepared to handle a bolo, for as man and boy he and his bolo are almost indispensable. It appears that the town officials were permitted to make arrests and confine persons in the guardhouse as malhechores. Pursuant to a well-laid scheme they began filling up the guardhouse with their friends on accusations of being bad people. On the 23d of September additional arrests were made, until the number in confinement on the morning of the 28th was nearly 100. The chief of police had prepared the way for an additional increase of 90 on the morning of the 28th. Had not the chief of police been killed he could probably establish the fact that he brought in the 90 men on

the morning of the 28th, but did not deliver them to the guard. Two days before Lieutenant Bumpus had telegraphed for an allotment of 150 pesos to repair the roofs, as they did not turn water. He was authorized to expend 100, and this gave occasion for additional men to come in on the plea of getting employment as nipa roofers. A fictitious funeral gave an innocent appearance to a gathering of men in the church, where the corpse was transformed into bolos.

The church party passed without hindrance by a stairway in the church to the quarters of the officers, two of whom were assassinated in their bedrooms. At the same time the chief of police seized the rifle in the hands of the sentinel over the prisoners and gave the signal for the general attack on the men at their breakfast and a rush for the quarters to secure the rifles. The great loss of life occurred in this struggle, while our men were without arms and the natives had the only weapon with which they are expert. About one-third of the company succeeded in gaining possession of their arms and drove the natives off, but being left without any experienced leader they determined upon removing the wounded to barotos and abandoning the town, which was done. The company having sailed directly from Manila for its station, merely calling at Calbayog for instructions, had an unusual amount of ammunition in reserve. The loss of life was finally established to have been 3 officers and 41 men of Company C and 1 hospital-corps man. The savages secured 57 serviceable rifles and 25,000 rounds of ammunition.

The prompt and vigorous action of Captain Bookmiller and Colonel De Russey in doing all that was possible to neutralize the unfavorable effect of this success in the enemy's camp was admirable. Colonel De Russey held the district until relieved by marines on October 18.

It now became apparent that the combination of the natives and the agents of the business firms of Catbalogan and Calbayog made too strong a team in the smuggling business to be stopped without resorting to stronger measures. Therefore on the 13th of September a letter was written the agents of these firms at Catbalogan and Calbayog directing that they should cease business and quit the island. After reaching Cebu a cable was received asking stay of proceedings until the acting consul of His Britannic Majesty in Manila and a member of each of the firms of Warner, Barnes & Co. and Smith, Bell & Co. could come down in person and look into the facts. These gentlemen visited me in Cebu and then visited Samar, and returned to Manila. Then the agents themselves asked for a further delay of four days to get their goods and marine property sent out, which was granted. These agents finally quit the island on the 10th of October. There has been considerable discussion on this matter, and it may be well to insert here the statement of one informant taken from the mass without selection.

STATEMENT OF GENEROSO ALMAZAN, FIRST LIEUTENANT OF MILITARY ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INSURGENT FORCES IN SAMAR.

CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, P. I., October 27, 1901.

Generoso Almazan, factor and first lieutenant of military administration, to Maj. E. F. Glenn, Fifth Infantry, acting judge-advocate, judge-advocate Department of the Visayas:

Q. Where do you live?—A. In Salog, on the other side of the town.

Q. What office did you hold last year, and up to June this year, with the insurgents?—A. First lieutenant of the military administration.

Q. What else?—A. That was all.

Q. Were you a commissioner of any kind for the collection of an impost or tax or anything of that sort for Lucban?—A. Yes, sir; I was appointed to collect from the local chiefs.

Q. Did you at any time have anything to do about making arrangements for the supply of rice that came in?—A. Yes, sir; I was a commissioner to send the rice.

Q. How was that arranged—how was it done?—A. I used to send the rice every week.

Q. Where did you get it?—A. I got it from Mr. Gibson when he sent it to me.

Q. Did you have any arrangement with Mr. Gibson about sending it?—A. By order of Lucban I went to Talolura to meet him.

Q. When did you go to Talolura to meet Gibson?—A. In November.

Q. Of last year?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. What date was it when you met him there?—A. The 10th of November.

Q. Who was present at this meeting?—A. Cipriano Comprador, Gibson, Mr. Easton, and myself.

Q. Whose house did you meet in?—A. In the house of Cipriano Comprador.

Q. What time of day was it, and how long were you there?—A. In the morning, from 9 until 11.30 o'clock.

Q. You are sure about its being the 10th?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you remember the day of the week?—A. No, sir.

Q. Where were you when you got this letter from Lucban directing you to go there and meet Messrs. Gibson and Easton?—A. In Bato.

Q. How did Lucban know Gibson and Easton would be at Talolura to meet you?—A. Surely (seguro) through letters between Lucban and Mr. Easton to go there and meet me.

Q. What date did you arrive there at this place?—A. On the 9th.

Q. When did they arrive there, and how?—A. On the morning of the 10th, coming from Tacloban.

Q. They had to come by boat; what boat did they have?—A. They came by baroto.

Q. What arrangement did they make that day, if any?—A. The agreement was made after I showed them the order from Lucban; I told them to send me the rice to Bato. They told Cipriano Comprador that as soon as he received the rice to send it to me, and also the same to Ciriaco, who is dead.

Q. Who is Ciriaco; Ciriaco Pecson?—A. Yes, sir.

(Note: Ciriaco Pecson was really the agent of Smith, Bell & Co., at Mualbual, Island of Buad, and is dead.)

Q. What was it about Ciriaco Pecson? Did they give him an order?—A. They sent an order to him because he was the agent of Easton.

Q. Did Easton send a written order to Pecson?—A. I do not know whether he sent a written order, but he told me that he would furnish all of the rice.

Q. That Ciriaco would furnish all the rice?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. He was Smith-Bell's agent at Mualbual?—A. Of Easton.

Q. I want to know what else, if anything, you carried from General Lucban and presented to Messrs. Easton and Gibson. You mentioned orders just now—what were they?—A. Yes, sir; one letter that was as follows: "The bearer of this is in charge of receiving the rice, and he will designate for you the place where the rice must be sent." When I showed them the letter they asked me where they should send the rice, and I answered them: "To Bato."

Q. Did they, pursuant to this agreement, deliver any rice or not?—A. They told me they would send it.

Q. Did they send it?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Tell me, first, where Mr. Gibson sent it, and how much and when?—A. Gibson sent first, on the 15th of November, 25 sacks; on the 19th, 20 sacks; afterwards, on the 4th of December, 10 sacks; on the 16th of December, 30 sacks, and afterwards 5 sacks on the 28th of December. That is all from Gibson.

Q. Did Mr. Easton send any under this agreement; and if so, where did he send it from, how much, and when?—A. He sent from Mualbual on the 3d of January, 20 sacks; on the 18th of January, 25 sacks; on the 14th of January, 15 sack, and February 6, 10 sacks.

Q. Did you have any definite arrangement as to any definite amount these people were to send?—A. Yes, sir; for each year each one was to furnish 500 sacks.

Q. They were each one to furnish 500 sacks a year for your center?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did your center include?—A. Masac-pasac (barrio of Catbalogan).

Q. Who is commander, Colonel Guevarra?—A. Francisco Rafael was in command when I left that place.

Q. Do you know anything about any other rice that was to be furnished by

them?—A. No, sir; I was all the time at Bato, but Luchan gave me 2,000 pesos to buy rice.

Q. Did you buy this rice (from the English firms) with the 2,000 pesos?—A. No, sir; I bought from different persons.

Q. Who paid for this rice to Easton and Gibson?—A. I do not know; I never paid them anything.

Q. Did they understand that you were to pay them, or who was to settle with them for this rice?—A. I do not know anything about that; I only received a letter from Luchan to go to Talolura and meet them and present this recommendation (letter) to them.

Q. Who else in Talolura knows that you were there on that trip? Does the presidente know that you were there, and others?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who else?—A. Manuel Absonar; Patricio Absonar; Domingo Navarro, the presidente. There were many people there, but I can not remember their names, because I do not know the people in Talolura.

Q. I want to know about this boat that brought Gibson and Easton there to this place; can you tell me who run it or anything so that I can identify it?—A. No, sir; because as soon as they arrived we went to Comprador's house and we had the meeting, and after the meeting they did not take dinner because they said they had some food on the boat.

Q. Was there anything said about the price of this rice?—A. No, sir; they did not say anything about the price, only that they would send it to me.

Q. How did the rice come to Talolura? Who sent it?—A. To Cipriano, by barotos.

Q. How did this come to you at Bato from Mualbual, and who sent it?—A. The boys of Ciriaco Pecson brought it.

Q. How did it get up to Bato? Tell me the route it took.—A. By baroto.

Q. How?—A. Up the river Bato. [Witness here indicated route on blue-print map.]

Q. Why have they not delivered any rice since February? They have not delivered 500 sacks to you?—A. I do not know why; but the 1st of February Luchan gave me 2,000 pesos to buy rice.

Q. Where did you get your rice with that 2,000 pesos and from whom?—A. In Villareal from Ynocencio Hilbano, brother of Gabiano Hilbano, now a prisoner here; Buenaventura Lola, Baldomero Brillante, Cicilio Tison. I bought a good deal from Tison. He used to send rice himself to the mountains and also many presents.

Q. Is that all the rice you know of as having come from Gibson and Easton?—A. Yes, sir; 90 sacks and 70 sacks.

Q. Where was that rice used?—A. In Masac-pasac.

Q. How did it get there?—A. Carried on the shoulders of cargadores (carriers).

Q. Who used this rice when it got to Masac-pasac?—A. The insurrectos; they had a camp there.

First district: Capt. Pedro Dorado and Lieut. Alberto Rafael surrendered in person and turned over 2 Remington rifles and 1 Colt's revolver on the 12th.

On the 1st, First Lieut. M. L. Avery, Philippine Scouts, attacked Capili in a barrio near Leyte, island of Leyte, and had 1 man wounded, but killed 7 of the enemy and captured 9 rifles, 1 revolver, and a quantity of ammunition.

Second district: September 3, Captain Rowan, Nineteenth Infantry, attacked and carried the intrenchments of the enemy in the Calajayon Mountains, Bohol, scattering the enemy and capturing a considerable quantity of supplies, which were destroyed.

On the 6th, Chief Claudio Lopez surrendered 1 captain and 10 rifles to Lieut. G. W. Helms, Nineteenth Infantry, at Dumanjug, Cebu.

Third district: On the 27th of September ladrones attacked detachment of native scouts at Castellana, Negros, killing 3, wounding 4, and capturing 7 Springfield rifles and 50 rounds of ammunition.

Fourth district: On the 16th the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry was relieved from duty in the department and embarked on the U. S. army transport *Kilpatrick* for the United States via the San Bernadino Strait.

OCTOBER.

On the 1st, instructions received by cable that the Philippine Scouts on and after that date would be a charge against the Regular Army appropriation, instead of being paid from insular funds, and that they would be enlisted regularly for a term of three years. The Department of the Visayas was allotted in the new arrangement 13 companies, while there existed 19 companies and 2 in Samar in course of organization. The original plan of organization was 2 battalions in Panay and 1 battalion in each of the other districts—Negros, Cebu, Bohol, and Leyte. But Samar had been transferred into the department and needed such troops. The character of the material to be had and the demands of the localities were the prime factors in determining the distribution to be made, which was as follows: Panay, 1 battalion of 4 companies; Negros, 2 companies; Cebu and Bohol, 2 companies; Leyte, 3 companies; Samar, 2 companies.

By this distribution the discharges without cause all fell on the islands of Panay and Negros, which were in a state of tranquillity. The company dropped in Leyte was absorbed in the three retained companies, and the two companies in embryo in Samar were recruited to full companies. The reorganization was accomplished without a ripple of discontent. These troops have been tested as to dislocating for service. Hunsaker with a portion of his company went from Panay to Samar and they did excellent service; Hunsaker and Walker took a platoon each from Panay to Cebu, where they rendered very valuable service.

Uhrig took a platoon to Bohol from Cebu, where it did fine service.

Captured papers showed that the center of insurrection in Samar was still in Catbalogan, notwithstanding the fact that it had been garrisoned ever since the original occupation of the island by our troops. Some of those who were shown to be offenders were town officials. They and others who were found to be giving aid and encouragement to the insurgents were arrested on the 14th of September and sent to Iloilo for detention. Major Glenn, the judge-advocate of the department, examined these men after their arrival in Iloilo, and after doing so he was sent to Samar to continue his investigation. He succeeded in getting possession of a considerable amount of the funds collected for the insurrecto cause, and in so doing hurt their cause, not only by depleting the treasury, but by demonstrating to the people at large that disregard or active violation of obligations voluntarily assumed, were not to be treated lightly or with contempt. His work was thorough and had a widely spread effect.

On October 10 Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Smith reported for duty in the department, and the island of Samar was attached to the first district, to which General Smith was assigned as commander.

A battalion of the Seventh U. S. Infantry reported at Calbayog on the same date and was assigned as follows: One company, Gandara; one company, Paric; one company, Borongan; one company, Pam-bujan.

On the 13th Major Williams reported by telegraph his arrival at Tacloban with four companies of the Twenty-sixth U. S. Infantry, which were assigned as follows: One company, Weyler; two companies, Calbayog; one company, Catubig.

On the 14th division headquarters cabled that two companies of the

Ilocano scouts were being sent. One was designated for station at Catbalogan and the other at Catarman. The latter, not being able to land at Catarman, was directed to land at Calbayog and march to Catarman via the Hibatan and Catarman rivers.

On the 18th division headquarters telegraphed:

Admiral Rodgers offers 300 marines for service in Samar. Where is the best place to send them? Some special field where can cooperate in territory unmixed with the army for a couple of months? * * *

In pursuance with above it was advised that the wreck of Company C, Ninth Infantry, and Bookmiller's company, both at Basey, should be transferred to Santa Rita and Catbalogan and the marines given the Basey and Balangiga section, with a third station well north of Basey. Balangiga was still held by troops drawn from Leyte, which were needed there.

On the 26th of October the First Battalion, Twelfth U. S. Infantry, arrived at Calbayog and was disembarked, instructions being given to send one company to Weyler and one to Pilar on Paysonhay. The battalion of marines reached Samar in due time and were in place at Basey, Balangiga, and Guinapundan on the 26th.

On the 2d Lieutenant Schoffel, Ninth Infantry, picked up 2 lieutenants, a sergeant, 2 corporals, and 9 privates of insurrectos in Mutiong, who had sneaked into the town for the purpose of firing it when it would be attacked by a force from the outside. The attack did not take place. On the 4th Lieutenant Schoffel picked up a lieutenant, a corporal, and 5 privates in Hiabong, who were to fire the town when it would be attacked from the outside.

On October 6 Lieutenant Bains, First U. S. Infantry, discovered a well-laid plan prepared for making an attack on the detachment stationed in the convent at Calbiga, which seemed to have been planned on the same general line as that made at Balangiga.

On October 14 Lieutenant Schoffel struck a band of insurrectos, killing 3 of the party.

Lieutenant Wallace, Ninth U. S. Infantry, was given a roving commission on September 15 to take a platoon of Captain Schoffel's company up the Gandara Valley and protect the peaceable natives while they gathered the rice harvest of the insurgents. The necessities coming upon the insurrectos can be appreciated by the following paragraph from the latest proclamation from Lucban:

* * * * *

I order and command that there will be shot to death with musketry * * *
 Seventh. The Filipino who does not engage in agriculture, such as the cultivation of palay and other products, or to the occupation from which he may best derive a livelihood, and remain in tranquillity of mind.

* * * * *

Lieutenant Wallace's camp on the 16th was not favorably located, and conditions were such that it was possible for a heavy body of bolomen to approach it in the night under cover of the darkness and dense tropical growth without discovery, which was done. The camp was rushed in the early morning while some of the men were still in their blankets. The native rice gatherers gave the first alarm; the men rose to the situation and, after a hard fight in which they lost 25 per cent in killed or mortally wounded, the attacking force was driven off with a loss in dead left on the field of double the total number of the detachment present. The moral effect of the fight has been excellent, but

the price paid was entirely too heavy. It was fully recognized that the policy of cutting the abaca (hemp) and gathering the rice on the insurgents' land would have a tendency to bring the enemy to action. Although it was wished to provoke a fight it was expected that it would be made on a more suitable field. Our loss was 8 killed, 2 mortally wounded, and 6 wounded.

On the 17th the detachment stationed at Weyler was attacked by an estimated force of 10 rifles and 150 boleros. The attack was beaten off with a loss to the detachment of one man, who was fatally hit by a rifle ball.

October 18 Captain Jackson, First U. S. Infantry, sent an expedition by trail from Mauo to Catarman, which found boleros infesting the section about Carainan, and killed 14 of them.

Captain Jackson also reports the opening of the trail along the coast from Weyler to Lavezares, which was undertaken under Captain Read to secure overland communication between detachments.

On October 17, Naval Cadet Noa was killed by the enemy near Nipnipa, where he had landed from the gunboat *Mariveles*.

Second district: On the 2d Lieutenant Hegeman, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry, reported capture at Tuburan, Cebu, of Col. Sabas Estrella.

On the same date Lieutenant Helms, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry, from Dumanjug, Cebu, reported that Lieutenant Sager, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry, and Lieutenant Monday, Philippine Scouts, ran a band of bolomen into a cave so located that it could only be reached by climbing one at a time. In doing this both lieutenants were injured by stones thrown down on them, but 11 of the bolomen were ultimately killed.

On the 11th Lieutenant Sager, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry, burned a part of the barrio Maulbaul and killed several bolomen.

On the 12th orders were issued to stop hostilities.

On the 11th a telegram was received from division headquarters saying that "Troop D, Sixth Cavalry, will leave to-day for Bogo, Cebu."

Time had to be given the various chiefs to hunt up their men who had been disbanded in order to find concealment in the mass of the people. The arrangements were made to have the different bands assembled at the nearest central point for surrender. The first one took place at Guadalupe, Cebu, on the 23d, and they continued from day to day until the transaction was completed by administering the oath of allegiance to the head chief Maxilom at Cebu on October 30. The presentation and delivery of arms, etc., seemed to be done in good faith and all parties seemed to hope for peace and prosperity.

NOVEMBER.

The first district seems to have been taking a breathing spell while preparing for greater effort.

Second district: The department headquarters in the field were moved to Tagbilaran, Bohol, in order to see if some strong measures might be taken to stop "petite guerre" going on over there, which was originated by one Samson, chief of police of the provincial insurrecto government, and was also continued in that office by the commanding officer of the United States forces which took possession of the island the 20th of March, 1900. Samson went out the 2d of September, and

got together a few riflemen and quite a gang of boleros and unexpectedly attacked a detachment of troops under 1st Lieutenant Theodore Levack, 44th U. S. Volunteer Infantry, near Carmen. Efforts were made to check the insurrectionary movement, but it grew until virtually every able-bodied native in Bohol was an insurgent boloman. The organization was poor and has never been able to procure any appreciable number of rifles, never having at one time, it is believed, over 25 serviceable rifles; but they have claimed 100, which is taken as including arms of all kinds.

On November 3, Company D, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry, to which Lieutenant Feeter was assigned, was ordered to proceed to Bohol to take station at Carmen. On the 5th, Company I, Sixth U. S. Infantry (Hanigan's), was ordered from Cebu to Bohol to take station at Guindulman. On the 6th, Company D, Sixth U. S. Infantry, was ordered from Cebu to Bohol to take station at Antequera. On the 9th, a platoon of native scouts (Uhrig's) was ordered from Cebu to Bohol to take station at Dimiao. These additional forces so blanketed the island that Samson and his forces simply disappeared. He would neither fight nor treat. Finally about fifty of the women of Tagbilaran called upon the department commander and suggested that they were the fitting persons to deal with Samson and his people, and offered to bring them in if the delegation present was landed at García Hernandez on the south coast. While a long experience with the Filipinos has convinced the department commander that in domestic and commercial affairs the wife is the best man of the family, still he had not seen her tried in the field, and declined the offer.

On the 15th it was suggested that the governor and people invite Colonel Estuardo del Rosario, of Cebu, who had lately surrendered and was formerly an employer of Samson, to come to Bohol and have an interview with Samson. This was done, and Rosario accepted the call and visited Samson. It being evident that the disturbance was about ended, the department commander, who had been absent from the established headquarters for six months, determined to return to Iloilo, visiting the first district en route. Major Glenn was brought away from Catbalogan and sent to Bohol to look after the progress of the submission there. On the 30th he forwarded the following telegram:

DIMIAO, BOHOL, *November 30, 1901.*

GENERAL HUGHES, *Iloilo:*

Following just received from Valencia via Tagbilaran:

"I confide to you that peace is to be realized on Bohol. In my interview with Samson he manifested sincere desire for reconciliation with the Americans. I will have his official report to-morrow and will notify you.

"PEDRO ROSARIO."

This was dated yesterday.

GLENN.

This looks as though the territory of the Fifth Separate Brigade would now be a district of peace.

The operations in the department have been greatly aided by the navy commanders, Selfridge and Garst being in general charge while younger officers had the smaller gunboats: The *Villalobos*, Huse, commanding; the *Frolic*, Helm, commanding; the *Arayat*, Shoemaker, commanding; the *Pampanga*, Taylor, commanding; the *Paragua*, Stirling, commanding; the *Mindoro*, Butler, commanding; the *Leyte*,

Sargent, commanding; the *Basco*, Comfort, commanding; the *Gardoqui*, Morrison, commanding.

When all have done so willingly and well it would be difficult to make special mention of any individual.

Respectfully submitted.

R. P. HUGHES,
Brigadier-General.

PAMBUJAN, SAMAR, P. I., July 9, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *In the Field.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the morning of July 7 I left here with a column of 35 men and proceeded to Hernani, about 12 miles north, to act in conjunction with Lieutenant Lindsay. For half the distance the travel was very poor, being in my opinion almost impassable during continuous wet weather. About 5 miles this side of Hernani we captured 4 men armed with daggers—apparently an outpost—and from there on we saw a number of men who ran at our approach.

About three-quarters of a mile outside of Hernani the enemy had prepared an ambush consisting of breastworks made of hemp tree trunks filled in with stone and about 6 feet from the trail, concealed by tall grass. There were numerous passages made so as to allow for sudden attack upon us. Their presence was discovered by the point before the head of the column had gotten between the first line of breastworks, and an engagement ensued. I estimate that the attacking force was about 150 strong. The engagement lasted for about ten minutes, the enemy being driven back and through the town, about 30 of them being killed, wounded unknown. The only casualty on the American side was the wounding of Lieutenant Townsend in the right forearm, which happened in the early part of the engagement and was due to the failure of his revolver, the cartridge refusing to explode. The wound is not serious.

On the march back all the houses in the vicinity were destroyed and nothing was seen of the enemy.

From the information extracted from the prisoners it would seem that those engaged in the attack lived in and around Hernani. They have no rifles, and are armed with bolos and daggers.

Very respectfully,

G. L. TOWNSEND,
Second Lieutenant, First Infantry, Commanding Detachment.

PAMBUJAN, SAMAR, July 15, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *In the Field.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that on July 11, 1901, a detachment of 8 men of Company K, First Infantry, and 35 men of Company H, First Infantry, left here under command of Capt. A. S. Pinto, assistant surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, returning July 14, 1901. Owing to my wound I was unable to take personal command.

The column proceeded toward Quinapundan and while crossing a river about 2 miles from here were fired upon from intrenchments commanding both the trail and the river. The fire was returned and the intrenchments were abandoned, 2 natives being killed. Private S. A. Marshall, K, First Infantry, received a flesh wound in the groin, the bullet merely breaking the skin. Quinapundan was reached without further opposition. Five rifles in attacking party. The column camped here two nights, expending the entire day in destroying the rice in the vicinity. They were fired upon twice during the second night, but no harm was done. It was found necessary to burn Quinapundan in order to destroy the large quantities of rice stored in the houses of the town. In all about 125 tons of rice was destroyed in and around Quinapundan.

The third day the detachment proceeded to Pinamant (Pinama), which is connected by river with Quinapundan and is its seaport. Pinamant (Pinama) has long been reported as the headquarters of the insurgents in this vicinity, but none were seen, although the town was commanded by new intrenchments, as was also the river for almost its entire length. The insurgents probably sought cover, as all their works were built apparently expecting an attack from the coast. The town was destroyed.

From Pinamant (Pinama) the detachment proceeded to Salcedo in boats, finding the town unoccupied. From Salcedo they went south to Mercedes, crossing to the Pacific and up the coast to Pambujan, meeting no opposition on the way.

About 20 families of Pambujan have come in asking permission to live here. Quarters have been assigned to them.

My wound has now healed sufficiently to enable me to march again.

Very respectfully,

G. L. TOWNSEND,
Second Lieutenant, First Infantry,
Commanding Detachment Company H, First Infantry.

CERVANTES, SAMAR, P. I., August 7, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,

In the Field, Calbayoc, Samar.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on July 31 while I was absent from here with part of my command the town was attacked by insurgents with about 20 rifles and 6 cannon (bamboo). The firing was from the hills across the river from the town, and occurred about 6 o'clock in the evening. The position is inaccessible, the only way of getting to the top by making a wide detour to the rear. This, of course, we had found out previously by reconnaissance. Sergeant Green Hatton, the noncommissioned officer in charge, contented himself by firing volleys, and they withdrew in about twenty-five minutes, carrying their wounded, of which there were several, as evinced by pools of blood. At daylight the morning of the 1st a detachment took their trail, which went toward the northeast, or, as near as I can judge, in the direction of Mondragon, but was compelled to return without seeing them, owing to the trail being obliterated by heavy rains. On July 17, 20 men under Corporal John DeLotal were on their way to Catarman for rations, when they were fired upon by what they thought 20 rifles from the trenches directly on the river bank. How any of them escaped is a miracle to me, but only 1 man, Private Halcombe, was wounded, in the right thigh severely. As soon as I learned of it I moved into that country for four days, and they know I have been there. I found unmistakable evidence that the enemy has been subsisting on large herds of carabaos, so was compelled to destroy all except some I brought to this place for work animals. One man was wounded there by spear from trap, Private Richard M. Long, in left side; not serious. On July 31 I destroyed a large barrack building, a corral, and four large houses full of rice in the barrios of Hiboboban, or near where your map shows Palah. It showed signs of having been occupied up to that day. They evidently got out in a hurry, as they left considerable clothing, which was acceptable to the smaller soldiers of my command. Private Parker was seriously injured by falling on a sharp snag while descending a hill. I took him to Catarman, and while there a native came in with information that Captain Pepe was about 6 miles from there. As Lieutenant Beacham was absent and the sergeant in charge there said all his men were sick, I sent 15 men out to see about it. They found where he had spent the night but had gone back to the mountains. They brought in a number of men whom they captured, but whether they were bolomen or not I don't know. I turned them over at Catarman. On the 3d instant I sent a small detachment into the neighborhood of Lope de Vega, who, on approaching the former site of the town, discovered four men in the fascinating pursuit of setting traps; killed three and wounded the fourth badly. This morning my scout was attacked by four bolomen about a mile from camp. He shot one and the others ran, and in pursuing he fell into a trap and ran a spear through each foot. I am doing my best to doctor up all these cuts myself, and am having reasonable success. Have tried several times to communicate with Captain Chandler by native messenger, but the insurgents are constantly watching the trails, and the friendly natives are (and not without reason) afraid to go over the divide.

We are about all out of shoes and leggings, but by those staying in camp going barefooted we make out.

Very respectfully,

W. K. McCUE,
First Lieutenant, First Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,

In the Field, Calbayog, Samar, P. I., August 20, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Manila, P. I.

SIR: The progress in Samar is satisfactory in some ways and not in others. The subduing of the fighting propensities of the war faction is reduced almost to a nullity. The growth of our strength in the estimation of the people is also quite satisfactory. The fact is, their love for the fleshpots, and incidentally for the Americans who represent said pots, is growing burdensome as the securing of the hemp with which to pay for rice is becoming a heavy business. In nearly all our posts where the commander has exercised good judgment, colonies of natives have come in and settled and concluded they would set up their Lares and Penates under our wing. These colonies differ in strength, but in this vicinity—or between the Hibitan and the Gandara rivers—about 16,000 have come in. In the interior, Blanca Aurora, Taviran, Matuguinao, Oquendo, etc, have their colonies. The correspondence the troops have captured shows that the armed forces are deserting and breaking away from military control of the Bicol leaders.

The unsatisfactory features are, the slowness of the process of conversion, the failure to get the rifles, and the slowness and the difficulty in making roads and trails. Every fact presents its peculiar obstacle, but the troops are doing all that can be justly demanded of them; and while efforts have been made to push things faster, I am entirely satisfied with the results thus far secured. I inclose a map which will show the commanding general at a glance about our situation, with the exception of two stations now on the map which it is hoped to occupy when all the Ninth Infantry is in position. The commands are small, but I hope I have not made a mistake in underestimating the fighting ability of the forces now in the field against us. I would feel quite easy if all officers of the organizations were present, but it is fully appreciated that some of the detachments are commanded by officers who have really never been shot over.

Just at this date the bulk of the rifles seem to be in the region just west of the Catubig River. There are now five detachments in there making it uncomfortable for people; one on the Pambujan, one on the Mondragon, two moving east from the Upper Catarman, and one moving north from Taviran and San Enrique. The Pambujan Mountain is the objective, speaking generally, of all these detachments.

The people in Bohol seem to be gradually coming to the opinion that they made a mistake, and are showing symptoms of a change of front.

Our cause is growing stronger with the people in Cebu, and while the outlaws there will have to be roughly dealt with, there is no doubt that we will find much assistance from the natives themselves in doing so. I hope to be able to go over there in person by the 1st of September and try and push matters.

In Leyte the latest surrender was that of the Chief Pacheco. The Capili brothers are still out, and will probably have to be killed, but to do so it will be necessary to find them, which is difficult. They have not made any aggressive move for months.

Negros and Panay continue in entire tranquillity. It is my intention to leave one battalion of the Sixth Infantry, four troops Tenth Cavalry, and two battalions of natives. Two companies of the Sixth Infantry I expect to bring, temporarily at least, to the west coast of Cebu.

Very respectfully,

R. P. HUGHES,

Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Manila, P. I., August 27, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington, D. C. Attention being especially invited to the statement that there are five moving detachments west of the Catubig River.

Since the date of General Hughes's letter, report has been received that one of these detachments, under Capt. H. L. Jackson, First Infantry, surprised Lucban, August 18, in the Pambujan Mountains, reporting the wounding of Lucban and killing 3 of his guard; also this detachment captured Captain Sinko and Lieutenant Tapio and Lucban's wife, child, and mother-in-law.

The Department can feel assured that General Hughes is doing his utmost to bring the insurrection in Samar to a close.

The country is very difficult, extremely rough and mountainous, practically without trails, which too often must be cut through the heavy undergrowth. Beds of

streams must be used whenever possible, and supplies to the interior points packed on the backs of the natives.

Attention is invited to the inclosed map, showing where General Hughes has located his troops in the past two months in order to put down this small force of about 150 insurrectos.

Experience in the past in campaigning in these islands is to the effect that the enemy must be worn out by constant activity and cutting off the sources of supply. The latter can only be well done by occupying the towns constituting the main source of this supply, thus preventing anything being sent out to hostile parties.

During the past month active operations may have been slightly interfered with, due to a change of troops, withdrawing some dismounted cavalry and substituting the Ninth Infantry for it. No estimate can be made of the time when the campaign in Samar is liable to close. It will have to be continued until the surrender of Lucban is effected.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,
Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

CATARMAN, SAMAR, August 12, 1901.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
(*In the Field*), Calbayog, Samar:

I have the honor to report the following operations in this vicinity August 9, 10, and 11, 1901.

August 9 I directed First Lieut. J. W. Beacham, jr., Twentieth Infantry, with a detachment of 20 men, to proceed at night to the barrio of Carajan, where one Jose Hermosilla, called "Pepe," formerly presidente of Catarman, but at present a captain of insurrectos, and who is practically the civil and military governor of this district and is and has been the impediment in the way of the return of the natives to Catarman and vicinity, was reported as being.

The detachment left at 3 a. m. August 9, marched until daybreak, surrounded Pepe's house and captured 14 insurgents, but Pepe had left forty-eight hours previously from information received from these prisoners. I decided to make another night march to Pomolbagan (another barrio of Pepe's), where Pepe went when he left Carajan, so started at 7 p. m. August 20, with Lieutenant Beacham and 20 men of Companies I and L, First Infantry; marched until 11 p. m., halted until 3 a. m., moved on and struck the barrios at 6 a. m. August 11. Captured 3 men and 4 women and found my information was correct in that Pepe had passed through the barrio on his way from Carajan to Caligang two days previously. I therefore returned to Catarman, arriving at 3 p. m., and at 9 p. m. that night started for Caligang with detachment of 20 men of Companies I and L, First Infantry; marched until 5 a. m. August 12. When I reached Caligang found there Pepe with 13 riflemen was intrenched in rear of village; proceeded immediately until 150 yards of the trenches, when was fired upon; fire was returned and two advances of 25 yards each were made. At the third volley, fired at the second halt, the insurrectos broke and ran for the mountains in their rear. Two shots were fired at us from bamboo cannon in the hills. A steady fire was delivered at the insurrectos while they were escaping, but the riflemen all managed to get away. Captured 5 prisoners, 3 of whom were prisoners of Pepe, and 2 insurgents. Their information is to the effect that there were 13 riflemen with Pepe in this engagement. Two Mausers and 11 Remingtons and Mauser and Remington discharged shells were found in the trenches vacated. I can not commend too highly the energy and zeal displayed by First Lieut. J. W. Beacham, jr., Twentieth Infantry, and First Sergeant Smith, Company I, First Infantry, and the cheerfulness of the men of Companies I and L, First Infantry, in enduring the hardships of these three night marches.

Very respectfully,

H. L. JACKSON,
Captain, First Infantry, Commanding.

CALBAYOG, SAMAR, P. I., August 26, 1901.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
(*In the Field*), Calbayog, Samar, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report covering march made by my command August 13-25, 1901:

August 13, 1901: Left Catarman, Samar, with detachment consisting of First Lieut. J. W. Beacham, jr., Twentieth Infantry, 45 men Company I, and 25 enlisted men

Company L, First Infantry, Contract Surg. C. R. Ohliger, U. S. Army, and 20 native guides and prisoners, with four days' rations, and proceeded up the Catarman River on U. S. naval gunboat *Gardoqui* and small boats towed by launch *Julia*, 12 miles, when the gunboat having run into sand bar disembarked command for the night.

August 14: Started on gunboat for Palali, ran aground after proceeding about 3 miles. Transferred command to small boats and reached Palali 4.30 p. m. and went into camp.

August 15: Sent Lieutenant Beacham, Twentieth Infantry, with 40 enlisted men, Company I, First Infantry, and 15 natives, across Catarman River, with instructions to strike headwaters of the Mondragon River and penetrate as far as possible into Catarman and Pambujan mountains, and I proceeded with Contract Surg. C. R. Ohliger, U. S. Army, 5 enlisted men Company I, Thirty-fifth, Company L, First Infantry, and 15 natives, up the west side of the Catarman to Cervantes, reaching there at 3.30 p. m., and going into camp with a detachment of the First U. S. Infantry, First Lieut. W. K. McCue, First Infantry, commanding; at 5.30 p. m. the insurgents opened fire upon us from the surrounding hills with bamboo cannon and rifle fire; fire was returned by the detachments and the insurgents fled, leaving behind 7 bamboo cannon (4 of which had not been fired), which were destroyed. No casualties.

August 16: Left Cervantes 6 a. m., marched until 5 p. m. in a south and south-easterly direction, crossing Cervantes Mountains, and up the Indian River to its headwaters at the western base of the Catarman Mountains, and went into camp.

August 17: Left camp at 6 a. m. and marched nearly due east, crossing Catarman and Pambujan mountains and striking the headwaters of the East Fork of the Pambujan River and following it until 6.30 p. m., when I made camp.

August 18: Left camp at 5.30 a. m., followed river until I reached barrio of Rosario at 11.45 a. m., found it occupied by General Lucban, Capt. Luciano Sinko, Lieut. Filisberto Tapio, 3 riflemen, and about 20 bolomen. Charged the village, returning fire of insurgents, killing 3 (1 rifleman) and wounding Captain Sinko and one other, who, from his appearance (clothes, size, etc.), is believed to have been General Lucban, but who escaped through the assistance of his men, who returned for him after he was wounded.

I captured Mrs. Lucban and baby, her mother and maid, Captain Sinko, and Lieutenant Filisberto, together with 1 Mauser rifle, about 300 rounds of ammunition (Krag, Mauser, Remington), 3 revolvers, personal effects, and official correspondence of General Lucban, etc., gaining information from the captives that the insurgents had a powder factory at Suba, about 10 miles farther down the river. I burned the barrio of Rosario and started for Suba, but had to abandon attempt to reach it that night and went into camp at 6.30 p. m.

August 19: Broke camp at 6.30 a. m. and started for Suba; arrived there at 12.30 p. m.; found entire town destroyed, but still burning, and all inhabitants fled. My guides found some of the machinery of the powder factory in the bushes, which I had destroyed and thrown in the river. Went into camp here and proceeded to hunt up boats and build rafts to bring my command down the river to Pambujan.

August 20: Broke camp at 12.16 and proceeded down the river on 3 boats and 3 rafts (64 people in all) in the following order: (1) The advance guard; (2) boat containing Mrs. Lucban, her mother, child, Capt. Luciano Sinko, and myself; (3) boat with 11 men, under charge of Dr. Ohliger; (4, 5, and 6) rafts, all boats and rafts having received instructions to keep at least 75 yards interval. At 8 p. m. advance guard ran into a tree, felled and placed about 1 foot below the surface of the water, and swung broadside to the stream. I succeeded in getting my boat clear of this obstruction, but the third boat, containing Dr. Ohliger, ran into the advance guard boat and filled with water and partially sunk. The men of the detachment remained with the boat and were saved, but Dr. Ohliger attempted to swim ashore and was drowned. Three rifles were lost. I immediately disembarked command, went into camp, and tried to recover Dr. Ohliger's body and the rifles, but the river being over 15 feet deep at this point, with very swift current of over 3 miles an hour, was unsuccessful.

August 21: Broke camp at 10 a. m. and proceeded down the Pambujan River until 5.30 p. m., when disembarked and made camp for night.

August 22: Broke camp 7 a. m. and proceeded down river to Pambujan, arriving at 4.15 p. m. Sent over to Laguan for transportation for my detachment.

August 23: Went to Laguan, found U. S. transport *Baltimore* there and requested captain to bring me and my prisoners to Calbayog. Embarked on *Baltimore* at 6 p. m. with Mrs. Lucban and child, mother, and maid, Captain Sinko, Lieutenant Tapio, and arrived at Calbayog at 9.45 a. m., August 25, 1901, and reported to commanding general.

Very respectfully,

H. L. JACKSON,
Captain, First U. S. Infantry, Commanding Expedition.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
In the Field, Calbayog, Samar, P. I., August 27, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Division of the Philippines.

The within report gives simply the facts. The obstacles overcome, and the exertion and privations, the suffering from injuries to feet and lack of food (having only four days' rations and being out ten), as related to me by Captain Jackson, show that this detachment is entitled to great credit for its work.

R. P. HUGHES,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[Fourth indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., November 9, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General U. S. Army, inviting attention to General Orders, No. 300, current series, these headquarters, copy inclosed.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,
Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

GENERAL ORDERS, }
 No. 300. }

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., October 1, 1901.

In a report dated August 26, 1901, Capt. Harold L. Jackson, First U. S. Infantry, gives account of a scout made August 13-25 in the island of Samar by a detachment under his command consisting of First Lieut. Joseph W. Becham, jr., First U. S. Infantry, Contract Surg. Conn R. Ohliger, 45 enlisted men of Company I, and 35 of Company L, First U. S. Infantry, with 30 natives.

In forwarding this report, the department commander remarks: "The within report gives simply the facts. The obstacles overcome and the exertion and privations, the suffering from injuries to the feet and lack of food—having only four days' rations and being out ten—as related to me by Captain Jackson, show that this detachment is entitled to great credit for its work."

The remarks of the department commander are fully concurred in. The report shows that the enemy was twice encountered and defeated, valuable papers captured, cuartels and supplies of the enemy destroyed, and valuable information gained. The energy and gallantry displayed are highly commendable, and the instance is placed on record as one of the many feats of endurance and determination shown by the troops of his command.

By command of Major-General Chaffee:

W. P. HALL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

LAGUAN, SAMAR, P. I., *September 10, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT, LAGUAN, SAMAR, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

With 30 men, Company B, First Infantry, I left the post at 7.30 p. m. September 8, going up the river to Catubig, at which place we disembarked at 11 p. m. with 25 men and a guide, who said he would take us to an insurrecto cuartel. We went southwest and west until daylight, searching the houses we passed, when the guide said he was wrong. Taking another guide, we went east, then south, but at 11 a. m. came out at the Catubig River at the visita Gingangadian, about 3 miles above Catubig. At 12.45 we were fired on from the mountains about 1,000 yards distant. We returned the fire at once, and then dividing the detachment into three squads we went across the "sementera" to the mountains, each squad going against that portion of the mountains from which the fire was coming. With a squad on the left I went up and over the mountains, but did not get any of the enemy. I think there were at least 15 guns, about 6 of which were Mausers, the others of larger caliber. After going over the mountain and investigating it we returned to the river and boarded the launch, arriving at Laguan at 6 p. m.

Captured 15 men; burnt 21 houses.

Very respectfully,

I. W. JORDAN, Jr.,
First Lieutenant, First Infantry.

GUIUAN, SAMAR, P. I., *September 12, 1901.*

The ADJUTANT, GUINAN, SAMAR, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in compliance with Special Orders, No. 48, post at Guiuan, Samar, P. I., I left this post at daylight on September 3 with 30 men, Company H, First Infantry, and 15 native police. Acting Asst. Surg. William A. Wickline, U. S. Army, and 1 Hospital Corps man accompanied the expedition. Marched northwest to Mercedes, and thence in the same direction to Salcedo. After leaving the bridge, about 2 miles north of Mercedes, no natives were seen except an occasional outpost disappearing in the brush. From Salcedo proceeded northwest toward the sitio of Tagbacan, along the main trail for Quinapundan; about two hours out of Salcedo turned to the right and followed a side trail, which proved to lead to a large shack occupied by several hombres, who discovered our approach and fled before we got close enough to do accurate shooting. This house was destroyed. Moved back to the main trail and camped for the night in the Tagbacan Mountains.

Shortly after daylight next morning marched through the sitio of Tagbacan, destroying some 5 houses, all of which had been abandoned. About an hour out of Tagbacan left the main trail and turned to the left into the sitio of Conanay, where we captured 1 man, subsequently used as a guide. We then turned back to the main trail and moved northwest to the sitio of Litid. Before reaching this place a large house was observed on a hill some distance away. Five men ran out of this house, and the detachment fired and crossed the ravine and moved up the hill to the house, where we found 5 war daggers and considerable food in process of preparation. The house was destroyed. We then moved on to Litid and destroyed 6 houses and a small quantity of palay. A few natives were seen running in the distance.

From Litid marched in northwesterly direction through a part of Quinapundan district, passing within a mile of where the village used to stand, and thence on to Omagongong, passing through the place where Lieutenant Downes was killed in June, which is located about a quarter of a mile this side of Omagongong.

As we crossed the stream and entered the clearing where the village used to stand, 3 rifles fired at us from behind a breastwork on top of the hill about 200 yards away. These were run out, and the column marched some distance in pursuit of them along a trail leading over the hill and turning off to the west.

We then returned to Omagongong and went into camp at the stream, selecting a protected place, as it was supposed that these riflemen would return and fire into the camp, as had been done on Lieutenant Downes's expedition. This they did from several different points during the night and killed a native policeman, who had located himself on top of a fold in the ground, contrary to my express instructions.

In the center of the pueblo of Omagongong are 17 fresh graves, presumably those of the men who were killed in the fight of June 23. One of them may contain Lieutenant Downes's body, but I understand that the natives strip a corpse before burying the same, and I feared that I would be unable to identify the body. Besides, if I molested their graves and did not find Lieutenant Downes's body, they would, in all probability, retaliate on his grave, if he has one, so I deemed it best to wait until the natives give information on this subject.


At Omagongong we found three sets of new breastworks, so located as to command the approach from the bay, from the Quinapundan trail, and the Pambujan trail. Shortly after daylight the next morning we took the trail for Pambujan. The natives had destroyed some time ago the bridges across the two rivers south of the Pambujan River. The first river is too deep to ford, but is fortunately very narrow, and we succeeded in effecting a crossing.

Shortly before reaching the second river a number of men were observed on a hill in front of us. They dispersed on a volley being fired into them, and a little farther down the trail one native was captured. The second river is fairly wide, but can be forded without difficulty in ordinary weather. The bridge is standing over the Pambujan River, which is the largest of the three rivers. We reached Pambujan about 12 o'clock, and found the garrison in good condition. Lieutenant Townsend reports affairs to be quiet in the immediate vicinity of the town. They have a presidente and a few families living in the pueblo, but the natives do not appear happy or cordial toward the troops.

We spent Friday with the garrison, and at daylight Saturday morning started out on the Omagongong trail.

I arranged with Lieutenant Townsend to make an effort to surround the Omagongong outfit. He proceeded with a detachment in barotos by water, to attract their attention while I came in behind through the woods. We reached Omagongong at about the same time, but the natives were evidently posted as to both movements, for they fired on the barotos and skipped out in the opposite direction from my column.

Sketch of Route of Expedition from Guiuan to Pambujan, Samar, September 3-9, 1901



From Omagongong I moved southeast along the main trail and camped in the mountains near Tagbacan. The next morning started at the first signs of day, without allowing the men to get breakfast, and moved rapidly into Salcedo, hoping to effect a surprise, but not a native was seen, nor did we encounter any on the Salcedo trail until we reached Mercedes. Detachment arrived in Guiuan at 4 o'clock p. m., September 9.

The whole country around Salcedo, Quinapundan, and Omagongong is in a most pronounced condition of insurrection—men, women, and children. They appear to be scattered in the woods and hills around the former pueblos. On the approach of troops conches can be heard on every hand warning the people in advance. These districts can not be reached from any of the points in which garrisons now are, in such a manner as to take them by surprise. Besides they do not appear to remain collected in large bodies, but are usually scattered all over that district unless assembled for specific purpose. I believe to effectually deal with these people it will be necessary to place a garrison in the heart of their country, at Quinapundan, for instance, as a constant menace to their lives, and I respectfully recommend this for consideration. The people are sullen and defiant, and the one or two successes they have had in killing and wounding American soldiers has produced a bad effect on their spirits.

The trail marched over was for the most part level and dry, practicable for a pack train as far as the Omagongong at this time of the year, but dangerous on account of the heavy growth that conceals everything from sight.

Distance marched about 80 miles.

Very respectfully,

CAMPBELL KING,
First Lieutenant, First Infantry, Commanding Company H.

[First Indorsement.]

GUIUAN, SAMAR, P. I., *September 13, 1901.*

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Department of the Visayas, in the field, Calbayog, Samar, P. I.

For the complete pacification of this district there should be a half of a company stationed at Salcedo. It is a better strategic point than Pambujan.

JOHN J. O'CONNELL,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Third Infantry, Commanding.

[Second Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
In the Field, Cebu, Cebu, P. I., October 28, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Division of the Philippines. Quinapundan is now occupied, and there is no necessity for occupying Salcedo.

R. P. HUGHES,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
In the Field, Calbayog, Samar, September 11, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: When Samar was reassigned to the Department of the Visayas for the purpose of resuming active operations the then division commander stipulated that the department commander should come to Samar in person to look after matters. That was done, and all due care and study have been given the occupation of the island, so that it now seems so held down that the enemy has been in hiding for two months, and are liable to stay so. The second district of the department needs attention, and for some time past it has been my intention to go there and see if matters can not be put in some more satisfactory condition. I have been delayed by the transport *Churruca* running on the rocks off Guiuan, which delayed some final dispositions it was desirable to make, but it seems now that they can be closed up in a few days, and then it is my intention to go to Cebu.

The question is, what is to be done with Samar. If it is the desire of the division commander that I should turn the island over to Colonel Robe as a separate command, I will do so. If it is his desire that it go back as an integral part of the first

district, and so come under the command of Colonel De Russey, I am prepared to have that done. If I am to determine what is to be done, I shall carry the command of Samar with me to Cebu, directing matters from there by telegraph, after first organizing an island staff here of chief quartermaster, chief commissary, and chief surgeon.

Very respectfully,

R. P. HUGHES,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
In the Field, Cebu, Cebu Island, P. I., September 24, 1901.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I would respectfully report that I changed to this town something over a week ago. Our affairs in Samar seemed to be in a promising condition, and growing slowly but surely, and in due course of nature and after a few more funerals I think that island will have had sufficient experience in the discomforts of war to be willing to accept peace on any sort of terms. The death of President McKinley may have a tendency to delay matters, as it will afford a plea on which the leaders can appeal to the ignorant people for a longer resistance on the promise of a change of policy in our Government. Such tactics are being used here.

I had previously directed that two companies of the Sixth Infantry and two half companies of Panay Scouts should meet me here. There are now half a dozen commands in the field, and some additional coast towns are being occupied and supplied in order to enable the field commands to get rations at nearest point whenever needed. The tone of the press and the people have both changed somewhat within a week; but one can never be sure that he knows what the Filipino is thinking about by what he says.

The officials here asked to be permitted to use their influence to induce the brigands to come in, and were informed that we would be greatly obliged to them if they would do so. They then suggested a cessation of operations while they made their effort. To this the reply was, "Not an hour. I will declare any district you elect neutral territory, where you can meet representatives of the brigands and talk just as long as you please and you will not be disturbed by our troops, but the operations will continue in all other parts of the island." There are about 100 serviceable rifles in the island and they may be quite difficult to capture, and if they can talk the holders out of them it would be good service.

Affairs seem to be improving in Bohol, but it may be necessary to send a couple of companies over there when it is possible to do so.

The Panay troops are only borrowed, and I find the staff in Iloilo inclined to doubt the wisdom of their being withdrawn, but I think my longer experience with the people over there enables me to judge of the conditions with more certainty.

Very respectfully,

R. P. HUGHES,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Iloilo, Panay, P. I., September 15, 1901.

Diary of events, Department of the Visayas, for the period ending September 15, 1901.

The following events reported from the island of Samar, not previously reported in the diary:

August 26. Capt. H. L. Jackson, First Infantry, reports expedition in Catarman, Cervantes, and Pambujan mountains, from August 13 to 25, resulting in killing of 3 of Lucban's guard, capture of Capt. Luciano Sinko and Lieutenant Tapio, Lucban's wife and mother-in-law. One officer wounded, believed to have been Lucban. Captured 1 rifle and some ammunition and all of Lucban's papers and correspondence. ence.

The following event reported by the commanding officer, first district, Department of the Visayas, not previously reported in the diary:

August 31. Reports a scout from Malitbog, Leyte. Burned quarters of Alas Alas

and 5 others, with many supplies, powder, and repair shop. Captured 4 rifles and 10 prisoners. Enemy's loss unknown. No casualties to American troops.

September 1. Commanding officer, Ninth Infantry, reports that Private Frederick Kopp, Company E, Ninth Infantry, was killed at Dapdap, Samar, by insurgent trap.

September 2. Capt. T. O. Murphy, Nineteenth Infantry, commanding Naga, Cebu, reports native scouts killed 1 insurgent at barrio of Naga.

September 2. Lieut. Col. M. C. Foote, Ninth Infantry, reports from Basey, Samar, that party of 12 men sent from Basey along telegraph line were attacked about 2 miles out. Two enlisted men killed and 2 wounded, 1 probably fatally. One rifle lost. Fully 15 of the insurgents are known to have been killed or wounded.

Colonel Foote reports later that he burned barrio near where this fight occurred.

September 2. Lieut. Col. B. D. Price, First Infantry, reports from Cathalogan, Samar, that Lieutenant Hoover, Philippine Scouts, with detachments of soldiers and native scouts located party of insurgents in vicinity of San Sebastian. Burned huts, killed 1 and captured 2 insurgents.

September 5. Lieut. Col. B. D. Price, First Infantry, reports from Cathalogan, Samar, that Lieut. J. B. Schoeffel, Ninth Infantry, captured several insurgents and 18 sacks of rice on coast of Buad. That Captain Swaine's supply train was attacked by rifles and bolomen and 6 mules killed. Insurgents had 1 officer and 5 men killed. That on next day Captain Swaine swept through that district as far as hills behind San Sebastian, destroying large amount of rice and many huts.

September 5. Ladrones attacked town of La Castellana, Negros, killing 3 and wounding 5 native scouts, and capturing 6 rifles.

September 5. Lieut. G. W. Helms, Nineteenth Infantry, reports from Dumanjug, Cebu, that Lieutenant Monday, Philippine Scouts, had returned from expedition to mountains of Alcantara, where he had surrounded a house and killed 2 insurgents. Three were captured, but were killed while attempting to escape.

September 5. Lieut. G. W. Helms, Nineteenth Infantry, reports from Dumanjug, Cebu, that a guerrilla named Eustaquio surrendered on the 4th; that Claudio Lopez, jefe of the Second Guerrilla of the Fifth Fraccion under command of Rosario, surrendered with his brother, who is a captain. They surrendered 5 Remingtons, 3 Krag, 1 Colt, and 1 Winchester rifle; also 1 revolver and 265 rounds of ammunition.

September 6. Lieut. G. W. Helms, Nineteenth Infantry, reports from Dumanjug, Cebu, that Lieut. J. S. Cecil, Nineteenth Infantry, struck band of insurgents near Sibonga, Cebu. One of the party killed and a bundle of papers captured, which showed the party was left with a collector of funds. On return a boloman armed with bolo and dagger was killed. Supposed to have been in the same party.

September 11. Commanding officer second district reports that Captain Rowan, Nineteenth Infantry, attacked insurgent stronghold in the mountains of Colajogman, near Calape, Bohol. Drove them out and forced them to scatter. Captured considerable correspondence and destroyed large amount of food supply. Had 2 of his men slightly wounded.

SUMMARY.

Enemy's loss: One officer and 17 men killed, 1 officer wounded, 2 officers and 12 men captured, 3 officers surrendered. Arms captured, 5 rifles. Arms surrendered, 5 Remington, 3 Krag, 1 Colt, 1 Winchester rifles, and 1 revolver; also 265 rounds of ammunition.

Our loss: Three enlisted men killed, 4 enlisted men wounded, 3 Negros native scouts killed and 5 wounded; 7 rifles lost.

Respectfully submitted.

ROBERT H. NOBLE,

Captain, Third U. S. Infantry, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

(In the absence of the department commander.)

BASEY, SAMAR, P. I., October 1, 1901.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,

Iloilo, Panay, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the action at Balangiga on September 28, 1901. This report is based upon information given by men who escaped from Balangiga and from my personal observation on scene of action the day following.

Company C, Ninth Infantry, occupied on September 28, 1901, the building marked "E," "F," "G," on accompanying sketch (inclosure No. 1^a). The officers of the

^a Not printed.

post, Capt. Thomas W. Connell, Ninth Infantry, First Lieut. Edward A. Bumpus, Ninth Infantry, and Maj. R. S. Griswold, surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, occupied the convent "A." This building has its main entrance at "L," where a sentinel is stationed during the day, and at night at the head of the stairs. A passage leads from second story to church; stairs connect this passage with rear of building and door of church. The guard at convent consisted of a corporal and 3 men.

The entrance of main barracks was at center of west side, from which stairs lead to second floor—the sleeping quarters. The center of the lower floor was the guard-house. The north end was used as a prison and storeroom. It contained quartermaster and ordnance stores. Of the latter, there were 1 box containing 23 rifles and 22 boxes of rifle ammunition. The south end was used as a sales commissary storehouse. At northwest corner of this barrack were two conical wall tents in which native prisoners were confined. No. 1 sentinel walked from entrance of building to these tents. No. 4 on opposite side of tents, and No. 3 from kitchen "H," past barracks "G," to "F." The main barracks could be entered by a bamboo ladder at northeast corner, but it was a difficult entrance and used by a few men only in that angle of the barracks.

Fifteen men occupied barracks "G," 9 occupied "F," and the remainder of company, "E."

The streets shown on sketch were lined with native houses, except that there were none in block "C," "D," or that occupied by main barracks. At the end of streets to north and east was dense undergrowth. This undergrowth covered most of space between houses in the different blocks, consequently many natives could be concealed from view and be quite near the quarters.

On September 22 Captain Connell had collected 78 natives of the town and held most of them prisoners for police work. During the next four days the town officials brought in prisoners from the country, and nearly all of the prisoners living in the town had been released, a number presenting themselves each morning for work. On September 27 the chief of police informed Captain Connell that he would bring in more on the morning of the 28th. He sent in 13 on the afternoon of the 27th, but he did not return with them. Sixty-four prisoners were held over the night of the 27th.

These prisoners had been making nipa for the roof of barracks and worked between the tents and the main building. The bolos used by them, 60 in number, were piled in front of building 3 feet north of entrance.

At 6.30 a. m., September 28, breakfast time, a number of the prisoners were at work and about 20 more had appeared voluntarily near No. 1 post and the tents, apparently waiting to be set to work by the first sergeant. The first sergeant was at this time at breakfast in the kitchen. Nearly all of the men were at breakfast in tents in front of the kitchen. The men who lived in barracks "C" were eating under this building; some few were walking to or from the kitchen. At the guard-house there were but the sentinel on No. 1 and the sergeant of the guard. Private Gamlin, a member of the guard, had taken breakfast, went to his quarters in main building to return his mess kit, and immediately relieved the sentinel on No. 2 post. When he was in quarters he saw no one in them.

Corporal Burke, with others, were at breakfast under barracks "G." The chief of police came near him, leaned against pillar of building, then walked along post No. 2 toward barracks "F." As the sentinel passed him he seized the sentinel's rifle, gave a loud call, the church bells rang, and a rush was made by the natives simultaneously on the different barracks, officers' quarters, and on men at breakfast table and kitchen.

The sentinel on No. 1 and the sergeant of the guard were killed at once, and the native prisoners and others near rushed into the main barracks. From east of kitchen the natives rushed upon men at breakfast.

A few men gained entrance to the main barracks by a ladder at northeast corner of building; others rushed up the stairs with natives; some were cut down in attempting to reach the building. A struggle ensued to obtain possession of the rifles.

At barracks "G" the men under building rushed into it with the natives; but all the natives who entered this building were killed or driven away; and from this building 8 rifles were secured and fire opened upon the insurgents, which drove them to cover. When this firing began some natives threw rifles out of the windows of main building; others jumped out with them. In this way more rifles were secured and the entire force of the enemy driven back.

At the officers' quarters, which were entered from the church and rear by the enemy, First Lieut. E. A. Bumpus, Ninth Infantry, and Maj. R. S. Griswold, surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, were killed in their rooms. Capt. T. W. Connell, Ninth Infantry, evidently jumped from window and was killed about 20 feet from the building. The two members of the guard were both killed at sentinel's post.

Acting First Sergt. James M. Randles was killed in kitchen.

When the enemy was driven back Sergt. Frank Betron, being the senior non-commissioned officer present, took command.

After holding the place for one hour, during which the enemy kept on outskirts of town but made no attack, Sergeant Betron collected the wounded and embarked in five barotos for Basey, 25 miles distant. Before leaving dock Sergeant Markley, with two men, returned to barracks for flag and to burn the building, but was fired upon and did not succeed in burning it.

Sergeant Betron, with 2 barotos, arrived at Basey at 4 a. m. September 29. His party consisted of 25 men, 22 of whom were wounded, and 2 bodies of men who had died en route.

Sergeant Markley and 1 private had been sent ahead to report, but had lost course and landed at Tanauan, Leyte.

When last seen 1 baroto contained 3 men, 2 of them severely wounded. One of these men, Private Powers, was seen on coast dead early next morning by Private Bertholf. The others, Privates Wingo and Driscoll, are missing.

The other baroto, containing Privates Bertholf and 3 wounded, Marak, Litto Armani, and Buhner, foundered. These men reached the shore, where they remained during the night. At daylight Privates Bertholf and Marak set off to find a baroto. When they returned with one they saw Armani and Buhner surrounded by insurgents and they were forced to abandon them. Privates Bertholf and Marak were picked up at sea later by my command en route to Balangiga.

At 9 a. m. September 29 I left Basey with 55 men Company G and 8 men Company C on steamship *Pittsburg*. Landed at Balangiga at 12.30 p. m. As it could be seen that the insurgents were abandoning the place, I opened fire as soon as the steamer arrived within 500 yards of the town. As we entered the town the main barracks were burning, but it was evident that the ordnance had been carried away. Twenty-three rifles and 22,000 rounds of ammunition were in basement of this building.

Of the 68 rifles in hands of men, 23 were brought to Basey and 4 lost at sea. Twelve others were rendered unserviceable by throwing away the belts.

The insurgents secured 52 serviceable rifles and, with that taken in belts, 28,000 rounds of ammunition.

I secured most of the commissary supplies, nearly all of which were burned, it not being practicable to take same aboard ship.

The bodies of the 3 officers and 29 men were buried in plaza in front of church.

The town was burned. Command embarked at 6.15 p. m. and reached Basey at 12 midnight.

The total garrison consisted of 3 officers, 1 Hospital Corps man, and 70 men of Company C, Ninth Infantry.

Three officers and 29 men were killed at Balangiga; 1 Hospital Corps man and 5 men of company missing at Balangiga, undoubtedly killed and bodies consumed in barracks or carried out to sea; missing en route to Basey, 2; killed en route to Basey, 3; died of wounds en route to Basey, 2; arrived at Basey or Tanauan, Leyte, 29, 22 of whom were wounded. The number of insurgents killed is estimated at 50.

The number of insurgents who took part in the attack was about 400.

It is not known who was the leader of this attack, but the town presidente and chief of police were, at least, the organizers and promoters. The presidente was near the kitchen when the attack was made. Both these men were killed.

Very respectfully,

EDWIN V. BOOKMILLER,
Captain, Ninth Infantry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
In the Field, Cebu, Cebu Island, P. I., October 4, 1901.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I forward herewith list of Company C, Ninth Infantry, which met with the tragedy at Balangiga. A similar confidence game has been tried on Lieutenant Schoeffel at Mutiong, but the deception was detected, and those who entered the town in accordance with a good plan are now in the Catbalogan guardhouse. I am not yielding an inch of ground, for to do so would mean the loss of much very hard work and some lives given to what has been gained. I had a gunboat at Pambujan to assist the 60 men there in case of an attack, and have warned the other stations,

so that if the battalions come in with reasonable promptness I don't think we will have lost much beyond the terrible loss in Company C. It is exceedingly worrying to me not to be over there, but the fact is these people are watching me to see if I will be forced to go, and if so they will undoubtedly break off all the peace negotiations now in progress, and from which some of our people and many of the natives draw much comfort. All the towns not intimidated by insurgents have voted for peace, and to aid the Americans if the bandits refuse. I never believe anything in the far East until it is an obvious fact, so have nothing to say except shall manipulate the affair as well as I know how. Climaco, Rosario, La Sola, Luga, Veles, and Larega have all appeared, and word was received from Maxilom that he would come if invited, and Rosario went out in person to find him. They are asking more time on account of difficulty in finding the chiefs of guerrilla, and I may have to give a few days. Our people continue killing bolomen, etc., and improving their geography. and we are not losing much by delay, and it is possible that we are gaining.

In assigning native scouts I took into consideration the following factors: The present condition of the district and the possible influence of great changes; the necessity for the native scouts at the present time, and finally the character of the material. The Samar material when secured, if we can judge by those we have, is excellent. The detachment at Calbayog has killed more barefoots than any full company on the island.

Yours, respectfully,

R. P. HUGHES,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

[First Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., October 8, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

I have telegraphed the list of casualties due to the attack on Company C, Ninth Infantry, at Balangiga, but send the written list also. It will be observed that General Hughes writes from Cebu and refers to his efforts in that island. To the request of the presidents that military work be suspended during the palaver, General Hughes expressed an emphatic no, which has met with my hearty approval. A troop of the Sixth Cavalry will get away from here to-morrow for service in the north end of Cebu Island. I resolved on this course in June, but the *Liscum*, my only horse boat, has been a third of the time under repair—rotten machinery—and when possible to work, she has been engaged in getting cavalry out of Samar, where it was dismounted, to other points where I could mount them.

That work is done. In a few days two additional battalions of infantry will have arrived in Samar. I am preparing two companies Ilocano Scouts for service there; they will get away about the 15th.

General Smith leaves to take command of the Sixth Brigade (Samar and Leyte) to-morrow morning. As soon as I hear that all stations in Samar have been warned to be watchful, I shall feel greatly relieved as regards anxiety for the situation. A company of our men can whip swarms of bolomen if they have five minutes warning. We have no telegraphic communication with troops occupying the north, east, and south coasts of Samar.

General Hughes's reference to assignments of scouts is in consequence of my recent order, organizing and numbering the companies and allotting companies to departments. He refers to disposition made of the companies assigned to his department.

General Smith, in command of the Sixth Brigade, will bring some relief to labors of General Hughes, who has been heavily taxed for several months, and personally in the field all the time.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,
Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

CASUALTIES AT BALANGIGA, SAMAR ISLAND.

The following men of Company C, Ninth Infantry, are absent, cause unknown: First Sergt. Samuel F. Whipp; Sergts. John Carroll, Charles H. Brown; Corpals. George M. Charbonneau, Charles Samuelson, Mack T. Bates; Privates Aaron J. Burke, Martin Coyne, Daniel J. Donovan, Charles J. Downey, John Gallagher, Delbert Gibson (probably left at Manila), Watson B. Hendry, Harry H. Hull,

Charles H. Meeker, Owen F. O'Neil, Homer Stewart, Anderson Temple, Herman Trapp.

Absent sick in Tacloban Hospital, wounded at Balangiga: Sergt. John D. Closson; Privates Henry Claas, Cornelius F. Donahue, Albert B. Keller, Henry W. Manire, George E. Meyers, Daniel S. Mullins, Ernest U. Ralston, John Uhtof.

Present at Basey, wounded at Balangiga: Sergt. Frank Betron; Corpls. Sylvestre Burke, James Pickett, Arnold Irish; Cook Melvin M. Walls; Privates George Allen, Richard Considine, Elbert B. De Graffenreid, Adolph Gamlin, William J. Gibbs, Charles F. Marak, Clifford M. Mumby.

Present at Basey, not wounded: Sergt. George F. Markley, Corpl. Taylor B. Hickman, Privates Samuel Allison, Walter J. Bertholf, Roland T. Clark, Alfred R. Davis, George L. De Vore, John L. Hartley, Sherman S. Kelly, Andrew C. Neilson, Themistocles Qula, Anthony Stier, Carl E. Swanson, Philo J. Proesser, John S. Wolfe; Musician Ladislaus Garcia.

Killed at Balangiga: Sergts. James M. Randles, John F. Martin, Henry J. Scharer; Corpls. Frank McCormack, Leonard P. Schley, Proal Peters; Cook Gustav F. Schnitzler; Artificer Joseph R. Marr; Privates John D. Armani, Litto Armani, John W. Aydelotte, George Bony, Robert L. Booth, John D. Buhner, James L. Cain, Charles E. Davis, Guy C. Dennis, Bryon Dent, Eli Fitzgerald, Joseph I. Gordon, Joseph O. Kleinhamp, Richard Long, James Martin, James F. McDermott, John H. Miller, Robert Sproull, Charles E. Sterling, Joseph Turner, Frank Vobayda, John Wannebo, Harry M. Wood, Charles Powers.

Missing at Balangiga: Musician John L. Covington; Privates Patrick J. Dobbins, Jerry J. Driscoll, Evans South, August F. Porczeng, Christian S. Williams, Claude C. Wingo. Some bodies are known to have been cremated in the barracks which the savages burned.

Died of wounds received at Balangiga (either at Tacloban or Hospital of Basey): Corpl. Thomas E. Baird; Privates Chris F. Recard, Floyd J. Shoemaker.

Officers killed at Balangiga: Capt. Thomas W. Connell, Ninth U. S. Infantry; First Lieut. Edward A. Bumpus, Ninth U. S. Infantry; Maj. R. S. Griswold, surgeon, U. S. Volunteers.

Missing: Private Harry Wright, Hospital Corps, U. S. Army.

Of the 16 present not wounded none arrived from detached service on the 29th instant. All names taken from an unsigned pay roll of August 30, found at Balangiga.

BOOKMILLER,
Captain, Ninth Infantry.

Copy telegraphed over military line; this forwarded on *Princeton*.

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 22.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY,
Calbayog, Samar, P. I., October 11, 1901.

A calamity as unprovoked as unexpected has happened to the regiment in its loss at Balangiga, Samar, P. I., on the 28th ultimo, of a majority of those present of Company C, details of which are only just at hand in the official report.

It would appear that while the company was at breakfast the occasion arose, knowing which the town rabble took advantage of opportunity, and the bloody and wanton destruction of life too easily followed.

The names of those assassinated by the cowardly mob, led by men at whose hands their confiding victims were entitled to receive a naturally human return in exchange for kindly and considerate treatment, are as follows:

Capt. Thomas W. Connell, Ninth Infantry, company and station commander; First Lieut. Edward A. Bumpus, Ninth Infantry; Maj. Richard S. Griswold, surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, and the following enlisted men: Q. M. Sergt. James M. Randles; Sergts. John F. Martin and Henry J. Scharer; Corpls. Frank McCormack, Leonard P. Schley, and Proal Peters; Cook Gustav F. Schnitzler; Artificer Joseph R. Marr; Privates John D. Armani, Litto Armani, John W. Aydelotte, George Bony, Robert L. Booth, John D. Buhner, James L. Cain, Charles E. Davis, Guy C. Dennis, Byron Dent, Eli Fitzgerald, Joseph I. Gordon, Joseph O. Kleinhamp, Richard Long, James Martin, James F. McDermott, John H. Miller, Charles Powers, Robert Sproull, Charles E. Sterling, Joseph Turner, Frank Vobayda, John Wannebo, and Harry M. Wood.

Died of wounds: Corpl. Thomas E. Baird; Privates Cornelius F. Donahue, Daniel S. Mullins, Chris F. Recard, and Floyd J. Shoemaker.

Missing: Musician John L. Covington; Privates Patrick J. Dobbins, Jerry J. Driscoll, August F. Porczeng, Evans South, Christian S. Williams, and Claud C. Wingo, of Company C, and Private Harry Wright, Hospital Corps, U. S. Army.

Captain Connell was graduated from the Military Academy in 1894. He served with his regiment at Madison Barracks, N. Y., in the expedition to Santiago de Cuba, in the Philippines, and in the China relief expedition; was present at the battle of San Juan Hill, several engagements with the Filipino insurgents in northern Luzon, the battles of Tientsin, Pietsang, and Yangtsun, China, and the attacks on the Imperial City, Peking, China. He served at times as a battalion and regimental staff officer and as an aid-de-camp on the staff of Brig. Gen. Henry T. Douglas, U. S. Volunteers.

Lieutenant Bumpus was appointed second lieutenant, Twenty-first Infantry, July 9, 1898, promoted first lieutenant, Ninth Infantry, July 8, 1899, served in the Philippines with each of these regiments, and was with the latter in the China relief expedition. He was in engagements with Filipino insurgents in Luzon, in the battles of Tientsin, Pietsang, and Yangtsun, China, and the attacks on the Imperial City, Peking, China.

Major Griswold's service with the Ninth Infantry covered only the short period with Company C at Balangiga, to which station he had been assigned on August 13, 1901. He had had former service with the U. S. Volunteers in the Philippines.

Of the enlisted men, almost all had been with the company during the campaign in Luzon and in China. Sergeant Scharer, Corporal Peters, and Private Porczeng were of still longer service and had participated in the campaign against Santiago de Cuba. Sergeant Scharer was wounded at Tientsin. Private Christian S. Williams was one of the crew of the U. S. S. *Olympia* in the memorable battle of Manila Bay.

The usual badge of mourning will be worn for thirty days.

We may turn from the profound sorrow which is our lot to bear with those in former homes of our dead to the happy and enlivening contemplation of the valor and heroism displayed by the few remaining members of the company, but the most graphic pen and vivid description are wanting to rightly portray the brave, heroic, and successful efforts of the little band of survivors who, having fought off the foe, one portion held it at bay while the other examined and made sure of our dead being actually so, succored the wounded, carrying them off the field to the one possible point in the direction of safety—the river bank; and calmly lowering from its staff and bringing away their flag.

The embarking of the little party in five barotos for Basey, Samar, 25 miles away, the day and night ride, the foundering of one boat; the separation and misfortunes to others, entailing further losses of life; the arrival of two of the boats at Basey at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 29th, with 25 then living men, 22 of whom were wounded, and two bodies of men who died en route, and yet still further mortality, all conspire to make continuous most strange and eventful history.

Survivors of Company C, your splendidly courageous, defensive, and aggressive warfare at Balangiga has gone into history as a rare achievement. Your regiment is proud of you. To you, and to those who fought with you and fell, the Army is indebted for a superb demonstration of what the will and bravery of a few determined men may accomplish under most unequal and unfavorable conditions.

By order of Colonel Robe:

C. R. NOYES,
Captain, Ninth Infantry, Adjutant.

MANILA. (Received September 29, 1901—9.50 a. m.)

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

Hughes reports following received from Basey, southern Samar: Twenty-four men, Company C, Ninth Regiment U. S. Infantry, 11 wounded, have just arrived from Balangiga; remainder company killed. Insurgents secured all company supplies and all rifles except 3. Company was attacked during breakfast morning September 28; company 72 strong. Officers: Thomas W. Connell, captain; Edward A. Bumpus, first lieutenant; Dr. R. S. Griswold, major, surgeon. Investigation will be made.

CHAFFEE.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, September 30, 1901.

CHAFFEE, *Manila*:

With reference to your telegram of 29th report by telegraph names killed, wounded, missing as soon as possible. What was the result of the investigation?

CORBIN.

MANILA. (Received October 1, 1901—12.23 p. m.)

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

With reference to your telegram of 30th ultimo, will cable names missing enlisted men as soon as ascertained. Company was rushed about 6 o'clock morning, large party bolomen, about 400. General Hughes thinks surprise due confidence commanding officer assertions friendship from natives. Result investigation cabled as soon as obtained.

CHAFFEE.

MANILA. (Received October 4, 1901—10.05 p. m.)

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*.

From those who escaped following:

"September 29. While at breakfast 6.45 morning company was attacked at signal ringing convent bells by about 450 bolomen, 200 from rear of quarters, 200 front simultaneously attack officers' quarters. Company completely surprised. Force attacking front gained possession arms. Fight ensued for them in which most men met death, mess room in rear. Enemy beaten off temporarily by about 25 men who gained their arms. Sergeant Betron assumed command, endeavored collect men, leave in boats, reattacked by enemy. Strength command, 3 officers, 72 men. Killed: 3 officers, 40 enlisted men; missing, 6; wounded, 13; present, 13. Party attacking officers in convent entered through church. Large numbers led by presidente, probably 101 rifles with company; 26 saved; 15 of rifles lost, bolts drawn; 25,000 ammunition lost; 95 prisoners outside cuartel joined in attack at signal; boat of enlisted men capsized. Captain Bookmiller may pick up men." James P. Drouillard, Lieutenant Ninth Infantry.

"September 30. Have just returned Balangiga. Drouillard explains conditions correctly. Landed yesterday. Inhabitants deserted town, firing one shot. Buried 3 officers, 29 men; number bodies burned. Quarters, buildings fired as we entered, secured or destroyed most of rations; all ordnance gone. Insurgents secured 57 serviceable rifles, 28,000 cartridges. Forty-eight men Company C, Ninth Infantry, 1 Hospital Corps man killed or missing; 28 men accounted for. Found 2 men in boat en route here. Buried dead, burned town, returned Basey." Bookmiller.

"DeRussy has sent strong company to chastise savages if found." Hughes.

"No other details. Names of killed to be determined by elimination of survivors as soon as possible. June muster roll probably latest evidence to be had. Battalions Seventh and Twenty-sixth regiments U. S. Infantry sent to Samar. Loss of arms serious matter because of effect generally. Island's inhabitants southern Samar generally savages." Hughes.

No information regarding prisoners reported; they are seldom caught. He thinks part of scheme of attack feel apprehension stations, east coast. Hughes will strengthen. Lieutenant Harry W. Bathiany, second-lieutenant, Third Infantry, just from Sulat, says whole east coast hostile; will not intercourse with troops; destroyed all towns before our arrival there.

CHAFFEE.

MANILA. (Received October 8, 1901—3.32 p. m.)

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

Casualties engagement at Balangiga, Samar, September 28. Wounded will be reported as soon as received. Company C, Ninth U. S. Infantry: Killed—Sergt. John F. Martin, Sergt. James M. Randles, Corpl. Henry J. Scharer, Privates Joseph I. Gordon, James Martin, John W. Aydelotte, Byron Dent, Eli Fitzgerald, Charles E. Sterling, Robert Sproull, John H. Miller, Richard Long, Joseph Turner, Gustav F. Schnitzler, Corpl. Frank McCormack, Private Proal Peters, Private Leonard P. Schley, Artificer Joseph R. Marr, Privates James F. McDermott, Charles E. Davis, Harry M. Wood, John Wannebo, Joseph C. Kleinhampl, Robert L. Booth, Guy C. Dennis, John D. Armani, Litto Armani, George Bony, John D. Buhner, James L. Cain, Frank Vobayda, Charles Powers. Died from wounds received in action—Corpl. Thomas E. Baird, Private Chris F. Recard, Private Floyd J. Shoemaker. Missing bodies probably burned when insurgents deserted town—Musician John L. Covington, Privates Patrick J. Dobbins, Jerry J. Driscoll, Evans South, August F. Porczeng, Christian S. Williams, Claude C. Wingo; also Harry Wright, Hospital Corps.

CHAFFEE.

MANILA. (Received October 12, 1901—11.17 a. m.)

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

Engagement Balangiga, Samar, September 28: Wounded—Company C, Ninth Infantry, Corpl. James Pickett, wounded in abdomen, serious; Private Henry Claas, wounded in back, serious; Ernest U. Ralston, severe; Henry W. Manire, wounded in arm, serious; John Uhtof, wounded in chest, serious; George E. Meyers, wounded in back, slight; Sergt. John D. Closson, scalp, ear, severe; Albert B. Keller, hip, severe; Charles F. Marak, wounded in arm, moderate; William J. Gibbs, moderate; Cook Melvin M. Walls, wounded in chest, slight; Corpl. Arnold Irish, wounded in shoulder, moderate; Elbert B. De Graffenreid, ear, severe; Clifford M. Mumby, elbow, slight; Sergt. Frank Betron, wounded in thigh, slight; Adolph Gamlin, wounded in head, serious; Richard Considine, elbow, slight; Corpl. Sylvestre Burke, eye, slight; George Allen, finger, slight. All will recover. Died from wounds received in action October 2—Private Cornelius F. Donahue.

CHAFFEE.

MANILA. (Received October 18, 1901.)

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

* * * * *

Forty-six men, Company E, Ninth Regiment, U. S. Infantry, under First Lieut. George W. Wallace, in field Lower Gandara, Samar, were attacked by 400 bolomen October 18. Our loss, 10 killed, 6 wounded, names not received; 81 enemy left dead on field; enemy beaten off.

CHAFFEE.

MANILA. (Received October 19, 1901.)

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

* * * * *

With reference to my telegram of 18th, following casualties Gandara River, October 18, Company E, Ninth Infantry: Killed—George W. Teachout, William H. Ritchie, Edward F. Burns, Carl M. Johnson, William Loftin, Jack Pleoplis, Charlie Wilson, Orville J. Dromgoole. Died from wounds received in action—First Sergt. William F. Gormly, John P. Kelly. Wounded—Martin G. Lyons, lung, wounded in back, serious; Robert L. Hampton, lung, skull, serious; Jack M. Russell, thigh, serious; Henry Stierle, cheek, serious; Eugene Dewitt, wounded in thigh, serious; Frank McAndrew, back head, slight; Musician Charles W. Buck, wounded in shoulder, slight.

CHAFFEE.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
*Washington, October 23, 1901.*CHAFFEE, *Manila*:

What is the situation and what steps have been taken suppress disturbance Samar?

CORBIN.

MANILA. (Received October 23, 1901.)

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

* * * * *

Department need not feel further apprehension serious loss Samar. As soon as additional troops sent there distributed to strengthen small garrisons bolomen will be cautious. Many rumors further disturbance other quarters, but do not regard same as being serious nature. Battalion Twelfth Infantry, 300 marines additional force named cable October 4 to Samar.

CHAFFEE.

MANILA. (Received October 31, 1901.)

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

Following from Brigadier-General Hughes:

"Insurrecto forces Cebu Island have come in, laid down arms in good faith in obedience demand of people for peace—150 rifles, 8 brass pieces, 60 officers, 470 men. Affairs not yet satisfactory Bohol Island; may move additional troops there force settlement. This settles for present at least disturbance hitherto existing Cebu. Further disorder that island will be matter deliberate action by inhabitants as peace may be easily preserved if people disposed do so."

Shall advise Hughes waste no time but move on Bohol immediately.

CHAFFEE.

The following letter from the presidente of Balangiga to the insurgent officer in command of Samar was captured with a large quantity of official papers, in Spanish and Visayan, at the capture of Lucban's headquarters August 25, 1901. These documents were carefully gone over, but this letter was not found until some time after the Balangiga massacre:

Sr. Gral. en Jefe de esta Provincia de Samar:

Como representante de este pueblo de Balangiga, he tenido el honor de exponer á V. que después de haber exigido el parecer de la principales relativo al caso de representarse en el mismo nuestro enemigos, se ha acordado unánimemente tener con estos un trato de política ficticia, como fuera de su agrado, significándole que si la oportunidad permitiera favorablemente, el pueblo se levantará estratagémicamente contra los mismos.

Lo que á V. comunico para su superior conocimiento, suplicando se digne circular á todo el ejército de esta provincia la aprobación favorable si así lo crea conveniente.

Dios guarde á V. muchos años.

Balangiga, 30 de mayo de 1901.

P. ABAYAN, *el Jefe Local*.

[Translation.]

To the General in Chief of this Province of Samar:

As a representative of this town of Balangiga I have the honor to let you know, after having conferred with the principales of this town about the policy to be pursued with the enemy in case they come in, we have agreed to have a fictitious policy with them, doing whatever they may like, and when the occasion comes the people will strategically rise up against them.

This I communicate to you for your superior knowledge, begging of you to make known to all the army your favorable approval of the same, if you think it convenient.

May God preserve you many years.

Balangiga, 30th of May, 1901.

P. ABAYAN, *Local President*.

Note concerning letter of the presidente of Balangiga, stating that if the Americans sent a garrison of troops to his town he would arrange to receive them in a friendly manner and then rise up against them.

Least it may be thought strange by some, seeing that the American authorities had in their possession the aforesaid letter, that special warning was not given the aforesaid garrison at Balangiga and steps taken to prevent the uprising mentioned, it should be stated that the original of the letter in question was captured among a very large quantity of official papers in Spanish and Visayan at the capture of Lucban's headquarters during the latter part of August. This large quantity of insurgent documents was carefully gone through at these headquarters, what appeared to be the most important documents being read first.

The letter in question was not found until sometime in October, and it should be remembered that the Balangiga incident occurred September 28.

ROBERT H. NOBLE,
Captain, Third U. S. Infantry,
Adjutant-General, Fifth Separate Brigade.

[Translation.]

NOTE BY THE OFFICIAL INTERPRETER.

P. Abayan, the treacherous and cruel local presidente of the town of Balangiga, has fulfilled his word, because, four months after having written this letter to General Lucban, he rose with all the people, some 600 men, armed with bolos, and surprised by deceit the American detachment which was in said town, on September 28, 1901, at 6 o'clock in the morning, assassinating 48 soldiers, including 3 officers, and wounding 27, who were able to escape in barotos. This detachment was composed of Company C, Ninth Infantry. God, that God of Armies, who is very just, had willed that the despicable traitor, P. Abayan, together with many of his followers, should have died in that hetacomb that the Americans must not forget. Those valiant soldiers of Company C, who fought 1 against 10 insurgents, may they rest in peace.

F. R. FABIE.

To the local chief of Natividad:

On this date the colonel informs me that with great pleasure he communicates to you for your general knowledge, and satisfaction of all the people, the glorious achievement carried out successfully in the town of Balangiga on September 28, at 7 o'clock in the morning, by the inhabitants, led by the great local leader, assisted by the leading men of the town, and without other arms than bolos, overcoming in less than five minutes the detachment of the enemy, composed of 75 men.

All were killed, including a major, a captain, and a lieutenant, with the exception of 5 badly wounded, who survived and escaped in small boats to the adjacent province of Leyte. We captured all their rifles, 20,000 rounds of ammunition, sabers, and, in short, everything in the barracks of the enemy and in the quarters of the American major. On our part we sustained no loss.

Providential events like these clearly demonstrate the justice of a God, of the forces which are vigilant, and which are aids and a defense for the State which they defend; of a proper and legitimate right in accordance with the positive and natural laws; in reality there was revealed a principle of this war in the town of Balangiga, which to-day has shown praiseworthy behavior, given without hope of reward nor praise, and without ostentation.

A half then, brave compatriots, was the example shown us by the praiseworthy people of Balangiga, procuring the death of all according to justice by certain means and with a happy ending to all our plans.

We desire you to attempt the same thing against the enemy, and with them demonstrate in sight of the nations our dignity, and with them bequeath to our successors, fame and honesty, those successors whom we have made happy with their independence.

For the last, these headquarters comprehending the stoppage of agriculture in this province, decrees that all the inhabitants will not suffer the price of food stuffs to be raised during the course of the war, this in order to protect our present and projected plans.

With entire confidence in your recognized patriotism I hope for great activity, and if possible that you will oblige all inhabitants to plant sweet potatoes, corn, etc., in the places which may be thought convenient, and for this object if it will help you I will extend this order to the head men of the barrios, whom it will be necessary for you to constantly inspect, punishing the first infraction of these orders, which are beneficial for all, and particularly so for each inhabitant of the town or barrio.

From the beginning of this work you will inform me every 15 days regarding the progress thereof for my satisfaction, in the same manner as has been followed regarding the many orders which I have given before during this war.

God keep and guard you.

Given at the headquarters of Samar and Leyte this 6th day of October, 1901.

LUCBAN,
Department Commander.

Note: I have further notice of another attack equal to that just described in one of the neighboring towns (Gandara). The same inhabitants lead by the local chief were engaged in it, and when I receive official confirmation will have the pleasure to immediately give you the name of the town and a description of the fight.

TAGBILARAN, BOHOL, P. I., October 22, 1901.

The ADJUTANT, TAGBILARAN, BOHOL, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

In compliance with verbal orders of the subdistrict commander, I left Tagbilaran on the morning of October 4, 1901, with First Lieut. J. H. Bradford, Nineteenth Infantry, 20 enlisted men of Company L, Nineteenth Infantry, 50 enlisted men of Company M, Nineteenth Infantry, and two privates of the Hospital Corps. We marched to Daus and embarked on quartermaster launch *Philadelphia* and a lorch and proceeded to Loay, where First Lieut. W. W. Fiscus, jr., Nineteenth Infantry, met us with Contract Surg. W. A. Christensen, U. S. Army, 30 enlisted men of Company L, Nineteenth Infantry, 50 enlisted men of Company K, Nineteenth Infantry, and 1 private of the Hospital Corps.

It was necessary to proceed with the launch to Loboc to load rations for this latter detachment.

It was the object of the expedition to proceed to Garcia Hernandez and there establish a base. However the delay in loading at Daus caused by the low tide and the time lost in going to Loboc made us late leaving Loay.

We reached Dimiao about 5.30, and there being some doubt as to whether or not we could get into Garcia Hernandez after dark I decided to stay here for the night.

Dimiao having been for a long time the headquarters of a great number of insurgents headed by the priest at that place, the police force having actually constructed and manned a set of intrenchments in the hills in plain view of the convent, the presidente, under pretext of cutting various weeds, having prepared the road within five hundred yards of the tribunal for an ambush, and the general hostile character of the people, decided me to burn this place.

This was done by First Lieutenant Fiscus and his detachment of Company K. After the town was fired I disembarked the rest of the command, except guards for the boats, and spent the night here.

The 5th was consumed in moving to Garcia Hernandez, establishing ourselves, and a short reconnoissance in the afternoon for the purpose of locating the trails leading into the mountains. We succeeded in capturing a native boy, who said that there were trenches back of this place and that he would take us to them. The morning of the 6th, with Lieutenants Fiscus and Bradford, Contract Surgeon Christensen, and 120 enlisted men and one private of the Hospital Corps, we left Garcia Hernandez to find any trenches that may be in that neighborhood.

We marched all day the 6th and up to about 10 a. m. of the 7th before finding anything; then we ran into the set of trenches we visited last June. This place was now deserted, but showed signs of having been occupied since June. The barracks were rebuilt and new works had been constructed. The main works, however, had become undermined by water and were practically destroyed.

This place was built and manned by the Dimiao police, and supplied by the same place. The outworks were visible from the convent in Dimiao, and I believe that it has really been used by Samson as his headquarters, as he could easily have been warned from Dimiao of any movement of the American troops.

In the afternoon we marched to Valencia, where Lieutenant Bradford and Company L were left for the night while the rest of the command returned to Garcia Hernandez. We had no trouble in going around Punta Gorda. Company L joined us at Garcia Hernandez on the morning of the 8th.

I then thought best to allow the men a day's rest in which to wash their clothing, etc., and I returned to Tagbilaran with the launch and lorch for more rations. Contract Surgeon Christensen came to Tagbilaran, where he was detached from my command.

Having loaded rations for the entire command, I returned to Garcia Hernandez, arriving about 5 p. m., October 9.

It was plain that there was nothing back of Garcia Hernandez, so I decided to move the command to Duero, on the 10th. However, I was anxious to capture, if possible, some of the insurrectos whom I believed were using Duero as their headquarters, so I took Lieutenant Fiscus and details of 15 men from each company on board the launch, left Garcia Hernandez about 2 a. m. of the 10th, and ran into Duero with lights out. This detachment landed about 4 a. m. and succeeded in catching four natives, one of whom, Doroteo Abreu, is a sergeant in the insurgent army, as shown by papers taken off him addressed to the "Sergeant, commanding post of Duero."

I returned to Garcia Hernandez and brought the rest of the command down to Duero, having everything on shore by noon. The launch was then sent to Tagbilaran to report to the subdistrict commander. Abreu, on being questioned, finally admitted that he knew where the insurrectos were intrenched and said that he would take us there.

On the morning of the 11th, with Lieutenants Fiscus and Bradford, and 95 enlisted men of the three companies and 1 private of the Hospital Corps, I left Duero and proceeded on the trail shown us by Abreu. It was misty and cloudy, and about 9.30 a. m. we succeeded in surprising the natives at work on the pitfall in front of Binakayan. (See prefixed photograph marked "A.")

We opened fire on them at 300-yards range, but the mist settled again and everything was obscured; we advanced and ran into a rifle and cannon fire which we could not locate accurately as we could see neither smoke nor flash. However, we continued the advance with steady volley firing until we got into Binakayan. The mist was so thick now that it was impossible to tell anything of our surroundings, I halted and waited for the mist to clear away. When it did both Lieutenant

Fiscus and I were much surprised to find that we were in the lower fort from which we had driven the insurgents a few days previously. They had continued work on it and it was nearly completed. In addition to this we found that the main fort of Mayana, as we understood it, was slightly above us, and we found a new stockade guarding the entrance to a ravine between the hill on which Mayana was built and one nearer to us. We opened fire on the stockade and it was promptly returned with rifles and cannon. I sent a detachment to a high point from which we formerly drove the occupants out of Mayana, and found that this work had carefully been defiladed from this hill and a second line of intrenchments built in rear of the first.

As we afterwards learned the position was as follows: Binakayan in front and the lowest work, Mayana, on the extreme right of their position and the newly discovered stockade in the center. Mayana and Binakayan were outworks of the Verde system, and the stockade guarded the entrance to Verde. It was impossible to approach either from the front. Mayana has a sheer drop of about 200 feet on three sides and the stockade one of about 50 feet in front. Only one narrow trail leads up to them and it is a very difficult climb under the most favorable circumstances. Photographs of these places are prefixed and marked "D."

After carefully reconnoitering the place, I decided that the stockade was the key to the position. Posting detachments where they could fire on the front of all the works, I sent Sergts. C. A. List, Company M, and Frank McMahon, Company K, Nineteenth Infantry, with 20 men to climb the hill to the enemy's left of the stockade. If this could be done the enemy's position would be untenable. The hill was about 300 feet high and the sides almost perpendicular. Some idea of the difficulty may be gained from the fact that it took four hours' steady work to climb it, trails having to be broken through an almost impenetrable undergrowth.

In the meanwhile a slow but steady fire was maintained in front to occupy the enemy's attention, and at intervals a volley or two would be fired. Finally, Sergeants List and McMahon reached the top of the hill and came down in rear of the stockade. They opened fire, but were somewhat handicapped by fear of firing over the stockade into our men.

The surprise was complete. A worse rout could not be imagined. Two natives jumped directly over their stockade and were killed on the rocks below.

Half the detachment followed around the stockade passageway to Mayana, where they drove out the enemy, causing him to run down in front of a detachment of 16 men near there.

They were not 150 yards distant and suffered terribly from our fire. The rest of the detachment went up the ravine and ran into a very large barracks. While there an officer and 3 men came down from Mayana, evidently to remove their papers. They were all killed and I am sure that the officer was either Valmora or Olivares. It was impossible to photograph him as his face was shot away.

We went into Verde and destroyed everything but their correspondence, which has been turned in.




A.—Pitfall in course of construction in front of Binakayan.


There were in this system of fortifications 14 forts and large trenches. Eleven of these had well-built parapets with embrasures for their guns. Besides these 14 there were numerous rifle pits. The place if attacked from the front was almost impregnable, but with our present knowledge of the topography we can with 150 men surround and catch all who go in there again.

We found 8 dead bodies. All the trails and brush around were covered with blood and it is safe to say that a great many more were killed and wounded.

We captured 5 cannon—1 wooden and 1 breechloader. We destroyed the wooden one and brought 3 down with us. The fourth was too large to handle so we buried it in an old rice paddy. In addition we found 2 breechblocks for cannon which we put where they can not be recovered. In addition, 1 Remington rifle in excellent condition and 2 single-barrel shotguns in serviceable condition.



B.—Interior of Binakayan.



C.—Stockade guarding entrance to Verde.



D.—Fort Mayana.

We returned to Duero on the 12th, and the time from then until the arrival of the subdistrict commander in Duero on the 17th was spent in thorough reconnoissance of the country down to Guindulman and far enough back to cover everything but the Bilar range.

The detaching of Company L and our return to Tagbilaran is personally known by the subdistrict commander.

In closing my report, I desire to call particular attention to the excellent conduct of Sergt. C. A. List, Company M, and Sergt. Frank McMahon, Company K, Nineteenth Infantry.

To their energy and courage is due the complete surprise and rout of the enemy behind the stockade guarding the entrance to the whole Verde system.

I will add further that Duero has been completely destroyed except the church and convent.

Very respectfully,

F. G. LAWTON,
Captain, Nineteenth Infantry.

[First indorsement,]

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT OF BOHOL,
Tagbilaran, Bohol, P. I., October 23, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, second district, Department of the Visayas.

The first week Captain Lawton's command was occupied in going over the mountains back of Valencia, Dimiao, and Garcia Hernandez, and nothing except deserted trenches were found here. It was in this range that the two principal headquarters of Samson were situated, "Israel" and "Guadalupe," both of which have been captured and burned. Captain Lawton then reported to me and he was instructed to move his command to Duero and endeavor to locate the position of Monte Verde. How well he did it is shown by his report.

The insurrectos have been driven from every known position held by them from Bilar to Ubay, and the towns that have taken an active part in aiding and abetting the insurrection have been punished.

The consequence is that the insurrectos have lost heart and are coming in and surrendering. About fifty have done so.

A peace commission started yesterday to bring the rest in and seem confident that they will succeed.

As I have reported, the district commander, Captain Lawton, and the officers and men of his command deserve great credit for their work, and Sergeant List, of Company M, and Sergeant McMahon, of Company K, are especially commended for the manner in which they executed the flank attack on Monte Verde.

T. C. WOODBURY,
Major, Nineteenth Infantry.

[Third indorsement,]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
In the Field, Tagbilaran, Bohol, P. I., November 14, 1901.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Division of the Philippines.

Capt. F. G. Lawton and the officers and men of his command are entitled to much credit for the persistent and successful effort made between October 4 and 11 in locating and expelling the enemy from his well-prepared position in the hills of Duero.

R. P. HUGHES,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

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